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14850 Highway 4
0
Suite #A326
Disco
overy Bay, California 94505
Bus) 925-513
3-3231
(Fax) 925-513
3-8465

Mann & Asso
M
ociate – Appraise & Co
es
ers
onsultan
nts
Providing Fair and Trustworthy V
ng
Tr
Valuations sin 1983
ince
www.mannappraisa
sal.com

STAT
TEMENT O
OF KAREN
N J. MANN, SRA, A
ASA, MRICS 
TO THE 
T
FINANCIA
F
AL CRISIS INQUIRY
Y COMMI
ISSION 
Septem
mber 23, 2010 
 
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman, and m
members of the Comm
f
mission. Th
hank
you for the opportu
t
unity to testi today regarding my opinions, analysis an personal
ify
y
nd
conclusi
ions regard
ding the fina
ancial crisis of the Sac
s
cramento ar and the factors
rea
e
affecting single fam residential real est
g
mily
tate market
t.
Before I commence with the re
e
esponse to the questio posed to me, you should be
o
ons
aware of a significa stateme which ha caused my increas awareness and
ant
ent
as
sed
sensitivity to the ch
hanges in th marketplace. FNMA represen
he
ntatives wer guest
re
speaker at the Appraisal Inst
rs
titute conference in 19
994. The re
epresentativ for FNMA
ve
told about 400 of us appraiser that we should be p
rs
s
prepared. F
FNMA then outlined th
hat
their nee of “live” appraisers will diminis in the ne future du to the an
ed
sh
ear
ue
nticipated
increase use of st
ed
tatistical valuation met
thods. Sin that day I’ve come to realize that
nce
y,
e
the futur of residential lending could cha
re
ange – and that to sur
d
rvive the va
aluation indu
ustry
I must continue to expand my valuation services.
e
s
at
xperience in the mort
tgage mark and ap
ket
ppraisal ind
dustry and my
1. Wha is my ex
pers
spective on how thes sectors have evolv of the past decad includi
n
se
ved
de,
ing,
but not limited to, the reg
n
d
gulation of appraisal
f
ls.




My training began as a real estate appraiser in 1980, du
M
b
e
uring the pe
eriod of 13% %
18% interest rates. It became clear early in m career t
b
my
that the mo success
ore
sful
and respecte valuation professio
ed
onals had de
esignations from the p
s
primary
ganizations For the residential a
s.
r
appraiser th choices were the
he
appraisal org
SRA/RM and the ASA.
S
ecoming ac
ctive with the two prima apprais organiza
ary
sal
ations
o By be
(Appr
raisal Institu and Am
ute
merican Soc
ciety of App
praisers) I w able to
was
obtain mentoring and continuing educ
n
g
cation which resulted in the increa
h
n
ased
obser
rvation of th market and the tren therein.
he
a
nds
In 1987 The Appraisal Foundation was forme by 8 maj appraisa
n
n
ed
jor
al
organization to help re
ns
egulate the appraisal p
profession w
within the U
United State
es.
As mandated by federa law, The FIRREA ac of 1989 e
A
al
ct
established the Apprai
isal
Subcommittee who are charged with oversee
S
e
w
eing the fou
undation.

1 
 



o In 1994, the FRB, OCC, FDIC and OTS proposed a rule change that
would increase the de minimus appraisal threshold from $100,000 to
$250,000, exempting more real estate loans from requiring an appraisal
by a licensed/certified professional. The regulators contended that the
proposed rule change would reduce regulatory burdening, improve credit
availability and serve federal financial and public policy interest without
threatening the safety and soundness of financial institutions. This law
was enacted to expedite home loan lending in spite of the vast concern
conveyed by appraisers and appraisal organizations, reportedly for the
protection of the consumer.
 This law allowed the mortgage loan to depend more on a
borrower’s creditworthiness than the value of the collateral (the
house).
 Under Title 11, lending institutions were not required to have a
licensed or certified appraiser providing an on site inspection and
valuation services for home loans less than $250,000.
 The products utilized to determine the worth of the collateral for the
loan included; Broker Opinions of Value (BPO’s), on line statistical
valuation services such as Zillow, and Evaluations (prepared by
individuals who may or may not be real estate professionals).
 One of my neighbors is not a Realtor, and he has been
preparing BPOs for lending institutions at $40 per
assignment for the last 3 years. A perfect example of an
evaluation being used in the lending industry versus a
professional appraisal.
Between 1994 – 2003. Bank Regulators referred the real estate appraisal
oversight to the state regulatory agencies. Many states do not have an adequate
means to oversee appraisers. It should be noted that the State of California does
not have an oversight “appraisal board” in the office of Real Estate Appraisers,
one of the few states which does not.
 This resulted in the influx of potentially fraudulent new licensees
who’s training (required to mentor under a licensed or certified
appraiser) may have overstated their experience. We had a vast
increase of licensed appraisers in the State in spite of the lack of
qualified/experienced trainers.
 (Quoted from the Office of Real Estate Appraisers “Effective
January 1, 2005, affidavits are not acceptable for claiming
appraisal education or work experience.”)
o This means affidavits were acceptable prior to 2005
leading one to wonder how many affidavits were not a
truthful document.

