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2/I8/I46

Statement of Marriner S# Eccles, Chairman of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, b e f o r e the Banking
and Currency Committee o f the House of Representatives, February
, 19^6, on Extension of the Emergency Price Control Act of lyLfi*

I should l i k e to begin by reading from my statement on
the extension of price controls made before the Senate Banking
and Currency Committee almost two years ago»

At that time, I said:

^'Inflations seldom get out of hand during -wartime, but the danger carries over a f t e r peace comes and
a war-weary people, t i r e d of wartime controls ana r e s t r a i n t s , are eager to throw them o f f .

That i s j u s t

the time when i t may be f a t a l to relax prematurely the
controls of war-engendered inflationary f o r c e s .

That

i s why i t i s so important to extend the l i f e of t h i s
l e g i s l a t i o n f o r a s u f f i c i e n t period a f t e r the war to
enable the country to convert i t s enormous production
capacity to turning out f o r peacetime consumption a
supply of goods comparable to what i t has shown i t s e l f
capable of turning out f o r war purposes»"
I also said then:
"Inflationary pressures are s t i l l

increasing,

and w i l l continue to increase u n t i l reconversion from




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wartime production to peacetime production has been
achieved and a balanced budget i s in prospect»

If

the public i s assured that the Congress i s determined
to continue t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n which has been so e f f e c t i v e , the great confidence which now e x i s t s i n the purchasing power of the d o l l a r w i l l be maintained—-without
that c o n f i d e n c e , not only would the successful prosecut i o n of the war be jeopardized, but an o r d e r l y t r a n s i t i o n
to a peacetime basis would be out of the question» 11
These statements of two years ago s t i l l h o l d , but i n
the meantime many of our i n f l a t i o n checks have been discarded
while i n f l a t i o n a r y pressures have been augmented g r e a t l y .
The danger of i n f l a t i o n , i n f a c t , was never so great
during the war as i t i s today.

Two years ago i n f l a t i o n pressures

were s i z e a b l e but our defenses were strong.

We had many checks

and influences t o ward o f f t r o u b l e , including d i r e c t controls over
the a l l o c a t i o n of materials, rationing, heavy excess p r o f i t s taxes,
strong wage c o n t r o l s , and by no means l e a s t , the compelling urge
of patriotism, which led the public to accept s a c r i f i c e s and i n e v i t a b l e i n e q u i t i e s without complaint.

Today, most of these c o n t r o l s

have been abandoned and the unifying f o r c e o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n war
i s no longer operating.
Too many of our defenses against i n f l a t i o n already have
been destroyed.

Once gone, they are d i f f i c u l t to restore*

These

l o s t defenses i n c l u d e : the repeal of the excess p r o f i t s t a x ; the




abandonment of most a l l o c a t i o n c o n t r o l s and rationing of

practically

a l l commodities; the f a i l u r e to f o r e s t a l l the development of a ^boom"
psychology i n real estate and security markets? and the early r e duction i n average hours o f work b e f o r e we had achieved the mass
production of c i v i l i a n peacetime output.
In the meantime, i n f l a t i o n pressures have continued to
expand.

Liquid assets i n the hands of the public now exceed 225

b i l l i o n and Y/ill r i s e f u r t h e r i n the coming year as the remaining
budget d e f i c i t w i l l be financed by drawing on the Treasury 1 s
general balance.

Currency and demand deposits held by businesses

and individuals alone are nearly 80 b i l l i o n , or almost 3 times the
prewar l e v e l .

A l s o , these groups hold 50 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s of de-

mand deoosits and nearly 100 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s of Government s e c u r i ties.

The potential demand f o r consumers goods, plant and equip-

ment, t h e r e f o r e , i s not limited by current income o r by available
credit.

I t may be greatly augmented at any time by drawing on

these b a l a n c e s .

This s i t u a t i o n , of course, i s the result of war

financing—the r e s u l t o f a p o l i c y which placed excessive reliance
on borrowing and inadequate reliance on t a x a t i o n .

Thus, during

the f i s c a l years from. I9J4-O to I9I4-6 the Treasury w i l l have raised
over if.00 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s , and more than I4.O per cent of t h i s w i l l
have come from borrowing.

Of the t o t a l increase i n the debt, the

commercial banking system w i l l have absorbed over I4.O per c e n t .
In time, the vast expansion of l i q u i d assets brought
about by t h i s p o l i c y may be a healthy f a c t o r i n helping to sustain




a high l e v e l of economic a c t i v i t y *

But now—-and u n t i l peacetime

production has been resumed at a f u l l scale and the brunt of d e layed demand has been met—the vast store of l i q u i d assets p r e sents a serious threat to economic s t a b i l i t y »

I t enormously i n -

creases the importance of maintaining a vigorous

stabilization

p o l i c y , including p r i c e controls and a determined e f f o r t to balance
the budget»

I f these things are not done, i f we permit the m i l -

l i o n s of individuals and businesses who hold currency, d e p o s i t s ,
and s e c u r i t i e s to l o s e f a i t h i n the purchasing power of the d o l l a r , we shall i n v i t e disaster»
I am not c a l l i n g attention to these things because I
l i k e c o n t r o l s o r -want to see them continued i n d e f i n i t e l y »

On

the contrary, a l l c o n t r o l s should be dropped as soon as i t can
be done safely»

They must be retained, however, u n t i l the t r a n -

s i t i o n to a stable peacetime economy has been assured and supplies
i n most l i n e s have become adequate to meet the demand»

As y e t ,

there are very few l i n e s i n which supplies are adequate to s a t i s f y
demand o r are l i k e l y to be adequate soon»

