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Chronology of Selected Events Related to Lehman Brothers and the Possibility of Government Assistance
Date
Summary
03/17/08 The FRBNY loans $29
billion to Maiden Lane to
facilitate JP Morgan’s
acquisition of Bear Stearns,
establishes the PDCF and
starts daily onsite
monitoring of the
investment banks.
Description
PDCF. FRBNY announces in a 3/16/08 press release that it has “been granted the authority to establish a Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)” that “is intended to improve the ability of primary dealers to provide financing to
participants in securitization markets and promote the orderly functioning of financial markets more generally.”
The PDCF provided “overnight funding to primary dealers in exchange for a specified range of collateral, including
all collateral eligible for tri‐party repurchase agreements arranged by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as well
as all investment‐grade corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgage‐backed securities and asset‐backed
securities for which a price is available.” The FRBNY reported the PDCF would remain in operation for a minimum
period of six months and that it might be extended as conditions warrant to foster the functioning of financial
markets. Lehman draws $1.6 billion from the PDCF on 3/18/08, $2.3 billion on 3/19/08, $2.3 billion on 3/20/08,
$2.13 billion on 3/24/08, 3/25/08 and 3/26/08 and $2.0 billion on 4/16/08. It does not draw on the PDCF again
until 9/15/08.
Maiden Lane. FRBNY announces in 3/24/08 press release that it “will provide term financing to facilitate JPMorgan
Chase & Co.'s acquisition of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. … to bolster market liquidity and promote orderly
market functioning.” The FRBNY reported that it would take, through a limited liability company formed for this
purpose (Maiden Lane), control of a portfolio of assets valued at $30 billion as of March 14, 2008, that would be
pledged as security for a $29 billion loan.
On‐site Monitoring of Investment Banks. The FRBNY begins onsite monitoring of investment banks with a focus
on liquidity.
TAB 1
FRBNY Press Release, Federal Reserve Announces Establishment of Primary Dealer Credit Facility, March 16, 2008
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080316.html
FRBNY Press Release, Statement on Financing Arrangement of JPMorgan Chase's Acquisition of Bear Stearns, March 24, 2008
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080324.html
See, e.g., FRBNY, Lehman IB Update (Aug. 27, 2008) [FRBNY to Exam. 007968] (a representative FRBNY daily report analyzing Lehman’s liquidity pool, the status of Lehman’s
3/18/08
4/15/08
secured and unsecured funding, intraday funding, stock price, clearing bank actions, and significant stories about Lehman circulating in the press).
Lehman reports better than Lehman reports better than expected 1Q08 results and the Firm’s stock price increases from $31.75 on 3/17/08 to
expected 1Q08 results
$46.49 on 3/18/08.
TAB 2 Earnings release available at: http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/1_08qe.htm
Treasury official believes
Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy Phillip Swagel writes that Lehman is securitizing loans and keeping them on
Lehman is gaming the PDCF their books “to game the PDCF – they securitized their illiquid CLO’s and got a rating agency to say that some large
fraction of it was investment grade. And then poof, they get access to tens of billions of dollars from the Fed’s PDCF.”
TAB 3 UST‐FCIC 0030001
Page 1 of 15
Date
4/16/08
Summary
Emails between David
Nason and Tom Russo re
regulation of investment
banks.
4/29/08
Emails between Mario
Ugoletti and Jeremiah
Norton re PDCF, TSLF and
regulation of investment
banks.
6/09/08
Lehman pre‐announces
2Q08 net loss of $2.8
billion.
Lehman reports change in
management
Kirsten Harlow onsite
monitoring report to
FRBNY officials re
Lehman’s earnings release
6/12/08
6/16/08
6/17/08
Email from William Dudley
to Ben Bernanke, Tim
Geithner and others re
Lehman and PDCF.
6/19‐
20/08
Kirsten Harlow onsite
monitoring report to
FRBNY officials re funding
counterparties.
Description
Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions David Nason emails Lehman Chief Legal Officer Tom Russo
and writes that “Secretary Paulson has asked me to visit with some of the large investment banking firms to get a
sense of the firm’s current thinking on the types of regulation and supervision that might result from the Bear
situation. As you can expect, there is a lot of interest in this issue now and it is likely that the Congress will focus on
this…”
TAB 4 UST‐FCIC 0029516 ‐ UST‐FCIC 0029517
Treasury’s Director of the Office of Financial Institutions Policy Mario Ugoletti emails Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions Policy Jeremiah Norton that he met separately with representatives from Goldman and
Lehman’s Russo re the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (“PDCF”) and Term Securities Lending Facility (“TSLF”).
Ugoletti writes that Russo supported “a framework that would provide discount window access to individual
institutions and on a market‐wide basis” and that it needed to be “implemented in a collaborative manner to avoid
the stigma associated with discount window borrowing” including “anonymity and working together to solve
problems.”
TAB 5 UST‐FCIC 0029512 ‐ UST‐FCIC 0029514
Lehman’s first loss since going public. Stock declines from $33.02 on 6/6/08 to $29.24 on 6/9/08 due to higher‐
than expected loss.
TAB 6 http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/2_08qe.htm
Lehman announces that Bart McDade will replace Joseph Gregory as President and COO, and that Ian Lowitt will
replace Erin Callan as CFO.
FRBNY onsite monitor Kirsten Harlow emails several FRBNY officials and reports that “Lehman’s earnings release
today was largely in‐line with last week’s pre‐release. No adverse information on liquidity, novations, terminations
or ability to fund either secured or unsecured balances has been reported.” Harlow also reports that Lehman has
taken measures to strengthen liquidity and capital, including increasing liquidity pool from $34 billion to $45 billion,
reducing assets, issuing $4 billion of preferred shares and $5.5 billion of long‐term debt.
TAB 7 Email from Kirsten Harlow, FRBNY to Tim Geithner, et al. (June 16, 2008) [FCIC‐155446]
FRBNY Executive Vice President of the Markets group Bill Dudley emails Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke,
FRBNY President & CEO Geithner and others that PDCF and TSLF should be extended to the end of the year. He
writes that the “PDCF remains critical to the stability of some of the IBs. Amounts don’t matter here, it is the fact that
the PDCF underpins the triparty repo system. I think without the PDCF, Lehman might have experienced a full
blown liquidity crisis. So this has to be kept as is until 1) the IBs are in better shape in terms of funding/leverage
and 2) triparty is strengthened – both are in process.”
TAB 8 6/17/08 email, FCIC 154463‐464.
Kirsten Harlow reports that with respect to Lehman, there are “trading issues with four financial institutions: Natixis
(eliminating all activity with Lehman), Santander, Wespac, and Commonwealth Bank of Australia.” Harlow also
reports that Citi has “decided to reduce total clearing/settlement lines to Lehman from approximately $20 billion to
around $10‐12 billion” and that “Lehman has agreed to place $2 billion cash with Citi, not as collateral but in case of
difficulties.” Also reported that JPMC reported that “some large pension funds and some smaller Asian central banks
are specifying (or tightening the standards on) what classes of assets they will accept” and that certain investors are
“still refusing to deal with these seemingly weak counterparties” even though JPMC agreed to indemnify them. Fed
Senior Advisor in the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation Tim Clark responds that “this is not sounding
good at all.”
TAB 9 6/20/08 email, FCIC155450
Page 2 of 15
Date
6/25/08
7/10/08
7/11/08
Summary
Lehman fails FRBNY
liquidity stress test.
Description
A FRBNY liquidity stress projects $66 billion of outflows and $51 billion of liquidity. It concludes that “(1) Lehman’s
weak liquidity position was driven by its relatively large exposure to overnight CP combined with significant
overnight secured funding of less liquid assets, (2) one and two notch downgrades would result in significant
collateral calls, (3) Lehman recognized its vulnerabilities and was trying to reduce illiquid assets and extend
maturities, and (4) Lehman should improve liquidity by $15 billion.”
TAB 10 6/25/08 Primary Dealer Monitoring: Liquidity Stress Analysis, FCIC‐155470‐474, at 474.
Robert Hoyt email to Laurie Treasury General Counsel Robert Hoyt writes in email to Treasury Assistant General Counsel for Banking and
Schaffer re Lehman
Finance Laurie Schaffer that “the real problem is 70 billion of illiquid bonds, so I assume finding liquidity for them is
Liquidity.
the key.”
TAB 11 UST‐FCIC 0029097
Treasury emails re options Robert Hoyt writes that “the Fed has plenty of legal authority to provide liquidity, and if they choose not to, I doubt
to minimize effects of
we would. So the real question may be what authorities can we exercise in a scenario where we want to let the firm
Lehman failure.
fail, but then step in to minimize effects on creditors and the system. Basically a receivership option. Consider this –
could we negotiate a pre‐packaged bankruptcy where we provide funding, operate the business, and take care of
creditors?”
7/11/08
7/11/08
7/12‐
13/08
Emails between Fed
officials re Lehman funding
counterparties pulling repo
lines.
Emails between Fed
officials re plan to provide
tri‐party repo funding to
Lehman.
Emails between Fed
officials re providing tri‐
party repo funding to
Lehman.
TAB 12 7/11/08 email, UST‐FCIC 0029096.
In response to report that Dreyfus and Federated pulled their repo lines from Lehman, Fed Deputy Director of the
Research and Statistics Division Pat Parkinson writes that “there are other such reports but overall LB’s funding
seems to have held up thus far. Lots of anxiety nonetheless.”
TAB 13 7/11/08 email, FCIC‐155481.
FRBNY staff informs Geithner of plan for Fed to step in to the shoes of clearing bank (JPMC or BoNY) because a
clearing bank’s unwillingness to provide intra‐day funding “could be disastrous for the firm and also cast
widespread doubt about the instrument as a nearly risk free, liquid overnight investment.”
TAB 14 7/11/08 memo, FCIC‐155485‐491
Fed officials discuss whether the Fed would provide tri‐party repo funding to Lehman without a buyer. FRBNY EVP
& Director of Financial Research James McAndrews writes that “the thing we would have to decide is whether the
distressed firm was likely to be sold. If we think that the run had progressed too far and that it wouldn’t be sold, then
any lending we did to it would be a permanent addition to the government’s balance sheet – like Northern Rock,
again. That is the crucial question at the time a decision must be made. If we think it can be sold, then proceed as in
BS. If not, discuss with the Treasury its appetite for a permanent addition to the government’s balance sheet by
lending to the distressed firm; if there is little appetite for that, then lend to the distressed firm’s creditors, and work
to contain the spread of the problem with communication policy.”
TAB 15 Email from Jamie McAndrews to Meg McConnell, et al., (July 12, 2008) [FCIC‐155504 ‐ FCIC‐155506]
Page 3 of 15
Date
7/12‐
13/08
Summary
Emails between Fed
officials re providing tri‐
party repo funding to
Lehman.
7/15/08
Bill Dudley email re
Lehman Good Bank/Bad
Bank Idea.
7/20/08
Pat Parkinson email to Ben
Bernanke, Fed Governor
Kevin Warsh, Fed General
Counsel Scott Alvarez and
Fed Director of the Division
of Monetary Affairs Brian
Madigan re options in the
event of a run on Lehman
8/08/08
Emails between Fed
officials re “gameplan” for
potential Lehman failure.
Description
Fed officials continue to discuss providing tri‐party repo funding to Lehman if “JPMC refuses to unwind LB’s triparty
one morning out of fear of being caught with the entirety of this exposure when the music stops.”
Fed Research Director Pat Parkinson responds that the Fed should be willing to lend to Lehman under the PDCF
with conservative haircuts if Lehman was judged to be sound and that the Fed should tell JPM that with the PDCF in
place, JPM’s “refusing to unwind is unnecessary and would be unforgiveable.” Parkinson also writes that “the point
of our PDCF lending would be to head off a massive run” and that a run might still occur in a world where headline
risk is an important concern.
TAB 16 7/12‐13/08 email, FCIC‐15510‐12.
FRBNY’s Bill Dudley proposes Maiden Lane type vehicle where $60 billion of Lehman assets would be held by the
SPV and financed by $5 billion of Lehman equity and a $55 billion loan from the Fed. Dudley writes that this
proposal “[t]akes illiquid assets off the market, reduces risk that forced sale of assets will generate losses that make
Lehman insolvent” and would “[p]reserve Lehman franchise as a going concern” and provide “[n]o externality to the
rest of financial system. . . . Clean Lehman can be sold or remain a viable concern.”
TAB 17 FCIC‐154477.
Parkinson writes that “JPMC, LB’s clearing bank is likely to be the first to realize that the money funds and other
investors that provide tri‐party financing to LB are pulling back significantly. If some morning it fears that the
investors are unlikely to roll their repos, it may threaten not to unwind LB’s previous night repos. If it did that, LB
would be done because the tri‐party investors would control its securities inventory. The investors presumably
would promptly liquidate the $200 billion of collateral and there is a good chance that investors would lose
confidence in the tri‐party mechanism and pull back from funding other dealers. Fear of those consequences is, of
course, why we facilitated Bear’s acquisition by JPMC.” Parkinson continues that the Fed “could try to dissuade JPMC
from refusing to unwind by pointing out that if the investors don’t roll the repos LB can borrow from us through the
PDCF” but that JPMC “might still balk” because some collateral not eligible for PDCF and because JPMC “would be
stuck with $200 billion of secured loans to LB” if Lehman filed bankruptcy intra‐day. …. “JPMC and BNYM are
sufficiently concerned that they have arranged a meeting Monday afternoon with SIPC.”
Parkinson also noted that even if the Fed “extended as much as $200 billion of financing to LB, absent an acquirer
our action would not ensure LB’s survival” because the stigma associated with PDCF borrowing could likely result in
other liquidity demands that Lehman might not be able to meet.
TAB 18 7/20/08 email, FCIC‐154545.
Fed’s Parkinson circulates “gameplan” to deal with a potential Lehman failure and includes the following: (1)
identify activities whose liquidation under Chapter 11 could have a significant adverse effect on financial markets
and the economy; (2) gather additional information about those activities to assess the likelihood of negative effects
of liquidation; and (3) where there is serious potential for significant adverse effects, identify actions that the firm,
its counterparties or the government could take to mitigate risk.” Fed and Treasury identify that the principal
investment bank activities that could entail systemic risk are tri‐party repo borrowings and OTC derivatives
activities, that options to avoid a fire sale of tri‐party repo collateral are not very attractive and that the Fed is still in
the early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk from close‐out of OTC derivatives transactions by an
investment bank’s counterparties and identifying potential mitigants.
TAB 19 FCIC 156050‐156054
Page 4 of 15
Date
8/14/08
8/14/08
8/8‐
19/08
9/2/08
9/2‐5/08
9/05/08
Summary
FRBNY email re meeting
with OTS and AIG liquidity
concerns.
FRBNY summary of AIG
Earnings, Capital and
Liquidity Issues.
Description
Kevin Coffee, from the FRBNY’s Financial Sector Policy and Analysis group, emails FRBNY officials and notes that the
OTS was generally comfortable with AIG’s liquidity.
TAB 20 FCIC‐AIG0015409 ‐ FCIC‐AIG0015410
Stated in summary that “AIG is under increasing capital and liquidity pressure,” that AIG “appears to need to raise
substantial longer term funds to address the impact of deteriorating asset values on its capital and available liquidity
as well as to address certain asset/liability funding mismatches.” Also notes there may be a ratings downgrade.
TAB 21 FCIC‐AIG0015389‐ FCIC‐AIG0015390
Emails between Fed and
Pat Parkinson and Steven Shafran, Senior Advisor to Treasury Secretary Paulson, exchange emails about the
Treasury officials re risk of “gameplan” and the risk of forming a “default management group” composed of senior business representatives of
assembling industry group major market participants that would work with regulatory authorities to consider and anticipate issues likely to
and collecting derivative
arise in the event of a default of a major counterparty. Parkinson writes that they “would need to be careful not to
data from Lehman.
suggest concerns about any particular market participant” but noted that “they no doubt would draw their own
conclusions.” Shafran responds that “this would make sense in a less stressed market” but that the “timing right now
is problematic” because asking to form the group could “signal[] concerns that only exacerbate the issues.”
Parkinson responds, “I worry that without gathering more info we will not come up with a sensible gameplan.”
TAB 22 UST‐FCIC 0029725 ‐ UST‐FCIC 0029730
On 8/15/08, FRBNY Vice President in the Bank Supervision Group William Brodows reports that FRBNY officials
met with Lehman to get derivative‐related information and that the meeting “caused a stir in Lehman and we had to
assure them that our questions were not institution specific.” Parkinson responded on 8/19/08 that he thought it
was worth engaging the industry group even though there were risks and that they needed to better understand
OTC derivative exposures.
TAB 23 FCIC‐156050 ‐ FCIC‐156051
FRBNY document titled
Reported that “AIG’s current liquidity position is precarious and asset liability management appears inadequate
“AIG Liquidity and Access
given firm’s substantial off balance sheet liquidity needs” and that borrowing through the PDCF “could potentially
to the PDCF.”
allow AIG to unwind its positions in an orderly manner while satisfying its immediate liquidity demands, although it
is questionable whether such a facility is necessary for the survival of the firm.”
TAB 24 FCIC‐AIG0016236‐39.
FRBNY summary of
FRBNY summary of Lehman tri‐party repos shows that balances ranged from $149 billion to $151 billion and that
Lehman tri‐party repos.
$20.4 billion was not PDCF eligible.
TAB 25 FCIC‐154556 ‐ FCIC‐154563
Pat Parkinson email to
Parkinson emails FRBNY Senior Vice President Theodore Lubke and writes that (1) the Fed is going to request OTC
Theodore Lubke re request derivative information from Lehman, (2) Geithner will ask former FRBNY President Gerald Corrigan to accelerate
for OTC derivatives
the formation for a private sector default management group and (3) Lubke, Parkinson and Shafran will “create the
information from Lehman,
‘playbook’ for an IB failure that the Secretary has been asking for.”
formation of industry group
and “playbook” for
investment bank failure
that Paulson has been
TAB 26 FCIC‐156055
asking for.
Page 5 of 15
Date
9/7/08
Summary
Description
Treasury places Fannie and Government places Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship, providing $200 billion in federal aid.
Freddie into
conservatorship and
TAB 27 United States Treasury, Press Release: Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial
provides $200 billion in aid. Markets and Taxpayers (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2010); Mark Jickling, Congressional Research
9/9/08
Public disclosure that KDB
will not invest in Lehman.
Service, CRE Report for Congress: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship (Sept. 7, 2008), available at: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110097.pdf.
Korea Development Bank announces that it ended its talks with Lehman, and Lehman’s stock plunges 45%, its
largest daily percentage decline.
TAB 28 Email from Catherine Jones, Lehman, to Hugh E. McGee, III, Lehman, et al. (Sept. 9, 2008) [LBEXDOCID 131058] (forwarding Jin‐Young Yook, Korea FSC: KDB, Lehman
Investment Talks Have Ended, Dow Jones Int’l News, Sept. 9, 2008)
6 am: when Treasury staff tell Paulson of the failed KDB deal and that Fuld was “still clinging to the view that
somehow or the other the Fed has the power to inject capital,” Paulson “felt a wave of frustration. Tim Geithner and
I had repeatedly told Dick that the government had no legal authority to inject capital in an investment bank. That
was one reason I had been pushing him to find a buyer since Bear Stearns failed in March. Fuld had replaced
Lehman’s top management, laid off thousands of employees, and pitched restructuring ideas, but the firm’s heavy
exposure to mortgage‐backed securities had discouraged suitors and left him unable to make a deal. Ken [Wilson]
had been telling Dick with increasing urgency that he needed to be ready to sell, but Dick did not want to consider
any offer below $10 per share. Bear Stearns had gotten that, and he would accept nothing less for Lehman.” Paulson
calls BofA CEO Ken Lewis to reinitiate talks with Fuld, even though BofA had already considered Lehman twice that
year.
Paulson, On the Brink at 173.
9/9/08,
9:00 am
9/9/08,
10:14 am
9/9/08,
11:07 am
9/9/08,
5:00 pm
FRBNY Deputy Chief of Staff
for Policy and Vice
President Margaret
McConnell email re meeting
to discuss options for
dealing with a failing
nonbank.
Pat Parkinson email to
Steven Shafran re Lehman
concerns.
Margaret McConnell email
to Fed officials re Lehman
derivatives and tri‐party
repos
Email scheduling meeting
to discuss potential
bankruptcy of Lehman.
FRB and FRBNY officials meet to discuss “near term options for dealing with a failing nonbank.”
TAB 29 FCIC‐155639‐647.
Parkinson emails Treasury’s Shafran re concern that Lehman would announce further losses, might not succeed in
raising new equity, and that Lehman was vulnerable to a loss of confidence even though its liquidity position was not
as bad as Bear.
TAB 30 UST‐FCIC 0029680
Margaret McConnell circulates list of Lehman derivative counterparties which show that Lehman had over 1.3
million derivative deals, a tri‐party repo book “much larger than Bear’s” ($182 billion v. $50‐$80 billion), and that
the top 10 counterparties provided 80% of the financing.
TAB 29 FCIC‐155639‐647.
Call between Secretary Paulson, Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, and staff to discuss
potential bankruptcy of Lehman.
TAB 31 FCIC‐154564; Paulson, On the Brink, p. 178
Page 6 of 15
Date
9/9/08,
5:20 pm
Summary
Jim Wilkinson email re
bailing out Lehman.
9/9/08,
9:00 pm
Geithner meeting with
Bernanke.
9/10/08,
7:30 am
Lehman pre‐announces
3Q08 results.
9/10/08,
8:30 ‐
9:30 am
9/10/08,
11:49 am
FRB officials meet with
Treasury officials
9/10/08,
5:17 pm
9/11/08,
(time
unknown)
9/11/08,
6:55 am
Matthew Rutherford email
to Treasury officials re
Lehman funding
counterparties.
Mark VanDerWeide email
to Alvarez re Lehman
options
Geithner tells FSA that
government assistance is
possible.
Parkinson email re
“liquidation consortium.”
Description
Treasury Chief of Staff Jim Wilkinson writes that he “can’t stomach us bailing out lehman. Will be horrible in the
press.”
TAB 32 UST‐FCIC 0029964.
Geithner calls Bernanke after receiving information showing that Lehman’s tri‐party repo book was much larger
than Bear Stearns ($182 billion versus $50‐$80 billion).
TAB 29 FCIC‐155639‐647.
Lehman reports $3.9 billion 3Q08 loss including $5.6 billion of writedowns. It also announces plans to sell a
majority stake in its asset‐management unit, spin off commercial real estate holdings, and cuts its dividend.
TAB 33 Final Transcript of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Third Quarter 2008 Preliminary
Earnings Call (Sept. 10, 2008) [LBHI_SEC07940_612771].
Conference call between Paulson, Bernanke, Geithner and staff.
TAB 34 FCIC‐154731.
Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for Federal Finance Matthew Rutherford informs Treasury officials that he
spoke to several large money funds that were concerned and reassigned their exposure, but no wholesale pull‐back
of lines. These funds “stressed that they saw negligible risk in maintaining these positions.”
TAB 35 UST‐FCIC 0029201.
Fed Assistant General Counsel Mark VanDerWeide emails FRBNY General Counsel Scott Alvarez that working groups
had been directed to flesh out “[1] how a Fed‐assisted BofA acquisition transaction might look,” “[2] how a private
consortium of preferred equity investors transaction might look,” and “[3] how a Fed take out of tri‐party repo
lenders would look.” VanDerWeide notes that “Geithner seemed to think that Lehman would survive into the
weekend, but may need some PDCF help.”
TAB 36 FCIC‐154786.
Geithner told the Lehman bankruptcy examiner that he told the FSA that government assistance was possible.
Fed and Treasury staff circulate “liquidation consortium gameplan” to Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn, FRBNY
General Counsel Alvarez and Fed Director of the Division of Monetary Affairs Brian Madigan. The gameplan is to
convene CEOs of major counterparties of Lehman (tri‐party repo, CDS and other OTC derivatives) who would be
most adversely affected by a Lehman insolvency and to provide a forum where these firms could explore
possibilities of joint funding mechanisms to avert a Lehman insolvency. The gameplan:
Notes that Paulson would tell representatives that that they had until the opening of business in Asia to
come up with a plan to recapitalize Lehman to enable an orderly wind down and that the government was
willing to let Lehman fail.
Refers to a “FRBNY financial commitment” and stated that “[w]e should have in mind a maximum number
of how much we are willing to finance before the meeting starts, but not divulge our willingness to do so to
the consortium… Terms of any liquidity support should be long enough to guard against a fire sale, but on a
short enough fuse to encourage buyers of Lehman assets to come forward. Two months to a year in
duration?”
Notes that “Lehman is bigger and more global than Bear Stearns.”
TAB 37 FCIC‐154768‐773
Page 7 of 15
Date
9/11/08,
8:26 am
Summary
Susan McCabe email to
FRBNY officials re Lehman
situation spinning out of
control.
9/11/08,
10:32 am
Hayley Boesky email re
situation at Lehman.
9/11/08,
10:45 am
Jason Miu email to
Bernanke re Lehman
concerns.
9/11/08,
10:46 am
Hayley Boesky email re
Lehman options
9/11/08,
11:36 am
Hayley Boesky email re
hedge funds leaving
Lehman.
FRBNY outline for meeting
with Lehman
counterparties.
9/11/08,
1:40 pm
9/11/08,
1:46 pm
Bryan Corbett email to
Nason re Lehman bailout.
Description
Susan McCabe email to Bill Dudley and others re negative market reaction to Lehman’s 9/10/08 announcement,
concerns about AIG and WaMu, and that the situation “is getting pretty scary and ugly again…They have much bigger
counterparty risk than Bear did, especially in derivatives market, so the market is getting very spooked, nervous.
Also have Aig, Wamu concerns. This is just spinning out of control again. Just fyi, this is shaping up as going to be a
rough day.”
TAB 38 FCIC‐154785.
FRBNY Vice President Hayley Boesky tells Fed officials that the head of Lehman’s FI sales called and stated that (1)
counterparty volumes were extremely low, (2) Lehman had received a handful of requests for unwinds but there
were no problems in others taking Lehman credit in the broker market, (3) Barclays and Citi had agreed to a handful
of requests to intermediate, (4) there had not been any denial of novations, (5) the prime brokerage business was
losing balances and (6) the fixed income desk was funded through 9/12/08 but that Lehman employees and clients
all understood that it was “close to the end game, but that they [were] not experiencing a full blown run.”
TAB 39 UST‐FCIC 0029573.
FRBNY Markets Group analyst Jason Miu email to Chairman Bernanke states that (1) the markets continued to
negatively react to Lehman’s 9/10/08 announcement; (2) Moody’s disclosed that Lehman’s reorganization plan was
insufficient to avoid a downgrade; (3) the consequences of a downgrade would be OTC derivative collateral postings
of $4.4 billion and possible pull back by funding counterparties; (4) it would be a much more complex proposition to
unwind Lehman’s positions than Bear Stearns because Lehman had twice as many positions; and (5) a worst case
Lehman scenario could push hedge funds toward their NAV triggers.
TAB 40 FCIC‐154787‐789
Hayley Boesky forwards an email from hedge fund manager Louis Bacon that included a list of what the Fed or
Treasury could do to help Lehman, including (1) Fed cutting rates, (2) Treasury announcing a large GSE MBS
purchase program, (3) Treasury announcing a major expansion of funding to the FHLB system that would be passed
on to banks via FHLB advances, (4) bank regulators cutting risk weightings on GSE‐issued MBS and debt (on the
basis that the government now backstopped the GSEs) to help banks with their capital problems, (5) FRBNY lending
to Lehman through the PDCF and facilitating a transaction with a Maiden Lane structure.
TAB 41 UST‐FCIC 0029425‐428.
Hayley Boesky emails Fed official that “nearly every large HF (Moore, Cap. Tudor, Fortress, etc.) has called to tell me
that others are refusing to take LEH’s name”
TAB 41 UST‐FCIC 0029425‐428.
FRBNY circulates outline to convene a representative group of Lehman counterparties and creditors to make plans
in the event of a Lehman bankruptcy filing, including resolution of derivatives, swaps, QFCs, repos, commodities
futures and other transactions outside the bankruptcy process. The group would hold off on exercising their
contractual rights to close out their trades and instead establish a process to net down all exposures and use a
common valuation for marking positions after the bankruptcy filing.
TAB 42 FCIC‐154818‐820.
Special Assistant to the President for Economic Policy Bryan Corbett emails Treasury Assistant Secretary for
Financial Institutions David Nason and writes “get ready for the Lehman bailout.”
TAB 43 UST‐FCIC 0029510
Page 8 of 15
Date
9/11/08,
4:15‐6:18
pm
Summary
FRBNY circulates Lehman
Counterparty Credit Risk
Exposure Summary.
9/11/08,
11:58 pm
Hayley Boesky email to
FRBNY officials re hedge
funds panicking.
9/12/08,
(time
unknown)
9/12/08,
1:28 am
Paulson tells FSA the
government might provide
assistance to Barclays.
FRBNY email attaching
latest version of “Decision
to File Bankruptcy”
Document.
Paulson and Bernanke
breakfast meeting.
9/12/08
Description
FRBNY circulates summary of large financial institution (“LFI”) exposures to Lehman that shows about $3 billion of
current exposure and about $11 billion of potential exposure. Document shows that Barclays, Citi, and UBS had
increased their exposure to Lehman since 2Q08 and that Credit Suisse, JPMC, BofA and Deutsche had reduced their
exposures to Lehman.
TAB 44 FCIC‐155141 ‐ FCIC‐155143 and FCIC‐155144‐147.
Hayley Boesky writes that “I have spent the past 3 hours receiving calls from HFs. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 is
Bear‐Stearns‐week‐panic, I would put sentiment today at 12. People are expecting full blown recession, There is full
expectation that Leh goes, wamu and then ML. Worries about GS and reports of losses in their PB business.
Apparently GS had a lot of commodity HFs who took big losses. ALL begging, pleading for a large scale solution
which spans beyond just LEH….. I felt I needed to relay the message given they all took the time to call and given the
panic in their voices.”
TAB 45 UST‐FCIC 0029425
According to the Lehman Bankruptcy examiner, Paulson told the FSA that the FRBNY might provide assistance to
Barclays.
Theo Lubke emails “Decision to File Bankruptcy” document which states that Lehman would need to resolve a
number of complex issues before electing to file and that there is a great deal of uncertainty about how unregistered
Lehman affiliates would be liquidated and how foreign bankruptcy regimes operated.
TAB 46 FCIC‐154847 ‐ FCIC‐154850
Paulson has breakfast with Bernanke and tells him that he “was hopeful but had serious doubts about both Bank of
America and Barclays [coming into the weekend].” Bernanke allegedly tells Paulson, “We can only hope that if
Lehman goes, the market will have had a lot of time to prepare for it.”
Paulson, On the Brink at 187.
9/12/08,
8:49 am
9/12/08,
3:00 pm
Jim Wilkinson email to
Secretary Paulson re
Lehman bailout
unimaginable.
Secretary Paulson goes to
New York and Chairman
Bernanke stays in DC.
Treasury’s Chief of Staff Wilkinson writes in an email that Paulson was going to New York to “sort through this
Lehman mess” and that Wilkinson “[could not] imagine a scenario where we put in govt money.”
TAB 47 UST‐FCIC 0029418‐424.
Paulson (with Wilkinson and others) leave DC for New York. Paulson, On the Brink at 187.
Bernanke stays behind in DC because a possibility existed that Bernanke might need to convene a meeting of the
Federal Reserve Board to exercise the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending powers under Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act.
Valukas Report at 618 (citing Examiner Interview of Bernanke at 9).
9/12/08,
3:21 pm
Emails between Governor
Warsh and Nellie Liang
Fed Senior Associate Director Division of Research and Statistics Nellie Liang writes that “I know lots of balls in the
air, but hope we don’t have to protect Lehman’s sub debt holders” and Warsh responds “I hope we don’t protect
anything.”
TAB 48 FCIC‐154863
Page 9 of 15
Date
9/12/08,
3:35 pm
Summary
Jim Wilkinson emails SEC
Chairman Cox a Financial
Times article re no Lehman
bailout.
9/12/08,
4:23 pm
Don Kohn email to
Bernanke and Warsh re no
government assistance.
9/12/08,
5:21 pm
FRBNY General Counsel
Tom Baxter emails
Secretary Paulson’s
opening remarks to
Shafran.
9/12/08, Meeting between FRBNY
(time
and AIG officials.
unknown)
9/12/08,
6:45 pm
Lucinda Brickler email re
possibility of JPMC not
unwinding Lehman’s tri‐
party repos
Description
Jim Wilkinson emails Christopher Cox an FT article, “No Fed Bail‐Out this Time Around,” which reports that (1)
Lehman is less involved in CDS and clearing system than Bear, (2) the markets has had 6 months after Bear to
prepare for Lehman crisis, and (3) the Fed now has in place an emergency liquidity facility to guard against risk that
Lehman could suffer the kind of sudden funding strike in repo market that sank Lehman, quoting a former Fed
official that “Now there is an infrastructure to prevent a disorderly liquidation with the Fed willing to lend against
good collateral.” It also quotes a private equity firm executive that “Lehman may be the poster child for enough is
enough.”
TAB 49 UST‐FCIC 0029440
Fed Vice Chairman Kohn emails Bernanke and Fed Governor Warsh stating there is a strong predilection against
government involvement beyond liquidity and that the Fed and Treasury were exploring the bankruptcy option as
well as involving the private sector in a wind down outside bankruptcy but could not give 100% guarantees on what
the perception of the situation would be Sunday evening.
TAB 50 FCIC‐154870‐871
Paulson’s opening remarks to private consortium include that (1) a “sudden and disorderly unwind [of Lehman]
could have broad adverse effects on the capital markets, with significant risk of a precipitous drop in asset prices,
the widening of spreads and reduced liquidity,” (2) “the financial community needs to come together to fashion an
orderly resolution of the current situation,” and (3) Paulson could not “[contain] the damage” if the financial
community failed to fashion an orderly resolution.
TAB 51 UST‐FCIC 0029633‐35
Notes show that (1) AIG is facing serious liquidity issues that threaten its survival viability, (2) potential credit rating
agency downgrades would trigger billions of dollars in liquidity needs, (3) market are punishing AIG’s stock, (4)
some banks already pulling away and turning down AIG in the secured repo market, (5) AIG having problems rolling
commercial paper, (6) unwinding in the event of an AIG bankruptcy is likely to be very messy because of $2.7 trillion
derivatives book with $1 trillion concentrated in 12 large counterparties.
TAB 52 FCIC‐AIG0021217‐ FCIC‐AIG0021218
FRBNY Senior Vice President Lucinda Brickler emails thoughts on triparty repo and writes that “I’ve attempted to
capture everyone’s positions and concerns, so we’re all on the same page as we think about options. I’ve also
attempted to briefly describe a few things we may need to consider in the event that JPMC refuses to unwind
Lehman’s positions on Monday – assuming they’re still in business, but haven’t been rescued – and the policy makers
believe an intervention is necessary to protect the market from the fallout from a sudden default. As always, your
thoughts, questions, etc., are welcome. We obviously have some work to do if we think we want to consider options
that go beyond the existing facilities.”
TAB 53 FCIC‐155903
Page 10 of 15
Date
9/12/08,
7:00 pm
Summary
Government officials meet
with CEOs.
Description
Paulson, Cox and Geithner meet at the FRBNY building with CEOs from Goldman (Blankfein), Merrill (Thain),
Morgan (Mack), JPM (Dimon), Citi (Pandit), CS (Dougan), and BoNY (Kelly), to discuss Lehman. Paulson states,
“there will be no bailout for Lehman,” and “that there are two potential buyers for Lehman,” BofA and Barclays.
Paulson, On the Brink at 192.
9/12/08,
8:49 pm
9/12/08,
11:04 pm
Parkinson responds to
Brickler’s 6:45 pm email re
plans if JPMC does not
unwind Lehman’s tri‐party
repos.
Lucinda Brickler email
responding to Pat
Parkinson’s 8:49 pm email.
9/12/08, Discussions with BofA and
(late
Treasury officials.
night,
exact time
unknown)
Geithner outlines 3 main groups for Lehman to work on the following: (1) “‘lights out’ scenario of a Lehman
bankruptcy, focusing on Lehman’s vast skeins of derivatives, secured funding, and triparty repo
transactions;” (2) “how the industry might buy all of Lehman with the intention of liquidating it over time –
an approach similar to what Wall Street had done in the 1998 LTCM bailout;” (3) “examine how to finance
the part of Lehman that a prospective buyer didn’t want.” Paulson, On the Brink at 193.
Prepared statements drafted by Baxter tasks the consortium to fashion an orderly resolution of Lehman
because “a sudden and disorderly unwind could have broad adverse effects on the capital markets, with a
significant risk of a precipitous drop in asset prices, the widening of spreads and reduced liquidity” and that
the Fed and Treasury “[could not] offer the prospect of containing the damage if that doesn’t occur.”
TAB 54 9/12/08 email and attached speaking notes, UST‐FCIC 0029633‐35.
Parkinson writes, “I’m forced to guess why plans have changed. I assume the fundamental problem is that even after
the parent files for bankruptcy, the SEC wants the b/d to live on and does not want us grabbing tri‐party collateral
and paying off investors? And/or that we don’t want to take OMO collateral because we can’t rehypothecate and
funds rate would go to zero? In any event, this now looks to me like a godawful mess.”
