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BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF

THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Office Correspondence
Tn

Miss Egbert

Date

October so, 1942

Subject:

From Martin Krost

Here are two memoranda: (1) A short one that may eliminate the
need for the Chairman to have a conference before the Economic Stabilization
Board meeting this afternoon. (2) A longer one if he wants more detail.




BOARD OF GOVERNORS

OF THE

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

ice Correspondence
Tn

Chairman Eocles

From

Martin Erost

Date_ Q^ober 50, 1942
Subject!

The Manpower Problem
:

Summary*
There is no manpower problem; only the problem of how to use manpower
most effectively• That is to say, there is no manpower problem; only the problem of
manpower policy*
The facts* About 59 million people are now at work and in the armed forces*
Unemployment has virtually disappeared; about 1*7 million people were counted as unemployed in September; because of various local, temporary causes — people in transit
between jobs, local material shortages, sudden shifts in demand, etc* ~ this number
will never be much smaller* The labor force —• the total of people at work and seeking
work ~ is already somewhat above normal, in terms of the proportion of the labor
force to the total population* The only numerically important group of people now
outside the labor force who could be brought into it are married women* This is the
supply side of the picture.
On the demand side, about 4 million men must be added to the armed forces,
about 4 million people must be added to the labor force in war industries by the end
of 1943* Taking normal turnover into account, about 14 million persons, 34 per cent
of the present labor force, must be put into new jobs; about 9 million of them, 15 per
cent of the labor force, must be trained to fill jobs new to them* These over-all
figures look serious; the situation in local scarcity areas is very much more serious*
Broad policy problems* The problem is so big that a number of different measures
are needed to produce a reasonably satisfactory solution* Organized labor dislikes
some of the measures needed; employers dislike others* The political problem is how to
keep a reasonable balance between these two different points of view* Anyone who believes that, even in a crisis, it will be possible to force a one-sided solution is
in for some nasty surprises*
(1) How large should the armed forces be? By the end of 1943 the Anay will
have 7*5 million, the Havy, Marine, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine 2 million. The
total, 9*5 million men, is about one-third of all men aged 18-45* Industrial and
agricultural manpower needs, shipping and land transportation shortages, and Lend-Lease
requirements make it clearly unwise for the armed forces to exceed this figure*
(2) How many hours a week should people work? In September, the average hours
per week actually worked was 43* Allowing for sickness, lay-offs due to material
shortages, and other causes of voluntary and unvoluntary absenteeism, average hours
scheduled were about 45* 4*4 million people worked 60 hours or longer, 4*5 million
50-59 hours, 24 million 40-49 hours, 5*5 million 30-39 hours, and 3*1 million less than
30 hours* Not all of these people would work 48 hours a week if overtime for hours in
excess of 40 were eliminated* Hot all of them would work 48 hours a week even if the




- 2 -

Government made a scheduled 48-hour week compulsory• Some of these people worked
short hours "because they were sick; others because they were on vacation; others because of material shortages and inefficient management; others because they worked
in continuous process industries where technical factors control the length of shifts;
some of them -- but only some of them — worked short hours because their employers
could not or would not pay overtime rates for the longer hours •. Because these
considerations all come in, it is hard to estimate how many people would be released
by lengthening the straight-time work week to 48 hours* One rough estimate would be
about 2 million*
(3) How can hours be lengthened without discouraging the use of other, more
desirable, methods of relieving the labor shortage? Lengthening hours is not the only
answer to labor shortages* Other, better answers are training; action to eliminate
over-staffing and labor hoarding by employers; drastic action to clean up the unwholesome situation in the field of raw material allocations; and measures to give the
United States Employment Service personnel competent to deal with the m s t problems
now being thrust upon it*
Immediate policy problems*
(l) Problems arising out of wage stabilization* Wage
stabilization solved no problems* It merely gave a new form to the problem: How are
people to be put into tfie jobs where they are most needed? Before the freeze, wage
incentives could be used to move people from less essential, to more essential jobs*
How the existing differences in wages are frozen* Some differentials are moving
workers in the right directions; others are moving them in the wrong directions* Wellinformed people knew that the freeze would greatly increase demands for non-monetary
concessions and benefits to workers* They also knew that the freeze would shift emphasis
from wage incentives to non-monetary ways of moving workers from less, to more essential
jobs* These ways cover the whole range from just letting people know where jobs are to
forcing them to take jobs that the Government considers essential*
The general trend of decisions by the War Labor Board on wage increases is
now in the right direction. The worse mistake that could be made would be to insist
on complete rigidity in the eixisting wage structure* The War Labor Board is avoiding
this mistake*
(2) What about a Mational Service Aet? The President decided yesterday to
postpone action on a National Service Act until some indefinite time next year*
Voluntary and compulsory methods are in conflict here just as in the fiscal field* Almost nobody wants compulsory methods; hence they will be postponed until they are long
overdue* Experience abroad shows conclusively that voluntary methods will not work*
Apparently the Administration and the American people will have to discover this truth
the hard way*
(3) Who should control manpower policy? The only hope of putting some economic sense into the manpower picture lies in giving the Manpower Commission, under
HcUutt, real, instead of its present nominal control over the operations of the Selective
Service System* Although Hershey has managed to get al&ng with Congress, both his public
statements and his specific policy actions show his ignorance of and lack of interest in,
the economic considerations that should underlie manpower policy.