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- For releci.se in morning papars
Frida.y, Saptember 23, l9Zl.

•
. "THE t.ED'ERAL ni;SERVE SYSTEM ... WHAT IT IS Aln> WHAT I'l IS NOT."
·Address by

W. P. G..

HARDL~

. GOVERNOR~ FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD

at the
"MADE-IN-QAROLlNAS 11 EXPOSITIOU

at
CHARLOTTE, N.. C•

.September




2~,

1921.

994

..
X-32~

.'i:

·,,
~

'

·.;

THE J'ED.IRAL RIS!RVi S'fSTEM -

IHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT.

Nearly aeYen years have elapsed since the establishment of the
Federal Res..

ve Banks ani

yet there is still a surprising lack of

knowledge of what they really are and of wbat their proper functions
are, not only on the part of the public but among bankers as well •
•
Much has been said and writteJl reaardin& them~ which 1$ oalc'l.lla.ted to
create entirely wrong iDtreseiona and .while it ia

1~~pose1ble,

in the

brief space of time whioa can properly be allotted to a public address,
to enter into an elaborate 4iecusaion of the subject, I shall endeavor
this afternoon to describe concisely the character aDd some of the 4ia:tinctive

tunctioua ·of the Federal Reserve Banks 'and of the Federal

Reserve System.
The Federal Reaerve Act,

~hiob

is responsible for the existence of

the Fe4eral ReseJ"Ye Board and the Fe4eral Reserve Banke, was approved
on December 2J,
Congress.

1913;

and;

has, at variou• times since, been amended bf

The qenc1J3nts, lor the .m.ost part, haYe been the result of

. suggestions made by the Federal Reserve Board and were designed to render
the Act more effective,
The general purpoaea of the Act are outlined in its caption or
short title, which is as followa:
"An Act 'to prGvide for the establishment of
Federal reserve banke, to furniah an elastio currency1 to affor4 meana of rediscounting commercial
paper, to establish a more effective supervision of
banking in the United States, apd for other purposes."




X-3202

- 2 The need for a more efficient banking system in the United States
had been felt for many years.

Ever

sin~e

the year 1890 the subject was

one which was discussed frequently at bankers' conventions and at gatharings of commercial bodies, but the event which gave great
movement for banking reform along constructive lines was
1907.

imp~tus
th~

to the

panic of

The following year Congress created a Monetary CommissionJ wllich

after a long and thorough study of the banking systems of the world nubmitted an exhaustive report.

During the years 1911 and 1912 a committea

of the House of Representatives 1 commonly known as the

11

Pujo Cornmittee" 1

investigated banking methode in this country and submitted a report.
With this wealth of information in hand 1 Congress. early in the year
1913 took up the matter of banking reform in earnest and the Federal

Reserve Act was put upon the statute books before the close of the year.
This Act is universally admitted to be a great constructive piece
of legislation and is applauded b9th by friends and critics of t_he
Federal Reserve System, by those who understand the Act as well as
those who do not.

It is,because so many have no real conception of the

purposes or meaning of the Act that there has been eo much criticism
of its administration.
The Federal Reserve Act did not estab+ish a central bank.
contrary~

On the

it made possible the establishment of as many as twelve Federal

Reserve Banks1 each almost wholly independent of the others in operationJ
as well as in local policies.

From a legal standpoint these banks are

private corporations, organized under a special act of Congress, namelyJ
the Federal Reserve Act.

They are not in the strict sense of the word

Government banks 1 but are only quasi-Governmental institutions 1 in that



... 3 they are under the general supervision of the Federal Reserve B':lar:! a:1d
have on their boards of directors three men, representing the Gvvem'illln't,
who are

a~pointed

by the Federal Reserve Board.

Eaah bank has nine directors and the other six are choson by the
member banks, which are the sole stockholders of the Federel
Bank.

The law does not permit the Federal Reserve Banks to

P~£~rve

ccmpet~

f o1·

business with each other or with the national banta, state banks

&~

trust companies of the country.

depos~.ts

They are not allowed to receive

from. the public and can accept deposits only from their

~mber banks~

from the United States Government and, solely for the purposes of exchange
or collection, from non-member banks or trust

companies~

They are not

allowed to make loans or advances direct to the public, but can ler.d only
to the United States, to their member banks and, subject to certain
~onditions,

for periods not exceeding six months, in anticipation of

the collection of taxes or the receipt of assured revenues, to states#
counties~

municipalities and other political subdivisions in the

United States.
rn lending to their UBmber banks Federal Reserve Banks are not
permitted by law to use the same discretion that is allowed national banks,
state banks and trust companies, but they must observe the limitations
prescribed by law as to the character and maturity of the notes offered
them by member banks for discount.

Except as to notes, drafts and bills,

drawn or issued for agricultural purposes or baaed an live stock,

~hich

a Federal Reserve Bank may discount for a member bank if the maturity
does not exceed six months, a Federal Reserve Bank can not discount any
paper which has longer than three months to run, exclusive of days Pi
grace,




c· ~-':~""-~
X-3202

- 4The law puts a limitation also upon the character of, a note which
a Federal Reserve Bank may discount for a member bank.

A Federal Reserve

bank may make advances to its member banks on their promissory notes.,
for a period not exceeding fifteen days, provided, such promissory notes
are secured by the deposit or pledge of bonds or notes of the United States 1
or by notes, drafts and bills of exchange or bankers• ccceptances which
are themselves eligible for rediscount or purchase by a Federal Reserve
Bank.

To be technically eligible for rediscount a note must be endorsed

by a member bank, its maturity must be withint the time limit prescribed
by law and it must have been issued or drawn for agricultural, industrial
or commercial purposes, and it must also be shewn that the proceeds of
the note have been used or are to be used for such purposes.
Federal Reserve Banks are forbidden by law from discounting notes,
drafts or bills, covering merely investments, or issued or drawn for the
purpose of carrying or trading in stocks, bonds or other investment
securities, except bonds and notes of the Government of the United States.
The Federal Reserve Act, as amended, has changed both the amount
and character of the reserves which all national banks and state member
banks must carry against their deposit liabilities.
of

years~

For a long period

it has beenthe practice of American banks to carry as a reserve

in cash and on deposit with other banks, a certain prop·ortion of their
deposits.

Before the passage of the Federal Reserve Act, the national

banks in the three central reserve ei ties were required to keep in their
own vaUlts as reserve in gold or lawful money an amount equal to 2'5% of
their net deposits 1 and in other cities and towns they were required to
keep a part of their required reserves in cash in their own vau1 ts




ij.,..i' ,._...

