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X-3156

rro~Yself

In my remarks today I she.ll confine

mainly to a discuscion

I shall endeavor to lay be-

of some of our domestic economic problems.

fore you a. picture of .. condi tions as they exist today and to describe
some of the causes and events which have brought about these conditions,
and before closing shall take occasion to discuss the inequa.li ties in
the readjustment which has taken place.

tole,

r~cently

By way of illustration, I a:;J..s

by a. gentlerr:an from Oklahoma, whorr I met in Kansas City,

that he had just had a shave and a haircut,

He said that a year ago

when he was in Ka.nse.s City a shave and haircut cost him the equivalent
of one bushel of corn

ar~d

that yestr>rday his sb.e'l8 ,,_nCJ. haircut co.:;t :.tim

the equivalent of tl:ree bus'1.2ls of cern.

I rr.ay havs occasion .?lso in

the course of TT'Y remarks to say soa:ething about :profiteers.
years past and up to a few months a;o we
profiteers and profiteering.
profJ. teering.

he~r~

Put•lic officials

The public has winced under it.

For some

a gr?at deal about
~enerally

have denounced

Sometir.ces the stetemer.t

is maie that the Federal Reserve System is oren to the charge of rr-of:. V
ing.

~-r-

Such statements are based U!:On thE e~m.:::-:ss r.'adc •·y the Federal

Reserve Banks in the year ending

1920 'Nith respect to their



~aid

1919

and. !!'ere p.;"ticulerly in tr1e year

in capital, but critics disre;r,ard. the fact

~,,,~~.c~

~'

···2-

;jf.,j

X- 3156

'

that there are other factors besides the capital of the Federal Reserve
Banks which contribute to their earning power.

The average paid in capital

of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks combined during the year 1920 was about

$94,000,000, pr 3~ of the capital and surplus of all banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System ; and their average surplus, accumulated
as provided by law and accrued profits total $143,000,000.

Figured against

paid in capital alone the net earnings of the Federal Reserve Banks for
tho ye~r l920, $149,000,000, were 158.41-, but the ratio to combined average
capital and surplus was but 62.9%.

That, however, is not all.

relies upon its deposits fori ts earning pow""r.

Every bank

If banks had to depend upon

their capital stock and surplus alone for their earnings, banking would not
lie very profitable and there would be very few banks.

use for joint stock companies,
loan out his own capital.

There would be no

for an individual could as well himself

The Federal Reserve Banks during the yr:ar held

,, reserve del)esi''£ of their member banks averaging daily $1,835,000,000.
~very

bank which is a member of the Federal Reserve System is required

by law to carry

its

~ntire

legal reserve with the Federal Reserve Bank

of its· District in the fonn of a collected balance, and must under the
law, maintain its full reserve at· all times or else be subject to penalties.
lf we consider the net earnings of the Federal Re"'erve Banks for the year

1920 as related to the t.otal of capital, surplus and reserve deposits, we
will find they amount to but 7 per cent.




p·.. ·.'/"·',t~
~

·- ..,-z ..

There is, however, still another very

import~t

'.j,j.

factor contribut-

ing to the earnings of the Federal Reserve Banks - the Federal Reserve
notes·, obligations of the Crovernmsnt, of tho TJni+.ed States, whir..h the
Federal Reserve Banks are permitted to have the use of under certain
conditions.

A Federal Reserve ]ank can deposit with the Federal Reserve

Agent of its District eligible paper which has been discounted for member
banks or otherwise

ac~uired

them into circulation.

and receive Federal Reserve notes and

put

The law provides that a gold reserve of not less

than 40 per cent must be maintained by ]'ed·eral Reserve Banks against their
notes in actual circulation.

This privilege, it will be seen, adds very

gr-atly·to the earning power of the Reserve Banks and has w3de it possible
for them to extend. to the member banks and through them to the :public the
very large credit 'a.Ccol"'T!!odations which were granted during the year 1920;the largest in the history of the System.
In this _connection, I may say that the Federal Reserve note has
proved itself to be an elastic form of currenGy, expanding and contracting
with the needs and requi.rements of the nation's business.

The daily average

of amount of Federal Reserve notes in circulation for all twelve Federal
Reserve Banks during the year 1920 was i3,146,000;000.

If the net

earnings

of ~149 ,oooi OCO are considered in relation only to the average amount of
circulation outstanding, i t will be seen that they were but 4.7'% of that
amount.

