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Privileged & Confidential
Attorney Work Product
Investigative Material
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Meeting with Members of the SEC Regarding the CSE Program
Type of Event: Meeting at the Office of the General Counsel at SEC
Date of Event: April 13, 2010
Participants - Non-Commission:

Mike Macchiaroli, Director of Trading and Markets, Sam Forstein, Assistant General
Counsel, Sarah Hancus, Office of the General Counsel
Participants - Commission:

Tom Krebs, Troy Burrus, Jay Lerner, Greg Feldberg, Desi Duncker and Mina Simhai
MFR Prepared by: Mina Simhai
Date of MFR: April 13, 2010
Summary of the Interview or Submission:
This is not a transcript of the meeting and should not be quoted as such

On Thursday, March 18, 2010 Tom Krebs, Troy Burrus, Jay Lerner, Greg
Feldberg, Desi Duncker and I met with Mike Macchiaroli, Director of Trading and
Markets; Sam Forstein, Assistant General Counsel; and Sarah Hancus, Office of the
General Counsel, at the SEC to discuss the CSE Program and oversight over Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers under the CSE Program.
Background Leading up to the CSE Program
According to the SEC:
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In the 1990s, the SEC began working on holding company issues. Drexel was an
example of a holding company that failed.
In 1995, the Derivatives Policy Group was set up. Through this program, the
SEC collected information voluntarily outside of the broker/dealers. The SEC
collected information on derivatives and it had built in stress tests. Goldman
Sachs agreed to give the SEC information for the whole firm. The five firms that
later became CSE program participants (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
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Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch) participated in the
Derivatives Policy Group.
The SEC had seen the pattern of the holding company failing, and then the broker
dealer collapsed many times.
The EU issued a directive that said broker-dealers who had a presence in the E.U.
must have a consolidated regulator. The U.S. investment banks did not want to be
regulated by the Fed, and OTS did not have the authority to regulate them. That
left the SEC. The SEC did not have authority to regulate the holding companies,
so the holding companies had to agree to give the SEC consolidated oversight.
This permitted the SEC to examine the entities and get reports on them. The SEC
did not examine entities that were already regulated.
The SEC granted firms who consented to SEC consolidated regulation an
exemption from the Net Capital Rule, allowing an exemption for position taking
and allowed participants to do VAR for liquid assets. To be in the program, firms
had to have a minimum of $5 billion in liquid capital. Bear Stearns, the smallest
member of the CSE Program, gave the SEC a hard time about the $5 billion
minimum, but eventually agreed to it.

CSE Program Generally
According to the SEC:
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The SEC evaluated the holding companies on a liquidation basis, not as a going
concern.
Under the prior net capital rule there were precise haircuts that firms had to take
for certain assets. Under the CSE Program, the SEC would approve internal
models submitted by the firms, and these internal models would be used to
calculate capital requirements.
Broker dealer assets included repo, borrowed stocks, margin debits and
commodities. They were not allowed to have derivatives because derivatives had
credit risk. Derivatives were done out of the firms’ UK broker/dealers.
Through the CSE Program, the SEC received, pursuant to Rule 15(c)(3)(4)
examinations and monthly reports on value at risk and market and credit risk
(approximately 25-35 pages per month), and the SEC had monthly meetings with
the 5 CSEs. The CSE Program used Basel II capital requirements. It was all done
on a consolidated basis at the holding company level.
The CSE Program focused on soundness of a firm. If a firm was not sound, CSE
staff would look at what steps should be taken.
Mike Macchiaroli stated the CSE Program should have looked at more than Basel
Standards – it should have looked at valuations and liquidity.
Mike Macchiaroli thought the CSE Program was a good program.