~~·

X-J202

*

-5·
a. pArt on deposit with other banka.

!'be laws regarding the reaerfM

of state banks varied in the different states.

Under the FederEU. Reserve

Act the percentage of reserve required has been substantially reduced~ and
iu6mber
as amended 1 no national bank and no stat~bank is required to keep any
definite amount of cash in its own vaults and whatever amount of cash is
kept on hand by 1be member banks6 as deemed necessary by the judgment and
experience of their

officers~

does not count as part of the banks 1 lawful

reserve.
The entire legal reserves of all member banks must be kept on deposit
with the Federal Reserve Banks.

As a consequence 1 the cash resources of

the Federal Reserve Banks are necessarily very· large and their holdings of
gold 1 in particular, constitute a very large proportion of all the gold tn
the country.

The gold held by the Federal Reserve Banks is equal substan-

tially to all the gold that might have been held by all the banks throughout the country if there had been no Federal Reserve Banks established.
As the Federal· Reserve Banks are made

the sole custodians of the legal

reserves of all member banks; the object of Coxtgress in throwing safeguards

and limitations around "their loan transactions is evident.

It is necessary

that Federal Reserve Banks should keep themselves in a "liquidtt

position~

that is, their bills discounted must be of short maturity and should be
readily collectible.

The strength of the entire banking system of the

United Stater:s ia directly related to the strength of the Federal Reserve
Banks.

If a Federal Reserve Bank should find itself in a

weak~

over-

extended or unsafe position1 all its member banka would be directly affected •
.,.lac~:i

While Congress has--- · ·--- upon the Federal Reserve Board the responsibility of defining eligible paper 1 within the




mean~1g

of the Federal

..

:

X-32Cl2

- 6 Reserve Act, it has entrusted the management of the Federal Reserve Banks,
under the general supervision of the Federal Reserve Board, to their own
directors.

Ea~h

FederaReserve Bank has power to appoint1 by its board

of directors, such officers ar.d employees as are not otherwise provided
for in the Federal Reseri/'e Act ani to define their duties, to prescribe
by-laws, not inconsistent with the law, regulating the manner in which its
general busiressmay be conducted, and to exercise, by its board of directors,
or duly authorized officers or agents, all powers specifically granted by
law and such incidental .powers as may be necessary to carry on the bus5.ness
of banking within the limitations prescribed by law.
Each Federal Reserve Bank is conducted under the supervision and
control of its board of directors, who are charged by law to perform the
duties usually appertaining to the office of directors of banking associations and to administer the affairs of the bank fairly and impartially and
without discrimination in favor of or against any member bank or banks and,
subject to the provisions of law and the orders of the Federal Reserve Board,
to extend to each member bank such discounts, advancements and accommodations
as may be safely and reasonably made with due regard for the claims and
demands of other member banks.
The Federal Rese1·ve Board does not appear to be authorized by law to
pass upon the paper which is offered for discount to Federal Reserve Banks.
This is a function which must be exercised by the directors of the Federal
Reserve Bank or by their duly authorl.zed officers or agents.

While the

law ·does not prescribe any fixed limit as to the amount of loans that a
Federal Re·serve Bank may make to a member bank, it does require that due
regard must be given to the claims and demar.ds of other member banks, that



- 7 is~

to their possible needs for credit

acco~nodation.

It also provides

that a Federal Reserve Bank must extend to each member bank such discounts
and accommodations as may bs "safely and reasonably made" ... This means
that the directors of a Federal Reserve Bank ani the officers appointed
by them must exercise their best judgment in granting discount a.ccon:rro'dations.

They must assure themselves that the discounts

are such as

can be safely made., and reasonably made., with duEJ regard to •the pO!:;sible
requirements of other member

ban~s

which may ask for accommodations

later on.
This discretion is not vested in the Federal Reserve Board and the
reason for this is probably tv.-o-f old.
is not a central bank.

First: the Federal Reserve System

It is a regional system comprising twelve banks.

Congress did not intend that there should be a centralized control of
credits.

Second:

in a country embrasing so vast an area as the United

States., it would be a very difficult task, if not an

impossibility.~

for

a central Board to pass intelligently upon the security of the paper
offered ior discount, which must necessarily come from all sections
of the

~ountry.

I have already called yourattention to the fact that Federal Ro:::.wve
Banks are not permitted by law to make loans direct to individuals, L
or corporations, and that they can only rediscount paper which bears
endorsement of a member bank.

c~:.u

~he

It is evident) therefore) that in orde;:·

for a Federal Reserve Bank to render financial assistance to those
engaged in commerce or indus-.:. ry., in agriculture or in the raising of
live stock, the loans must first be negotiated with member banks. There
are· many loans1 however, which member banks may legally and properly
make >Yhi ch can not be rediscounted with Federal Reserve Batl}(s for the



- g ...

reason that the

as

eligible.

l~w

does not edmit of the classification of such

p~rer

A Federal Reserve Barik, therefore, can not disCOU"l.t
.. any paper

however good it may be, which is not technically eligible under the
terms of the Federal Reserve Act. and, on the other hand, it is entirely
within its rights in declining to discount notes which, even-though

.

technicall7 eligible, are not satisfactory from a credit standpoint •
While the Federal Reserve

~ct

was intended to strengthen the bank-

ing system of the United StJ:Otes and to provide ready means of rediscountin!Z certain classes of paper., it is e.lso the evident intention of the

Act to disturb as little as possible the business of the member and
non-member banks, or their

deelin~

with their customers.

There is nothing

in the Federal Reserve Act which gives either the Federal Reserve
Board or a Federal Reserve Bank eny control over the loan polieyrof
any rr.ember bank.

A Reserve Bank cannot compel a merriber bank to make

a loan which it does not desire to make nor restrain it from making a
loan which it wishes to make even though it is forbidden by law.
I have already explained that a Federal Reserve Bank cannot lend
directly to the customers of· a member bank, nor does it, in fact. take
the initiative in making loans to a member bank for the purpose of
enabling the member bank to distribute the funds so advanced to its
customers.

The Federal Reserve Bank lends to the member bank against

trans.actions alreedy made, for the purpose of enablin~ the member bank
to restore its reserva to the legal requirement, after the reserve has
been impaired or is about to be impaired because of increased loans
and deposits.
I know that there is a very general popular udsconception regarding•



X-3032

- 9this and I think that some of the n:ember banks are responsible for this
misunderstanding, although~ I am sure~ they ha.Ye not been actuated ,by
'

malicious motives.

