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June 30, 1956 Dear Karl: X am sure It will be no news to you that tnis Oocaaittee is transferring its case and its activities to the Brookings Institution. A letter to that effect has gone to Mr. Villiams, and ^ill «£~ doubtecily come to you. This move means that my ovn activities as Executive Director of the Gowtlttee will be handed over to someone else, not jet chosen. I have, as you know, found the work fascinating, and your ovn services as guide, tutor, and illuminator of dark corners have added no small bit to the intensity of that interest. 11 though I fcnev vhen I undertook toe job that my work could not last the full tern of the grant, I find the actual process of departure very sorrowful. Hot the least of my regrets is the loss of reasons to cone and seek your friendly council in Philadelphia. Thanks a thousand for much cherished kindnesses. And very best greetings always. Sincerely yours, Mildred Adams Mr. Karl E. Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia Pennsylvania MAika FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RH I LADELPH IA ( Z O N E I) April 26, 1956 RECEIVED APR 2 71956 COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY OF THE FEOEftAL RESERVE g m i M Miss Mildred Adams Executive Director Committee on the History of the Federal Reserve System 33 Liberty Street New York 4.5, New York Dear Mildred: Under separate cover I am sending you the three copies of our 1955 Report that you requested yesterday. As usual, my contribution has been simply to drop a few hints, ask a few questions, and make a few minor suggestions. The lion!s share of the credit for this product goes to David P. Eastburn, our Financial Economist. Sincerely, KRB/b Karl R. Bopp Vice President April 25, 1956 Sear Karl: I have just read with greet Interest your 1955 report which you call "Money on iiootf Behavior** It is a very Interesting job, and you ought to get a good public response to it. Could I have three copies? I*ve been carrying on arguments with some skeptical W e H Street friends as to whether or not the System knows what it is doing these days, lour report presents tit* Federal Reserve side of the case better than I can do it, and I think the boys may be less jaundiced in their views if I can persuade them to do a bit of homework, the bright red cover and the provocative title may helpI Gratitude in advance* Cordially yours, Mildred Adams Dr* Karl Bopp, Vice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania January 10* 1956 Karl? ..-. I in not sure that I &&ve you over the telephone thf date you may vant about fche prpers of Mr. Hovard A* Loab* Xou vere going to find out 'whether or not the Hfeartoa School would like ihma deposited there* t i t l e d i. Oli ooHoction i s i-j.irll, tod p*rtln«ftt Plla folders ^re enll 1, Federal Ad.vl-orj Council, 19"9-1 2, Federo.l AdriflOXy Council^ Me.y IT-7 Berkle/ Bill - Trust Irv^nture l e t o4* Cole Bill 3. Federal Advisory Council, 1?37 Fabrnary 15-16, Bank Ourrej Regulation Q C5aandl«r Bill, Bankruptcy Act May 17-18, Barclay Bill Decamber 13-l£p Pataaa Bill Federel A^vi^ory Council, 19^0, 19/*1* 194<, 1951 Taey contain .son© interesting x^terl&l &ncl ere vorth saving, but the question if tihether Mi^rton ia quipped to handle this kind of thing* As I told you when we talked about t h i s , Mr* h&rge of th© Tredesmens Bank i s balding the p&psrs until I get word froc you about Thanks for rindert^king thip inquiry- for us* Cordially yourg| Mildred Adams Dr. Karl Bopp ?ice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Penngylv&xda January 6, 1956 TO* Messrs. Karl Bopp Lester Chandler W© were wondering in Philadelphia about the progress of £iisier Vo*6*a book* A l e t t e r xhlch h&© j u s t come in curries the news of I t as follow I "Xou asked about the book I UL working on» I made some progress during the sxaacier ** a cn&pter on "The Acceleration of HExpenditure" WMA one on "The Qucatitf1 Theoty of Money, Tiiou^h I reject the Quantity Theory approach, I t^iink th«r« i s real value in &nfcly*ing i t in some detail and in itfttiag nhy I reject i t * Ihisr tttfct semestei* I &a getting • iiblbtlotl ¥lth ball p&^ &;^d hope to do so*:]^ more chapters. The Ford Foundation h&a esked our Department to m&k© one application for e faculty research fellowship in sccnoaice for next y&tir* whether I can &et in on lhat I don't know* There sees to be a number of difficulties« v of appl/in^ pressure to the Ford Board? Mildred Adans December 8, 1955 Bear Miss Beweni Thanks so such for your note of the 6th» I vill vith grsat pleasure come to U M B&nk on Thursday, Decaaber I5th# &t 12$30 for lunch with Dr, Bopp and Dr» Chandler. It is good of Dr. Bopp to make time for this In his very crowded schedule. Cordially yours, Mildred Adams Miss Dorothy Bowen Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1 # Pennsylvania FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPH IA ( Z O N E I) December 6, 1955 re Miss Mildred Adams Executive Director Committee on the History of the Federal Reserve System 33 Liberty Street Nev York 45, New York Dear Miss Adams: Mr. Bopp asked me to let you know that it will be quite convenient to have you and Dr. Chandler come to the Bank on Thursday, December 15. He suggested that you come in for lunch about 12:30 o1clock. As I mentioned, he will be free until 3:30 p.m. when he must leave for a class at the University, Sincerely, 0 Secretary to Mr. Bopp mber 6, 1955 Dear Miss Eoven v l l l have told you thfit I called to fisk whether or not It vould be possible for you to discuss vith Lester Chandler and me on the afternoon of Thursday, December 15th. She t e l l s me that she thinks you vould be free until ebout 3*3G> vhich i s very good Tne problea stasis froa the fact that oar Executive Committee thinks I t vould like to hp.ve compiled a book of readings in Federal Reserve history* Les made certain BUggeption^ over th© phone tills ©orriing, and ¥© both agreed that further conversation on the subject would be fine, en6 tfeftt i f we could dr«v you into I t , both the process and the result vould be even finer - hencf* my telephone cr.ll« an errsnd in Philadelphia on Thursday morning and can co$e to the Bank at any time after noon that i s convenient for you* CordicOLly yours, Mildred Ad*ms Dr. Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF F>H I L A D E L P H IA ( Z O N E I) November 22, 1955 FED Miss Mildred Adams Executive Director Committee on the History of the Federal Reserve System 33 Liberty Street New York 4-5, New York Dear Mildred: I am passing along your compliments to Doris Zimmermann, Evan Alderfer and Bill Boehner who are responsible for the essays in the October issue of The 3-C. The issue reflects the notion that life is more fun if one takes his work rather than himself seriously* Sincerely, KRB/b Karl R. Bopp Vice President November IS, 1955 Dear Sari: October ifttttt of the Philtceli-hic- 3rp «M»iiaa cane In the other day, end I have- just finished reading It* v i l l you please extend &y coogrttulatioaa to I t s editor bo tin for th« hi $ to xy and. the hfOTi I t i s e lively and Interesting number, and Miss ZimAffMa ou^ht to hrve kind of ex l&orel leaf for i t . Cordially yours, Mildred Adams Dr# K&rl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania BOFP, Ksn\ June 6, 1955 Br. Karl Bopp Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania Bear Karls I tried to reach you by phone this morning but Hiss Bowen reported you were ia the wilds of Louisiana, My sympathy. What I wanted was to make a date to come down and talk with you about this old problem of just what it is that we want the banks to save for our potential (and as yet unappointed) historians. Certain things like Minute Books are ©bvious, so is the presidential correspondence on policy matters. But when you get below that level, the defining becoses more difficult and it is there that we need help. At one stage we got worried over the effect of the so-called Destruction Schedule promoted by the Presidents* Conference, and Hr. Earhart of San Francisco, the present chairman, will make any changes, or include any warning that we suggests The problem therefore returns to the old one - what is it Specifically that we want? If, out of your wide experience in these matters, you can help me forsaulate an answer that will be understandable in terms of historical needs and of operating departments, I111 be even further in your debt. What I'd like to do is to cose down to Philadelphia, and have a couple of hours to thrash this tiling ©tit • I've got to go to Kansas Gity and Minneapolis tomorrow, but llfll be back late next week. While I'm gone, Mrs. Singer will be discussing possible dates with Miss Bowen. I'm eager to catch you before you go on vacation. My warm thanks in advance. Cordially yours, Mildred Adams May 13, 1955 Miss Dorothy Bowen Federal Reserve Pwilr of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania Dear Miss Bowen: Thank you v*ry such for the information on Mr, Grosscup which you got from Mr, Hill. You were ^uite right that we shall wish to send a different letter to Dr. Grosscup. It is so difficult to track down these men who may be dead (out we don*t know) that I am specially grateful to you for clearing this minor mystery up. Very sincerely yours, Mrs. Singer Research Assistant March 4, 1955 Dear Karl: Since I Ifcst saw you, the exciting prospect has come up that I may go to Europe for a month, flying late in August. I tart begun to wonder whether there was any possibility of seeing people a t the Bank of England, the bank of France, and possibly the Reichabank in connection with federal Reserve a c t i v i t i e s in the foreign field during trie 1920's. That led me inevitably to consider the question of Mr. Echacht and to meditate