Offhand, I can hardly

think of a single commodity i n which the supply i s adequate»
Acute s c a r c i t i e s p e r s i s t f o r most products»
Because we have scrapped nearly a l l of our other c o n t r o l s , i t i s double important that we maintain and strengthen our
control of prices»

I f we had retained the excess p r o f i t s t a x ,

we could a f f o r d to operate p r i c e c o n t r o l s more l e n i e n t l y since
the danger of i n f l a t i o n a r y s p i r a l s would be substantially l e s s




because incentives f o r raising prices -would be checked by high
taxes«

Similarly, i f we had retained more d i r e c t i o n over the a l -

l o c a t i o n of m a t e r i a l s , p r i c e controls could have been operated
more l o o s e l y since the danger of a serious d i s t o r t i o n of

supplies

o r diversion of goods into black markets could have been met by
d i r e c t means»

I f we had continued longer hours of work, the c r i t i -

cal issue of sharp advances i n wage rates to maintain take-home
pay could have been postponed u n t i l the peak of i n f l a t i o n pressure
was passed and the job of p r i c e control would have been made
simpler»
I t has been argued that adequate supplies w i l l be f o r t h coming only i f p r i c e c o n t r o l s are dropped promptly»
dangerous f a l l a c y »

This i s a

I f u l l y subscribe to the premise that a f l o o d

of production i s the only sure way to prevent i n f l a t i o n , but I
see no assurance whatsoever that greater production w i l l
from generally higher prices and costs»

Of course, there are p r o -

ducts here and there the supply of which would increase i f
p a r t i c u l a r prices were raised»

result

their

These cases can be handled best

on an administrative b a s i s and I am confident that under the new
arrangement Mr» Bowles and Mr» Porter w i l l make whatever a d j u s t ments are needed»

I should, l i k e to urge that the O f f i c e of Price

Administration be assured adequate f a c i l i t i e s to handle j u s t i f i e d
demands promptly and without delay»

The general need, however,

i s not f o r a loosening of p r i c e controls»

Generaly higher p r i c e s

w i l l i n t e n s i f y the scramble f o r scarce m a t e r i a l s , the accumulation




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of i n v e n t o r i e s , the holding of goods o f f the market i n expectation
of f u r t h e r p r i c e advances, the disorganization of production, and
the f a i l u r e to supply those goods which consumers need most.

In

the scramble f o r scarce materials and supplies, i t i s the small
business i n p a r t i c u l a r which i s l i k e l y to l o s e o u t .

As prices

r i s e , industrial discontent and s t r i f e w i l l be i n t e n s i f i e d and
production may again be s t a l l e d as workers seek higher wages t o
meet t h e i r r i s i n g costs o f

living.

I t i s not t r u e , i n general, that production i s being
held back by p r i c e c o n t r o l s »
than anyone expected.

Hecoversion i s proceeding f a s t e r

Instead of the high ^^nemployment widely

a n t i c i p a t e d , the number unemployed remains below

million.

In

spite of the large l a y - o f f s i n munitions i n d u s t r i e s , t o t a l nona g r i c u l t u r a l employment by January had regained i t s pre-YJ Day
l e v e l and i s s t i l l increasing.

The Federal Reserve index of

in-

d u s t r i a l production was above i t s 1941 l e v e l u n t i l the s t e e l
s t r i k e and w i l l soon surpass t h i s l e v e l once the strike i s s e t tled.

Income payments have declined only moderately and by sum-

mer may exceed the l e v e l reached at the peak of the war.

Where

•production i s being r e s t r i c t e d , the usual cause i s lack of manpower o r materials and, more r e c e n t l y , industrial disputes which
now at>pear in the process of settlement»

Only i n exceptional

situations are low p r i c e c e i l i n g s t o blame»

Although there i s

much comolaint about low p r i c e s , p r o f i t s are large and i t i s not
u n l i k e l y that p r o f i t s a f t e r tax f o r I9I4.6 w i l l be the highest on
record»




A l l t h i s points to the necessity f o r maintaining our
defenses against i n f l a t i o n .

The most e f f e c t i v e thing that can

be done i s f o r Congress to extend without amendment the present
p r i c e control law f o r at l e a s t one y e a r .

The sooner this i s done,

the sooner businessmen w i l l know how to plan ahead and the sooner
goods w i l l come out of hiding.

I t would be unthinkable to l e t

p r i c e c o n t r o l s lapse or t o c r i p p l e them with amendments«

Doubt-

l e s s the Act i s not p e r f e c t and i t might be improved by some
amendments.

However, once you open the door t o meet the c r i t i -

cisms of one group, you cannot without d i f f i c u l t y c l o s e i t to
other groups.

Every exception adds to the i n f l a t i o n spiral and

creates pressure f o r other exceptions.

Every p r i c e increase f o s -

t e r s expectations of other p r i c e increases«
Our primary need and our only sure means of escape from
i n f l a t i o n i s production.

We must go to work, stop haggling over

pennies, and have f a i t h in our economic system.

No single measure

b e f o r e Congress i n my opinion c a r r i e s with i t the hopes and prayers
of the American people as does the extension of p r i c e control
legislation.

Unless this lav/ i s extended promptly and f o r at

l e a s t a y e a r , I am f e a r f u l of the consequences i n l o s t production,
i n d u s t r i a l s t r i f e , and i n f l a t i o n .

Prompt passage of t h i s measure

w i l l do more toward d i r e c t i n g the country into a period of peacetime prosperity and f u l l employment than anything e l s e Congress
o r the Administration can do.