I have been in the banking business myself and I

think that I know something of banking psychology.
~mit

do not like to

Banks.. as a rule.

to customers that they are short of loanable funds

nor do they like to arouse

e~ty

in declining to make loant or in asking

for a reduction of a. loan e.lready ma.de.
I know thPt there are some bank officers w·ho are able frankly to ·
decline an e:ppltcation for a loan in a way which leaves no sting, but
which on the contrary gives-the applic~nt the impression that therejection of his application is a f~vor to him.
ha.ve such tact.

"But not

I? 11

bank•. officers

Some are frl?nk enough but their bluntness hurts the

feelings of the would-be borrower.

It is not unusual, therefore, for

bank officers in declining loans to look for .,a buffer, or some one to
whom they can "pass the

buc~.

~s ~ede

e~pacity.

useful in this

In the old days, the board of directors
By way of illustration I

~

going to

tell you a story which~ told me by ~naative of North Carolina and who,
by the wey., was one of the best citizens that the Old North State ever
ga.ve to /llabama, the

Honor~.ble

Joseph F. Johnston, who we.s Governor of

.Alabama for two terms and who died some years ago while he was a Senator
of the United States.
He w~:~s formerly president of a bank in Birmingham and he used to
enjoy telling this joke on himself.

It seems that one day a man, who.m I

shall call Jones, who had no credit res-ponsibility and no·.-v:isible means
of sup-port, but who was an all-around good fellow end had some little
:politiGJal influence in local elections* came into the bank and wanted to
borrow ~300.



Governor Johnston asked him whet collateral he had.

X-3202
- 10-

"Well", said Jones,

11

1 haven't got any.

If I had any collateral I

would sell it end I would not wtmt to borrow r=>.ny money".
"Well a, Governor Jomston said, "Who is going to endorse your paper

for you't"
Jones replied, "I do not know anybody who will endorse my paper.

I

want to borrow it on my own name·"
Governor Johnston wa.s

wr
the

will tell you
money~

wh~t

~nxious

I will do.

not to offend the fellow, so he said,
I cannot promise offhand to let you have

but I Hill see our directors about it end if they approve the

loan I will be verv g:lad to rtr-lke it for you".
directors ?nd they all
so Jones got busy

~nd

~d

offices in the business section of the town,

went ero,·nd and sew each one of the directors of the

bank and he ascertained <:!lso
~he

-

There were only seven

v.

'r

'-he next directors' rr:eeting would be held ..

day following the (irectors' meeting Jones came in with his note all

filled out Pnd said:
"ftll rig~, here ~ is my note.

Let me have the rr.oney".

Governor Johnston seid, "I ron very sorry, my- friend, I cannot make the
loan; the directors turned it down".
"WhPt", Jones exclaimed, "Did they turn thr=>t loan down"7
"Yes, they did".
"Well", s::>id Jones, "Th~t is very queer.

I saw Mr• .A and Mr. I:; I

sew evary one of the directors, and they all s2id I could have the money.
All of them were in favor of it".
~.Well", Governor Johnston s 2id, "I cannot hel:P what they told yoo;. I

brought the matter up at the ali rectors

1

meeting and they all voted to turn

it down".
"Well", Jones replied, "ftll I have to

s~y,

Governor Johnston. is that

personally and seperatsly you: directors are a very clever set of men. but
collectively they are the bigpest liars in Dirminghe.nl'-




- 11 X-3202

In these days, however, banlz- officers find in the Federal
R.eserve Board or the

Federa~.

""'"' rve Bank a rr,uch more satisfactory

buffer than a local board of directors.

wr :r:?

1 mow of Tany cas :,s

banks have found it very convenient to uass the buck to the F3dera1
Reserve Bank or the Feaeral Reserve Board, and rave stated to a
borrower or would-be borrower that they
asked f u.:
~ermit

01

it.

wouldp.l~s

to grant the extension

make the loan desired, but the Federal Tie serve would not
Such a procedure has a tendency to relieve the situation

as far as the local barik is concerned but it is certainly unfair to
the Federal Reserve System.

This evasion of responsibility ras

subjected the Federal Reserve Banks to augreat amount of unjust
criticism and has given the public a wrong impression of the authority
and attitude of the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal ~eserve Board.

It has aroused indignation ·which is entirely natural. in the circurr:-

stances and has caused rnuch correspondence with the Federal Reserve
Board direct and with Congressmen and United States Senators, whose
ire has been aroused because of these

alleb~d

arbitrary methods.

It is entirely true trat a Federal Reserve Barik, mindful of its
resvonsibility under the law and acting in accordance with the dictates
of ordinary banking prudence, rray have bad occasion to call the attention of some of its larger

··oorrow·ing banks to their ~. . . . . .
''

discount lines, which have run in some cases over
<

without. being reduced, and have cc:~.lleci
:.

.

.

banks.to. the necessity

-

th,e

'.

1

a.c,' "~tioi of y;:Q.rs,

,--;··-

t
ditton~ion
1

cil wdtlung th~msul\tos in\o

&

of t~ borro;Jing
strongor position

But in no cd.SJ wttt.iu d:e k1o·vl0dg0 of ·t..l<.~ :F..t.;...H'd.l Reserve Boar<l has
any F~ieral Res.fr·le; Bd:.k u:':..ic:ttakm to ~·dy
pc:~.rticular



~0 a tiiefubJt bank wba.t

loans it should call or ask to ~vo l'J~UCoi.

~

- 12 X-3202.

I will give you a concrete example.

In anotaer state, not in
,,

this Federal Reserve District, there is a national bank \vb.ich has
for a long time beun a large and continuous borrower at the Federal
Reserve

B~,

the amount of its red.iseounts being several times greater

than its capital stock and. its fair proportion of the loanable funds
of tb.e Reserve Bank.

It sec ..s that this bank has made frequent

promises to roduco its discount line to a more reasonable sum, but as
it collected notes it would cons'tantly send in otllers for rediscount.
t~t

I hold in my band a notice

this bank appears to have beJn

senling to soma of its borrowing customers, which roals as follows:
"Your note for $_ _ _falls d.U:o - - - - ·"OUr FEDERAL RESERVE BANK owns this noto, having rediscountoJ.
it for us,

As i t has bo.;n r(.)ruwod several times, t.uoy are INSISTING ON

A PAYMENT of $____ or more.