The Federal Reserve l3oard. has the power under the law to

an interest charge on that portion

·or

i~ose

the Federal Reserve note circulation

which is not cov6red, dollar for clolla.r, by gold, the rate to be charged
to be determined by the Federal Reserve Board.




It is not mandatory, but

f•_ .• ,...-•.
, I
t.

-._.

4.'.
,.

X-3156
optional with the Board whethsr or not i"., "hell

rr.e:t<.3

such a charge and

it has always been the Board's poHcy in order not to discourage the free

circulation of needed currency to refrain f;,·om i!J7POsing such a charge.

No

injustice is do11e to the government because in the final ana.lysis, tne net
earnings of the Reserve "Banks after the payment of the 6'% dividend req_uired
by law, go to the Government, for after the banks have acc1.rrnulated a surplus of
100~ of their subscribr:d capital they ·can retain ·only 10% of their net earn-

ings and must pay the other"goS'b to the Gove.mrnent a.s a franchise tax.

On

the first day of last January·, the Federal Reserve BankS paid more than

$6o,OOOJOCO into the Treasury of the United States as a franchise tax.

Had

the Federal Reserve "Board imposed an interest charge against th5 Federal
Reserve Banks on the uncovered portion of their note circulation, the net
earnings might verywell have been reduced to the extent of

50

or fD

mil-

lions, but even in such an event the Government would not have been benefited
because the amount wh·ich the banks would have had. to :pay under the inpos it ion
of such a charge wou!·i have been paid in to the Treasury month by month
instead of being paid in as a franchise tax at the end of the year-. The
Federal Reserve Banks have accumulated a.reserve for franchise tax for the
current year of nearly

$4o,ooo,ooo,

and the sum that they will pay to the

Government as a franch1s e tax at the end of the year will no doubt be larger
than the arr:ount. paid at the close of the year 1920,- not because of grsa.ter
earnings, for the earnings will be less - but because of s1r.aller
for account of surplus.

~ions

The items· I have enumerated as contributi..ng to the

earnings of the Federal Reserve Banks total $5,218,000,000, and if we con-

sider U49-,000,000 of net earnings in relation to that total, it will be
seen that they are but 2.9 per cent.



I ask you is

tnax ~g?

When

f"'-~''

Lr

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·. :~ . ~;~}

X-3156

the Federal Reserve .Act was framed care was takc'n that the stockholding
member banks should not profiteer, for the Act provides that their di vi-

dends are limited to fit no matter what the pro.fi ts of the Reserve Bank
may be.

The charge has been made, however, that the Government itself

is profiteering and the foregoing facts have been called to your attention

in order to refute that ah arge.
Before discussing present conditions, I wish to point out some high

lights in the financial history of this country as seen by the Federal
Reserve Board from the first of January, 1919 up to last Wednesday night,
May 18th.

Whon the United States entered the World War, our Government became
the principal employer of labor, the chief borrower of money, and the grsat-

est consumer of goods.

All of our activities were readjusted with a view

of furnishing the services, material, and the credits necessary for the winning of the war and our people willingly submitted to restrictions and regulations which would be plainly out of place in ordinary times of peace.

With

the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, the war was ended from a
rrili tary standpoint but not in a !inane :\,al sense, because we had a.b out two

million men in France and an equal number in the training camps at home ..
f.he troops abroad had to be brought back demobilized and disbanded, and the
men permitted to return to their accustomed avocations.

The business and

industry of the country had to readjust itself ag.qin - this time to a peace




f'''~'.r
(,

·~

{_)

-6basis.

The Government had large stocks of supplies on hand which bad

to be disposed of. and also a large undetermined li3.bility which had to
be ascertained and arranged for.

So in the early months of 1919 the

Victory Loan was flo::t ted and even wi tb the proceeds of that loan in hand.
the Government still had outstanding a large

flo~ting

debt, represented

by Treasury Certif ic::ttes of Indebtedness, amounting to about $4~ 000., 01)0, -:•v0
which'amount., however, has been reduced from time to time and now stands
:~.t

a ·col siderably smaller figure.
During the year 1919 the impression prevailed that there was a

world-wide shortage of goods.

The peoplc3 of the Old \'/orld and in A.nerica

had deprived themselves during the War of most luxuries and of many of
the necessities of life_

They had subscribed heavily for b9nds and

were saving and paying for them.

Oar Government issued obligations

amounting to over twenty-five billions of dollars within a period of
eighteen months.

The normal investment power of this country was es-

timated to be about six billion; dollars a year and it had become
sary., therefore., to expand credit.

