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-25

September 16,

Honorable Jamea F. Byrnes*
Office of War Mobilization,
l a s t fling of the White House,
Washington, £• C»
Dear Hr. Byrnesi

Jou trill recall that soBft two w e k s ago I discussed briefly with you some aspects of the reconversion
problem.
Wo have been giving continuing thought to this
aatter here at the Federal Reserve* As a result of recent
sauting the Board of Governors and the Conference of Eeserve
Bank Presidents, a aeaorandum #iich contains a brief statesent of the problem as viewed by the Federal Reserve Systasu
I as transmitting & copy of the pstemoranduia herewithBecause of its broad responsibilities in the
banking and credit field, the Federal Reserve System is
particularly §onc@rned with the financial problgaa impending
during the reconversion period* Sk>reover,rthe System1* e»^~
p@rlence in &dbdni sterlng industrial loans under Section 13b
and war production loans under Regulation ¥, the System is in
a position to assist in working out the financial part of a
coordinated program suggested In the rr.esaorandu®. I should
be glad to discuss this matter further with you if you should
so desire*
Xours very truly,

H. S. Ecclee,
Chairman.
Enclosure
LC:nsI(



Need for a Coordinated Governmental Program Relating to the
Reconversion of Industry

As the war progresses, there Is a growing demand for the development of plans which will facilitate the reconversion of industry to
civilian production* Business nrgH)1iit1OHl find local authorities ar®
showing a growing concern over a variety of problems with which they
will be faced lontediately when contracts are terminated* They realize
that prosrpt soliations will be necessary if reconversion i s to proceed
with a sdnlmum of delay and in an orderly manner. I t is believed that
full production for war would be fftatly facilitated from DO* on If assurance isere given that the Government :1s working out • <MWH
| diWltlM ;md
coordinated py»gr— relating to reconversion of industry. This meraorariduo suggests such a program; i t Is not concerned with the MtBJ other postwar problems •
Some of the '.ore important reconversion questions ares
Will provision be Mdi promptly to clear priv&telyw
o-;-:3nad plants of Govermtsnt-owied inventories and »ni1|Wit after
termination of contracts? What plans are there for the disposition of surplus inventories held by the Government and by
industry? In what eases may i t be desirable temporarily to
continue production on Government contracts?
What disposition will be Mutt of Govern&ent~onn«di
plants and -nacMnery? Winch slants trill be operated, sold,
or dosed?
additional M l W H .:<ay be needed for the protection of subcontractors?
Will there be adaqu&tts provision to tak© care of
financial probleeus? How promptly will payment be reade on
terminated contracts? Are existing f a c i l i t i e s adequate to
provide prompt credit for the release of T?orking capital
pending such payment? Are special provisions needed for
capital and credit requirements, both for reconversion of
war industries and for readaptation of civilian lines of
activity, such M service industries, to peacetime conditions?
How will problems which arts© out of demobilization
from n i l i t a r y service -and the discharge of wrkers frosi the
i«ar industries be handled? Drastic poptilation shifts will
create serious problems for local business, real estate owners,
and local Governments*




-2-

As things are now, each war producer finds that his situation
depends on the solution of not one but several of these questions* He
finds that Government agencies are individually working on specific reconversion Droblems. The procurement authorities are no*- giving active
consideration to the r^any problems relating to contract termination, but,
in general; thes© responsibilities cease ushen settlement of contracts i s
co.es|>let®d, A related qu@sti.on i s the disposition of Government-owied
plants and machinery, which represent about one-fifth of total manufacturing capacity. Agencies concerned Fith such matters ares the Array,
the Navy, the Maritime Corral as I on, the Tar Production Board, and the Defense Plant Corporation.
h variety of agencies i s concerned with the impending problems
of uneiaployri^nt and reeisployiaent* Such problems will be of tremendous
magnitude compared with those following the last war. The aggregate number
of people ??ho will be seeking reenploynent during the course of the reconversion period may approach 20 millions. The situation will be especially
acute in some sections of the country where war-built plants have created
excess industrial capacity, A number of Government agencies ar« now isorklng
on programs to spread out the demobilization process over a .period of time,
to assist persons in finding nan employment in private industry, end to
consider other ways of ; .eeting ::bny local problatis. Among the agencies
particularly concerned with these questions eret th© Department of Labor,
the "Ear Manpower Coisraission, «nd the Federal Security Agency,
Financing of business during the reconversion period i s an essential part of any coordinated program. Adequate funds should be assured
to deserving companies which cannot secure then through regular banking
connections on the usual basis. Because of i t s broad responsibilities in
the banking and credit field, the Federal ieaerve 8jr*t*n Is particularly
concerned vita the financial problems* I t has had valuable experience with
the guarantee of loans Md* by private financial institutions and will continue to be engaged in the fHiiiniitrttlfltn of Regulation V loans during the
reconversion period.
Each Government cogency attempting to study i t s owi special questions relating to reconversion finds i t s e l f handicapped by having limited
knovdedge of or authority regarding other phases of the lsrobleau Mo one
agency has responsibility or authority to deal with the full range of these
problems* 16Mb T S could be accomplished during the war on the overall
problem — with no disruption of the war effort — if the studies and planning of the various agencies were coordinated.
To accomplish t h i s , i t is suggested that an official be appoint*!
with responsibility for developing & program. This official should have
authority to coordinate work in the various Government agencies on reconversion problems. He should have an advisory consaittee on which agencies
with particular responsibilities in the field would be represented.




