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February 26, 19%1

MEMORANDUM lolls The Secretary of the Treasury,
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System,
The Director of Defense Mobilisation,
The Chairman of Council of Economic Advisers*
I have been much concerned with the problem of reconciling
two objectives! first, the need to maintain stability in the Govern­
ment security market and full confidence in the public credit of the
United States, and second, the need to restrain private credit expan­
sion at this time* How to reconcile these two objectives is an
important facet of the complex problem of controlling inflation
during a defense emergency which requires the full use of our
economic resources*
It would be relatively simple to restrain private credit
if that were our only objective, or to maintain stability in the
Government security market if that were our only objective* But
in the current situation, both objectives must be achieved within
the framework of a complete and consistent economic program*
ie must maintain a stable market for the very large
financing operations of the Government* At the same time, we must
maintain flexible methods of dealing with private credit in order
to fight inflation, ^e must impose restraints upon non-essential
private lending and investment. At the same time, we must maintain
the lending and credit facilities which are necessary to expand the
industrial base for a constant build-up of our total economic
strength* Instead of fighting inflation by the traditional method
of directing controls toward reducing the overall level of employ­
ment and productive activity, a defense emergency imposes tie harder
task of fighting Inflation while striving to expand both employment
and production above what would be regarded as maximum levels in
normal peacetime.
What we do about private credit expansion and about the
Government securities market is, of course, only a part of the
problem that confronts us. A successful program for achieving pro­
duction growth and economic stability in these critical times must
be based upon much broader considerations.




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We must make a unified, consistent, and comprehensive
attack upon our economic problems all along the line* Our program
must Include, in proper proportion, production expansion policy,
manpower policy, tax policy, credit policy, debt management and
monetary policy, and a wide range of direct and indirect controls
over materials, prices and wages* All of these policies are neces­
sary} each of them must be used in haroony with the rest} none
must be used in ways that nullify others.
We have been striving in this emergency to develop such a
unified program in the public interest. Much progress has already
been made, both on the production front and on the anti-inflation
front* Many peacetime activities of Government, including the
activities of lending and financing agencies, have been pruned
down* Cutbacks of civilian supplies and allocations of essential
materials have been successfully undertaken* Important expansion
programs for basic materials and productive capacity needed in the
defense effort have been gotten underway* Mice and wage controls
have been initiated* Restraints on consumer and real estate credit
have been applied* Large tax increases have been enacted, and
additional tax proposals are now pending* In all these fields
further action is being planned and will be taken as needed*
One outstanding problem which has thus far not been solved
to our complete satisfaction is that of reconciling the policies
concerning public debt management and private credit control* Con­
sidering the difficulty of this problem, we should not be discouraged
because an Ideal solution has not yet been found* His essence of
this problem is to reconcile two important objectives, neither of
which can be sacrificed.
On the one hand, we must maintain stability in the Govern­
ment security market and confidence in the public credit of the
United States. This is important at all times. It is imperative
now* We shall have to refinance the billions of dollars of Govern­
ment securities which will come due later this year. «e shall have
to borrow billions of dollars to finance the defense effort during
the second half of this calendar year, even assuming the early enact­
ment of large additional taxes, because of the seasonal nature of
tax receipts which concentrate collections in the first half of the
year, and because of the inevitable lag between the imposition of
new taxes and their collection by the Treasury* Such huge financial
operations can be carried out successfully only if there is full con­
fidence in the public credit of the United States based upon a stable
securities market*
On the other hand, we must curb the expansion of private
loans, not only by the banking system but also by financial insti­
tutions of all types, which would add to inflationary pressures*