It is A.BSOLUTELY NECESSARY to arrange

this note on th0 day of its maturity.

Yours truly.

Casi:l.L1r.

11

The Casaior of this Bc:l.nk recently wrote the Federal Rcsorvu

Bar~~~

as follows:
"We wish to assure you that we appruciate your help an-i could not
have gotten along without it.
t.uan you are to have us io it,

we

are more anxious to reduce our line

To show you howmiesirous we arc to get

our line d.oNn I wn enclosing a. notice w.uicb. we have lately gotten out
anJ.

whlch is proiucing exccller. . li results. ---- Now be patient with us

just a little

long~r

and we will show you

to a Nspectabla size,

th~t

we can reduce our lino

we thank you just the same.

11

To this the Fedoral Reserve Bank replied promptly:
"We aro plaa.sed to note froo your letter of. Septeober 9th that
you anticipate



bcin~

ablo before very long to materially

redu~o

your

- 13 X-3202

large borrowings from us
t~t

a

inj;rc;~.d.u.:a.l

you are justifiad in son1ing a

w~

I'OCinniJr.
notic~

do not, b.ow;;ver,

f.;~l

to borrowing customers

as per the form which you onclosod, as it makes sta.tuments that ar.J
entirely uncalled for.
with us and which

The

~:apors

acc~pt..:c'

w0

that you hl::l.vo bad under Ndi$count

'""'; being 3ligi ble in oricr to extend

to you nvc·_:ei c;;a.iii, NpNs.3nt +oa.ns

t~t t~

officurs of your oanl;:

h.:a.ve passed upon from the stcl.nipoint of the ere-lit worth involvel,
an.l, no douct, witil
W.C.Cn

~Ue,

t~e

considerc;o.tion as to t.c.eir collactib.ility

and, therefore, Wh3n t.c.e timo

CO~CS

for making colluction,

it would souc that, ooing conversant wit.c. local conditions, w.:a.ys
and moans for

~kin3

colliJction coull ba

devise~

by the same

officors wi tnout laying t.c.c. buru.on upon tho FJicr<.<.l Rosorvo B.::..nk.
This Bank has nover sot forth to your institution whd.t loans it
shoula or should not make, nor has it stated

t~t anyparticul~r

nota or notes tllat it bas held under ro.iiscount from your bank should
oc collected.
purio~

Wa havo

ext~nded acco~dation

which, in our opinion, was the timo

order to aid your

c~tomcrs

in

th~ir

to you over a long

wh~n

credit was needed

i~

commercial, iniustria.l a.nd

agricultural operc:Ltions. b' - w.b.an the b.d.rvesting and marketing period
arrived a.nd t.c.ere sccmod to
ings, w..;

d.;;:.n:n~d

~

_ 1.i ttlc or no reduction in your borrow-

it a.dvisa.ble to bring to your d.tt;;.;ntion tu.;;

d~:sLci.-

bility of efforts oeing made to get out from your seriously c::.ct.3ndcl
position.

Tho dJsirod

your

iniivid~l

your

dir~ctors

~unt

customers is

of

curt~ilmont

~matter

tbat should be

wor~d

out oy

and officers, they bearing in mind tho oxtcnded

position of your institution and its safety.
tlld.t you discontinue



in tho indcbtJdnoss of

c~.t

W+J would. ask t.uorcforo

once using t.ll.c fon:. of notice :t;ofcrr;.;c.l. to

- 14 X-3;;;02

and tbd.t

yo,~

also rocall the noticos. of a similar tenor that have

a.lr,;Ji:Ld.y oevn sont to your customers."
To this tho meteor

oa~k

replied:

"Your lott0r of tno lOth instant wa.s received this morning.
~ny

Fortunately wo had not issued
~v0

of the notices in question and

dustroyc:i tno entire su}ply.

.AJn sorry the incidGnt occurrod.

11

No J.ouJt tn:.! Fc:iera.l R.:;serve Board. will receive many complaints
growing out of tills incidJnt.
Tr..ere is

por~ps

even

gre.;~.ter

confusion in t.h3 public mind

rog.;;.rdiu§; the issuu of FvJ.erd.l Reserve Notes tl4m tr..ere is regarding
the rediscounting functions of tne FeJ.eral Reserve Banks.

T~e

im-

pression seews to prevd.il very generally that the Federal R0scrve Board
~s

poNor to expd.Ud or contract the currency of tne country at will

and

so~e

oelieve that it

aroitrary manner.
3o61.rJ.

s~ll ~ve

.!lciS

exercised this powor in a.

Wnile th3 law prescribes

th~t

r~ckloss

and

tne Federal Reserve

the right, cl.Ctin g through the Federal Reserve Agent,

to grdnt in whold or in part or to reject entirely the application of
ar1y

Fed3ral Reserve

B~

0xercis3l this right.

for Federal Reserve Notes, it bas never

on the contrd.ry, it hcls always approved

prorr.ptly ev.;;ry appliccl.tion wnicn has been :rrJa.J.o for th() issue of
Federal Reserve Notes.

on~

of the p,brposes of the Federal Reserve

Act, as stdtcd in its caption, is to furnis.u an elastic cur runcy'. out
there ar8 ffidnyWhose idea of oldsticity is continuous stretching.
Currency to be really elastic

must be susceptiole of expar1sion

or t:ae reverse. as t:Oe needs of industry ar1d. com:nerco IDi::l.Y require.
Many believe t.c.at there was

d.

preordained contrd.ction of the currency

luring the y.aar 1920, determined upon in order to reduce ];:rices.



- 15 X-3202
The

f~cts,

wnich cct.rt oe readily

ascertGin~d

from the figures which

were puolisned every we0k during the year 1920,
impression is

~osolut~ly

unwarranted.

s~ow t~t t~is

·

Tliw Federal Reserve Boari

said in its Anrruct.l Report for 1919:
11

Tnc expansion of credit set ill ruotior;. oy tr..e war must oe

checked.

cr~ait

must be brought undor effective control and its

flow be once more regulated and governed with caruful regard to tho
econorrdc welfare of the country and the needs of its producing
inJ::.:;.s tries.
and

ct.

Defla.tion, however, merely for the so.k.3 of deflation

speeJ.y return to

11

noi'l1ld.l" - deflation merel;)' for the sake of

r.astoring security Vct.lu-3s "' .d. cnr.:unodi ty pric0s to their prewar
levels without regard to other consequences, would bo an insensate
procee;iing in tile existing posture of nation.:.l cmd world affct.irs.
It said also

i~

11

tDat report:

"It must never bo forgotten toot productive industry is profoundly affected by cNdi t conditions.
credit.

one of its lifo-giving

MoJ.ern business is do:1e on

principl~s

is credit.

