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The Papers of Eugene Meyer(mss52019)
117_02_001-




Subject File, Federal Reserve Board, F.R. Bank of NY — Correspondence,
1932 -3

EUGENE MEYER




SUBLIL,

P4c4cie.€44 eesz-evz- 804/u)
'• 4840( o,. 1./Y— (aiteEspodorre-

_

FINAL COPY

TRANSLATION

Jarriary 150 1932

CABLEGRAM F::OM PARIS
TO GOVT,,RNOR HA:- RISON

24 NEW YORK

JANUARY 13

STOP

INFLATION IS THE ORDF2 OF 7HE DAY
RES7RVE RANKS AS WELL AS

PH! LEGISLATIVE

DECIDED TO TAKE THIS ROAD

STOP

STOP

THE MEDAL

Aa;EIDLIES SrEM TO HAVE

THE DISCOUNT RATE WILL PRO-rABLY

LOWERED AT THE NUT MEETING OF THE BOARD OF DIR7CTORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW

YORK

STOP THE REDUCTION OF THE BUYING

RATE FOR ACCEPTANCES IN THE OPEN MARKET WHICH TOOK PLACE ON TUESDAY
IS A PF.EPARATORY MEASURE TO WHICH THE FEDERAL RESERVE .'RANK ALWAYS
HAS RECOURSE IN SUCH CASES

STOP

FINANCIAL CIRCLES CONSIDER IT AN

INDICATION OF A CHANGE IN MONETARY POLICY AND EXPECT HEAVY PURCHASES
OF GOMNMENT SECURITIES, ACCEPTANCES, AND PERHAPS OF OTHER P1 LS
,7T AND DEFOR THE PURPOSE OF INCREASING THE LIQUIDITY OF THE MAR7
FINITIVELY' ALLEVIATING THE GENERAL SITUATION

STOP

TH7 EFFORTS TO-

WARDS CREATING MONETARY EASE ARE ACCOMPANIED BY PROPOSALS rrNDING TO
BROADEN THE CR-DIT 73ASES AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS

STOP

PRESIDE:71T

HOOVER SURUITTED THEM IN HIS MESSAGE OF JANUAR'
, 4th AND HAS SINCE

MANDED

FROM CONGEESS VARIOUS MEASURES OF THIS NATURE

STOP

DE-

THERE

IS REASON TO EXPECT THAT ALL ATTEMPTS TO CURB INFLATION AND HAMPER
CREDIT EXPANSION BASED ON LONG TERM PAPER
OPPOSITION

STOP

WILL M7ET WITH GENERAL

INFLATIONARY IDEAS HAVE SERIOUSLY TAKEN HOLD OF

i!ANY MINDS IN FINANCIAL CIRCLES AND THEIR CONCERN IS !UCH MORE TO
TARRY OUT THESE IDEAS AT LEAST I




PART THAN TO LI'IT TH"IR DEVELOP-

-2STOP

WALL STREET IS GENERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE

MEASURES AND HAILS INFLATION AS ASSURING AN UPWARD MOVEMENT OF SECURITIES STOP

THE MORE CONS"RVATIVE FINANCIERS ARE ALARMED BY THAT APPEARS

TO BE THE INAUGURATION OF ANEW ERO EXTRAVAGANCE (TASTE) AND PREDICT
POSSIBILITIES OF DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES ENSUING

STOP

THEY 'RELIEVE

THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT THAT BENEFICENT EFFECTS OF AN ERA OF
CREDIT EXPANSION WILL LAST LONG AND THEY THINK GOOD RESULTS WOILD
RATHER BE OBTAINED BY THE SYSTEMATIC APPLICATION OF OTR REMEDIES
RELATING PARTICULARLY TO FORAM TRADE, GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND TAYES
STOP

THE GREATEST DANGER INHERES IN THE RISK TO VETCH THE FEDERAL

RESERVE BANKS AE EXPOSED IN CONNECTTOU WITH THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS
FOR THE BROADENING OF THEIR

DISCOUNT

AND LOAN OPERATIONS

STOP

THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS THEMSELVES SOME TIME AGO DECLARED AGAINST
ANY CHANGE IN THE DISCOUNT RE-qULATIONS AND AGAINST ANY r'ROADENING
OF THE OMIT 9ASE AS AT PRESENT AUTHORIZED
PRESENT AS IF THEY HAD CHANGED THEIR OPINION

STOP
STOP

IT LOOKS AT
SOME EVEN INSIST

UPON THE NECE:SITY OF SOFTENING THE REGULATION IN iORCE

STOP

IN 'an

OF THESE DEVELOPENTS CERTAIN OBSERVERS REMARK TIAT THE GOLD EXPORT
WHICHCEASED SOME TIME AGO MAY EASILY BEGIN AGAIN THE MARKETS MICH
PERMIT THE FREE 17X.13071 OF GOLD HAVING EVERYWHERE BECOME VE27 NA7ROW
H. PARKER WILLIS
(3ANK OF FROCE)

Foreign Information Division,
January 15, 1952
GL







Mb, •




THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASH I NGTON

March 22, 1933.

TO GOVERNOR MEYER:

Attached is a copy of letter dated
March 21st from Governor Harrison in regard
to certain foreign exchange transactions,
together with a copy of my reply.
I will greatly appreciate it if you
will consider this and give us the benefit
of your views as soon as practicable.

Copy sent to:
Dr. Miller
Mr. James
Mr. Hamlin
Mr. Morrill
Mr. Coldenweiser
Mr. 7:yatt
J/.(0j




Mar& 22, 1933.

Dear Governor Harrison:

FOREIGN "EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS

I have your letter of March 21st in regard to certain
transactions in foreign exchange which are being eonsummated
under the Executive Order of the President of March 10, 1933.
I should like to consider this question somewhat and shall
discuss it with Mr. Kent when he is here tomorrow.

I shall

then write you further in regard to it.
For the present it seems to me satisfactory to proceed
unon the basis w-xich you indicate.
Sincerely yours,

.

(Signed) A. A. BaL

AA3:abm

George L. Harrison, Esq.,
Governor, Federal Reserve Bank,
New York, N Y.

44.0
COPY
FEDERAL RESEEVh BANK
OF NEW YORK
March 21, 1933.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I am writing to confirm our telephone conversation this
morning with respect to certain transactions in foreign exchange
which are being consummated under the Executive Order of the
President of March 10, 1933.

As you know, this Executive Order

provides "No permission to any banking institution to perform
any banking functions shall authorize such institution **** to
engage in any transaction in foreign exchange except such as may be
undertaken for legitimate and normal business requirements, for
reasonable traveling and other personal requirements, and for the
fulfillment of contracts entered into prior to March 6, 1933."
This bank is required by the Executive Order of March
10, 1933, to report to the Secretary of the Treasury all transactions in foreign exchange in this district which are prohibited.
Consequently, we are called upon to interpret the provisions of
the Executive Order with regard to foreign exchange transactions
and to decide as best we can whether those transactions are in
fact in contravention of the Executive Order.
There is one class of foreign exchange transactions
about which we wish to advise you.

There are, of course, many

foreigners who own dollars in this market.

As the principal money

market in this country it is entirely natural that this should be
so, and each day there are current dealings in foreign exchange by




Federal Reserve Bank of New York

2.

Hon. A. A. Ballantine.

3/21/33.

foreigners whose dollars have accumulated beyond the amount
which they would normally expect to carry, or which are required
for other reasons.

The purchase of foreign exchange by such for-

eigners is considered a natural and normal transaction which the
banks carry out in the course of the day's work.

It does not rep-

resent a flight of capital by American holders, but rather represents a repatriation of dollar funds by foreigners wishing, for
one reason or another, to bring their dollars home.

It is our

judgment that it would be inadvisable for the banks to refuse to
conduct these transactions so long as they are usual and normal
transactions within reasonable limits.

To do so would undoubtedly

be interpreted abroad as a sign of weakness on our part and it might
well result in a severe decline in the quotation of the dollar.
By means of daily reports which we obtain from all dealers
in foreign exchange in this district, we keep ourselves currently
informed as to the extent of the movements of foreign funds in this
market.

As long as withdrawals by foreign owners remain within

reasonable limits and do not materially weaken the position of the
dollar, it is our belief that such transactions may properly be
considered "for legitimate and normal business requirements."

If, on

the other hand, any withdrawals of foreign funds from this market
should assume unreasonable and abnormal proportions and would appear
to menace the position of the dollar, it would we believe be entirely
appropriate to put a stop to such withdrawals as being in contravention of the above-mentioned provisions of the Executive Order.
This letter is merely to advise you of the fact that transactions of this character are being carried on daily by banks and



•

.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York

3.