People ·v-.:ere encouraged to

nece~-

b~y

bonds.

to make notes at the banks in order to carry them" the member banks
discounting the notes with the Federal Reserve Banks, and this together
with the burden which abnormal values placed upon our credit structure,
caused great expansion of credit.
Wages advmced.

Prices ::tdvanced and \iith raw materials advanc.ing

1nd wages advancing, the cost of production was greatly increased.

But

there was such an urgent world-wide demand for goods that even in Europe war torn and debt ridden -a very active demand for American supplies of
all kind sprang up.

Our large exportations to Europe during the flrst

half of the year 1919 were financed very largely out of



th~

unused

X-3156

-7-

balance of the $10., 0~:01 000,000 fund which Congreso authorized our
Government to lend to those n21.tions which 'NC're :~.ssociated Yvith us in tile
There remained over $2,500.0001 000 titill uneApende1 and available

war.

when the Armistice was signed .. and our large exportations to Eurore

most of the year of 1919 were paid for largely

o~t

durir~g

of funds advanced by

our own Treasury.

About the middle of September .. 1919. various influences v•ere at
work. which all combined, gave a tremendous impetus to production and to

commerce and business generally.

This impetus at first was

ju~tified;

but

the situation was soon afiected by speculation, and dangerous tendencies

developed •
. In the Fall of 1919 there was manifest a great wave of speculation.
It was not confined to any particular section, but it swept over the
country everywhere and over all countries.

People who had commodities

of all kinds to sell were in no hurry to place them on the market.
saw week by week prices rise and rise

They

a~in1

and they saw that as they
and
took this ~sa guarantee of the stability of prices, prices rose/costs
of production advanced also.

Mercrants thought it advisable to lay in

large stocks of goods in anticipation of future

requirements~

and many

of them were in no hurry to dispose of their goods at a reasonable profit 1
because it seemed that the longer they held their stocks the more valuable

they would bocome.

But there were dangers in the situation and not a f ow

were alive to those dangers.

Many, however failed to sense them.
1

were signs all over the world that a reaction was coming.

After

There

frequ~nt

warni.ng.. to which little heed was given 1 the Federal Reserve System took
action.

The discount rates of the Federal Reserve Banks which had been

advanced first to



4i'f

and

4l-%

were during the latter part of January

~fl.·.'~.--~\0

~

advanced to 67;.

·-· (_)

X-)1:56

-8-

The final advance to ]i:· did not come until abot.lt the

1st of June, 1920.

These rates \;er<J le s;:;~ however, than current

rates, and the banks having the

7~

marl~et

rate have recently reduced it, some

to 67;, and others to 61f,·.
On the 19th of September, 1919, the earning assets of the

Federal Reserve Banks amounted to about $2,350,000, 000.

By J.:lnuary 23,

1920, during a period of four months, they had increased by nearly one
billion dOllars.

Wha.t would have been the result if those who ha.d

charge of the administration of the Federal Reserve Banks had sat
supinely by and permitted this rate of expansion to continue?

If no

restraining measures had been taken1 if no warning sigruls had been
given, it is probable that this rapid and reckless pace might have
continued for perhaps two or tnree months longer,
would have been inevitable.
be done

of

whe~ a

collapse

It was highly desirable t~at nothing shoulJ

a sensational m.ture but/~l1fet unavoidable reaction should be

controlled and made as &radual and orderly as possible.

The effect of

advanced discount rates of the Federal Reserve Banks was merely to
slow down the rate of expansion.

There was no curtailment of credit

on the part of the Federal Reserve B::mks, nor w~s there any contraction
of the currency. As a matter of fact the loans and invested assets of
the Federal Reserve Banks increased from the middle of January, 19~0
until the 5th of November 1920~ a steady and gradual increase all the
way along by about $400,000,0CO~ The volume of Federal Reserve notes
in circulation increased during the same periodi from Jan~ry 16 1 1920
to December 24, 1920, from $2,80o,ooo,ooo to $3~4oo~ooo,oco, so that
during the most acute period of readjustment, when the sharpest react ions
were taking place, there was going on all the time a steady and gr:a.d,al
expansion both in Federal Reserve note issues and loans- $400,000,000
in loans and $600,000,000 in currency. A graat many people have been
deceived into thinking that the drastic reactions ;·1nich took place la.st
summer and fall resulted directly from some decree of some arbritrlry
power.




I',,~~(~

lo

-9-

I want

~--.

'1....!'

ou to kno·N tl:at the reaction which took place was

not decreed by any Govern;r,ental Board or by a:ny group of banks.