T~

mood

and tempt::r of t.ue businuss cormnuni ty ar.: deeply c.tffected by
state of credit and mct.y edsily be

d~sturbed

t~e

by ill-considered or

precipi. tate action.-.. ,Too ra-pid or too drastic defla.tion would J._;i vat
the very purpose of

ct. well-r~gulated

credit system oy the needlGss

unsettlement of mind it would produce and the disdstrous reaction
that such unsGttlement would have uponFroJuctive
and drastic deflation is not, therafore,
a policy of further u.Xpdnsion.
only to disaster .;1nd must



L

industr~

Radicdl

"in contempld.tion, nor is

Either course would in the 0nd lead

c be pormittad. to develop.

our economic

-16X-3202

and financial position is essentially strong.

There need oe no

occasion for apprehension as to our ability to effect the transition
from war-time to peace-time conditions if reasonable safeguards
against the abuse of credit ar0 respected,

Tnero is, however, no

need for precipitate action or extreme measures.

Extremes must be

avoided, t.b.\3 process of adjusting the volume of credit to a no:I'IIl.ll
basis should bo effected in an orderly manner, and its rapidity must
be governed by conditions and circumstances as they develop.

Much

,will depend upon the cooperation of t:O.c business and general comrnunity.

Indeed without such cooporation progress can be nei thor rapid nor sub;stantial.

Much will depend also upon the rapidity with which t:O.O

unabsorbed portion of the outstanding issues of war securities passes
into

th~

hands of pCFillancnt holders.

As the national debt is tbus

absorbed and as it is reduced tnrough toe operation of the sinking
fund, t.u.e loan accounts of too banks SL.Ould be reduced corNspond.ingly
until t:U.e proper balance betwecin t.lle volume of crcdi t and tue volume
of concrete things, whic.ll crodi t h13lps to produce and whico. aro thu
normal basis of credit, is NstorocL

Tnis equilibrium, it cannot

be too frequently or too emphGtically stated, .can be restored only
by speeding up the processes of production, by the orderly J.istribu-

tion of goods, by the avoidance of wasteful consumption, and by the
increas~d accumul~tion

process0s upon which
B~nks

rr:rust depend.

tuos~

procssscs

Effic~cious




~t

of savings.

th~

TnosG arc

tn~ fund~£ntal

proper functioning of tnc Federal Reserve

The Federal Reserve System
it can not of itself and

action along

economic

th~se

Ccln

~lone

do ruucb. to assist
compel them.

lines involves the intelligent ani

- 17 X-320t:earnest cooperation of t:U.J
tho Fuderal Reserve

,simss and general community.

Bo~rd wil~ ~lways

deponlence of credit

~•d

\Vnile

oe mindful of tile inter-

industry and of tile influence axerted on

prices by tne general volume of credit, tnu Board nevertheless CaQ
not assume to oe an arbiter of industry or prices.
as t.n.:l

i,~rdian

Its

prir~ry

duty.

of t.ne Nation's ultimate be:alking reserve, is to see

tb.d.t tnG bi:l.l'1ks under its supervision function eff\Jctivcly ani :properlyas reserve banks."
It is not tne function of

t~

Federal Reserve System or of

any banking system to atter.1pt to fix or control prices.

B:.il'lks ar..;

conc;,;rned vvi t.l:l prices only in so fa..r a..s the security of tJ.leir loans
lilcl.Y be involved, and t:aey are interested more in the sta.bi.lity of

prices and tueir margin of collateral than in t.lle' price level itself.
Banks do not create general conu.i tions, but

t~y

must adjust t.J.emsclves

to clld.nging conditions, wnich, in the recent ev .mtful ::;onths, .ilave
been brougnt about by til.; ir _Jsis tible force of popular sentir.::ent

throughout tne world.
Tnere wa.s mt only no
d~ring

the year 1920

contr~ction

but on

tr.~

in Federal Resdrvv Note currency
ot!ler .hd.ni

th~

total voluw·J

of Federal Reserve Not0s Ll' c.trcula.tion silows an -...lmost continuous
upward trend during tJ.Jo.t y0ar, rising frorr. $£:,
to $3,404,000,000
time

t J....;

~n

8~:t4,

000,000 on J'-'r.!U.6.ry 23rd,

December 23rd, a Ncord high r.kl.rk.

Sincu t.u.a.t

volume of F.Jderet.l Reserve Not;:;s in circul.:.tion ila.s been

gred.tly reduced, until on Szpt<Jmb::;r 14, 19-dl it stood a.t $2,491,651,000.
I wisil to rei terdte that n3i t.a.ar tee increaso r,or t:.o .i0cre.::1so in
volume of Fadoral R3survo Not0s outstanding is tu~ r0sult of any



·~L....;

- 18 -

X-3202

preordained policy or premeditated d0sign, for tho volume of Federal
Rcservo Notes in circulation

d.cp~nd.s

ontirely upon the activity of

business, and upont.aa kind of activityw.uic:O. calls for currency
ratuer than book credits.

As I

dlrGady stat0d. one of, the

~ve

purposes of t:ne ]\;deral Reserve Act was to provide a3:1 elastic
curr~nc~

Unit0d States notes, or legal tenders. are required by

law to remain at

d

fixed amount, $346,681,016.

are secured by Government bonas and
qualities of elastic

currenc~

t~ese

T:O.eir

National Bank note$

notes do not

vol~

:aas

n~var

~ve

the

depended upon

the actual need for currency so much as upon tue price of Government
bonds wn.ic.o. .aave tne circulation privilege and the.rc .aas been only a
moderd.te cbd.nge in t..a.e volume of National Bank Notes outstanding for
severd.l years past.

Federal Reserve Notes, on the contrary, are

distinctly elastic.

T.a.cy may be issued to Federal Reserve Banks

against collateral in an amount equal to the sum of the Federal Reservo Notes applied for, w..a.ic.o. collateral security is

requir~d

to

be notes and bills discounted or acquired by the banks, or gold or
gold certificates.

The

lawprovid~s

furt:nor that eacn FedvrGl

R~serve

Bcink snall maintain a reserve of forty per cent in gold against its
Federal Reserve Notes in actUcll circulation.