Hon. A. A. Ballantine

3/21/33

dealers in foreign exchange, that we do not believe it would be
advisable to attempt to prohibit them so long as they remain
within reasonable limits and do not prejudice the position of the
dollar, but that if they should assume such unreasonable proportions as to menace the position of the dollar, we think they might
then be prohibited on the ground that they are not "for legitimate
and normal business requirements."
Very truly yours,

(Signed)

Honorable A. A. Ballantine,
Undersecretary of the Treasury,
Treasury Department,
Washington, D. C.




George L. Harrison,
Governor.

Dictated over the telephone by Miss McCarrick.

Basle
Received May 4, 1932.

PERSONAL FOR HARBISON
THE PRESS REPORTS REGARDING THE GOLDSBOROUGH BILL, THE
(1)
CONTENTS OF WHICH ARE NOT CLEARLY REPORTED, AND THE VOTE IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ON IT, HAVE CAUSED A NEW WAVE OF ANXIETY IN EUROPE
CONCERNING THE DOLLAR. YESTERDAY AND TODAY WE HAVE RECEIVED PROBABLY
FIFTEEN IELEPHONE INQUIRIES FROM ALL OVER THE CONTINENT. CONFIDENTIAILY,
ONE SMALLER CENTRAL BANK TODAY WITHDREW ITS DOLLAR BALANCES, SUBSTITUTING
INSTEAD FRENCH FRANCS. ANOTHER HAS INSTRUCTED US TO TRANSFER ITS DOLLAR
BALANCES INTO GOLD.
HAS
(2)
MY ONLY PURPOSE IN REPORTING THE FOREGOING, WHICH 1331 PROBABLY
ALREADY COME TO YOUR ATTENTION FROM OTHER SOURCES, IS TO KEEP YOU ADVISED
OF THE SENSITIVE AND NERVOUS DISPOSITION WHICH PREVAILS ON THE CONTINENT
IN CONNECTION WITH AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS.




(signed) MCGARRAGH

Extract from cable of May 4 from Governor Harrison to Mr. McGarragh

I realize that the Goldsborough bill has had a bad psychological
effect abroad and while it is not certain -That its fate will be in the
Senate, nevertheless the reaction against the bill in the Dress and on
the part of the most responsible people have been so widespread and
vigorous that we are hopeful that it will be defeated in the Senate.
In any event, however, our opinion is that it will certainly be vetoed.
As you perhaps know, both Governor Meyer and I have publicly opposed its
passage.

By many the bill is not considered seriously or else is regarded

as wholly innocuous.

It was passed by the House, I think, largely as a

political gesture on the theory that even if it would do no good, it could
do no harm.
But even if the bill should ever become law, which we think most unlikely, you will see from its text that it contains no realizeable threat of
currency inflation.

Furthermore, its enactment into law would not lead us

to make any daange in our present policy.




The bill reads as follows:

"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States that
the average purchasing power of the dollar, as ascertained by the
Department of Labor in the wholesale commodity market, for the
period covering the years 1921 to 1929, inclusive, shall be
restored and maintained by the control of the volume of credit
and currency.

The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal reserve

banks, and the Secretary of the Treasury are hereby charged with
the duty of making effective this policy."

Plan for Providing Immediate Employment.
(Revised as of June 27th, 1932)
ress and by states and cities
The plans being considered in Cong
d
ide eployment are, first increase
for relief of unemployec or to prov
or
ars,
doll
of
hundre's of millions
charity on a large scale running into
re
natu
and
ss,
in location, timeline
second, creation of public works which
ic
publ
not meet the need. The
"Eia-FiEtent of employment required, will liability for maintenance and
ng
works will constitute also a continui
° - few in number.
ing
idat
liqu
f
"sel
the
operation except
to work almost immediately
This substitute plan proposcs to put
that a total of 3,000,000 people will
11000,000 people and it is believed
be given employment. As part of the
be employed who otherwise would not
to employment is averaged on the base
work is seasonal, the objective as
actual number of employes.
of increoso in number of days rather than
employment to which they are
This Plan puts the people to work in
the migration of people and
accustomed and very largely at home, saving
lt; that is, if people employed
the destruction of communities as a resu
values will be maintained,
are kept in communities already created,
and savings banks kept open;
es
property create'' there made useful, stor
vity to all creative industry
and the incident business and labor acti
will be maintained.

of available bank reUnder this plan the very large reservoir
nels and under existin7 governserves will be employe through normal chan
nstruction Finance Corporation,
ment and banking agencies including the Reco
g savings banks,building and loan
Federal Reserve System, all banks includin
will have the cooperation of the
societies, and the like. These agencies
set up in each Federal Reserve
Business and Banking Committees recently
be necessary.
District with such sub-committees as may
e will be no call on the
Through the use of existing reserves, ther
a loan fund. The only call upon
government to sell securities to create
time, and when incurre, for actual
the government will be over a period of
handled through the Reconstruction
losses to be paid, these losses to be
its other operations.
Finance Corporation and classified apart from
s but Will increase
The plan will not put any burden upon the bank
nature and.therefore tax bearing
their usefulness. It will be productive in
s program involves.
instead of tax consuming, which public 'eork
s of labor and material,
The Plan in its essence is that employer
record and known character, will agree
in good standing because of previous
additional materials, certifyto employ additional labor and therefore usr and materials would not othering in applying for the loan that such labo
the approval of the Banking and
wise be use, that loans will be made with
O.K.'d by representatives of the
Business Committees referred to and resnonsive to such applications. They
Reconstructicn Finance Corporation
able to repay on basis of his
shall be repaid as fast as the borrower is
Rate of interest is one par
earnings as indicated by income tax returns.
rict (but this is open to dis
cent above the rediscount rate in that dist
g to the judgment
Security may or may not be reeuired accordin
cussion).
ion may be made
icat
apnl
The
of the con -ittee that has power to approve.
on to the comit
send
its recommendation '7111
to a local bank, which with
mittee or sub-committee, or it may be made direct.



-2The loans are roughly classified into two groups:
First, those of users of labor and material who have been successful
in the pst but now find themselves going into liquidation because of inability to secure working capital, the banks being either unable to furnish
the money, or desirous in protecting themsalves and not takinp, any chances,
of asking for repayment of existing loans through liquidation of inventoriea
and other current assets and the like: this being largely for fear the
industry will not be able to supply working capital from other sources.
The second group will be those such as of the railroads and other
industries who are deferring all possible expenses in order to avoid charges
to operating expenses, and through such avoidance, maintain their black
ink situation, showing they have earned fixed charges; and further than that,
to keep their cash in position to meet anticipated demands. Many such
industries can properly enlarge upon their operations without any question of
overproduction being involved.
It is proposed therefore that money advanced shall not involve
charges to current operating expenses except with the consent of the borroi:,er,
but will be carried in a suspense account as an "anticipated expenditures",
and later on, _hen net earnings make federal income tax payable and these
loans likewise become due and are paid, either be charged direct to profit
loss or into the normal operating account as may be decided. V1ith respect to
the railroads, counsel and auditor advise me that only the approval of the
Interstate Commerce Commission is needed to create such a suspense account
with deferred liabilities set up as proposed.
Activities under this plan can cease in any section or with respect
to production of any commodity, or as a whole l on action of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation or the President. Of necessity, it decentralizes the
power of making loans except large loans; but this will not interfere
with current, intensive revier of all loans made including classification or
cessation of activity temporarily or permanently at any time as may be concluded best.
The plan brings into use the needed experience and ability of business leaders and gov-:rnment finance officers and banks locally gained, on the
broad foundation of considerinr- the national and local need for employment
and the use of materials; with a quickening of the pulse of business generally
it is believed an advance in commodity prices will core since demand depends
75% on employment; and taxation, which is now a tremendous burden, must depend
almost altogether on productive employment.
The point of under consumption rather than overproduci-ion has certainShelves are bare; buying in on a hand to mouth basis. Fear
ly been reached.
and lack of purchasing power have reduced demand tremendously. As to overproduction, the situation canbe safeguarded by limiting the productive
activity of any concern to the quantity produced say in the twelve months
ending June 30th, 1931. It can be further and perhaps better controlled by
stopcing activity with respect to the production of any kind of goods if there
appears to be an over supply. I firmly believe, however,that the increased
payrolls and increase of material we will need, will in alnott every direction
overcome any problem of presumed overproduction without any narked limitation
on loaning power that might be created through this plan. The plah does not




go beyond encoarea7ing the activities which would be done in normal times
The plan indeed is not intended
and to a normal extent without this aid.
to go Beyond using money and ere ,it to a normal extent as ressured say by
the twelve manths ending June 30th, 1931. If the railroads during the
twelve Tonths ending July 1st, spend as much money on maintenance as they
did in the twelve months period name,-1, it would illustrate the aealication
of a so-called normal
esure to an abnarrially depressed situation.
The objections to the plan are plain. The lack of adeauate
security, the lack of definite time of repaairent, errors in judgment which
will make for losses, competition in an industry whore some people need
help and some do not, and use of credit which will in some instances create
an unsuccessful activity -- these have been thought of and weighed as
against the vast charity distribution we hlve to make or the great waste
of money in public expenditures; and have not been found formidable. There
is the advantage that after this plan is tried, it may be changed or done
away with and without any undue shock or publicity
Further, it proposes to give help to those who have been successful
heretofore; but have not set up a back log of credit because they have not
foreseen these abnormal conditions.
&nd to encoura7o everybody to do the
the things they would like to do if they could keep black ink above fixed
charges.
It will be noted that the alan provides not for handlnaa out the
money, but for contracts for loans; and the borrower must each month make
a report in order to secure his noney showing that he has lived up to his
obligations to provide additional employment of labor and use of materials
in accordance with the datails set forth in. such contract. This is not
an impossible condition at all since all large corporations have authority
for exaenditure reauests covering in every detail every unusual expenditure
before the work is undertaken; and the cost of the work is then checked up
against such detailed requests.
I h,ve attached hereto in detail a suggestion as to how the plan should be made operative. This foreword covers the purpose and the method
in a general way.
If I did not feel the railroads could be induced in thirty days to
100,000
men to work under it that would not otherwise be employed this
Put
year, I would not propose it. The test is before acceptance to get them to
agree to it.




