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PEHSOHAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr.

November 2 7 , 19U6.

Clifford:

In accordance with our conversation last evening and as
you suggested, I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum along the lines
of one I prepared last week for a discussion I had with Secretary
Krug on Friday afternoon.
I feel very strongly that i t i s necessary to take far more
drastic and effective action than the court procedure now underway.
I t seems to me that this court action is merely incidental, tending
to confuse the public and obscure the basic issue, namely, this
challenge to the sovereignty of the Government- However i t turns
out, the court action does not meet this issue and the practical
problem of raining coal.
I t seems to me that if the Government is determined to
meet the challenge, i t must mobilize a l l i t s resources, calling
Congress to provide any emergency powers that may be needed to deal
with the situation while leaving the question of long-term legislation to the new Congress, Every day's delay in obtaining authority
to commandeer coal in order to ration i t for the protection of l i f e ,
health and property weakens the Government's position. Millions of
tons of coal are being consumed daily for private purposes that are
not as essential in a crisis of this sort as the basic public need
to assure food supplies and warmth. By bringing a l l the powers i t
can to bear on this strike, the Government, in my judgment, can very
soon break the morale of the strikers and end the strike.
Sincerely yours,

M. S. Eccles,
Chairman.
Mr. Clark M. Clifford,
Special Counsel to the President,
The White House.
Enclosure



November 27,
the present crisis anounts to an economic war against the Government,
as the press generally recognises.

The President alone, however, can dramatise

the issue in these terms for the general public. He alone can appeal to the
public to face this rebellion as we would face a war.

The only alternative

to surrender is to prepare for a fight to the finish.
In a national broadcast or, in any case, in a formal public statement, the President should dramatize and clarify the issue, and announce:
1.

That he is calling Congress in special session to enact legis-

lation (a) to commandeer all coal supplies wherever located to be used and
redistributed where necessary for the protection of life, health and property;
(b) to impose fines, levied on union funds, and to dissolve the union; (o) to
draft workers, as a final resort, to mine coal just as soldiers are drafted
to fight a foreign instead of a domestic enemy.
2.

That, meanwhile, if the strike continues, and as soon as neces-

sary arrangements can be made, he will call for volunteers, assuring them of
protection at the mines, either by asking the States to provide such protection through the National Guard or by calling on Federal troops to stand
guard.
3*

That he is appealing to all States, counties and cities, pend-

ing enactment of legislation, to put into effect rigid wartime brownouts and
bring about the utmost possible conservation, urging at the same time that
all places of amusement and other nonessential places be closed, that public
gatherings be suspended, and tnat industrial and other users place themselves
under rigorous self-rationing.




- 2 -

Bio effect of announcing such a drastic course of action and the
calling of Congress itself would dramatise and bring home to the nation the
gravity of the issue.

It should be made clear that the issue is not one of

wages, hours, etc., or reducing labor's living standards, nor ia it one of
the legalities connected with the court injunction action, this being merely
a legal formality which will not settle the strike, no matter what the outcome,

The fundamental question is whether any group has a right to strike

against the Government and thus inflict irreparable injury not only upon the
entire domestic economy but upon all our international relationsnips. If
the issue is drawn in these terms, it will tend to divide the ranks of labor
which tend to be united by injunction action in the courts.
In this battle the ammunition is coal.

It, therefore, should be

mobilised and conserved to protect life, health and property to the utmost.
Even if present stooks of coal were equally divided, they probably would not
last more than I4.O days if used normally.

Requisitioning and rationing of

the existing supply is essential because the coal is not evenly distributed,
and acute distress is therefore likely to develop in some areas in a very
short time. The length of time the Government can hold out clearly depends
on how effectively the supply is conserved and redistributed.

The drastic

program indicated would make it possible to nold out for two and a half to
three months, with the use of other fuels.
If the use of the ooal is left to the discretion of the private
owners, even under the best-intentioned, self-imposed conservation, many
millions will be thrown out of work sooner or later, depending on how the




supply is now distributed.

The proposed requisitioning and rationing would

spread the unemployment more evenly and immediately*

However, this would

nerve to bring tremendous public pressures to bear on rebellious labor.
With Million* out of employment, the appeal for volunteers under Federal
protection would receive an immediate response and thus an immediate way of
breaking up the strike would be opened.

Superintendents, foremen and other

nine supervisors, not members of the union, would be available to work with
and direct even a snail number of volunteers at first, and production would
be steadily increased as more were recruited, and especially as the miners
themselves in scattered areas who are not in sympathy with, striking against
the Government joined the volunteers.
the miners' leaders know that in a short time the situation will
be so critical that public opinion may veer around to a point where the
Government would be forced to capitulate.

On the other hand, the knowledge

that the Government is determined to win, that it is prepared to take the
drastic steps indicated in order to win, would be a tremendously potent influence in breaking the morale of the labor leaders and strikers so rapidly
that public distress would in the end be infinitely less than by following
any other course at this time.

If, through the President, the issue is made

unmistakably olear as a rebellion against the Government itself, it will undoubtedly divide the ranks of labor.
feared than he is popular.

It is well known that Lewis is more

If he wins, however, he will emerge as a virtual

dictator of labor, nore powerful than the Government itself, and fear and




-uother human motives will tend to drive nillions to hi a ranks. Moreover,
surrender to Lewis would usher in a series of wage-price increases making
certain a boom and bust that would have disastrous consequences at home
and abroad*
the Government cannot afford to wait it out under anything less
than an all-out prograa. Lewis can afford to wait it out, particularly if
the issues can be confused and he can appear to be a champion or a martyr
upon behalf of labor*
to lose.

The Administration has everything to gain and nothing

Only bold action will convince the country and especially the re-

bellious labor leaders that thjs Government will not capitulate or accede
to any appeasement. Manifestly, the issue rises far above Lewis and the
coal miners. It is fundamental to the preservation of the nation and our
democracy.