TAB 53 FCIC‐155903
Lucinda Brickler responds to Pat Parkinson’s 8:49 pm email and writes “There has also not been much appetite over
the past few days for ideas that involve extending public support beyond the existing programs. These issues and
speculation about how bankruptcy would likely unfold are the drivers of this thinking. The situation is fluid,
however. The notes I have been sending are intended to test ideas and generate dialog.”
TAB 53 FCIC‐155902
In a late‐night conversation, BofA CEO Ken Lewis tells Paulson that BofA would only consider buying Lehman if the
government would take around $65 billion off Lehman’s books. When Paulson said no, Lewis bows out.
TAB 55 CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008 (hereinafter “CNN Article”)
Page 11 of 15
Date
Summary
Description
9/12/08, Secretary Paulson discusses At the consortium, Paulson notes, “All the attendees knew how fraught the market was and that its problems went
(time
AIG at consortium.
beyond Lehman. By now, everyone knew that AIG was in trouble. The insurance giant’s problems had been all over
unknown)
the news that day. Apart from the dramatic plunge in its shares, S&P’s had warned that it might downgrade the
company’s credit rating; this would force AIG to produce billions in additional collateral. Then what? What was the
point of having the private sector weaken itself further to save Lehman if someone else was going to need help
afterward.” Paulson, On the Brink at 192.
Earlier that day, FRBNY met with AIG executives re “serious liquidity issues that threaten its survival viability.”
Notes from meeting indicate that (1) a ratings downgrade would lead to $10 billion of collateral calls and another $3
billion in liquidity needs, (2) some banks were already pulling away and turning down AIG in the secured repo
borrowing markets, (3) AIG was having trouble rolling its commercial paper, (4) AIG estimated it had 5‐10 days
before it ran out of liquidity, (5) a bankruptcy of AIG would be “very messy” because $1 trillion of a $2.7 trillion
derivative book was concentrated in 12 large counterparties, and (6) AIG explicitly asked about how to obtain a loan
under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.” Geithner was advised that “[t]he key takeaway is that they [AIG]
are potentially facing a severe run on their liquidity over the course of the next several (approx. 10) days if they are
downgraded by Moody’s and S&P early next week.”
TAB 56 FCIC‐SSI0001367‐1371, e‐mail from Alejandro Torre, vice president, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to Timothy F. Geithner, president, Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, September 12, 2008.
9/13/08, VanDerWeide email
VanDerWeide writes that various options need to be discussed.
10:53 am responding to Brickler’s
9/12/08 11:04 pm email.
TAB 53 FCIC‐155902
9/13/08, Timeline for 9/13‐15/08
Master timeline for meetings on 9/13‐9/15.
11:29 am circulated to Fed officials.
TAB 57 FCIC‐155172
9/13/08, Bernanke email to Alvarez
Bernanke writes that during the 7 pm call, they “may want to discuss some broader issues, e.g., should we go to
2:31 pm
and Fed Governors re 7 pm Congress to ask for other authorities.”
conference call.
TAB 58 FCIC‐154949
9/13/08, Wall Street Journal article,
The articles report that biggest hurdle in discussions is whether government funding will be provided.
2:34 pm
“Lehman Deal Could Come
Tonight As High‐Level
Talks Continue” and other
TAB 59 FCIC‐155927
articles circulated.
9/13/08, Emails between SIPC and
Harbeck (SIPC) and Nason (Treasury) discuss SIPC preparing pleadings to initiate a SIPA case against Lehman, that
3:29 pm
Treasury re Lehman self
the SEC prefers a self liquidation but Lehman may file Chapter 7 liquidation instead.
to 5:55
liquidation.
TAB 60 UST‐FCIC 0029499
pm
9/13/08, Alvarez email re disclosing Alvarez tells VanDerWeide to not disclose tri‐party solution structure to JPMC “if it’s the only question about how to
7:44 pm
tri‐party solution structure manage the bankruptcy – don’t want to suggest Fed willingness to give JPMC cover to screw L or anyone else.”
to JPMC.
TAB 61 FCIC‐154966
Page 12 of 15
Date
9/13/08,
8:01 pm
9/13/08,
8:40 pm
9/13/08
Summary
Lehman prepared
document re impact of
default circulated to FRBNY
officials.
AIG Systemic Risk Analysis.
BofA is out, Barclays
remains, Lehman leaves
FRBNY that night thinking
it’s saved. AIG concerns
linger.
Description
Memo prepared by Lehman counsel circulated to FRBNY officials that “internal counsel described as their view on
how a default for their B/D units may trigger a cascade of defaults through to the subs which have large OTC deriv
books.”
TAB 62 FCIC‐155967‐69
AIG systemic risk analysis circulated to FRBNY officials states that Fed lending to AIG “will further extend the
universe of institutions with discount window access, thus changing expectations about future Fed behavior,” that
“Fed wants to limit the systemic risk externalities, and the potential spillover onto the real economy” and that
“estimates of systemic risk losses are potentially large.”
TAB 56 FCIC0SSI0001367‐71
Morning. With BofA out, the consortium examines Barclays’ proposal to acquire all of Lehman except for its real‐
estate asset book, which has a face value of $40 billion (before write‐downs). The consortium realizes that contrary
to Lehman’s mark‐down of the commercial real‐estate assets to $33 billion (from $40 billion), the valuation is
actually at $25 billion. The consortium would therefore have to provide $1 billion each to finance the $15 billion of
real‐estate assets left behind by Barclays in what would remain of Lehman.
TAB 55 CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008
McDade, Lowitt and other Lehman executives spend all day at the FRBNY to provide information to Barclays and the
consortium. Fuld stays behind in Lehman building.
FCIC staff interview with McDade.
Afternoon. Merrill CEO Thain calls and meets with BoA’s Lewis to discuss a deal.
CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008 (hereinafter “CNN Article”)
9/14/08,
9:00 am
9/14/08,
7:46 am –
9:00 am
Government directs
Lehman to file bankruptcy
after the UK’s FSA decision
re waiver. Fed expands
PDCF to cover less liquid
securities.
Wilkinson email to Staley
that the government is
“united behind no money”
for Lehman.
Evening. Consortium works throughout the evening to put together a term sheet for how they would all agree to
support Barclays’ acquisition of most of Lehman.
TAB 55 CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008.
Consortium reassembles at the Fed and had outlines of a deal around financing. Treasury’s Shafran states that
“[p]eople were happy with the term sheet, so there was a doable deal on the table.”
TAB 55 CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008.
Consortium willing to finance approximately $50 billion in assets that Barclays did not want to buy.
FCIC staff interview with McDade and Baxter.
Wilkinson emails JPM’s Jes Staley that he was meeting with Paulson and Geithner and that it “doesn’t seem like it is
going to end pretty.” Staley responds, “the issue here is can we end it at lehman. What’s the solution for Merrill? And
who loses on the triparty unwind? And what will you guys do in the end.” Wilkinson responds, “No way govt money
is coming in… I’m here writing the usg coms plan for orderly unwind … also just did a call with the WH and usg is
united behind no money. No way in hell Paulson could blink now… we will know more after this ceo mtg this
morning but I think we are headed for winddown unless Barclays deal gets untangled.”
TAB 63 UST‐FCIC0029411‐0416.
Page 13 of 15
Date
9/14/08,
9:31 am
Summary
FRBNY email re assistance
to AIG.
Description
FRBNY’s Ashcraft writes that “I think that a case can be made to lend to them given the potential market disruptions
of the unwind.”
TAB 64 FCIC‐AIG0021165‐21172
9/14/08, FSA rejects Barclays deal.
Paulson calls Lehman’s President McDade and tells him that the “deal’s off. The FSA has turned it down.” The
9:45 am
Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) in London, the UK equivalent of the SEC – has rejected Barclays deal.
TAB 55 CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008.
9/14/08, Emails between Financial
In response to a question whether Paulson’s “firm no government money” would rule out some kind of short term
9:12 am
Times reporter and
bridging support while the acquisition of the problem asset portfolio by consortium was organized and
to 9:49
Treasury’s Davis re
implemented, Davis writes that “off the record, his view is that the existing tools should be used as needed. Existing
am
assistance to Lehman.
tools include the PDCF.”
TAB 65 UST‐FCIC 0029177
9/14/08, Paulson and Geithner
Paulson and Geithner brief the Consortium at the FRBNY re the FSA’s rejection. Among the reasons for FSA’s
10:00 am inform the Consortium of
rejection are (1) “the overall size of the potential exposure that Barclays was taking on and whether Barclays was in
FSA’s rejection of Barclays
good enough shape to do it,” (2) “FSA was looking for some kind of a cap to avoid U.K. contagion, and the Fed had
deal.
just said, ‘No assistance for Lehman,’” (3) “Barclays wasn’t really that serious about getting FSA approval.” The FSA
then concluded that based on the amount of diligence, the risk profile, and the lack of any assistance from the U.S.
that they were not going to let it proceed.”
TAB 55 CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008
9/14/08, Emails between Wilkinson Staley writes “I think market can take the Lehman unwind, but there needs to be a bid for Merrill early in the week.
11:25 am and Staley re possibility of
If Merrill goes, the whole 2a7 funding of Wall Street stops and the Fed will have to step in a bigger way. Its getting
to 11:59
Lehman assistance.
heated here. And I think people are getting that Paulson wont move.” Wilkinson responds that “At the end of the day
am
fed will have to harden support to I banks” and that the “CEOs here are talking abt a private sector liquidity facility.”
TAB 63 UST‐FCIC 0029411
9/14/08, McDade calls Fuld to inform McDade calls Fuld to inform him that the Government told Lehman to file for bankruptcy. McDade and his Lehman
(time
him the Government
Team return to Lehman’s headquarters. Paulson tells consortium to focus on a solution to stabilize the markets.
unknown) directed Lehman to file for FCIC staff interview with McDade, Cohen, and Fuld.
TAB 55 CNNMoney.com, William D. Cohan, “Three Days that Shook the World,” Dec. 15, 2008
bankruptcy.
9/14/08, Fed expands PDCF window. Fed expands PDCF to cover more illiquid assets that broker‐dealers could pledge to clearing banks.
1:22 pm
TAB 69
9/14/08, FRBNY officials inform
Kohn writes in 3:03 pm email to Bernanke that “just talked to Kevin. LEH heard about the pdcf enlargement and
3:03 pm
Lehman it cannot access
thought it was a lifeline, but they didn’t understand it was limited to triparty. KW thinks everything’s on track for
expanded PDCF window.
4:30ish. SEC will go first announcing Chapt. 11 for holding company. I haven’t seen any details.”
TAB 66 FCIC‐154997; FCIC staff interviews at McDade, Lowitt, and Baxter.
9/14/08, FRBNY officials inform
On hearing about expanded PDCF window, Fuld and other Lehman executives thought that Lehman is saved and
(time
Lehman it cannot access
could open the following day. McDade, CFO Lowitt, counsel Harvey Miller, and other Lehman executives return to
unknown) expanded PDCF window.
FRBNY to meet with FRBNY’s Baxter and staff. Baxter tells them that Lehman cannot access the expanded window
and had to file bankruptcy. McDade and Lehman staff present PowerPoint showing catastrophic consequence of
Lehman bankruptcy, to no avail.
FCIC staff interviews with McDade, Lowitt, and Baxter.
Page 14 of 15
Date
9/14/08,
4:16 pm
9/14/08,
5:53 pm
9/14/08,
6:13 pm
9/14/08,
7:23 pm
9/14/08,
8:37 pm
Summary
Bernanke email to Warsh
regarding amount of capital
injection that would have
been necessary.
Treasury emails re Fed
actions to address potential
issues in the repo market.
Email re expansion of PDCF
and 23A relief.
Listing of Lehman Triparty
repos.
FRBNY circulates analysis
of Lehman counterparty
exposure.
9/14/08, Lehman board votes on
(evening, bankruptcy.
exact time
unknown)
Description
Bernanke emails Warsh, “In case I am asked: How much capital injection would have been needed to keep LEH alive
as a going concern? I gather $12B or so from the private guys together with Fed liquidity support was not enough.”
TAB 67 FCIC‐155000
Robert Hoyt writes to Schafer that he had not heard the Fed would (1) widen collateral acceptable for the PDCF, (2)
adjust the schedule related to certain auctions and (3) provide 23(A) relief to the banks but knew they were working
on relief in the wake of Lehman talks failing.
TAB 68 UST‐FCIC 0029475
FRBNY Deputy Director of Banking Supervision Deborah Bailey writes in email to Fed officials that “Lots going on ….
and little of it good!.... There will be some changes in the PDCF…. I have attached below the final draft notice for the
23a exemption … which applies to those institutions which are engaged in triparty repo through JPMC and BNY. It is
important to note that an institution is eligible unless they are specifically told by the FRB and/or the primary
supervisors that they are not eligible.”
TAB 69 FCIC‐155006‐10
Lehman triparty repos $94.8 billion.
TAB 70 FCIC‐155011‐014
FRBNY circulates analysis of Lehman’s counterparty exposure showing that Lehman had $24.6 billion in current
payable exposures to the market including (1) $818 million to $2 billion to large financial institutions (“LFI”), (2) $3
billion to commercial banks that were not large financial institutions, (3) $11 billion to hedge funds and (4) $7.9
billion to “other” institutions. Coryan Stefansson, a Fed Associate Director of Bank Supervision and Regulation,
responded, “so for 818 million the tax payer is exposed for up to 90b???”
TAB 70 FCIC‐155014‐15.
Bart McDade, Ian Lowitt, Lehman Counsel Harvey Miller and others return to the Lehman building where the Board
of Directors were assembled to vote on the bankruptcy filing. Cox and Baxter calls into the Board meeting to direct
Lehman to file bankruptcy. Miller’s team prepares for a Chapter 11 filing – a reorganization plan, not a liquidation
plan – for the Lehman parent company, allowing the operating subsidiaries, such as the broker/dealer and the asset
management business, to continue operating outside of bankruptcy.
FCIC staff interviews with McDade, Russo, and Miller.
9/15/08,
1:30‐2:00
am
Lehman files bankruptcy,
but LBI accesses PDCF for
orderly wind down (filing
for bankruptcy days later).
9/15/08,
9:33 am
Fed email re Lehman
broker dealer accessing
PDCF.
1:30 am, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. files for bankruptcy, listing $639 billion of assets with over 100,000
creditors in the largest bankruptcy in US History. That day, DOW declines 504 points.
The Fed gives LBI, the broker dealer, access to PDCF, which Lehman uses three more times ($28 billion on 9/15;
$19.7 billion on 9/16, and $20.4 billion on 9/17) until Barclays stepped into the shoes of the Fed in providing
financing to LBI.
VanDerWeide writes to Alvarez, “Are you OK with Lehman b/d accessing the PDCF today in light of its parent’s
chapter 11 bankruptcy? Or should we talk about this one more time. I think Baxter is doing some analysis/writeup
on this issue.”
TAB 71 FCIC‐155027
4843‐8755‐3031, v. 4
Page 15 of 15
TAB 1
Federal Reserve Announces Establishment of Primary Dealer Credit Facility - Federal Re... Page 1 of 1
NE WS AN D E V ENT S
Home > News and Events > News
PRESS RELEASE
News
Events
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Federal Reserve Announces Establishment
of Primary Dealer Credit Facility
Public Engagements
March 16, 2008
View News and
Events Contacts
The Federal Reserve has announced that the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York has been granted the authority to establish a Primary
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). This facility is intended to improve the
ability of primary dealers to provide financing to participants in
securitization markets and promote the orderly functioning of
financial markets more generally.
The PDCF will provide overnight funding to primary dealers in
exchange for a specified range of collateral, including all collateral
eligible for tri-party repurchase agreements arranged by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, as well as all investment-grade
corporate securities, municipal securities, mortgage-backed
securities and asset-backed securities for which a price is available.
The PDCF will remain in operation for a minimum period of six
months and may be extended as conditions warrant to foster the
functioning of financial markets.
For more information, see
Board of Governors Press Release
PDCF Program Terms and Conditions ››
Frequently Asked Questions ››
Contact:
Andrew Williams
(212) 720-6143
(646) 720-6143
andrew.williams@ny.frb.org
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8/31/2010
Statement on Financing Arrangement of JPMorgan Chase's Acquisition of Bear Stearns - ... Page 1 of 1
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Home > News and Events > News
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Events
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View News and
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Statement on Financing Arrangement of
JPMorgan Chase's Acquisition of Bear
Stearns
March 24, 2008
At the closing of the merger, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
("New York Fed") will provide term financing to facilitate JPMorgan
Chase & Co.'s acquisition of The Bear Stearns Companies Inc. This
action is being taken by the Federal Reserve, with the support of the
Treasury Department, to bolster market liquidity and promote
orderly market functioning.
The New York Fed will take, through a limited liability company
formed for this purpose, control of a portfolio of assets valued at
$30 billion as of March 14, 2008. The assets will be pledged as
security for $29 billion in term financing from the New York Fed at
its primary credit rate.
JPMorgan Chase will bear the first $1 billion of any losses associated
with the portfolio and any realized gains will accrue to the New York
Fed. BlackRock Financial Management, Inc. will manage the portfolio
under guidelines established by the New York Fed designed to
minimize disruption to financial markets and maximize recovery
value.
Summary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the JPMorgan
Chase Facility ››
Contact:
Andrew Williams
(212) 720-6143
(646) 720-6143
andrew.williams@ny.frb.org
Home
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Contact Us
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8/31/2010
TAB 2
Lehman Brothers - Quarterly Earnings - First Quarter 2008
Page 1 of 3
Quarterly Earnings
>>First Quarter 2008
>>Second Quarter 2008
>>Third Quarter 2008
First Quarter 2008
Lehman Brothers Reports First Quarter Results
Quarterly Earnings side image
Reports Net Income of $489 Million, or $0.81 Earnings Per Share
NEW YORK, 18 March 2008
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (ticker symbol: LEH) today reported
net income of $489 million, or $0.81 per common share (diluted), for
the first quarter ended February 29, 2008, representing decreases of
57% and 59%, respectively, from net income of $1.15 billion, or $1.96
per common share (diluted), reported for the first quarter of fiscal
2007. Fourth quarter fiscal 2007 net income was $886 million, or
$1.54 per common share (diluted).
First Quarter Business Highlights
J
K
• Experienced record client activity across our Capital Markets
businesses, which was offset, in part, by the effect of the
continued dislocations in the credit markets that significantly
impacted the Firm's results
• Maintained strong liquidity position, with the Holding Company
having a liquidity pool of $34 billion and unencumbered assets of
$64 billion, with an additional $99 billion at our regulated entities,
at quarter end
• Reported record net revenues in the Investment Management
segment
• Ranked #2 in announced global M&A transactions for the first two
months of calendar 2008, according to Thomson Financial
Chi
T diti
Chi
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Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Richard S. Fuld, Jr. said, "In
what remains a challenging operating environment, our results reflect
the value of our continued commitment to building a diversified
platform and our focus on managing risk and maintaining a strong
capital and liquidity position. This strategy has allowed us to support
our clients through these difficult and volatile markets, while
continuing to build and strengthen our global franchise for our
shareholders."
Net Revenues
Net revenues (total revenues less interest expense) for the first
quarter of fiscal 2008 were $3.5 billion, representing decreases of
31% and 20%, respectively, from $5.0 billion reported in the first
quarter of fiscal 2007 and $4.4 billion reported in the fourth quarter of
fiscal 2007. Net revenues for the first quarter of fiscal 2008 reflect
negative mark to market adjustments of $1.8 billion, net of gains on
certain risk mitigation strategies and certain debt liabilities.
Business Segments
Capital Markets reported net revenues of $1.7 billion in the first
quarter of fiscal 2008, a decrease of 52% from $3.5 billion in the first
quarter of fiscal 2007. Fixed Income Capital Markets reported net
revenues of $262 million, a decrease of 88% from $2.2 billion in the
first quarter of fiscal 2007, as strong performances in liquid products
such as high grade corporate debt, foreign exchange and interest rate
products were offset, in part, by continued deterioration in the broader
credit markets, in particular residential mortgages, commercial
mortgages and acquisition finance. Equities Capital Markets reported
net revenues of $1.4 billion, an increase of 6% from $1.3 billion in the
first quarter of fiscal 2007, driven by continued growth in prime
brokerage and strong activity in execution services.
Investment Banking reported net revenues of $867 million, an
increase of 2% from $850 million in the first quarter of fiscal 2007.
These revenues were driven by strong merger and acquisition
advisory revenues, which increased 34% to $330 million from
$247 million in the first quarter of fiscal 2007, and higher equity
origination revenues, which increased 23% to $215 million from
$175 million in the first quarter of fiscal 2007, partially offset by lower
revenues in debt origination as compared to the first quarter of fiscal
2007.
Investment Management reported record net revenues of
http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/1_08qe.htm
8/31/2010
Lehman Brothers - Quarterly Earnings - First Quarter 2008
Page 2 of 3
$968 million, an increase of 39% from $695 million in the first quarter
of fiscal 2007. This performance was driven by record revenues in
both Asset Management, which increased 49% to $618 million from
$416 million in the first quarter of fiscal 2007, and Private Investment
Management, which increased 25% to $350 million from $279 million
in the first quarter of fiscal 2007. The Firm reported assets under
management of $277 billion, compared to $282 billion at November
30, 2007.
Firm Profitability and Liquidity
Non-interest expenses for the first quarter of fiscal 2008 were
$2.8 billion, compared to $3.3 billion in the first quarter of fiscal 2007
and $3.2 billion in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2007. Compensation and
benefits as a percentage of net revenues was 52.5% during the first
quarter of fiscal 2008, compared to 49.3% for both the first and fourth
quarters of fiscal 2007. Non-personnel expenses in the first quarter of
fiscal 2008 were $1.0 billion, consistent with the fourth quarter of
fiscal 2007 and compared to $860 million in the first quarter of fiscal
2007, reflecting continued investments in growing the franchise and
costs associated with the resizing of the Firm's mortgage origination
platform.
The Firm's pre-tax margin was 18.9% for the first quarter of fiscal
2008, compared to 33.7% for the first quarter of fiscal 2007. Return
on average common equity was 8.6% for the first quarter of fiscal
2008, compared to 24.4% for the first quarter of fiscal 2007. Return
on average tangible common equity was 10.6% for the first quarter of
fiscal 2008, compared with 29.9% for the first quarter of fiscal 2007.
As of February 29, 2008, Lehman Brothers' total stockholders' equity
was $24.8 billion, and total long-term capital (stockholders' equity and
long-term borrowings, excluding any borrowings with remaining
maturities of less than twelve months) was $153.2 billion. Book value
per common share was $39.45. The Holding Company had a robust
liquidity pool of $34 billion at quarter end. In addition, the Holding
Company had other unencumbered assets of $64 billion and our
regulated entities had unencumbered assets of $99 billion at quarter
end.
Lehman Brothers (ticker symbol: LEH), an innovator in global finance,
serves the financial needs of corporations, governments and
municipalities, institutional clients, and high net worth individuals
worldwide. Founded in 1850, Lehman Brothers maintains leadership
positions in equity and fixed income sales, trading and research,
investment banking, private investment management, asset
management and private equity. The Firm is headquartered in New
York, with regional headquarters in London and Tokyo, and operates
in a network of offices around the world. For further information about
Lehman Brothers' services, products and recruitment opportunities,
visit the Firm's Web site at www.lehman.com. Lehman Brothers Inc. is
a member of SIPC.
Conference Call
A conference call to discuss the Firm's financial results and outlook
will be held today at 10:00 a.m. ET. The call will be open to the public.
Members of the public who would like to access the conference call
should dial, from the U.S., 800-619-3387 or, from outside the U.S.,
415-228-4939 at least ten minutes prior to the start of the conference
call. The pass code for all callers is LEHMAN. The conference call will
also be accessible through the "Shareholders" section of the Firm's
Web site under the subcategory "Webcasts." For those unable to
listen to the live broadcast, a replay will be available on the Firm's
Web site or by dialing 800-308-3945 (domestic) or 203-369-3240
(international). The replay will be available approximately one hour
after the event and will remain available on the Lehman Brothers Web
site and by phone until 11:59 p.m. ET on April 18, 2008.
Please direct any questions regarding the conference call to Ed Grieb
at 212-526-0588, egrieb@lehman.com.
Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
This press release may contain forward-looking statements. These
statements are not historical facts, but instead represent only the
Firm's expectations, estimates and projections regarding future
events. These statements are not guarantees of future performance
and involve certain risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict,
which may include risks and uncertainties relating to market
fluctuations and volatility, industry competition and changes in the
competitive environment, investor sentiment, liquidity and credit
ratings, credit exposures, operational risks and legal and regulatory
http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/1_08qe.htm
8/31/2010
Lehman Brothers - Quarterly Earnings - First Quarter 2008
Page 3 of 3
matters. The Firm's actual results and financial condition may differ,
perhaps materially, from the anticipated results and financial condition
in any such forward-looking statements and, accordingly, readers are
cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements. The Firm
undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements,
whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
For more information concerning the risks and other factors that could
affect the Firm's future results and financial condition, see "Risk
Factors" and "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations" in the Firm's most recent
Annual Report on Form 10-K.
Selected Statistical and Financial Information Attached (255 k)
You will need to have Adobe® Reader® software to view PDF files on
your computer. Visit the Adobe Web site to download a copy of the
software.
http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/1_08qe.htm
8/31/2010
TAB 3
TAB 4
TAB 5
TAB 6
Lehman Brothers - Quarterly Earnings - Second Quarter 2008
Page 1 of 3
Quarterly Earnings
>>First Quarter 2008
>>Second Quarter 2008
>>Third Quarter 2008
Second Quarter 2008
Lehman Brothers Reports Second Quarter Results
Quarterly Earnings side image
Reports Net Loss of $2.8 billion, or ($5.14) Per Share
NEW YORK, 16 June 2008
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. (ticker symbol: LEH) announced today
a net loss of $2.8 billion, or ($5.14) per common share (diluted), for
the second quarter ended May 31, 2008, compared to net income of
$489 million, or $0.81 per common share (diluted), for the first quarter
of fiscal 2008 and $1.3 billion, or $2.21 per common share (diluted),
for the second quarter of fiscal 2007. For the first half of fiscal 2008,
the Firm reported a net loss of approximately $2.3 billion or ($4.33)
per common share (diluted), compared to net income of $2.4 billion,
or $4.17 per common share (diluted), for the first half of fiscal 2007.
J
Chi
The Firm reported net revenues (total revenues less interest expense)
for the second quarter of fiscal 2008 of negative ($0.7) billion,
compared to $3.5 billion for the first quarter of 2008 and $5.5 billion
for the second quarter of fiscal 2007. Net revenues for the second
quarter of fiscal 2008 reflect negative mark to market adjustments and
principal trading losses, net of gains on certain debt liabilities.
Additionally, the Firm incurred losses on hedges this quarter, as gains
from some hedging activity were more than offset by other hedging
losses. For the first six months of fiscal 2008, the Firm reported net
revenues of $2.8 billion, compared to $10.6 billion for the first half of
fiscal 2007.
T diti
Chi
Si
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lifi d V
i
During the second quarter of fiscal 2008, the Firm further
strengthened its liquidity and capital position (all below amounts as of
May 31, 2008):
• Grew the Holding Company liquidity pool to $45 billion from
$34 billion at the end of the prior quarter
• The Firm reported gross assets and net assets of approximately
$639 billion and $327 billion, respectively, which decreased
approximately $147 billion and $70 billion, respectively, from the
first quarter of fiscal 2008
• Reduced gross leverage to 24.3x from 31.7x at the end of the first
quarter, and reduced net leverage to 12.0x from 15.4x
• Reduced exposure to residential mortgages, commercial
mortgages and real estate investments by approximately 20% in
each asset class
• Reduced acquisition finance exposures by approximately 35%
• Reduced aggregate non-investment grade inventory (including
funded acquisition finance assets) by approximately 20%
• Completed the budgeted full year fiscal 2008 unsecured funding
plan
• Increased the Firm's long-term capital through the issuance of
$4.0 billion of convertible preferred stock in April and
approximately $5.5 billion of public benchmark long-term debt
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Richard S. Fuld, Jr. said,
"Since we announced our expected second quarter earnings last
week, we have begun to take the necessary steps to restore the
credibility of our great franchise and ensure that this quarter's
unacceptable performance is not repeated. We have raised an
additional $6 billion of capital. I have asked Bart McDade, our best
operator, to serve as the Firm's president and chief operating officer. I
have also asked Ian Lowitt, our co-chief administrative officer, to be
our chief financial officer. With these actions and our continued
commitment to our client-driven franchise, we are positioned to take
advantage of opportunities that lie ahead, and we are focused on
maximizing shareholder value."
Business Segments
Capital Markets reported net revenues of negative ($2.4) billion in
the second quarter of fiscal 2008, compared to $1.7 billion in the first
quarter of fiscal 2008 and $3.6 billion in the second quarter of fiscal
2007. Fixed Income Capital Markets reported net revenues of
negative ($3.0) billion, compared to $0.3 billion in the first quarter of
2008 and $1.9 billion in the second quarter of 2007. Excluding mark
to market adjustments, related hedges and structured note liability
http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/2_08qe.htm
8/31/2010
Lehman Brothers - Quarterly Earnings - Second Quarter 2008
Page 2 of 3
gains, client activity in securitized products, municipals and
commodities remained strong, while credit, interest rate and financing
were down from last quarter but each up versus the year ago period.
Equities Capital Markets reported net revenues of $0.6 billion, a
decrease from $1.4 billion in the first quarter of fiscal 2008 and
$1.7 billion in the second quarter of 2007, as record revenues in
prime brokerage and solid execution services activity were offset, in
part, by lower volatility revenues as well as losses of approximately
$0.3 billion on principal investments.
Investment Banking reported net revenues of $0.9 billion, consistent
with $0.9 billion in the first quarter of fiscal 2008 and a decrease from
$1.2 billion in the second quarter of fiscal 2007. Debt underwriting
revenues were $0.3 billion, consistent with $0.3 billion in the first
quarter of fiscal 2008 and a decrease from $0.5 billion in the second
quarter of 2007, as strong high grade debt underwriting revenues
were offset by continued weakness in high yield new issuance. Equity
underwriting revenues were $0.3 billion, an increase from $0.2 billion
in the first quarter of fiscal 2008 and consistent with $0.3 billion in the
second quarter of 2007. Merger and acquisition advisory revenues
were $0.2 billion, a decrease from $0.3 billion in both the first quarter
of fiscal 2008 and the second quarter of 2007.
Investment Management reported net revenues of $0.8 billion, a
decrease from record revenues of $1.0 billion in the first quarter of
fiscal 2008 and consistent with $0.8 billion in the second quarter of
fiscal 2007. Asset Management revenues were $0.5 billion, a
decrease from $0.6 billion in the first quarter of fiscal 2008 on lower
gains from minority interests in third party alternative investment
managers, and consistent with $0.5 billion in the second quarter of
2007. The Firm reported assets under management of $277 billion,
consistent with the prior quarter. Private Investment Management
reported revenues of $0.4 billion, consistent with $0.4 billion in the
first quarter of fiscal 2008 and an increase from $0.3 billion in the
second quarter of 2007, with strength across both fixed income and
equity products.
Firm Profitability and Capital
Non-interest expenses for the second quarter of fiscal 2008 were
$3.4 billion, compared to $2.8 billion in the first quarter of fiscal 2008
and $3.6 billion in the second quarter of fiscal 2007. Compensation
expense was approximately $2.3 billion in the second quarter of 2008,
compared to $1.8 billion in the first quarter of fiscal 2008. Nonpersonnel expenses for the period were approximately $1.1 billion,
compared to $1.0 billion in the first quarter of fiscal 2008. The tax rate
was 32.1%.
As of May 31, 2008, Lehman Brothers' total stockholders' equity was
$26.3 billion, and total long-term capital (stockholders' equity and
long-term borrowings, excluding any borrowings with remaining
maturities of less than twelve months) was $154.5 billion. Book value
per common share was $34.21.
In June, Lehman Brothers closed a $4.0 billion public offering of 143
million shares of common stock as well as a $2.0 billion public
offering of 2 million shares of 8.75% non-cumulative mandatory
convertible preferred stock, Series Q. The capital and equity statistics
in this Press Release do not reflect the impact of these offerings.
Lehman Brothers (ticker symbol: LEH), an innovator in global finance,
serves the financial needs of corporations, governments and
municipalities, institutional clients, and high net worth individuals
worldwide. Founded in 1850, Lehman Brothers maintains leadership
positions in equity and fixed income sales, trading and research,
investment banking, private investment management, asset
management and private equity. The Firm is headquartered in New
York, with regional headquarters in London and Tokyo, and operates
in a network of offices around the world. For further information about
Lehman Brothers' services, products and recruitment opportunities,
visit the Firm's Web site at www.lehman.com. Lehman Brothers Inc. is
a member of SIPC.
Conference Call
A conference call to discuss the Firm's financial results and outlook
will be held today at 10:00 a.m. ET. The call will be open to the public.
For members of the public who would like to access the conference
call, it will be available through the "Shareholders" section of the
Firm's Web site under the subcategory "Events and Presentations."
The conference call will also be available by phone by dialing, from
the U.S., 1-800-988-9465 or, from outside the U.S., 1-312-470-7006
http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/2_08qe.htm
8/31/2010
Lehman Brothers - Quarterly Earnings - Second Quarter 2008
Page 3 of 3
at least fifteen minutes prior to the start of the conference call. The
pass code for all callers is "3713056". For those unable to listen to the
live broadcast, a replay will be available on the Firm's Web site or by
dialing 1-800-890-3520 (domestic) or 1-203-369-3844 (international).
The replay will be available immediately after the beginning of the call
and will remain available on the Lehman Brothers Web site and by
phone until 11:59 p.m. ET on July 16, 2008.
Please direct any questions regarding the conference call to Ed Grieb
at 212-526-0588, egrieb@lehman.com.
Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements
This Press Release may contain forward-looking statements. These
statements are not historical facts, but instead represent only the
Firm's expectations, estimates and projections regarding future
events. These statements are not guarantees of future performance
and involve certain risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict,
which may include risks and uncertainties relating to market
fluctuations and volatility, industry competition and changes in the
competitive environment, investor sentiment, liquidity and credit
ratings, credit exposures, operational risks and legal and regulatory
matters. The Firm's actual results and financial condition may differ,
perhaps materially, from the anticipated results and financial condition
in any such forward-looking statements and, accordingly, readers are
cautioned not to place undue reliance on such statements. The Firm
undertakes no obligation to update any forward-looking statements,
whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.
For more information concerning the risks and other factors that could
affect the Firm's future results and financial condition, see "Risk
Factors" and "Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations" in the Firm's most recent
Annual Report on Form 10-K and Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q.
Selected Statistical and Financial Information (252 k)
Financial Supplement (38 k)
You will need to have Adobe® Reader® software to view PDF files on
your computer. Visit the Adobe Web site to download a copy of the
software.
http://www.lehman.com/press/qe/past/2_08qe.htm
8/31/2010
TAB 7
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Kirsten Harlow
Adam J Weisz; Alexander J Psomas; Amy White; Angela MIKNIUS; Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Brian Peters;
Christopher Calabia; Daniel Sullivan; Denise Goodstein; Dennis Herbst; Dianne Dobbeck; Elizabeth Tafone;
Gerard Dages; Helen Mucciolo; Homer Hill; James P Bergin; Jan Voigts; Jeffrey Kowalak; Jim Mahoney; John
Leiby; JohnP McGowan; Jonathan Stewart; Kevin Coffey; Kevin Messina; Kirsten Harlow; Lance Auer; Michael
Holscher; Robard Williams; Sarah Dahlgren; Steven J Manzari; Theodore Lubke; Til Schuermann; Tim P Clark;
Timothy Geithner; William BRODOWS; William Rutledge; YoonHi Greene
On-Site Primary Dealer Update: June 16
06/16/2008 05:09 PM
IB Financing Liquidity Master New.pdf
Kirsten J. Harlow
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(212) 720-2912
kirsten.harlow@ny.frb.org
ON-SITE TEAMS REPORT
Summary: Lehman's earnings release today was largely in-line with last week's prerelease. No adverse information on liquidity, novations, terminations or ability to
fund either secured or unsecured balances has been reported.
Lehman Earnings Release:
Highlights:
Earnings: Net loss of $2.8 billion, compared to $0.5 billion in the 1Q08 and
$1.3 billion in 2Q07
Revenue: Net revenue of negative ($0.7) billion, compared to $3.5 billion
in the 1Q08 and $5.5 billion in 2Q07
Economic hedges: Provided no benefit (previously found to be 70%
effective)
Asset Markdowns: Marked down approximately $4 billion of illiquid assets,
of which 50% was residential mortgage-related, and 25% of commercial
mortgage-related.
Measures taken in 2Q08 to strengthen Liquidity and Capital:
Increased the liquidity pool from $34 billion to $45 billion
Reduced gross and net assets by $147 billion and $70 billion, respectively
Improved gross and net leverage ratios from 31.7x to 24.3x and 15,4x to
12.0x, respectively
Reduced exposures to residential mortgages, commercial mortgages and
real estate investments by 20% in each asset class
Issued $4 billion in convertible preferred stock in April and $5.5 billion of
public long-term debt in the quarter
Counterparty Credit Issues for Secured and Unsecured Financing
Goldman: Fidelity has indicated having no interest in renewing a $1 billion prom
note that is maturing today. Goldman did, however, add a new $500mm 7-day lowgrade equity repo.