as to whether an interview with him might be either feasible or fruitful. He i s , of course, the l a s t one surviving of the famous quartette which, in addition to hiaself, included Strong, Rist and Montagu Sorman. I heve no idea whether he would talk or not, nor do I know i f what he remembered on the basis of a carefully prepared questionnaire would or would not be either accurate or helpful* All these considerstiorts led me to the isonogr&ph which you wrote for the University of Missouri in 1939, and I got i t out of the library. I t i s as good as a fine detective story, and better than most. I read i t on the subway standing or sitting} i t i s only the sternest self-discipline which has made me keep i t in my brief-case during office houre. In view of this monograph and your obvious intimate knowledge of Schacht, I would greatly appreciate word from you as to whether you think this interview idea useful or not. F i r s t , i s i t feasible? Second, would i t be fruitful? And, third perhaps, would i t be politic? I would be aost grateful for advice from you on t h i s . Cordially yours, Mildred Adams Dr» Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania FEDERAL RESERVE BANK PHI OF LADELPHIA (ZONE 1) February 2U, 1955 Mrs. Ellen C. Singer Committee on the History of the Federal Reserve System 33 Liberty Street New York 4-5> New York Dear Mrs. Singer: I have been unable to "extract" an expense account from Mr. Bopp for his trip to Princeton. I mentioned the items you suggested should be included, but he refused to tell me how much he had spent at Princeton and, of course, the Bank had taken care of his train fare along with his other expenses during that week. I suppose under the circumstances we shall just have to forget about it. Sincerely, Dorothy Boven Secretary to Mr. Bopp February 21, 1955 Miss Dorothy Boven The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania Dear Miss Bowen: _ ,.. - Will you please extract ant expense account for the Princeton meeting froa Dr. Bopp. Mi3S Adams tells •• tfc*t he paid for a round of drinks so there is at least that to also should be train fare to Princeton and Thank you very ntoh for taking care of this. Sincerely, Research Assistant * FEDERAL RESERVE BANK or RH I LADELRH IA (ZONE I) February 11, 1955 R EC EJVED FEB ^ 1955 Miss Mildred Adams, Research Director -_..,.,. Committee on the History of the COMMTTEEON THE HISTORY Federal Reserve System FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 33 Liberty Street New York 45, New York Dear Mildred: The stenotype report came this morning at the worst possible time in terms of pressure of work. At the same time, I appreciate your desire for speed and have inserted comments as I went along. I hope they may prove helpful and an looking forward to a copy of the final draft. Sincerely, KRB/b Karl R. Bopp Vice President February 11, 1955 Dear Br» BoppJ the members of this Committee have asked me to thank you in their MttM for the care, the active thought, znti the fine scholarship vhich you and your colleagues put into the meaorandt you prepared for them and the. discussions held vith theou Tney recognise that the success of the two Princeton conferences held in Hove&ber tad IfcMU? *M solidly* betswl on vork tifcieh you three did in advance end the contribution© you s&de in the course of the rlis As £ m a l l token of their appreciation, they hope you v i l l accept the enclosed honoraria• Tiia i s by no &©&ns to be considered as &a ^tteapt a t ompMUNtttflttj but rfeiiier as an eertieat of their gr&titude snd their esieasu Hay I add ay personal regret that circumstances beyond ajy control prevented my sharing so interesting end r e warding e session 63 Ihftt of January 29th must ?iave been. vara personal regards I &sn, Very sincerely yours, Donald Woodward Dr« Karl Bopp Vies President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Check for $100.G).fl). Letter and check sent to DBW for signing and mailing. February 10, 1955 The stenotype report of the Princeton nesting on January 29th has just come. I am hastening to send you & copy for your reeding in the some>?iiat Simon Legreeish hope that you may be able to get at i t over the weekend* IGU v&ll remember that because so much of this wbll* thinking, Mr* V^rsllo had acre d i f f i c u l t than vitia the earlier meeting. We will edit the trenscript for textual errors* here at the same tiiae you &re editing your copy in Philadelphia. %fc*a we get the editorial changes you think necessary, we- vrill add thea to ours and then have the mimeograph or Eultilith job done for distribution of the corrected copy to a l l meabera of that conference group. We voold, of course, like your copy beck wtth your corrections just as quickly M possible. I am going to Atlanta ?md ¥aahington for n. week Monday afternoon. If we can have your changes here Monday morning, either in the form of the corrected