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.

Washington, February 13, 1918.

Me_more..nd'1Ill•
The Jbjer.t of this memo:ra.ndum is to outline briefly sor:Je Jf
the most

import~nt

points of difference, in substance and

e~Ie:rt,

between the so-called "0al.der BHl'' c...nd the VJar Finance Corporation.
(l)
~nks·

The Calder BUl wuuld give power

to Federal Reser-:e

to rediscount member banks' notes secured by "such bonds or

note;s of any rCLilroad, industrial, public utility

co:rporat~.on

or

municipality ... s the FederCLl Reserve Boc:Lrd upon inves"Ciga.t:i.vn dMms
a proper security for the Federal Reserve Banks to racaive as collateral .. "

aesu~e,

For the purposes of this memorandum, we must

of

course, tha.t if the bill were passed the Feder""l Reserve B.oe.rU. would
permit tl!e· ·rediscount of member

b~:mk

notAs secured by snch col.late.rA.l.

Upon thc:Lt assumption, it is clear that billions of outstanding s:::curities would become directly avta.ilable CLS

eolJ.ater~l

by Feder""l. Reserve Btmks, i:l.nd indirectly av...iiable
Feder... l Reserve notes.

It would not be

ci.

interA~t

or vd th the renewal of mtt turing ob) igi.i.tions, but

ptv.rer of

alre~di outst~nding

differentic:~.tion ~t

would become

....11

~s

the public interest at this '\;ime.

f')j.·

J.~he

~vail~ble

0.<1Jy

c.t ~.. hi:.

wh:Jle

Irk:L >!:;

t:~me·•,

>_,_

with~ut Q~y

to whether or not they-

~re

servinE,

The proceeds of such bo·rrowing

could be used for anything - compatible or




c:~.s S<'~t;U>:"ity

question Jf ufla.1'.ne;

with new· fimLncing "cvmp;4.tibJ.e with the publ.ic

securities

for t:i.dv.-..nces

incompatible~

It is un-

X-740

necessary to
(2)

elabor~te

2

the importance of this point.

Granting that most of the securities covered by the Calder

Bill amP.ndriJent are either unsalci.ble today or could be sold only with
substtmtia.l concessions, even as against the present heavily reduced
prices, the Calder Bill does not have for its object to find a means
of thawing out these frozen securities.

The only solution that the

Calder Bill provides is that holders of securities, either directly
or indirectly, pledge them against advances to be secured from Federal Reserve Banks.

The Finance Corporation, on the other hand, pro-

viues ways and means by which the appeal should be made not exclusively to the Federal Reserve System but to the securities market in general.

By substituting, in effect, the short term bond for the unsale-

able security of industrial corporations, public utilities, railroads
or municiFalities, or by substituting these short term bonds for the
maturing obligations of such corporation, a new security is offered
which will have a general marker, first, because it will be considered
a Government security, and, second, because of the fact that some provision is made, in case of emergency, to use these bonds as collateral
for borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks.
Suppose that an electric company has
million dollars;

m~turing

To make this

p~int

clear:.

bonds amounting to ten

it wants to offer instead a five year electric note

but finds it impossible to place the same.

Under the Calder Bill,all

that could possibly be aone would be to borrow the full amount from
the

Federd.~-

Reserve B.:mk ·

Under the plan of the War Finance

Corpor~-

tion, five year bonds of that corporation would be issued and either




X-'740

tak0n in

'3.Y.C~1 ...i.Y"6'?.

3

by the holders of the old, zr.aturing electric notes,

or the new fi·.re :,rsa':"' short term bonds coC-tld be placed on the zr.arket
and
the

t!~0

pruceeC..s us0d to pay off the maturing notes.

In otiher words,

C0rpard.tion should h"-ve the tendency of reopening the se-

F:i.~1ance

now unsAleable securities, so that new elasticity

curi~y rnar~et

fo~

will be

the securities tr.drket instedd of regarding this mdrket

give~

as hopt::)essly dea.d dnd inst.edd of using the Federdl Reserve System, an
instn1ment credted for the p.cotection of commercidl paper, as a zr.arket
upon

w~ich

to unload unsaleable securities.

(3)

It is safe to conclude from the above thdt the amount of

paper secured by Wur Finance Corporo.tion bonds expected to be rediscounted with Federdl Reserve Banks would be much smaller than the
amount likely to be borrow·ed from the Federdl Reserve System in the
case of the Salder Bill, not only because, in the first case, the absorbing povJer of the security rearket acts as a buffer
the security

zr.~rket

cannot

t~ke

C~.nd

on1y v.rhat

- and what, after that, the banks

cannot carry - wi.J.l go into the Federal Reserve System, but also, as
stated under (1), because the output of the short term bonds by ths
War

Fin<;~.nce

Corporation is restricted to definite purposes of the pres-

ent emergency, while, under the Calder Bill, the only possible

ass~st­

ance would have to come through the Federo.l Reserve System, a.nd all
securities issued during

p~st

generutions

wo~ld

become

a.vail~ble

as

collateral without a.ny scrutiny t..s to the objects for which they have
been issw.3<.i.




"' ...

x.rf40

(4)

4

If we hb.ve these points clearly in mind, it is incompre-

hensible why the hue and cry of inflation should be raised agciinst the
Fincince Corporation by the very people who, apparently, are in favor of
the Cb.lde r Bill·

As a matter of fact, as above stated, we would have

to expect a much larger degree of inflation under the

Cc;~.lder

under the proposed Vlar Finance Corporation legislation.

Bill than

Are we not

driven to the logical conclusion that these critics of the Vib.r Finance
Corporation bill are opp'Jsed to it because it restricts infJ.ation so
much more tho..n the Calder Bill rather than becciuse they are generb.lly
apprehensive of too much inflation to be ca.used by the contemplated
legislation 7

?i;;l.u1 M.




Warburg~