2 
 



The OREA was understaffed and there was extensive
backlogs for appraisers to obtain licenses as well as
investigations which may reveal fraud or disciplinary action.
 Prior to licensing – the Appraisal Organizations (Appraisal Institute,
American Society of Appraisers, ASMFRA and NAIFA) were the
organizations that any appraiser needed to join and adhere to their
Professional Practices. Rigorous education and peer review
requirements – practicing appraisers needed to stay in line, or else
the penalties and potential expulsion meant significantly decreased
business opportunities. Since that time, the Banks and Lending
institutions pretty much ignore the professional designations that
appraisers worked so very hard to obtain.
 During the last couple of years the IRS has acknowledged
the importance and preference of the professional appraiser
with a professional designation as acknowledged by the
industry.
o 2003 – 2005. The Bank Regulators Release Independent Appraisal and
Evaluation functions. It is acknowledged that similar reliance is given to
an Evaluation (not prepared by a real estate professional) versus an
Appraisal. The appraisal industry was outraged. The Regulators
released the Frequently Asked Questions on the Appraisal Regulations
and Interagency Statement on Independent Appraisal and Evaluation
Functions. This document was in response to the questions from
federally regulated institutions regarding clarification of existing standards
to select an appraiser, proper ordering procedures, the procedures for
accepting transferred appraisers from one institution to another, and other
related topics.
 It would be curious to know the percentage of subprime loans
which were Evaluations (the complete opposite of an appraisal
in experience, professionalism, training and does not abide by
ANY appraisal guidelines) versus Appraisal Reports as regulated
by USPAP, the Appraisal Foundation, etc.
o 2009 HVCC (Home Valuation Code of Conduct) was implemented with
drastic and immediate effects to the appraisal industry.
 Long term clients (Mortgage brokers, Bankers, Mortgage Bankers)
after 28 years of business development were severed. The
creation of middlemen to “protect” the appraiser from getting
pressure of value was changed to pressure of lowering your fee
and an unreasonable turn around time.
 On a personal note, prior to HVCC – the customary and
reasonable fees for my firm was between $400 and $450. In

3 
 












the early to middle 1990’s our fees were in the $350 to $375
range. In the middle 1980’s our fees were $200 to $225.
 The Middlemen known as AMC (Appraisal Management
Companies) are now in control of 80% - 90% of the lending
institution appraisal assignments. The fee paid to residential
appraisers is between $200 and $275 per report. The AMC
retains the rest of the fee, although not disclosed on the
consumers Loan Cost Discloser Statement that the
Appraisal Fee is split between the Appraiser and the AMC.
 As a result, many experienced appraisers, like my firm, do
not prefer to do this work and have concentrated on
alternate types of valuation services.
It has come to the attention of many that the unintended
consequence of HVCC has driven the more qualified and more
desirable appraisers away from the mortgage loan process, and the
less qualified are performing these reports.
The other issue which has come to attention is that some of the
AMC’s were hiring appraisers from distances more than 7 hours or
several states away from the property under appraisal. Resulting in
less than reliable valuations.
The HVCC is nicknamed the HAVOC Code and has driven many
very capable and qualified appraisers from the business to other
forms of employment.
 To quote Ann O’Rourke, MAI (author of Appraisal Today)
“the one thing I know is that the dishonest appraiser will
do fine as a result of the HVCC changes to the
residential appraiser; the honest and diligent
appraiser….well that remains to be seen”
The good news is that appraisers are not being asked to “hit a
certain value”.
The bad news is that if the appraiser has a question in regards to
how the lender wants an issue handled, the appraiser is prohibited
from talking to anyone else but the clerk who ordered the appraisal.
A very frustrating factor.
In my opinion, the consumer is being ripped off and is not being
provided the best practice nor safe lending by providing the most
inexpensive or the quickest appraisal versus the most qualified
appraiser for the assignment.