Parent Company Liquidity Pool
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155446
FRB to LEH Examiner 001795
TAB 8
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
William Dudley
Chairman's
Email
Brian F Madigan; Donald L Kohn;
Re: TSLF
06/17/2008 08:20 AM
Chairman's
Email
; Timothy Geithner
My two cents after consulting with Brian:
I agree with Tim that we should extend both through yearend--probably to January
31 or so. Sooner is better to provide clarity on this issue.
TSLF is a bit different than PDCF in that it is an auction, less of a backstop, available
only for AAA-rated collateral and has been mostly undersubscribed. It seems to me
that this argues for beginning to phase it out by cutting down the sizes of the
auctions, and I might make this part of the overall announcement--extending it but
starting to cut back the amount. This will underscore to people that these programs
are not permanent and may help to mollify some of the critics a bit. I would not
make a distinction here betw Schedule 1 and 2 (even though there is a difference)
just to keep the message simple--both have been undersubscribed so we are going
to begin to phase them out.
PDCF remains critical to the stability of some of the IBs. Amounts don't matter here,
it is the fact that the PDCF underpins the triparty repo system. I think without the
PDCF, Lehman might have experienced a full blown liquidity crisis. So this has to be
kept as is until 1) the IBs are in better shape in terms of funding/leverage and 2)
triparty is strengthened--both are in process.
So I (and I think Brian is on board with this) might propose a memo to the FOMC
that extends both programs but also announces the phasing down of TSLF auction
sizes beginning in July or August (depends on how much warning we want to give).
Best,
Bill
ź
Chairman's Email
Chairman'
s Email
To
06/16/2008 06:31 PM
Donald L Kohn/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Timothy
Geithner/NY/FRS@FRS, William
Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian F
Madigan/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Chairman's Email
cc
Subject
Re: TSLF
Ok. Then we need to outline a short memo to the fomc from brian. I
have no time till tomw afternoon but can take a stab at it then.
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154463
FRB to LEH Examiner 000812
ź Donald L Kohn
----- Original Message ----From: Donald L Kohn
Sent
6:25 PM EDT
Chairman's Email
To:
Timothy Geithner; William Dudley; Brian
Madigan
Subject: Re: TSLF
ź
Both the tslf and the pdcf depended on 13-3, though the latter gets all
the attention. If we don't extend tslf does that raise questions about
the need for the pdcf. Besides I like the idea of keeping the auction
facilities alive, at least in some form. Getting the fomc to sign onto an
extension could be tough and will require, as you note, some
consideration of the broader picture for after September. But I think
the discussion, like cod liver oil, will be good for us. If we can't
convince most of our colleagues we will have problems with the public.
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
Chairman's Email
----- Original Message ----Chairman's Email
From:
Sent:
:12 PM EDT
To: Timothy Geithner; William Dudley; Brian Madigan; Donald
Kohn
Subject: TSLF
If we are going to announce an extension of the TSLF in July, we
probably should get the authority from the FOMC to do so. If we
want to do that, then we need a short memo in advance of the
meeting. At the meeting I could explain the reason for the request in
more detail in the context of our discussion of plans for investment
bank supervision.
Before thinking through what the memo would say, let me ask the
following: Given that the TSLF has been undersubscribed, do we want
to announce its extension? We could for example extend the PDCF in
July (by Board decision) but say that we are reserving judgment on the
TSLF. We could then revisit the TSLF at the August meeting.
Thoughts?
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154464
FRB to LEH Examiner 000813
TAB 9
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Tim P Clark
Robard Williams; Kevin Coffey
Fw: On-Site Primary Dealer Update: June 19
06/20/2008 08:58 AM
IB Financing Liquidity Master New.pdf
this is not sounding good at all...
----- Forwarded by Tim P Clark/BOARD/FRS on 06/20/2008 08:57 AM ----Kirsten
Harlow/NY/FRS@FRS
To
06/19/2008 09:06 PM
Adam J Weisz/NY/FRS@FRS, Alexander J
Psomas/NY/FRS@FRS, Amy White/NY/FRS@FRS,
Angela MIKNIUS/NY/FRS@FRS, Arthur
Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian Begalle/NY/FRS@FRS,
Brian Peters/NY/FRS@FRS, Christopher
Calabia/NY/FRS@FRS, Daniel Sullivan/NY/FRS@FRS,
Denise Goodstein/NY/FRS@FRS, Dennis
Herbst/NY/FRS@FRS, Dianne Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS,
Elizabeth Tafone/NY/FRS@FRS, Gerard
Dages/NY/FRS@FRS, Helen Mucciolo/NY/FRS@FRS,
Homer Hill/NY/FRS@FRS, James P
Bergin/NY/FRS@FRS, Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, Jeffrey
Kowalak/NY/FRS@FRS, Jim Mahoney/NY/FRS@FRS,
John Leiby/NY/FRS@FRS, JohnP
McGowan/NY/FRS@FRS, Jonathan
Stewart/NY/FRS@FRS, Kevin Coffey/NY/FRS@FRS,
Kevin Messina/NY/FRS@FRS, Kirsten
Harlow/NY/FRS@FRS, Lance Auer/NY/FRS@FRS,
Michael Holscher/NY/FRS@FRS, Robard
Williams/NY/FRS@FRS, Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS,
Steven J Manzari/NY/FRS@FRS, Theodore
Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS,
Tim P Clark/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Timothy
Geithner/NY/FRS@FRS, William
BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, William
Rutledge/NY/FRS@FRS, YoonHi Greene/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
On-Site Primary Dealer Update: June 19
Kirsten J. Harlow
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(212) 720-2912
kirsten.harlow@ny.frb.org
ON-SITE TEAMS REPORT
Counterparty Credit Issues for Secured and Unsecured Financing/Other
Lehman: Acknowledged trading issues with four financial institutions: Natixis
(eliminating all activity with Lehman), Santander, Wespac, and Commonwealth
Bank of Australia.
Merrill: Since June 13 the total repo book declined by $39 billion to $196 billion
and will continue to lower $11 billion more going into quarter end on June 27.
Management intends on reducing the size of its balance sheet usage through
customer matched repo/reverse repo activity.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155450
FRB to LEH Examiner 001799
Parent Company Liquidity Pool
Merrill: Operating cash and liquidity at the holding company increased by $5 billion
closing at $66.1 billion on Wednesday. The major inflows consisted of $1.8 billion
from domestic stock loan, $1.1 billion from equity triparty, $900 million from ML Pro
(unwinding of short positions), $ 500 million from corporate services triparty and
$500 million back from prior day government fails.
Comments Submitted by CPC Teams
JPMC: Some large pension funds and some smaller Asian central banks are
specifying (or tightening the standards on) what classes of assets they will accept.
Some are switching to repo only, and away from ABCP and Time Deposits. JPMC
indicated that it will indemnify against losses on some of these counterparties (the
names which are coming up in the market as generating the most concerns are
Lehman and Merrill). Despite JPMC’s indemnification, certain investors are still
refusing to deal with these seemingly weak counterparties.
Citi: has decided to reduce total clearing/settlement lines to Lehman from
approximately $20 billion to around $10-12 billion. Further, Lehman has agreed to
place $2 billion cash with Citi, not as collateral but in case of difficulties. The cash
could also be used to fund any intra-day credit extensions. It should be noted that
Citi is Lehman’s largest clearer outside the United States. Tom said this approach
will also be applied to the other 3 major Broker/Dealers.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155451
FRB to LEH Examiner 001800
KEY METRICS: PRIMARY DEALER FINANCING AND LIQUIDITY
June 19, 2008
Preliminary
The first two columns below present secured and unsecured financing that did not roll on the day noted, as well as any reductions in credit lines, as reported to the
on site FRBNY staff. A dash in the secured and unsecured columns indicates that there were no counterparty turndowns on that date. The third column presents
maturity of the total outstanding CP, while the fourth column displays the parent company liquidity pool.
$ in billions
0
Ju
n
e1
e2
22
M
ay
Ju
n
6
14
M
ay
M
ay
M
ar
ch
14
M
ar
ch
25
A
pr
il
2
A
pr
il
10
A
pr
il
18
A
pr
il
28
$ in billions
14
M
ar
ch
25
A
pr
il
2
A
pr
il
10
A
pr
il
18
A
pr
il
28
M
ay
6
M
ay
14
M
ay
22
M
ay
30
Ju
ne
9
Ju
ne
17
Morgan Parent Liquidity Trend
90
80
70
60
50
18
ne
Ju
Ju
ne
10
2
ne
Ju
A
pr
il
2
A
pr
il
10
A
pr
il
18
A
pr
il
28
M
ay
6
M
ay
14
M
ay
22
25
ar
ch
14
40
Merrill Parent Liquidity Trend
80
Parent Co.
Liquidity
Pool (EOD)
66 2
66 0
65 1
64 9
66 7
66 9
62 9
63 6
66 1
70
60
50
40
20
8
e1
e1
Ju
n
Ju
n
Commercial Paper Outstanding ($ in billions)
15
10
5
Morgan
1
e1
Ju
n
e3
Ju
n
23
15
Merrill*
M
ay
M
ay
7
M
ay
21
pr
il
A
pr
il
11
Lehman
29
0
A
Goldman
14
14
14
14
14
14
17
17
0
30
pr
il
COMMERCIAL PAPER OUTSTANDING
Lehman
Morgan
Merrill*
June 6
82
11 8
June 9
72
11 6
38
June 10
75
11 6
June 11
78
11 6
June 12
79
11 6
June 13
61
11 1
31
June 16
56
10 8
June 17
56
10 9
June 18
65
10 8
* Only represents CP outstanding for the next two weeks
($ in billions)
60
A
Did not roll
03
02
00
04
-
70
3
June 6
June 9
June 10
June 11
June 12
June 13
June 16
June 17
June 18
Did not roll
-
80
pr
il
($ in billions)
90
A
MERRILL LYNCH
Secured
Unsecured
Financing
Financing
100
M
MORGAN STANLEY
Secured
Unsecured
Parent Co.
Financing
Financing
Liquidity Pool
Did not roll Did not roll
CP WAM
(EOD)
63
85 3
61
90 1
60
80 7
60
83 1
59
81 2
62
80 7
62
80 7
61
79 1
63
77 6
110
26
June 6
June 9
June 10
June 11
June 12
June 13
June 16
June 17
June 18
CP WAM
31
30
31
30
30
30
32
32
32
M
ar
ch
($ in billions)
Did not roll
01
04
10
25
02
ch
June 5
June 6
June 9
June 10
June 11
June 12
June 13
June 16
June 17
June 18
Did not roll
13
08
-
Goldman Parent Liquidity Trends
120
$ in billions
($ in billions)
Parent Co.
Liquidity Pool
(EOD)
103 5
99 0
102 9
96 1
96 2
96 7
96 3
93 3
91 2
98 7
20
M
ar
GOLDMAN SACHS
Secured
Unsecured
Financing
Financing
30
$ in billions
90
40
ar
ch
CP: O/N as a
% of Total
41%
33%
37%
37%
42%
21%
25%
18%
01
31%
M
Did not roll
05
13
01
17
Lehman Parent Liquidity Trends
50
M
ar
ch
17
M
ar
ch
26
A
pr
il
3
A
pr
il
11
A
pr
il
21
A
pr
il
29
M
ay
7
M
ay
15
M
ay
23
Ju
ne
2
June 6
June 9
June 10
June 11
June 12
June 13
June 16
June 17
June 18
Did not roll
17
03
04
30
Parent Co.
Liquidity Pool
(EOD)
42 4
40 6
41 8
40 4
48 4
45 7
42 6
41 5
43 1
17
($ in billions)
LEHMAN
Unsecured
Financing
M
ar
ch
Secured
Financing
Goldman
Source: Estimated from IB reports and onsite team updates; data supporting secured / unsecured may be incomplete.
Restricted FR
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155452
FRB to LEH Examiner 001801
TAB 10
Primary Dealer Monitoring:
Liquidity Stress Analysis
June 25, 2008
Strictly Confidential
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155470
FRB to LEH Examiner 001819
Liquidity Stress Analysis: Assumptions
Severity
Assumption
As of dates: 5/22/08 - 6/10/08
UNSECURED FUNDING - Percent not rolling
Total Unsecured Funding
SECURED FUNDING - Percent not rolling
Fixed Income Finance
OMO Eligible
Liquid
Less Liquid
Illiquid
Equity Finance
Liquid
Less Liquid
ON-BOARDING AND OTHER COMMITMENTS
Off-Balance Sheet Assets On-Boarded
Loan Commitments/Other Contractual Uses
Other Liabilities/Commitments
OPERATING CASH FLOWS
Prime Brokerage, Withdrawal of Free Credits
Prime Brokerage, Customer Shorts with Liquidity Risk
Prime Brokerage, Release of Lockup Cash Flows
Collateral Payments
Derivatives / Margin Mismatches: Payments / Receipts
ADDITIONAL FUNDING
Affiliated and Unaffiliated Bank Lines
100%
0%
20%
50%
100%
20%
50%
Institution Specific
Institution Specific
Institution Specific
50%
11%
90% - 100%
Institution Specific
100% / 90%
Institution Specific
Strictly Confidential 2
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155471
FRB to LEH Examiner 001820
Summary of Results
Lehman
Liquidity Sources as % of Liquidity Required
78%
Cushion / (Deficit) $ in billions
(15)
150
125
$ in billions
100
75
50
66
51
25
0
oo
o
L qu d ty
Requ red
L qu d ty Poo
Lehman
Strictly Confidential 3
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155472
FRB to LEH Examiner 001821
Detailed Cash Flows
Exhibit produced 6/23/08
$ in billions, 4 Week Horizon, As of 5/22/08 - 6/10/08
Lehman
Liquidity Outflows
1
Unsecured Funding: amount not rolling
2
Secured Funding: amount not rolling
3
On-Boarding and Other Commitments
4
Operating Cash Flows: net outflows (sum of lines 4a - 4c)
4a
Prime Brokerage
4b
Collateral Payments
4c
Derivatives/Margin Payment Mismatches
5 Liquidity Required (sum of lines 1-4)
Liquidity Sources
6 Liquidity Sources (sum of lines 6a - 6c)
6a Broker Dealer Cash (available to fund B/D outflows only)
6b Parent Liquidity Pool (unrestricted)
6c Affiliated and Unaffiliated Bank Lines
7 Cushion / (Deficit)
8 Liquidity Sources / Liquidity Required (line 6 / line 5)
9 Secured Funding Outflow / Liquidity Sources
9a Secured Funding Outflow / Liquidity Sources (line 2 / line 6)
Discussion Point: Reduction in Secured Funding Outflow
required to achieve a 33% ratio in line 9a1
9b
2
9c % Secured Funding > 30 days
1
14
32
8
13
2
9
2
66
33
-
-
51
4
38
9
(15)
78%
2
10
62%
15
43%
Line 9b = line 2 - (line 6*.33)
2
Lehman %
Secured Funding is >14 days.
Strictly Confidential 4
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155473
FRB to LEH Examiner 001822
Observations and Conclusions
LEHMAN
* Lehman's weak liquidity position is
driven by its relatively large exposure to
overnight CP, combined with significant
overnight secured funding of less liquid
assets.
*
antly term
O*
e
n
red in
*
n
m
G
M
l
m
i
ndations for
this
*
l
s
s
r
s
* Both one- and two-notch downgrades
cant outflows in would result in significant collateral calls.
of
l's equity
e
n's.
* Lehman recognizes its vulnerabilities
and is trying to reduce illiquid assets and
extend maturities where possible. At
5/23/08, Lehman had 43% of its nonOMO eligible secured liabilities maturing
beyond 14 days.
nd
uity, * Lehman should improve its liquidity
position by $15 billion. Its exposure to
rollover risk in non-OMO eligible
secured funding represents a large draw
on its liquidity sources (62%) and should
be reduced by further extensions in
maturity on these liabilities, sales of the
underlying assets or by increasing
liquidity sources to mitigate the risk.
a very
s
n non
dn
a
its
Strictly Confidential 5
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155474
FRB to LEH Examiner 001823
TAB 11
TAB 12
TAB 13
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Patrick M Parkinson
Pat White
Fw: Update on Lehman
07/11/2008 05:14 PM
Federated is one of the very largest tri-party repo investors. Pat
ź David Marshall
----- Original Message ----From: David Marshall
Sent: 07/11/2008 03:45 PM CDT
To: Patrick Parkinson; William Dudley; Patricia Mosser; William English
Cc: Pat White; Alejandro LaTorre
Subject: Update on Lehman
Kim Taylor sent me a follow-up e-mail. The repo lines that were pulled from
Lehman were from Dreyfus and Federated. These are mid sized players, but not
dealers. Kim thought that this represented an improvement to the picture.
-- David
_________________________________
David Marshall
Senior Vice President
Financial Markets Group
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(312) 322-5102
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155481
FRB to LEH Examiner 001830
TAB 14
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Kieran Fallon
Rich Ashton; Mark VanDerWeide
Fw: PDCF, Tri-party variant
07/11/2008 06:38 PM
Memo--loss of confidence triparty repo borrower 11July2008.doc
----- Forwarded by Kieran Fallon/BOARD/FRS on 07/11/2008 06:38 PM ----Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS
07/11/2008 12:51 PM
To
brian.f.madigan@frb.gov, Kieran
Fallon/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
Subject
Fw: PDCF, Tri-party variant
FRBNY's latest thinking about how the Fed might provide liquidity to Lehman
through PDCF (or an expanded PDCF).
Pat
----- Forwarded by Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS on 07/11/2008 12:50 PM ----Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS
To
Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
07/11/2008 12:19 PM
Subject
Fw: PDCF, Tri-party variant
See attached below. It's not really a new plan. it's the recycled plan on how to step
into the clearing bank's shoes to provide intraday credit to a dealer in the event the
clearing bank is unwilling to do so.
You will likely find the third part interesting--which analyzes the current state of
Lehman's triparty collateral.
Although this document refers to a conditional non-recourse loan to the bank, a
13(3) loan directly to the dealer seems to be a better idea. We are talking through
collateral, margin, legal agreement, operating issues, etc., today to put together a
plan in the event it becomes necessary to consider this.
Lucinda Brickler
Payments Policy Function
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
212.720.6132 or 646.720.6132
----- Forwarded by Lucinda M Brickler/NY/FRS on 07/11/2008 12:12 PM ----Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS
Chris McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
To
Calvin Mitchell/NY/FRS@FRS, Chris
FCIC-155482
FRB to LEH Examiner 001831
McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS, James P Bergin/NY/FRS@FRS,
Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, Joseph Tracy/NY/FRS@FRS,
Joyce Hansen/NY/FRS@FRS, Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS, meg.mcconnell@ny.frb.org,
Michael Schetzel/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Schussler/NY/FRS@FRS, Sandy Krieger/NY/FRS@FRS,
Tanshel Pointer/NY/FRS@FRS, Terrence
Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, Timothy Geithner/NY/FRS@FRS,
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, William
Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS, William Rutledge/NY/FRS@FRS
07/11/2008 09:37 AM
Subject
Re: PDCF, Tri-party variant
The attached now includes the firm-specific impact. Should have been there last
night -- computer snafu.
I will bring printed copies now.
Best,
Til
--------------------------------------------------------Til Schuermann
Research, Financial Intermediation
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(212) 720-5968
http://nyfedeconomists.org/schuermann/
Any comments or statements in this message represent the views of the author only
and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal
Reserve System.
ź Chris McCurdy/NY/FRS
Chris
McCurdy/NY/FRS
To
Timothy Geithner/NY/FRS
cc
Terrence Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, William
Rutledge/NY/FRS@FRS, William Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS,
Joseph Tracy/NY/FRS@FRS, Sandy
Krieger/NY/FRS@FRS, Calvin Mitchell/NY/FRS@FRS,
Chris McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS, Joyce
Hansen/NY/FRS@FRS, Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS,
James P Bergin/NY/FRS@FRS, William
BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, meg.mcconnell@ny.frb.org,
Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Schussler/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Schetzel/NY/FRS@FRS, Lucinda M Brickler/NY/FRS,
Tanshel Pointer/NY/FRS@FRS
07/11/2008 08:42 AM
Subject
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
PDCF, Tri-party variant
FCIC-155483
FRB to LEH Examiner 001832
Here is draft memo on an idea for making the PDCF more like tri-party investing.
We are working on a section outlining what extensive PDCF financing would mean
for Lehman.
[attachment "Memo--loss of confidence triparty repo borrower.doc" deleted by Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS]
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155484
FRB to LEH Examiner 001833
Tim Geithner
July 11, 2008
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
DATE
July 11, 2008
TO
Tim Geithner
SUBJECT
Managing a Loss of Confidence in a
FROM
Brickler, Brodows, McCurdy, Schuermann
Major Tri-party Repo Borrower
RESTRICTED FR
Objectives
Drawing on the current arrangement for tri-party repo financing, here is a plan
for Federal Reserve financing of a dealer’s positions on a 24-hour basis.
Currently, a dealer’s positions are financed overnight by tri-party repo investors
and during the day by its clearing bank. Should a dealer lose the confidence of
its investors or clearing bank, their efforts to pull away form providing credit
could be disastrous for the firm and also cast widespread doubt about the
instrument as a nearly risk free, liquid overnight investment. In the event a firm
faced this situation the Federal Reserve could step- in an provide overnight
financing as it does now through the PDCF, and by replacing the credit
provided by the clearing bank during the day.
The key elements are outlined in the second section of this note. Finally,
we have estimated what it would mean for Lehman Brothers, as one example, if
we were to apply our conservative haircuts to the full range of their tri-party
collateral.
By allowing a dealer to provide a strong face to the market, this approach
is intended to support market confidence in the dealer and, by continuing the
smooth functioning of the market, in the tri-party repo instrument itself. This
could be done on an announced or unannounced basis. Providing an
unannounced financing back-stop to the firm would permit it to face the market
in a business as usual manner, seeking funds at market rates and on terms
comparable to other firms. Further, the Fed’s provision of funds to the clearing
banks during the day would put them in the position to wire out any funds
investors may request intra-day. In the midst of a stress situation the fast return
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155485
FRB to LEH Examiner 001834
2
Tim Geithner
July 11, 2008
of funds would again alleviate concerns about market functioning and further
boost confidence in the tri-party instrument.
Providing the facility on an announced basis--that we are willing to do
this against good collateral and with strong haircuts might cause the same sort
of speculation about use--but it would underscore the Fed’s intention to support
the instruments. Investors would still need to make their credit judgments about
counterparties but they would know that they will get their money back and will
not get locked in if they decide to pull back.
Proposed Action
To prevent a loss of confidence in a large tri-party repo borrower from
triggering a broader loss of confidence in the tri-party repo mechanism, the
Federal Reserve should strongly encourage the tri-party repo agent bank to
provide intraday financing to the bank and honor investor requests for
withdrawals promptly. If the borrower fails to attract sufficient financing by the
end of the day, the borrower could turn to the PDCF.
If the triparty repo agent bank cannot be convinced, the Federal Reserve could
consider providing the dealer with intraday credit in order to avert a widespread
loss of confidence in the triparty repo mechanism.
x FRBNY could enter into a “conditional” non-recourse loan with the
clearing bank at the beginning of the day, collateralized by a cash claim
on the dealer in question and the associated collateral. If the dealer
survives the day, the clearing bank would be required to repay the loan
before the end of the day (at zero percent interest). The loan would not
appear on their balance sheet or on the Federal Reserve’s. The dealer
could turn to the PDCF for any residual funding needed for the following
night.
x If the dealer does not survive the day, the clearing bank would have the
option to extinguish the loan before the end of the day by transferring
their cash claim on the dealer and the associated collateral to FRBNY.
(Legal analysis pending.)
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155486
FRB to LEH Examiner 001835
3
Tim Geithner
July 11, 2008
x FRBNY would liquidate the dealer’s collateral (potentially at a loss) in
the event that the cash claim was not fulfilled. Collateral could be held in
an off-balance sheet entity during the liquidation period.
Impact on Firm
To compute the financial impact, we make use of the firm’s reported allocated
repo collateral as per the firm’s own MIS dated July 9, 2008. The total global
collateral is $297.7bn, of which $1.5bn is Asia, $59.8bn Europe, and $236.5bn
US. The US breakdown is summarized in Table 1 below, with totals by type
indicated at the top. The firm had $173bn or 73% of its collateral in OMO
eligible, another $39.5bn (17%) in PDCF eligible,1 and a remaining $23.6bn
(10%) in other collateral types.
1
All munis are assumed to be PDCF eligible, though only investment grade are. We do not
know precisely what proportion of the muni portfolio is investment grade, but are
told that it is the vast majority. The category “other” was left out entirely; it makes
up only $0.1bn and is thus not material.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155487
FRB to LEH Examiner 001836
Tim Geithner
July 11, 2008
4
Table 1: Lehman US repo collateral, as of July 9, 2008
Collateral Type
OMO
PDCF
Other
Treasuries
Government Agency
Agency MBS
Asset Backs - Investment Grade
Asset Backs - Non-Investment Grade
Corporates - Investment Grade
Corporates - Non-Investment Grade
Money Markets
Muni
Other
Private Labels - Investment Grade
Private Labels - High Yield
Wholeloan Commercial
Wholeloan Residential
C1 - Investment Grade Convertibles
C2 - Non-Investment Grade Convertibles
Equities
Total
Exposure (bn)
173.3
39.5
23.6
62.0
28.4
82.9
5.8
1.5
10.4
4.2
9.6
4.1
0.1
9.7
2.0
5.7
0.4
0.5
0.8
8.5
$ 236.46
We now go on to compute the haircut impact on this portfolio of collateral.
This is presented in Table 2 where we repeat the collateral amounts and add
haircut information for each asset type. Two haircuts are presented. First our
proposed haircuts based on conservative volatility assumptions [a brief
methodology description can be found at the end of this document], and second
the average haircut actually charged by JPMC in the course of its tri-party
clearing operations. The latter are meant to reflect typical current haircuts
experienced by the firm.
Because the portfolio is 73% OMO eligible, the weighted average haircuts are
modest: 1.055 (or 5.5%) using the conservative volatilities, and 1.023 (2.3%)
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155488
FRB to LEH Examiner 001837
5
Tim Geithner
July 11, 2008
using the average JPMC haircuts. 2 If all collateral were to be pledged –
including $23.6bn of heretofore non-PDCF eligible collateral – the firm would
need to post $13.1bn in extra cash, using our proposed conservative haircuts, to
realize the full value of its collateral. Using JPMC’s average haircuts, that
amount is just $5.4bn.
2
The (non-weighted) average haircut of PDCF eligible collateral is about 1.079, or 7.9%.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155489
FRB to LEH Examiner 001838
Tim Geithner
July 11, 2008
Table 2: Lehman US repo collateral, as of July 9, 2008, including haircut considerations
Collateral Type
Treasuries
Government Agency
Agency MBS
Asset Backs - Investment Grade
Asset Backs - Non-I-Grade
Corporates - Investment Grade
Corporates - Non-Investment Grade
Money Markets
Muni
Other
Private Labels - Investment Grade
Private Labels - High Yield
Wholeloan Commercial
Wholeloan Residential
C1 - Investment Grade Convertibles
C2 - Non-I-Grade Convertibles
Equities
Total
cash equivalent
extra collateral
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Conservati
ve
Exposure Volatility
($bn)
62.0
1.015
28.4
1.02
82.9
1.05
5.8
1.15
1.5
1.25
10.4
1.05
4.2
1.10
9.6
1.05
4.1
1.10
0.1
1.05
9.7
1.15
2.0
1.25
5.7
1.15
0.4
1.15
0.5
1.15
0.8
1.20
8.5
1.15
$ 236.46
1.055
FCIC-155490
Average
JPMC
HC
1.01
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.15
1.01
1.05
1.01
1.05
1.02
1.05
1.10
1.08
1.08
1.08
1.12
1.08
1.023
Collateral Requirement (bn)
Conservative
$ 62.94
$ 28.97
$ 87.07
$ 6.66
$ 1.82
$ 10.87
$ 4.67
$ 10.03
$ 4.48
$ 0.08
$ 11.16
$ 2.55
$ 6.50
$ 0.49
$ 0.58
$ 0.90
$ 9.77
$ 249.54
$ 224.06
$ 13.08
Avg
$ 62.63
$ 28.69
$ 84.59
$ 5.94
$ 1.67
$ 10.47
$ 4.46
$ 9.65
$ 4.28
$ 0.07
$ 10.19
$ 2.24
$ 6.10
$ 0.46
$ 0.54
$ 0.84
$ 9.18
$ 242.00
$ 231.04
$ 5.54
FRB to LEH Examiner 001839
Tim Geithner
July 11, 2008
Conservative Haircut Methodology
The principle behind the haircuts is a scaled dynamic volatility measure. For
each of the major tri-party asset classes, we chose 2 risk factor time series,
usually indices available on Bloomberg. One was the major or most
representative index (say for municipals, the Merrill Muni Master), or a more
adversely selected index (for munis, Merrill's Muni Misc 12-22 yrs series). The
latter would likely be more appropriate since if and when an institution would
pledge a security at the PDCF, it will probably be one of the less liquid
securities for a given asset type or class.
Using daily returns from the indices, we compute a dynamic volatility using the
RiskMetrics exponentially weighted moving average model. We then have a
time series of daily volatilities. Some of the time series are quite long (10+yrs),
others shorter (<2 yrs for some of the more esoteric series). We then take the
99th percentile from the time series of volatilities as a measure of an unusually
large volatility. This may have occurred recently, eg. in March for some of the
structured credit products, or in the more distant past, an example here being the
fall of 1998 for the corporate credit master index. This daily volatility is then
scaled to a monthly horizon via the square-root of t (here t=21 days) rule. The
volatilities are then grouped into three initial haircut buckets: 2%, 5%, and 10%.
Treasuries have a haircut of 1.5%, commensurate with the standard tri-party
repo haircut. It seems reasonable to keep this haircut the same as Treasuries,
though they may be volatile as well, are likely to improve in value during
turbulent times ("good volatility").
Finally we make an adjustment based on the shape of the volatility distribution
itself. Volatility is but one way of measuring risk. If the volatility itself is
subject to sudden moves and jumps, which tends to happen in the more illiquid
instruments, then this is an added risk. Thus, the more skewed the distribution
of volatility, the more volatility surprises one may experience, the more risky
the asset class.
Our final haircuts range from 2% (1.5% for Treasuries) to 25% (ABS
speculative grade).
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155491
FRB to LEH Examiner 001840
TAB 15
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Joseph Sommer
Jamie McAndrews; Meg McConnell; Lucinda M Brickler
Antoine Martin; Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Catherine Kung; Chris McCurdy; HaeRan Kim; Jan Voigts;
Lawrence Sweet; Michael Schussler; Morten Bech; Patrick M Parkinson; Sandy Krieger; Terrence Checki;
Thomas Baxter; Til Schuermann; William BRODOWS; William Dudley
Re: another option we should present re triparty?
07/13/2008 08:50 AM
I agree with your analysis, but I don't endorse the word "permanent.".
The question is whether the government wishes to get into the private
equity business--not whether the government wishes to get into the
investment banking business.
Your mileage may vary, but the question is one of PE.
----------------Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.
ź Jamie McAndrews
----- Original Message -----
From: Jamie McAndrews
Sent: 07/12/2008 09:46 PM EDT
To: Meg McConnell; Lucinda Brickler
Cc: Antoine Martin; Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Catherine
Kung; Chris McCurdy; HaeRan Kim; Jan Voigts; Joseph Sommer;
Lawrence Sweet; Michael Schussler; Morten Bech; Patrick
Parkinson; Sandy Krieger; Terrence Checki; Thomas Baxter; Til
Schuermann; William BRODOWS; William Dudley
Subject: Re: another option we should present re triparty?
Woops;
Antoine makes the following point:
"The question we should ask is: In hindsight, is there anything we
would do differently in the case of BS?
If we think we would do something fundamentally differently, then we
should tell Tim what and why.
My impression is that we would do essentially the same thing, so
there is not much to talk about for the very short-term. Of course,
there is lots to do in the medium and long term."
The thing we would have to decide is whether the distressed firm was
likely to be sold. If we think that the run had progressed too far and
that it wouldn't be sold, then any lending we did to it would be a
permanent addition to the government's balance sheet--like Northern
Rock, again.
That is the crucial question at the time a decision must be made. If we
think it can be sold, then proceed as in BS. If not, discuss with the
Treasury its appetite for a permanent addition to the government's
balance sheet by lending to the distressed firm; if there is little appetite
for that, then lend to the distressed firmks creditors, and work to
contain the spread of the problem with communication policy.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155504
FRB to LEH Examiner 001853
The difficulty of making the determination of whether we think the firm
can be sold is high, especially given that the refusal of the clearing
bank to unwind the repos means that a run on the firm is fait
accompli.
Jamie
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld (www.BlackBerry.net)
ź Meg McConnell
----- Original Message -----
From: Meg McConnell
Sent: 07/12/2008 09:07 PM EDT
To: Lucinda Brickler
Cc: Antoine Martin; Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Catherine
Kung; Chris McCurdy; HaeRan Kim; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts;
Joseph Sommer; Lawrence Sweet; Michael Schussler; Morten Bech;
Patrick Parkinson; Sandy Krieger; Terrence Checki; Thomas
Baxter; Til Schuermann; William BRODOWS; William Dudley
Subject: Re: another option we should present re triparty?
I guess I'm not sure about the analogy to the BSC situation. In that
case we were lending to JPMC on a nonrecourse basis, but we weren't
doing so because they were BSC's clearing bank, but rather because
they intended to purchase BSC, and thus ultimately stand behind all of
BSC's obligations--tri-party or otherwise. And as Michael pointed out,
the "beauty" (in the legal sense of the word) of the LLC was that we
could lend to the LLC and the LLC could buy from BSC the assets that
JPMC would not. I'm wondering whether without a buyer for LEH in
the picture, what the end game is for the scenario you describe below
(i.e., what is this a bridge to, given that there is no one in the wings
waiting to buy LEH's assets and stand behind the remainder of their
liabilities?). Do you see what I mean or am I missing something?
ź Lucinda M Brickler/NY/FRS
Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS
To
07/12/2008 06:22 PM
Chris.McCurdy@ny.frb.org, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD,
Sandy.Krieger@ny.frb.org,
Lawrence.Sweet@ny.frb.org, Arthur
Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS,
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS, Morten Bech/NY/FRS@FRS,
Antoine Martin/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Schussler/NY/FRS@FRS, Joseph
Sommer/NY/FRS@FRS, Meg McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS,
HaeRan Kim/NY/FRS@FRS, Catherine
Kung/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian Begalle/NY/FRS@FRS, Jan
Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, William Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS,
Terrence Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, Thomas
Baxter/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
another option we should present re triparty?
FCIC-155505
FRB to LEH Examiner 001854
Perhaps another option we could offer Tim on triparty...
If JPMC refuses to unwind LB's triparty one morning out of fear of
being caught with the entirety of this exposure when the music stops,
by that evening they (and we) will likely have a much bigger problem
to deal with as scores of investors pull away from triparty repo.
Instead of merely offering to take all of the risk to LB on our shoulders
by stepping in as the intraday creditor (as the current proposal
suggests), perhaps we just need to offer JPMC an outcome that is
slightly more palatable.
We could encourage them to unwind and tell them that if LB fails on
their watch, we will facilitate off balance liquidation support for some
or all of the assets (a la Bear). (The mechanics of this are hazy, but
one way would be to enter into the dreaded non-recourse loan with
JPMC against the assets in question. They can pay back the loan by
handing us the collateral. The legal community doesn't like this
because it smells not so much like a loan, but an outright purchase of
assets I'm not sure what authority we used to purchase the Bear
assets.)
We would apply our conservative margins on the assets--to reduce the
likelihood that FRBNY will experience a loss, but capping the clearing
bank's losses at a level that is more palatable outcome than if they use
their nuclear option. (As Jamie McAndrews and his team have pointed
out, there must be some value that this business brings that them
would make some level of losses to preserve it tenable.)
Could we offset the sting of margins that would protect us from loss
with giving them notes in the liquidation vehicle that would entitle
them to any profits made on the sale of the assets allowing them the
possibility of recovering some of their losses (a la Checki-LEC?)
This has the advantage of containing the problem without taking on
the whole potential for losses. Allows the clearing bank to see light at
the end of a tunnel of the default of a $236 billion exposure.
This is an idea Chris hatched back in May. Our writeup from that time
is attached. Let me know your thoughts...
Lucinda
[attachment "FRBNY Liquidation Facility 5-23.doc" deleted by Meg
McConnell/NY/FRS] ]
Lucinda Brickler
Payments Policy Function
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
212.720.6132 or 646.720.6132
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155506
FRB to LEH Examiner 001855
TAB 16
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Joseph Sommer
Patrick M Parkinson
Re: another option we should present re triparty?
07/13/2008 12:39 PM
I agree, if you are willling to fund the firm indefintely, and maybe enter the private
equity business. The question, in my mind, is whether we will be perceived as a
credible investor by counterparties and employees. If so, the only question is goingconcern value
----------------Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.
ź Patrick M Parkinson
----- Original Message -----
From: Patrick M Parkinson
Sent: 07/13/2008 12:35 PM EDT
To: Joseph Sommer
Cc: Antoine Martin; Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Catherine Kung; Chris
McCurdy; HaeRan Kim; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts; Lawrence Sweet; Lucinda
Brickler; Meg McConnell; Michael Schussler; Morten Bech; Sandy Krieger;
Terrence Checki; Thomas Baxter; Til Schuermann; William BRODOWS; William
Dudley
Subject: Re: another option we should present re triparty?
