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X-9326

"THE BANKING ACT OF 1955"
Address
by

M. S. SZYMCZAK, MEMBER,
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
before the
Essex County Bankers Association,
Newark, New Jersey
Thursday, September So, 1935
6:30 P. M.

Released for Publication
September 26, 1935
After 6:30 P. M.

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A little more than three months ago I had the privilege of speaking
before the New York Bankers Association at Lake George, and my subject
then was the same as it is today - The Banking Act of 1955.
however, the Act was not law.

Today it is.

At that time,

Accordingly, it is possible

to discuss it again, but from a different point of view - to speak not of
what its provisions may be, but of what they are.

I wish first to take

up the changes made by the Act in the general organization of the Federal
Reserve System, and then certain changes which most directly affect your
operations as bankers and as members of the Federal Reserve System.
The changes that the law makes in the organization of the System may
be described as fundamental, but not revolutionary.

They are changes

which closely follow the dictates of experience, and they are adaptations
to present day needs which are too well supported by realities to be
called experimental.

Many conceptions which formerly prevailed have

undergone a great change as a result of what has happened in more than
twenty years of actual operation under the Federal Reserve System.

In

consequence, Congress has amended the law and certain readjustments have
been made in the organization of the System.

To make clear the purposes

behind these changes let me mention some of the things we have learned
from experience.
To begin with, we recognize today that the elasticity of the currency,
while it is important, is not a governing factor in the supply of credit.




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When people borrow they do not usually want currency, and when they want
currency they do not always borrow to obtain It.

Fluctuations in currency

demand, except when there is hoarding, are largely seasonal, and reflect
seasonal changes in the volume of retail trade and of payrolls.

To meet

currency requirements is not a major problem, for deposits have largely
taken the place of currency, and the duties of the Federal Reserve System
can not be regarded as entirely discharged merely by supplying commerce,
industry and agriculture with the cash they require for retail transactions and payrolls.

That is merely a beginning.

The real tasks of the

System are much greater and more complex.
Again, the idea that the Reserve banks lend to one bank the funds
deposited by another is now found to be quite inaccurate.

The lending

power of the Reserve banks docs not arise from the receipt of member bank
deposits, except to the extent that those deposits consist of gold.

On

the contrary, member bank deposits with the Reserve banks are created
by the Reserve banks.

The reserve banks rediscount paper or purchase

bills or securities and enter corresponding credits to the accounts of the
member banks.

The lending of funds and the creation of deposits is not

dependent, therefore, on the previous deposit of funds.

It depends upon the

power of the Reserve banks to acquire assets by purchase or discount, and
their power to issue notes or create deposits in payment for those assets.
Furthermore, the idea was once held that a discount by the Federal
Reserve bank, say of $1,000, for example, made it possible for the member bank




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to extend that much more credit and only that much.

If this were true the

control of credit expansion would be a relatively simple matter.
not true.

But it is

A thousand dollars borrowed and placed to the credit of a member

bank enlarges its reserves by only that much, but it makes possible a much
larger expansion of member bank loans and deposits.

This is because the

bank's reserves need be only a fraction of its deposits.

In practice it

works out that on the average, member banks need borrow only about onefifteenth of what they create in deposits by loans to their customers.
Again, there is no necessary, direct connection between any particular
piece of discounted paper and the use to which the proceeds thereof are
placed.

Yet this connection was formerly assumed to exist and it was con-

sidered an important factor of credit control.

The thought was that the

Reserve banks would shut off speculation by refusing to discount the notes
of speculators.

Of course, that is very far from the facts.

In the first

place, as I just said, you bankers do not borrow at the Reserve bank in
order to lend, and even if you did, the kind of paper you borrowed on
wouldn't necessarily indicate what kind of loan you expected to make.
The fact that a banker borrowed on bills of lading would give the Reserve
bank no assurance that he did not on the same day buy some mortgages or
lend to a stockbroker, or employ his funds in some other way that might
at the moment be contrary to general policy.
You are entirely familiar with these commonplace facts about your own
business, for they have been repeatedly demonstrated in banking operations
as you have known them under the Federal Reserve System.

But they are things

that could not be seen so clearly until we had the actual experience.

In the

absence of that experience it was natural to suppose that member banks would



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deposit their funds in the Reserve banks, that the receipt of those funds would
give the Reserve banks power to lend, that as the demand for money increased
member banks would borrow of the Reserve banks to meet that demand, that they
would draw out currency for the purpose, that loans would be repaid by currency,
and that the Reserve banks fcy discounting only commercial paper would insure that
Reserve bank credit was being used for the legitimate requirements of commerce
and not for speculation.
As a result of experience, however, it has become clear that things do
not work just that way.