4 
 

2. My assessment of which factors, if any, contributed to the run-u in home
a
h
i
o
up
e
price and the collapse of the mort
es
o
tgage mark includ
ket,
ding but no limited to
ot
o,
inappropriate subprime lending, fla
s
l
aws in the appraisal process and mortga
age
fraud
d.




d
Approximate 80% of U.S. mortga
A
ely
ages issued in recent years to su
ubprime
borrowers were adjusta
w
able-rate mortgages.
o After U.S. house prices pe
r
eaked in mid
d-2006 and began the steep
d
eir
declin thereafte refinancing became more diffi
ne
er,
e
icult, if not i
impossible.
.
o As ad
djustable-ra mortgag began t reset at h
ate
ges
to
higher rates mortgage
s,
e
delinq
quencies so
oared.
o Securities backe with subprime mort
ed
tgages, widely held by financial firms,
y
lost most of their value. Th result ha been a la
m
r
he
as
arge decline in the cap
e
pital
of ma banks and U.S. go
any
a
overnment s
sponsored enterprises tightening
s,
g
credit around the world.
t
e
Using one of the publis
U
shed trends by the Nat
s
tional Association of R
Realtors and the
d
US Social Security Adm
U
ministration, we can ob
bserve the differential and the tre
ends
of wages versus home prices. We can see o the follow
e
on
wing graph the two we
ere
ame between 1963 to 1973 (the c
commence
ement of the Oil Embargo
e
nearly the sa
ssion). Bet
tween 1975 until 1985 there was a gradual c
5
5
change with an
h
and a Reces
a
cession in th mid 198
he
80s. Between 1993 to 1999 the
uptick after another rec
median hom price exc
m
me
ceeded the Average N
National Wa
age, but it re
emained
constant and the indice are parallel. The up
d
es
pswing and the really began in 1
d
1990
5
ave
and by 2005 it skyrocketed. This should ha been an indicator than
something is “out of line  
s
e”.

 
Source: N
National Ass
sociation of Realtors, U.S
S. Social Sec
curity Administration

 

5 
 



The Perfect Storm hit the market
T
t
tplace in the Sacramento area. D to the p
e
Due
prior
shortage of supply, the extremely affordable interest rat and the very strong
e
tes
e
g
demand, prices were in
ncreasing up to 30% p years w the high
u
per
with
hest increas
ses
between 200 and 200
03
05. 
o It was between 2003 and 2005 my att
s
2
2
tention beca
ame at full alert. The
word of FNMA in 1994 echoed in m head an I knew th trend co
ds
A
my
nd
his
ould
not la for appra
ast
aisers nor for consume
f
ers. We ob
bserved the decline du
e
uring
2005 and into 20
006, as dem
monstrated by the follo
owing published data a
and
confir
rmed with our in house appraisal reports. O clients d not like the
o
e
Our
did
fact th we were beginning to make d
hat
e
g
downward m
market condition
adjus
stments for the change in the mar
e
rket conditio
ons. 
 The follow
wing graph illustrates t average sales pric by County
the
e
ce
within the Sacramen Metropo
e
nto
olitan area. The inclus
sion of each of
h
the adjacent Countie was to d
es
demonstrate that the m
e
market within
Sacramen was not abnormal based on t trends w were
nto
the
we
observing throughou the area.  
g
ut

 


Not to rely on just one source, the typical app
N
o
s
e
praiser will review tren and
nds
compare the trends to our persona observat
e
o
al
tions in the individual n
neighborho
oods
of properties we are ap
s
ppraising. For anothe unbiased sales grap
er
ph,(publishe
ed
m)
ng
y
between 20 and 201 the
000
10,
by Trulia.com illustratin the 10 year trend b
ollowing gra
aphs are re
eviewed. 
fo

6 
 

 
 





The above graphs as produced by Trulia.com illustrate the change which
T
g
p
y
m
e
according to this source shows a median Sa le Price pea
o
e
aking out a the end o
at
of
2005 and the beginning of 2006. Likewise, t he number of sales tra
g
r
ansactions also
ning in mid 2005.
began declin
o Even though published indicators sho a variatio the overall trend is
ow
on,
s
reflec
ctive of the change of the market between 2005 and 20 and
t
006
provid an unbiased report of the ma
des
arket trends
s.
The following graph wil demonstr
T
ll
rate that for every dras increase of
r
stic
appreciation the declin is just ar
n,
ne
round the co
orner – this is a trend of apprecia
s
ation
ra
ates for the Sacramen Metropo
nto
olitan area.
o We can see the on the follo
owing graph first increase and de
h
ecline from
1979-1980 – wit the declin between 1980 and 1984.
th
ne
n
o The la 1980 ha a very strong upsw
ate
ad
wing to 20% but the de
%,
ecline was
signif
ficant and la
asted from 1990 to 1995.
o The next increas started out to be a g
n
se
o
gradual upt
tick, howev the upw
ver,
ward
trend lasted from
m1998 to mid 2005.
m
o The current dow
c
wnturn has been the m
b
most severe noted perh
haps since the
Great Depressio
t
on.
o It app
pears we may have hit bottom in the 3rd qua
t
arter of 2009 However the
9.
r,
loss in appreciat
tion was an aggregate 40% - quit significan
n
e
te
nt.

7 
 



Since I appraise both residential homes and non-reside
S
r
d
ential prope
erties ( I rem
main
vi
igilant of the trends of pr
e
roposed land commercia and churche construc
d,
al
es)
ction in new
w
subdivisions At the ba of any new constr
s.
asis
ruction is th cost of th land. Th
he
he
he
fo
ollowing will illustrate the average pricing priior to, durin and after the financ
t
e
ng
r
cial
crisis.
o The market area used for this depictiion is in the Towns of Elk Grove (just
m
as
e
south of Sacram
h
mento) and the Town o West Sac
t
of
cramento, a
also adjacent to
Sacra
amento.

Raw
w Land Sales, Purchased fo
or potential Re
esidential Subdivision: Elk G
Grove & West Sacramento
Period
# Transactions
#
$/Acre A
Average
Change
C
$/SF Avg Da
$
ays On Market
02
0
$98,510
$2.26
1999‐200
30
218
2003‐200
06
16
6
144%
$223,614
5.13
120
2008‐201
10
11
1
‐61%
$88,241
$2.03
363

Period
02
1999‐200
2003‐200
06
2008‐201
10

les: Elk Grove & West Sacra
amento
Finished Lot, Subdivision Sal
# Transactions
#
$/Acre A
Average
$/$F Avg Da
$
ays On Market
3
$6.02
13
$262,389
218
1
$1,212,429
$
122%
17.7
120
$266,721
‐78%
3
$6.12
363

o Read should note the diff
der
n
ference of d
days on ma
arket and th $/Acre
he
avera for the raw land sa
age
ales betwee 1999-20 and Cha
en
002
ange of value
of the following two periods
e
t
s.
 Run up in prices nor
n
rmally resullts in Red F
Flags by underwriters
and/or rev
viewers. In most case appraise have a d
n
es
ers
difficult if no
ot
impossibl task to va
le
aluate prop
perties in su a scena and
uch
ario

8 
 

typically do not deve
d
elop an app
praisal whic would illu
ch
ustrate the
actual sal price du to the lac of marke substanti
les
ue
ck
et
iation.
o Anoth source of observat
her
tion is the C
California A
Association of Realtors
s
Marke Outlook. The follow
et
wing outlook provides a comparis of the
k
son
numb of resale the per
ber
e’s,
rcentage of change, th Median P
f
he
Price for the
e
State and what the current loan rates were. We will note th the
t
e
hat
adjus
stable mortg
gage rates between 20 and 20 were ex
003
005
xtremely low
w,
and lo
ower than the following years as well.
t

o The observation of unsold resale (hom
o
n
mes) invent
tory is also known as t
the
absor
rption rate. The follow
wing periods were indic
s
cators as o
obtained from
my files and wer confirme with the C
re
ed
California A
Association of Realtors
s.
The shorter the unsold inve
s
entory, the more the supply is depleted whic
ch
result in the inc
ts
crease of pr
rices.
Period 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 


Unsold in
nventory 
(Absorpti
ion Rate) 
2.5 mo
onths 
1.5 mo
onths 
1.3 mo
onths 
2.7 mo
onths 
5.7 mo
onths 
9.1 mo
onths 

The media encouraged the “feedin frenzy” o the historical low mortgage rat
T
e
d
ng
of
tes

9 
 

o Many San Francisco Bay Area residents relocated and/or invested in
homes in the Sacramento/Stockton areas at what they considered bargain
prices. Housing prices in the Sacramento/Stockton area are typically 40%
to 50% less than that found in the San Francisco Bay Area.

3. My assessment of the types of loans that entered the market and how these
mortgage products affected the housing market.



In two words I can describe the types of loans between 2000 and 2005.

EASY MONEY!
o The following graph will illustrate that the period between 2002 and 2005
had the lowest mortgage rates since 1964 – and we know how much the
standard person likes a “sale” or discounted price. Therefore, the market
was stimulated.
 The period of very low interest rates stimulated the construction
industry, banking industry, finance and insurance industries,
construction industries and other ancillary industries related to
housing.
 Not only were interest rates low, but unemployment rates are under
6% which meant the public felt like they had money and security.
When rates bumped up slightly in 2005/2006 it was barely felt,
however, the financial crisis had already shown signs that the “glory
days” were over.

Mortgage Interest Rate
30 year loan financing
12
10
8
6
4
2



Jan‐09

Jan‐08

Jan‐07

Jan‐06

Jan‐05

Jan‐04

Jan‐03

Jan‐02

Jan‐01

Jan‐00

Jan‐99

Jan‐98

Jan‐97

Jan‐96

Jan‐95

Jan‐94

Jan‐93

Jan‐92

Jan‐91

Jan‐90

0

With the confidence of low interest rate trends and the easy
underwriting practices; the Consumer, the Speculators/Developers
and many of the Economists were lulled into complacency and

10 
 





became reckless in observing the various market indicators which
were approaching during 2005/2006.
Loan products were predominately the adjustable rate mortgages which were
starting out at 3.8% to 4.5%. Property owners were optimistic that these price
increases would just continue into the future – after all Real Estate Never Goes
Down in Value – does it?
Some call it greed, some call it ignorance, frankly, I call this mess not a
surprise.
o Lenders & underwriters were qualifying the borrowers ONLY at the
introductory rate of the loan (not the maximum the loan could be
adjusted to) – Seems dishonest to the consumer to me (Poor lending
guidelines)
 The volume of loan activity required the hiring and training of title &
escrow officer, underwriters, loan processors, mortgage brokers
(some who were not licensed)
o Radio, TV, Internet and Newspaper ads were BLARING about obtaining
loans which exceed 100% of the value of your home….Again –

Easy Money!
o When collateral/home prices are increasing up to 30% a year and the
public or media thinks it’s going to just keep going up – we must wake up
and realize that the Wild, Wild West of these lending practices would
eventually catch up and haunt us.
 My firm was receiving an average of 15 – 20 appraisal requests a
day via fax machine. Previously, our norm was 30 -50 per week, we
increased 100 per week which resulted in the expansion of the firm
to adequately process the reports. This was quite exhausting on all
staff personnel.
o Personally, in 2004 I began warning my friends, family and discussing with
colleagues the fact that the faster and longer the prices rise unrealistically,
the harder they will fall and that I was very concerned about the Banking
Crisis which would result. Many of my colleagues agreed, others keep
their head in the sand.
 My warnings came out as Seminars (Incredible Income
Opportunities of Residential Appraisers, Profitable Appraising,
Building New Skillsets for Appraisers, and Beat the Clock and Make
More Money) of which I wrote and taught at various Appraisal
Institute chapters across the nation. The Seminars were focused
on alternate valuation services other than the mortgage lender
(FNMA’s warning was still echoing in my head). I just did not
want to see my colleagues or employees unprepared for when the
demand for our services would wane due to the change of market
forces.

11 
 

4. The impact of the financial crisis on my business and family



Our children have been raised to understand that real estate is a good and solid
investment. Both of our kids saved adequate money to buy their first homes in
their early 20’s when they each got married.
o One of our children and spouse purchased a condominium in 2001, then
upgraded to a 4 bedroom home with a pool and great tot lot for the 3
children to play a couple years later. Like most young couples they
refinanced to take advantage of the lower rates and used an equity line
during times of need and to make home improvements. By 2007, baby #4
was born, mom needed to be home with the baby, dads’ hours/pay got
decreased and the homes in their neighborhood began declining. When it
was near the time to re-adjust their mortgage rate according to the terms
of their loan, the property value was approximately the same as the loan
amount. They began the arduous process to obtain a loan modification to
find out the lender may not consider them as viable candidates (they were
never late on their mortgage) and would let them know in 4 months if they
qualify. Meanwhile they investigated selling the house via short sale. A
buyer was willing to pay a reasonable “market” price and which exceeded
the value developed by the lending institution. After 6 months of the
lender stall or ignorance - the lender declined the permission for the short
sale. After a serious medical complication, the family of six (6) moved in
with my husband and I for 7 months until they could get back on their feet.
The children were relocated to new schools, and the adults dealt with the
pain and emotional suffering while they were trying to rebuild their lives.
The uncertainty of their housing caused them (and us) great stress – but
as a family we endured and they were able to rent a condo for the six of
them.
 The lender said it is to go to foreclosure…our kids would have tax
obligations beyond their net worth, so they filed Bankruptcy, even
though they had minimal debt in other areas.
 2 months after the Bankruptcy , the lender called them and asked if
they wanted to do a loan remodification.
o Obviously the banking system does not have a clue what is going on intercompany departments
 I know of 3 transactions where the home was sold via short sale
and was in the final days of escrow; only to have the house sold at
a lower purchase price at the auction block than the short sale
which was in the final stages of escrow (not a fiscally sound
decision for a banker)

o Not only does the banking system not have a clue but fiscally, their
behavior needs to be re-examined because it is NOT sound lending
practices nor sound business practices – consumer protection has been
lost.

12 
 



Please consider other owner occupants who have lost their homes
via foreclosure. You can multiply our family’s experience by
several million people (some 2.7 million families) in the United
States who have gone through similar processes in the loss of their
HOMES – not investment – but their “castle” is the place that is
supposed to be safe and secure.
 In the Sacramento area, a review of REO data suggests that
approximately 75% of homes that have gone through the
foreclosure process thus far have been owner occupied
(which is quite dismal when you consider the FAMILIES it has
adversely affected).



As I mentioned earlier, I have been a practicing appraiser since 1980 and have
been either a co-owner of the owner of a firm since 1983 (27 years). I’ve had an
office with 1 – 3 clerical help and 3 – 17 appraisers. As of 2004, I had 8
appraisers employed full time and 3 clerks. Once I realized the warning signs
were in place for The Perfect Storm (aka Banking Crisis) I began warning my
staff. Two appraisers paid attention and began learning commercial valuation,
relocation valuation, and other areas where their services would be necessary in
the future. The other 6 wanted to “make hay while the sun was shining” and did
not expand their skill set.
o On May 15th 2005 I went into my office and announced that based on the
lack of a lackluster spring (appraisal orders had declined 30% to 40% during
the prior three months). My gut told me the market has turned and that we
need to take some drastic measures, to be prepared for a long and
turbulent ride! I laid off the 3 clerks and 6 appraisers.
 They looked at me like Noah’s neighbors must have looked Him
building that Ark.
 The decision stuck and it was fiscally a good decision as the year
did not improve.
o I knew my lease would end by 2008 so I hoped we would be able to hang
in there, however, the change of the residential business resulted in the
need to move out of my beloved office in 2007 and sub-lease it.
 My 3 remaining appraisers and I moved our offices to our homes,
we set up an excellent system for intercompany communication
and kept the business going strong.
 The sub-lessee paid 50% of the 1 year of his term, then he skipped
and my unit was not really leasable for the remainder of the term so
I had that expense anyway.
 We had a lease burning party in 2007!
o It is now 2010 – it’s been a VERY VERY challenging time to be in
business
 Nearly 30% of my colleagues have either retired, moved or found
something else to do
 The AMC business (thanks to HVCC) has eliminated the
relationships I developed and nurtured for 25 years (what
happened to free enterprise?)
 Just because I spoke to my clients does not mean they
pressured me for values or that I would even consider
committing fraud for any of them

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

Many of the banks I used to work with on the non-residential side
are now out of business
 Commercial lending is at a stand still
 Thankfully we do a lot of estate and dissolution valuations.
 The erosion of the business has also resulted in us remaining
appraisers competing to obtain business so the fees are 25% lower
(so we are working more and making less)
 My firms “rainy day” fund has shrunk substantially in the effort just
to downsize and keep the firm operational (as expenses do not
decline do they?)
o What annoys me is that just like my kids did – I’ve done all the right things
as a business owner – unfortunately the Banking Regulatory agencies and
market forces just eliminated any visions of financial security for some
time to come.

5.

Other view and information regarding the impact of the financial crisis in the
Sacramento Region
 According to the Sacramento Housing and Redevelopment Agency, in their April
11, 2008 “California Reinvestment Coalition” paper, the fiscal impact of the
Mortgage Crisis will have the following effects;
o Direct Effects
 Borrowers
 Costs: Homes, Equity, Credit rating declines, expenses,
emotional impact, increased crime. Anticipated
$53,798,000
o Indirect Effects
 Municipalities
 Costs: Administrative, legal, vacant & unsecured property
costs, decreased tax revenue
 Anticipated Cost: $40,0345,000
 Neighbors
 Decline of property values, increased crime, eyesore of
unmaintained or burglarized properties
 Local businesses
 Decline of sales and revenues, anticipated closures
 Anticipated cost $7,427,168,000
o Social Cost of Foreclosures
 Decreased Economic spending
 Decreased job growth
 Decreased housing development
 Affecting ancillary construction or housing related
businesses
 Increased violent crime, blight and disease
 The long range effects of this Banking/Financial Crisis could have been avoided
if the lending institutions had been more organized and developed a plan to work
with their homeowners

14 
 



o Perha they did not need to modify lo
aps
d
oans or hav as an ex
ve
xtensive
forecl
losure rate if the mortg
gage terms could have been exte
s
e
ended to 40
0
years or if the ad
s
djustable ra would adjust to an affordable rate.
ate
cts
o The whole problem was ex
w
xacerbated by the effec of the c
chaos in the
e
banki industry from hiring the least qualified ap
ing
y
g
ppraisers, d
depending o
on
produ
ucts less tha a full valuation (for example B
an
r
Broker Opin
nions of Value –
BPO’s, statistica appraisals, etc.) to d
al
determine M
Market Valu and fina
ue,
ally
oordination of efforts to assist the public.
e
the co
o The le
ending institutions sho
ould have d
done everyt
thing possib to prote
ble
ect
their collateral by keeping the homes occupied and/or ren
c
s
d
negotiating the
loan in some wa – BUT KEEP the ho
i
ay
K
omes occu
upied. The presence of
e
vacan homes le
nt
eads even a good neig
ghborhood to blight. T
Then property
value “tumble” or plummet even more rapidly.
es
e
As of this wr
A
riting there are 2,400 homes in fo
h
oreclosure i the City o Elk Grove
in
of
(6 of the homes in tow and 56 homes in foreclosu in the City of West
6%
h
wn)
61
ure
Sacramento (5% of the homes in town).
S
o
e
o That also transla
ates to 7,20 people in Elk Grove who were “unhomed
00
n
e
e
d”
and 1,683 peopl in West Sacramento who now lack home ownership
1
le
S
o
p.
When you put fa
n
aces on the people, they could be your family and/or
ese
r
friend as well.
ds

Thank you for allow
y
wing me to share with you my tho
oughts, opin
nions and a
analyses. It is
t
with sinc
cere optimis and hop that you can find on or more solutions to this crisis as
sm
pe
ne
s
a result of pinpointi the contributing fac
ing
ctors.

tfully submitted,  
Respect

Karen J. Ma State C
K
ann
Certified Ge
eneral Appr
raiser

15 
 

1485 Highway 4
50
Suite #A326
e
Disc
covery Bay, California 9450
05
Bu 925-513us)
-3231
(Fa 925-513ax)
-8465

Man & Associ
nn A
iates – App
praise &
ers
Consultants
C
s
Providing Fair and Trustworthy V
ng
Tr
Valuations sin 1983
ince
www.mannappraisa
sal.com

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