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CSE Program Staff
According to the SEC:
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The CSE program had 10-12 people, broken into teams of 3 (with some overlap)
that monitored risk at the 5 CSEs, Citibank and Chase. The main focus was on
the holding companies.
The CSE Program had several PhD economists, including Matt Eichner and
David Lynch, a group of accountants, and an examination staff.
Citibank and Chase wanted the exemption from the net capital rules that other
CSE entities received, but they did not receive it and the SEC relied on the Fed to
regulate Citibank and Chase.
The CSE staff would take reports received from the CSEs at face value and work
from there. The CSE program did not perform audits or in depth examinations.
Instead, they verified the Basel II calculations (e.g. the capital at the holding
companies), verified controls, analyzed reports received from the CSEs and asked
them questions.
Associate Director Matt Eichner reported to Mike Macchiaroli (who was an
Assistant Director).

Basel II
• Mike Macchiaroli stated he did not trust Basel II for 3 reasons:
o 1) it allowed many correlations that do not hold up in a real crisis,
o 2) no liquidity in the model, and
o 3) no concentration limits.
Examinations
According to the SEC:
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Examinations were done out of OCIE. At one point it seemed that OCIE was
more concerned with finding violations that checking controls.
OCIE conducted complete examinations of the CSEs before they were allowed
into the CSE Program.
Mike Macchiaroli advised there were some tensions with the examination staff.
Around 2007 the Division of Trading and Marketing (“T&M”) (where the CSE
Program was located), rather than OCIE, was given the authority to conduct
examinations, so T&M hired additional staff.

Coordination with the Fed
According to the SEC:

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Before the MOU was in place there was no formal agreement with the Fed, but
they cooperated with the SEC.
Mr. Macchiaroli stated that the Fed hid some documents from the SEC because
the Fed was worried that the SEC would turn the documents over to OCIE, but he
also stated that there was full cooperation between Lehman and SEC.

Failure of the CSE Program
According to the SEC:
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By April/May of 2007 it was too late; it was clear to Mike Macchiaroli that
something was wrong with the CSE Program.
In June of 2007 Mike Macchiaroli knew the CSE Program was done. He also
knew that mortgages were going bad.
Mike Macchiaroli stated he does not think holding company regulation works.
There are too many legal entities and too much leverage.

Bear Stearns
According to the SEC:
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By July 2007, there was nothing the SEC could do to help the Bear Stearns
situation. They just kept monitoring the situation at Bear Stearns. Bear Stearns
was continually optimistic.
In August of 2007 Mike Macchiaroli was worried that Bear Stearns would fail.
Sunday Meeting.
o On a Sunday in August of 2007, Mike Macchiaroli, Matt Eichner and
others from the CSE Program went to NYC to meet with Bear Stearns’
CFO (Sam Molinaro), Treasurer (Bob Upton), and Chief Risk Officer
(Mike Alix), and 2 other executives from Bear Stearns.
o At the meeting, Bear Stearns executives went through their numbers with
the CSE Program staff. The SEC couldn’t detect anything wrong and
couldn’t point to anything specific, but they were still worried about Bear
Stearns.
o After the meeting, the CSE Program staff called Annette Nazareth to brief
her on the situations.
o The result of this meeting was the SEC wanted more reports from Bear
Stearns to ascertain the liquidity and capital at Bear Stearns.
Bear Stearns was a relatively small firm (approximately $400 billion) that was
very heavily into the mortgage business and securitizations. Bear Stearns
separated its businesses by brokers (customers) and dealers (positions).
After the Sunday meeting Bear Stearns and the CSE Program continued talking
and meeting.