It

was decreed by the neor:le themselves, by the greatest of all forces popular sentiment.

people began to reduce the volume of their pur-

chases, becaree ·more economical and discriminating, and there resulted
a condition which is sometimes called t:re

11

buvers strike 11 •

prices began to decline about the middle of May 1920.

wtolesale

The wr.olesale

price index number on January 1, 1919 was 203 as com"T?ared wi trc the
wholesale price index number of 100 for 1913.

By the middle of May.

1920, the wholesale price index number reached 272 and stands new at
about

150.

It is interesting in this connection to note. again that

during 1920 when wholesale prices were falling tr.ere was practically
a steady increase in the volume of Federal reserve notes in circulation,
and in the loans and invested assets of the Federal Reserve

~ants.

The first manifestation of the changing condition was the break
in the silk market in Ma.rc:r 1920.

This precipitated a financial

crisis in Japan, involving the suspension of many batiks in that empire.
Next we had the break in the wool market about tre middle of May, 1920,
caused i?rimar:ily by an excessive supply of raw wool.

The War De<;lart-

ment tad large amounts of wool on hand, accumulated for war purposes
for which it had no need.

It undertock to sell at public auction in

the great wool market of Boston.

The sales were not satisfactory.

The British Government brought in wool from Australia and other
dependencies and attempted to sell it in the same way.
tions of wool were coming in from theCArgentine.
the western wool clip was ready for market.



Regular iroporta-

AbOUt the sarr.e tirLe

-10-

X-3156

/

Meanwhile it was evident that public O'!Jinicn all over the
world had undergone a change.
\

·.

For a wti.:.e back., :peOiJle did not see:m

to care 't)articula;rly what prices they pai,l. Tre r;::;.in ia.et:..

WE.S

to get

deliveries, and ·you will remerr:ber we had what is l:novvn as a sellers•

It was experienced in all business.

market.

Purchasers !:ad an id.ea

that ttere was a real shortage of almost everything and in some cases
there were actual
~d sho~tage

we

shcr~ages.

But after all this question of surplus

is merely a relative one.

may learn what the supply of a comr.~..odi t.J· is; t!:.at can be ascer-

tained or estimated with approxirr.ate accuracy, but no ma.h can state in
advance just what the demand for consll:nption is going to be,. oecause
that is a matter which depends largely upon sentiment.

It is almost

impossible to say what things and how n,uch ::oeo'l?le are going to require

or what they need, for while

actual human needs are very siiir?le. there

are a great ma:ny things people rave become accustomed to which they
regard as absolutely necessary.

Many a

man, I presun:e, has rLOre

clot't ing

than he really needs, and the depression in the textile trade was due

to the fact that :people realized tr..at they could do without new clothes
and that in large n:easure brou.&}lt about the demoralization of tl:e wool
market.

The retailers found that the;-/ had 1 i ttle or no demand for

woolen goods, and the tailors were not doing the usual business.

Tr"ey

did not order goods from the mills or they cancelled orders already·
placed.

The mills found, in the new circumstances. t·tat trev ':lad ax.t.9le

su:pplies of raw wool and

t:~.e

wool rr.ercr.ants called in their buyeTs from

the '.'Test and the price of wool droDT.Jed from about ?2 cents a pound do•vn

to 15 or 20 cents.



-11-

X-3156
Two or three months later the same experience >vas undergone in

the cotton market.

Of all Amarican products, cotton is probably the one

most dependent upon foreign rns.rkets and is most quickly affected by
conditions abroad.

People who ••ere engaged in the sugar trade iuagined.

that there was a great shortage in sugar.
Sky-rocketed up to

You will remember ho>; sue::1.r

25 or 26 cents a pound. There

seemed to be a shortage

of sugar, but there was much held off the market in order to be sold out
gradually at high prices, and then a situation developed) which seems
perfectly natural now v'Jhen we look backv;ard.

In view of the dep recia-

tion of foreign exchange, all other m.ticns vihich produced sugar,
attracted by the high price at which sugar could be sold in cur market,·
shipped sugar here and a great n:any nations which were not producers

of sugar but merely consumers 1 shipped sugar to us in order to get
dollar exchange - - in other words 1 they were perfectly ·willing to deprive themselves of sug3.r in order to get things they needed or desired
Consequently along in September there was a collapse in the sular

more.
market.

During all this time the
le~l

Feder~l

Reserve Blnks maintained their

reserves but they did it by means of inter-bank rediscounting.

There were 8 federal Reserve Barijcs at one time which were borro•;ing

$267 1 000.,000

from four Federal Reserve BJ.nks.