But the point of our PDCF lending would be to head off a massive run.
Perhaps in a world where "headline risk" is an important concern a run
would still occur. But if so we would end up lending at the end of the
day an amount that still would be no higher(and could be far smaller)
than what others seem to want to commit to lend at the beginning of
the day. I assume that our judgment that an institution is sound refers
to its going concern value, not its fire sale value.
Pat
ź Joseph Sommer/NY/FRS@FRS
Joseph
Sommer/NY/FRS@FRS
To
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, Antoine
Martin/NY/FRS@FRS, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Arthur Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian
Begalle/NY/FRS@FRS, Catherine Kung/NY/FRS@FRS,
Chris McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS, HaeRan
Kim/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS,
Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, Lawrence
Sweet/NY/FRS@FRS, Meg McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS,
Michael Schussler/NY/FRS@FRS, Morten
Bech/NY/FRS@FRS, Sandy Krieger/NY/FRS@FRS,
Terrence Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, Thomas
Baxter/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS,
William Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS
07/13/2008 11:21 AM
Subject
Re: another option we should present re triparty?
I only wish. Balance-sheet capital isn't too relevant if you're suffering a
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155510
FRB to LEH Examiner 001859
massive run. And capital is the difference between two large numbers-sensitive to asset value fluctuations.
I suppose this is where we come in. If we indeed do come in.
----------------Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.
ź William BRODOWS
----- Original Message -----
From: William BRODOWS
Sent: 07/13/2008 11:19 AM EDT
To: Antoine Martin; Patrick Parkinson; Lucinda Brickler
Cc: Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Catherine Kung; Chris
McCurdy; HaeRan Kim; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts; Joseph Sommer;
Lawrence Sweet; Meg McConnell; Michael Schussler; Morten Bech;
Sandy Krieger; Terrence Checki; Thomas Baxter; Til Schuermann;
William Dudley
Subject: Re: another option we should present re triparty?
Given that lehman has 32 billion in capital (which is also in liquid form),
there are few scenarios over the next few weeks in which one could
contemplate an intra-day determination that they would become
bankrupt.
---------------------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.
ź Antoine Martin
----- Original Message -----
From: Antoine Martin
Sent: 07/13/2008 10:07 AM EDT
To: Patrick Parkinson; Lucinda Brickler
Cc: Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Catherine Kung; Chris
McCurdy; HaeRan Kim; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts; Joseph Sommer;
Lawrence Sweet; Meg McConnell; Michael Schussler; Morten Bech;
Sandy Krieger; Terrence Checki; Thomas Baxter; Til Schuermann;
William BRODOWS; William Dudley
Subject: Re: another option we should present re triparty?
JPMC should be willing to unwind as long as we can commit to lend at
the PDCF. If we cannot commit, they may be worried that by the end
of the day, we would judge that LB is not solvent and then we could
not use the PDCF.
Of course, in that case we would do something else to rescue LB, but
the negotiating position of JPMC would be much weaker than in the
morning, before they unwind.
Antoine
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
ź Patrick M Parkinson
----- Original Message -----
From: Patrick M Parkinson
Sent: 07/13/2008 09:21 AM EDT
To: Lucinda Brickler
Cc: Antoine Martin; Arthur Angulo; Brian Begalle; Catherine
Kung; Chris McCurdy; HaeRan Kim; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts;
Joseph Sommer; Lawrence Sweet; Meg McConnell; Michael Schussler;
Morten Bech; Sandy Krieger; Terrence Checki; Thomas Baxter; Til
Schuermann; William BRODOWS; William Dudley
Subject: Re: another option we should present re triparty?
I think this option is much too complex. To answer a question others
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155511
FRB to LEH Examiner 001860
have asked, the biggest difference between today and when Bear lost
access to financing is that the PDCF is in place. As long as we judge
that LB is sound we should be willing to lend to it through the PDCF at
conservative haircuts (as previously envisioned). With the PDCF in
place there is no need to use JPMC as an intermediary.
And we should tell JPMC that with the PDCF in place refusing to
unwind is unnecessary and would be unforgivable. It is unnecessary
because even if JPMC is right that LB will have trouble rolling its repos
with private counterparties we will provide the credit necessary to
obviate any credit extensions to LB by JPMC. Failing to unwind would
be unforgivable because it would force us to immediately lend an
amount equal to the entire amount of LB's outstanding tri-party
financing when private parties may be willing to continue to fund a
significant portion, especially after we demonstrate that they are not
vulnerable to a run because of our willingness to lend.
Pat
ź Lucinda M Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS
Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS
To
07/12/2008 06:20 PM
Chris.McCurdy@ny.frb.org, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD,
Sandy.Krieger@ny.frb.org,
Lawrence.Sweet@ny.frb.org, Arthur
Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS,
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS, Morten Bech/NY/FRS@FRS,
Antoine Martin/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Schussler/NY/FRS@FRS, Joseph
Sommer/NY/FRS@FRS, Meg McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS,
HaeRan Kim/NY/FRS@FRS, Catherine
Kung/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian Begalle/NY/FRS@FRS, Jan
Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, William Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS,
Terrence Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, Thomas
Baxter/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
another option we should present re triparty?
Perhaps another option we could offer Tim on triparty...
If JPMC refuses to unwind LB's triparty one morning out of fear of
being caught with the entirety of this exposure when the music stops,
by that evening they (and we) will likely have a much bigger problem
to deal with as scores of investors pull away from triparty repo.
Instead of merely offering to take all of the risk to LB on our shoulders
by stepping in as the intraday creditor (as the current proposal
suggests), perhaps we just need to offer JPMC an outcome that is
slightly more palatable.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155512
FRB to LEH Examiner 001861
TAB 17
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Scott Alvarez
Kieran Fallon
Re: Lehman Good Bank/Bad Bank idea discussed last night
07/15/2008 09:46 AM
Good
Thanks
Scott
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
ź Kieran Fallon
----- Original Message ----From: Kieran Fallon
Sent: 07/15/2008 09:39 AM EDT
To: Scott Alvarez; Rich Ashton; Mark VanDerWeide
Subject: Fw: Lehman Good Bank/Bad Bank idea discussed last night
See scenario that New York is shopping for dealing with Lehman.
Differences between proposal and Bear: no buyer in the wings for
Lehman, Lehman would have $5B in equity in LLC formed to take bad
assets, Fed gets EQUITY in the "good Lehman."
Pat said that Kohn did not push back very hard on this proposal on call
last night. I told Pat that I would raise significant concerns with
proposal on the 10 am call this morning.
Kieran
----- Forwarded by Kieran Fallon/BOARD/FRS on 07/15/2008 09:34 AM ----Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS
To
Kieran Fallon/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
07/15/2008 09:29 AM
Subject
Fw: Lehman Good Bank/Bad Bank idea discussed last
night
----- Forwarded by Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS on 07/15/2008 09:28 AM ----William
Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS
To
07/15/2008 08:15 AM
cc
Subject
chris.mccurdy@ny.frb.org, donald.l.kohn@frb.gov,
Kevin Warsh/BOARD/FRS@BOARD,
lucinda.brickler@ny.frb.org, Meg
McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS, Terrence
Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, timothy.geithner@ny.frb.org,
Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Michael Schetzel/NY/FRS@FRS
Lehman Good Bank/Bad Bank idea discussed last night
Just to put some words to what I was proposing last night. Very much
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154477
FRB to LEH Examiner 000826
in the spirit of what we did with Bear...but better because less damage
to franchise, no forced sale.
Lehman Good Bank/Bad Bank proposal
All the numbers are rough guesses, but I want to give you an explicit example
to think about.
Separate into two parts:
Maiden Lane type vehicle: $60 billion of illiquid assets backstopped
by $5 billion of Lehman equity. Fed guarantees financing or finances
the $55 billion. Lehman owns this vehicle, so if assets > liabilities
upon windup, accrue to Lehman shareholders.
Clean Lehman left. $600 billion of assets, $23 billion of equity. Much
less risk, greater liquidity cushion (don’t have to finance illiquid
assets).
Fed gets equity in clean Lehman (whether warrants or some other form
of equity TBD in compensation for backstop financing in SPV).
Protections to the Fed. First loss piece, net interest margin on SPV, and equity
in clean Lehman.
Why we want to do this. Takes illiquid assets off the market, reduces risk that
forced sale of assets will generate losses that make Lehman insolvent.
Preserve Lehman franchise value as a going concern. No negative externality
to rest of financial system. Moral hazard considerations low given equity
dilution. Clean Lehman can be sold or remain a viable concern.
Risks:
Other firms will want to do the same thing.
Response: Can set the level of dilution high to make this less attractive. For
example, if the Fed was given warrants giving it effectively 50% or more of
the upside in Lehman going forward, this would deter others from pursuing
this unless in extremis.
Why would Lehman do this?
Better than forced asset sales. Preserves franchise. No need for distressed
sale of the entire company. Can find a medium-term solution.
If Lehman is solvent now, this preserve solvency. If Lehman is, in fact,
insolvent now--even in the absence of forced asset sales--this limits degree of
insolvency. Risk of not intervening early, Lehman is solvent now, becomes
insolvent due to forced asset sales. Benefits of forced sale of firm under
duress accrue to buyer, and large negative externalities to the broader market.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154478
FRB to LEH Examiner 000827
We could propose it to Lehman as a choice. Does not have to be coercive. If
slide were to continue, what might have looked unattractive might increasing
look attractive relative to the alternatives.
Best,
Bill
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154479
FRB to LEH Examiner 000828
TAB 18
on@frb.gov
To
Chairman Bernanke
07/20/2008 12:42
PM
Kevin.Warsh@frb.gov,
scott.alvarez@frb.gov,
brian.f.madigan@frb.gov
cc
Subject
Our Options in the Event of a Run
on LB
The short answer is the one that Tim gave to the FOMC on Wednesday: There
are no good options.
Here is my version of the long answer.
Focusing for the moment on LB's vulnerable tri-party borrowings, as of July
14 it was financing $200 billion of collateral. Of that amount, all but
$12.8 billion was PDCF-eligible. Of the non-PDCF-eligible, $8.7 billion
was equities.
JPMC, LB's clearing bank, is likely to be the first to realize that the
money funds and other investors that provide tri-party financing to LB are
pulling back significantly. If some morning it fears that the investors
are unlikely to roll their repos, it may threaten not to unwind LB's
previous night's repos. If it did that, LB would be done because the
tri-party investors would control its securities inventory. The investors
presumably would promptly liquidate the $200 billion of collateral and
there is a good chance that investors would lose confidence in the
tri-party mechanism and pull back from funding other dealers. Fear of
those consequences is, of course, why we facilitated Bear's acquisition by
JPMC.
We could try to dissuade JPMC from refusing to unwind by pointing out that
if the investors don't roll the repos LB can borrow from us through the
PDCF. Even if we did so, for two reasons JPMC might still balk. The first
is the non-PDCF collateral. We could address that concern by making the
equities and other non-PDCF collateral eligible. Or we could try to get LB
to wire $12.8 billion of cash into JPMC to cover the rollover risk. The
other reason is a fear that LB could be placed in bankruptcy intra-day,
before the next day's tri-party repos and any PDCF loans are settled, in
which case JPMC would be stuck with $200 billion in secured loans to LB.
I'm not sure that this is at all likely, but JPMC and BNYM are sufficiently
concerned that they have arranged a meeting Monday afternoon with SIPC.
(LB's PD is a SIPC member (as are some but not all of the other PDs) and
its bankruptcy would be administered by SIPC.) Board staff plan to sit in
on this meeting.
But even if we are willing to extend as much as $200 billion of financing
to LB, absent an acquirer our action would not ensure LB's survival. If
stigma associated with PDCF borrowing is justified, LB likely would face
other (non-tri-party) liquidity demands and I'm not sure whether its
liquidity resources would allow it to meet them. (Presumably our PD
supervisory team has a better idea but any judgment is likely to be
qualified.) So we would have protected LB's tri-party counterparties but
not its other counterparties (e.g, securities (mainly equities) borrowers
and lenders and derivatives counterparties). Further, the demonstration of
our willingness to lend large amounts through PDCF may not reassure
tri-party investors that the mechanism is safe, especially if they start
asking about our remaining capacity to meet further runs. That's not to
imply that it would not be worth the gamble, but it would be a gamble.
Pat
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154545
FRB to LEH Examiner 000894
TAB 19
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Patrick M Parkinson
steven.shafran@do.treas.gov
William BRODOWS; Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org; Theodore Lubke; Til Schuermann
Fw: Gameplan and Status to Date
08/19/2008 12:19 PM
Steve,
See below. We keep coming up against the same quandary that we have discussed
previously. I still think it is worth engaging the industry group, even though that is
not without risks. We could cast it simply as CRMPG III follow-up on issues of longstanding interest to public sector as well as the private sector. At the same time, we
could quietly drill down deeper at LB and perhaps at some other dealer that is not
under a cloud, both to see the extent to which different business models present
different problems and to be able to truthfully tell LB that they are not the sole
source of concern, as they shouldn't be.
On the substance, the interesting question is whether it would be possible to
stabilize the legal entity where most of an IB's OTC derivatives trades are booked.
One potential problem is that defaults by affiliates would allow counterparties to
terminate trades with the legal entity that we seek to stabilize. Cross default
provisions presumably could allow counterparties to terminate trades with the legal
entity. If so, how readily could the legal entity reestablish its hedges, even if the
government recapitalized it or guaranteed its obligations? Another potential problem
is that the legal entity may have large exposures to affiliates that are going under.
Notwithstanding these potential problems, I think the place to start is with an
understanding of the legal entities positions, hedges, and counterparty exposures.
As to timing, Both Bill and I (and many others) are on vacation this week.
Reactions?
Pat
----- Forwarded by Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS on 08/19/2008 11:56 AM ----William
BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS
Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
08/15/2008 06:11 PM
To
Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org, Theodore
Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS
Subject
Re: Fw: Gameplan and Status to Date
Pat--we met with Lehman two days ago and have a draft of notes that have not
been agreed upon. In any event, I don't think we really got much new information
that will push the agenda forward. My initial takeaway is that legal entity will drive
the analysis and that aggregation of counterparties across legal entities will be the
next level of analysis. As HaeRan indicated, to really get into possibilities, you would
need to request master agreements which I believe would be a huge negative
signal, and I would be very reluctant to take that step. In this connection, merely
having the meeting with Lehman caused a stir in Lehman and we had to assure
them that our questions were not institution specific, even as I noted that we did
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not have any other meetings yet scheduled with other institutions. Fortunately,
there was an industry meeting on the subject the next day that indicated a broad
interest in the subject. We were very careful to limit the meeting to 60 minutes. I
would be very reluctant to drill deeper at Lehman at this point without a clear signal
that our work involved other institutions in some way. Asking for the industry group
(your suggestion) would seem to me to be less provocative than gathering info from
a single firm. However, I certainly can see the point that asking for the industry
group could spook the market, but going to a single firm is even less desirable in my
view. Sorry I can't be more helpful than this. Going on vacation next week, but will
check for your emails. Cheers.
ź Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
To
08/15/2008 02:02 PM
Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org, Theodore
Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS, William
BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
Fw: Gameplan and Status to Date
See below. I worry that without gathering more info we will not come up with a
sensible gameplan.
How are you coming with info gathering from Lehman?
Pat
----- Forwarded by Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS on 08/15/2008 01:56 PM ----Steven.Shafran@do.treas.gov
To
08/11/2008 03:04 PM
cc
Subject
My worry
that the
anything
us? And
issues?
Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
RE: Gameplan and Status to Date
is that while this would make sense in a less stressed market,
timing right now is problematic. If we ask, will we see
in time to deal with some of the immediate issues that concern
by asking, are we signaling concerns that only exacerbate the
My concern is we need a gameplan for a specific problem that we could be
confronted with at any time.
steve
-----Original Message----From: Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov [mailto:Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov]
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2008 4:02 PM
To: Shafran, Steven
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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Cc: Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org; haeran.kim@ny.frb.org; Schaffer, Laurie;
lucinda.brickler@ny.frb.org; Broome, Meredith;
Theodore.Lubke@ny.frb.org; Til.Schuermann@ny.frb.org;
William.BRODOWS@ny.frb.org; Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
Subject: Re: Gameplan and Status to Date
I have been plowing through the CRMPG III (Corrigan III) report.
Recommendation V-22 (p. 125) states that the industry should consider
formation of a "default management group", composed of senior business
reresentatives of major market participants (from the buyside as well as
the sell-side) to work with regulatory authorities on an ongoing basis
to
consider and anticipate issues likely to arise in the event of a default
of
a major counterparty.
Would it be worth asking Corrigan to accelerate formation of this group
and
ask them what they see as the issues? We would of course need to be
careful not to suggest concerns about any particular market participant,
although they no doubt would draw their own conclusions.
Pat
Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/F
RS
To
steven.shafran@do.treas.gov
08/08/2008 09:47
cc
AM
Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org,
haeran.kim@ny.frb.org,
laurie.schaffer@do.treas.gov,
lucinda.brickler@ny.frb.org,
Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS, William
BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD,
Meredith.Broome@do.treas.gov
Subject
Gameplan and Status to Date
(Document link: Patrick M
Parkinson)
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Here is how I see the gameplan.
Comments are welcome.
1. Identify activities of the firm whose liquidation under Chapter 11
could
have a significant adverse effect on financial markets and the economy.
2. Gather additional information about those activities so as to assess
more accurately the potential for liquidation to have such an effect.
3. Where we conclude the potential is serious, identify actions that the
firm, its counterparties or the government could take to mitigate the
risk.
With respect to government actions, consider both actions that could be
taken under existing authority as well actions that would require
legislative authorization.
4. Our preliminary view is that the principal investment bank activities
that could entail systemic risk are tri-party repo borrowings and OTC
derivatives activities. But we need to ask again whether they may be
other
such activities, including sec borrow/loan.
5. We have given considerable thought to what might be done to avoid a
fire
sale of tri-party repo collateral. (That said, the options under
existing
authority are not very attractive--lots of risk to Fed/taxpayer, lots of
moral hazard.) We still are at the early stages of assessing the
potential
systemic risk from close-out of OTC derivatives transactions by an
investment bank's counterparties and identifying potential mitigants.
Pat
Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/F
RS
To
steven.shafran@do.treas.gov,
08/08/2008 09:15
laurie.schaffer@do.treas.gov
AM
cc
Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org,
lucinda.brickler@ny.frb.org,
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS,
haeran.kim@ny.frb.org, Theodore
Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Subject
Conference Call Participants
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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Are copied on this message.
Pat
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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TAB 20
TAB 21
TAB 22
TAB 23
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Patrick M Parkinson
steven.shafran@do.treas.gov
William BRODOWS; Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org; Theodore Lubke; Til Schuermann
Fw: Gameplan and Status to Date
08/19/2008 12:19 PM
Steve,
See below. We keep coming up against the same quandary that we have discussed
previously. I still think it is worth engaging the industry group, even though that is
not without risks. We could cast it simply as CRMPG III follow-up on issues of longstanding interest to public sector as well as the private sector. At the same time, we
could quietly drill down deeper at LB and perhaps at some other dealer that is not
under a cloud, both to see the extent to which different business models present
different problems and to be able to truthfully tell LB that they are not the sole
source of concern, as they shouldn't be.
On the substance, the interesting question is whether it would be possible to
stabilize the legal entity where most of an IB's OTC derivatives trades are booked.
One potential problem is that defaults by affiliates would allow counterparties to
terminate trades with the legal entity that we seek to stabilize. Cross default
provisions presumably could allow counterparties to terminate trades with the legal
entity. If so, how readily could the legal entity reestablish its hedges, even if the
government recapitalized it or guaranteed its obligations? Another potential problem
is that the legal entity may have large exposures to affiliates that are going under.
Notwithstanding these potential problems, I think the place to start is with an
understanding of the legal entities positions, hedges, and counterparty exposures.
As to timing, Both Bill and I (and many others) are on vacation this week.
Reactions?
Pat
----- Forwarded by Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS on 08/19/2008 11:56 AM ----William
BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS
Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
08/15/2008 06:11 PM
To
Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org, Theodore
Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS
Subject
Re: Fw: Gameplan and Status to Date
Pat--we met with Lehman two days ago and have a draft of notes that have not
been agreed upon. In any event, I don't think we really got much new information
that will push the agenda forward. My initial takeaway is that legal entity will drive
the analysis and that aggregation of counterparties across legal entities will be the
next level of analysis. As HaeRan indicated, to really get into possibilities, you would
need to request master agreements which I believe would be a huge negative
signal, and I would be very reluctant to take that step. In this connection, merely
having the meeting with Lehman caused a stir in Lehman and we had to assure
them that our questions were not institution specific, even as I noted that we did
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-156050
FRB to LEH Examiner 002399
not have any other meetings yet scheduled with other institutions. Fortunately,
there was an industry meeting on the subject the next day that indicated a broad
interest in the subject. We were very careful to limit the meeting to 60 minutes. I
would be very reluctant to drill deeper at Lehman at this point without a clear signal
that our work involved other institutions in some way. Asking for the industry group
(your suggestion) would seem to me to be less provocative than gathering info from
a single firm. However, I certainly can see the point that asking for the industry
group could spook the market, but going to a single firm is even less desirable in my
view. Sorry I can't be more helpful than this. Going on vacation next week, but will
check for your emails. Cheers.
ź Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
To
08/15/2008 02:02 PM
Arthur.Angulo@ny.frb.org, Theodore
Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS, William
BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
Fw: Gameplan and Status to Date
See below. I worry that without gathering more info we will not come up with a
sensible gameplan.
How are you coming with info gathering from Lehman?
Pat
----- Forwarded by Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS on 08/15/2008 01:56 PM ----Steven.Shafran@do.treas.gov
To
08/11/2008 03:04 PM
cc
Subject
My worry
that the
anything
us? And
issues?
Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
RE: Gameplan and Status to Date
is that while this would make sense in a less stressed market,
timing right now is problematic. If we ask, will we see
in time to deal with some of the immediate issues that concern
by asking, are we signaling concerns that only exacerbate the
My concern is we need a gameplan for a specific problem that we could be
confronted with at any time.
steve
-----Original Message----From: Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov [mailto:Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov]
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2008 4:02 PM
To: Shafran, Steven
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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TAB 24
TAB 25
Lehman Triparty Summary for week of 9/2-9/5
Lehman’s total triparty book ranged from $149 – 151 billion during the week of 9/2. The majority
of collateral was Treasury and Agency Debt (approximately $100 billion each day).
Approximately $20 billion of collateral financed each day is NOT PDCF-eligible. This collateral
is noninvestment grade and had the following breakdown on 9/5:
$9.0 billion in Equities
$4.4 billion in Corporate Bonds
$3.8 billion in CP
$1.6 billion in ABS
$1.5 billion in Municipal Bonds
$300,000 in Private Label CMO
The following table shows the breakdown of the entire book on 9/5:
Asset Class
Agency MBS
US Treasuries and Strips
Agency Debenture
Corporate Bonds
Equity
Private Label CMO
Commercial Paper
Corporate Bonds
Commercial Paper
Asset Backed Securities
Agency Remic
Ginnie Mae MBS Pools
Municipal Bonds
Asset Backed Securities
Municipal Bonds
Ginnie Mae REMICs
DTC-Other
Private Label CMO
DTC-Other
Equity
Other
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
Market Value
37,635,274,288.68
37,150,876,381.27
24,115,937,583.22
9,605,027,603.20
8,972,375,258.96
5,813,030,575.22
4,984,088,772.37
4,383,194,254.41
3,797,977,443.34
3,313,509,111.42
2,245,488,150.01
2,092,985,107.76
1,787,313,109.47
1,608,021,237.69
1,451,264,391.98
589,785,121.61
548,992,978.64
322,386,919.57
167,029,227.35
146,394,627.18
14,235,460.81
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
Investment Grade
N/A
The following charts show the breakdown of the book for the week of 9/2.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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Lehman Agency and Treasury Triparty Repo
45,000,000,000.00
40,000,000,000.00
35,000,000,000.00
30,000,000,000.00
Agency Debenture
25,000,000,000.00
Agency MBS
20,000,000,000.00
Treasuries
15,000,000,000.00
10,000,000,000.00
5,000,000,000.00
0.00
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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FRB to LEH Examiner 000906
12,000,000,000.00
Agency Remic
10,000,000,000.00
ABS - Investment Grade
ABS - Noninvestment Grade
CP - Investment Grade
8,000,000,000.00
CP - Noninvestment Grade
Corporate Bonds - Investment Grade
Corporate Bonds - Noninvestment Grade
6,000,000,000.00
Equity - Investment Grade"
Equity - Noninvestment Grade
4,000,000,000.00
Muni Bonds - Investment Grade
Muni Bonds - Noninvestment Grade
Private Label CMO - Investment Grade
2,000,000,000.00
Private Label CMO - Noninvestment Grade
0.00
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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TAB 26
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Patrick M Parkinson
Theodore Lubke
Draft Email to Shafran re Contingency Planning re OTC Derivatives
09/05/2008 01:50 PM
Info Request for OTC Derivatives Sep 4 2008.doc
Theo,
Please review and comment asap on the message below.
Thanks.
Pat
*************************************************
Steve,
We have discussed this matter with President Geithner and are planning to move
forward promptly on several fronts.
1. We are going to make the attached request to Lehman Brothers for information
regarding their OTC derivatives positions. Tim will call Dick Fuld soon to inform him
of the request prior to its delivery.
2. With respect to other OTC derivatives dealers, there is an existing Federal reserve
project that has been at six BHCs' MIS with respect to counterparty credit risk
management, with a focus on OTC derivatives. To date this project has focused on
metrics that are relevant to the banks as going concerns rather metrics that would
be relevant to assessing the potential risks from their failure or options for mitigating
those risks. Further, it has not covered the IBs. Nonetheless, we believe that it
would be better to expand this existing project rather than initiate a separate but
related project. Expanding the project may take some time, but we need some time
to sharpen our information requests related to a failure scenario.
3. Tim will ask Corrigan to accelerate formation of the private-sector default
management group (DMG) that was proposed by CRMPG III. Specifically, we will
ask the group to advise us on: (1) the information that we would need to obtain
from a troubled dealer to assess the potential impact of closeout of a dealer's OTC
derivatives books on its counterparties and on financial markets; and (2) the
information that a potential acquirer of a troubled dealer's OTC derivatives book
(and possibly also related hedges) to assess the potential risks and returns from
such an acquisition. The group's advice (and what we learn in the course of
inquiries at Lehman) would inform the next steps in the MIS project and ultimately
what our expectations will be with respect to dealer MIS.
4. Last (but not least), Theo Lubke and I have been asked to work with you to
create the "playbook" for an IB failure that the Secretary has been asking for. We
see it having at least three segments, corresponding to what we see as the areas of
greatest concern: (1) its tri-party repos and other secured financing, (2) its OTC
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
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derivatives book, and (3) its obligations to various clearing entities (FICC, NSCC,
DTC, CME, OCC, etc.) and the risks to those entities in the event that it does not
meet those obligations. Tim would like us to complete a draft of the playbook by
Sep. 15 when LB, MS, and GS will be reporting their earnings.
Please let me know asap if they seems reasonable to you (other than the Sep. 15
deadline for project #4!). Also, I assume that we will want to involve SEC in
preparation of the playbook Please let me know if Treasury wants to take the lead
in drawing the SEC in or whether you want us to do that.
Pat
ź Steven.Shafran@do.treas.gov
Steven.Shafran@do.treas.gov
To
08/28/2008 04:54 PM
Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
cc
Subject
RE: treasury draft
Thanks for the quick response.
I had a brief chat w Paulson yesterday, and the view here (consistent w
yours) is that it is impt for us to continue to push ahead to collect
the information we need in the short term for contingency planning
purposes. Can confirm that his preference is to do this in a way that
minimizes disruption or concerns. Indicating that we are working in
spirit of Corrigan recommendations and with more than one institution
seems a good idea.
Im here tomorrow. Have a good weekend and lets talk Tuesday when you
back. Looking forward to de-brief on the fed staff/ny staff OTC
analysis.
Steve
-----Original Message----From: Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov [mailto:Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov]
Sent: Thursday, August 28, 2008 4:34 PM
To: Shafran, Steven
Subject: Re: treasury draft
Steve,
Thanks. No, I will not be in the office tomorrow. I have circulated
this
to a small group of Fed (NY and DC) staff and will discuss with them
next
week.
Fed staff had a long discussion of the OTC derivatives issues today.
New
York staff will seek some guidance from Geithner tomorrow. I related
your
view that if we are going to approach individual firms we should do so
at
the top. Whatever we do with individual firms, we are inclined to
encourage Corrigan to move ahead promptly with his initiative. But we
don't see that as a substitute for gathering some info from individual
firms in the very near term.
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Pat
Steven.Shafran@do
.treas.gov
To
08/28/2008 04:11
Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
PM
cc
Subject
treasury draft
Pat: attached is a draft of the working product over here. Looking
forward to comparing notes between this effort and yours. I think the
teams were working together and hope we haven't drifted too far apart.
Will you be in on Friday?
steve
<<systemicallycriticallegis draft ls.7.29.doc>> (See attached file:
systemicallycriticallegis draft ls.7.29.doc)
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TAB 27
hp-1129: Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing ... Page 1 of 4
To view or print the PDF content on this page, download the free Adobe® Acrobat® Reader®.
September 7, 2008
hp-1129
Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal
Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers
Washington, DC-- Good morning. I'm joined here by Jim Lockhart, Director of the
new independent regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA.
In July, Congress granted the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and FHFA new
authorities with respect to the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Since that time,
we have closely monitored financial market and business conditions and have
analyzed in great detail the current financial condition of the GSEs – including the
ability of the GSEs to weather a variety of market conditions going forward. As a
result of this work, we have determined that it is necessary to take action.
Since this difficult period for the GSEs began, I have clearly stated three critical
objectives: providing stability to financial markets, supporting the availability of
mortgage finance, and protecting taxpayers – both by minimizing the near term
costs to the taxpayer and by setting policymakers on a course to resolve the
systemic risk created by the inherent conflict in the GSE structure.
Based on what we have learned about these institutions over the last four weeks –
including what we learned about their capital requirements – and given the
condition of financial markets today, I concluded that it would not have been in the
best interest of the taxpayers for Treasury to simply make an equity investment in
these enterprises in their current form.
The four steps we are announcing today are the result of detailed and thorough
collaboration between FHFA, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve.
We examined all options available, and determined that this comprehensive and
complementary set of actions best meets our three objectives of market stability,
mortgage availability and taxpayer protection.
Throughout this process we have been in close communication with the GSEs
themselves. I have also consulted with Members of Congress from both parties and
I appreciate their support as FHFA, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have
moved to address this difficult issue.
Before I turn to Jim to discuss the action he is taking today, let me make clear that
these two institutions are unique. They operate solely in the mortgage market and
are therefore more exposed than other financial institutions to the housing
correction. Their statutory capital requirements are thin and poorly defined as
compared to other institutions. Nothing about our actions today in any way reflects
a changed view of the housing correction or of the strength of other U.S. financial
institutions.
***
I support the Director's decision as necessary and appropriate and had advised him
that conservatorship was the only form in which I would commit taxpayer money to
the GSEs.
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm
8/30/2010
hp-1129: Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing ... Page 2 of 4
I appreciate the productive cooperation we have received from the boards and the
management of both GSEs. I attribute the need for today's action primarily to the
inherent conflict and flawed business model embedded in the GSE structure, and to
the ongoing housing correction. GSE managements and their Boards are
responsible for neither. New CEOs supported by new non-executive Chairmen
have taken over management of the enterprises, and we hope and expect that the
vast majority of key professionals will remain in their jobs. I am particularly pleased
that the departing CEOs, Dan Mudd and Dick Syron, have agreed to stay on for a
period to help with the transition.
I have long said that the housing correction poses the biggest risk to our economy.
It is a drag on our economic growth, and at the heart of the turmoil and stress for
our financial markets and financial institutions. Our economy and our markets will
not recover until the bulk of this housing correction is behind us. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are critical to turning the corner on housing. Therefore, the primary
mission of these enterprises now will be to proactively work to increase the
availability of mortgage finance, including by examining the guaranty fee structure
with an eye toward mortgage affordability.
To promote stability in the secondary mortgage market and lower the cost of
funding, the GSEs will modestly increase their MBS portfolios through the end of
2009. Then, to address systemic risk, in 2010 their portfolios will begin to be
gradually reduced at the rate of 10 percent per year, largely through natural run off,
eventually stabilizing at a lower, less risky size.
Treasury has taken three additional steps to complement FHFA's decision to place
both enterprises in conservatorship. First, Treasury and FHFA have established
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, contractual agreements between the
Treasury and the conserved entities. Under these agreements, Treasury will ensure
that each company maintains a positive net worth. These agreements support
market stability by providing additional security and clarity to GSE debt holders –
senior and subordinated – and support mortgage availability by providing additional
confidence to investors in GSE mortgage backed securities. This commitment will
eliminate any mandatory triggering of receivership and will ensure that the
conserved entities have the ability to fulfill their financial obligations. It is more
efficient than a one-time equity injection, because it will be used only as needed
and on terms that Treasury has set. With this agreement, Treasury receives senior
preferred equity shares and warrants that protect taxpayers. Additionally, under the
terms of the agreement, common and preferred shareholders bear losses ahead of
the new government senior preferred shares.
These Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements were made necessary by the
ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been perceived to
indicate government support for agency debt and guaranteed MBS. Our nation has
tolerated these ambiguities for too long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are
held by central banks and investors throughout the United States and around the
world who believe them to be virtually risk-free. Because the U.S. Government
created these ambiguities, we have a responsibility to both avert and ultimately
address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and breadth of the holdings of
GSE debt and MBS.
Market discipline is best served when shareholders bear both the risk and the
reward of their investment. While conservatorship does not eliminate the common
stock, it does place common shareholders last in terms of claims on the assets of
the enterprise.
Similarly, conservatorship does not eliminate the outstanding preferred stock, but
does place preferred shareholders second, after the common shareholders, in
absorbing losses. The federal banking agencies are assessing the exposures of
banks and thrifts to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The agencies believe that, while
many institutions hold common or preferred shares of these two GSEs, only a
limited number of smaller institutions have holdings that are significant compared to
their capital.
The agencies encourage depository institutions to contact their primary federal
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm
8/30/2010
hp-1129: Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing ... Page 3 of 4
regulator if they believe that losses on their holdings of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
common or preferred shares, whether realized or unrealized, are likely to reduce
their regulatory capital below "well capitalized." The banking agencies are prepared
to work with the affected institutions to develop capital restoration plans consistent
with the capital regulations.
Preferred stock investors should recognize that the GSEs are unlike any other
financial institutions and consequently GSE preferred stocks are not a good proxy
for financial institution preferred stock more broadly. By stabilizing the GSEs so
they can better perform their mission, today's action should accelerate stabilization
in the housing market, ultimately benefiting financial institutions. The broader
market for preferred stock issuance should continue to remain available for wellcapitalized institutions.
The second step Treasury is taking today is the establishment of a new secured
lending credit facility which will be available to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
Federal Home Loan Banks. Given the combination of actions we are taking,
including the Preferred Share Purchase Agreements, we expect the GSEs to be in
a stronger position to fund their regular business activities in the capital markets.
This facility is intended to serve as an ultimate liquidity backstop, in essence,
implementing the temporary liquidity backstop authority granted by Congress in
July, and will be available until those authorities expire in December 2009.
Finally, to further support the availability of mortgage financing for millions of
Americans, Treasury is initiating a temporary program to purchase GSE MBS.
During this ongoing housing correction, the GSE portfolios have been constrained,
both by their own capital situation and by regulatory efforts to address systemic risk.
As the GSEs have grappled with their difficulties, we've seen mortgage rate
spreads to Treasuries widen, making mortgages less affordable for homebuyers.
While the GSEs are expected to moderately increase the size of their portfolios
over the next 15 months through prudent mortgage purchases, complementary
government efforts can aid mortgage affordability. Treasury will begin this new
program later this month, investing in new GSE MBS. Additional purchases will be
made as deemed appropriate. Given that Treasury can hold these securities to
maturity, the spreads between Treasury issuances and GSE MBS indicate that
there is no reason to expect taxpayer losses from this program, and, in fact, it could
produce gains. This program will also expire with the Treasury's temporary
authorities in December 2009.
Together, this four part program is the best means of protecting our markets and
the taxpayers from the systemic risk posed by the current financial condition of the
GSEs. Because the GSEs are in conservatorship, they will no longer be managed
with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns, a strategy which
historically encouraged risk-taking. The Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements
minimize current cash outlays, and give taxpayers a large stake in the future value
of these entities. In the end, the ultimate cost to the taxpayer will depend on the
business results of the GSEs going forward. To that end, the steps we have taken
to support the GSE debt and to support the mortgage market will together improve
the housing market, the US economy and the GSEs' business outlook.
Through the four actions we have taken today, FHFA and Treasury have acted on
the responsibilities we have to protect the stability of the financial markets, including
the mortgage market, and to protect the taxpayer to the maximum extent possible.
And let me make clear what today's actions mean for Americans and their families.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large and so interwoven in our financial
system that a failure of either of them would cause great turmoil in our financial
markets here at home and around the globe. This turmoil would directly and
negatively impact household wealth: from family budgets, to home values, to
savings for college and retirement. A failure would affect the ability of Americans to
get home loans, auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance. And a
failure would be harmful to economic growth and job creation. That is why we have
taken these actions today.
