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August 9,2010

Phil AngeJides

Cltnirlllnll

Via Email & Mail
Chairman Christopher Cox
Bingham McCutchen LLP
600 Anton Boulevard
Floor 18
Costa Mesa, CA 92626-7221

Hon. Bill Thomas

Vice Cltnirlllnll

Brooksley Born

Re:

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Hearing on May 5, 2010

Dear Chairman Cox:

Commissioner
Byron S. Georgiou

Commissioller

Thank you for testifying on May 5, 2010 in front of the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission and agreeing to provide additional assistance. Toward that end,
please provide written responses to the following additional questions and any
additional information by August 23, 2010.'

Senator Bob Graham

Comlllissioner
Keith Hennessey

Commissioller
Douglas Holtz-Eakin

Commissioner
Heather H. Murren, CFA

Commissioner
John W. Thompson

Commissioner

1. Do you think the current Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act is adequate in reforming the financial services system? If not,
please describe your recommendations or priorities for what Congress should
do in reforming the financial system.
2. Please describe the role of over-the-counter derivatives in the financial crisis.
3. Did any of the following factors create systemic risk and if so, how?
a. The concentration of derivatives in the hands of the large derivatives
dealers;
b. The interconnections between those dealers and/or other large financial
institutions through derivatives contracts;
c. Lack of transparency in the derivatives market.

Peter J. Wallison

Commissioner

I The answers you provide to the questions in this letter are a continuation of your testimony
and under the same oath you took before testifying on May S, 2010. Further, please be advised
that according to section 1001 of Title 18 of the United States Code, "Whoever, in any matter
within the jurisdiction of any department or agency often United States knowingly and willfully
falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Suite 800 • Washington, DC 20006-4614
Wendy Edelberg

Executive Director

202.292.2799 • 202.632.1604 Fax

Chairman Christopher Cox
August 9, 2010
Page 2 of2

4. Were derivatives a factor in necessitating the rescue of a number of large institutions? If so,
which institutions?
5. Were credit derivatives a factor in fueling the securitization of mortgages and other loans? If
so, did this in turn contribute to the housing and credit bubbles?
6. Were credit derivatives the primary cause of AIG's failure and the government's decision for
its rescue?

The FCIC appreciates your cooperation in providing the information requested. Please do not
hesitate to contact Sarah Knaus at (202) 292-1394 or sknaus@fcic.gov if you have any questions
or concerns.
Sincerely,

Wendy Edelberg
Executive Director, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
cc:

Phil Angelides, Chairman, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
Bill Thomas, Chairman, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission

Responses of Former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
to Additional Questions of August 9, 2010
from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
1. Do you think the current Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act is
adequate in reforming the financial services system? If not, please describe your
recommendations or priorities for what Congress should do in reforming the financial system.
No.
The most significant actors in the “shadow banking” system that contributed to the mortgage
meltdown were Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Their current status in federal conservatorship,
with multi-billion dollar losses continuing after taxpayers have already paid over $140 billion into
them to keep them afloat, is unsustainable. The government’s ongoing ownership and use of
these GSEs as instruments of policy to stimulate the housing market is inconsistent with the
ostensible aim of the legal conservatorships into which they have been placed, which is to restore
them to financial health. This is particularly important as the conservatorships: (1) have not
seriously addressed the underlying concerns raised by FHFA to justify the conservatorships; (2)
have not required the GSEs to charge guarantee fees that fully reflect the cost of Treasury's
Senior Preferred Stock or that build the capital base necessary for the GSEs to be considered
adequately capitalized, either under the old regime, or under the "bank-like" capital standards that
OFHEO and FHFA had previously suggested was appropriate for the GSEs; and (3) have
required the GSEs to engage in practices that support housing at the expense of their financial
well-being. Likewise, the government’s completely unjustifiable practice of keeping these two
GSEs off of the federal balance sheet even as they are under government ownership makes a
mockery of financial reporting norms and honest accounting. Addressing this glaring omission in
the Dodd-Frank Act must be the top priority of financial reform in the next Congress.
Next in importance is the inadequacy of bank capital and liquidity standards. Dodd-Frank does
not adequately address the obvious failure of the Basel standards in the financial crisis, their
powerful incentives for asset concentration in mortgages, their reliance on credit ratings per se,
and their role in generating the mortgage bubble that led to the financial crisis. The inadequacy
of the Basel standards currently in use became manifest with the bailouts of Wachovia, Citigroup,
Bank of America, and hundreds of other banks whose regulators, such as the Federal Reserve,
relied upon the Basel standards then and continue to do so. The failure of over 200 traditional
banks since the crisis began is further evidence of the need for more, and higher quality, bank
capital and liquidity. Yet the Basel process for reforming the current inadequate standards has
been tediously slow, and planned implementation of the results of that process has now been
delayed until 2018. This makes a U.S. legislative solution a matter of the utmost urgency, in
particular for commercial bank holding companies, whose ranks now include not only such large
and systemically important entities as Citigroup and Bank of America, but also the nation’s
largest investment banks.
The emergency actions taken from late fiscal 2008 through the middle of fiscal 2009 had the
effect of transferring significant investment risk from the private sector to the government, greatly
increasing the need for improved government accounting. The lack of high-quality standards for
the federal government’s financial statements has been an embarrassment for many years, but it
has become a critical obstacle to sound financial decision making by Washington policy makers
since the onset of the financial crisis. Dodd-Frank does nothing to deal with this problem.