Yeeorendum of Plan in Detail
Its objectives are:
(a) Put to work 1,000,000 men in sixty days nfter nechinery established,
and as n direct incidence nean the employment of 2,000,000 more,

(b) the work to be Productive, of neture to which people ere accustomed
and therefore fitted, requiring minimum of migration from homes- thus making
for least economic waste in personal affairs,
(c) revive industry along normal lines without material waste and save
from bankruptcy or absolute disappearance thousands of business • activities
heretofore successful, and: in other instances maintaining a necessary
efficiency,
(d) not to interfer?with the very vital and necessary efforts of industry
to maintain black ink in its operations essential to its credit and indeed
to its life; which under existing conditions hns necesserily resulted in a
narrowing circle of use of both labor and nnterial,
(e) utilizing existing agencies - all banks, bui1din7 and loan associations
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Reserve System, the newly created
Business and Banking Committees in each. Federal Aeserve District - minimizing
additional machinery and exeense,
(f) bring into use united exp rience and ability of business leaders,
goverment finance officers, and bankers to the end that loans may be most
wisely made to fit our national need,
(g) enable banks to utilize
or loss to either stockholders
fulness, security and earnings
and loan associations, and any
eluded,

their great reserves without fear of depositors
or depositors, but instead incrense the useof banks, saving and loan essociations,building
other financial institutions that may be in-

(h) use the credit of the United States most economically through the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (using as agencies the factors mentioned
in (e), to extent necessary with least actual draft in Immediate future on
such credit in proportion to service that credit will render),

(i) necessitating the establishment of no new government debt to meet the
requirement that our people be put back to work; will check inflation later
on beceune of repayments necessary,
(j) the operation to be slowed down, changed or stopped entirely as the
need dwindles or disappears, or lack of usefulness is demonstrated,
(k) maintain industry which pays the taxes and upon which the government
must depend for existence. In other words, spend the money through tax-payin
instead of tax-spending activities. VA) cannot collect taxes from highways,
post offices, bridges or other public enterprises,
(1) would ston many desirable business activities from liquidating their
working stocks to meet their debts, such liquidation involving further
demoralization of erices RS well as putting activities out of business and
further reducing employment,




r,

0041.1116

(m) as a. final result, entail a very modest loss (comparatively) to the
Government from loans made compared with any other evenue of expenditure
proposed that will bring Pack employment; such losses to be realized over st
period of time and not immediately.
Use

of Govevneont Credit.

(I) Broaden vowers of Reconstructien Finance Corporetien end enable
St to establish additionel creeit for purpose of restorine employment of
capital and lebor under cenditions thet, while eiving fair aseurance of
return of loans with interest, involve risks that banks, insurance cereanies,
saving and loan societies, and building and loan corporations cannot undertake because of their responsibilities to depositors, lenders and share
holders; and also loans that normally would be made by such orgenizetiens End
cannot now be undertaken because of present liettations on their lending
powers.

Further to induce railroads and other large corporations to under-

teke naintonance and other work deferred with provision thet current
operating charges will not be increased thereby.
(2) Ageneiee to lea i:naployee.
The agencies to be employed are the Fedoeal Reserve eystee, the
banks, building and loan associatiers, and the Business and. banking Comeittees
recently established, slid such other agencies as Reconstruction. Finance
Corporntlen may select. (This will save any unnecessary expense in admininistration.

Nxisting loan agencies such as the banks can then carry the loans

thomeelves if they wish, thus utilizing any reserve creJits they may have to
the extent they choose to do so, eith asserenco thet if need arises, loans
will be taken off their hands by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
through Federal Reserve banks when disceentee or direct.)
(3) General Rules Governine Loans.
Loans will be finally aperoved, if not in greater sum than 4‘i0,000
to any one borrower, by a oommittee consisting in each Federal Peserve
District ofthe nominees of the Reconstruction Fieance Uorooratien, the
Federal Reserve beard, and the Busiress and Bankine Coneittee recently



_3organized.

or by reference
This comrittee ray either upon the initiative of

loan by a joint action
thereto be instructe1 with respect to any particular
principal representatives
of the Governor of the Federal Reserve Eoard, the
ct, and the Business
of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in thqt distri
whole to consider such
and Banking Comrittee calle as a committee of the
loan.

rm 7 ttees within the
The loan committee will also be aided by sub-co

three organizations as ray be fror tiro to tire create
separately or collectively.

by such organizations,

(Separate loan committees may be establishoj in

districts geograohically large.)
al of the three
If a loan exceeds 0.00,000 it must hnve the aprov
organizations in meeting called for that purpose.

If it excers 45s000,000

Finance Corporation through
it must hove the an7roval of the Reconstruction
(Those local authoriits properly authorized officers at V;ashingtons D.C.
ovorburden ':,nshington
ties granted are to secure prompt action necesspry, not
on for informed
authorities, the local cor71ttee must generally bn depended
judgments anyway.)
the
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation will hive

DO

or to

nding at any one time,and
deter•ne the maximum arount of loans to be outsta
for each Reserve District;
will from time to time ratably deterrine the limit
and may Impose conditions as to loans to any one industry.

The borrower

d his principal
must apply for loans within the district in wh;ch is locate
through one channel.
place of business and shall make application only

One

subsenuent loans. The
loan does not preclude the borrower from securing
shall not at any
total loans contracted for, whether or no n.ctually made,
time exceed five billion dollars.

Initially the Reconstruction Fiance

Reserve Districts
Corporation shall apportion a creOlt among the Federal
In such amounts as it finds necessary.
must have been
The borro7ers or their oredeces ors in interest
engaged in the business on account of which loans to be rade continuously



.
L

Loane can be made only for ourooso of employrent

311100 Jan ory 1, L3-30.

r and
of capital and labor that according to the best judgeont of the borrove
.2111.21in would not otherwise have boon created. The borrower
a_aLLaa.LaL.12
Er
o'rtnership,
other corporation or
or
tive
coopera
a
ual,
individ
may be an
any institution or individual norm'Illy obtnining credit.
Loans shall be ride only within a period of two yearn after the
effective date of lecislation making such leans available.

The Reconstruct-

ion Finance Corporation ray with the approval of the President suspend the
makine of loans at any tire and for any period.
within a period of five years

All loans must be repaid

except as provided for

hareinefter by

collections in connection with payment of income taxes.
shall be one per cent

The rate of interest

above the discount rate effective in such Federal

Reserve District st the time the 1 ,an is made and subject to revision annually in accord with the discount rate in effect as arranged for thirty days
prior thereto.

Interest

payeble semi-annually.

The cormittees havin0authority to approve loans shall determine
what security, ifeany, shall be required but unless otherwise provided when
loan is made, any addition in the way of security through such loans shall
be maintained free and clear

of incuMbrance, or other security equal in

value given in lieu thereof as security for the loan.

No loan shall be made

that shall cover expenditures extending over a period of more than tee years.
No loan shall be made that withhis otle-r expenditures vill exceed the expenditures of the borrower for like purposes for a correseondine; prior
period on seasonal or annual besis in the :veers ondce

June 30, 1931.

(4) Applications for Loans.
The applicant may apply direct to the loan comeittoe in each Federal
Reserve District or to any bank, building and lean association, or other
approved financial agency willingto act as agent therefor.

He will contract

ment through
for such loan as will enable him to give additional emplo



exDenditurF,s for labor and
materials.