copy or of telephoned corrections, vi v i l l save sn entire week on the distribution process. Gratefully yours, Mildred Dr» Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania One copy of transcript of second Princeton conference, MISC. S4.3-24M-7-54 COPY OF TELEGRAM Cafc&itte* on KiatorySSf 10 OF NEv\£Y$Rf<e ieral Reserre Board Federal Reserve System V&ahingtoa 2$g D. C. Ih^ vX&*1 Boon ERAIl *RESKJf? twfN K TO FILES ! SENT BY Princeton Inn fears deleyed aedic&j. convention jaay cr»E them Friday night. Heve ^ergency reservations for /our lodging »nd consultants dinner Friday at Nassau Tavern in Princeton. STOP. Saturday conference IQSOO Aji. at Inn as scheduled. Mildred Adams from KARL R. BOPP January 19, 1955 ear Mildred: Your draft covers the issue in fine fashion. I have made only one minor suggestion. Sincerely, DRAFT COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM RECEIVED January 2 1 , 1955 TO: Messrs. Allan Sproul, Chairman W. Randolph Burgess R o b e r t D. C a l k i n s JAN 2 0 1955 COMMITTEE ON THE HISTORY F. Cvril James v i n £ Me" Lrtin, Jr. Walter W. Stewart Joseph H. Willits Donald B. Woodward, Secretary OF THE ?H >ERM. RESERVE SYSTEM i You will remember that after the meeting of Sunday, November 21, 1954 with the Committee, the three consultants (Dr. Bopp, Dr. Chandler, Dr. Wood) met on Monday, November 22 to discuss questions raised and suggestions made during the Sunday conference. At that time, they drafted a memorandum outline which, when revised after study, was to be presented to the Committee for discussion at the meeting on January 29th. The original aim was a preliminary document which would serve both as a definition of what the Committee means by a comprehensive history of the Federal Reserve System and an outline for its writing. The enclosed memorandumoutline is presented as a rough attempt to serve those ends. Were tais intended as a finished product, the consultants might have cast what, in some sections, seem to be conclusions into the form of questions to be explored. They do not wish to impose their ideas on the ultimate his- torian, but they do feel that a basic focus of the comprehensive history should be the development of ideas. Within their limits of time and space, the best they could do was to illustrate what they had in mind. The historian at work may find that ideas mere noted)develop7very differently from the way in which that development is here suggested. The outline as presented is designed to provoke, not to end, discussion. The consultants hope that the Committee will so accept it, and proceed accordingly. Mildred Adams Research Director January 18, 1955 Dear Karl: Acting on your suggestion that a covering letter go with the outline to the CoBs&ttee members, I have framed a draft -wnich is enclosed. Would you read it and see vhether this says vhat you had in mind. If you vant changes made, just pencil them on the draft, We would like it beck as quickly as possible so that it aay go with the memorandum on Friday. Cordially yours. Mildred Adams Dr. Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA (ZONE I) January 14, 1955 Miss Mildred Adams, Research Director Committee on the History of The Federal Reserve System 33 Liberty Street New York U5, New York Dear Mildred: I am attaching the latest version of the tentative outline. It is enlarged substantially from the original draft primarily on the basis of the extensive suggestions from Elmer. Unfortunately, we have had to squeeze this project into rather tight schedules and although Les and I see each other often our contact with Elmer has been limited to corresponding. I mention this tc explain why the outline, as it now stands, contains many apparent "conclusions" rather than topics to be explored. Ve do not wish to impose anything on the ultimate historian but we do feel that a basic focus of the comprehensive history should be the development of ideas. Vithin the time we had the best we could do was to illustrate what we have in mind. The historian may find that ideas, in fact, develop very differently from what we suggest. In short, the outline is designed to provoke - not to end discussion1. I am sure that the members of the Committee understand this. It might, however, be well to mention it again in a covering letter to them. As to time, Les and I agree on U p.m. Friday, January 28. That will be agreeable with Elmer, who plans to arrive in Princeton by noon. Of course, we want you to join us. Each of us has some ideas about interviews, questionnaires, key incidents, and other matters that we might discuss. It will be grand to see you again. E C E I V E D JAN 1 7 1955 Sincerely yours, Karl IU Bopp Vice President d S : ON THE HISTORY op T H E iSrtVE SYSTEM (Dictated by Mr. Bopp v 4- • /* I* v \ but signed in his absence) 1 SOME ASPECTS AND PURPOSES OF THE COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM *• General approach and purposes — A. Some of the major objectives of the Comprehensive History 1# (j/P To gather and preserve all relevant information about the Federal Reserve System that could possibly bear on the evolution of the structure and functioning of the System. /7V 2. To present a comprehensive analysis from an evolutionary point of view, tracing the development of ideas and showing the interrelationships of social attitudes, social and economic events, pressure groups, and personalities on the structure and functioning of the System. 