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Once the mortgage and securitization markets dried up, Bear Stearns could not
sell its positions and could not raise capital. The falling market brought Bear
down with it.
Mike Macchiaroli saw no evidence that Bear’s marks were bad. However, the
SEC did find Bear’s leverage of 8:1 very troubling.
January 2008.
o The mortgage market was imploding.
o CSE Program staff went back to Bear Stearns and asked how they thought
they would make it through the next year. Sam Molinaro responded that
he thought Bear Stearns would make it through 2008.
Documents
o The CSE program received monthly reports for market and credit risk.
o Reports were sent to the director of T&M by the staff.
The SEC believed Bear’s problem was liquidity.
Repo.
o In the last 2 weeks all of Bear Stearns’ liquidity drained away. The CSE
Program had thought that Bear Stearns would be able to get repo, but the
liquidity model did not work. People thought a 5% haircut would be
enough, but the market demanded 20-40%, and Bear Stearns could not
meet these haircuts.
o Fidelity and Federated pulled repo from Bear Stearns.
Sale to JPM.
o On Friday morning around 6:30 Hank Paulson, Tim Geithner and Jamie
Dimon decided that JP Morgan Chase would buy Bear Stearns.
o Mike Macchiaroli did not expect $2 a share to go through; he expected
shareholders would reject this price.
Mike Alix, Chief Risk Officer, was very good. He was on top of things, but Mr.
Macchiaroli was not sure how much pull Mike Alix had within Bear Stearns. He
speculated that Bear Stearns became too aggressive and probably did not listen to
Mike Alix.
Not sure if Jimmy Cayne understood mortgages.
Bear Stearns was too heavily concentrated in mortgages.
Does not believe the broker-dealer failed, it was very liquid. There were massive
losses at the holding company level.
People at Bear Stearns that Mike Macchiaroli dealt with:
o Sam Molinaro
o Robert Upton
o Jeff Farber
o Paul Friedman
o Mike Alix

Managing Balance Sheet at Quarter End.
According to the SEC:
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The CSE program staff was aware that the CSEs managed their balance sheets at
quarter end. It showed how liquid things were, was common practice, and did not
add to the risk profiles. SEC was ok with it, so long as it was disclosed.
If a firm put assets on its balance sheet, it had to have capital to back those assets.
CSE Program spoke with Don Walker in the SEC’s Corporate Finance division
about disclosure issues and they worked out what needed to be disclosed.

Lehman Brothers
According to the SEC:
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Repo 105.
o When Matt Eicher was quoted as saying “we didn’t care about Repo 105”
he meant that he didn’t care from a risk perspective, as it had no impact on
the overall risk of the firm.
o If the SEC had known about Repo 105, it would have required Lehman to
disclose it.
o Leverage was already coming down, Lehman didn’t need Repo 105.
o Repo 105 was legal under UK law.
o The SEC found out about Repo 105 in January 2010 when it saw the
Valukus report.
o The SEC stated one other firm admitted it was doing Repo 105
transactions, and it will have to disclose it.
After Bear Stearns, Lehman clearly was the next firm in line to fail because it was
also heavy on mortgages and didn’t have other big businesses. Lehman had high
real estate risk and less capital. JPM and money market funds also had a role in
bringing Lehman down.
Lehman was better capitalized than Bear Stearns had been but also had a bigger
balance sheet. Lehman had $27 billion in capital and $80 billion in long term
debt. Lehman was highly leveraged and had a small customer base.
Lehman was still able to get capital in June of 2008 (approx. $7 or $8 billion).
Lehman failed because it had too many illiquid assets on its books. Poor
communications and a disbelief in what was happening contributed too. Lehman
had $55 billion in illiquid assets.
Lehman tried to salvage the firm with the Spinco deal, which it told the SEC
about.
Erin Callan and Richard Fuld thought Lehman’s only hope was selling Lehman.
They were hoping that the Fed would save them.
In June/July of 2008 Lehman asked the Treasury Department for $100 million to
provide liquidity to Lehman.
In August Lehman was still optimistic.
Mike Macchiaroli does not believe the broker-dealer failed, it was very liquid.
There were massive losses at the holding company level.
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Barclays got a great deal on Lehman – they paid $250 million and received
billions of dollars worth of assets.
In August of 2008 Mike Macchiaroli knew Lehman was going down.
People at Lehman that Mike Macchiaroli dealt with:
o O’Mara
o Ed Greeb
o Martin Kelly
o Dave Goldfarb
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Tom Russo

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