"Mat.-)rials"

ill include all
supplios and -rtcles of
utility essential to his
work. Be will accompany
such application with an
Authority for Exrendituro
Request, such as in use
by railroads and other
large corporations Trener
ally, showin7, ,
)roDose:! use
of the money to be borrow
ed, its anticipate' divisi
on between employment of
labor and purchase of materi
al, overhead chsrges, and
inter;Ist, the estimated
time within which it is to
be used and all other inf
ormativo dQt us that
will, responsive to the inf
ormation required in suc
h expenditure request
by the Reconstruction Fin
ance Corporation, enable
the loan committee to
pass promptly upon the loa
n with a minimum of additi
onal investigation by
the agency or sub-com-itte
esprovided for.
If the application be mad
e
through an agency such cs
a bank, then that agency
shall in transr-itting
the request to Vie loan
com7ittee give its views,
if any, as to desirabil
ity
of such loan and the abi
lity and willir.gness of the
borl.ower to carry out
the ..c,rms of the contract.
The borrower shall in thi
s certificnte under oatl
state that to the best of
his belief and judgment the
money will provide,
Insofar as his business is
concerne,10 use of materials
and labor th9t ould
not otherwise be created;
not more than 15% may be
used for olp.rhead and
interest charges.
If a l ,an be aporove ,

a certificate shall be
issuea by the loan
com-Ltteo. Loan shall then
be rode through an age
ncy of the borrower's
choosing or if he has no cho
ice or the agency chosen
is not wil1in to set,
then through an agency of the
committee's selection. The
Ian certificate
shall cc deposited with such
agency. Rec'mstruction Fin
ance Corporation
shall provide report blanks
on a form on zhIch the bor
rower may record and
attest to the expenditures
made in accord v.ithlthe provis
ions of the loan
contr,--ct.
borrower may then call on the
agency at the end of any
.-ree6
period but not more frenDe
ntly than once a month with
atieste- statement of




expenditures incurred for labor and materials in accord with the terms of
the contract, and the agency thereupon will pay to the borrower the amount
shown, takini7 his receipt therefor, upon the loan controt and attach:ng
•statorent of expenditures thereto as voucher.

(It is exrected that 90% of

loans approved locally will be made through bf?nks as agencies.)
Reconstruction Finance Corporation, if the loan be of any areunt req4iring its home office aproval, will detersne the channel through which
payment is to be Ir.a.de.
'Any bank or other financial _corporation so erToered acting as agency
for the loan cammittee may carry loans made for its awn account for such
period as it max choose and collect interest and principal accordingly; but
rendering staterent as often as the loan cor,eittee shall require of such loans
so carried, and status of each.. It shall be at liberty at any time to call
upon the Reconstruction Finance Corporation through such agency as it may
direct (preferably the Federal Reserve Banks) to take over any such loans.
Federal Reserve Ban'ics may discount such obligations accordingly.

Agencies

for the loan comvittoes will be paid for actual expenses incurred under such
rules as may be established by the Rec:Aistruetion Finance Corporation, and
such

expenses shill be charged to the borrower,
Loan corrittee, or any sub-committee, or any agent for either shall

at all times

have the right to examine the borrower's books or rake any

other investigation desired with respect to conduct of his arfairs that may
be related to the use of the money secured through the loan.

If agency does

not desire to carry the loan, it shall under the rules and through. channels
provided by the Reconstruction Finance- Corporation, be promptly relieved by
advances equal to the arount paid to the borro.::er with intre.ost
under the certificates of expenditure hereinbefore referred to.




at loan rate

-7(5) Accounting for Xxponditure of rt)ney Secured from Logns.
Imsnuch

5 the money secure:: under loans involves exyorditures that

otherwise would not have been'undertaken and which may not immediately
return to the borrmer any net returns, it rmy be desirable thRt all such
loans bz; carrie

in a zusense account with full detsil.

ThP exenditures

made thereunder shall not 6.1, entered in the norral accounts of the borrower
unless othrwise a7reed at tine loan is contracte

for, or

later desired,

except as and when repaynnts are mpdc., when with the interst accrue'j and
paid he ray dispose threof with apropriato allocations to ceoltal and
profit and loss accounts or direct to operating expenses.

n
'oc;:nstructi

Finance kl:oeporetian will det-rm;ne the method of aceountin7 disposition, it
being undretood, however, that unless the borrower cnnsents, his normal
accounting as it oth•-rwise would exist without such loans shall not be
This is of vital importance and requires careful c:nsiderntien.

disturbed.

Plan must be worked out so ns not to interfere with borrower's necessary
efforts to raintain black ink in his operations.

It is rel!Aed to orvision

thst loans seed not be repaid until borrcmer makes roney !-ls shown by income
tax staterent.

He must have an incentive to borrow and take a chance. The
•••••••=1•011.11.1.

enployment is borrower's necessity for nein-

thief cusr.! of dwindling

taining black ink In accounts and cash in banks.
(6) tieonyment of Loans.
Leans shall be made for

Et

p7r1od not exceecling five years except

as renaid through income taxes but nay be repaid by the borrower at any time
with accrued interest
notice.

the end of any calendar month on tirty days'

After makin7 allowance for any such

payments, the loan will be

collecte!1 through annual paynents equal in amount each yoar im the Income
tax paid by the borrovier until the whole remaininr: amount with interest
is repaid.




Collection will be made at same time and throw7h the same

asFlor

channel as the income tax is collected.
Collection through income, tax channels shall be established in 1934
for leans made in 1932; in 1935 for loans rade thereafter.
The amount of such collections by the income tax representatives
shall be credited to the Reenstrnetion Finance Corporation; or a receipt
showing payment from the holders of loan contract for amount due under this
paragraph will be accepted as a credit by the income tax bureau of the
Treasury Department*
All loans made hereunder, principal and interest, to extent remaining
unpaid shall be due and payable November 10 1942.
The agencies that can give the greatest immediate employment
NOT
cannot do so unless they have a real incentive. The incentives are:
(1) Vo call on their cash.
(2) Wo necessary repayment until as shown by income tax return they
can afford it - subject to ten year limitation.
(3) No edde llred ink° to current.operation through added charges
to operating expenses.
(4) opportunity to repay when money is easy with them or cheap loans
avnil4b1e. (It is not probable that 11:eney actually will be
collected threuf9a income tax channels; but the orovision will
insure collections when borrower has made money.)
(5) The revival of industry which will help everybody.
The question is - will these inducements be sufficient to enable
large industrial enterprises to add to their activitiest

I think so.

I will

ascertain the attitude of the railroads; an ennfident they will authorize
added emplement equivalent to giving sobs to 100,(X0 men.
As to less r enterprises or those in more difficult situations who
cannot Fo ahead unless they can borrow money through other channels than
normal bank credits, though heretofore successful and enjoying such bank
credit.

I know personally at least fifty such - perhaps could name a

hundred.

In some instances the life of a whole community is involved.

The incentive to then is sufficient.

They will remain going concerns

Instead of liquidating, and will give employment and buy material accordingIy4




Th..- largest building and lean association on the-Pecific Coast has

-9not made a loan in thirteen months.

It is pressing, collections instead

because of constant cash withdrawals.

No end of foreclosures are under lay.

dislike even to think
This must not continue or we will have n problem we
about.

wish to
It could, for example, make many loans now to people 'ho

build.
Direct relief can be afforded to sore extent there; more 1:7Tortant
is the resumrAion of onployrent which will stabilize that situation v.ith
resrect both to building and loan pfrsrents and withdrawals.
The basis of this plan is tht the great bank credit re!lerves shall
be made available for loans to increase employment and encourage industry by
the assumption of any lose by the povernr7ent.
There will be loss, but it will be wisely incurred for loans will be
intelligently made; nnd such loss will be snall compared with the alternatives.
The dole budFet now exceeds 0 0,CC0,000 annually if we include
cormmity chests and the like.

Any nati nal dole legislation will increase

this enormolzsly; and pork barrel public work involves such west°, inefficiency nn to objectives andicontinuing

119b3.lities

to be intolerable.

Nor will our incorre tax returns suffer, even if the ;oncentive be
2(, if plan succeeds; for unless sore bold step be succesfully undetaken
there wIll be only drie1 up sources for such taxation.
And again, I would point out such a plan as this with the apnroval
of the President and the Reconstruction Finance Corporation can be dropped,
slowed down, modified or for the time being susended
notice.




almost without

R,/ —

tti \i KING AND INVOSTRIAL COMITTEE
of the
RESERVE DISTRICT
FEDERAL
SECOND
July 16, 1952.
Proposals for Putting Credit into

Use

1. Public mrks - Many worthy projects may be found, but measures must
be taken to improve budgetary positions of States and municipalities
in order that they can borrow.

Snell reduction in current expenditures

or increases in receipts would assure service for large loans.
a. New York City has public works program of 2 billion dollars; authorizations for projects to be undertaken this year have been rescinded to
extent of 100 Anions and few, if any, authorizations are being made
for next year, because of inability to borrow.
b. New York Port Authority projects.
c. Other State and city projects.
2.




Private or semi-Public construction _Projects
a. East Side housing development to clear slums and provide cheap hems.ing.

In stage of negotiation Ath several interested, and opmetiines

conflicting, parties.

Some important auestions remain to be solved,

but it is possible that if strenuous efforts were made active work
of demolition could be started within 60 days.
b. Rehabilitiation scheme - Formation of into groups of large non-competetive companies to supply financing for repairs, etc. of atructures now
obsolete.
other.