This type of inflationary pressure oust be stopped, to the greatest
extent consistent with the defense effort and the achievement of
its production goals*
The maintenance of stability in the Government securities
market necessarily limits substantially the extent to whic£ changes
in the interest rate can be used in an attempt to curb private
credit expansion* Because of this fact, much of the discussion of
this problem has centered around the question of which is to be
sacrificed — stability in the Government securities market or con­
trol of private credit expansion* I am firmly convinced that this
is an erroneous statement of the problem* m need not sacrifice
either*
Changing the interest rate is only one of several methods
to be considered for curbing credit expansion* Through careful con­
sideration of a much wider range of methods, I believe we can achieve
a sound reconciliation in the national interest between maintaining
stability and confidence in public credit operations and restraining
expansion of inflationary private credit*
We have effective agencies for considering this problem
and arriving at a proper solution.
Over the years, a number of important steps have been
taken towards developing effective machinery for consistent and
comprehensive national economic policies* Cue of the earliest
steps in this century was the establishment of the Federal Reserve
System before iorld War I* At that time, under far simpler con­
ditions than those now confronting us, the Federal iSeserve System
was regarded as the main and central organ for economic stabilisa­
tion* After World far II, in a much more complex economic situa­
tion and a much more complex framework of governmental activities
affecting the economy, the Council of Economic Advisers was estab­
lished by the Congress under the Employment Act of 19h& to advise
the President and help prepare reports to the Congress concerning
how all major economic policies might be combined to promote our
economic strength and health* Still more recently, in the current
defense emergency# the Office of Defense Mobilisation has been
established to coordinate and direct operations In the mobilisation
effort* In addition, some of the established departments, such as
the Treasury Department, have always performed economic functions
which go beyond specialised problems and affect the whole economy*
Consequently, I cm requesting the Secretary of the Treasury,
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the Director of Defense
Mobilisation, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
to stu^y ways and means to provide the necessary restraint on private
credit expansion and at the same time to make it possible to maintain




• In­

stability in the market far Government securities, while this study
is underway, I hope that no attempt will be made to change the inter­
est rate pattern, so that stability in the government security market
will be maintained.
Among other things, I ask that you consider specifically the
desirability of measures: (1 ) to limit private lending through volun­
tary actions by private groups, through Government-sponsored voluntary
actions such as was done in a narrow field by the Capital Issues Com­
mittee of World War I, and through direct Government controls* and (2)
to provide the Federal Reserve System with powers to impose additional
reserve requirements on banks*
Under the first heading, I an sure that you are aware of the
efforts that are already underway by the American Bankers Association,
the Investment Bankers Association, and the life insurance association.
I want you to consider the desirability of this or other kinds of
private voluntary action in bringing about restraint on the part of
lenders and borrowers*
I should like you to consider also the establishment of a
committee similar to the Capital Issues Committee of World nar I,
but operating in a broader area* The objectives of such a Committee
would be to prevail upon borrowers to reduce their spending and to
curtail their borrowing, and to prevail upon lenders to limit their
lending* The activities of this committee could be correlated with
those of the defense agencies under Mr. Wilson with the objective of
curtailing unnecessary uses of essential materials*
Furthermore, I should like you to consider the necessity and
feasibility of using the powers provided in the Emergency Banking Act
of 1933 to curtail lending by member banks of the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem. These powers are vested in the Secretary of the Treasury subject
to my approval. The Secretary could by regulation delegate the admin­
istration of this program to the 12 Federal Reserve Banks, each to act
in its own Federal Reserve District; under some flexible procedure*
The program could be extended to institutions other than member banks,
if desired, by using the powers provided by the Trading with the Enemy
Act.
Under the second heading, you will recall the recommenda­
tion I made to the Congress a number of times in recent years to pro­
vide additional authority for the Federal Reserve %stem to establish
bank reserve requirements* I should like you to consider the desira­
bility of making that or another recommendation with the same general
purpose at the present time.
rou are all aware of the importance of this problem, and
the need for an early resolution* I should like your study to proceed




as rapidly as possible in order that I may receive your recommenda­
tions at a very early date* I am asking the Director of Defense
Mobilisation to arrange for calling this group together at mutually
convenient times*
At the same time that we are working to solve this problem
of maintaining the rtability of the Government securities market and
restraining private credit expansion, we shall, of course, continue
vigorously to review Government lending and loan guarantee operations,
Since the middle of last year, we have taken a series of steps to
curtail such operations and limit them to amounts needed in this
defense period* I am directing the agencies concerned to report to
me by March 15 on the nature and extent of their current lending and
loan guarantee activities, so that these oper ations may again be
reviewed as part of our over-all anti-inflationary program*




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