While we expect these four steps to provide greater stability and certainty to market
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm
8/30/2010
hp-1129: Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing ... Page 4 of 4
participants and provide long-term clarity to investors in GSE debt and MBS
securities, our collective work is not complete. At the end of next year, the Treasury
temporary authorities will expire, the GSE portfolios will begin to gradually run off,
and the GSEs will begin to pay the government a fee to compensate taxpayers for
the on-going support provided by the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements.
Together, these factors should give momentum and urgency to the reform cause.
Policymakers must view this next period as a "time out" where we have stabilized
the GSEs while we decide their future role and structure.
Because the GSEs are Congressionally-chartered, only Congress can address the
inherent conflict of attempting to serve both shareholders and a public mission. The
new Congress and the next Administration must decide what role government in
general, and these entities in particular, should play in the housing market. There is
a consensus today that these enterprises pose a systemic risk and they cannot
continue in their current form. Government support needs to be either explicit or
non-existent, and structured to resolve the conflict between public and private
purposes. And policymakers must address the issue of systemic risk. I recognize
that there are strong differences of opinion over the role of government in
supporting housing, but under any course policymakers choose, there are ways to
structure these entities in order to address market stability in the transition and limit
systemic risk and conflict of purposes for the long-term. We will make a grave error
if we don't use this time out to permanently address the structural issues presented
by the GSEs.
In the weeks to come, I will describe my views on long term reform. I look forward to
engaging in that timely and necessary debate.
-30REPORTS
FHFA Director Lockhart Remarks on Housing GSE Actions
Fact Sheet: FHFA Conservatorship
Fact Sheet: Treasury Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Fact Sheet: Treasury MBS Purchase Program
Fact Sheet: Treasury GSE Credit Facility
Freddie Mac Warrant to Purchase Common Stock
Freddie Mac Certificate
Freddie Mac Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Fannie Mae Warrant to Purchase Common Stock
Fannie Mae Certificate
Fannie Mae Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1129.htm
8/30/2010
TAB 28
TAB 29
Meg
McConnell/NY/FRS
To
Meg McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS, Arthur
Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian Peters/NY/FRS@FRS, Chris
McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS, Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS,
Craig Leiby/NY/FRS@FRS, Debby
Perelmuter/NY/FRS@FRS, Dianne
Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS, HaeRan Kim/NY/FRS@FRS,
James P Bergin/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS, Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS,
Jonathan Polk/NY/FRS@FRS, Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael Holscher/NY/FRS@FRS,
Michael Schetzel/NY/FRS@FRS, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Sandy
Krieger/NY/FRS@FRS, Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS,
Steven Friedman/NY/FRS@FRS, Terrence
Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS,
Thomas Baxter/NY/FRS@FRS, Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS, Wendy Ng/NY/FRS@FRS,
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Kristin Mayer/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Silva/NY/FRS@FRS
09/09/2008 11:07 AM
Subject
Quick comparison
As he mentioned in the meeting this morning, Tim would like someone
to put together a quick "what's different? what's the same?" list about
LEH vs BSC, as well as about mid-March (then) vs. early Sept (now).
He would like this for a call he's having with Chairman Bernanke at
3:00. Any takers for this? Please let me know.
Thanks,
Meg
-------------------------Margaret M. McConnell
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
212-720-8773
ź Meg McConnell
----- Original Message -----
From: Meg McConnell
Sent: 09/08/2008 06:44 PM EDT
To: Arthur Angulo; Brian Peters; Chris McCurdy; Clinton
Lively; Craig Leiby; Debby Perelmuter; Dianne Dobbeck; HaeRan
Kim/NY/FRS@NY; James Bergin; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts;
Jonathan Polk; Lucinda Brickler; Meg McConnell; Michael
Holscher; Michael Schetzel; Patrick Parkinson; Sandy Krieger;
Sarah Dahlgren; Steven Friedman; Terrence Checki/NY/FRS@NY;
Theodore Lubke; Thomas Baxter; Til Schuermann; Wendy Ng; William
BRODOWS
Cc: Kristin Mayer; Michael Silva
Subject: Meeting tomorrow at 9:00
The purpose of tomorrow's meeting is to continue the discussion of near-term
options for dealing with a failing nonbank. Sorry for the late notice on this meeting.
Meg
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155639
FRB to LEH Examiner 001988
Derivatives: Top 25 Counterparties by Current Exposure (to Lehman)
Counterparty
MINISTRY OF FINANCE ITALY (1)
BH FINANCE LLC (2)
PYXIS ABS CDO 2007-1 LTD
LIBRA CDO LIMITED
MKP VELA CBO LTD
CENTRAL BANK OF NORWAY (NORGES BANK)
KBC INVESTMENTS CAYMAN ISLANDS V LTD
BALLYROCK ABS CDO 2007-1 LTD
CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES
GE FINANCIAL MARKETS
PORTFOLIO CDS TRUST 187
TEXAS COMPETITIVE ELECTRIC HOLDINGS CO LLC
PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE
MINISTRY OF FINANCE GERMANY
DEUTSCHE BANK AG
AGR FINANCIAL PRODUCTS INC
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK
MIZUHO INTERNATIONAL PLC
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORPORATION
CALYON
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA
LINN ENERGY LLC
RUBY FINANCE 2008-01
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL SERVICES INC
801 GRAND CDO SPC SERIES 2006-1
Industry Description
CCE ($mm)
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPAR
2,878
MISC FINANCE COMPANIES
1,445
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE
1,085
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE
889
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE
877
CENTRAL BANK
543
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE
435
SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLE
392
OIL/GAS COMPANY
379
GENERAL MANUFACTURER
369
FINANCIAL GUARANTOR
357
UTILITY-INVeSTOR OWNED/IND
334
COLLEGES/UNIVERSITIES
298
291
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEPAR
COMMERCIAL BANK
283
FINANCIAL GUARANTOR
275
268
SUPRANATIONALS - MULTI GOVT
BROKER DEALER GENERAL
260
OIL/GAS COMPANY
247
COMMERCIAL BANK
225
COMMERCIAL BANK
213
OIL/GAS COMPANY
207
33
LEHMAN SPECIAL PURPOSE VEH
BROKER DEALER GENERAL
173
173
LEHMAN SPECIAL PURPOSE VEH
MPE ($mm)
5,300
2,854
1,128
961
981
727
500
420
484
512
390
1,059
321
410
1,480
364
525
714
999
1,072
1,323
418
83
675
280
Deal counts
16
44
125
146
110
1,560
1
108
26
110
1
8
200
62
59,149
75
22
8,820
268
7,397
53,036
30
5
40,283
9
(1)
Exposure reported above does not reflect hedges we have against our exposure, including $1,899m of long credit protection. Actual CCE and MPE net of hedges was $979m
and $3,401m respectively.
(2)
Exposure reported above does not reflect $710m of CDS hedges we have against our exposure. Actual CCE and MPE net of hedges was $735m and $2,144m respectively.
Derivatives: Top 25 Counterparties by Deal Count
Counterparty
DEUTSCHE BANK AG
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA
UBS AG
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL SERVICES INC
BARCLAYS BANK PLC
CITIBANK NA
BANK OF AMERICA NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC (THE)
GOLDMAN SACHS INTERNATIONAL
BNP PARIBAS
MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL
BEAR STEARNS CREDIT PRODUCTS INC
SOCIETE GENERALE
MIZUHO INTERNATIONAL PLC
ABN AMRO BANK NV
CALYON
HSBC BANK USA
DRESDNER BANK AG
AIG INTERNATIONAL INC
BANK OF TOKYO MITSUBISHI UFJ LTD
NATIXIS
WACHOVIA BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP, INC.
BAYERISCHE HYPO-UND VEREINSBANK AG
COMMERZBANK AG
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Industry Description
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
BROKER DEALER GENERAL
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
BROKER DEALER GENERAL
COMMERCIAL BANK
BROKER DEALER GENERAL
BROKER DEALER GENERAL
COMMERCIAL BANK
BROKER DEALER GENERAL
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
INSURANCE-LIFE/HEALTH
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
BROKER/DEALER COMMODITIES
COMMERCIAL BANK
COMMERCIAL BANK
1 of 3
FCIC-155640
CCE ($mm)
283
213
43
173
100
92
56
19
77
147
20
38
77
260
22
225
82
70
17
76
52
27
23
90
114
MPE ($mm)
1,480
1,323
832
675
1,251
804
579
602
372
864
311
244
860
714
641
1,072
223
328
49
134
350
367
94
309
523
Deal counts
59,149
53,036
44,619
40,283
36,912
24,816
23,188
22,294
18,896
18,609
17,289
16,890
12,021
8,820
7,854
7,397
5,781
5,767
5,445
4,103
3,799
3,375
2,740
2,353
2,201
FRB to LEH Examiner 001989
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155641
FRB to LEH Examiner 001990
LEHMAN'S VIEW OF LEHMAN VS. BEAR
Presentation to FRBNY "Gameplan"
9/2/08
on 5/28/08
Key Liquidity Metrics
Lehman
Bear
Lehman
Q108
Q108
Q308
Net Balance Sheet
254
397
315
Net Leverage
22.6x
15.4x
10.7x
Liquidity Pool
17
34
41
STD (excluding current portion)
16
16
Current Portion LTD
10
19
Total Short-term Debt
Short-term Debt/Liquidity Pool
Unencumbered Assets
Free Credit Balances
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
26
1.5x
14
43
FCIC-155642
35
1.0x
161
13
1
FRB to LEH Examiner 001991
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Lucinda M Brickler
Meg McConnell
Arthur Angulo; Brian Peters; Chris McCurdy; Clinton Lively; Craig Leiby; Debby Perelmuter; Dianne Dobbeck;
HaeRan Kim; James P Bergin; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts; Jonathan Polk; Kristin Mayer; Michael Holscher;
Michael Schetzel; Michael Silva; Patrick M Parkinson; Sandy Krieger; Sarah Dahlgren; Steven Friedman;
Theodore Lubke; Til Schuermann; Wendy Ng; William BRODOWS; Timothy Geithner
Re: Quick comparison
09/09/2008 02:40 PM
triparty bear versus lb.doc
Lucinda Brickler
Payments Policy Function
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
212.720.6132 or 646.720.6132
ź Meg McConnell/NY/FRS
Meg
McConnell/NY/FRS
09/09/2008 12:39 PM
To
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS, Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Arthur Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian
Peters/NY/FRS@FRS, Chris McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS,
Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS, Craig Leiby/NY/FRS@FRS,
Debby Perelmuter/NY/FRS@FRS, Dianne
Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS, HaeRan Kim/NY/FRS@FRS,
James P Bergin/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS, Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS,
Jonathan Polk/NY/FRS@FRS, Kristin
Mayer/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael Holscher/NY/FRS@FRS,
Michael Schetzel/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Silva/NY/FRS@FRS, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Sandy
Krieger/NY/FRS@FRS, Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS,
Steven Friedman/NY/FRS@FRS, Theodore
Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Til Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS,
Wendy Ng/NY/FRS@FRS
Subject
Re: Quick comparison
1. Lucinda and McCurdy are doing a "that was then, this is now"
analysis for the triparty repo piece.
2. Markets (I think?) is going to do some state of the world
comparison.
3. We have Bill B. giving us Leh's version of the difference between
them and BSC.
(Not sure whether we want to also do something that focuses narrowly
on OTC derivatives, or whether that will be covered in what Brodows
sends?).
These would need to be ready by around 2:45 or so at the latest.
Thanks!
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155643
FRB to LEH Examiner 001992
Meg
-------------------------Margaret M. McConnell
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
212-720-8773
ź William BRODOWS
----- Original Message -----
From: William BRODOWS
Sent: 09/09/2008 12:22 PM EDT
To: Lucinda Brickler
Cc: Arthur Angulo; Brian Peters; Chris McCurdy; Clinton
Lively; Craig Leiby; Debby Perelmuter; Dianne Dobbeck; HaeRan
Kim; James Bergin; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts; Jonathan Polk;
Kristin Mayer; Meg McConnell; Michael Holscher; Michael
Schetzel; Michael Silva; Patrick Parkinson; Sandy Krieger; Sarah
Dahlgren; Steven Friedman; Terrence Checki; Theodore Lubke;
Thomas Baxter; Til Schuermann; Wendy Ng
Subject: Re: Quick comparison
I have Lehman's own analysis of differences between their position and position of
Bear which I will forward.
ź Lucinda M Brickler/NY/FRS
Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS
To
Meg McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Arthur Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian
Peters/NY/FRS@FRS, Chris McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS,
Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS, Craig Leiby/NY/FRS@FRS,
Debby Perelmuter/NY/FRS@FRS, Dianne
Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS, HaeRan Kim/NY/FRS@FRS,
James P Bergin/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS, Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS,
Jonathan Polk/NY/FRS@FRS, Kristin
Mayer/NY/FRS@FRS, Meg McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS,
Michael Holscher/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Schetzel/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael Silva/NY/FRS@FRS,
Patrick M Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Sandy
Krieger/NY/FRS@FRS, Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS,
Steven Friedman/NY/FRS@FRS, Terrence
Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS,
Thomas Baxter/NY/FRS@FRS, Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS, Wendy Ng/NY/FRS@FRS,
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS
09/09/2008 11:28 AM
Subject
Re: Quick comparison
Meg
Chris McCurdy and I will put together the "that was then, this is now" analysis for
the triparty repo piece.
Lucinda
Lucinda Brickler
Payments Policy Function
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155644
FRB to LEH Examiner 001993
212.720.6132 or 646.720.6132
ź Meg McConnell/NY/FRS
Meg
McConnell/NY/FRS
To
Meg McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS, Arthur
Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian Peters/NY/FRS@FRS, Chris
McCurdy/NY/FRS@FRS, Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS,
Craig Leiby/NY/FRS@FRS, Debby
Perelmuter/NY/FRS@FRS, Dianne
Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS, HaeRan Kim/NY/FRS@FRS,
James P Bergin/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS, Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS,
Jonathan Polk/NY/FRS@FRS, Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael Holscher/NY/FRS@FRS,
Michael Schetzel/NY/FRS@FRS, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Sandy
Krieger/NY/FRS@FRS, Sarah Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS,
Steven Friedman/NY/FRS@FRS, Terrence
Checki/NY/FRS@FRS, Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS,
Thomas Baxter/NY/FRS@FRS, Til
Schuermann/NY/FRS@FRS, Wendy Ng/NY/FRS@FRS,
William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Kristin Mayer/NY/FRS@FRS, Michael
Silva/NY/FRS@FRS
09/09/2008 11:07 AM
Subject
Quick comparison
As he mentioned in the meeting this morning, Tim would like someone
to put together a quick "what's different? what's the same?" list about
LEH vs BSC, as well as about mid-March (then) vs. early Sept (now).
He would like this for a call he's having with Chairman Bernanke at
3:00. Any takers for this? Please let me know.
Thanks,
Meg
-------------------------Margaret M. McConnell
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
212-720-8773
ź Meg McConnell
----- Original Message -----
From: Meg McConnell
Sent: 09/08/2008 06:44 PM EDT
To: Arthur Angulo; Brian Peters; Chris McCurdy; Clinton
Lively; Craig Leiby; Debby Perelmuter; Dianne Dobbeck; HaeRan
Kim/NY/FRS@NY; James Bergin; Jamie McAndrews; Jan Voigts;
Jonathan Polk; Lucinda Brickler; Meg McConnell; Michael
Holscher; Michael Schetzel; Patrick Parkinson; Sandy Krieger;
Sarah Dahlgren; Steven Friedman; Terrence Checki/NY/FRS@NY;
Theodore Lubke; Thomas Baxter; Til Schuermann; Wendy Ng; William
BRODOWS
Cc: Kristin Mayer; Michael Silva
Subject: Meeting tomorrow at 9:00
The purpose of tomorrow's meeting is to continue the discussion of near-term
options for dealing with a failing nonbank. Sorry for the late notice on this meeting.
Meg
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155645
FRB to LEH Examiner 001994
What do we know about conditions in the triparty repo market in September 2008 that we
either did not know or that has changed since the situation in March 2008?
x
We didn’t/don’t know much about Bear’s triparty repo book
o It was probably about $50-80 billion, depending on who was talking
o It was probably weighted heavily toward MBSs
x
We know much more about Lehman’s triparty repo book
o Size much larger than Bear
OMO Eligible
Treasury
Agency debt
Agency MBS
Non-OMO PDCF-eligible
Non-OMO, non-PDCF
TOTAL
Value of
Collateral
$128 billion
$35 billion
$28 billion
$65 billion
$31 billion
$23.5 billion
$182
Percentage of
Value
70%
19%
15%
35%
17%
13%
100%
o Term of financing percentage financed for more than one night increases
for less liquid collateral
OMO-eligible
Non-OMO, PDCF
Non-PDCF
17%
33%
50%
o Margins for less liquid collateral, particularly non-investment grade
private label CMOs and asset-backed securities, are higher (and are
probably more rational than they were in March)
o Investors concentration is high with the top 10 counterparties providing
80% of the financing; the good news is that these are all sophisticated
advisors and investors who should be expected to take a professional view
of the issues; the bad news is that they are investing others’ money and
need to meet fiduciary responsibilities and avoid perception of being too
exposed
BNYM (sec lending and asset mgmt)
JPMC and State Street
Fidelity
$35 billion (19%)
$35 billion
$12 billion
o Post-bear, investors may be quicker to withdraw funds
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
PDCF is a backstop
FCIC-155646
FRB to LEH Examiner 001995
Fidelity is the only 2a7 fund in the top 10 investors, generally
accepts lower quality collateral, will likely be among the first
to flee
Lesson from March was that it is better to be the first to flee
than the last
|
o We know that the matched book is large in nominal terms ($550 billion+),
but we have no insights as to the degree of double counting or netting that
this number involves. The consequence of an unwind would be to cause
dislocations (of unknown severity) for a fair number of investors/market
players who rely on the intermediation provided by Lehman.
o We now know that clearing banks do not have the technical capacity to
effect an unwind by collateral type (only by firm and with some effort by
trade). This was an option considered during the Countrywide episode
that the clearing banks, in fact, would not have been able to operationalize.
o Other concerns
Intraday liquidity provided by settlement banks may be a
problem as LB’s situation deteriorates. Citi, JPMC and we
believe BofA have all demanded more margin from LB for
providing clearing and settlement liquidity. We know that
Citibank is watching them closely on an international basis and
if they become uncomfortable, they will likely demand more
intra-day margin and will likely cut off Lehman if they don’t
receive it. LB has a much larger international footprint than
Bear had.
DTCC complex is likely watching Lehman more closely and
could raise participants fund deposits or cut net debit cap if
they feel uncomfortable. Most likely they would not do this
without speaking to us first. A concern is that
uncertainties/misperceptions about closeout procedures may
still exist among CC participants, which could cause them to
pull back from the CC to avoid loss sharing.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155647
FRB to LEH Examiner 001996
TAB 30
TAB 31
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Rita C Proctor
Donald L Kohn; Kevin Warsh; Michelle A Smith; Scott Alvarez; Brian F Madigan; Patrick M Parkinson; Marie L
Spicer
Rivane V Bowden; Margaret Owens; Valerie Delaney; Cecelia M Bradshaw; Julie Edwards; Yvette K McKnightJohnson; Cecelia M Bradshaw
This evening's conference call will take place at 5 p.m. instead of 6 p.m.
09/09/2008 04:26 PM
Tuesday, September 9, 2008
05:00 PM - 06:00 PM Conference Call [re: Lehman Brothers]
Location: Chairman's Office
Principals: Secy. Paulson, Secy. Cox, Chairman Bernanke, Vice Chairman
Kohn(?) Governor Warsh & President Geithner
Board Staff: Scott Alvarez, Brian Madigan, Pat Parkinson & Michelle Smith
FRB NY Staff: Arthur Angulo, Thomas Baxter & William Rutledge
Conference bridge information:
Toll Free Dial In Number: (866) 209-6438
Participant Code: 623345
Int'l Access/Caller Paid Dial In Number: (865) 297-1127
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154564
FRB to LEH Examiner 000913
TAB 32
TAB 33
TAB 34
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Rita C Proctor
Rita C Proctor
Brian F Madigan; Cecelia M Bradshaw; Donald L Kohn; Julie Edwards; Kevin Warsh; Margaret Owens; Marie L
Spicer; Michelle A Smith; Patrick M Parkinson; Rivane V Bowden; Scott Alvarez; Valerie Delaney; Yvette K
McKnight-Johnson
Conference Call -- Wednesday, 9/10/08 @ 8:30 a.m.
09/09/2008 07:37 PM
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
08:30 AM - 09:30 AM Conference Call [re: Lehman Brothers]
Location: Chairman's Office
Principals: Secy. Cox, Chairman Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn, Governor
Warsh & President Geithner
Board Staff: Scott Alvarez, Brian Madigan, Pat Parkinson & Michelle Smith
FRB NY Staff: Arthur Angulo, Thomas Baxter & William Rutledge
Conference bridge information:
Toll Free Dial In Number:
Participant Code:
Int'l Access/Caller Paid Dial In Number:
Rita
************
Rita C. Proctor
Assistant to the Chairman
The Honorable Ben S. Bernanke
Federal Reserve Board
Eccles Board Building
20th and C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20551
Phone: 202-452-3201
Fax: 202-452-6499
rita.c.proctor@frb.gov
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154731
FRB to LEH Examiner 001080
TAB 35
TAB 36
To Scott Alvarez/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
Subject lehman
Mark VanDerWeide/BOARD/FRS
09/10/2008 05:17 PM
At 4:15pm FRBNY/Board call, same three options were laid out once again by Tim. Working groups were
directed to spend the next few hours fleshing out how a Fed-assisted BofA acquisition transaction might
look, how a private consortium of preferred equity investors transaction might look, and how a Fed take
out of tri-party repo lenders would look. Reconvening for a 7pm call to discuss again.
At Pat Parkinson's request, I am trying to insert myself into the Fed-assisted acquisition transaction
discussions, but no success yet.
There are definitely a number of legal issues associated with each option, which we will need to focus on
before too much more time goes by. I am compiling a list.
Tim seemed to think that Lehman would survive into the weekend, but may need some PDCF help
tomorrow or Friday.
Mark
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154786
FRB to LEH Examiner 001135
TAB 37
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
Don Kohn; Scott Alvarez; Brian Madigan
Fw: revised Liquidation Consortium gameplan + questions
09/11/2008 06:55 AM
LEGALDOCS-#283188-v1-9 10.DOC
From: Michael.Nelson
Sent: 09/10/2008 10:59 PM AST
To: Christine Cumming; Terrence Checki; Jamie McAndrews; Thomas Baxter; Chris
McCurdy; Dianne Dobbeck; William BRODOWS; Brian Peters; William Dudley; Michael
Schetzel; Patrick Parkinson
Subject: revised Liquidation Consortium gameplan + questions
- LEGALDOCS-#283188-v1-9_10.DOC
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154768
FRB to LEH Examiner 001117
Liquidation Consortium
I.
Rationale
x
x
II.
To convene in one room senior-level representatives of major
bank and investment bank counterparties of Lehman -- most
notably in tri-party repo, credit-default swaps, and other OTC
derivatives – who we feel would be most adversely affected by
a Lehman insolvency.
To provide a forum where these firms can explore possibilities
of joint funding mechanisms that avert Lehman’s insolvency.
Possible Consortium Members
Banks and Investment Banks with exposures from loans,
OTC derivatives, tri-party repo:
Bank of America
Barclays
Citi
Credit Suisse
Deutsche
Goldman
JPMC
Merrill
Morgan Stanley
RBS
Other affected parties
BONY
State Street
x
III.
Goal would be to invite institutions that will stay at the table. If
one leaves, many more may follow
Logistics
x
x
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
First meeting must occur, at the very latest, Friday at the close of
business New York time. If we perceive that the current potential
bids for Lehman are unlikely to materialize, we should move the
meeting up and consider holding it on Thursday.
Very little advance time given to participants – 2 hours max – to
minimize risk of outside leaks.
FCIC-154769
FRB to LEH Examiner 001118
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
IV.
FRBNY financial commitment (this section expected to be
overhauled by Dudley, Schetzel)
x
x
x
V.
Exception: we should immediately indicate to current
and potential sole bidders for Lehman that we are
planning to convene a consortium that will include them
and other market participants no later than Friday.
Invitations by phone – inviting the CEO and one other participant.
Invitees are told that they should have the authority to bind their
firms but are not in advance told the identity of the other firms to
be represented at the table.
FRBNY to host. Paulson delivers introductory remarks (we script)
and Treasury and FR staff recede to background to provide passive
mediation at most. Lawyer present to provide antitrust protections.
Lehman senior staff (not Fuld) in a separate room, available to
provide information if necessary. Lehman must also be prepared
to open its books to representatives of the consortium as early as
Friday night.
Participants told by Paulson that they have until opening of
business in Asia (Sunday night NY time) to explore whether they
can jointly come up with a credible plan to recapitalize Lehman to
an extent necessary to enable an orderly winding down. Paulson
conveys willingness of the official sector to let Lehman fail.
FRBNY starts to communicate with foreign supervisors while
meeting is taking place.
We would expect consortium members to break and reconvene for
a period of up to 48 hours, in addition to sending a consortium
team to Lehman for due diligence.
We should have in mind a maximum number of how much we are
willing to finance before the meeting starts, but not divulge our
willingness to do so to the consortium.
Term of any liquidity support should be long enough to guard
against a fire sale, but on a short enough fuse to encourage buyers
of Lehman assets to come forward. Two months to a year in
duration?
Preferable to style FRBNY commitment as much as possible as a
backstop rather than lending, but we can’t attach too much of a
subsidy to liquidity, or the consortium will not have sufficient
incentives to act.
Consortium commitments
x
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
We will put forth at the meeting how much we think Lehman
needs in terms of an infusion. We assume that members of the
2
FCIC-154770
FRB to LEH Examiner 001119
x
VI.
Sunday Night Statements
x
x
VII.
consortium will not pull business from Lehman going forward,
which may decrease the amount of support needed.
Consortium members will incur other costs – seconding their staff
to work at Lehman starting immediately.
x Lehman is bigger and more global than Bear Stearns, so
the consortium will have to address in short order the
question of how to establish control at Lehman offices
outside New York.
Consortium will have to come up with a statement to the financial
markets on Sunday night, if they can come to material agreement
on a sufficient plan.
Treasury, FR may wish to issue statements on Sunday as well. FR
will want to discuss any new liquidity facility that has been created
to provide a backstop to the consortium.
Open Issues
x Legal
x Approval of current Lehman shareholders – what would a
takeover by the consortium require, and can it be
obtained easily?
x Regulatory approvals – what would be necessary
worldwide, and with what time
constraints/considerations? (Presumably FR could help
facilitate.)
x Is the consortium vulnerable to attempts by
nonconsortium members to take Lehman into involuntary
bankruptcy, including in jurisdictions outside of the
United States?
x Can we obtain necessary FOMC approval for whatever
funding facility is fashioned to facilitate a consortium?
x What type of capital or other regulatory relief
should/must we provide for members of the consortium?
x Governance
x Can the consortium come to sufficient agreement on how
to manage Lehman, at least in the short term (next two
weeks) by late Sunday afternoon? Will 2-3 firms emerge
as leaders willing to shoulder the administrative burdens
by, for example, seconding staff to Lehman?
x Does Fuld have to be replaced on Sunday? If so, do we
exercise influence over the choice of his successor?
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
3
FCIC-154771
FRB to LEH Examiner 001120
x
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
To what extent does FRBNY become involved, or mired,
in disputes between the consortium members after
Sunday?
4
FCIC-154772
FRB to LEH Examiner 001121
x
x
x
x
x
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
Ratings Agencies
x When do we expect the consortium to approach the
ratings agencies, and to what extent do we engage in
discussions with the ratings agencies over FR liquidity
we expect to provide to the consortium?
Communications
x Do we have any chance of keeping the initial and
ongoing meetings of the consortium on Friday and over
the weekend confidential? How do we get the
consortium members – and Paulson – into the building
without alerting the press?
x Which foreign authorities do we inform about the initial
meeting of the consortium? Are there other official
bodies whom we inform before a statement is made to the
public -- either inside or outside the United States?
x What are the bare minimum elements of the Sunday night
statements – by the consortium, by Lehman, by FR, by
Treasury – that will provide sufficient, immediate
comfort to the financial markets?
x When and how do inform key Members of Congress?
Financial capital
x How do we best hone in on the monetary figure we think
the consortium will have to provide in new capital and
the type/maximum amount of any FR financing to
support the consortium? What is the deadline for
finalizing these numbers, and what further financial
information do we require?
x Does this new financial commitment put a material strain
on consortium members?
x Are current compensation commitments by Lehman (for
example, bonus accruals) – which presumably survive
takeover by the consortium – unduly onerous?
Human capital
x How can the consortium retain key Lehman staff?
Longer-term planning
x It is recognized that much of Lehman will disappear in
relatively short order. For financial stability purposes,
will we want to shorten, lengthen, or otherwise manage
that process through the consortium?
x When would we expect to wind down any FR liquidity
facility that supports the consortium, and to what extent
must/should we state this publicly?
5
FCIC-154773
FRB to LEH Examiner 001122
TAB 38
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Mccabe, Susan L
william.dudley@ny.frb.org; gustavo.a.suarez@frb.gov; Chris.Burke@ny.frb.org
Hope you have the Radar screens on early this morning:
09/11/2008 08:26 AM
It is not pretty, This is getting pretty scary and ugly again. Analysts, WSJ, CNBC all
piling on talking about disappointment with LEH plan( wish they would stop), LEH is
trading pre-open in a "4" handle our equity hoot is saying, their CDS out to 715 area
last I heard. They have much bigger counter-party risk than Bear did, especially in
Derivatives market, so he market is getting very spooked, nervous. Also have Aig,
Wamu concerns. This is just spinning out of control again. Just fyi, this is shaping up
as going to be a rough day.
© Copyright 2008 The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. All rights reserved. See
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these links, please notify us by reply message and we will send the contents to you.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154785
FRB to LEH Examiner 001134
TAB 39
TAB 40
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Rita C Proctor
Chairman
B AMkFinancial Markets Conference Call 9/11/08
Fw:
09/11/2008 10:45 AM
RESTRICTED FOMC CLASS II
Overnight, sentiment towards risky assets remains decidedly negative as market
participants continued to discuss the Lehman Brothers announcement yesterday. In
particular, overseas equities, particularly in Asia, were off as much as 3 percent
overnight, while U.S equity futures were down 1.4 percent. Again, financial sectors
underperformed, with the Topix banking sector index 5 percent lower. In addition
Treasury yields were 8 basis points lower and the dollar continued to appreciate
against most major currencies The yen also outperformed against against most
higher yielding currencies.
For the most part, analyst have continued to express disappointment that Lehman
Brothers has yet to make significant progress in actually obtaining additional capital.
Some market participants have been comparing the “feeling” in the market with that
just ahead of Bear Stearns in March.
Because of the ongoing focus on Lehman, there has been a great deal of focus on
the potential implications of a downgrade (or worse) could have on financial
markets.
Lehman's share price declined 45 percent to $4 in the pre-open and its CDS price
widened 200 basis points to 775 as market participants voiced concern over the
viability of Lehman as an ongoing concern. Yesterday afternoon, Moody's held a
conference call on this topic and stated that Lehman's plan for reorganization was
insufficient for them to maintain their current 'A2' credit rating and -- without
additional shoring up of their capital base, preferably by a strategic buyer with
substantial capacity -- Moody's would likely downgrade Lehman's long-term credit
rating. Moody's cited the market's "crisis of confidence" concern with Lehman to
suggest that ratings downgrades could come quickly unless there was swift progress
to shoring up Lehman's capital base. There are several possible implications of a
Lehman downgrade:
1. Lehman would have to post collateral to many of its over-the-counter derivative
counterparties, which could put further strain on its funding needs. One dealer
estimates that a one notch downgrade of Lehman could require them to post $2.9
billion of collateral, and a 2 notch downgrade could require $4.4 billion of collateral.
2. In addition, funding from money funds are likely to be adversely impacted by a
ratings downgrade. We've spoken with several large money funds since Lehman’s
preannouncement and have received somewhat mixed reports in terms of new shifts
in providing funding to Lehman. Of the funds that we have spoken with thus far, all
but one were continuing to roll overnight repo for steady amounts. One fund did
not roll about $1.5 billion in overnight positions for Treasury and agency-MBS repo.
They stressed that they saw negligible risk in maintaining these positions, but found
it easiest to eliminate the exposure in the face of inquiries from investors and senior
management. Another fund, which had maintained small overnight unsecured
positions did not roll these yesterday. Importantly, Fidelity, the largest fund
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154787
FRB to LEH Examiner 001136
complex, stressed that while they hadn't made any significant shifts yet today, they
were still in the process of making decisions and would follow up with us later.
As background, over recent months, funds have gradually reduced their exposures
to Lehman, by reducing or eliminating unsecured positions, by reducing the tenors
and amounts of secured positions, and in some cases narrowing the types of
collateral accepted for secured lending. In many cases, the only remaining
exposures were overnight repo for traditional (Fed OMO-eligible) collateral.
As such, some believe that Lehman is currently in a distressed sale situation, and it
is not completely clear who would or could buy the firm. Some suggest that Lehman
Brothers’ most viable option is to find a highly rated, deep-pocketed buyer. Some
suggest that this might mean it could be a large bank, though they note that two of
the largest U.S. banks may not currently have the capacity to acquire Lehman and
its assets. JPMorgan is still digesting Bear Stearns and Bank of America is still
working through their Countrywide acquisition. Thus, some have suggested that a
consortium of banks could take on this role. Other potential candidates are
sovereign wealth funds or private equity firms. However, some suggest that the size
of a potential capital injection may be large enough to require some type of federal
approval for a sovereign fund to inject capital, which would lengthen the duration of
the process and may deter some potential suitors.
In many ways, if Lehman were to fail, it would be a much more complex proposition
to unwind their positions than it would have been to unwind the positions held by
Bear Stearns. At the end of 2007, Lehman's net positions in derivatives measured
approximately $54 billion, or nearly twice the size of Bear Stearns at that time.
While Lehman's management has taken significant steps to reduce these positions
and de-risk Lehman's balance sheets, it is likely that a failure by Lehman would be
significant. With sentiment towards Lehman appearing to shift, market participants
have also started to discuss the implications for other broker dealers and the
financial system as a whole. The CDS term structures of other broker dealers have
inverted further. Assuming recovery values of 40%, the market is placing a 5%
probability that Morgan Stanley defaults in the next year and a 7% probability that
Merrill Lynch defaults.
In addition, some market participants suggest that a further deterioration in risk
sentiment due to a worst-case scenario with Lehman Brothers could have an impact
on the risk positions of hedge funds. As we noted yesterday, this may push more
hedge funds towards their NAV triggers. Hedge funds’ poor performance and
investor redemptions are also behind some recent concerns regarding the strength of
Goldman Sachs’ prime brokerage business. Several market participants have
speculated that the prime brokerage business may be suffering as a result of the
closure of a significant number of clearing accounts, and that these accounts may
be under-margined, requiring Goldman to make up the difference. Goldman’s share
price is 3 percent lower on the session and their CDS spreads have widened 10 basis
points to a level of 182 basis points.
Pressures in the funding markets Redacted Materials
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154788
FRB to LEH Examiner 001137
markets to persist in coming months. Spreads 6-months forward and beyond have
also risen notably over the intermeeting period.
Rates in collateralized funding markets Redacted Materials
Jason Miu
Markets Group
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(212) 720-6860
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154789
FRB to LEH Examiner 001138
TAB 41
TAB 42
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Jamie.McAndrews@ny.frb.org
Patrick Parkinson; Jeff Stehm
Fw: Default Management Group 9 Sep 2008.doc
09/11/2008 02:06 PM
Default Management Group Sep 2008.doc
For the meeting you are listening in on.
Jamie
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld (www.BlackBerry.net)
----- Original Message ----From: Jamie McAndrews
Sent: 09/11/2008 02:01 PM EDT
To: Tobias Adrian
Cc: Beverly Hirtle; Michael Schussler
Subject: Re: Default Management Group 9 Sep 2008.doc
Some edits:
(See attached file: Default Management Group Sep 2008.doc)
Tobias
Adrian/NY/FRS
To
09/11/2008 01:40
PM
Jamie McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
Default Management Group 9 Sep
2008.doc
[attachment "Default Management Group 9 Sep 2008.doc" deleted by Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS]
- Default Management Group Sep 2008.doc
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154818
FRB to LEH Examiner 001167
Lehman Default Management Group
Purpose:
Convene a representative group of Lehman counterparties and creditors to make plans in
the event of a bankruptcy filing by Lehman.
Under the auspices of the FRBNY, the group would initially consist of trading partners
who trade contracts that are resolved outside the bankruptcy process, such as derivatives,
swaps, QFCs, repos, commodities futures, etc. One set of firms that meet this definition
would be all member firms of the CRMPG. The key is that firms conduct a “critical
mass” of trades with Lehman, so that the close out of other trades would not confer large
external costs on the market.
The purpose of the group is to reach a public agreement by the members of the group to
hold off on fully exercising their contractual rights to close out their trades with the
defaulting counterparty. Specific potential agreements could include an agreement to
establish a process to net down all exposures versus the defaulting counterparty and an
agreement to use a common valuation for marking positions after the bankruptcy filing.
Idea: There are three possibilities for the weekend: 1) single institution taking over, 2)
consortium taking over, 3) bankruptcy.