Several such groups may be formed to compete with each

Expected that participants will be able to obtain funds with-

out special action.

question of organization, not of credit.

-23. Mortgage funds Not only does lack of mortgage money retard new building, but also
failure to renew or large payments of principal required on maturing
mortgages at this time of reduced incomes necessitates considerable harmful liquidation.

Although reduction in mortgage debt is justified on

basis of reduced vaues, postponement of zonte of this readjustment would
materiany aid present situation.

This will °all in some cases for gen-

erous measures of relief 'with some sacrifice of principles of soundness,
but in many cases perfectly sound arrangements are possible.
a. Crintral Savinps and Loan Bank of New York - Funds have been promised
and this plan may considerably relieve situation in New York State.
b. Aid needed for New Jersey and Connecticut, nnd probably for other districte„ not only to check necessitous failure to renew mortgages, but
Paso to take up those rthich must be paid.
0. Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans and Home Loan Discount Bank
might help to check liquidation.
do Private corporation in process of formation to finance home construetion under new l5-,year mortgage plan.

4. Industri and trade -




Numerous complaints received of inadequate credit accommodations from
banks.

Uthout detailed credit investigations, difficult to determine

whether individual restrictions arc justified. Rhera restrictions are due
to bank stringency and not to defective credit standing of borrowers

130111e

assistance should be provided.
ao

Uvular be desirable to set up machinery for receiving and investigating

individual claims of this nature, and then to find banking accommodation for them. Such procedure may be necessary unlar Glass amendment

to relief bill.
b.

Aid may be provided by working with large industrial or
local groups that have been hurt by banking difficulties.
Toward this end an investigation is now being made of
the clothing industry in New York City.

Possible

measures are (1) formation of new bank; (2) capital contribution by interests in industry to and participation
in some existing bank; (3) formation of some sort of
finance company by industry.
c.

Further investigations of this nature are being made by
the National Industrial Conference Board.

d.

Trade acceptance plan might provide credits to some concerns to which usual credit channels are now closed.

e.

Concerted efforts by large industrial establishments to
continue operations and provide employment, accumulating
inventories where possible.

Many concerns agreeing to

follow such a policy might be able to finance themselves;
others might need emergency credits of some sort.
f.

Financing equipment purchases and repairs and maintenance
by railroads and other industries.

In some cases econo-

mies are possible Which would fully justify such expenditures.
5.




Ortanized support to commodity marXets.
a.

Formation of corporation to buy and hold commodities,
selling options for two or three years to consumers.
Recent strength in commodities might make such steps unnecessary, or, on other hand, might indicate that such a
scheme could now be effective and profitable.

-4-.
b.

Endeavor to induce banks to encourage borrowing for purpose of buying and carrying commodities.

c.

Credits to foreign purchasers of commodities, especially
in countries where there are exchange restrictions.

6.




Security market.
a.

American Securities Corporation is presumably giving organized support to bond market, and speculative interest
in bonds seems to be growing.

b.

Loans to railroads (and to other corporations) for purchase of their own bonds at depreciated prices.

Some

plans call for retirement of these bonds; others would
permit their sale at higher prices, thus providing corporation with new funds without necessity of floating new
issues.
c.

Banks might be encouraged to be more generous regarding
collateral loans.
lateral.

New loans might now be made on bond col-

Some banks are now permitting obligors on inad-

equately secured collateral loans to purchase new collateral
instead of making payments on loans.
d.

Relaxation of pressure on banks by supervisory authorities.
Much has been done in this regard.

It has been suggested

that Shifts in holdings of bonds Should be permitted without marking down value of assets.

7:7
July 22, 1952.

I. COORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND CREDIT PROGRAMS
g
a. R. F. C. to provide funds to stop liquidation and aid in financin
public projects.
b. Federal Reserve to furnish basis for credit expansion.
c. Member banks to extend credit to meet needs of Treasury, R. F. C.,
and business.
d. Banking and Industrial Committees to discover and promote projects
to utilize credit for increasing employment.
II. PROGRAM FOR BANKING AND INDUSTRIAL COMMITIEES




A. National Projects
*1.
2.
5.
4.
*5.
6.

securities Markets - American Securities Investment Corp.
Commodities.
Railroads.
Equipment purchases in other industries.
Trade Accentances.
Coordination of district programs.

* Already under way.
B. District or Re:Atonal Projects
*1.
*2.
*5.
4.
5.

Public works and public credit.
Home mortgages and cheap housing.
Credit needs of business - by industries.
Credit Supply to business - the banks.
Spreading work.

* Experts at work 3n these projects in Second District.




July 23, 1952.

PROGRAM FOR BANKING AND INDUSTRIAL COMMITTEES

It is the primary function of these committees to discover
and promote such use of bank credit as will stimulate employment,
restore confidence and hasten recovery.

They should make every

effort, therefore, to bring together sound borrowers and lenders and
see to it that no legitimate demand for credit, useful in achieving
these ends, is neglected.

There All naturally be two principal

fields of activity (a) national — (b) district or regional.
A. NATIONAL PROJECTS
1. Security Markets — The American Securities Invest—
ment Corporation with an authorized capital of $100,000,000 has al—
ready been established for the purchase of sound securities.

The

question may be raised whether a larger volume of funds should be
made available for the operation of this corporation by extending
participation to banks or others throughout the country.

This

question was discussed when the Securities Corporation was first
organized, but may well be raised again in developing a national
program.
2.

Commodities — The advisability of organized

efforts in support of basic commodity markets may well be considered.
Proposals in this field are discussed in an accompanying memorandum.
5. Railroads — Railroads are an outstanding case
where credit might be utilized wisely to increase employment.

Rail—

roads could reduce operating costs and improve service largely by
replacing obsolete with modern equipment.

To accomplish this may




- 2-

July 25, 1952.

require not only immediate means of financing such improvements
but a broader program of bettering the basic financial position of
the roads.

A corporation organized to lend railroads funds to

buy their own bonds and to buy new equipment is worth considering.
4. Equipment Purchases in Other Industries - Methods
adopted for financing railroad equipment purchases may be applicable
to other industries where similar savings can be effected, thus helping to restore employment in capital goods industries where unemployment is most acute.
5. Trade Acceptances - With the sponsorship of the
New York and other committees and with the cooperation of the
Federal Reserve Banks, the American Acceptance Council, the National
Association of Credit Men and committees appointed by them, a campaign
for the wider use of trade acceptances is already under way.

This

campaign can be further promoted by judicious publicity, both local and
national, and the cooperation of Chambers of Commerce, trade associations, and similar bodies.
6. Coordination of District Program - Some informal
machinery appears desirable to facilitate an exchange of views between
districts, and to avoid duplication or conflict of efforts.
B.

DISTRICT OR REGIONAL PROJECTS
1. Public Works and Public Credit - The establishment

Of a subcommittee, with an expert, to discover and promote means for
increasing employment and stimulating activity through public works
by cities and states.

This project, which is described in the ac-

companying memorandum, involves dealing with citizen organizations




_ 3 _

July 23, 1952.

and promoting budget revision with the objective of improving
state and municipal credit in order that these bodies may be in a
position to borrow to finance public works in the market, using
the facilities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation only as
supplementary to and as an aid to such borrowing.
2. Home Mortgups and Cheap Housing - The estab—
lishment of a

subcommittee, with an expert, to deal with real

estate problems, with the object of stimulating building construction both by arranging a more liberal supply of mortgage money and
by discovering and promoting various housing projects as may be
economically justified, such as housing projects for the lower East
Side of New York.

It would be the function of this subcommittee

to promote adequate facilities for the renewal of maturing mortgages
as a necessary preliminary to the stimulation of new building activity.
The rehabilitation of old buildings would offer another field for
the activity of this committee.
5. Credit Needs of Business by Industries - Each
district committee should set up machinery for exploring the adequacy
of the present credit supply for business and agriculture and finding
means for supplying credit in cases where it is warranted, but not
now available.

There may be some question as to how far this work

should be done by the banking and industrial committees and how far
by departments of the Reserve banks organized under the Glass amendment to the relief bill, but the committee in each district should
see to it that the work is done.

This appears to involve some survey

of business and agricultural credit requirements and the extent to
which they are being met, as well as the examination of particular
cases which make themselves known.

The work may involve leadership




— 4 —

July 23, 1932.

in the organization of credit corporations of one sort of another
or other devices for placing business in a position to tap the
available supplies of credit.

The promotion of the wider use

of trade acceptances is one such device.
4. Credit Supply to Business — the Banks.

The

problem of supplying adequate credit to business involves the
added question whether there are difficulties within the banking
structure itself which may stand in the way of the banks' supply—
ing adequate funds to business.

There may be changes in banking

policies, practices, and organization which would enable the banks
to meet business needs more fully.