Legislation is needed to ensure that the most significant financial obligations of the federal
government are not chiefly hidden off-balance sheet, as is the case today, and that they are fairly
presented in accordance with the highest standards of accounting in the private sector. Likewise,
with the $2.5 trillion state and local bond market under stress because of the insolvency of state
and local governments, both the protection of investors and the health of the economy require that
honest accounting standards are applied in the municipal market. Federal law should mandate the
maintenance of high quality, transparent accounting standards – and a standard setter with teeth –
for all state and local government securities that are traded in public markets.
Additionally, Dodd-Frank has inadequately dealt with the problem of concentration in
commercial and investment banking, and the correlative risk that financial failure in these
concentrated industries will permeate the financial system. Indeed, the crisis itself resulted in
greater concentration, as major banks were acquired or liquidated; arguably the Dodd-Frank
legislation serves to validate that status quo through its distinct regime for systemically important
institutions. In addition to giving the Financial Stability Oversight Council a strong incentive to
protect specific competitors, rather than to protect competition which might take market share
from the dominant firms, the “systemically important” designation implies government readiness
to support the firms in a crisis, perversely encouraging more risky behavior despite the more
stringent capital and other requirements, and thus deepening moral hazard. As former Federal
Reserve chairman Paul Volcker testified about the “systemically important” designation before
the House Financial Services Committee, “Whether they say it or not, that carries the connotation
in the market that they’re too big to fail.”
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act failed to include provisions mandating greater transparency in many
important areas of the financial markets. The recent financial crisis demonstrated how disclosure
that was adequate in a legal sense, but grossly inadequate in a practical sense, resulted in even
sophisticated investors relying on credit ratings in structured finance offerings. This lack of
transparency will become an even more serious problem as new rulemakings under the DoddFrank Act continue to multiply the number of forms, and their length, that are used for disclosure
by regulated entities. Congress should restore the concept of disclosure to its original purpose of
providing investors with clear and comprehensible information, in place of the highly legalistic,
often incomprehensible, and difficult to locate disclosure that is currently the norm. Instead of
disclosures that serve only to protect issuers in the event of litigation, legislation should mandate
an electronic system for use by government and issuers alike that permits each piece of
information to be individually searchable and that permits easy electronic collation and analysis
of that information on a broad scale. In addition to permitting markets to better price risk, such a
system would also greatly enhance the search for errors and fraud. Congress should also mandate
a new disclosure system based on a single, integrated platform for the administration of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, which uses interactive data for not only financial but nonfinancial information as well. Legislation to achieve these objectives is already under
consideration in the Congress.

2. Please describe the role of over-the-counter derivatives in the financial crisis.
Credit default swaps, which by law were unregulated by any agency of the federal government,
lacked transparency. Over-the-counter CDS contracts created financial exposures to the
mortgage market that were in many cases invisible to other market participants. Absent the
statutory authority to regulate CDS, no regulatory authority had a complete picture of how they
affected the regulated securities markets. Moreover, what was true for the government was also
true for the market. The available information about CDS and most other OTC derivatives

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products, as well as about market participants and trading, was seriously limited in comparison to
what was available for other financial products and markets subject to the federal securities laws.
Lacking such information, the market relied heavily on the credit rating agencies for analysis of
the reference securities and counterparties. Both the rating agencies and CDS sellers relied upon
flawed pricing models that failed adequately to consider issues such as seller-related downgrades.
The failure of market participants and regulators to assess the risks of CDS exposures and the
opaque disclosure of information that might have permitted its discovery became critical factors
in the financial crisis as the use of CDS grew enormously over the space of just a few years.
When an entire asset class – mortgages – began rapidly to lose value, the market began to
question the creditworthiness of the CDS counterparties themselves. The lack of transparency
meant that investors fled from exposure to both good and bad firms, in order to escape altogether
from risks that were known to be sizeable but the locus of which could not be precisely
determined. Since many of the affected firms were themselves mortgage lenders, the downward
pressure on their equity constricted their ability to lend and in many cases threatened their
viability. This in turn deepened both the mortgage crisis and the crisis for financial firms.