Unless we have credible bankruptcy plan our negotiating position for limiting the subsidy
in the liquidation consortium option will be weak. Consequently, planning for a
bankruptcy will reduce some of the expected costs of bankruptcy and externalities
imposed on the financial system as a whole, and make it a more viable alternative.
Timing: Contingent on the anticipated bankruptcy filing by Lehman, on Friday evening,
after the markets have closed, issue invitations to the chief risk officers of the member
firms. The meeting would convene at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday at the FRBNY, and continue
through to Sunday evening.
Membership: Because the focus is primarily on the trading partners of Lehman, the
membership will be broadly representative of the major financial counterparties of
Lehman, including derivatives, futures, swaps, commodities, and repo counterparties. In
addition, major regulators, both domestic and foreign, will be informed of the activity of
the group.
A second, larger, group could be convened on the day of the bankruptcy, which would
consist of all major creditors of the defaulting party.
Outcome: A public statement of the framework to which the members would have
agreed. To be issued on Sunday evening.
Antitrust concerns: There is a concern that the group could engage in illegal price
setting or other restraints of trade. To prevent this, the group should be open and it
should rely on legal advice to avoid such agreements.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154819
FRB to LEH Examiner 001168
Activities of the group: During the weekend, the group would review their options for
agreement on netting offsetting agreements, reaching common valuations for contracts
post-bankruptcy, and achieving a framework for addressing all the issues that will arise
after the bankruptcy filing. The Fed’s role would be to be a neutral party that could assist
the group in communicating to the public, and provide “cover” for the membership of the
group (many excluded parties will feel that they are unfairly excluded).
Pros and Cons:
-Antitrust concerns; could include an attorney from the DOJ antitrust division
-Improved the Fed bargaining position for a resolution outside of bankruptcy
-Improved outcomes if bankruptcy were to occur.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154820
FRB to LEH Examiner 001169
TAB 43
TAB 44
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Coryann Stefansson
Deborah P Bailey
Fw: LFI Counterparty Credit Risk Exposure to LEH
09/12/2008 04:05 PM
Coryann S. Stefansson
Associate Director
Bank Supervision and Regulation
Board of Governors
Office
Cell Number
Assistant - Ms. Kimberly Jensik
Kim.Jensik@frb.gov
Office Number
----- Forwarded by Coryann Stefansson/BOARD/FRS on 09/12/2008 04:05 PM ----Dianne Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS
To
BSR LFIC, Jeanmarie Davis/NY/FRS@FRS, John Ricketti/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven J
Manzari/NY/FRS@FRS, Caroline Frawley/NY/FRS@FRS, Deborah P
Bailey/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Brandon Hall/NY/FRS@FRS, Kyle Grieser/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven
Mirsky/NY/FRS@FRS
09/11/2008 04:15 PM
Subject
LFI Counterparty Credit Risk Exposure to LEH
Please find the first of two distributions outlining the LFIs exposure to LEH. The matrix of below (prepared by
Brandon Hall of the counterparty credit risk) outlines select LFIs counterparty credit risk exposure to LEH. As
expected, risk coordinators have regular conversations with the LFIs regarding their exposures to financial firms so
the data were obtained through normal channels with in many cases the LFIs raising the topic to the relevant CPC
team. We've elected to keep this distribution small (that is not include all of the CPC teams) in an effort not to
promote new inquiries / specifical requests of the teams to the firms. In a follow-up message, Brandon will share a
table that captures additional exposures the LFIs may have to LEH (e.g. committed lines, settlement lines, etc.) We
welcome any questions you may have regarding the data collected.
An updated snapshot of LFI CCR exposures (on potential and current exposure bases) to Lehman Brothers, as well
as institutional commentary, is provided below.
Exposure Update
Barclays, Citigroup, and UBS have demonstrated an upward trend in potential exposure to Lehman since 2Q08.
Meanwhile, risk appetite has trended downward at Credit Suisse, JPMC, BAC, and Deutsche.
Institutional Commentary
Barclays (As of 9/11/08)
Barclays has been following a business-as-usual strategy with Lehman, albeit with a more cautious approach to future
business. All assignments and large/structured trades must be approved on an individual basis by Credit.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155141
FRB to LEH Examiner 001490
Overall, Barclays exposure to Lehman has increased to $2.3B (from $2.2B on July 11, 2007) despite the total financing
limit (TFL) decreasing ~$80MM to $3.1B. The decrease in TFL is driven exclusively by a decrease in primary (lending)
exposure from a decrease in Bond Holding (from $172 million to $141 million). There are currently no reported
collateral disputes outstanding with Lehman. Total TFL is a numerical limit of the bank's credit risk appetite to a
particular entity.
Citigroup (As of 9/10/08)
Previously, Citi had requested that Lehman leave $2B on deposit to self-fund some of its intra-day clearing lines. On
Monday, Citi and Lehman signed a formal agreement which gives Citi the right to offset any overdraft exposure against
this deposit. Citi has informed Lehman that it will not extend any intra-day exposure beyond the size of this deposit.
At the end of yesterday, Lehman added to the deposit, increasing it to $2.7B. Yesterday, Citi approved (at the highest
levels) an additional $500MM above the $2.7B in order to release a payment to CLS. The approval was based on Citi's
confidence in CLS and the concern that holding this payment could be disruptive to an orderly settlement.
Citi continues to trade normally with Lehman. Citi has seen a pick-up in novation activity but continues to accept
these. There where no notable collateral disputes with Lehman.
Total Exposure to Lehman is $3.4B consisting of:
- $2.6B potential exposure ($207MM current exposure) from trading across 10 ISDA agreements
- $610MM in direct loans (offset by $490MM in CDS)
- $50MM in un-drawn contingent lines
Citi also has $3.2B in FX settlement limits for Lehman.
Credit Suisse (As of 9/11/08)
The firm has concerns about Lehman given the dramatic increase in CDS spreads and the declining share price. CS
noted combined derivatives and FX MTM exposure of approximately $130MM. This includes approximately $70MM
due to collateral not yet received and $5MM in disputes.
The firm reported seeing a significant influx of requests for parties looking to novate away from Lehman. Novation
requests have been seen across all desks, with particular concentration in FX trades. A few requests have been
declined over the last two days when deemed outside the normal course of business. The firm is currently undertaking
discussions to determine policy for what novations to accept and not.
CRM has increased monitoring on hedge funds R3 and GLG. Lehman Brothers has invested in R3’s new debt
strategies fund, which purchased $5B in assets from Lehman in June.
Deutsche Bank (As of 8/21/08)
As of August 21st, DB does not have any credit exposure to Lehman Brothers. In fact, DB owes Lehman around $2.1B
on derivative trades, of which DB has posted to Lehman $2.0B in cash and Treasuries.
As of last week’s meeting with CRM, DB has not changed its stance in that it will continue to watch Lehman very
carefully, but is not prepared to curtail trading with Lehman at this time.
JPMC (As of 9/10/08)
JPMC has secured an additional $3B in O/N collateral since yesterday from Lehman, and that is posted under a lien
agreement in place with the firm. The collateral consisted of $1B in cash posted yesterday and $2B in JPMC money
market fund investments made by Lehman. Today Lehman asked to substitute in some securities and JPMC risk
executives are considering it. JPMC was concerned about not being in a position to meet calls on behalf of Lehman
and so requested the additional coverage. Lehman met that request in addition to covering roughly $500MM in
collateral disputes outstanding. To the extent JPMC determines the disputes are not warranted they may return
collateral to Lehman but for now Lehman agreed to cover them.
3rd party haircuts are up substantially although no more details were offered other than confirmation one large
investor has doubled their haircuts (from 8% to 16/20%). If tri-party investors increase haircuts its will force Lehman
to reduce the size of its book.
A one notch ratings agency downgrade would require Lehman to post an additional $2B in collateral (Lehman's
estimate) and a two notch downgrade approximately $5B in collateral across all counterparties. They are concerned
that the rating agencies, particularly S&P, are ready to act and may not be satisifed by the proposed asset sales and
real estate spin.
Novation activity has picked up on Lehman throughout the day but it is still too early to determine if the underlying
exposures are sizable. JPMC is very sensitive to other firms attempting to move entire derivative books over without
telling JPMC upfront and so may reserve the right to decline the novation requests if they feel that is the case.
JPMC reiterated, as it has in the past, that it does not want to be the first to stop trading, cut lines, and/or run from
Lehman and are mindful of the implications of such a decision. However, they did state that they do not want to be
the last one to make that decision and so will remain vigilant concerning (a) prime brokerage onboarding activity at
JPMC, (b) activities of other major counterparties, and (c) behavior of tri-party investors.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155142
FRB to LEH Examiner 001491
UBS (As of 9/9/08)
As of 9/9/08, UBS's posture toward Lehman is business as usual. Traders were instructed to continue dealing with
Lehman over the next 24 hours. Lines will not be cut and the name will not be turned down. Traders were instructed
to hedge (correlated) exposure where possible. UBS is most concerned with the sensitivity in the derivatives book and
correlation risk (assets held such as CRE/CMBS that may deteriorate if Lehman deteriorates further).
UBS is monitoring the Lehman PB business and noted that one hedge fund is planning on moving away from Lehman
to UBS. UBS will continue to monitor the PB business and will let us know if other HF's begin to move away from
Lehman. UBS is also reviewing legal contracts, determining which Lehman entities they are exposed to and running
various stress scenarios on current exposures.
UBS's exposure to Lehman is as follows:
1. OTC derivatives: $1B MTM / Net of Collateral: $15MM MTM
2. Uncollateralized OTC derivatives: ~$0
3. Close-out exposure: $1.2B
4. Securities Borrowing/Lending
UBS has lent out $4.7B in securities to Lehman entities (105% collateralized)
UBS has borrowed $900MM in securities from Lehman entities (collateralized)
Repo: UBS has cash in of around $400MM and cash out of around $300MM.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155143
FRB to LEH Examiner 001492
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Coryann Stefansson
Deborah P Bailey
Fw: LFI Key Credit Risk Exposures to LEH - COB Update
09/11/2008 06:36 PM
Coryann S. Stefansson
Associate Director
Bank Supervision and Regulation
Board of Governors
Office
Cell Number
Assistant - Ms. Kimberly Jensik
Kim.Jensik@frb.gov
Office Number
----- Forwarded by Coryann Stefansson/BOARD/FRS on 09/11/2008 06:34 PM ----Brandon Hall/NY/FRS@FRS
To
Dianne Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS, BSR LFIC, Caroline Frawley/NY/FRS@FRS, Clinton
Lively/NY/FRS@FRS, Deborah P Bailey/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Jeanmarie
Davis/NY/FRS@FRS, John Ricketti/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven J Manzari/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Steven Mirsky/NY/FRS@FRS, Kyle Grieser/NY/FRS@FRS, William
Hallacy/NY/FRS@FRS
09/11/2008 06:18 PM
Subject
Fw: LFI Key Credit Risk Exposures to LEH - COB Update
As per Dianne's message below, the table following here captures LFI key credit risk exposures to LEH including
Lending and Settlement alongside Trading. Data is sorted by Trading Potential Exposure.
Please note that in the body of the forwarded message below, updated commentary has been added to the Barclays
note. In addition, the "LFI Counterparty Exposures to LEH" table has undergone slight revisions - including the
addition of BNPP data - and should be treated as the most current version available.
____________________________________
Brandon J. Hall
Counterparty Credit Risk Monitoring & Analysis
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty St. | New York, NY 10045
----- Forwarded by Brandon Hall/NY/FRS on 09/11/2008 05:59 PM ----Dianne Dobbeck/NY/FRS
To
BSR LFIC, Jeanmarie Davis/NY/FRS@FRS, John Ricketti/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven J
Manzari/NY/FRS@FRS, Caroline Frawley/NY/FRS@FRS, Deborah P
Bailey/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Brandon Hall/NY/FRS@FRS, Kyle Grieser/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven
09/11/2008 04:18 PM
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155144
FRB to LEH Examiner 001493
Mirsky/NY/FRS@FRS
Subject
LFI Counterparty Credit Risk Exposure to LEH
Please find the first of two distributions outlining the LFIs exposure to LEH. The matrix of below (prepared by
Brandon Hall of the counterparty credit risk) outlines select LFIs counterparty credit risk exposure to LEH. As
expected, risk coordinators have regular conversations with the LFIs regarding their exposures to financial firms so
the data were obtained through normal channels with in many cases the LFIs raising the topic to the relevant CPC
team. We've elected to keep this distribution small (that is not include all of the CPC teams) in an effort not to
promote new inquiries / specifical requests of the teams to the firms. In a follow-up message, Brandon will share a
table that captures additional exposures the LFIs may have to LEH (e.g. committed lines, settlement lines, etc.) We
welcome any questions you may have regarding the data collected.
An updated snapshot of LFI CCR exposures (on potential and current exposure bases) to Lehman Brothers, as well as
institutional commentary, is provided below.
Exposure Update
Barclays, Citigroup, and UBS have demonstrated an upward trend in potential exposure to Lehman since 2Q08.
Meanwhile, risk appetite has trended downward at Credit Suisse, JPMC, BAC, and Deutsche.
Institutional Commentary
Barclays (As of 9/11/08)
Barclays has been following a business-as-usual strategy with Lehman, albeit with a more cautious approach to future
business. Barclays has not stopped doing business with LEH but the firm continues to actively monitor its exposure to
LEH on an intra-day basis. All assignments and large/structured trades must be approved on an individual basis by
Credit.
The firm's main concern right now is intra-day settlement risk generated from "give ups" ("give ups" refer to
arrangements common in FX business whereby a counterparty transfers its trade with Barclays to another firm, and
Barclays must settle with the other firm. In this situation, Barclays does not know of this settlement risk with an
alternative counterparty until COB. "Give ups" are slightly different than novations, which are formerly papered and
assigned.). Today, Barclays considered requesting that clients notify the firm real time of any "give ups", so that
Barclays can better monitor its intra-day exposure to counterparties such as Lehman. However, the firm ultimately
decided against this change in strategy given the potential adverse reputational impact.
Overall, Barclays exposure to Lehman has increased to $2.3B (from $2.2B on July 11, 2007) despite the total financing
limit (TFL) decreasing ~$80MM to $3.1B. The decrease in TFL is driven exclusively by a decrease in primary (lending)
exposure from a decrease in Bond Holding (from $172 million to $141 million). There are currently no reported
collateral disputes outstanding with Lehman. Total TFL is a numerical limit of the bank's credit risk appetite to a
particular entity.
Citigroup (As of 9/10/08)
Previously, Citi had requested that Lehman leave $2B on deposit to self-fund some of its intra-day clearing lines. On
Monday, Citi and Lehman signed a formal agreement which gives Citi the right to offset any overdraft exposure against
this deposit. Citi has informed Lehman that it will not extend any intra-day exposure beyond the size of this deposit.
At the end of yesterday, Lehman added to the deposit, increasing it to $2.7B. Yesterday, Citi approved (at the highest
levels) an additional $500MM above the $2.7B in order to release a payment to CLS. The approval was based on Citi's
confidence in CLS and the concern that holding this payment could be disruptive to an orderly settlement.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155145
FRB to LEH Examiner 001494
Citi continues to trade normally with Lehman. Citi has seen a pick-up in novation activity but continues to accept
these. There where no notable collateral disputes with Lehman.
Total Exposure to Lehman is $3.4B consisting of:
- $2.6B potential exposure ($207MM current exposure) from trading across 10 ISDA agreements
- $610MM in direct loans (offset by $490MM in CDS)
- $50MM in un-drawn contingent lines
Citi also has $3.2B in FX settlement limits for Lehman.
Credit Suisse (As of 9/11/08)
The firm has concerns about Lehman given the dramatic increase in CDS spreads and the declining share price. CS
noted combined derivatives and FX MTM exposure of approximately $130MM. This includes approximately $70MM
due to collateral not yet received and $5MM in disputes.
The firm reported seeing a significant influx of requests for parties looking to novate away from Lehman. Novation
requests have been seen across all desks, with particular concentration in FX trades. A few requests have been
declined over the last two days when deemed outside the normal course of business. The firm is currently undertaking
discussions to determine policy for what novations to accept and not.
CRM has increased monitoring on hedge funds R3 and GLG. Lehman Brothers has invested in R3’s new debt
strategies fund, which purchased $5B in assets from Lehman in June.
Deutsche Bank (As of 8/21/08)
As of August 21st, DB does not have any credit exposure to Lehman Brothers. In fact, DB owes Lehman around $2.1B
on derivative trades, of which DB has posted to Lehman $2.0B in cash and Treasuries.
As of last week’s meeting with CRM, DB has not changed its stance in that it will continue to watch Lehman very
carefully, but is not prepared to curtail trading with Lehman at this time.
JPMC (As of 9/10/08)
JPMC has secured an additional $3B in O/N collateral since yesterday from Lehman, and that is posted under a lien
agreement in place with the firm. The collateral consisted of $1B in cash posted yesterday and $2B in JPMC money
market fund investments made by Lehman. Today Lehman asked to substitute in some securities and JPMC risk
executives are considering it. JPMC was concerned about not being in a position to meet calls on behalf of Lehman
and so requested the additional coverage. Lehman met that request in addition to covering roughly $500MM in
collateral disputes outstanding. To the extent JPMC determines the disputes are not warranted they may return
collateral to Lehman but for now Lehman agreed to cover them.
3rd party haircuts are up substantially although no more details were offered other than confirmation one large
investor has doubled their haircuts (from 8% to 16/20%). If tri-party investors increase haircuts its will force Lehman
to reduce the size of its book.
A one notch ratings agency downgrade would require Lehman to post an additional $2B in collateral (Lehman's
estimate) and a two notch downgrade approximately $5B in collateral across all counterparties. They are concerned
that the rating agencies, particularly S&P, are ready to act and may not be satisifed by the proposed asset sales and
real estate spin.
Novation activity has picked up on Lehman throughout the day but it is still too early to determine if the underlying
exposures are sizable. JPMC is very sensitive to other firms attempting to move entire derivative books over without
telling JPMC upfront and so may reserve the right to decline the novation requests if they feel that is the case.
JPMC reiterated, as it has in the past, that it does not want to be the first to stop trading, cut lines, and/or run from
Lehman and are mindful of the implications of such a decision. However, they did state that they do not want to be
the last one to make that decision and so will remain vigilant concerning (a) prime brokerage onboarding activity at
JPMC, (b) activities of other major counterparties, and (c) behavior of tri-party investors.
UBS (As of 9/9/08)
As of 9/9/08, UBS's posture toward Lehman is business as usual. Traders were instructed to continue dealing with
Lehman over the next 24 hours. Lines will not be cut and the name will not be turned down. Traders were instructed
to hedge (correlated) exposure where possible. UBS is most concerned with the sensitivity in the derivatives book and
correlation risk (assets held such as CRE/CMBS that may deteriorate if Lehman deteriorates further).
UBS is monitoring the Lehman PB business and noted that one hedge fund is planning on moving away from Lehman
to UBS. UBS will continue to monitor the PB business and will let us know if other HF's begin to move away from
Lehman. UBS is also reviewing legal contracts, determining which Lehman entities they are exposed to and running
various stress scenarios on current exposures.
UBS's exposure to Lehman is as follows:
1. OTC derivatives: $1B MTM / Net of Collateral: $15MM MTM
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155146
FRB to LEH Examiner 001495
2. Uncollateralized OTC derivatives: ~$0
3. Close-out exposure: $1.2B
4. Securities Borrowing/Lending
UBS has lent out $4.7B in securities to Lehman entities (105% collateralized)
UBS has borrowed $900MM in securities from Lehman entities (collateralized)
Repo: UBS has cash in of around $400MM and cash out of around $300MM.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155147
FRB to LEH Examiner 001496
TAB 45
TAB 46
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Ada Li
Jeff Stehm; Patrick M Parkinson; Pat White; Jeffrey Marquardt
Theodore Lubke; Wendy Ng
Fw: Bankruptcy doc
09/12/2008 09:15 AM
Decision to file Bankruptcy 4.doc
FYI --also for the 9 AM meeting.
Thanks,
Ada Li
Federal Reserve Bank
Tel: 212-720-6468
Ada.Li@ny.frb.org
----- Forwarded by Ada Li/NY/FRS on 09/12/2008 09:15 AM ----Lily Tham/NY/FRS
To
09/12/2008 01:28 AM
Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Michael Schussler/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven
Pesek/NY/FRS@FRS, Wendy Ng/NY/FRS, Ada
Li/NY/FRS, Shari Ben-Haim/NY/FRS@FRS,
mcgowant@sec.gov
Subject
Bankruptcy doc
Hi, Theo,
Attached is the latest version Decision to File Bankruptcy document prepared by
Tom McGovan and Michael Schussler. I'll leave it to you to pass on to the broader
mailing list, as appropriate.
I'll be in the office around 8:30am tomorrow. Thanks!
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154847
FRB to LEH Examiner 001196
Highly Confidential
Decision to file Bankruptcy
Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (“Lehman”) would need to resolve a number of complex
issues before electing to file for bankruptcy protection. The issues include (1) which entities are
eligible for bankruptcy protection; (2) which entities are subject to customer claims that would
be effectively stayed by a bankruptcy filing; (3) would regulatory interests be inconsistent with
management’s reasons for seeking bankruptcy protection; (4) when should a filing take place.
The decision by the board to seek bankruptcy protection for the holding company does
not necessarily imply that each subsidiary also will be subject to the bankruptcy proceeding. We
would expect that many of Lehman’s material affiliates would not seek bankruptcy protection.
The applicable authority for initiating insolvency proceedings for these affiliates is described
below.
Timing of Bankruptcy Filing
One option would be to urge Lehman to file mid-afternoon (such as Sunday before 6:00
p.m.) to provide markets, clearing entities, and counterparties time to react to the filing.
However, it may be less disruptive to the tri-party repo market if a filing delayed until after the
morning unwind. In contrast, Lehman may have an interest to file at a different time even
though filing at that time may be more disruptive to the markets. Our expectation is that the firm
would work with regulators to file for bankruptcy at such a time that would minimize disruption
to the markets.
U.S. Depository Institutions
With respect Lehman’s thrift and ILC, only the chartering authorities or the FDIC have
authority to place the entities into receivership or into other insolvency proceedings. Neither the
thrift nor the ILC can be subject of a voluntary or involuntary insolvency proceeding. Regulators
can monitor the liquidation of the holding company and other entities that are in bankruptcy as
well as the operations of the thrift and ILC to determine what steps may be appropriate if those
firms face financial or operational difficulties.
ILC Thrift -
Lehman Brothers Commercial Bank
Lehman Brothers Bank, FSB
U.S. Registered Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors
If Lehman filed for bankruptcy, assuming the broker-dealer remains in compliance with
applicable regulatory requirements, the SEC would work towards ensuring that the broker-dealer
self-liquidate and not be part of a formal insolvency proceeding. With respect to the U.S.
registered brokers, a broker-dealer with “customers” would not be eligible for Chapter 11
(Reorganization). Accordingly, Lehman Brothers, Inc. and Neuberger Berman LLC. would not
be eligible to be included in a Chapter 11 reorganization. Further, as a policy matter, the SEC
would require that Lehman Brothers Inc. be liquidated under SIPA, if a formal liquidation was
appropriate. Unless the broker-dealer was not in compliance with the financial responsibility
rules, the preference would be that Lehman Brothers Inc. self-liquidate under the supervision of
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154848
1
FRB to LEH Examiner 001197
Highly Confidential
the SEC, the CFTC, and self-regulatory organizations. We note that Lehman Brothers, Inc. has
two significant subsidiaries, a derivatives affiliate and a commercial paper dealer. Those entities
would likely be liquidated separately from the broker-dealer.
Neuberger Berman also owns a registered investment advisor that would be eligible for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy; however, a Chapter 11 filing would likely cause assignment of advisory
contract and change of control regulatory issues for the advisor.
Lehman Brothers OTC Derivatives Dealer, Inc., a registered limited purpose brokerdealer, may be a “stockbroker” under the bankruptcy code and would therefore not be eligible to
be reorganized under Chapter 11. The OTC derivatives dealer is not a member of SIPC and
would not be liquidated under SIPA.
Other Derivative Dealers and Material Unregistered Affiliates
There is a great deal of uncertainty regarding how unregistered Lehman affiliates would
be liquidated. Lehman owns a number of unregistered derivatives dealers, such as Lehman
Special Financing, Inc., and other material entities such as Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc.
These entities are eligible for Chapter 11 and Chapter 7 bankruptcy. However, the holding
company may elect not to seek bankruptcy protection for these firms, especially if these firms
remain sufficiently capitalized and liquid. The derivatives dealers also may also meet the
definition of a “stockbroker” under the bankruptcy code and therefore only be eligible for
liquidation under Chapter 7. Unregistered affiliates include ALI, Lehman Brothers Commercial
Corporation, Lehman Brothers Derivatives Products, Lehman Brothers OTC Derivatives, and
LB1 Group.
Foreign Subsidiaries
Lehman owns a number of foreign entities, some of which are registered as banks or
securities firms in their respective foreign jurisdictions. These entities would be subject to
foreign bankruptcy regimes. At the discretion of the appropriate local authorities, their
proceedings could be handled separately or as part of a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding. Key foreign
entities are Lehman Brothers Bankhaus, AG (German bank - BaFin), Lehman Brothers
International Europe (U.K. broker-dealer – U.K. FSA), Lehman Brothers Europe LTD. (U.K.
FSA), Lehman Brothers Finance SA (unregistered), Lehman Brothers Japan (broker-dealer,
Japan FSA), Lehman Brothers Luxembourg SA (unregistered), and Lehman Brothers Treasury
Co. BV (unregistered).
Actions by U.S. Regulators upon Lehman Bankruptcy Filing
Supervisors would need to review whether to take any action in response to a bankruptcy
filing by Lehman. Further, supervisors would monitor the formal and informal self-liquidations
of Lehman and its affiliates to determine whether regulatory action should be taken. Particular
events which may require supervisors to reconsider their decisions would include actions taken
by clearing houses and clearing banks, decisions by foreign regulators, a determination that a
bank or broker-dealer is no longer in compliance with applicable regulatory requirements.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154849
2
FRB to LEH Examiner 001198
Highly Confidential
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”)
Generally, all U.S. registered broker-dealers are members of the Securities Investor
Protection Corporation (“SIPC”). SIPC may seek to begin a SIPA proceeding if any member of
SIPC has failed or is in danger of failing to meet its obligations to customers, and the brokerdealer
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
is insolvent;
subject to a proceeding pending in any court or before any agency of the United
States of any State in which a receiver, trustee, or liquidator has been appointed;
is not in compliance with applicable SEC or self-regulatory organization financial
responsibility rules or hypothecation of customers’ securities; or
is unable to make such computation as may be necessary to establish compliance
with those financial responsibility or hypothecation rules.
The broker-dealer has the ability to consent or object to the application to place the firm
in a SIPA proceeding. If the broker-dealer objects, the application shall be heard three business
days after the date the application is filed, or at such other time as the court may determine
taking into consideration the urgency which the circumstances require. If the broker-dealer does
not consent to the SIPA liquidation, SIPC will look to SEC or FINRA examiners to demonstrate
that the firm is not in compliance, or is unable to demonstrate compliance, with the applicable
financial responsibility rules. In the event of a SIPA proceeding for a large broker-dealer, the
court would appoint a person specified by SIPC to serve as the trustee to administer the
liquidation.
Generally, a “customer” is defined in SIPA as a person who has a claim on account of
securities received, acquired, or held by the debtor in the ordinary course of its business as a
broker-dealer from or for the securities accounts of such person for safekeeping, with a view to
sale, to cover consummated sales, pursuant to purchases, as collateral security, or for purposes of
effecting transfer. SIPC has taken the position that counterparties to repurchase transactions and
securities lending are not customers under SIPA.
A SIPA liquidation would likely proceed in a similar manner as a self-liquidation. The
trustee would look to complete a bulk transfer of securities accounts to a solvent broker-dealer as
quickly as possible. However, even after the trustee has completed returning all customer
property, a SIPC liquidation may continue as the trustee seeks to collect amounts owed to the
broker-dealer or SIPC
.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154850
3
FRB to LEH Examiner 001199
TAB 47
TAB 48
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Kevin Warsh
JNellie Liang
Re:
09/12/2008 03:21 PM
Thx nellie for encouragement. I hope we dont protect anything!
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
ź JNellie Liang
----- Original Message -----
From: JNellie Liang
Sent: 09/12/2008 02:51 PM EDT
To: Kevin Warsh
Gov Warsh,
I know lots of balls in the air, but hope we don't have to protect
Lehman's sub debt holders.
Nellie
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154863
FRB to LEH Examiner 001212
TAB 49
TAB 50
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Chairman
B
k
Kevin Warsh
Donald L Kohn
Re: RB presidents
09/12/2008 05:12 PM
We covered all the bases. Thanks for your help.
ź Kevin Warsh/BOARD/FRS
Kevin
Warsh/BOARD/FRS
09/12/2008 05:11 PM
To
Chairman
BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Donald L
Bernanke
Kohn/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
Subject
Re: RB presidents
Spoke with sandy, gary, tom -- they are all fine. Thx
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
ź Chairman Bernanke
----- Original Message -----
From: Chairman Bernanke
Sent:
:39 PM EDT
To: Donald Kohn
Cc: Kevin Warsh
Subject: Re: RB presidents
Talked to Sandy but Kevin had reached her first. Kevin, did you talk to any other
presidents?
ź Donald L Kohn/BOARD/FRS
Donald L
Kohn/BOARD/FRS
To
cc
09/12/2008 04:23 PM
Subject
Chairman
Bernanke
BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Kevin Warsh/BOARD/FRS@Board
Re: RB presidents
talked to Lockhart, Rosengren, Fisher. All seemed fine with LEH briefing, though I
was quized closely by Fisher on the appetite for Fed/Gov't involvement beyond
liquidity provision. I told him strong predilection against by both Treas. and Fed-were exploring the bankruptcy option as well asways of involving private sector in
wind down outside of bankruptcy--., but could give no 100% guarantees on what
perception of situation would be Sunday evening. Only discussion on policy was with
Fisher, who was fine with B; had some preference for a minor tweak in language,
but couldn't remember what it was and didn't have statment in front of him. Brian
later told me Fisher was ok with B language.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154870
FRB to LEH Examiner 001219
ź Chairman Bernanke
BOARD/FRS
Chairman
Bernanke BOARD/FRS
Donald L Kohn/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
09/12/2008 02:04 PM
To
Kevin Warsh/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Subject
RB presidents
I briefed Plosser and Evans on LEH and also discussed Material
comfortable both with LEH developments Redacted Material
Redacted
.
Both are
Redacted Material
I had previously talked to Lacker and Bullard.
I will speak to Yellen later this afternoon ( Redacte
d
Material
I have briefed both Govs Duke and Kroszner on LEH and discussed Material
with them briefly.
Redacted
I am willing and able to make additional FOMC calls if needed.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154871
FRB to LEH Examiner 001220
TAB 51
TAB 52
TAB 53
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Mark.VanDerWeide@frb.gov
Lucinda.Brickler@ny.frb.org
Chris McCurdy; Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
Re: triparty repo thoughts for this weekend
09/13/2008 10:53 AM
A few comments/questions. Since your paper last night was probably 1-2
steps behind TFG, my comments this morning are probably 3-4 steps behind.
Option 1: need to discuss whether this fits within existing PDCF
authorization or would need to be new 13(3)/10B loan (like the Bear March
14 loan).
Option 2: need to understand factually how the JPMC/FRBNY sharing would
work and how the "shell" works. Some concern about the nature of the legal
entity to which the FRBNY would have credit exposure.
Option 4:
need to better understand how this credit facility would work.
Mark (202-452-2263)
Lucinda.Brickler@
ny.frb.org
To
09/12/2008 11:04
PM
Patrick.M.Parkinson@frb.gov
cc
"Donald Kohn"
<Donald.L.Kohn@frb.gov>, "Kevin
Warsh" <Kevin.Warsh@frb.gov>, "Mark
VanDerWeide"
<Mark.VanDerWeide@frb.gov>, "Chris
McCurdy" <Chris.McCurdy@ny.frb.org>
Subject
Re: triparty repo thoughts for this
weekend
Pat
Thanks.
I think there has been much concern raised about maintaining the
rate and perhaps also with retaining capacity to expand the existing
programs if needed. There has also not been much appetite over the past few
days for ideas that involve extending public support beyond the existing
programs. These issues and speculation about how bankruptcy would likely
unfold are the drivers of this thinking.
The situation is fluid, however. The notes I have been sending are intended
to test ideas and generate dialog. They seem consistently one or more
steps behind TFG. So let's see how the situation evolves over the weekend
and raise the appropriate concerns and recommendations. It's good that
you'll be here. Safe travels.
Lucinda
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155902
FRB to LEH Examiner 002251
----- Original Message ----From: Patrick M Parkinson
Sent: 09/12/2008 08:49 PM EDT
To: Lucinda Brickler
Cc: Chris McCurdy; Mark VanDerWeide; Donald Kohn; Kevin Warsh
Subject: Re: triparty repo thoughts for this weekend
Lucinda,
I have attached some comments, but I am not sure they will be helpful. I'm
forced to guess why plans have changed. I assume the fundamental problem
is that even after the parent files for bankruptcy, the SEC wants the b/d
to live on and does not want us grabbing tri-party collateral and paying
off investors? And/or that we don't want to take OMO collateral because we
can't rehypothecate and funds rate would go to zero?
In any event, this now looks to me like a godawful mess.
Pat
[attachment "triparty Cheat Sheet 9 12-15 parkinson comments.doc" deleted
by Lucinda M Brickler/NY/FRS]
Lucinda M
Brickler/NY/FRS@F
RS
To
Sandy.Krieger@ny.frb.org,
09/12/2008 06:45
Chris.McCurdy@ny.frb.org, Patrick M
PM
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Mark
VanDerWeide/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Joseph
Sommer/NY/FRS@FRS, HaeRan
Kim/NY/FRS@FRS, Chris
Burke/NY/FRS@FRS, Susan
McLaughlin/NY/FRS@FRS, William
Dudley/NY/FRS@FRS, Meg
McConnell/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
triparty repo thoughts for this
weekend
Hi
Attached are some thoughts on triparty repo for the weekend. I've
attempted to capture everyone's positions and concerns, so we're all on the
same page as we think about options. I've also attempted to briefly
describe a few things we may need to consider in the event that JPMC
refuses to unwind Lehman's positions on Monday--assuming they're still in
business, but haven't been rescued--and the policy makers believe an
intervention is necessary to protect the market from the fallout of a
suddent default. As always, your thoughts, questions, etc., are welcome.
We obviously have some work to do if we think we want to consider options
that go beyond the existing facillities.
ttys
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155903
FRB to LEH Examiner 002252
Lucinda
[attachment "triparty Cheat Sheet 9 12-15.doc" deleted by Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS]
Lucinda Brickler
Payments Policy Function
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
212.720.6132 or 646.720.6132
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155904
FRB to LEH Examiner 002253
TAB 54
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The weekend that changed Wall Street forever - Dec. 15, 2008
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Three days that shook the
world
Exactly three months ago, the collapse
of Lehman triggered a global financial
panic. Fortune examines what
happened in the 72 hours when the
world's most powerful bankers met to
try to save Lehman and wound up
changing the face of Wall Street
forever.
By William D. Cohan
Last Updated: December 16, 2008: 4:10 PM ET
NEW YORK (Fortune) -- When the most powerful people in American capitalism convened at the New York
Federal Reserve Bank's Italianate palazzo in lower Manhattan on Friday evening, September 12, to try to save
Lehman Brothers from certain death, what confronted them was nothing less than the knowledge that whatever
actions they took - or did not take - that weekend could push the financial system into the abyss.
Over the next stressful 72 hours, CEOs and their top deputies from Goldman Sachs (GS, Fortune 500), Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley (MS, Fortune 500), JPMorgan Chase (JPM, Fortune 500), Citigroup (C, Fortune 500),
Credit Suisse and other firms worked alongside Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Timothy Geithner, then the
president of the New York Federal Reserve and now Barack Obama's choice to replace Paulson at Treasury. Three
months to the day that the bankers emerged from that fateful weekend, though, it is clear that the ideals and egos of
the participants in those meetings have reordered the American business landscape.
On Friday September 12, there were four major investment banks. Today, there are none recognizable as such. On
that Friday, the Dow closed well above 11,000. Today, it is 3,000 points lower. On September 12, a form of
"compassionate conservatism" was still the doctrine of the Bush administration.
Today, the federal government has nationalized Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG. It has bailed out banks with
hundreds of billions of dollars of taxpayer money, purchased some of their most toxic assets, and no one is sure
where this blurring of the lines between the public and private sector will end. By turning the clock back and
looking at what transpired during that weekend, one can see how a transformation of the U.S. financial industry
occurred almost in a flash, with the consequences unknown even to people in the room.
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"We went into the weekend knowing it was very dark," explained a government official. "There was nobody that
was part of this process that did not believe the world was exceptionally fragile and that Lehman was systemic and
that the consequences of its default would be traumatic. There was nobody in that room - from the Treasury, the
Fed or from the Federal Reserve Board or from the private sector - that could have told you exactly what would
happen or what the consequences would be. And I made it clear over and over and again in that room that if we
didn't solve this, everything else would be harder to deal with. Solving this was not going to make all the other
problems go away but we did not feel we had the ability to insulate the markets from the broader consequences of
default."