As

~1 evid~ncc

of

tn~

eld.S tic qu.:Ui ty of Federal Reserve Notes rna.y be cited the fact that
on April 1, 19l'i tne tot02.l outstanding was

$357,239,000; on August 1,

1919 t~e total amount outstanding LGd increased tv· $2,506,820,000 and,
as

nas

just been stated, tae rnaximum amount ever in

$3,404,000,0001 was rcac.aed

Oll

December 23, 1920, altnoug.o. :pric3S i:J.aJ.

dlready begun to decline several montns before



circulation~

t~t

dd.te.

-lSX-3202

Since the first of the present year t.u.e loans of the Federal
Reserve B~nks to tneir membJr banks decreosed
~ t
a.•JOU

~d as the notes discounted witn Feieral Reserve

$1 1 200 , 000 , 000

Bru~

up to September 1st

nave been paid off Federal Reserve Note currency nas come
of.~

back to the banks and in tne absence
been reissued.

U,pon

deposited to secure

p~ymen~

co~~rci~l

of

Federa~ :P:"'~

2rve

ei tner an imr:ncdiate return of an
bank or an dUtowatic

de4dnd for it, has not

~fotes,

equiv<;~lent

increase in t.ue

av...ilable for tL,;,eir reJemption..

paper which nas been ·
t.uere necessarily results
ar.aount of notJs to tn,:;

percent~ge

of golJ reserve

Federal Reserve Notes are not legal

tender, nor J.o t.u.ey count as reserve moriey for member banks.
are issued only as .... need. for tc.em develops and

Q.S

they

Tc.ey

becor~e

rc-

dundc:mt in any locality t.aey are ret'J.rned for creJ.i t or for rau.emption
to t.ue Federal Reserve Banks or to t.ue Treasury o.t Was.nL1c;;ton.
t~ere

tl.4i:in
ru~d

T.._us,

cannot be at any time more Fed.er<.il Reserve Notes in circul ..... tio."
t.ue needs of tne country C:!-t tne prevailin€; level of prices

wa3es

stan~ing

re~uire,

and as

t~e

deillcind abates tna volume of notes out-

will be corraspondingly reduced tnrougu

reJ.emptio~

T~e

iucredsed volume of F3d3ral Reserve Notes in ci:r:-cula.tion from 1917
to the end of t.ue yea_r 1':320

w~s,

in so far

<;~,S

it

Wd.S

not t.ue result

of direct excnanges for gold and gold certificdtes, tne effect of
as
advanging wages and prices , :.J. DOt t.ueir cause, just
t.ae reduction
wJ::Ucll .na.s taken pl<.ice during t.ne present

;yec:~.r

is t.ue result of lo·'iur

prices. ~•~l s;na,ller volur..:e of business, rCA.t.G.er t.:..:m t.ueir ccms.:;.

more fu.lly employed c:.nl as productioa increases



~nd

d.istribution

1Ci3
X-3202
becomes more active, tbare follows a demand for greater discount
accoilJlJ::;Odations and a. need for more currency, dlld t.l:le incred.sed volume
of discounts furnisnes a means of providing t~~ increased vol~ of
currency required..
As long as Fe.iaral Res~rve notes c;a.re r3del.3mable ;in gold .:and t:O.e
ID4intGined~

r0quired reserves are

it is difficult to

s~e ~w

tnere

can be any inflc;a.tion of tue currency growing out of tne issue of
F-3derc;a.l Reserve HotcJs.

Tne .notes

Cl;a!l

only be issued in exc£iange for

gold or gold certificates or against t40 security of commercial paper
w.nicn

first

A;i.S

inflC~.tion

J.iscount0a. wi t.h some

be~n

w.aich now axis ts L
a.~

tuis country during

memb~Jr

bank.

T.ue cur;rency

ot.uer countries. a.nd wmc.u cxis ted in

after t.ue Civil War, is due, first: to the

suspension of gold. payments• second:; to an unba.lal ced budget, tl::c..t is,

insufficient revcnuJs to . mablo til<.: Gove.rru:lent to pay its currerJ.t
expenses, and t.w.irJ.: to t.u.e iSS'.le of irredeamd.ble

pc;~.per

currency

ei tuer by tile Governm.mt direct or by a centr.:l.l bank agc;:a.inst Gova:mment
s~curities,

cind

of Government

t~e

forcing of sucn notes into

obli~tions

c;:a.nJ private

circul~tion

in

inJebt~dn0ss.

T.c.e most conspicuous examples to..ka.y of countries uc.tving

Here i:-.

t~c

Sout.w., we

in t.L:ie price of cotton.
loc;i.l'ls of tAle FoJlare:.l

c;~.rf;;l

infla.t~i

ctll rejoicing over t.L:ie recent ca.dvd.l:.<ce

T~is d.livance is not ..iue to

Rl)s~rve

p~~1m~t

Ba.nks or to

ciJ:ly increca.se in

t.n~

any expansion of t..o.e currency.

As a. matter of fact, t.i:l.l amount of FGd.er.,.l Res.Jrvcl Notes in circula.tic"'

today

is

<:~.bout $500,000,000 less tw.n w.aJn cotton r<Ja.c.c.Gd. its lo-.-o~est

point last spring.

T.a~

eoonondc causss, to t.aa



a.dvar._J in t.::. e price of cotton is due to
opor~tion

of tue inevita.olo law of supply

X-3202

-.Gl-

and demand.

Aft.-;r tna lct.st roport of tnc Department of Agriculturat
to t~o fact tnat the prasont crop is abnormcilly

the world awakened

small and tnat probably loss tnan

s~vcn

million bales will be produced.

In ordinary circumstar.ces a partial crop failure of tnis kind would
havJ been calamity to tne Soutn, but owing to tDc large dffiount of
cotton left in the .oands of prod:uc<:>rs from last s..;ason, i t will be a
benefit

becau~o

a more

non~~

equilibrium of tha mark0t will ba re-

stored and t.aeroforG tne debt-paying and purc.Jasing power of tile Sout.o.
tllis fall will ba far graa.tor tnan bad boan anticipated.

I wish to empnclsizu, however, the fct.ct that this nappy result
is due, not to CNdit or currency expansion but rather to the defla-

•

tion of t.ne anticipated supply of cotton.

Touc.ning aga.in upon the crvdit policies of the Foderal Reserve

Banks during the -year J920 and at t.ae present time, 1 wish to remind
you tho.t a cn.:..nge_ in t.ae discount ra.to is not nucossarily a c:t..a.nge in
policy.