Bank policies and practices

as to collateral loans, maturity of investments, relations with
new customers, etc., may well be examined.

It may be well to

ascertain the attitude of bank examiners, with a view to seeing
whether their policies also are adapted to current developments.
In some districts steps may be desirable for restoring banking
facilities in communities where adequate facilities no longer
exist.
5. "Spreading Work" — A subcommittee, with an
expert, to study the possibilities of distributing available em—
ployment among the largest number of workers.
6. Other Projects — Various districts will prob—
ably present problems that are peculiar to one or more districts and not
to others.

In agricultural districts, for example, special aid may

be needed of a kind different from that required in industrial
districts.

July 23, 1932.

PUBLIC WORKS BY CITIES AND STATES
Authoritative estimates now indicate that the total number
of unemployed exceeds 10,000,000, an increase of about 3 million
over the total for last autumn.

This unemployment constitutes the

major social and economic problem the country now faces.
There are two possible methods for meeting the problem.
One is by providing employment, and the other is by direct relief.
Of these two the former is much the more desirable, both socially
and economically.
It hardly seems likely that sufficient business recovery upon which the real solution of the unemployment problem must
ultimately depend - will have occurred six months from now to
absorb any large proportion of the unemployed in their normal
occupations, though every effort should be made in that direction.
iaeanwhile, the great weight of this problem will fall upon the
Federal Government, states, and municipalities.

Only a relatively

small part of the needed relief can be met with private charity.
At present there is no comprehensive plan of the states
and municipalities for dealing with this problem.

On the con-

trary most of them have only been able to secure the money they
need for current operations at the price of drastic programs of
curtailment.

Retrenchment has usually begun at the easiest point

for curtailment, which was public works.

Thus the total ex-

penditure on public works by states and municipalities now
contemplated is considerably less than normal.
The Federal Government program, aside from relatively
moderate plans for national public works, is embodied in the relief



-2bill just passed, which provides for loans by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporatianto cities and states and other public or
semipublic agencies primarily to promote activities which will
furnish employment.




The Federal program thus rests largely

uponithe city and state programs.

While the Federal agency can

assist in financing local public works projects, it clearly should
do so only in cases where there is a sound budgetary programir which
justifies the city or state in increasing its debt.

The present

financial position of cities and states leaves considerable doubt
as to the extent to thich they will be in a position to utilize
the facilities of the Federal agency.
The principal reason for this situation is that recently
city and state financial programs have been determined almost
solely from the point of view of the banker and the taxpayer, both
of whom are primarily interested in cutting all expenditures
rather than in dealing with the unemployment problem.

There is

clearly need for another approach to the problem by which the
budget will be readjusted, not solely with a view to reducing
expenses but more broadly with a view to improving the administration, and thereby the credit, of states and cities, placing
them in a position to borrow for necessary public works.
The situation in New York City may be taken as an
illustration.

Last winter when the city needed more funds it was

compelled to make a drastic revision of its budget.

A first step

in this revision was the rescinding of authorizations on projects
valued at more than $1000000,000 and offering potential employment

to many thousands of workers.

No adequate steps, however, have been

taken to reduce salaries or to reduce non-essential expenses of
government, nor have adequate steps been taken to place the city's
commercial enterprises on a self-sustaining basis.

If these

latter steps were taken New York City could borrow in the market
the necessary funds to continue her 4100,000,000 program of public
works, and so do much to meet the problem of unemployment.
Banking and industrial committees in the several Federal
Reserve districts are public bodies which could well undertake
the task of organizing public support for budgetary revisions in
cities and states which would clear the way for bond issues for
necessary public works.
A program of budgetary reform based on these principles
would have a much sounder and more effective appeal than a program
the sole object of which was to cut expenses and relieve the taxpayer.

And, on the other hand, a program of public works could be

better justified from the viewpoint of taxpayers, bankers, and
municipal officials if accompanied by sound budgetary reform.

The

social appeal pf putting the unemployed to work should constitute
a lever powerful enough to force the necessary reforms.
A program of this sort, broadly conceived and energetically carried out throughout the entire country, would not only do
much to meet the unemployment problem and promote business
recovery, but would as well bring about long-needed reforms in
city and state finances and would benefit the bond market both by
the improvement in city and state credit and by the issuance of
sound new securities.




July 25, 1932.
BANKING AND INDUSTRIAL COtEITTEE
of the
Second Federal Reserve District

ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR COMMODITY MARKETS
In view of the great influence of commodity prices upon the world
business situation, the suggestion has frequently been made that the banking
and industrial committees should sponsor some scheme which would stabilize
or raise commodity prices.

The plans suggested may be grouped under the

following headings:




(1) Organization of a corporation to be participated in by consumers of
commodities.

Basic commodities would be purchased at present prices

and options for three years or less sold to stockholders in anticipation
of their repluirements as consumers.
(2) Organization of one or more private corporations of the investment
trust type to speculate in commodities.

Such organizations might be

similar to the present securities corporation or it might be effected
without sponsorship of the banking and industrial committees.

It is

rumored that some such corporations are already in the process of
formation.
(3) Orpnized efforts to induce banks to be more generous in making
loan-3 to consumers or speculators for the purpose of purchasing commodi—
ties at present prices and holding them for future use, or for speculative
profits.
(4) Some scheme for providing credits to foreigners who may wish to
purchase basic commodities in this market.

This would apply particularly

to purchasers in those countries that are under foreign exchange restrictions.
Reasons advanced in favor of such schemes:
(1), Prices of most basic commodities are at the loi.est levels of the
century and prices of many are at the lowest levels in history.

These

July 25, 1952.

— 2—

prices are well below any reasonably computed costs of production.

It is

logical to believe that under such conditions prices will rise at some time
within the near future.

Under these circumstances there are great possi—

bilities for profit to speculators and to consumers anticipating future
requirements.
(2)

With prices at such low levels and buying in small volume relatively

few funds would be needed to provide substantial support.
is in contrast to previous efforts at stabilization.

This situation

Any substantial

buying of commodities at this time and firmness of prices would probably
lead other purchasers to enter the market in order to anticipate price
advances.
(3) Speculative commitments in most commodity markets are much smaller
than usual.

There is need for a group of buyers to take the position

ordinarily held by speculators.
e
(4) Consumers' stocks are also small and any scheme which would encourag
restocking would provide an element of strength to commodity markets.
(5)

As in security markets, there are also at times forced sales of com—

modities by owners unable to hold them further.

Under present conditions

these forced sales have a demoralizing effect upon the market.

Some organ—

ized support is needed to broaden the markets and to take care of this type
of distress selling.
(6)

A rise in commodity prices would immediately bring a change of sentiment

in vast world areas devoted to producing raw materials, would increase the
buying power in those areas, and thereby give a stimulus to business recovery.
Aroumeats advanced against such schemes:
purchase and holding of commodi—
(1) Any action which provides only for the
of production, consumption and
ties does not change the fundamental factors




— 3 —

July 25, 1952.

and supplies on hand, which must be influenced before a sustained rise may
be expected.

The real need is for measures which will increase consump—

tion or reduce production so that the large supplies now available for
nearly all commodities can be reduced.

If this were accomplished, prices

would rise without need for any organized support.
(2)

All that most of the suggested schemes, with the possible exception

of that providing for foreign purchases, propose to accomplish is simply
the shifting of available supplies from one group of holders to another.
This may bring about a rise in prices if the supplies are shifted from
weak to strong holders who are able to keep them off the market.

If this

is done, however, by some publicly organized body, knowledge that these
stocks are overhanging the market will be an influence of uncertainty
similar to that attributed to the Federal Farm Board holdings.
(3) The fact that prices are now below the cost of production has no
market significance unless producers actually reduce output or consumption
is increased.

If production continues in excess of current consumption,

there is no fundamental reason to believe that prices can be maintained
at higher levels.

In many commodities there has as yet been insufficient

decline in output to strengthen the technical position of the particular
markets concerned.

On the other hand, there are probably important short—

ages in finished goods.




July 25, 1932.

Conclusion:

There remain to be settled two auestions, one of policy and

one of procedure.
The first is primarily a matter of public psychology.

If it is

felt that public reaction to a program of organized support to commodity
markets would be favorable, the next step would be a careful study of the
statistical position of individual commodities.

Support should then be

directed to those commodities whose position justifies the expectation
In
/such an advance
sustained.
and
effected
be
could
improvement
price
that
other commodities would probably share.




July 25, 1932.

ANp

INEUSTRIAL COMITTEE
of the
Second Federal Reserve District
BANKING

ORGANIZED SUPPORT FOR COMMODITY MARKETS
In view of the great influence of commodity prices upon the world business
situation, the suggestion has frequently been made that the banking and industrial
committees should sponsor some scheme which would stabilize or raise commodity
prices.

The plans suggested may be grouped under the following headings:

(1) Organization of a corporation to be participated in by consumers of
commodities.