FRIDAY EVENING SEPTEMBER 12 Paulson pulls the fire alarm
Henry Paulson, the Treasury secretary, and Christopher Cox, the chairman of the SEC, flew up from Washington
on Friday for a 6 p.m. meeting with Geithner to discuss what the plan for the weekend would be. Meanwhile, Ben
Bernanke, the chairman of the Federal Reserve, stayed in Washington to coordinate a response with the leaders of
other central banks around the globe. Going into the weekend, there were two potential suitors for Lehman
Brothers - Bank of America and London-based Barclays. With Geithner at his side, at 6:15 p.m., Paulson stood
before the assembled Wall Street CEOs and delivered a harsh message, according to a source there. "There will be
no bailout for Lehman," Paulson said. "The only possible way out is a private-sector solution."
At that moment, Ian Lowitt, Lehman's CFO since June 2008, knew it was over for his firm. That night
"[government] officials...indicated that emergency federal funding would not be forthcoming to stabilize Lehman
Brothers and provide the liquidity needed for its operations," he wrote in an affidavit accompanying the firm's
September 15 bankruptcy filing.
Unlike what the government did for Bear Stearns, in March, there would be no taxpayer money made available to
support a Lehman bailout. According to one government official, there was a lot of rhetoric going into the
weekend both from the Congress and from people around the Treasury about how the solution for Lehman should
not involve public money. Whether that was a clever negotiating tactic or the line in the sand that would not be
crossed, the Treasury secretary had set the definitive tone for the weekend. The future of Lehman Brothers, a 158year-old firm with origins as a dry-goods store and cotton trader in Montgomery, Alabama, rested solely with the
people sitting around the table in the Fed's ornate boardroom at 33 Liberty Street. Come up with a private market
plan in 48 hours to save the firm from insolvency or suffer the consequences of a catastrophic unwind of Wall
Street's complex and internecine financial relationships.
After Paulson announced that there would be no government bailout for Lehman, he and Geithner laid out three
possible contingency plans for the titans of Wall Street to work on during the weekend. Door Number One:
Investigate whether there could be a "private-sector liquidation consortium" that would somehow finance a gradual
sale of Lehman's assets outside of bankruptcy. Door Number Two involved the assembled bankers closely
examining Lehman's most damaged assets and then forming a consortium to finance those that neither Bank of
America nor Barclays wanted to take, allowing an acquisition of the remainder of Lehman to occur. Door Number
Three was to contemplate how the free world could contain the damage in the event there was no solution possible.
The first idea quickly became untenable and nobody, at the outset, had the slightest interest in seriously
considering the third scenario.
The focus of the meetings became how to finance the Lehman assets that neither Bank of America (BAC, Fortune
500) nor Barclays (BCS) wanted. (Representatives of Bank of America, Barclays and Lehman were in and around
the Fed that weekend but were not included in many of the meetings of the wider group because of their stake in
the outcome.)
LATE FRIDAY NIGHT Bank of America bows out
Earlier in the week, Paulson had called Ken Lewis, the CEO of Bank of America, and asked him to take one for
the team by looking seriously at buying Lehman. (Some people believe that Paulson also gave his former
colleagues at Goldman Sachs an early peek at the Lehman books, too.) Representatives from Bank of America
flew up from its corporate headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina and met with Lehman bankers at the midtown
offices of Sullivan & Cromwell, Lehman's legal advisors. Bank of America spent a few days reviewing Lehman's
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$85 billion book of commercial and residential real-estate loans. "We figured that the $85 billion in troubled loans
was at least $10 billion underwater," Lewis told Fortune (see "A visit with Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis"). He
doubted the value of Lehman's better assets - its investment-banking and asset-management businesses - would
cover the $10 billion hole. He proposed to Paulson - in a late-night phone conversation - that the government take
around $65 billion off Lehman's books. Without that level of assistance, Bank of America couldn't consider buying
Lehman.
But the Bank of America proposal was beyond what the Fed or Treasury could realistically consider given the
nature of the assets Lewis wanted the Fed to finance and because it was more than twice the $29 billion secured
loan the Fed had made to JPMorgan to facilitate its acquisition of Bear Stearns. When Paulson told Lewis the
government wouldn't help, Lewis put his pencil down - for the moment. He did come to New York that weekend
but would never become part of the meetings at the Fed.
SATURDAY MORNING Lehman's books get scrubbed
With Bank of America out of the mix, the bankers at the New York Fed examined a proposal by Barclays,
whereby the British bank would acquire all of Lehman except for the firm's commercial real-estate asset book,
which had a face value of $40 billion (before writedowns).
The assembled bankers spent much of Saturday poring over Lehman's commercial real-estate portfolio in hopes of
finding a way to finance the $40 billion of assets that Barclays did not want to acquire. The dodgy assets left
behind needed a layer of equity underneath them for the remaining entity to have any hope of viability. According
to a participant in the weekend's fevered meetings, Lehman had 2,400 real estate "positions."
Lehman CEO Richard Fuld and Lowitt had announced on the previous Wednesday that the commercial real-estate
assets would be marked down to $33 billion - from $40 billion. But, on Saturday, as mortgage-securities experts
from Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs analyzed the portfolio, they quickly realized,
according to one participant, "the effective marks on the assets should probably have been $12 billion lower," or
$21 billion, rather than $40 billion, almost a 50% discount to their marked value (notwithstanding the Wednesday
revision). "There wasn't a disagreement among the group about what the write-down should be," he said.
But there was some disagreement about the $21 billion valuation depending on whether some institutions would
have to mark them to market. As a compromise, the four banks instead recommended to the other banks in the
consortium that Lehman's real-estate portfolio be valued at around $25 billion. The hole the consortium of banks
had to fill was closer to $15 billion, meaning that each one would need to provide around $1 billion to finance the
commercial real-estate assets left behind by Barclays in what would remain of Lehman Brothers. The banks also
knew that they would have to take a write-down on their loans as the assets were sold into the market over time.
But to facilitate the Barclays deal they were willing to do it. "There was a real concern that the demise of Lehman
would lead to real problems for everybody else," one banker said.
SATURDAY AFTERNOON Thain gets busy
While most of Wall Street was hunkered down at the New York Federal Reserve to review Lehman's books, Greg
Fleming, the president of Merrill Lynch and a former financial institutions banker, had been urging his boss, John
Thain, Merrill's CEO, to call Ken Lewis to talk about a deal between the two firms. Fleming had grown concerned
during the week as Merrill's stock fell to $17.05 per share, from $28.50 per share. Fleming also knew that Lewis
had long coveted Merrill Lynch and that Fleming's previous boss, Stan O'Neal, had no interest in such a deal. "It's
an iconic name," Lewis told Fortune about Merrill Lynch and the "one company" he wanted "to round out" his
strategic vision for Bank of America. He said owning Merrill Lynch "would give us a major presence in
investment banking as well as wealth management."
Thain, who had been at the Fed on Friday night, knew by Saturday morning that Bank of America was out of the
hunt for Lehman, and he had also decided that Lehman was not going to be saved. If Lehman declared bankruptcy,
he figured Merrill would be the next domino to fall. He had watched the group of bankers "pummel" Bart
McDade, Lehman's president, with questions about Lehman's assets "and decided he did not want to be next,"
according to a banker there. "It became clear to me that it would make sense to explore options for us," Thain said
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in the press conference after announcing the deal.
Thain got Lewis' cell phone number from Fleming, stepped out of the meeting and called the Bank of America
CEO. "We began to talk about the opportunity over the phone," Lewis said. "Then a few hours later, we were
talking about it in person." Rumors began circulating at the New York Fed that Thain and Lewis were talking
about a deal. In the interim, Lewis flew up by private jet from Charlotte to New York. They agreed to meet
secretly in Bank of America corporate-owned apartment at the TimeWarner Center, at Columbus Circle. "It didn't
take but about two seconds to see the strategic implications or [the] positive implications" of the deal, Lewis said.
"It was obviously a fairly short period of time, very intense and we saw a lot of each other." Following his call to
Lewis, Thain said the two men "quickly" realized "the strategic combination made a huge amount of sense, and the
opportunity to put this transaction together really was [so] unique that we both decided we wanted to take the
opportunity." The code name for the deal was "Project Alpha."
At his side as an advisor Lewis had J. Christopher Flowers, the head of his own private-equity firm that specialized
in financial services. Flowers, an ex-Goldman partner, seemed to have examined the books of nearly every Wall
Street firm by September 2008, including Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch. "[Flowers] had done quite an amount of
due diligence on Merrill Lynch fairly recently," Lewis said. "It was very, very extensive. They had looked at the
marks very comprehensively. This allowed us to have him and his team as an advisor, and just update the
information they already had. That was one of the key ingredients to being able to do this as quickly as we did."
Flowers was very complimentary of what Thain and his team had done in terms of shedding assets including
Merrill's 25% stake in Bloomberg and a $30.6 billion portfolio of troubled, mortgage-backed securities for 22
cents on the dollar.
Lewis determined he had to move quickly to win Merrill. Not only had he wanted to own the firm for years, he
also was aware that Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were in the mix. Merrill had reached out to Morgan
Stanley about a deal. Morgan Stanley passed quickly - reportedly because the firm decided there simply was not
enough time. Separately, on Saturday morning at the Fed, representatives of Goldman Sachs reached out to former
Goldman partner Peter Krause, Merrill's newly recruited head of strategy, to see whether Merrill would consider
allowing Goldman to make a 9.9% minority investment in Merrill. This set off a heated debate - according to
someone who witnessed it - between Krause and Fleming about whether Merrill should pursue the Goldman deal
or the Bank of America deal. For Goldman, the idea was to save a rival and to keep the fury of the looming storm
at bay. "I think about it in terms of the Great Barrier Reef," one Goldman executive said. "If you think of Bear as
being an outlying piece of coral at the far eastern extremity of the reef. Then Lehman is a bit closer in and then
Merrill is a bit closer. Then Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are on the beach but still pretty close to the water.
When you have a tsunami coming in, it's getting to be pretty uncomfortable."
SATURDAY NIGHT The gloves come off
Merrill and Bank of America executives were closing in on an all-stock deal, in which Merrill shareholders would
receive $29 per share in Bank of America stock, which valued Merrill at $50 billion, a 70% premium to where
Merrill's stock had closed the previous Friday. Meanwhile, back at the Fed, tempers started to flare. The assembled
bankers were still wrestling with how to value the Lehman real-estate assets that Barclays wanted to leave behind.
"It was a question of how much equity we needed to put up," one banker said, "to make the Barclays deal fly."
This led to increasing tensions on all sides. At one point, late Saturday night, Gary Shedlin, a M&A banker at
Citigroup, faced off against his old boss, Michael Klein, who was there representing Barclays and his client,
Archibald Cox Jr., who was appointed chairman of Barclays Americas in April 2008.
"How much equity do you need to raise to do the deal?" Shedlin asked Klein.
"Why is that important?" Klein shot back. "Why do you need to know that?"
"You're making an offer for this company and we've got to know how you're going to finance it," Shedlin
countered.
"We will not have to raise any incremental capital as part of this transaction," Klein said definitively. The two men
glowered at each other before turning to less confrontational matters. (Shedlin confirmed the exchange to Fortune;
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Klein did not respond to requests to be interviewed.)
Bankers worked most of the night to put together a term sheet for how they would all agree to support Barclays'
acquisition of most of Lehman Brothers. Some banks - such as BNP-Paribas and Bank of New York - were not so
sure they wanted to participate, causing Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan Chase to admonish them. "You're
either in the club or you're not," he said, according to one banker. "And if you're not you'd better be prepared to tell
the secretary why not." Still, a deal seemed close.
SUNDAY MORNING A flag on the play
On Sunday morning, the executive group re-assembled at the Fed at nine o'clock. "Everything was ready to go on
Sunday morning," one participant said. "People were happy with the term sheet, so there was a doable deal on the
table." Steve Shafran, a senior advisor to Paulson and an ex-Goldman Sachs partner, told a group of Lehman
Brothers executives at the Fed that morning, "It looks like we may have the outlines of a deal around the
financing." After which, the Lehman bankers thought they had saved their firm.
The Barclays deal required the blessing of the Financial Services Authority, in London - the UK equivalent of the
SEC. So Paulson spoke with his UK counterpart, Alistair Darling, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to the
FSA. He then summoned McDade, Lehman's president, to the New York Fed and told him at around 9:45 a.m.,
"Deal's off. The FSA has turned it down." At roughly 10 o'clock, Paulson and Geithner briefed the bankers at the
Fed.
The FSA would not comment on its decision, but a number of the participants at the Fed on Sunday morning said
the reasons given to them by Paulson for the FSA's rejection ranged from "the overall size of the potential
exposure that Barclays was taking on and whether Barclays was in good enough shape to do it" to the fact that the
"FSA was looking for some kind of a cap to avoid U.K. contagion, and the Fed had just said, 'No assistance for
Lehman.' The FSA then concluded based on the amount of diligence, the risk profile, and the lack of any
assistance from the U.S. that they were not going to let it proceed." There was also the suggestion made that
Barclays "wasn't really that serious about getting FSA approval" going into the weekend knowing that there might
be an opportunity to buy what it wanted from Lehman later at a lower price. (Barclays did not make its senior
officials involved with the Lehman deal available for comment.)
The Lehman team was devastated by the news. "We thought we had a trade and felt good about it and thought we
were in the right place," explained a Lehman banker, "and then to have the rug pulled out from under us after we
were led to believe that the Street was there on the financing, it was just horrifying from our perspective." The
stunned Lehman team returned to their headquarters at 745 Seventh Avenue to plot its next moves.
Paulson then told the remaining bankers, according to one, "Let's start talking about what the world will look like
if Lehman goes under. Let's focus on a solution for stabilizing the markets." Among the people still present for
Paulson's Sunday morning speech was John Thain. After Paulson and Geithner left the executives to contemplate
what they could do as a consortium to keep the world's markets from collapsing completely, the assembled alpha
males began talking about Merrill Lynch in front of Thain, as if he weren't there. "Merrill could be the next to go,"
one banker said. "And Thain wasn't saying anything," a participant said. "If Thain hadn't been there that morning,
the rumors really would have been flying," Shedlin said. A few minutes later, Thain got up and left the room "and
he never comes back," one participant said. Thain and his team were focused on negotiating a deal with Bank of
America. Merrill had planned to meet with Goldman on Sunday morning but by this time Merrill had stopped
returning calls to Goldman Sachs.
After Thain, Paulson and Geithner had left the New York Fed Sunday morning, the following exchange ensued,
according to several sources who were there. John Mack, the CEO of Morgan Stanley, spoke up. "Maybe we
should let Merrill go down too," he said.
Aghast, JPMorgan Chase's Dimon pointed out how shortsighted that was of Mack because Morgan Stanley might
be the next firm that counterparties lost faith in. "John, if we do that, how many hours do you think it would be
before Fidelity would call you up and tell you it was no longer willing to roll your paper?" Dimon's comment
quieted Mack. "We thought Mack said that because he might be buying Merrill," Shedlin said, and wanted to buy
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the firm on the cheap. (Mack denied he made the comment through a spokesman. A spokesman for Dimon said
Dimon did not remember having the conversation with Mack).
The group quickly began refocusing on putting together what became an agreement that every firm in the room
would continue to do business with every other firm in the room and would underwrite a multi-billion-dollar credit
facility for the firms to use in an emergency in the wake of the presumed Lehman bankruptcy. "We figured all hell
would break out the next day," one banker said. "And everyone else thought so too. Everyone was then focused on
netting out their derivatives positions starting right then."
SUNDAY AFTERNOON Paulson tells Lehman where to go
Back uptown, at Lehman, Fuld and McDade were making frantic calls to whoever would listen to their pleas for
help, including Paulson, Cox and Geithner. "But it crystallized in the course of the afternoon that it didn't look like
they were going to do anything for us," a senior Lehman official said, despite Fuld's belief after having dinner with
Paulson in April that "we have huge brand with [T]reasury." Calls also went out to Lehman's internal restructuring
group, to Harvey Miller, the lead bankruptcy counsel at the New York law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges and to
Barry Ridings, a vice-chairman of Lazard and a restructuring expert, that the end was near and the bankruptcy
papers - most likely for Chapter 7 liquidation - needed to be prepared.
There was little other choice, since there was no buyer and no deal to do. "We walked into that weekend," Fuld
told Congress on October 6, "[and] I firmly believed we were going to do a transaction. I don't know this for a fact,
but I think that Lehman and Merrill Lynch were in the same position on Friday night and they did a transaction
with Bank of America. We went down the road with Barclays. That transaction, although I believe we were very
close, never got consummated."
For his part, Geithner regretted that the FSA decision did not come sooner. A similar decision rendered on Friday
would have given everyone assembled at the Fed that weekend more time to fashion another solution. But by
Sunday, the clock had run out. If Barclays had been able to deliver, or if the banks had come up with a private
sector solution for liquidating Lehman's assets in an orderly way, the Fed could have stepped in. Under those
circumstances, it would have had the legal authority to do a deal similar to one it did to facilitate JPMorgan's
acquisition of Bear Stearns by lending $29 billion against a pool of Bear Stearns' assets that JPMorgan did not
want.
With Lehman Brothers, there was nothing like that on the table. That was one very big difference from the Bear
Stearns situation, where JPMorgan wanted to buy the company. Central banks do liquidity; they don't do
insolvency, is how Geithner viewed the Fed's role. He felt he did not have the authority to pump capital into
Lehman while it was in free fall and Lehman's assets were deemed to be of a lower quality than those of Bear
Stearns the Fed financed for JPMorgan (and which have already lost $2.7 billion in value as of October 23).
Bernanke and Paulson would get that authority only after approaching Congress to seek approval of what became
the $700 billion bailout bill - a bill whose passage was undoubtedly conceivable only in the wake of fall-out in the
stock market that followed Lehman's collapse.
McDade and Lowitt, on Lehman's behalf, made one last-ditch effort to convince Paulson that taxpayers should bail
out Lehman. They went back down to the Fed and walked the Treasury secretary through a doomsday presentation
that Lehman had put together foretelling the likely global consequences in various markets - foreign exchange,
swaps and derivatives, among others - if Lehman were allowed to fail. After McDade finished, Paulson told him,
"You're talking your own book. We've thought this over."
Paulson not only told McDade and Lowitt that Lehman had no choice but to file for bankruptcy, he also apparently
told them the firm had to file for Chapter 7 liquidation by 7 p.m. Sunday night. That would mean a court-appointed
trustee would take over the firm, the firm's doors would be locked, and its assets sold as rapidly as possible. By the
time McDade and Lowitt returned to the 31st floor of 745 Seventh Avenue, the Lehman board of directors had
assembled to vote on the bankruptcy filing. But the directors had decided to hold off until McDade and Lowitt had
returned from the Fed with their report. Since McDade had taken over as president of the firm in June, he had
displaced Fuld as the firm's day-to-day leader.
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"The words," remembered one participant in the meeting, "that Bart used when he came into the board meeting
were that 'We were mandated to file. We were mandated to file.' He was very, very, very clear on that." Some
shocked board members wanted to know what that meant. What if the board decided to defy Paulson and not file
for bankruptcy protection?
Because the Fed controlled Lehman's access to the money it needed to open for business the next day, the point
was moot. But then lawyer Harvey Miller had an idea. "They can tell us to do it," he told his client. "But they can't
tell us when. And they can't tell us what form." The Weil Gotshal team began preparing for a Chapter 11 filing - a
reorganization plan, not a liquidation plan - for the Lehman Brothers parent company allowing the operating
subsidiaries, such as the broker/dealer and the asset management business, to continue operating outside of
bankruptcy. In the scheme of things, it was a technicality, but it allowed Lehman a modicum of leverage and the
chance to tweak Paulson.
But Lehman's ordeal that Sunday night was far from over. First came a tantalizing ray of hope with the word that
the Federal Reserve Board agreed to expand the collateral that investment banks could pledge to the Fed as part of
both the Primary Dealer Credit Facility - the name given to the historic measure that allowed investment banks to
borrow directly from the Fed window after the demise of Bear Stearns on March 16 - and the Term Securities
Lending Facility, a $70 billion "collateralized borrowing facility" created on Sunday by banks to enhance liquidity
in the marketplace.
When the Lehman executives started to hear on Sunday afternoon that these windows of emergency financing
were opening up, they called the New York Fed to see if it were true. If the Fed allowed Lehman to pledge its
shaky collateral to the discount window "we might get a reprieve," one Lehman banker said. But the Fed told
Lehman, according to this Lehman banker, "'Yeah, we're doing that for everybody else but you. We're going to let
you guys go.'"
MONDAY MORNING Lehman throws in the keys
At close to midnight, Mark Shafir, Lehman's global head of M&A, and Mark Shapiro, the head of Lehman's
restructuring practice, went to see Fuld in his 31st floor office. They told Fuld there was a way Barclays could buy
Lehman's U.S. securities business out of bankruptcy, which would get Barclays what it really wanted and
potentially save 10,000 jobs. The three men called Bob Diamond, Barclays' president and chief negotiator on the
Lehman deal, on his cell phone. Diamond expressed his disappointment to them that Barclays had failed to get a
deal done earlier in the day but when the men suggested to him he could buy Lehman's U.S. securities business
"clean," he expressed great interest but needed to talk to his lawyers at Cleary, Gottlieb.
When Diamond called back, twenty minutes later, he told them, "I can't talk to you tonight. Call me at 7:00 in the
morning."
By that time - at 1:45 a.m. to be precise - Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. had filed for Chapter 11. After the
bankruptcy filing, the Fed agreed to lend money to Lehman's broker/dealer to allow it to keep operating for 24
hours, by which time a deal with Barclays could possibly be reached. At 7 a.m. Monday morning, as the
calamitous effect of Lehman's bankruptcy began spreading virally to financial capitals all over the globe, Diamond
and Michael Klein, his financial advisor, got on the phone with Fuld, McDade, Shafir and Shapiro to discuss the
possibility of Barclays buying Lehman's U.S. investment banking business. Based on the due diligence work
Barclays had already done on Lehman, "they were the only guys able to pick up the pieces of the melting ice
cube," Shedlin said. The Lehman team told Klein and Diamond, "We absolutely have to get this done before the
[markets] open on Tuesday because we're out of money."
With that, Fuld told Shafir to "Go finish it." For the next 24 hours, swarms of lawyers and bankers took over the
32nd floor of Lehman's building. The terms of the deal had to be negotiated, which required a fast-track appraisal
of Lehman's headquarters building at 745 Seventh Avenue and two data centers in New Jersey that Barclays
wanted to buy. Barclays wanted all of Lehman's U.S. investment banking, fixed-income, equity sales-and-trading,
research and certain support functions. Barclays did not want the investment management division nor any of the
commercial real-estate assets.
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The plan had been to announce the deal before the market opened Tuesday morning and Lehman's broker/dealer
subsidiary ran out of cash to operate. Finally, just as the market was opening, the terms of the deal were agreed:
Barclays would buy the Lehman businesses it wanted for $250 million and pay another $1.45 billion for 745
Seventh Avenue and the two data centers (later the package was reduced to $1.29 billion) plus assuming some of
Lehman's trading obligations. Barclays also agreed to provide a $500 million debtor-in-possession facility to the
bankrupt holding company and also to refinance the $40 billion or so Lehman's U.S. broker/dealer had borrowed
from the Fed after the filing to keep operating.
With that in hand, Barclays asked the FSA for its blessing. According to a Lehman executive, "It took four hours
to get out of the FSA, and we thought, 'Here we go again. They're going to turn it down and we're going to be
facing a Chapter 7 liquidation anyway.'"
AFTERMATH
At around 1 p.m. Tuesday, the FSA signed off and Barclays announced it had bought much of Lehman's business
in the U.S., subject to bankruptcy court approval, which was granted - on an extremely expedited basis - on Friday,
September 19. "Lehman Brothers became a victim," Judge James Peck said in approving the deal. "In effect, the
only true icon to fall in the tsunami that has befallen the credit markets. And it saddens me."
In the days following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the government came to the rescue of AIG - eventually to
the tune of $150 billion; created the TARP - the Troubled Asset Relief Program - for $700 billion; and saved
Citigroup by pumping in $45 billion in equity and effectively underwriting $306 billion in toxic assets (Citi agreed
to take the first $29 billion loss on the pool.) Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley would morph from investment
banks into bank holding companies regulated by the FDIC, the same agency that monitors commercial banks. Wall
Street would never be the same.
Many of the principal actors in the drama of the September weekend have been transformed as well. The Lehman
crowd is no longer who they used to be. Bryan Marsal, a noted turnaround expert, has replaced Fuld as CEO of
Lehman Brothers Holdings, and is busy liquidating the remaining assets of the firm. Fuld has been moved out of
his palatial office to more modest digs on the 45th floor of the Time & Life Building, which houses Fortune as
well. He was spotted entering that building recently wearing a tuxedo. A security guard stopped him on his way
through the lobby and said "Huh? What's that name again?"
No one is crying for him. In addition to some world-class real estate in Manhattan, Greenwich, Connecticut, Sun
Valley, Idaho and Jupiter Island, Florida, Fuld probably has around $100 million in the bank, including $20
million just received from selling a portion of his and his wife's art collection. He's reportedly also considering
opening his own advisory boutique.
In addition to the $639,082 Fuld received for selling 2.87 million shares for twenty cents each on September 17 (he
still has another 503,744 shares that are now worthless), he also has a grand jury subpoena from three U.S.
attorney's offices in the Eastern and Southern districts of New York, and in the district of New Jersey, which are
investigating whether Lehman executives made false or misleading statements about the firm leading up to its
collapse.
Thain has agreed to stay on at the combined Bank of America/Merrill after the deal closes in a few weeks. He will
continue to oversee the Merrill Lynch businesses at Bank of America and report directly to Lewis. He will no
doubt have a large role in helping to eliminate 35,000 jobs - as has been announced - at his new firm. His triumph
of that weekend has been tainted, in part, by the fact that the fall in Bank of America's stock since September 15
has reduced the value of the deal to Merrill's stockholders to around $20 billion, from $50 billion. Still, that is
better than the zero dollars received by Lehman's shareholders. Thain also misjudged the zeitgeist by asking for a
$10 million bonus this year from the Merrill board and had to quickly retreat in the face of negative publicity and
the outrage of many, including Andrew Cuomo, New York's attorney general.
Geithner emerged from the weekend in the best shape of all. Puffs of smoke emanating from the palazzo suggested
in the aftermath of the calamity that he was more inclined than his brethren to try to find a government solution for
Lehman Brothers. In any event, he seems to have passed his six-month trial by fire and is awaiting his
http://cnnmoney.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=The+weekend+that+ch... 8/30/2010
The weekend that changed Wall Street forever - Dec. 15, 2008
Page 9 of 9
confirmation hearing to become secretary of the Treasury in the Obama administration.
When Bernanke and Paulson have discussed their decision to let Lehman fail, neither one has any doubts about the
wisdom of their decision. "A public-sector solution for Lehman proved infeasible," Bernanke said at the Economic
Club of New York on October 15, "as the firm could not post sufficient collateral to provide reasonable assurance
that a loan from the Federal Reserve would be repaid, and the Treasury did not have the authority to absorb
billions of dollars of expected losses to facilitate Lehman's acquisition by another firm. Consequently, little could
be done except to attempt to ameliorate the effects of Lehman's failure on the financial system."
On Monday morning, September 15, as the Lehman volcano was spewing molten financial lava to every corner of
the globe, a pale and tired-looking Paulson - whose brother worked for Lehman, in Chicago - said at a White
House press conference that he "never once considered that it was appropriate putting taxpayer money on the line
in resolving Lehman Brothers." He added, "Moral hazard is not something I take lightly."
-William D. Cohan is the author of "The Last Tycoons: The Secret History of Lazard Freres" and the soon-to-bepublished "House of Cards: A Tale of Hubris and Wretched Excess on Wall Street"
First Published: December 15, 2008: 12:34 AM ET
Find this article at:
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/12/magazines/fortune/3days_full.fortune
Check the box to include the list of links referenced in the article.
© 2007 Cable News Network LP, LLP.
http://cnnmoney.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=The+weekend+that+ch... 8/30/2010
TAB 56
(
Tobias Adrlan/NY/FRS
09/13/2008 08:40 PM
To Adam AshcraftlNY/FRS@FRS, Alejandro
LaTorre/NY/FRS@FRS, Arthur AnguIOlNY/FRS@FRS,
Beverly HirtlelNY/FRS@FRS, Brian Peters/NY/FRS@FRS,
cc
bcc
Subject AIG's Financial System Risk
Here is the systemic risk analysis from market prices. Note that this is only the financial system risk
captured in current market prices, so it should'be viewed as a lower bound.
-m
AlG F'mancial S~em Risk Evaluatlon.pcf
Tobias Adrian
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Capital Markets Research
Tel: (212) 720-1717
http://nyfedeconomists.org/adrian/
The views in this message are those of the sender and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank
of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
(
(
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-SSI0001367
(
AIG's Financial System Risk!
Intro:
By lending to AIG, the Fed will further extend the uhiverse of institutions with
discount window access, thus changing expectations about future Fed behavior. This note
discusses some of the pros and cons.
The case for lending to AIG:
Fed wants to limit the systemic risk externalities, and the potential spillover onto
the real economy (the "Adverse Feedback Loop"). Estimates of systemic risk losses are
potentially large. The quantitative assessment of financial system spillovers is in the
Figures starting on page 3. Note that these might be underestimates, as systemic risk
events of the current magnitude are not in the historical data.
Figure 1: This figure plots the default probabilities implied by the COS spreads of
AIG, Lehman Brothers, and the primary dealer universe (PO). Implied default
probabilities of both AIG and Lehman have been rising rapidly in recent weeks. The
default probability of AIG is lower than Lehman's, but has risen more rapidly in recent
days.
(
Figure 2: This plot is a measure of risk spillover from AIG to the POs, from
Lehman to the POs, and the average spillover risk for the whole PO universe. The
spillover risk is computed from COS returns, and converted into a default probability.2
The probability of default in Figure 2 is the additional likelihood of defaulting due to risk
spillovers (i.e. systemic risk). The Figure shows that the systemic risk of AIG relative to
the PO universe is smaller than the systemic risk of Lehman. Caveat: these results are not
value weighted.
Figure 3: Plot of the VaR and CoVaR of the investment bank universe. The
difference between VaR and CoVaR is a measure of financial system risk. The difference
between CoVaR and VaR measures the increase in VaR due to exposure to the financial
sector. In this figure, the financial sector is proxied by the S&P financials sub index, and
the CoVaR and VaR is in percent, for equity returns (more negative numbers correspond
to larger risk).
Figure 4: Figure 4 shows that in equity space, the CoV aR is, on average, smaller
than the VaR, implying that the tail covariance of AIG with the financial sector is
negative. So, based on historical data, AIG is not systemically important. The caveat here
is that current equity prices might not fully price adverse feedback loop dynamics.
(
I
2
Prepared by Tobias Adrian, ext 1717, with comments by Josh Frost.
The measure is based on http://newyorkfed.org/research/stafCreports/sr348.html.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-SSI0001368
(
The case against lending to AlG:
1. AlG could fix its problem by seIling its mortgage portfolio. This might lead to
further declines in mortgage valuations in the market place, but the institutions
that we judge systemically important all have discount window access (either OW
or PDCF).
2. Discount window borrowing might increase the likelihood of AlG's default as it
reveals to the market that AlG is in worse shape than previously assumed.
3. Fed sends signal to the market that the market fragility is greater than currently
priced in.
4. By lending to AlG, Fed signals that existing universe of facilities is not enough to
assure financial stability.
5. Fed's lending will change the behavior of other insurance companies (and the
lenders to other insurance companies), who will assume that they will get similar
loans in future situations.
6. Fed's hands are tied for future situations.
7. The Fed crowds out private market solutions, and distorts price discovery.
8. Future backlash against Fed powers ( as Fed will be seen as captured by Wall St.).
9. Every dollar that Fed lends to AlG is a dollar that cannot be used for other
purposes: the Fed's balance sheet constraints might be binding at some point.
10. Treasury will have to issue more debt to allow Fed to lend to AlG in size. That
has adverse effects on inflation, capital flows, and US credit ratings.
(
Alternatives to lending to AlG:
1. Lend to the counterparties of the CB and PD universe who already have discount
window access.
2. Have Treasury or NY State, not Fed make a loan to AlG.
(
2
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-SSI0001369
(
Figure 1: CDS implied Default Probabilities
q
'"
- -__________________________
-J~
o
01 Dec 07
01 Jun 08
01 Mar 08
01 Sep 08
date
- - - Index Default Probability
- - - AIG Default Probability
Lehman Default Probability
(
Figure 2: Systemic Risk Default Probability Spillover Component (from CDS)
00
q
N
q
o
01 Dec 07
01 Mar 08
01 Jun 08
01 Sep 08
date
- - - AIG Systemic Risk Default Probability Component
Lehman Systemic Risk Default Probability Component
- - - Average Systemic Risk Default Probability Component
(
3
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-SSI0001370
(
Figure 3: VaR and CoVaR oflnvestment Bank Equity Returns
o
go
I
o
o
~ ~----------,-----------~----------~
01 Jan 08
01 Apr 08
01 Jui 08
01 Oct 08
date
aggregate VaR
- - - aggregate CoVaR
(
Figure 4: VaR and CoVaR of AIG Equity Returns
o
~----------------------------------
o
00
I
o
o
- ~--------,-----------.------------~-~
I
01 Jan 08
01 Apr 08
01 Jul08
01 Oct 08
date
- - - AIGVaR
- - - AIG CoVaR
I
(
4
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-SSI0001371
TAB 57
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Jeff Stehm
Deborah P Bailey
Fw: Master timeline as of 9/13 11:30am
09/13/2008 02:45 PM
Lehman 9.13.08 1130am EU.xls
See below. From NY. with your name attached :)
Jeff Stehm
Associate Director
Federal Reserve Board
----- Forwarded by Jeff Stehm/BOARD/FRS on 09/13/2008 02:44 PM ----Erin
Upton/NY/FRS@FRS
To
brehenyb@sec.gov, canavanj@sec.gov, Clinton
Lively/NY/FRS@FRS, Dianne Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS,
hsum@sec.gov, Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, Jeanmarie
Davis/NY/FRS@FRS, Jeff Stehm/BOARD/FRS@BOARD,
Jeffrey Marquardt/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Jim
Mahoney/NY/FRS@FRS, JohnP
McGowan/NY/FRS@FRS, Jonathan Polk/NY/FRS@FRS,
Joseph Sommer/NY/FRS@FRS, Lily
Tham/NY/FRS@FRS, Lisa Joniaux/NY/FRS@FRS,
Lucinda M Brickler/NY/FRS@FRS, Marsha
Takagi/NY/FRS@FRS, mcgowant@sec.gov, Michael
Schussler/NY/FRS@FRS, Patrick M
Parkinson/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Shari BenHaim/NY/FRS@FRS, Susan Stiehm/NY/FRS@FRS,
Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Wendy
Ng/NY/FRS@FRS, Ada Li/NY/FRS@FRS, Jamie
McAndrews/NY/FRS@FRS, Chris McCurdy/NY/FRS@NY,
Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Alexandra MerleHuet/NY/FRS@FRS, Daniel Muccia/NY/FRS@FRS,
Roger Graham/NY/FRS@FRS, Lawrence
Sweet/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Ann Miner/NY/FRS@FRS, Erin Upton/NY/FRS@FRS
09/13/2008 11:29 AM
Subject
Master timeline as of 9/13 11:30am
Attached is the master timeline for Saturday/Sunday/Monday scheduled meetings. A
snapshot view of this afternoons meetings is shown directly below as well. Please
keep us updated as to any additional meetings you schedule.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155172
FRB to LEH Examiner 001521
Erin Upton
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(212) 789-4444
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155173
FRB to LEH Examiner 001522
Master Timeline
as of Saturday 9/13 11:15AM
Sat Sept 13
12PM Noon
12PM Noon
12:30PM
1PM
2PM
2PM
2:30PM
2:30PM
After 4PM
6PM
Fed: OfficialOrganized
Consortium
Default
Management
Group/Operations
Management
Group
Fed
Fed
Lehman
Fed
Fed
Materi
Meeting
Fed
Fed: OfficialOrganized
Consortium
Fed: OfficialOrganized
Consortium
10PM
Official sector updated on progress
FR may ask private sector to activate Operations Managers Group
Treasury, CFTC, SEC, Fed Call
LFIT and LFI CPC Call
Potential Bankruptcy Court Notification
CLS Supervisory Call
DTC - Settlements (Securities)
Bill Rutledge
OTS - Federal Thrift (Deborah Bailey)
Official sector updated on progress
Official sector updated on progress
Sun Sept 14
Time
Who
Activity
7:45AM
Markets
Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange Opens for Monday*
9AM
Fed
Foreign Supervisors Call to coalition participants
10AM
Fed
Domestic Supervisors Call
10AM
Market (NYMEX)
Energy markets open early for trading (Hurricane)
12PM
Fed: OfficialOrganized
Consortium
3:30PM
Fed
CLS Supervisory Call
4PM
Citi - CLS
Period for Citi to decide to authorize Lehman settlement
instructions to CLS.
Deadline for public announcement if this plan materializes.
Early Evening
6:25PM
8PM
Fed: OfficialOrganized
Consortium
Markets
Markets
8PM
9PM
Payments
9:30PM
Markets
Fed
Effective deadline for credible plan
FRBNY updates relevant US, foreign regulators and other relevant
officials.
