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HEARINGS 0.N BRETTON WOODS ENABLING LEGISLATION
BEFORE HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMMITTEE
March 8, 1945 - 10:30 A.M.
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(Second day of hearings)" *;

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheron was the only witness
called during the session. He outlined briefly the problems which the
post-war world will face and suggested that such problems could be tackled
successfully only through the. cooperative efforts of all the leading countries in an expansionist environment. The Bretton Woods Agreements sought
to provide a framework for cooperation. He proceeded with an excellent
non-technical summary of "the basic aims and methods of the .Fund and the
Bank. i.Ir. Achoson considered the Fund proposal to be the heart of the
Brctton Woods Agreements for through its' operation it was hoped 'Countries
could be aided in abandoning those-methods of economic warfare which, center around exchange control and competitive exchange depreciation. The
Bank will be necessary to supply long-term financial aid for reconstruction
and development, aid which the Fund is not intended to furnish.
Mr. Acheson anticipated a question later raised by Representative
Barry (D. N.Y.) by discussing the wisdom of having two agencies to carry
out the two distinct problems involved. .For successful operation of the
Bank the training and judgment required were essentially those evidenced
by the private banker in the evaluation of specific risks and the prospects
for specific, projects. The management of the Fund, on the other hand, would
be required to keep constant watch oh the-entire economic position of the
Qpuntries using its facilities and the training and' judgment required would
be of a different nature. If -the two functions were placed under one organization, one or the other would.be subordinated. As for adoption of the
Bank without the Fund, Mr. Acheson stated that the main purpose- of the
Bretton Woods Agreements would bo frustrated if the Fund wore not approved.
In answer to Representative Barry's questions as to the relationship between the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank, Mr. Acheson stressed
the short end medium-term character of the loans of the domestic agency and
its exclusive interest in United States trade rather than in the broader
problems of world development.
Representative Sriith (R. 111.) called Mr, Acheson1s attention to
the liberalization of the provisions permitting exchange rate changes since
the earliest drafts of the proposals wore framed. Mr. Acheson suggested
that the provision requiring nations to consult with the Fund was itself
a major step toward international cooperation, and that the power of the
Fund management to deprive a country of access to the Fund if it changed
its exchange rate without Fund approval wa3 a powerful sanction. Undue
rigidity was not the aim of the Fund end the difficulty of setting original exchange ratus in the disturbed conditions of the post-war period
dictated a certain amount of flexibility. Representative Smith called
attention tc the provision that the Fund, if it regards an exchange adjustment as necessary to correct c. fundamental disequilibrium, shall not




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object to it because of the domestic social or political policies of the
member proposing the change. Mr. Acheson replied that this provision was
intended to insure that the Fund would judge the case on the basis of the
international situation and not upon domestic social or political considerations. It was designed to keep members from interfering in cno another's
domestic policies. Representative Smith saw the danger of increased regimentation in the Fund's operations but Mr. Achescn stated that he saw no
Chance for avoiding a far greater degree of government control of foreign
transactions if the Fund were not approved.
In answer to questioning by Representative Talle (R. Iowa),' Mr.
Acheson admitted that the Fund alone would not eliminate all unfair commercial policies, but stressed that the Fund Agreement was a necessary and
important stop in the right direction. In discussion with Representatives
Kilburn (R. N.Y.) and Hays (D. Ark.), }&, Acheson referred to Article XI of
the Fund Agreement as the means by which the Fund members would be protected against actions of non-member countries which were contrary to the
spirit of the Fund Agreement.
Representative Buffett (R. Neb.) stated that he found nothing in
the Fund Agreement providing for balanced budgets on the part of member
countries. Mr. Acheson replied that this could not be a prerequisite for
Fund membership since numerous nations would not be able to reach a con-,
dition of balanced budgets for some years after the war. Mr. Buffett ex- '
pressed concern lest other government agencies — Export-Import Bank, UNRRA,
Lend-Lease — might work at cross purposes to the Fund and suggested better•
coordination in domestic agencies might provide confidence in our ability
to cooperate in international agencies.
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Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System
Division of Research and Statistics
•March 8, 1945

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