Basic commodities would be purchased at present prices

and options for three years or less sold to stockholders in anticipation
of their requirements as consumers.
(2)

Organization of one or more private corporations of the investment

trust type to speculate in commodities.

Such organizations might be simi-

lar to the present securities corporation or it might be effected without
sponsorship of the banking and industrial committees.

It is rumored that

sorlo such corporations are already in the process of formation.
(3)

Organized efforts to induce banks to be more generous in making loans

to consumers or spoculators for the purpose of purchasing commodities at
present prices and holding them for future use, or for speculative profits.
(4)

Some scheme for providing credits to foreigners whc may wish to pur-

chase basic commodities in this market.

This would apply particularly

to purchasers in those countries that are under foreign exchange restrictions.

Reasons advanced in favor of such schemes:
(1) Prices of most basic commodities are at the lowest levels of the century
and prices of many are at the lowest levels in history.
well below any reasonably computed costs of production.

These prices are
It is logical to

believe that under such conditions prices will rise at some time within the



near future.

Under these circumstances there are great possibilities for

profit to speculators and to consumers anticipatin7, future requirements.
(2)

With prices at such low levels and buying in snail volume relatively

few funds would be needed to provide substantial support.
is in contrast to previous efforts at stabilization.

This situation

Any substantial buy-

ing of commodities at this time and firmness of prices would probably lead
other purchasers to enter the market in order to anticipate price advances.
(3)

Speculative commitments in most commodity markets are much smaller than

usual.

There is need for a group of buyers to take the position ordinarily

held by speculators.
(4)

Consumers' stocks are also small and any scheme which would encourage

restockinP, would provide an element of strength to commodity markets.
(5)

As in security markets, there are also at times forced sales of com-

modities by oTners unable to hold them further.

Under present conditions

these forced sales have a demoralizing effect upon the market.

Some organ-

ized support is needed to broaden the markcts and to take care of this type
of distress selling.
(6)

A rise in commodity prices would immediately bring a change of sentiment

in vast world areas devoted to producing raw materials, would increase the
buying power in those areas, and thereby give a stimulus to business recovery.

Arguments advanced against such schemes:
(1)

Any action which provides only for the purchase and holding of commodities

does not change the fundamental factors of production, consumption and supplies
on hand, which must be influenced before a sustained rise may be expected.
The real need is for measures which will increase consumption or reduce production so that the large supplies now available for nearly all commodities
can be reduced.

If this were accomplished, prices would rise without need for

any organized support.




3
(2)

All that most of the suggested schemes, with the possible exception

of that providing for foreign purchases, propose to accamplish is simply the
shifting of available supplies from one group of holders to another.

This

may bring about a rise in prices if the supplies are shifted from weak to
strong holders who are able to keep than off the market.

If this is done,

however, by some publicly organized body, knowledge that these stocks are
overhanging the market will be an influence of uncertainty similar to that
attributed to the Federal Farm Board holdings.
(3)

The fact that prices are now below the cost of production has no market

significance unless producers actually reduce output or consumption is increased.

If production continues in excess of current consumption, there is

no fundamental reason to believe that prices can be maintained at higher
levels.

In many commodities there has as yet been insufficient decline in Gut-

put to strengthen the technical position of the particular markets concerned.
On the other hand, there are probably important shortages in finished goods.

Conclusion:

There remain to be settled two questions, one of policy

and one of procedure.
The first is primarily a matter of public psychology.

If it is felt that

public reaction to a program of organized support to commodity markets would be
favorable, the next step would be a careful study of the statistical position of
individual commodities.

Support should then be directed to those commodities whose

position justifies the expectation that price improvement could be effected and
sustained.




In such an advance other commodities would probably share.

In
(
(Proposed Letter)

Mr. J. H. Case, Chairman
Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
New York, New York.
Dear Mr. Case:
The Federal Reserve Beard has received and noted with
interest your letter of July 22, 1932, wherein you advise that,
at an executive meeting held on July 21* 1932, your Board of
Directors voted, subject to the ad ?oval of the Federal Reserve
Board, to take certain action which in effect amounts to a reduction
in the compensation of all of the employees of the bank, othJr than
officers, in an amount equivalent to 8-1/0'4 of their present salaries,
and a reduction in the compensation of all offioers (which it is
; of their
'
assumed includes directors) in an amount equivalent to 10
present oompensation.
The .nly reasm for this action stated in your letter is
that the program was "formulated faiths light of present employment and salary conditions throughout the country"; and the letter
and the inclosed copy of the report of the Committee of the Dir=tors on the i.elfare of the Staff contain no discussion of this or
any other reason for the action and no reference to the existing
situation respecting the larnings and expenses of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York or the possible effeot of the proposed action on the
welfare, morale or efficiency of the bank's staff,
It appears frame previous corres)ondrmee and negotiations
with the bank regarding lroposed increases in the salaries of its
officers and employeass and fr)la conversations betwe,In Governor




-




Harrison and members of the Board's staff, that the oomIensation
of the bank's officers and employees has never been at as high a rate
as that of oorsons bolding eorresponding positions in the larger
co..-ercial banks in New York City and is not now as great as

he

compensation of those employees, even after the re uctions which
have been made in the colapensation of the latter.
It also appears that, since Jarrviry 1, 1962 the Bunk
has earned an amount which is not only sufficient to pay all
of its expenses, depreciation charges and dividends at the rate
of C per annum, but also to provide for some addition to its
surplus. In this connection, the B ard is advised that the bank
has book profits res lting from the appreciation of Government
securities held by it in an amount exceeding the cbpreciation
charged against its surplus at the end of the calendar year 1931
for the purpose of creating a reserve for depreciation in its bond
account, so that the bank's bond account probably will show a
net profit and this will result in a further addition to its
surplus.
The plan formalated by the Directors for the reduction of
the compensation of the bank's officers and employees bears a
striking similarity to the provisions for the reduction of
the conpensation of officers and employees of the United States

-3Government contained in the Act of June 30,
1932, making appropriations for the Legislative Branch of the ,;-over
nment for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1933; and this has given
rise to the question
whether the action of tne Directors wan
influenced to some extent by
the policy adopteu 41f Congres

regarding officers and employees of the

Government for the purpose of balancing the Gover
nment's budget and, if
so, whether the directors were cognizant of
the fact that the Legislative .‘ppropriation
expressly exempts the members of the veder
al
Reserve Board and its officers and employees,
along with all other persons whose compensation is pAu from assessment
s on banks, from the
provisions discontinuing leaves of absence with
pay and requiring compulsory furlouOis without pay, as well as from
the provt.ions regarding
reductions in salaries.

ids°, the question has been raised whether this

similarity of action might not adu to the erroneous
impression that now
exists to some extent that Teueral eeserve banks are
government institutions and that their officers and employees are in the
general category
of officers and employees of the Government.

Incidentally, the suggestion

has already been made that the Federal reserve banks
be require..:. to make
detailed reports of their earnings and expenses to
the Comptroller General
of the United States.

In this connection, the Legislative Appropriation

Act limits the reduction in compensation of officers
and employees of
the

overnment definitely to the fis:al year endin
'
g Julee 30, 193, thereas

no definite limitation of time is placed upn the
proposed reduction in
the compensation of officers and employees of the
'Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.




oment and salary
As to the general question of present empl
ciate advice
conditions througnout the country, the Board would ap:re
of the "Federal
as to what consideration was givan by the directors
such as increased facReserve Lank of Kew York to recent developments
al average of wholesale
tory employment and the upward trend in the geer
ning of an improvement
commodity orice:3 which may inriicate that the begin




ect.
in general business conditions Is in prosp
The Board would also ii ..e to know

hether your directors have

ble effect of its proposed action
given careful consideration to the possi
tions.
on the public and on general business condi

Such action might

not yet reduced salaries
encoura4e other business concerns which haydy reduced salaries to make
to do so and encoura,:e those w.lich have alrea
further reductions.

aso, in view of the superior facilities of the

ting information regarding
Federal reserve banks for gathering and diges
bility that the public
business and economic conditions, there is a possi
that the Federal reserve
adght interpret such action as an indication
leads them to fear some
banks are in possession of information wilich
unfortunate employment
impendinz development which liould prolong the
about to emerge.
conditions from wnich the country apparently is

Such

al resrve banks should
an impression would be increased if other reder
al Reserve Bank of
follow the precedent established by the reder

New

officers and employees;and
York and reduce the compensation of their
in discouraging the public And
its effect night be equally as potent
as the passage of the Goldsretarding business and economic recovery
tives, and in this way any general
borough Bill by the House of Representa
employees of the Federal
reduction in the salaries of officers and
reserve banks at this time might prove to be distinctly contrary to

-5..

the public interest.
You Are reque3ted to present this letter to your Board of
Directors at its next meetin

and to ask that the directors give careful

consideration to the questions raised above.

If, after careful con-

sideration of these questions, your Directors are still disposed to make
a gener,1 reduction in the compensation of the bank's officers and employees,
you are requested to furnish the Pederal Reserve Board for its consideration
a full statement of the views of your directors on the subjects discussed
above and also the following inform-,tion:
1.