The relationships and the sequences are different.

Accordingly, our legislation has had to be amended.

A good many minor changes

have been made in the Federal Reserve Act over a long period of time, but in
the last few years circumstances have demanded more thorough revisions of the
original Act than before.

Congress has made these revisions in the Banking Act

of 1933 and in the Banking Act of 1955.

These two measures, without any

violent break with the past, but in obedience to economic developments, have
adapted the original Reserve System legislation to the needs of the present,
and also to the needs of the future, insofar as those needs can be foreseen.
The effort has been to modify the mechanism so that it may perform the functions which time and change have thrust upon it.

It has been recognized that

in meeting the requirements of contemporary business life the Federal Reserve
System can not rely principally on the power to furnish currency when it is needed
and to retire it when it is not; nor can it rely on discrimination against one
class of paper or another - when and if offered for discount - on the theory
that by so doing it is diverting credit away from speculative uses and toward
commerce.

It has been recognized that the Federal Reserve System's power over

credit lies primarily not in the things I have mentioned, but arises chiefly out
of its ability to influence the total volume of bank deposits.



And it has been

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recognized that the System must not be thought of as waiting more or less
passively, like the fire department, until a crisis arises and it receives
an application for help.
of these facts.

The Banking Act of 1955 is based on a recognition

Perhaps the most important thing attempted in it is a more

definite fixing of responsibility for the country's credit policy.

If the

System is expected to act, it must be given the power to act effectively.
This principle has been followed in the authorization of a new Open Market
Committee.
Open Market Operations are, of course, not new, but they were not of
established or recognized importance when the Federal Reserve Act was adopted.
For years, ever since the war, they have had a powerful and direct bearing on
the volume and cost of money.

They are the means of controlling, in the mass

and in the most practicable way, the credit operations of the banks of the
country.

Until the new law was adopted, however, the machinery for the formu-

lation., and execution of open-market policies was ineffective.

The Open Market

Committee, comprising representatives of the 12 Reserve banks, might propose
purchases or sales of United States Government securities in the open market,
and the Board might approve those proposals; but any Reserve bank night refuse
to participate in the proposed program.

A policy might be adopted, but its

execution depended on the independent action of twelve boards of directors
comprising in the aggregate 108 persons.

Such an arrangement was likely to

result in delay and to afford opportunities for obstruction in matters
where prompt and decisive action was required in the public interest.
Under the Act of 1955, beginning March 1, 1956, authority over open market
operations will be vested in a new Open Market Committee consisting of the
seven members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and five




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representatives of the Reserve banks selected regionally:

one from the Boston

and New York districts, one from the Philadelphia and Cleveland districts, one
from the Richmond, Atlanta, and Dallas districts, one from the Chicago and St.
Louis districts, and one from the Minneapolis, Kansas City and San Francisco
districts.

The Reserve banks will have representation on the Committee, but a

majority of the Committee will be made up of Board members.

Open market trans-

actions, as under the old Act, are to "be governed with a view to accommodating
commerce and business and with regard to their bearing upon the general credit
situation of the country".

The Committee, in the language of the new act, is

to "consider, adopt, and transmit to the seVeral Federal Reserve banks, regulations relating to the open market transactions of such banks".

Not only will

Federal Reserve banks be forbidden to engage in open market operations, except
in accordance with the regulations of the Committee, but they also will be
forbidden to "decline to engage" in such operations except in accordance with
the directions and regulations of the committee.

Open Market policy will now be

determined, therefore, by a responsible statutory body, able to give it the
consistency and definiteness that the importance of the function makes necessary.
It is also required by the law that complete records be kept of the
action taken ty the Board and by the Committee in all matters of policy.
These records are to show the underlying reasons for the action, and are to
be published in the annual reports of the Board.

They will give the public

an opportunity to study the decisions of the Federal Reserve System, in much the
same way that Supreme Court opinions may be studied.

This opportunity should

be extremely helpful in clarifying the public discussions of national credit
policy.

It will also accentuate the individual sense of responsibility, for




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members will be called on not only to take firm positions on matters of
national policy, but to explain those positions to the public.
In the matter of discount rates, the law prescribes a new procedure
under which rates must come up for consideration by the Reserve banks and
by the Board every fourteen days or oftenor.

In effect this means that

rates must be newly established every two wjeks at least, though the new rates
may, of course, be the same as the old.
Under the now law, the authority of the Board to alter the amount of reserves which member banks must carry against their demand and time deposits
is restated in clearer terms than before.