3. Did any of the following factors create systemic risk and if so, how? a) The concentration of
derivatives in the hands of the large derivatives dealers; b) the interconnections between those
dealers and/or other large financial institutions through derivatives contracts; and c) the lack of
transparency in the derivatives market.
Yes, each of these factors contributed to the creation of systemic risk.
The largest derivatives dealers were units of the largest commercial and investment banks. The
Federal Reserve and the Treasury effectively determined these financial institutions were “too big
to fail” at the height of the financial crisis.
In almost every case, the exposure of these banks to the collapse of the mortgage market was
deepened by their exposure to the CDS market and its counterparties. In some cases, the market
judged a bank’s exposure to the CDS market to be a negative factor simply because of uncertainty
about the extent of the exposure, a lack of transparency, and a lack of contrary evidence. But
even these factors alone, given the overpowering market movement to avoid hidden exposures to
the mortgage market collapse, were sufficient to contribute significantly to the weakening of the
largest banks.

4. Were derivatives a factor in necessitating the rescue of a number of large institutions? If so,
which institutions?
The rescue of the largest commercial banks, and the largest investment banks, through the TARP
and through Federal Reserve and Treasury-assisted ad hoc financing, was undertaken, according
to the Fed and Treasury at the time, because they believed that these institutions were too
interconnected with others in the financial system to be allowed to suffer losses or fail in the
normal way according to established rules and legal precedents. The same was true for AIG,
which was rescued at the very moment that Lehman was allowed to fail. Interconnectedness was
never defined with precision, but I believe that the Treasury and the Fed used it in significant part
as a shorthand for the exposure of a firm’s counterparties to risk from credit default swaps and
other derivative obligations that, the Treasury and Fed believed, would have caused large losses
to those counterparties. The Treasury and Fed further maintained that such losses would then
contribute to financial instability beyond the particular institutions involved. Other factors

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besides CDS and OTC derivatives, of course, also contributed to the Treasury and Fed decisions,
most notably the firms’ exposures to subprime mortgages and other toxic assets. Moreover, these
other factors were not independent of the impact of derivatives. When counterparties reduced
their exposures to a particular bank or financial institution over fears of its exposure to toxic
assets, this included moving their derivatives positions to other dealers, quickly withdrawing the
cash collateral they had posted. This intensified liquidity pressure on the already-struggling
institution, deepening its difficulties.
5. Were credit derivatives a factor in fueling the securitization of mortgages and other loans?
If so, did this in turn contribute to the housing and credit bubbles?
Yes. The use of credit derivatives fueled the securitization of mortgages by allowing banks and
other financial firms to take larger and more complex risks than they otherwise would have. The
seemingly inexpensive insurance provided by derivatives permitted the structuring of hedges that
ostensibly managed the risk — thus enabling the issuance of more mortgages and more corporate
debt within existing risk management parameters.
Since the derivatives contracts were tradable, this not only increased the number of parties that
were exposed when the mortgage market collapsed, but also made it harder for the market to
determine which banks and other firms wound up with unacceptable risks. Neither regulators
nor market participants could assess the size of particular firms’ derivatives positions and
exposures, which would have allowed both the monitoring of risk concentrations at individual
firms and the collation of data to determine systemic implications. Lacking this critical
information, investors fled from banks and financial firms as a class, deepening the crisis.
6. Were credit derivatives the primary cause of AIG's failure and the government's decision for
its rescue?
The decision by the Treasury and the Federal Reserve to inject what is thus far over $180 billion
in taxpayer funds into the attempted rescue of AIG was prompted, according to the Treasury and
the Fed at the time, by the interconnectedness of AIG within the financial system. By this was
meant the exposure of other firms to the risk of AIG’s inability to meet its obligations, including
in particular its contract obligations on CDS. Just as important was the lack of transparency in
the derivatives market, which has also been cited to justify the decision by the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury to commit to an attempted government rescue. From their perspective at the
time, the Fed and the Treasury could not determine whether those who held AIG’s $440 billion in
credit default swaps might suffer crushing losses if those instruments weren’t honored. It was
thus not just the actual exposure of AIG to the credit derivatives market, but also the fact that
regulators and market participants lacked the necessary information to understand the risks that
these exposures posed, that contributed to the Treasury and Fed decision to mount a government
bailout. The cost of this uncertainty, and the government's acting on the fear of what might ensue,
was enormous in terms of taxpayer dollars.

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