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BOARD OF GOVERNORS

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Office C o r r e s p o n d e n c e
Mr. Goldenweiser
yrAtn W. R. Gardner

Dtajebraarr 19, i m ,
Subject; Harmful consequences of raising
the price of gold instead of reducing
reserve requirements.

An increase in the dollar price of gold of 60 per cent would have the
seme effect as reducing the reserve ratio from 40 per cent to 25 per cent; but
it would have other effects as well which would be harmful to the economy.
Additions to redundant money sup-ply*
The higher price for gold would add to an already redundant money supply in three ways:
(1) The gold increment of 12 billion dollars would be credited to the
Treasury1 s account and as it was spent it would increase both deposits in the
hands of the public and excess member bank reserves.
(2) The higher price would also stimulate additional gold -production
and the conversion of this additional gold into dollars at the higher price would
increase deposits in the hands of the public and excess member bank reserves*
(3) The increase of 8*1/2 billion dollars in the value of existing
foreign gold reserves would enable foreign countries to send a larger dollar
value of gold to the United States, as they did after a similar revaluation upwards of their gold reserves in 1934* Conversion of this added gold into dollars
would also add to deposits in the hands of the public and excess member bank reserves.
Subsidy to foreigners.
The higher price paid for foreign gold production and foreign gold reserves sent to this country would constitute a subsidy to foreigners. We would
be paying premiums for gold that we do not want* We already have more gold than
we need for purposes of international settlement. A creditor country such as
the United States with a strong balance of international payments could easily
settle any deficit that may develop in its international transactions with half
the gold that we now have. Gold is not needed for domestic circulation; and it
is needed as reserves against notes and deposits only to the extent that we
choose to impose requirements on ourselves* The British, the Canadians, the
Trench and others have eliminated required reserves altogether.
Threat to Bretton Woods Agreements
The lower value of the dollar in terms of gold might tend to depreciate
the dollar in the exchange market and create unsettled conditions there at the
very time when we are trying to' get the nations of the world to agree together on
policies of exchange stabilization. Depreciation of the dollar might jeopardize
the Bretton Woods Agreements.




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2

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General comments*
If we wish to add to our money supply (we do not at the present time)
it is far better to do so through an expansion of Federal Reserve credit, which
can later be withdrawn should inflation threaten, than to do so by creating added
billions of dollars in ways that add nothing to the offsetting powers of the Federal Reserve System. Particularly when those added dollars are created through
subsidizing foreign gold production or paying more for existing foreign gold reserves, they represent a drain on this country's productive resources. Nor would
foreigners be too well pleased if our action unsettles exchange markets and makes
it necessary for foreign countries to depreciate their own currencies.
None of these adverse complications will arise if the problem of a
falling ratio is met by a simple reduction of reserve requirements.




GOLD PRODUCTION
(In millions of dollars)
Year

Including an estimate
Excltding U.S.S.E.
for U.S.S.E.
Total U.S. 1/ |Foreign Total u.s. 1/ Foreign

1934

958

108

850

823

108

715

1939

1,389

196

1,193

1,209

196

1,013

1940

1,477

210

1,267

1,297

210

1,087

1944 2/

1,062

35

1,027

962

55

927

v/ Preliminary
1/ Including Philippine Islands

February 19, 1945




FOREIGN ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES
(In nillions of dollars)

End of
1939

End of
1940

June
1941

Official
Private
Total

585
2,506
3,091

1,266
2,519
3,785

1,440
2,380
3,820

Long-term investments

1/

1/

y

3,531

3,047

3/ 3,130

2/ 2,493
499
K
y
539

5/ 2,056
A/ 459
532
1/
y 2,051

5/ 1,950

750
5,848

7/ 1,525
6,605

1,808

1,916

Type

November
1944

Short-term balances

Stocks and bonds
a. Common stocks
b. Preferred stocks
c. Bonds
Direct investments

i/ 2,028

Other investments
Total

6/

^^old iinder earmark 8/

750
6,309
1,135

y

3,179
2,253
5,432

3,891

1/ Department of Commerce estimates.
2/ Reported to Treasury Department on TFR-5G0.
3/ Market value.
4/ Par value.
5/ Book value.
6/ Various values.
^7/ Includes estates and trusts, notes, debts and claims, insurance policies,
real estate, goods and merchandise, etc. at various valuations.
8/ Gold under earmark does not constitute a claim on the United States. It
is exactly the same as gold held by foreign countries in their oral
vaults except for the fact that it is physically located in the
tftiited States.

ebruary 19, 1945.