-25

September

Hr» Ben 7. Cohen,
Office of War Vobill ration,
Ihite House,
Washington, D. C«
Dear Ban?
1 sin enclosing herewith a copy of a letter of
even date to Rr« Byrnes together with the accoroanying Tn
rand\m relating to the probleae of reconversion. Sine*
you and T have discussed this matter, I thought this would
be of interest to you.
lours sincerely,

SU S, Eccles,
Chairman.

Enclosures
LCimlo




PY

-25

16, 1943.

\

Honorable Fred I* Vlnson,
Oilice of Economic Stabilization,
Washlegtan, D. C*
Dear Freds
I am enclosing herewith a copy of a l e t t e r of
even date to Hr« Byrnes together with th« &ccorapanying ffie»o~
r£iG<Jaai relating to the problems of reconversion,

Since

you and I have discussed this s a t t e r , I thought this would
be of interest to you.
Sincerely yours,

m S, Eccles,
Chairmen.

LC:mlo




WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON. D. C.
OFFICE OF

c. E. WILSON

October 19,

19h3

VICE CHAIRMAN

Mr, M. S. Eccles, Chairman
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
Washington 2£, D. C.
Dear Mr* Eccles:
This will acknowledge with appreciation your letter of October^l^ and attachments
on the reconversion problem.
This material has been turned over
to our staff working on this problem.




Sincerely yours,

C. E. Wilson

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON

October 19,

Dear Mr. Eccles:
In Mr. Bell f s absence from the
city I acknowledge receipt of your
letter of October 15, 1943, and the
enclosures therewith.
I will call these to Mr. Bell's
attention as soon as he returns and
I know he will be pleased to have them.
Very truly yours,

Secretary to Mr. Bell

Honorable Marriner b. Eccles,
Chairman, Board of Governors of
The Federal Reserve System,
Washington 25, D. C.
CTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES

TAR
INDS
AND

STAMPS







THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASH 1 NGTON

October 20, 1943

My dear Mr. Chairman:
Thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending
me the copies of the letters to which you referred
in your testimony "before the War Mobilization Committee.

I shall take them home and read them with

much care.
Yours sincerely,

Honorable Marriner S. Eccles
Chairman, Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Washington 25, D. C.

"WASHINGTON, D. C.
THE CARLTON HOTEL

Octobar 21, 1943

My dear Mr* Eooles:
This will aoknowledge with thanks
your letter of October 15th and the enclosures
which you were good enough to send me*
Sincerely yours,

Mr* M. S. Eccles, Chairman
Board of Governors
Of The Federal Be serve System
Washington (25), D. C*




JONES & LAMSON MACHINE CO.
SPRINGFIELD
VERMONT
RALPH E FLANDERS

October 26, 1943

P R E S I D E N T

Mr. Marriner Eccles, Chairman
Board of Governors
Federal Reserve System
Washington, D. C.
Dear Marriner:
I have read with much interest your communication of Sept
16th to Justice Byrnes and, of course, find myself in
full agreement with the idea that a coordinated Government program is essential.
Mr. Byrnes has been so beset by a series of crises that
he has had no opportunity for thought on the longerrange problems, which of themselves will develop new
crises unless they are thought out now* Here's hoping
he will have a go at them before too late.
I was much interested in the research project on the
ownership of demand deposits. One point which, it seems
to me, very much needs to be taken into account in connection with these figures is an over-all estimate of
the amount of the corporation deposits which can properly
be credited as tax reserves. This thought comes automatically to mind in the case of my own company, which
has bank deposits of fantastic volume as measured by
any previous experience, and yet our quick ratio is
only l,04. Not merely our millions of cash but our
accounts receivable are all owed to the Government.
Unless this factor is taken into account,rcerymistaken
conclusions will be drawn from the interesting figures
you have gotten together.
Sincerely yours,

REF:BB
Cc: Mr. W. W. Paddock, President
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston