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STATEMENT
OF
Ellen S. Wilcox
Special Agent
Florida Department of Law Enforcement
Tampa Bay Regional Operations Center
Tampa, Florida

REGARDING A HEARING ON

. “The Role of Mortgage Fraud in
the Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Miami, Florida.”

BEFORE
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION

September 21, 2010
Florida International University
Miami, FL

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee. I would like begin by thanking this
Committee for the opportunity to represent the State of Florida and the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement on the topic of investigating mortgage fraud. I am Special Agent Ellen Wilcox
with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. FDLE Special Agents investigate complex
felony cases which target criminal organizations, whose illegal activities and/or associates cross
jurisdictional boundaries, include multiple victims, represent a major social or economic impact
to Florida, and/or address a significant public safety concern. FDLE’s primary investigative
efforts are divided into five focus areas: Violent Crime, Economic Crime, Major Drugs, Public
Integrity and Domestic Security. Mortgage Fraud is a major component of the Economic Crime
focus and is one of the top priorities for FDLE. The Department is committed to working
complex, protracted high impact criminal investigations. Because of their complexity, cases are
lengthy and labor intensive, resulting in Special Agents investing more hours in fewer cases over
a longer period of time. Also, the elimination of Special Agent positions due to budget reductions
has had an impact on the number of cases that are being investigated.
Mortgage fraud is not new; it has existed for many years; however, in 2003/2004, the mortgage
industry exploded, particularly in the sub-prime arena, and mortgage fraud followed along. The
extreme price increases in the real estate market have provided for easy concealment of criminal
activities and other abuses as the perpetrators’ schemes were concealed in, and absorbed by, the
legitimate rise in real estate values and sales. Now that the real estate market has tanked, these
frauds are more apparent and are being reported by the investment firms left holding the bad
loans.
The State of Florida and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement have been addressing the
mortgage fraud problem for many years. In 2005, FDLE Office of Statewide Intelligence issued
a mortgage fraud assessment, warning that mortgage fraud was running rampant. This document
and other research were used to support the need for a new mortgage fraud statute, which was
passed by the Florida legislature in 2007. The Economic Crime Bureau for Miami-Dade Police
Department was instrumental in getting this legislation passed. This Bureau also identified the
need to train more investigators and obtained a grant to provide specialized training to law
enforcement investigators throughout the state in 2008. In 2009, the Tampa US Attorney’s office
also coordinated a two day seminar for state and federal investigators and prosecutors. This was
significant as there is very little training on financial crimes available for prosecutors. I am an
adjunct instructor for the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) in their course, Financial
Records Evaluation and Analysis. The course is applicable to the investigation of any financial
crime, but the case study used during the course is a mortgage fraud investigation. FDLE has
helped to sponsor this class throughout the state since 2000. Because mortgage fraud cases are
complex, this type of specialized training is needed for successful investigations; however, most
agencies training budgets have been cut back and can fund only mandatory law enforcement
training. Fortunately, all of the training mentioned above was able to be provided free to the law
enforcement community.
FDLE has dedicated at least two Special Agents per FDLE region/office with expertise in
mortgage fraud to investigate mortgage fraud cases. There are currently 40 Special Agents with
active mortgage fraud investigations (16% of total agents). Within my squad, 3 of the 6 Special
Agents have open mortgage fraud investigations. Numerous FDLE cases are being worked jointly
with Office of Financial Regulation, which is the agency under Florida’s Chief Financial Officer
that regulate and investigate mortgage brokers. This partnership brings another level of expertise
to an investigation. FDLE is also participating in Federal Mortgage Fraud Task Forces through
the state. I am part of the FBI Mortgage Fraud Task Force in Tampa. This has helped to promote
a more cooperative atmosphere between all state, local and federal agencies to ensure that all

available resources were being focused on the mortgage fraud issue. Even with all these joint
efforts, resources are still limited. Limited resources and the complicity of mortgage fraud cases
result in only the most egregious of the offenses and offenders being targeted for investigation
and prosecution.
I would like to cover some of the problem areas that investigators have encountered while
investigating mortgage fraud:
1. Mortgage fraud investigations are complex and paper intense, causing most investigators
and prosecutors to shy away from these types of cases. The typical mortgage fraud
investigation takes one to two years to investigate. Most Sheriff’s Offices or Police
Departments can not dedicate that length of time to a single investigation. The length of
these investigations makes them less attractive to both investigative agencies and
prosecutors trying to justify their budgets based on investigative statistics. The FDLE
case known as “Florida Beautiful” was opened in 2005; that is when FDLE was asked to
assist in the investigation. The case had already been developed and worked by Tampa
Police Department and Hillsborough County Consumer Protection for almost a year.
During this five year investigation, ten investigators and two prosecutors contributed
significant time to this task force. Over 250 subpoenas were served resulting in tens of
thousands of documents, which were all reviewed and analyzed. The investigation
resulted in 18 arrests. The defendants ranged from the processor in the mortgage
brokerage business, to the construction foreman, to the mortgage broker, and up to a Vice
President of a national sub-prime lender. Two defendants are still awaiting trial.
Many of the mortgages being investigated for fraud were stated income loans, commonly
referred to as a “liar’s loan”. The borrower was allowed to state their place of
employment and their income amount. The lender usually verified the place of
employment, but accepted the income amount as long as it fell within very lenient range
of typical salaries for that employment type. I work for a State agency, so I do not have
access to federal tax returns. In order to prove that the income amount is false, I need to
do a complete analysis on my target’s financial status for that time period. This requires
obtaining and analyzing records from all of the target’s bank accounts. This process is
time consuming and costly, as state law allows for reimbursement for the production of
records in response to a subpoena.
2. No one at the state level is mandated to coordinate the response of the various agencies
that regulate the mortgage and real estate industry. When a victim tries to file a criminal
complaint, they generally go their local Police Department or Sheriff’s Office. If the
complaint involves mortgage fraud, most street officers really do not understand the
complaint and, in the past, have told the victim that their complaint is either civil or
regulatory. Most Police Departments and Sheriff’s Offices now require that a report of
the alleged crime be written, even if the complaint might ultimately be determined to be
civil or regulatory. The victim may also try to file a complaint with a Florida regulatory
agency. However, in Florida, there are at least four different regulatory agencies that
govern parties to a mortgage transaction. Complaints to one agency were not necessarily
shared with other agencies that could have investigated or might have received
complaints about the same schemes. With the formation of task forces throughout the
state, we are slowly overcoming the issue of sharing information.
3. If you ask a State prosecutor what the number one problem is the answer will be Statute
of Limitations. Most mortgage fraud will not be reported until the mortgage goes bad,

but the “crime” occurred when the money was lent. If there was mortgage fraud in the
granting of a mortgage loan in 2004, it can not longer be criminally charged. In Florida,
the statute of limitations for obtaining a mortgage by false representations is only three
years; for an organized scheme to defraud it is four years; and for grand theft, the statute
of limitations is five years. In a conspiracy or racketeering charge, the mortgages prior
to 2005 can be used as predicate acts, but not actually charged as substantive crimes. This
has impact on the sentencing guidelines. There is a fraud exception to the statute of
limitations, conditioned upon the date of discovery of the fraud, that can extend the time
period for up to 3 years; However, most agencies, both investigative and prosecutorial,
can not justify spending a year or more on an investigation that is relying solely on this
exception. This is due to fact that pinpointing such a date is often speculative and difficult
to prove, and if the exception is disallowed, or the agreed upon time moves, the case
might be lost due to the events falling outside the statute of limitations.
4. In a criminal case, the State must have a witness from the original lender as the lender is
the “victim”. This witness must identify the documents that were critical to their lending
decision. The witness must then testify that “if he/she had known that these documents
critical to the lending decision were fraudulent, he/she would not have loaned the
money”. If the lender is out of business, how does the state find that witness? Defunct
lenders that gave out substantial mortgage loans in Florida include Argent Mortgage;
AmeriQuest; Long Beach Mortgage; Mortgageit; First NLC Financial Services; First
National Bank of Arizona, Ownit Mortgage Solutions; American Brokers Conduit; First
Franklin; Taylor, Bean, & Whitaker Mortgage Corp., etc.
We spend an exorbitant amount of time trying to find someone that worked for that now
defunct lender. If I find a former underwriter or account manager, I then tell them that I
need them for one or two days to testify on behalf of a company that they no longer work
for. The “testifying” part usually scares away half of my prospects. Then I tell them that
we will be paying actual expenses, plus a $5.00 witness fee. A trial subpoena requires
their current employer to release them to testify, but it does not require the employer to
pay the employee for the time missed. That does not leave a lot of incentive for people
to testify on behalf of the State.
5. In a criminal investigation, the first hurdle that we must overcome is obtaining the
documentation of the mortgage transaction from both the lender and the title company.
The lender’s file provides the information about the lending decision and the
documentation provided by the borrower and/or broker to support this lending decision.
The title file allows the investigator to “follow the money”. If the lender and/or title
company is out of business, how can we find the records? Under Florida laws, the
records retention period for a mortgage broker is only three years. For a lender, the
records retention period is three years by state law and five years by federal law. For a
title company, the records retention period is the longest at seven years. But if the
company goes out of business, what does the owner do with the business’ records? Most
destroy their records. What are the consequences? On the state level, the owner could
be held responsible for failure to maintain records by revoking the individual’s license,
fines, and other penalties. However, realistically nothing is done. In one of my
investigation, I found that a Federal bankruptcy judge granted an order to a major lender
to destroy their records because the lender could not afford to pay the storage fee. In
another case, the lender was a bank taken over by FDIC so two different state subpoena
were issued. In response to the first state subpoena, a FDIC senior attorney responded
“that as a federal agency, the FDIC is not subject to a subpoena issued by a state court in

connection with proceedings in which the agency is not a party”. For the second
subpoena, the FDIC took over a year to response and responded by stating that the loan
file could not be located. In most cases, the lender file can be located by contacting the
loan servicer. However, we are now facing a court challenge as to the use of this file
from the loan servicer.
6. If the information on the loan application is false, how does an investigator prove who
put down that false information? For most loans, the information on the loan application
is input into a computer program, printed and then faxed to the lender. For some lenders,
an application can be completed online. So who provided the false information - the
mortgage broker, the borrower, a lender representative? One defendant has put forth the
defense that that information and the documents passed through so many hands, the state
can never prove who actually put in the false information and supplied the false
supporting documentation. Without originals, a handwriting analysis cannot even be
done on the signatures.
7. In Florida, most closings are handled by title companies. The typical borrower views the
title company as “trustworthy” authority and believes that the title company is watching
out for their best interest. However, title companies are an independent third party and
do not represent any of the parties of the transaction. According to a title agent, the title
company should be more aligned with the interest of the lender as they have to certify
that they have followed the lenders’ closing instructions. In reality, title companies are
loyal to their clients; usually the mortgage brokers or realtors, as their future business rely
on repeat business from these brokers.
A typical closing occurs at a title company and the licensed title agent goes over the
documents as the buyer/borrower signing each document. The title agent will usually
point out the terms of the note and explain the basic purpose of each document.
However, a title company is allowed to use a mobile notary to handle closings that can
not occur in the title office. I interviewed an individual that had a very lucrative mobile
notary business during the housing boom. This individual stated that a mobile notary’s
job is to make sure the buyer/borrower signs all of the closing documents and that the
person signing matches a valid form of identification. This mobile notary specifically
stated that he DOES NOT go over any of the documents being signed; he just points out
where the document must be signed. In almost every investigation where the
borrower/”investor” claimed that they just signed the documents, a mobile notary was
used. In the Florida Beautiful case, the mortgage broker paid to have his employees
become notaries so that they could handle the closings and control what the borrower saw
and signed.
8. The last problem is probably the biggest obstacle to a criminal case – proving INTENT.
We have numerous cases where “investors” were brought into a scheme to make money
from flipping houses. These “investors” were told that their name and credit would just
be used to buy houses. After the houses were “fixed” up, the houses would be re-sold
and they would participate in the profit. Some were even paid part of the “profit” upfront
for the use of their credit. Now that the market has crashed, these investors are left with
these houses in their names and the mortgages in foreclosure. The “investors” are now
claiming that they are victims. The “investor” is shown the loan documents filled with
false information. The investor responds that they did not provide that information to the
lender; it was done by a third party. At the closing, the “investor” did sign the closing
documents, but did not read what they were signing. The closing person just pointed to

spot on each document where they should sign. This scenario happened regularly during
the housing boom.
Now in 2010, what do we do with that “investor”? If the State charges the “investor” with
submitting false loan documents, his first defense is that he gave the correct information
to the mortgage broker and the broker changed the information and submitted it to the
lender. A prominent defense attorney just presented his potential defense to the State by
saying that there is a distinct difference between false documents and fraudulent
documents. Fraudulent documents imply intent. His client may have signed documents
with false information, but did not have any intent to defraud the lender. Therefore, with
no intent, his client has not committed a crime. It doesn’t matter that the borrower signed
a loan application right under an attestation that the information is true and correct,
because no one reads that part and no one at the closing explained the documents before
they were signed.
If the State charges the mortgage broker with submitting false documents on behalf of the
borrower, the first defense raised will be that the borrower provided the false information
and that the broker just passed it onto the lender. Therefore, the broker had no intent to
defraud the lender. Besides, the borrower signed the final loan application at the closing
which had all of the false information on it. For an application that failed to list other real
estate owned and their corresponding liabilities, another defense has been presented the
loan application is completed by an online software program that self populates the
various fields, particularly liabilities, with information directly from a credit report.
Therefore, if other mortgage debt was not listed, it was just an “error” caused by the
credit reporting agency.
What if the “investor” was a waitress that actually made $1,200 per month, but the loan
application stated that she made $9,000 per month and she managed to buy four (4)
houses totaling $900,000 within seven (7) months? This waitress claimed that she had
no “intent” to defraud any lenders because she was just doing what her broker boyfriend
suggested and she did not read anything that she signed because she doesn’t read English.
Should the waitress be charged with a crime? The prosecutor declined to prosecute the
waitress, but is planning to charge the broker boyfriend.
What if the “investor” is a law student that actually made $3,755 for the entire year, but
the loan application stated that she made $6,750 per month. The law student purchased
only one property for $290,000. The law student claimed that she had no “intent” to
defraud the lender because she was just doing what her broker brother suggested and she
did not read anything that she signed. The law student never made any of the mortgage
payments, even after graduating. Her broker brother paid the mortgage payments for
approximately six (6) months before defaulting. The loan application stated that this
would be a primary residence for the law student; however, a renter was already in the
home at the time of the purchase. The renter stayed in the home and paid rent to the law
student for approximately 15 months, until the renter was served with the foreclosure
notice. Should the law student be charged with a crime?
What if the “investor” worked for a major lender making $50,000 per year, but the loan
applications stated that she made $105,000 or $180,000 per year? This “investor”
purchased eleven (11) properties in six (6) months totaling $3.6 million. The “investor”
claimed that she had no “intent” to defraud the lender because she was just doing what
her broker husband suggested and she did not read anything that she signed. The

“investor” also claimed that the income was actually correct for both her and her
husband, and the lender told her that “household” income could be used, even though she
was the sole applicant. Should this investor be charged with a crime?
Mortgage fraud is not stopping or going away. It used to mean something to own real estate – to
buy your first home. It was a valued asset, a status symbol, an investment in the future. Now,
thanks to infomercials, it is just a way to get rich quick.
With the current bailouts, mortgage modifications, and mortgage forgiveness programs, these
“investors” and/or fraudsters are just taking advantage of the system and these new programs.
The fraudsters are stalling foreclosures with bankruptcy or proposed short sales. The fraudsters
are finding new “investors” for short sale purchases so that the foreclosure does not continue to
affect their credit.
For example, Citimortgage, Wachovia and other lenders got caught up in a condominium
conversion scam by a developer, basically a builder bailout scheme. The condominium units
were primarily sold to investors for around $300,000, with lenders giving mortgages for 90% of
the value. Within a year, most of the loans went into default. The lenders were then solicited by
the same investors to authorize short sales and some of these short sales have occurred. Public
records show that one condominium sold as a short sale for $32,500 and then, without the
knowledge of the lender, was re-sold the same day for $48,000. A short sale is usually based on
representations from a realtor to the lender that this is the best price available in the current
market. Obviously in this case, someone didn’t inform Citimortgage of the best price available.
I was asked what changes are needed legally and regulatory to prevent mortgage fraud. I would
love to say hire more investigators and prosecutors and training them to handle complex financial
crime cases. But in these hard budget times, that’s not at all realistic. Instead, I would like to
make the following suggestions that might help:
1. Require lenders to do more due diligence before they fund the loan. You might consider
some type of form with itemized listing of “due diligence” the lender has accomplished
and acknowledges under oath. There would need to be criminal and/or civil sanctions for
failure to complete, violations, or perjury on the form. At the beginning of the loan
process, the borrower signs an authorization that allows the broker and/or lender to pull
financial information.
2. Require lenders’ due diligence to include the IRS form 4506-T. At the closing, lenders
have the borrower sign an IRS form 4506-T, which authorizes the lender to obtain a
transcript of the borrower’s tax return. In the past, most lenders never sent this form to
the IRS. Increased due diligence could include a requirement that the IRS form 4506-T
be signed at the beginning of the loan process and if a loan is approved based on a
“stated” income, the IRS form 4506-T must be submitted to the IRS prior to funding the
loan.
3. It may not be practical to require that every closing be done by a licensed title agent, but
there should be some requirement that a document review be completed at the time of
signing closing documents. This could include licensing and training of mobile notary
publics.
4. Require that a final loan application be signed at closing and that the closer be required to
have the borrower review the loan application for accuracy prior to signing the

acknowledgment.
5. Require that the lender apply a “suitability test” to the loan – is the loan appropriate for
that type of borrower and can the borrower handle any future changes to the terms of the
loan. A suitability test is currently being used in the securities industry.
6. There is currently a three day rescission period for a re-financing mortgage loan. The
three days allows the lender to do quality control on the loan documents to assure that the
underwriting is still sufficient before funding the loan. However, most lenders did little
to no quality control review until well after the loan was funded. This quality control
review should be mandatory for all lenders and a similar rescission period may be
appropriate for mortgage loans on new purchases.
7. A standardized records retention requirement and definitive standards for noncompliance. If the record were required to be maintained electronically, the problem
with storage facilities would be eliminated. The records retention should require the
lender to maintain the documentation that supported their lending decision. If the loan is
sold, this documentation needs to be included in the loan package sent to the investor
and/or loan servicer.

Thank you for this tremendous opportunity and I look forward to your questions.