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Internal Memoraiidm
Re:

February "IS-/ 1954-

Interview with Dr. Williams,
Febru&ry 29 1954-

Heading Suggestions:1. Bopp, Karl R.: Thfee Deeades of Federal Reserve Policy
2. Burgess, ¥. R.: The Reserve Banks and the Money Market
3.- Keimererj E. ¥. and Donald Keiamerer, The ABG of the Federal Reserve
4« Burgess, W. R.t Interpretations of Federal Reserve Policy in the
Speeches and Writings of Benjamin Strong.
5. Federal Reserve Board publications:
a. Banking Studies;
b. Postwar Economic Policy series
6. Goldenweiser, E. A.: American Monetary Policy.
7. Hardy, C* 0., Credit Policies of the Federal Reserve System.

Dr. Williams suggested that we should get hold of major topics:
(1) Development of the System
(2) The Federal Reserve Act
(3) Laying out Districts
(4) First job to strengthen the System—get banks to come in.
Section I: Amendments of 1917 intended to strengthen and bring in banks.
History of financing World War I:
First problem one of money supply.
Fractional reserve principle
Mistake made—to finance on rising rates of interest:
psychology bad. Did not do this in World War II,
which was financed on falling rates. Structure
of interest rates was frozen—but bankers began
"playiisg the pattern"—Morgenthau.
1920-21 found it all to easy
Section II: Beginning about learning about problem of monetary control.




Boom and bust of 1921. Had to learn and re-learn. Religion on
"commercial loan could do no wrong." Banks rediscounted on huge
scale. All that credit got frozen. No credit 4^t I& &W particular kind of loan.

Section III: Development of Open Market Operations
Influx of gold
Reserve banks worried about how they could pay way; began
to huff Government securities. Did not know this would offset reserves. Began small committee in Boston — Governor
Strong on it.
Section

International, 1922-29, brought us too much of world1s gold

IV:

Famous conference of 1927 •— Montagu
(note his grandson did book recently
Reserve policy! his son, Leonard is
at World Bank) and Hjalmar Schacht.
under those of other countriesj got
speculation.
Section V:

Norman and Charles Rist
on postwar (ll) Federal
head of Economic Division
Put down interest rates
rid of gold but fanned

What to do about speculative boom in stocks and real estate?
Did not want to injure "legitimate business." New tools
came outj margin requirements, loans to customers1 money.
Many people though System too small, slow, late. Needed more
tools. Stock market lilywhite since then. No speculative
credit in market, highly liquid.
•} ^^t^^m*
Today's problem: how to recapture the discount rate. Tiy to
bring it back as a weapon. It was important in the 1920*sj
but skills have been lost, cannot fit it in with open market
operations.
Now thinking is that when the banks need short-term help they
should f1use the discount window.f! Banks need to be taught.

Had important chapter:

j

/4

War --y^how to supply money, but no sense of control.
Boom and bust -- sense of responsibility, but no virtue in any special
type of loan.
Act of 1935 —

liberation from coismercial bank theory.

1922-1927 International phase




faced with international problems: Daves Plan, etc.
In 1925, the Bank of England went back on gold. N.Y. Federal Reserve
Bank arranged credits for England and for Poland. Central banking was
paramount in this decade.
Now central bank is tiying to get back dominant role in monetary policy,

- 3 Great Depression stripped it of strenih. There were really two
depressions: in 1931* abroad; panirf flows of "hot money";
Federal Reserve tried to help, but Britain was forced off gold.
The Federal Reserve lost 3/4 billion of gold in five weeks.
193Ofs: Development of excess reserves. Federal tried to pump
gold into banks but banks would not take it.
Banking Act of 19355 increased reserve requirements.
Depression of 1937-33: Sound economic conditions vs.#^«* ; "* °
support Government bond market.
Accord of March 1951 smoothed over Treasury-Federal Reserve differences. Broiaght understanding; Treasury very careful now not to
tell Federal what to do.
(j.H. Williams retired officially July 1952^

1920!s

Washington Board's function judicial — one of review; not enough
power. But Banking Act of 1935 cured this.
Strong^dominant figure in System —both at home and abroad. Went
to Washington and wore them out.
First Board was good, but not later. Now back somewhere in the
middle. But N.Y. is still the greatly dominant bank in System

Other District banks:
Very good as regional reporters.
Chief contribution — regional reporting.
Only aa*si»l N.Y. bank A- national and international problems. Foreigners
A
come in to N.X. bank •tt-^l 1+ ^^ H'k^W* ke^c fr^s^ ~iu "tfar* C