Centrd.l banks in for0ign countries nave been accustomed for

generations to

ad:v:a.~•ce

or reduce t.aeir rd.tas of discount in e:.ccorddnc..:;

wi t.a cbd.l1.3:ing concl..i tions L1. t.u.eir money markets and. t.c.dr action is.

d.CCepte:i wi t.c..out populd.r protest.

.

T~e

discount rd.tGs of

yed.r 1919 were below tne

t~c

Federal Reserve Banks Quring the

~rkot r~tos,

as Wd.S tue

gred.ter part of tue period wnen tno country Wd.S d.t

CciS0

war.

during tho
T.ue war

did not endt however, in a find.nci""l s;:msej'Ni. tu the siguing of the
armistice

cinQ t~

exigencies of tnc

Tr~asury

scomod to

ra~uire

a

continuance for sm:.:.0 mont.as of tee Fed0ra.l Reserve discount ratos
v1.aicn prava.ilcd during thG war.



""C··~

_._

X-3~0Z

-22In January, 1920, howevor,

Resurvc

·Fed~ral

rat~s

were advdnCed

generally to six pGr cont, wllicn, by taa way, is the bighest rate that
bas ever been cnarged by tJl::: Federal Reservo Banko f Richmond-

This

advance in ratos took place a.t a. timo when there !lad bC3en ample opportuni ty to market t.nc crops of 1919 and before preparations weN rna.d.o
for planting
T~c

t~c

crops of

1~.

effect of tais .increase in discount rates at tae

serve Banks was to

Feder~!

Rc-

tae degree of expansion of their loans, al-

r~ducc

thougJl tnc volume of ~deral Reserve discounts ·still continued to she~
a teniency to increa.se.

assets of

t~e

At tl:J.e end of JanUd.ry, 1 920, t.ac tot.;..l <Ja.m,ing

Federal RJscrve Banks, wl:J.ica

member banks, 4mountJd to $3,039,191,000,
at tnc enj of

octob~r,

1930.

D~ring

~s

compared

tnis period

prices l:J.ci.d. already set in._ alt.c..o-u;;.a. t.aere

rediscounts for

inclu~c

~c;i.d

tn~

wit~ $3.396,0~3,000

drastic doclinJ

i~

·ocon a very substdlltial.

.

increase botJl in t.ae volume of rediscounts of tne Federal Reserve Banks
and in tJle amount of t.c..vir Federal Reserve Notes in circulation.
T~ere

is no occdSion for rue to say that tno year 1920 was a

criticdl and disastrous
stat~

who

Cdn

on~~

T~er~ cir~ tuous~~s

bear witness to tnis out of

of pcopl0 in tJlis

t~ir ~in ~1owl0Jg~ ar~

0xperience, -.,ut t.ara orded.l t.arough w.i:lic.u you

.i:lo.v~ pass~.i

ord·J~l

by ;people in all otl:J.er

w.aich was

undergon~

g.t .tho same timo

is the same

statas in this country and by millions of people throughout the

civilized world.
brought about by

Tho reaction, when it
world-wid~




was overdue and was

oconorudc causes, wbicn wore cntirwly

beyond tne control of any group of
Government.

cam~,

ba1~,

of any Board or of any

,. .

; _li_ f

-·

X-3202

-23-

fM President of the United States in en address to the Sena.t• le.&\
July ea1d: "Our land has its share of the financial chaos and the indust-

rial depression of the world.

We little heeded the growth of indebtedness

or the limits of expenditure during the wa.r because we could not stop to
count the cost.

Our one thot,ght then was the winning of the war and the

survival of the Nation.

V:e borrowed and loaned - indiViduals to the Na-

tion and the Government to other Governments, and to those who served the

Nation, with little thought of settlement.
because nat1onai .life was at stake•

It was relatively easy then,

In the sober aftermath we face the

order of reason, rather than act amid the passions of war, a.nd our own
land and the world are feeing problems never solved before.

There can be

no solution unless we face the grim truths and seek to solve them in
resolute devotion to duty .. ,, •..• It is unthinkable to expect a business
revival and the resumption of the normal ways of peace while maintaining
the excessive taxes of war .•..• The slump which is now upon us is an inevitable part of war's aftermath.
since the world began.

It has followed in the wake of war

There was the unavoidable readjustment, the inev..

itable charge-off, the unfailing attendance of losses in the wake of bigh
prices, the inexorable deflation which inflation had preceded.
been wholly proper to seek to apply Gover-nment relief to

It has

~nimize

the

hardships and the Government has aided wherever possible, and is aiding
now, but all the special acts ever dreamed of 1 all the particular favors
ever conceived will not avoid all the distresses nor ward off a.ll the
losses.

The

pro~er

mentPl state of our people will commit us resolutely

and confidently. to .:·Our ta.ks, and definite assurances as to taxation and
expenditure will contribute to tha.t helpful mental order.




Tbe only sure

X- 3?02

- 24 -

man experience."
When things go wrong, e•pecially in matters pertaining to economics
tmd fina"lcet there are elwl".ys many people who are unwilling to c(,....,s!' r
abstract cemses, but prefer to seek the concrete and the personal.
demand a personal scapegoat.

t}.-'

They

Some people have made it their business to

chBrge, end may have deluded others into believing, that the Federal Re·
serve Banks and the Federal Reserve Board, particularly, have caused a
great economic crisis, which was foreseen by those responsible for the
management of the Federal Reserve System, but which was most certainly
not brought about by them.

On

the other ha"ld they did everything within

the bounds of reason and the limitations of lew to relieve the crisis
and. to avert a. financial panic, which everyone will now acln:it h:::.-s been
averted, whether the Federal Reserve System be commended or criticized
for the part it played in the drama) which but for its existence would
have developed into the

gre~test

financial

tra~edy

of modern times.

I wish now to introduce the testimony of one who is at present

th'~'

star witness of those who seek to hold the administration of the Federal
Reserve System responsible for the financial and economic ills which efflict the country.
I hold in my hand the report of the Comptroller of the Currency for
the yePr 1920.

This report is dated December 6. 1920 but was actually

sent to Congress in page proof form on February
.

,

7, 1921.

i

There is .nothir.g in this report which reflects in any way upon the
administration of the Federal Reserve System nor is there enyNh6re a auggesti6n that the precipitate decline in prices and the general depression




-25-

X-3202

whiCh set in during the last half of the year was due in any respect
to the policies or operl'tting methods of the Federal Reserve System.
On the Contrary several pages are devoted to a discuss ion of the world-

wide economic c9.uses which brou9ht about the drastic reaction, and I
sh~ 11

now read to you

sever~l

:passages in the report which refer to th:.