USFE Opens
Japanese Securities Depository Centre Opens*
Australia Securities Exchange Opens
Tokyo Stock Exchange Opens*
Bank of Japan Funds Transfer System Opens*
Fedwire Funds Open 9PM for next-day business activity.
Lehman can begin sending cash wires through JPMC to its DTC
account (at FRBNY).
Hong Kong Exchange Opens*
Please note that for weekend work, DTC closes on Friday and CLS opens Sunday.
* Monday, September 15 is a Holiday and these markets will be closed.
Mon Sept 15
C:\Documents and Settings\m1gmb01\My Documents\Lehman 9.13 08 1130am EU.xls
1
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155174
4/20/20105:45 PM
FRB to LEH Examiner 001523
Master Timeline
as of Saturday 9/13 11:15AM
Time
Who
Activity
12:30AM
12:30AM
12:30AM
3AM
3AM
CLS
CLS
CLS
CLS
Markets
3AM
4AM
4AM
6AM
Start of Day
Markets
CLS
Markets
CLS
DTC
Revised pay-in schedule issued 12:30AM
Bilateral rescinds at 12:30AM
Settlement eligible instructions transferred.
Completion of settlement
London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange Opens - Europe and London
London Stock Exchange Opens
CLS pays in and out Asia/Pac by 4AM
Japanese Securities Depository Centre Closes*
CLS and N. America pays in and out by 6AM
Government Securities Division (GSDs), General Collateral
Finance (GCF), Repo unwinds
Start of Day
7AM
DTC
GSDs, GSF, Repo Unwinds
Markets
Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange*
7:40AM
Market (CME)
Lehman settlement bank confirms daily variation and PB payment
8AM
Fed
Lehman can begin flowing securities through JPMC to its DTC account
(at FRBNY)
8AM
Tri-Party
8:30AM
Tri-Party
Does the clearing bank unwind repo transactions prior day? Fed
should expect call by 8AM
Are investors fleeing from Lehman? Should be able to gauge by
8:30AM. Their clearing banks would start seeing parties step
away.
8:30AM
OCC
Clearing members make net premium and variation payments to OCC.
Margin payments are generally made at the same time.
9:30AM
FICC
10AM
Market (NYMEX)
10AM
NSCC
FICC by 9:30AM
NSCC by 10AM
9:30AM
11:40AM
DTC
Clearing Fund Requirements for FICC due. FICC settles
through Fed NSS. NSCC settles through Fedwires to DTC.
Lehman settlement bank confirms daily variation and PB
payment
Clearing Fund Requirements for NSCC due. NSCC settles
through Fedwires to DTC Fed Account.
Clearing Fund Requirements due.
Markets
NASDAQ, CBOE and NYSE Open
Market (NYMEX) Daily PB and intra-day variation information provided to Lehman
1PM
Market (NYMEX)
2PM
2PM
2:40PM
MBSD
Market (CME)
Market (CME)
3PM
DTC
3:30PM
DTC
3:45PM
DTC
4PM
4PM
Throughout the day
DTC
Markets
Tri-Party
Lehman's settlement bank (JPMC) confirms end-of-day DTC
numbers.
Obligations for GSD are being made up until this point.
NASDAQ and NYSE Close
Sec Lending: Are owners reluctant to lend?
4:30
4PM
6PM
DTC
Citi-CLS
CLS
Fed
Fed
Completion of DTC, NSCC and Canadian settlement
Citi to decide authorization on Lehman transactions.
Initial pay-in schedule is issued.
Fedwire 3rd party close
Fedwire Settlement
6PM
6:30PM
Lehman settlement bank confirms daily PB and intra-day
variation
Deadline for clearing fund requirements.
Intra-day PB and variation information provided to Lehman
Lehman settlement bank confirms intra-day PB and variation
information
Issue and paying agent (IPA) cutoff for informing DTC of an
issuer failure/default within the money market instrument market
(MMI). Citi is Lehman's IPA.
Participants have until 3:30PM to DK ("don't know") transactions
* Monday, September 15 is a Holiday and these markets will be closed.
C:\Documents and Settings\m1gmb01\My Documents\Lehman 9.13 08 1130am EU 2
xls
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155175
4/20/20105:45 PM
FRB to LEH Examiner 001524
TAB 58
Bernanke
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Scott Alvarez
Re: Fw: Scheduled Call today at 7:00 p.m. w/Chairman Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn and Others
09/13/2008 04:08 PM
Thanks.
I am leaving soon and will take the call from home.
-------------------------Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld
ź Scott Alvarez
----- Original Message -----
From: Scott Alvarez
Sent
04:06 PM EDT
Bernanke
To:
Bernanke
Cc:
Subject: Re: Fw:
Vice Chairman Kohn and Others
Kevin Warsh; Michelle Smith
today at 7:00 p.m. w/Chairman Bernanke,
That will work. To make it easier, Randy and Betsy can take a cue
from Tim, who it sounds like will make a pitch for legislation. That
sounds like the part of the call that would be most susceptible to a
policy discussion, rather than just a briefing on the day's
developments. I would be happy to call Randy and Betsy after the call
and fill them in. We can then have a policy discussion at a Board
meeting at an appropriate later time.
Scott
ź
Bernanke
BOARD/FRS
Bernan
BOARD/FRS
ke
To
Scott Alvarez/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
Bernanke BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Kevin
Warsh/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Michelle A
Smith/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Donald L
Kohn/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
09/13/2008 02:31 PM
Subject
Fw: Scheduled Call today at 7:00 p.m. w/Chairman
Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn and Others
Scott: I invited Randy and Betsy to listen in on this call. However, I
have learned that we may want to discuss some broader issues, e.g.,
should we go to Congress to ask for other authorities. We can't
discuss policy issues with more than 3 Board members. So I called
Randy and Betsy and told them they could hear the briefing/update on
Lehman, with which we should begin the call. But if it turns to policy,
they should hang up. They were both totally fine with that. (You
could enforce that if you are on the call.) Let me know if you see any
problem.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154949
FRB to LEH Examiner 001298
Ben
----- Forwarded by
Bernanke
BOARD/FRS on 09/13/2008 02:28 PM -----
Randall S
Kroszner/BOARD/FRS
To
Bernanke
BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
09/13/2008 01:09 PM
Subject
Re: Fw: Scheduled Call today at 7:00 p.m.
w/Chairman Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn and
Others
ź
Thanks. I will plan to call in.
BOARD/FRS
Bernanke
Bernan
BOARD/FRS
ke
09/13/2008 12:58 PM
To
Randall S Kroszner/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Elizabeth A
Duke/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
Donald L Kohn/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Subject
Fw: Scheduled Call today at 7:00 p.m. w/Chairman
Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn and Others
Randy, Betsy:
Below is info for conference call with NY at 7 pm. I would probably
take that at home rather than at the office. You are welcome to listen
in.
As far as I know there is no formal conference call scheduled before
then. If I get substantive new information I will let you know.
----- Forwarded by
Bernanke
BOARD/FRS on 09/13/2008 12:55 PM -----
Rita C
Proctor/BOARD/FRS
To
Bernanke
BOARD/FRS
cc
09/13/2008 12:50 PM
Subject
Fw: Scheduled Call today at 7:00 p.m. w/Chairman
Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn and Others
Are you planning to participate?
Rita
************
Rita C. Proctor
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154950
FRB to LEH Examiner 001299
Assistant to the Chairman
The Honorable Ben S. Bernanke
Federal Reserve Board
Eccles Board Building
20th and C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20551
Phone: 202-452-3201
Fax: 202-452-6499
rita.c.proctor@frb.gov
ź Marlene Williams
----- Original Message -----
From: Marlene Williams
Sent: 09/13/2008 12:48 PM EDT
To: Rita Proctor; Rivane Bowden; Brian Madigan; Patrick
Parkinson; Michelle Smith; Thomas Baxter; Terrence Checki;
William Dudley; Meg McConnell; Calvin Mitchell; Michael Silva;
Donald Kohn
Cc: Tanshel Pointer; Daniel Boulos; Helen Ayala; Helen
Wendler; Millie Martinez
Subject: Scheduled Call today at 7:00 p.m. w/Chairman
Bernanke, Vice Chairman Kohn and Others
Please be advised that there will be a call this evening at 7:00 p.m. as
indicated below. Please confirm your (or your boss's) participation.
Thank you.
Participants
Board
Chairman Bernanke
Vice Chairman Kohn
Brian Madigan
Pat Parkinson
Michele Smith
FRBNY
Tom Baxter
Terry Checki
Bill Dudley
Meg McConnell
Calvin Mitchell
Michael Silva
Marlene A. Williams
Executive Assistant to the President
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY
(Office) 212-720-6174
(Fax) 212-720-8681
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154951
FRB to LEH Examiner 001300
TAB 59
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Michelle A Smith
Kevin Warsh
Fw: Newsclips on today's meeting (2:30 PM)
09/13/2008 02:35 PM
A deal doesn't seem likely tonight, right?
ź David M Girardin
----- Original Message -----
From: David M Girardin
Sent: 09/13/2008 02:34 PM EDT
To: Calvin Mitchell; Andrew Williams; Michelle Smith; David Skidmore;
Michael Silva; Michael Held; Meg McConnell
Cc: Krista Dente
Subject: Newsclips on today's meeting (2:30 PM)
Wall Street Journal - Lehman Deal Could Come Tonight As
High-Level Talks Continue
Reuters - Fed holds emergency meeting on market
developments
AP - Government, brokerage leaders resume meeting on plan
to rescue Lehman Brothers
Bloomberg -Treasury, Fed Summon Wall Street Leaders for
Second Day Talks
WALL STREET JOURNAL - Lehman Deal Could Come Tonight
As High-Level Talks Continue
By CARRICK MOLLENKAMP, DEBORAH SOLOMON, AARON LUCCHETTI,
JON HILSENRATH and SUDEEP REDDY
Talks continued Saturday between federal officials and top Wall Street
executives aimed at resolving the crisis swirling around Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. and soothing jittery U.S. financial markets.
While the situation remains fluid, some sort of solution might be
reached as soon as Saturday night, according to people familiar with
the situation. But it isn't clear how much progress has been made
toward clearing the biggest hurdle in the discussions, which is whether
any government funding will be provided to help engineer a rescue for
the battered investment bank.
Treasury Department and Federal Reserve officials have made it clear
to participants that no government bailout should be expected.
Potential bidders, worried about the risk of buying an ailing financial
institution like Lehman, want the government to step in with a package
similar to what was offered to J.P. Morgan when it bought Bear
Stearns Cos. Then, the federal government agreed to absorb as much
as $29 billion in losses.
On Saturday, the main task ahead in discussions being led by the
Federal Reserve is identifying whether a so-called "bad bank" structure
could be designed to hold Lehman's souring assets. That issue is now
seen by people familiar with the situation as the key stumbling block to
completing a deal, especially if Treasury and Fed officials keep digging
in their heels on opposition to a government-backed rescue.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155927
FRB to LEH Examiner 002276
Potential buyers such as Bank of America Corp. and Barclays PLC are
loathe to take on Lehman's bad assets, which are seen as an
immovable object to getting a deal done, according to people familiar
with the situation.
At an emergency meeting Friday night called by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, New York Fed President Timothy Geithner,
described two potential scenarios: either a liquidation of Lehman or an
industry-driven solution in which Wall Street firms would possibly
providing financing to remove some of Lehman's real estate assets,
one person briefed on the matter said.
Most of the Wall Street executives present at the meeting listened and
asked questions, "but didn't show their hands" as to what they
thought, this person said.
In addition to Mr. Geithner, government officials in attendance included
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Christopher Cox. The Wall Street executives
included Morgan Stanley Chief Executive John Mack, Merrill Lynch Chief
Executive John Thain, J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, Goldman
Sachs Group CEO Lloyd Blankfein, Citigroup Inc. head Vikram Pandit
and representatives from the Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC and
Bank of New York Mellon Corp.
Other industry leaders that attended were Credit Suisse CEO Brady
Dougan, Morgan Stanley Chief Financial Officer Colm Kelleher, Citigroup
Chief Financial Officer Gary Crittenden, UBS AG Chief Risk Officer
Thomas Daula, J.P. Morgan investment bank co-head Steve Black and
Goldman Sachs Co-president Gary Cohn, according to a person familiar
with the matter.
At the New York Fed's fortress-like stone and iron headquarters in
lower Manhattan, Mr. Black and Steve Cutler, J.P. Morgan's general
counsel, left the building early Saturday afternoon in a black sedan.
Mr. Cutler was carrying a manila envelope thick with papers. He exited
through the heavily guarded garage entrance at the corner of William
Street and Maiden Lane, declining to comment on the talks.
The meeting appeared similar to one a decade ago when the New York
Fed pulled together top Wall Street executives to prevent the collapse
of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.
In all, about 30 banks were represented at the meeting, which also
included an assessment of the risk Lehman's trading partners and other
counterparties face and discussion of Merrill Lynch and Washington
Mutual Inc., which saw their stock prices slide in recent days on
growing fears about their financial condition.
In trying to hold firm to their no-bailout stance even while pressing for
a deal, federal officials could try to pit Bank of America and Barclays
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155928
FRB to LEH Examiner 002277
against each other. But that leverage can work only if both banks stay
in the discussions.
Bank of America and Barclays know each other very well, having
considered a merger several years ago. More recently, Bank of America
agreed to pay $21 billion for ABN Amro Holding NV's LaSalle Bank of
Chicago in 2007. That deal came at a time when Barclays was trying to
buy ABN and fend off a European consortium bid. Bank of America's
purchase was seen at the time as helping that Barclays bid, which
ultimately failed.
At Barclays, a big question will be whether President Robert E.
Diamond Jr. and CEO John Varley both agree on buying all or part of
Lehman. Mr. Diamond is eager to expand Barclays's U.S. Investment
bank operations. But the unit, called Barclays Capital, is also
responsible for write-downs the bank has recorded.
After orchestrating the rescue of Bear and advising on the shift of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into government conservatorship, Federal
Reserve officials would very much like to draw a line with Lehman and
avoid any involvement that goes beyond the role officials have played
in advising Lehman to help it resolve its problems.
After Bear's collapse, the Fed set up lending facilities to help
investment banks with short-term liquidity needs. As of Wednesday, it
hadn't been tapped by Wall Street since July. The mere presence of
the lending program – called the primary dealer credit facility - might
be helping to reassure market participants that Lehman is a reliable
counterparty, since they know it has access to the facility should it
need it. It isn't clear whether the Fed would be willing to extend its
lending facilities even further for anything beyond helping a firm
manage a short-term liquidity crisis.
"The financing that we did for Bear Stearns is a one-time event that
has never happened before, and I hope it never happens again," Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke told lawmakers in April.
"As far as I know, we've never lost a cent. So it is not our intention on
anything like a regular basis to be putting taxpayer money at risk."
Mr. Bernanke also has expressed reservations about lending to troubled
institutions. "The intended purpose of Federal Reserve lending is to
provide liquidity to sound institutions," he said in a July 8 speech. The
Fed used its lending powers to help Bear in March "only because no
other tools were available to the Federal Reserve or any other
government body for ensuring an orderly liquidation in a fragile market
environment."
Paramount to Fed officials is the broader health of the financial system.
Behind the rescue of Bear was a fear that its collapse would disrupt
already shaky credit markets.
Conditions now are mixed. Short-term lending rates such as the
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155929
FRB to LEH Examiner 002278
London Interbank Offered Rate, or Libor, are elevated relative to
expectations for the Fed's benchmark fed funds rate, a sign of
pervasive risk aversion, but have been stable. Risk premiums on junk
bonds also are back to levels they hit in March. But the broader stock
market has been relatively stable through this latest round of turmoil.
One constraint for federal officials is that many of the steps they hoped
to have taken to resolve another investment bank crisis have not yet
been taken. Investment banks are big players in the credit default
swap market, in which firms trade contracts tied to corporate default
risks. It's an immense market that trades against $62 trillion worth of
debt. Officials worry that the collapse of an investment bank could
send problems cascading through the financial system through this
market. They've been pushing Wall Street to create a new
clearinghouse to diminish that risk, but it isn't in place yet.
They've also want Congress to develop new procedures to handle the
collapse of an investment bank so that it can be closed by the
government in an orderly way, as happens with failed commercial
banks. That also is far from completion.
Write to Carrick Mollenkamp at carrick.mollenkamp@wsj.com1,
Deborah Solomon at deborah.solomon@wsj.com2 and Aaron Lucchetti
at aaron.lucchetti@wsj.com3
Reuters - Fed holds emergency meeting on market
developments
232 words
12 September 2008
22:03
Reuters News
English
(c) 2008 Reuters Limited
(Adds participants, paragraph 3; additional background, paragraph 4)
WASHINGTON, Sept 12 (Reuters) - The Federal Reserve Bank of
New York held an emergency meeting on Friday evening with top
financial market representatives to discuss recent market
developments, a Fed official said.
"Senior representatives of major financial markets met at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Friday evening to discuss recent market
developments," a Fed official told Reuters.
The official said New York Fed President Timothy Geithner, U.S.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Christopher Cox were among the participants in
the meeting.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155930
FRB to LEH Examiner 002279
Financial markets have been on tenterhooks over the future of
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc and whether the struggling investment
bank, whose stock value has collapsed, may or may not be able to find
a buyer. The talks at the New York Fed took place as discussions
between Lehman and other parties continued.
The Treasury and Fed have been involved in talks regarding Lehman's
future. Earlier on Friday, a source familiar with the thinking of Treasury
Secretary Henry Paulson said Paulson was "adamant" no public funds
be put on the line to help facilitate a sale. (Reporting by Glenn
Somerville; Writing by Tim Ahmann; Editing by Gary Hill)
AP - Government, brokerage leaders resume meeting on plan
to rescue Lehman Brothers
By JEANNINE AVERSA
AP Economics Writer
125 words
13 September 2008
12:50
Associated Press Newswires
English
(c) 2008. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.
WASHINGTON (AP) - With the global financial system holding its
collective breath, the U.S. government is scrambling to help devise a
rescue for Lehman Brothers and restore confidence in Wall Street and
the American financial structure.
An official from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York said Saturday
deliberations have resumed with leading Wall Street executives and top
U.S. financial officials. They include Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson,
Timothy Geithner, president of the New York Fed, and Securities and
Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox. They were meeting
on the heels of an emergency session convened Friday night by
Geithner -- the Fed's point person on financial crises.
BLOOMBERG -Treasury, Fed Summon Wall Street Leaders for
Second Day Talks
2008-09-13 17:37:17.820 GMT
By Yalman Onaran
Sept. 13 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve
Bank summoned chief executive officers of Wall Street firms for a
second day of talks to find a solution to the plight of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc.
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and New York Fed President
Timothy Geithner met with executives in New York, said Andrew
Williams, a spokesman for Geithner.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155931
FRB to LEH Examiner 002280
--With reporting by Chris Anstey in Washington. Editor: Dick
Schumacher.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155932
FRB to LEH Examiner 002281
TAB 60
TAB 61
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Scott Alvarez
Mark VanDerWeide
Re: tri-party
09/13/2008 07:44 PM
Not if it's the only question about how to manage the bankruptcy--don't want to
suggest Fed willingness to give JPMC cover to screw L or anyone else.
Scott
ź Mark VanDerWeide/BOARD/FRS
Mark
VanDerWeide/BOARD/FRS
To
Scott Alvarez/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
09/13/2008 07:41 PM
Subject
Re: tri-party
We have no idea. FRBNY set it up. If the call is about lots of stuff, are you OK with
this being one topic?
Mark
ź Scott Alvarez/BOARD/FRS
Scott
Alvarez/BOARD/FRS
To
Mark VanDerWeide/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
09/13/2008 07:41 PM
Subject
Re: tri-party
What is the context of the JPMC call? Are we asking other similar questions?
Scott
ź Mark VanDerWeide/BOARD/FRS
Mark
VanDerWeide/BOARD/FRS
To
Scott Alvarez/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
cc
09/13/2008 07:39 PM
Subject
tri-party
Are you OK with us running the tri-party solution structure we spoke with you about
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154966
FRB to LEH Examiner 001315
just now past JPMC to see if it is operationally feasible for them (acknowledging that
this is just one of many options that are kicking around). FRBNY legal and policy
thinks our proposal is workable and the best option we have right now. JPMC call is
starting shortly.
Mark
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154967
FRB to LEH Examiner 001316
TAB 62
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Arthur Angulo
Thomas Baxter; Joyce Hansen; Jonathan Polk; Chris McCurdy; Patrick M Parkinson; Gerard Dages; Joseph
Sommer
Theodore Lubke
Fw: memo re: Lehman's inter-company default scenario
09/13/2008 08:24 PM
leh-def-scenario-memo-20080913.doc
FundingFacilities.xls
haven't opened docs yet ...
----- Forwarded by Arthur Angulo/NY/FRS on 09/13/2008 08:19 PM ----Christopher T
Tsuboi/NY/FRS
To
09/13/2008 08:01 PM
Alejandro LaTorre/NY/FRS@FRS, Alexa
Philo/NY/FRS@FRS, Anthony Cirillo/NY/FRS@FRS,
Arthur Angulo/NY/FRS@FRS, Bard
Stermasi/NY/FRS@FRS, Brian Peters/NY/FRS@FRS,
Caroline Frawley/NY/FRS@FRS, Catherine
Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, Christopher
Calabia/NY/FRS@FRS, Clinton Lively/NY/FRS@FRS,
Daniel Muccia/NY/FRS@FRS, Dennis
Herbst/NY/FRS@FRS, Dianne Dobbeck/NY/FRS@FRS,
Jan Voigts/NY/FRS@FRS, Jeanmarie
Davis/NY/FRS@FRS, Jim Mahoney/NY/FRS@FRS, John
Ricketti/NY/FRS@FRS, Jonathan Polk/NY/FRS@FRS,
Kyle Grieser/NY/FRS@FRS, Lily Tham/NY/FRS@FRS,
Paul Whynott/NY/FRS@FRS, Robert
Galletta/NY/FRS@FRS, Roger Graham/NY/FRS@FRS,
Sandra Rosario/NY/FRS@FRS, Sarah
Dahlgren/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven J
Manzari/NY/FRS@FRS, Steven Mirsky/NY/FRS@FRS,
Theodore Lubke/NY/FRS@FRS, Wendy
Ng/NY/FRS@FRS, William BRODOWS/NY/FRS@FRS,
William Hallacy/NY/FRS@FRS, Zahra ElMekkawy/NY/FRS@FRS
cc
Subject
memo re: Lehman's inter-company default scenario
RESTRICTED FR
Hello,
The attached memo is what Lehman's internal counsel described as their view on
how a default for their B/D units may trigger
a cascade of defaults through to the subs which have large OTC deriv books. Also
attached is a spreadsheet showing
the current status of the holding company's credit facilities (both syndicated and
bilateral).
Let us know any questions..thanks!
chris
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155967
FRB to LEH Examiner 002316
Christopher Tsuboi
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Bank Supervision/Operational Risk
212-720-2872
christopher.tsuboi@ny.frb.org
ATTACHMENTS RESTRICTED FR
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155968
FRB to LEH Examiner 002317
FR RESTRICTED – HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – DO NOT DISTRIBUTE
Date: 13 September 2008
Subject: Lehman cross default scenarios as viewed by Lehman.
x
This memo describes the opinion of Lehman’s internal legal counsel on the probable course of
events should a broker-dealer subsidiary of LBHI (the holding company) default on its
obligations, with focus on a B/D default on its overnight funding obligations.
x
The majority of securities financing is done out of the LBI (US B/D) and LBIE (UK B/D)
subsidiaries. In these entities, repos are transacted under the standard BMA form of master
purchase agreement (US) or GMRA agreements (UK). According to Lehman, these agreements
are considered “standalone”: that is, contractually speaking, a default by LBHI on its credit
facilities does not necessarily trigger a default for the LBI subsidiary on its repo lines. In practice,
it may become difficult to roll overnight repo in this event. Lehman stated that most of the
immediate rollover risk resides with LBI, since LBIE transacts more term repo.
x
LBIE has a corporate guarantee from LBHI, i.e. all LBIE obligations are ultimately obligations of
LBHI.
x
LBI does not have a corporate guarantee from LBHI, but because it is a “significant subsidiary” of
LBHI, under its various credit facility agreements a shortfall of USD100M or more in respect of
LBI and its overnight repo counterparties is considered an event of default for LBHI, and this in
turn would trigger defaults at these credit facilities (both syndicated and bilateral). A list (current
as of 9/12) of these credit facilities is in the accompanying spreadsheet, including information on
capacity, utilization status and roll dates.
x
Attachment A is a list of LBHI subsidiaries, grouped into those with guarantees by the holding
company (LBHI) and those without.
x
According to Lehman, a default in LBHI would trigger defaults in the other credit facilities,
including the bilateral facilities, most of whose agreements are based on that of the main JPMC
syndicated facility. The JPMC agreement is available and has been sent to Legal for review. The
triggered defaults at these facilities would make them come due immediately.
x
LBHI is named as a “Credit Support Provider” in the cross-default provisions in most of the ISDA
Master Agreements for a number of subsidiaries with large OTC derivatives books. Thus a
default at LBHI (passing a threshold of around USD100M) would trigger these provisions (q.v.
1992 ISDA Master Agreement section 5(a)(vi)). Most (roughly 80%) of the ISDA Master
Agreements at these subsidiaries involve unmodified cross default provisions, while the rest
modify the language to enable cross acceleration provisions, which requires positive acceleration
of the debt by the creditor (a higher threshold for the trigger).
x
The subsidiaries with the largest derivatives books are LBSF and LBIE. We still need to analyze
data to understand the relative sizes of these books. Other subsidiaries with derivatives books are
listed in Attachment A with the basic make-up of the books. In addition, Lehman is preparing
more cross default and termination event data related to ISDA Master Agreements for the
subsidiaries.
x
One other significant trigger according to Lehman (outside the scenario described in this memo)
would be termination events resulting from a ratings downgrade, in particular a downgrade to
below investment grade (below BBB-).
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155969
FRB to LEH Examiner 002318
TAB 63
TAB 64
TAB 65
TAB 66
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Donald L Kohn
Bernanke
Brian F Madigan; Kevin Warsh; Scott Alvarez
Re: Don and I are starting RB president calls
09/14/2008 03:03 PM
just talked to Kevin. LEH heard about the pdcf enlargement and thought it was a
lifeline, but they didn't understand it was limited to triparty. KW thinks everything's
on track for 4:30ish. SEC will go first announcing Chapt 11 for holding company. I
haven't seen any details.
Bernanke
ź
BOARD/FRS
Bernan
BOARD/FRS
ke
To
09/14/2008 02:55 PM
cc
Subject
Kevin Warsh/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Scott
Alvarez/BOARD/FRS@BOARD, Brian F
Madigan/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Donald L Kohn/BOARD/FRS@BOARD
Don and I are starting RB president calls
Anything new, Kevin?
Brian, Scott: Any more details on PDCF collateral, 23A details?
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-154997
FRB to LEH Examiner 001346
TAB 67
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Bernanke
Kevin Warsh
re:
09/14/2008 04:16 PM
Anything to report?
In case I am asked: How much capital injection would have been needed to keep
LEH alive as a going concern? I gather $12B or so from the private guys together
with Fed liquidity support was not enough.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155000
FRB to LEH Examiner 001349
TAB 68
TAB 69
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Attachments:
Charles.Holm@frb.gov
Robert Maahs
Fw: Todays events/23a
09/14/2008 07:22 PM
23a.doc.doc
Fyi
Sent by Blackberry Wireless
----- Original Message ----From: Charles Holm
Sent: 09/14/2008 07:21 PM EDT
To: Laurie Priest
Subject: Fw: Todays events/23a
Fyi
Sent by Blackberry Wireless
----- Original Message ----From: Deborah P Bailey
Sent: 09/14/2008 06:13 PM EDT
To: Molly Wassom; Kevin Bertsch; Betsy Cross; Jack Jennings; Coryann
Stefansson; Lisa DeFerrari; Jon Greenlee; Richard Naylor; Tim Clark;
Charles Holm; Barbara Bouchard; William Treacy; Arthur Lindo
Cc: Roger Cole; Ryan Lordos; William Spaniel
Subject: Todays events/23a
Lots going on ...and little of it is good! Unless it is something
critical, Norah and I would like you to limit your travel this week.
Thanks
There will be some changes in the PDCF facility with reference to eligible
collateral and the TSLF has been expanded to include all investment grade
debt securities. I am not sure of the time of the announcement.
I have attached below the draft final notice for the 23a exemption...In
short, it applies to those institution which are engaged in triparty repo
through JPMC and BNY. There are caveats around certain elements however it
is important to note that an institution is eligible unless they are
specifically told by the FRB and/or the primary supervisors that they are
not eligible.
Please pass on as appropriate .
communications.
Please let us know if you need broader
(See attached file: 23a.doc.doc)
- 23a.doc.doc
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155006
FRB to LEH Examiner 001355
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, Chapter II of Title 12 of the Code
of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:
PART 223 -- TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN MEMBER BANKS AND THEIR
AFFILIATES (REGULATION W)
1. The authority citation for part 223 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 371c and 371c-1.
2. In section 223.42, add section 223.42(n):
§ 223.42 What covered transactions are exempt from the quantitative limits,
collateral requirements, and low-quality asset prohibition?
*****
(n) Securities financing transactions. (1) From September 15, 2008, until
January 30, 2009 (unless further extended by the Board), securities financing
transactions with an affiliate, if:
(i) The security or other asset financed by the member bank in the
transaction is of a type that the affiliate financed in the U.S. tri-party repurchase
agreement market at any time during the week of September 8-12, 2008;
(ii) The transaction is marked to market daily and subject to daily marginmaintenance requirements, and the member bank is at least as over-collateralized
in the transaction as the affiliate’s clearing bank was over-collateralized in
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155007
FRB to LEH Examiner 001356
-2comparable transactions with the affiliate in the U.S. tri-party repurchase
agreement market on September 12, 2008;
(iii) The aggregate risk profile of the securities financing transactions under
this exemption is no greater than the aggregate risk profile of the securities
financing transactions of the affiliate in the U.S. tri-party repurchase agreement
market on September 12, 2008;
(iv) The member bank’s top-tier holding company guarantees the obligations
of the affiliate under the securities financing transactions (or provides other
security to the bank that is acceptable to the Board); and
(v) The member bank has not been specifically informed by the Board, after
consultation with the member bank’s appropriate Federal banking agency, that the
member bank may not use this exemption.
(2) For purposes of this exemption:
(i) Securities financing transaction means:
(A) A purchase by a member bank from an affiliate of a security or other
asset, subject to an agreement by the affiliate to repurchase the asset from the
member bank;
(B) A borrowing of a security by a member bank from an affiliate on a
collateralized basis; or
(C) A secured extension of credit by a member bank to an affiliate.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155008
FRB to LEH Examiner 001357
-3(ii) U.S. tri-party repurchase agreement market means the U.S. market for
securities financing transactions in which the counterparties use custodial
arrangements provided by JPMorgan Chase Bank or Bank of New York or another
financial institution approved by the Board.
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155009
FRB to LEH Examiner 001358
-4-
By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, _____,
2008.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155010
FRB to LEH Examiner 001359
TAB 70
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Importance:
Attachments:
Deborah P Bailey
Scott Alvarez; Brian F Madigan
Coryann Stefansson; Norah Barger
collateral-- tri party
09/14/2008 07:23 PM
High
Lehman and Merrill triparty from Friday.xls
FYI. I received from FRBNY
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155011
FRB to LEH Examiner 001360
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155012
FRB to LEH Examiner 001361
$165,428,805.69
$165,428,805.69
$6,277,920,699.08
$6,277,920,699.08
$89,929,487.87
$2,674,176,032.18
$1,175,186,924.09
$805,616,583.38
$313,454,292.76
$246,577,370.37
$5,304,940,690.65
$24,085,672,945.97
$6,368,450,147.33
$4,346,379,090.10
$112,761,796.38
$4,063,809,618.59
$2,855,191,046.83
$1,034,140,556.09
$18,780,732,255.32
$21,870,059,122.19
$20,773,912,803.83
$7,849,096,343.76
$1,941,672,000.42
$521,211,945.79
$456,023,698.94
$53,411,975,914.93
Collateral Value After Margin Reduction
$6,856,050,745.96
$3,410,825,000.00
$3,410,825,000.00
5-Cash
$3,410,825,000.00
$3,410,825,000.00
$3,424,863,226.15
$3,424,863,226.15
$6,443,349,504.77
$173,701,302.31
$173,701,302.31
$6,682,349,443.65
$6,682,349,443.65
$90,713,505.60
$3,027,145,049.38
$1,525,685,336.91
$871,684,859.54
$375,162,664.39
$258,840,551.13
$6,149,231,966.95
$26,487,266,860.00
$6,815,633,488.61
$4,690,516,434.82
$115,141,390.81
$4,425,982,807.90
$3,191,621,072.49
$1,099,139,698.42
$20,338,034,893.05
$22,192,197,941.50
$21,486,061,277.53
$7,944,315,385.52
$2,027,192,130.16
$534,128,905.29
$478,390,092.93
$54,662,285,732.93
Collateral Value Including Accrued Interes
$3,425,143,990.95
$3,425,143,990.95
5-Cash as collateral
Equities & Equity Derivatives
Equities & Equity Derivatives
Other
Corporate Bonds
Asset Back Securities
Municipal Bonds
Private Label CMO
Commercial Paper
Corporate Bonds
Commercial Paper
Other
Private Label CMO
Asset Back Securities
Municipal Bonds
US Treasuries and Strips
Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae MBS
US Government Agency Securities
Freddie Mac & Fannie Mae REMICs
Ginnie Mae MBS Pools
Ginnie Mae REMICs
Item Count
4-Other
Non-Investment Grade
3-DTC Equities
Investment Grade
Non-Investment Grade
2-DTC Fixed Income Securities
Investment Grade
Customer
11.LEHMAN BROTHERS
1-FRB Securities
Triparty Collateral Analysis
100.00%
100.01%
106.44%
105.00%
100.87%
113.20%
129.82%
108.20%
119.69%
104.97%
107.02%
107.92%
102.11%
108.91%
111.78%
106.29%
101.47%
103.43%
101.21%
104.40%
102.48%
104.90%
Effective Margin %
Sat Sep 13 15:22:31 EDT 2008
HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL
FCIC-155013
FRB to LEH Examiner 001362
TOTAL Unwind:
Redacted Material
$94,841,572,329.84
$90,776,686,591.82
From:
To:
Subject:
Date:
Coryann Stefansson
Brandon Hall
Re: Reverse Counterparty Analysis I (Lehman Brothers)
09/14/2008 08:56 PM
Can u send the table as an attachment so we can see on bb?
Thanks so very very much!! And good work!!
Coryann Stefansson
Associate Director
Bank Supervision and Regulation
ź Brandon Hall
----- Original Message -----
From: Brandon Hall
Sent: 09/14/2008 08:37 PM EDT
To: BSR LFIC
Cc: Dianne Dobbeck; Richard Cahill
Subject: Reverse Counterparty Analysis I (Lehman Brothers)
RESTRICTED FR
This note summarizes the results of a Reverse Counterparty Analysis
for Lehman Brothers. We examined LFI exposures to Lehman Brothers
in comparison with Lehman's own view of its counterparty payables to
the LFIs. Via this comparison, it is possible to draw out major
discrepancies regarding key counterparty exposure names and
magnitudes. The Lehman version below represents the first of a multiMaterial Redacted
part analysis, which will also encompass
forward.
--According to the firm’s data, Lehman has $24.6B in counterparty current
exposure payables to the market. By sector, nearly half (45%) of
Lehman’s payables are to hedge funds, with 16% payable to
commercial banks. LFI payables amount to $818MM or 3% of total.
(USD Millions)
Lehman’s view of its LFI exposure payables ($818MM) differs from the
LFIs’ view of exposure receivables ($2.0B) -- just over $1B MTM. A
significant portion of this $1B gap is potentially explained by collateral
netting, differences in metric, and/or collateral valuation differences. We
do not perceive this difference between LEH's view and that of the LFIs
to be significant.
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Specifically (see table below),
-SocGen reports $662MM in exposure to Lehman, while Lehman
reports a nearly flat position of $9MM, possibly explained by a
difference in exposure metric as well as collateral netting.
-Credit Suisse reports $179MM, while Lehman reports $38MM,
possibly due to collateral netting.
-BNP Paribas reports $742MM in exposure, whereas Lehman
reports $294MM, possibly due to a difference in metric.
It should be noted that estimates of counterparty risk and exposures are
extremely fluid. For example, JPMC reports today that they do not have
confidence in a MTM number, given the dynamics of how underlying
risk factors will react when markets open tomorrow.
(USD Millions)
Please call with any questions,
Brandon Hall and Jordan Pollinger
____________________________________
Brandon J. Hall
Counterparty Credit Risk Monitoring & Analysis
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
33 Liberty St. | New York, NY 10045
P: 212-720-1349
F: 212-720-1468
E: brandon.hall@ny.frb.org
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TAB 71
From:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Date:
Mark VanDerWeide
Scott Alvarez
Rich Ashton
lehman and the PDCF
09/15/2008 09:33 AM
Scott:
Are you OK with Lehman b/d accessing the PDCF today in light of its parent's
chapter 11 bankruptcy? Or should we talk about this one more time. I think Baxter
is doing some analysis/writeup on this issue.
Mark
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@FedFRASER