;more detailed and definite statement of the reasons

prompting such action
2.

The reasons for effecting the pr000sed reduction in

compensation througn the furlou-h system.
3.

Ilether such proposed action is based. upon any operating

or financial condition connecte

with the Federal lieu:rye Bank of New

"fork as distinguished from general economic conditions.
4.

How the present aDmpensation of the officers and employees

of the Tederal Reserve Bank of Sew York compares with that now being
paid to officers and employees of large commercial banks in the Gity
of New York, after the reductions which have been made in the cac..pensation of the lrItter.
5.

Mother the compens2.tion of the officers and employees of

the ?ederal Reserve Bank of New York was proportionately incre,sed
during the time that the large commercial banks in New York were increasing the compensation of their officers and employees and frequently




-6-

paying them bonuses at the end of each year.
,

6.

Ilether the directors have adopted a nev, polic
y which

contemplates that increases as well as decre
ases in the compensation
of ofticers 'lid employees of large commercial banks
in New 'York will
hereafter be met by corresponding changes in the
compensation of the
officers and employees of the 17ederal Reserve
Bank.
7.

'thether the proposed reduction in the compe
nsation of

officers and employees of the bank ,is intended to conti
nue indefinitely
Or is

intended to be limited to a definite period.
8.

hether the :
t4-enera1 economic conditions which in the

opinion of your Directors justi.ty a reduction in the
compensation of
the officers and employees of ,our bank would also justi
fy a reduction
in the dividends paid by your bank, even though the
law provides for
cumulative dividends.
9.

,hether the "iederal reserve bank has insti
tuted any

special survey of the Possibilities of effecting
economies in other
respects, such as in operating methods, eliminatio
n of unnecest.ary
expenses, the reduction or elimination of free servi
ces, etc., and,
if so, what specific results havu been achieved.




Very truly yours,

Chester Morrill,
Secretary.

411/1/1111""Pr
CC)1%,t 12-31

1
CLAAAA.A4

COI&

11/

DERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
To
FROM

DATE

September 1, 1932.

sU DJ E CT:__FaC tors governing recent move-

M. T. E. Crane

manta of sterling exchange,

E. M. Despres

The purpose of this memorandum is to indicate the factors which have governed
the movement of sterling exchange since the middle of June.

This date appears to have

marked a turning point in the British exchange situation; in order to indicate adequately
the character of the change which occurred at that time, a brief summary will first be
given of the factors which seem to have been of predominant importance before the middle of June.

Sterling exchange before the middle of June.
Since the suspension of gold payments in September of last year, the
Bank of Englama and the British Treasury had acquired up to the middle of June
approximately $800,000,000 in foreign currency assets.

Of this amount some-

thing more than ci550,000,000 had been used to repay emergency credits, totaling 050,000,000, which were obtained by the Bank and the Treasury in New York
and Paris just prior to the suspension of gold payments.

Of the remainder, it

is known that holdings of dollars totaled approximately 0.60,000,000 and it is
believed that holdings of francs are about half or this figure, or the equivalent of approximately $80,000,000.
The factors which enabled the British authorities to acquire foreign funds at the rate of ,;;100,000,000 a month during this period without
exerting a seriously depressing influence on sterling exchange will be enumerated in the following paragraphs.
It does not appear to have had its origin in a basic improvement of
the British international position.

The adverse character of the British

balance of payments prior to the suspension of gold payments has been frequently commented upon in the press and elsewhere.




Although the decline of

0'M 12-31
.
MISC. 1.1 6
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
To

DATE

E.

1*_ 1932.

SUBJECT:_ Factors governing recent move-

fr. X. E. Crane

FROM

SeRteMber

=nits of_erling exchange.

Despres
2

sterling exchange has been accompanied by a modest improvement in Great
Britain's merchandise balance of trade, this factor has been more than offset by the continued decline in income from overseas investments and from
shipping and financial services rendered to foreigners.

The strength of the

British exchange situation prior to the middle of June appears, therefore,
to have been the result of forces of a short-term or speculative character.
Many foreigners owing debts payable in sterling took prompt advantage of the depreciation of the exchange to repay their obligations. Prominent among those participating in this movement were the speculators who had
taken a short position in the pound.
The increase in the rupee price of gold, which resulted from the
depreciation of the British pound, accelerated the movement of gold from
Indian hoards, which was sold, either direct or from the London market, generally to buyers in France, Holland and Switzerland. From the standpoint of
its effect on sterling, the principal consequences of this movement were the
repayment of certain Indian debts in the London market, and the accumulation of Indian balances there.
A further factor of strength in the British exchange situation refolsulted from the world feeling of optimism concerning Britain's position
existed in the
lowing the passing of the critical financial emergency which had
summer of 1931.

balancThis sentiment was further sustained by the news of the

ing of the national budget.

Supplementing this factor, especially during May and

of the United States
June of this year, were the doubts concerning the position
and its ability to maintain gold payments.

While private foreign balances in Lon-

balances in this country were
don were reported to be increasing rapidly, such



11!""FF
ll!
i
J/F
6_ 12-31
MISC. 3.2!M

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK

•e

OF NEW YORK

DATEegtember 1, 1932,

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
To

suBJEcT,Factors governing recent move-

Mt. X. E. Crane

FROM_

ments of sterling exchange.

E. M. Despres
3

reduced to a working minimum. In addition, there were periodic reports of
sales of American securities by British investment trusts, and of the transfer to London of investment money derived from sales of American securities by
other foreigners. Under these circumstances it is quite clear that in the
absence of large purchases of foreign exchange by the British authorities, the
pound would have appreciated rapidly.

Sterling exchange since the middle of June.
The change which occurred about the middle of June in the world
attitude concerning the stability of the dollar coincided with a marked
diminution of the feeling of optimism concerning the British situation.

On

the one hand, our ability to withstand the final withdrawals on the Bank of
France was quite widely interpreted as a sign of the strength of the dollar
and the general financial stability of this country.

On the other hand, it was

increasingly recognized that although the financial crisis in England had terminated with the suspension of gold payments, the general economic crisis in
England had not been relieved.

Commodity prices, the activity of industry, and

employment had shown little or no improvement and the difficulties concerning
the national budget appeared not to have been wholly solved.
This change in attitude was reflected both in the movement of shortterm funds and in the international movement of securities.

Short-term funds

"due from"
figures collected by this Bank show a decline of .A0,000,000 in
England from June 8 to August 24.

Reports from London indicate that this out-

rather general withdrawal
ward movement of American funds was only a part of a




32s 60M 12-31
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

• #

DATE September 1, 1932.

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE
To

SUBJECT:_ Factors governing recent move-

Mr. J. E. Crane

FROM_

E. M. DOSPrOS

ments of sterling exchange.
4

of foreign short money from the London market.

Aportion of the funds which

were withdrawn from London were transferred to this country in the form of
short-term balances, but an examination of our own short-term fund statement
would appear to indicate that these funds were transferred more largely to our
security markets.

Moreover, reports have been current, appearing both in the

British and in our own financial press, of substantial British purchases of
American securities.

Although no quantitative data are available concerning

foreign buying of American securities, the existence of such a movement may
be inferred from the fact that the recent inward gold movement cannot be wholly
accounted for in terms of the other items in this country's balance of payments.
In addition to the psychological factors indicated above, the movement of sterling exchange has been influenced in recent weeks by a seasonal
increase in imports of raw materials by Great Britain.

Although this factor

does not become of great importance until the autumn months, bills financing
the movement of cotton and other raw materials to England have already been
noted in the foreign exchange market.
In consequence of these adverse factors, the British authorities appeerta
have considered it desirable to render financial support to sterling exchange.
Despite a reduction of ,70,000,000 in British official funds in this market since
the middle of June, and presumably some drawing down of official balances in Paris,
the pound has declined from 43.66 1/4 on June 15 to 43.47 on August 31.




V.

-.41111

• NIIsCA4.24001,1 6-32
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF NEW YORK

OFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

DATE

SeptEmber_l, )9_32.

SUBJECT: Factors governing recent move-

E. Crane
M_
FRO
To Mr. J.

ments of sterling exchange.

E. M. Jespres
5

Note concerning rovement of Short Term Funds
Short term funds figures collected by this bank give some indication
and
of the importance of the movement of short money between this country
England as a factor in the recent weakness of sterling.
In millions of dollars
1932
April 6*

June 8

August 31

"Due to" England
113
58
171

110
43

49
51

in"

100

"Due from" England

88

116

67

Excess "due to" England

83

37

33

Official (Treasury and Bank of England)**
Private
Total

First reporting date following final repayment of American private credit
*
to British Treasury.
It is
** Does not include dollar deposit of Bank of England with B. I. S.
d
during
increase
S.
known that Bank of England's dollar holdings through B. I.
ntly
reduced.
were
subseque
they
the period from April 6 to June 8, and that