The old law authorized the Board

to change required reserves only when an emergency existed as a result of
credit expansion, and the approval of the President of the United States was
necessary.

The new law authorizes the Board to make changes on the vote of

four of its seven members "in order to prevent injurious credit expansion or
contraction".

The legal reserves can not in any event, however, be reduced

below present requirements, nor can they be increased to more than twice what
they now are.
Since the Board of Governors constitutes a majority of the Open Market
Committee, and since it also has authority over discount rates, over member
bank reserve requirements, and over margin requirements on securities loans,
it is under more definite responsibility with respect to the national credit
policy than ever before.

At the same time, the law preserves the regional

autonomy of the Reserve banks in their relations with member banks.

Generally

speaking, it leaves the Reserve banks with responsibility for member bank




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relations, and gives the Board, with the help of representatives of the Reserve banks, responsibility for national credit and monetary policies.
The law also makes important changes in the constitution of the governing body of the Federal Reserve System, which is no longer known as the Federal Reserve Board, but as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.

The Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency

cease to be ex officio members February 1, 1936, and thereafter the Board
is to consist of seven members appointed by the President.
fice is to be fourteen instead of twelve years.

The term of of-

As at present, not more than

one member may be appointed from any one Federal Reserve district, and the
President, in selecting the members, is to "have due regard to a fair representation of the financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial interests and
geographical divisions of the country".
After March 1, 1936, the chief executive officer of each Federal Reserve
bank will be a "president", instead of a governor, and the title "vicepresident" will replace that of deputy governor.
I think I have covered sufficiently the more prominent changes which
the Banking Act of 1935 makes in the organization of the Federal Reserve System.

Those changes in general tend to place more definite responsibility

where it belongs.

Changing conditions in our economic life have thrown

greater responsibilities upon the System; and in order to meet those responsibilities in a direct and positive way, the System's organization has been
made more closely knit and more effective.
I wish to speak now of those features of the Banking Act of 1935 which
more directly affect your individual operations as bankers.




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The first of these is the broadened lending powers which the Act gives
you, both directly and indirectly.
Indirectly, the Act tends to broaden your powers by giving the Reserve
banks authority to make advances to member banks on any satisfactory security.
The former provisions still stand as to the character of paper that is eligible
for discount - paper that must originate in connection with industrial, commercial or agricultural transactions - and they also still stand as to advances
to member banks on notes secured by Government obligations or by eligible
paper.
them.

The new provisions do not alter the old ones, except by adding .to
The only conditions aside from the requirement that advances under the

new law be secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve bank, are that they bear
a rate of interest at least one-half percent above the Reserve bank's discount
rate and have maturities of not more than four months.

At a time like the

present, when you have excess reserves, this new provision in the law may not
seem very important.

But tines may change.

If they do, this new provision

means that, assuming your assets are good, the Federal Reserve bank will be
able to advance you money on them, no matter what the type of paper, or in
what kind of transaction they originated.

Borrowing from the Federal Reserve

bank is now possible on other than technical conditions of eligibility alone.
And this is very important.

Many banks in recent years would have had much

less trouble if they could have taken to the Reserve bank some of their
assets which were good, but not legally eligible, instead of having to sacrifice them on a demoralized market.
Apart from its practical bearing upon what paper individual banks may
use in borrowing at the Reserve bank,

the new provision of the law is sig-

nificant in that it recognizes an actual condition of American banking.




This

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is that American banks do not specialize in one type of credit as against
another.

They deal in credit of all sorts.

term functions.

They combine long term and short

They cannot confine themselves to short term commercial paper,

for there is not enough of such paper to fill more than a small part of their
portfolios.

They accept the savings and time deposits of their communities

and under such circumstances it must be oxpectcd that they will also hold
the long term obligations of their communities.

To disregard these living

facts of American banking is futile; and the new provisions for eligibility
simply make the Federal Reserve Act cognizant of the realities and adapt
the powers of the Reserve banks to those realities.
In a more direct way, the new Act broadens your powers by liberalizing
the conditions under which National banks may make real estate loans.

The

old stipulation that the real estate upon which such loans are made must bo
situated in the bank's Federal Reserve district or within a hundred miles of
the bank, is removed; and loans which are amortized are permitted in amounts
up to 60 percent of the appraised value of the property and for as much as
ten years, provided installment payments are sufficient to repay at least 40
percent of the principal in ten years.
The permissible aggregate of real estate loans which a national bank
may hold is changed by the now law from 25 percent of its capital and surplus or .50 percent of its savings deposits, whichever was greater, to 100
percent of its capital and surplus or 60 percent of its time and savings deposits, whichever is greater.
In general connection with this subject of enlarged lending powers I
wish to mention.also the provisions of section 15b of the Federal Reserve




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Act relating to loans which you may make for working capital purposes.
This section is a year older than the new act, but its provisions belong
logically with these more recent ones I have just been discussing.
Under this section you may make loans with maturities not exceeding
five years to established industrial and commercial businesses in need of
working capital.
serve bank.

These loans are eligible for discount at the Federal Re-

Nor is that all.

If you wish to hold the loan yourself, but

wish to be assured that you can dispose of it at any time if need be, you
can procure a commitment binding the Federal Reserve bank to take it off
your hands.

Moreover, if and when you dispose of the loan you can do so

without recourse for as much as 80 percent# < In other words you have a
1
loan which is insured 100 percent
loss.

as to liquidity and 80 percent

as to

This arrangement is not restricted to member banks; it is open to non-

members as well.
As of September 11, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York had received
and acted on 881 applications for working capital loans aggregating $65,000,000.
Of these, 350, aggregating ^£9,000,000, had been approved.

Of the amounts

outstanding, $7,500,000 was in the form of loans made by the Federal Reserve
Bank itself direct to the industrial or commercial borrower, because you
local bankers refused to make them.

There was also outstanding about

$10,000,000, which local banks and other financing institutions in the Second
Federal Reserve District had made, and which were protected by the commitments
I have just described.
These loans have been made to all kinds of enterprises, industrial
and commercial.

In many cases they have been loans which bankers have not

been accustomed to making, and which would not be made were it not for the




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fact that the Reserve bank stands behind the bank which makes them.

2

But as

it is, they constitute secure and liquid assets, yielding a good rate of
interest.
Here again as in the case of the advances made by the Reserve banks on
any good assets, and as in the case of real estate loans, the present legislation recognises two important principles.

One is that the local bank may

be called on to meet the general credit needs of the community; the other is
that the assets the local bank acquires should meet the general criterion of
soundness, rather than technical limitations as to maturity, origin, and
nature of the underlying transaction.
I think I have now covered the changes of most general interest, that
have been brought about by the Banking Act of 1935, but there are numerous
other provisions that it may bo worth while to run through even though you
may be familiar with them.
First there is tho matter of deposit insurance, which is continued on
what was originally intended as the temporary plan.

Insured banks are sub-

ject to an annual assessment at a fixed rate - one-twelfth of 1 percent of '
deposits - instead of being under an unlimited liability as would have been
the case under the old permanent plan.

Insurance covers deposits up to

$5,000 for any one depositor, instead of $10,000, as the old permanent plan
contemplated.
After July 1, 1942, no state bank with average deposits of #1,000,000
or more may bo an insured bank without becoming a member of the Federal Reserve System.

This postpones required membership for seven years.

In this

connection the term "state bank" does not include mutual savings banks or
Morris Plan banks.




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The former prohibition agaipst a member bank's purchasing and holding
more than 10 percent of a particular issue of investment securities has
been eliminated, but the total of the obligations of one obligor which
may be purchased and held by a member bank is reduced from 15 percent

of the

bank's capital and 25 percent of its surplus to 10 percent of its capital
and surplus.

Banks are not required to dispose of securities lawfully

held at the time the law was enacted.

It is also made clear,in conformity

with previous rulings of the Board and of the Comptroller of the Currency,
that member banks may purchase and sell stocks for the account of their
customers.

They may not purchase and sell stocks for their own accounts.

There are several important provisions in the new Act with respect
to affiliates and holding company affiliates.
the original requirements.

These modify considerably

When the first legislation defining affiliates

and requiring reports of them was adopted in the Banking Act of 1933, it
was undoubtedly directed primarily at securities affiliates and affiliates
formed for the purpose of engaging in activities in which member banks
were not authorized to engage or for the purpose of supplementing the activities of member banks.

The definitions, however, were made extremely

comprehensive, and as a result a very large number of organizations were
caught in a net that was never intended for them.

It frequently happened

that banks were surprised to discover that under the law they had "affiliates", when as a matter of fact no such idea was in their minds.

A

bank might find that it had as an affiliate a corporation which belonged
to an estate of which it was trustee; or it might find that it had as an
affiliate a corporation whose stock was accidentally owned by the bank's
own stockholders.



There might be no financial connection between the two

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and yet at every call date a report would have to be procured from the affiliate and published.

The original purpose of the law had been accomplished

so far as securities affiliates were concerned, for they all disappeared,
but the number of other affiliates reported to the Board was increasing not because banks were forming new affiliations, but because unknown and unintended affiliations, quite accidental in fact, were constantly coming to
light.

The effect of the new provisions of the law will be to exclude a

large number of such organizations from the requirement imposed originally.
The Board and the Comptroller of the Currency are now authorized to waive reports which are not necessary to disclose fully the relations between a member
bank and its affiliate, and the effect thereof upon the affairs of the bank,
and the conditions of waiver have been announced. Roughly speaking, organizations which are affiliates under the terms of the law need not submit reports
unless they are indebted to the affiliated member bank or unless the member
bank owns their stock or other obligations.

Reports of affiliations which

have arisen as a result of ownership or control of an organization's stock
by a member bank in a fiduciary capacity are also waived.

This, it is be-

lieved, will be welcome news to many banks.
In addition, organizations which own or control the stock of a bank,
but are found by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System not
to be engaged as a business in holding bank stock, are exempted by the new
law from the requirements imposed on holding company affiliates except as
to indebtedness of affiliates to member banks.

This provision makes possible

a distinction between holding companies organized for the purpose of holding
bank stock, and companies which happen to own control of a bank, though their
real business lies in a different field.



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The Banking Act of 1935 ended double liability on National bank stock
issued after June 16, 1933.

Under the new Act National banks are permitted

to terminate the double liability on stock issued prior to that date.

After

July 1, 1937, therefore, it is possible that all shareholders of active
National banks may be relieved of personal liability on their shares.

At

the same time National banks are required to accumulate a surplus equal to
the amount of their common capital.

This change should be better both for

bank shareholders and for the public.

Personal liability for bank shares

has never been a satisfactory protection to depositors, and it has placed
a burden on shareholders of banks not borne by shareholders of other corporations.
There are several provisions which are of importance in connection
with deposits and the interest payable thereon.

In the first place, the

rate of interest paid by the Postal Savings system is not to exceed that
paid on savings deposits by member banks in the same place; and postal savings depositories may deposit funds on time with member banks subject to the
provisions of the Federal Reserve Act and regulations of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System regarding payment of interest on time deposits.
In addition, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is required to forbid
the payment of interest on demand deposits by insured non-member banks, and
to regulate the rate of interest paid on time and savings deposits by insured
non-members.

This provision explicitly gives the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation authority similar to that which the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System has.

In the same general connection, the definitions

of deposits in the old Act are stricken out and the Board of Governors is




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authorized to define various types of deposits, and to determine what is to
be deemed a payment of interest.

For purposes of computing the reserves

member banks are required to carry, amounts due from other banks (except
Federal Reserve banks and foreign banks) and cortain cash items in process of
collection may be deducted from gross demand deposits.

Formerly amounts due

from other banks could be deducted only from amounts due to other banks.

This

will place country banks which have no balances of other banks, on a basis of
equality in this respect with city banks that carry a large volume of bank
balances.
I think it is not necessary to go further into details of the new
banning legislation.

I have described the major changes effected in the

organization of the Federal Reserve System and I have mentioned certain
provisions which affect you most directly as bankers.
You will realize from this partial account that a large number of
changes have had to be made in the Board's regulations.

This work has

been pushed as rapidly as possible, but it will be some weeks before the
Board will be able to complete the publication of all regulations in
revised form.
Personally I feel that the new Act places us on a better footing
than we have ever been on before.

To be sure, it involves many points of

compromise, as is inevitable in a democracy, and no two people will agree
that it is perfect.

Moreover, it is to be expected that unforeseen prob-

lems will arise, and that our resources and ingenuity will be taxed to
meet them.

But perhaps the greatest virtue of the Banking Act of 1955

is that it confers more definite responsibilities and more flexible powers.
We are better prepared than in the past to meet the unexpected.



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In particular I trust that membership in the System will be more
valuable to you bankers under the new Act and more highly esteemed by
you than ever

before.

I trust that you will find yourselves better able

to meet the credit needs of your communities, and better able to maintain
profitable operations.
that easier to do.

The new Act, as I have described it, should make

The Federal Reserve Bank has broader powers than ever

before to discount your paper and to lend to you.

In the case of industrial

loans for working capital purposes authorized by Section 13b it has the very
unusual power to grant you commitments under which you may be assured of
the perfect liquidity of your loan and have it virtually guaranteed up to
80 percent.

I suggest that, considering the idle funds you have, you

fully acquaint yourselves with what the Federal Reserve Bank is able and
glad to do in cooperation with you, and that you canvass your territories
for loans which you might formerly have felt were outside your field, but
which you may now make with safety and profit.

I thank you for this op-

portunity to discuss with you measures and matters of such moment to us all.