We had x.o financb.l p.::tnic,

the reserves of the Federal Reserve Banks were maintained in accordance
with the law 1 and there never was a time i.hen the Federal Ree.erve note

waz not redeem:lble in gold as required by law.
However1 since the first of January of thic year there has been
::~.

gradual change for the better in the position of the Federal

System.

Re~orve

The loans and earning assets of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks




-12X-3156
last l.ednesday night were

$2~314 1

point on October 15, 1920 of

$1~

000., 000~ a decline from the hibh

108 1 OCO, 000 1 Federal Reserve no~es

in circulation were $2,767,000, GOO, a decline;: since Christmas of
$637,000,000, total Cash f~Gerves have increased from~2 1 249 1 CCJ01 CCO
on December 30 to $2,549, ooo. OuO.

l'he Federal Reserve Banks are

strongj they hold today a gold reserve larger than that ever held
by any central banking institution in any country, an amount

eq~l

to more than one-fourth the entire known gold supply of the world.

The invested assets and loans of the Federal Reserve Banks
.have now declined to a point where they stood in September, 1::,19-

They

~re

about $300,000,000 less than their cash reservesi and

Federal Reserve notes outstanding have declined to an amount only
about $200~ 0001 000 greater than the total cash reserves.

Now-~ ··l'htm

any bank has more cash on hand than it has loans, it is in a pretty
strong position.

The Federal Reserve Banks 1 which are the ultimate fim.ncial
bulwark of all member ba rk:s and through them of the public are

nov1 in

a position better than ever before to extend to all legitimate businesb
the assistance needed and in adJition to having the ability 1 have the
disposition to do so.

There are no•·i no credit restrictions 1ilatev0r.

We must meet changed conditions.

VJc have a strong reserve.

lie have

had eJCperience and business is readjusting itself to the new levels.

There has been no
Federal Reserve System.

ch~ge

in principle in the policy of

th~

There nas n3ver been any change in the underlf•

ing principles of the Federal Reserve Syste,D and I hope there never will
be~

becausa the broad policies of the Federal Reserve Syste;n are based




-13upon the fundamental principles of
banking.

X-3156
~ound

finance

and

legitim~te

iTnile there has b_een no ch:1.uge in the principles of the

Federal Reserve System, varying conditions from time to time, 'however,
necessarily bring about changes in me3.sures and methods of applying
policies.
One thing that is holding back a revival of busir.es6 is the
disproportion and lack of uniformity in the readjustment process Y.hi.ch
is taking place.
for

instance~

There are some things, certain basic raw materials

prices for •• hich are very lo·,,-, belo•v the pre-war levels

and below cost of production, but there are other element::; ·.vhich
figure in production and distribution which are still high 1 which have
not been readjusted, so that somewhere in the process of distribution
between the primary producer and the ultimate consumer) there is a
hold-back.

The ultimate consumer is no·c getting prices in pror-orticr.

to what the primary producer is paid. One problem of the business
and industri~l world today is to iron out all these inconsistencies
and let the proper relationship betvveen one class of goods and anotner
class of goods and between goods-~nd services be restored.
It seems to me that this is one of the moct important of our
present domestic economic problems.

I take it that one problem of any

down

manufacturer or producer is to get his costs/in order

th~t

he .nay be

able to offer his products at fi~ures attractive to buyers, for the
sellers' market has now been replaced by the buyers' market.

The

farmer is in nard lines, and the farmer, as we knoi~, is a mcst important
element.
'

...

He constitutes a large perc10ntag_e of our population.

He ~s

the principal producer of the necessities Gf life, upon which the
industrial world depends for susteranca, and he is also the principal




..

.

r
eonsvmer of manufactured goods of every kind.

B04

Whenever any circum-

•tanees arise which impair tbe purchasing power of the farmer, the efis
feet/felt in eammereial and industrial centers everywhere.

·"

The reduction of over a billion dollars during the last four or
.

(

five months in loans and investments of the Federal Reserve
ed from liquidation

Ba~

has result-

tn the larger cities, in the financial centers and in the

manufacturing centers.

In no

a~recia.ble

in the agricultural dis'tdets.

degree has liq.uida.tion taken plaee

The Federal Reserve .Act :provides that all

paper discounted 'ri. th the Federal Reserve !anks must have a ma.turi ty af not
longer than 90 days, except agricultural paper or paper based on livestock.

which may have a reaturity as long as six months. 'l'he J'ederal Reserve :Banks
were carr,ving the first of

Mar of

8lld livestock paper, of maturities
<.

this year

$230,ooo.ooo

fr~m ~ree

of agricultural

to six 'YOnths.

On the first

of May~· '1920, they were careying *10~,ooo,oco of such paper and on the first ·
of May. 1919 they were carrying cnly

$66~oco,OOOw

Tbe Federal Reserve Banks have done a great deal to

sustain our basic

imustry Ul'On which so many other industries depend. !hrough rediScounts for
me~ber

banks they extended credits to farmers and livestock men during the

year 1920 aggregating three times the amount extended in
some people have that
i.a entirely erroneous.

the

19~9.

The idea. that

J'ederal Reserve Banks have been pressing the farmer

The Federal Reserve System is not operated with the

view of coercing, pressil'ls or oppressing anybody.

great safety valve of business.

It is designed to be the

It is the fil'lal reservoir of credit to be

resorted to in time of need and as such must be neither clogged nor del'leted.

The System has stood tbe tests of war and of the readjw;tment period

following lmd it finds itself now in a stronger position than it bas occu:pied

sinee the flotation of the Third Libert·y Loan.



.

"

,....
·

'f

..

-15-

X- 3156

'

The cash reserves of the twelve Federal Reserve :Banks last Wednesday
night, 'May lSth, were $2,5l~9 ,000,000 as against <1;2 ,080,.000,000 a year ago.
There is nothing as far as the banking position of the countr,r is concerned,
as reflected by the Federal Reserve Bank statements that cau.ses any ott.er
feeling than one of confidence.
I stand before you. today as a conservative ~d constructive optimist ..

The pessimist is with u.s and he has his uses, but the main fault I have to
find with the pessimist is that he operates at the wrong tirr.e.

The present

is no time for the pessimist,- .the time for him to have gotten in his work

was in the Fall of 1919.
I look for better conditions in the not distant futu.re~

an evsning
ei~her

up :process to go throu.gh with.

We have still

Things that are teo low rrus t

rise to the leVeil of those things that are higher, or those tl:ings

that are too high

~ust

come down to a lower level, or perhaps there will

be an average and we •till r: ach some l""vel half way betvle3n.

I think that we have passed through the most trying and dangerous
part of the readjustment period.

If

w~

can all get together and aid

the orderly processes of production and distribution and get the public out of the idea that things will go lower

~

lower indefinitely 1

than we will get same stability into the situation.

great deal of buying power left a.nd buying power

When one

i~ortant

industry resumes, others

The public has a

bege~e

buying power.

aut~tieally

revive.

In the changed conditions resulting from the wa.r we occupy a. new
~elationship

to the world.

We are no longer a debtor nation as we were in

1914 when we owed the rest of the world abov.t $4, 000., 000, 000..
world 1 s great creditor nation today.

The world owes us

We are the

$10,0001 000~000

on

account of advances made by our Government and owes us perhaps two billion



...

.
-16-

(it is impossible to ascertain th·· exact arr,ount) on private ?,ccount.
It is certain, however, that the lkite:i Stet·2s today is a grrat
creditor nation.

In order to maintei.n our rate of production, we must push
We produce more cotton, more foodstuffs, more of a grea.t

our foreign trade.

many things than we need for our own use.
with the uvorld.

We must reach out and do business

We must buy things from other nations which they can :produce

better and more cheaply then "ITe can, and exchange ccm1T'odities with them.

If

we dete!"!Tine to do business with end for ourselves alone, it seems to me ·in-

evi table that we must then reduce our production to meet merely Jlrr.erican noquireroents,
I know of no royal road back to business revival.
will test our :patience and
observe these sound

ener~.

~rinciples

but the process ·will be

wtich have stood. tb-:;

give and ta'k.o. live and let liv(}; giv() g,ood
W6 rec8iv~

and be content with moderate

L@t us

be~

morking

v~luG

t~sts

or

idt~as

to normal

exp-;;dited if ·Ne
of the agr::s - !.':'1:

s0n~~:G

fer -¥,hat

profits~

sane and reasonable - let us cast aside those

and got rich quick

ba.c~

spaculat.~'lJ

which w0re so prevalent eighteen months ago and

get down to hard work and solid business - th:m in dUEl

cours~

wo shall

return to more ordsrly and noi"I!JCtl conditions, and can d-3Volop not

3

fal#e and hectic prosperity such "'s was recontly exporiencod, but a
soundsr and more 0nduring era of good times than




W13-

havo evor had

08 tor;>.

'li"