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New York Times, “Punishing the Thermometer,” March 27, 1945.




TELEPHONE
HANOVER

CABLE
2-3822

I

ADDRESS

" G O D S O N "

GODNICK AND SON
M E M B E R S P U T &C A L L B R O K E R S AND D E A L E R S A S S N . ,

30

BROAD

INC.

STREET

NEW YORK 4 . N .

V.

March 28, 1945

Hon. Mariner S. Eccles
Chairman of Federal Reserve Bank
Washington, D. G.
Dear Sir:
I take this opportunity to present to you some facts regarding your
recent proposal to tax speculative gains ninety per cent and also
some observations on the rumors that the Federal Reserve Bank will
soon stop marginal trading. I know full well the reasons behind
such moves and would like to bring to your attention these random
but none the less true observations on both subjects.
Inflation is not a state of mind. It is a condition of too much
money in the hands of the people and too few consumer goods on
which to spend that money.
The end of marginal trading would not hurt the wealthy class in this
country who trade usually only on a cash basis but would hurt the
small- man who has speculative investments.
The end of marginal trading would create a black market in money
as no rule to restrict the lending of money could be applied to
xion banking individuals who have tremendous amounts of cash available for sound investments.
The end of marginal trading would raise interest rates as "Black
Market Money" is not interested in 2%, 2 o r 2.9% interest. Speculators are not deterred by a high interest rate.
The end of marginal trading would result in the cashing in of at
least one hundred and fifty million dollars worth of B bonds by
individuals who would rather continue to speculate than to hold
government bonds.
In the matter of ninety per cent tax on speculative profits
such a law would have the following effects:
1. It would stop -- not diminish -- trading and put out of
business the entire financial industry.




Hon. Mariner S. Ecoles

-2

March 28, 1945

2. It would wreck real estate values in New York and other financial centers in this country.
3. It would increase the holding of securities by the big fortunes
in this country as they would be the only ones able to assume the risks
of stock ownership.
4. It would ruin markets in equities and cause declines in the
prices of stocks and bonds. Equities would sell at such hish yields
that government bonds would be dumped for s-ound securities yielding
six to twenty per cent.
I realize the problems that beset the administration but the malady
seems preferable to the remedy,.,: Other mora rational f-oi»ms of control
can and must be brought tob ear. An Individual post war:tax refund
in the style of corporate taxation might be the cure for an aggravated
situation rather than the end of marginal trading and the ninety per
cent tax would create a condition worse than that which they are to
cure»
Very truly yours

BERTON W. GODNIGK

BWGrîGK




March 31, 1945.
Mr. Bert on
Godnick,
Godnick and Son,
30 Broad Street,
New York U, Wew York.
Dear Mr. Godnick:
On behalf of Mr. Iccles who is temporarily out of the city,
I wish to acknowledge your letter of March 28. You may not have seen 1
the full, text of the statement that Mr. Iccles gave out on this subject
and, accordingly, I enclose a copy.
He would agree with you as to what constitutes inflation and
as to the fact.that high interest rates are not a.deterrent to,speculators. Certarinly they were not in the late 20*s.
He would not agree, however, that the capital gains tax would
have the effects that you foresee. But I think you and he are fairly
close together on the idea of positive incentives for risk capital in
the postwar. In this connection, Mr. Eccles recently wrote to a Member
of Congress as follows:
"In the postwar, however, what would really give encouragement to investments; that result in production and
employment would be to put a tax premium on productive investment and a penalty on mere speculation that furnishes
neither production nor employment, but results only in economic instability. In-order to induce venture capital to
take risks in enterprise that furnishes production and employment, I would reduce the excess profits tax from the
present 95 per cent maximum to, say, 70 per cent, and make
the normal corporation tax 25 per cent without the corporate
surtax. I would then exempt from the'normal 25 per cent tax
profits paid out in dividends, since they would be taxed in
the hands of the recipients. Ahis would avoid the double
taxation that is a real deterrent to the investor in productive enterprise. At the same time, I would grant an exemption of $25,000 to all corporations under the excess
profits tax. This would not matter so much so far as the
large corporation is concerned, but it would be a tremendous
boon to the smaller and medium-sized concerns.




Mr.

carton

».•

uodnicK.

-

Harch 31, 1945

U)

M»>ith s u c h
p o s i t i v e inducement t o r e a l i n v e s t m e n t , t h e
c a p i t a l ¿¿ains t a x would be i n s i g n i f i c a n t « n d , i n f a c t , t h e r e
i s m u c h t o b e s a i d l o r r e t a i n i n g a c a p i t a l g a i n s i>ax t h a t
would penalize t h e speculator looking f o r a quick turnover
a n d n e n c e i ' u r t n e r e n c o u r a g e t n e baft4 . t i d e i n v e u t d r s e eKingincome o r ±oor,er-r«nge a p p r e c i a t i o n .
The low c a p i t a l g a i n s
t a x o f t r i e l a t e k.O*s9 1 ' s c i r o m e n c o u r a g i n g v e n t u r e c a o i t a l
g o i n t o new p r o d u c t i o n , was a p o s i t i v e i n c e n t i v e f o r l u r i n g
c a p i t a l i n t o s t o c n u i a n c e t s p e c u l a t i o n t o maice m o n e y t n e e a s y
way."

Eceles
on h i s

«ili,

I

Know,

oe i n t e r e s t e d

in

seeing

return«

Sincerely yours,

Elliott
Tnurston,
A s s i s t a n t t o the onainaan*

Enclosure

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your

to

letter