Federal Reserve System.
From page

6: "The story of Japan•s industrial and financial exper-

ience is largely similar to the experience of South American and European countries - s.on:e of them our allies 1 and others neutral.

Some of

these countries are now going through a b~siness cataclysm similar to.
that through which Jap~ bas so recently passed.

In our own country

we have been thus far fort'lmate enough'- thanks largely to the splendid
efficiency end stabilizing influence of the Federal Raserve System- to
avoid the financi~l crises end complete disorgani~ation which have ~ade
h~voc

elsewhere.

We have passed with coWParative safety through exceed-

in~ly troubled and nerve-racking times; but difficult and dgn£erous problen:s

remain to be solved, the solution of which will demand clear heads and
steady nerves."
From page 11:

•The deflation which at that time

(1919) was obviously

inevitable has corr-e, and tt~ co~try is now in many respects on a sounder
basis, econorrdcally, than it hes been for yeers."
From page 52:

"Largely through the a.id and excellent functioning

of the Federal Reserve System. the business and ba~ing interests of the
country have passed

succe~sfully

through the

~erils

of inflation and the

strain end losses of deflation without panic end without the demoralization which has been produced in the past at various times from far less.




X-3202
serious 8nd

r~ckin~

c;>uses.

'l'hose banking and other interests which at the

outset so Vi§'orously opposed the Federal Reserve Sys tern are now among its ' .warmest advocates.n
Fron; page 291: "The past seven

~e8rs

have been, in numbers of persons

and extent of interests involved, the most momentous and critical in the
history of this Republic.

We have had to fpce and solve gigantic and un-

p.recedented p.t ob:i.err's, and the banking and financial rna.chi:aery of the country

•

·has been subjected to a. test 8-nd strain unrarallelled.
the duty of our country very largely to

fin~nce

It has been

the world, and in cl'lrry-

1ng out .the program which fate imposed upon us we have overcome successth~t

fully difficulties
met every righteous

at tirees seerred alrrost insurmountable and we have

derr~nd

mede upon us.

Our Federal Reserve financial

~md banking sys tern, inaugur~ted in 1914, has been of inestimable value;

qnd without its aid, tr->sks which we have so successfully accomplished
would have been impossible.ft

I fee 1 th?t I should not close without saying something about present
conditions and future prospects.

The banking

sit~~tion

has &reatly

iiT~

proved· and. with respect to it the gloomy forebodin;;zs of last Ninter are
no longer justified

~nd

can be dismissed.

The process of reedjustment

bPs not yet been completed but evidences are multiplying
~s

been turned and th-'='t

hq.vc

•vefp~ssed

the most "!.CUte stage

th~.t

of

the corner

the readjust-

rnent period.
Mu,ch will depend Ul'On developments in the tCJgricultur"-'1 sections of
the country end upon the rn.an.."ler in which the crops are marketed.
all sections

h?~e

While

suffered, the burden of debt Rnd the lack of buying

po•ver is felt more keenly in the

fermin~

districts "nd no sust,ined for-

ward movement in commerce and industry ean be expected unless en improve


X-3032

-27-

ment is seen and felt in these districts, in which normally so large a
part of the country's

power lies.

purchasin~

With preFer cooperation

on the part of merchents P.nd bankers, those engaged in agriculture have
op~ortunities

now

it~s

ago and

P.nd prospects which were not anticipated a fe• months

of vital importance that this

It should be remembered, also)

th~t

cooper~tian

in order to

proiuction we must push our foreign tr!3.d.e.

th"n

Re

need for our own use.

maint~in

articles of great variety

In the chenged conditions resultine from the

war, Pmerice occuries ::. new re latianship to the world.
~debtor

our rQte of

We produce more cotton, more

manuf~ctured

fot2dstuffs, more copper and more

be given.

We 8I"e no longer

nation, as we were in 1914, but today Ne are the world's great

creditor nation..

We h2ve l"n enonnous stock of gold, much of which has

come to ua during recent months from ell q,uarters of the globe in pasnnent
of corrrr.odities

purch~sed

We cannot forever

from us.

rnaint~in

our

forei~

of the gold stock of other nations.

trade, however, on the

Some memns must be devised for ex-

tending long time credits abroAd or of interestin§
forei~n

so

properties

he~vilv ~~?inst

"'!ld.

b~sis

Arneric~n

investors in

securities, in or:der thet the exch!"'n2e which now runs

other nations

rr.a~

be corrected.

We rrust contimue to buy from foreign countries those things which they
can

pr~uce

'Ni th t 1-.e,-.

better or more cheaply then we can and exchange commodities
If we deterroine to do business with and for ourselves alone,

i t seems inevitable thPt ·ve must reduce our production to meet merely

Pmerican requirements.
One word more about the Federal Reserve System.
do the impossible.
~'1d it c~?n.'lot.



Do not expect it to

It is not & panacea for all economic and financial ills

however skillful its administration rr:ay be., pra\Yent periods

.i

-28-

Y.-3?.02

of depression in the future, although it can do nuch to mod,ffy them.
Other nations, such as Great Britain and France, with thetr great
central banking institutions, have always had their years of prosperity
and their periods of depression, although they have been free from the
money :panics which we formerly had in this country as a result of our
inade~uate

~11

bankin? system.

history shol"Ts that -reriods of

prosp~rlty

Pnd

de:prer-sio~

come

~in

cycles, the rotation being about as follows: (l) Prosperity, (.!!) ti~uid.ation,

(3) Stagnation, and (4) Revival~

flt the present time the Frocess of liquid·

ation is well advanced and the end of stagnation and the beginning of the
period of revival seem now to depend upon certain tbings which are susceptible of. accomplishment in the near future, among which may be enumerated
the financial rehabilitation of our great transportation
detennination

syste~s

and the

of the policy of the Governrrent with respect to revenues

and the tariff.
When the period of revival does definitely set in, to be followed by
a new -era of prosperity, let us remember that the greater the wave of pros. peri ty and the more unrest rained the exp-"'nsion and the speculation accompanyin? it, the sm>rper will be the depression thB.t will follow.
the lessons of the past

v•o

If, however,

years are remembered, the next period of pros-

parity will be of longer dura.tion than any we bave had before and the subsequent reaction will be far less severe •
• .

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