3. Some things to be given special attention a. One of the central interests of the entire study should be the methods and terms on which money has been made available to the banking system and the economy as a whole. This would include, of course, all major changes in the methods used, such as discounting and open market operations. But it would also give adequate attention to changes of policy represented ty changes in methods of administration even though there was no change in the broad method of providing or extracting funds. This would require adequate attention to the whole question of location of control, the methods of administration, and the development of ideas by those who make policy. 4- Things to be avoided a. This should not in any sense be considered an official history and the writer should feel perfectly free to criticize, evaluate, and interpret. b. It should not be financial history in the narrow sense but should be a social history, giving due emphasis to intellectual and political, as well as the narrower economic and financial, philosophies and events* B. Some of the specific topics and events that might be considered 1. The backgrounds of the Federal Reserve System a. This should include a detailed analysis of all the conditions and thinking that led to the movement v "y - 2 - r for financial reform and that influenced the form of the legislation finally enacted. This would include not only the legislative history and the conflicts in the Government accompanying the consideration of the legislation but should also include a consideration of the existing international monetary and financial relationships, the nature and structure of our own economy, the conflicts over broec1 economic policies, the structure and functioning of our banking system, the economic theories underlying the various proposals, and the personalities that were involved in the whole movement* b. A similar study relating to the organization of the Federal Reserve- Districts, of the Federal Reserve Board, and of the Federal Reserve Banks before the banks were actually opened for business. 2. Period of organization and growth - November 1 9 H to April 1917 a. The whole process of determining the structure and organization of the Federal Reserve Banks, the selection of personnel for the Federal Reserve Banks, the division of control between the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks, the location of control within the Federal Reserve Banks, the process of arriving at decisions as to the appropriate objectives of the Federal Reserve Banks for the longer run and for the existing situation, and the relationship between Federal Reserve operations and American foreign policy. Worthy of special consideration are not only longer term growth considerations, such as building of the prestige of the System, but the desirability of making earnings in order both to build prestige and to attract members. 3. War and inflation - 1917 to 1920 a. A comprehensive analysis of the entire war financing program and of ideas relating to it and the relationship of the Federal Reserve to the whole process. The effect of the prevailing economic theory on the types of assistance given ty the Federal Reserve to both public and private financing. b. In addition, adequate attention should be paid to such things as the effect of the war period on membership in the Federal Reserve System, the prestige of the Federal Reserve System, the relationship between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, the tendency to concentrate power in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the subordination of the Federal Reserve Board in dealing with monetary problems, the growth of relations with foreign central banks and governments, the impact of this experience on the earlier philosophy of the Federal Reserve Act and of Federal Reserve policy, and contemporary ideas as to later developments. 4-. The Federal Reserve and deflation - 1920 to 1921 Analysis of events during period and of Federal Reserve policies. A satisfactory treatment would include not only actual Federal Reserve actions but a close scrutiny of the changing role of Treasury financing, of basic philosophy and theory of the public at that time, and of the Federal Reserve officials. It would also include a detailed analysis of the process of decision-making and of the theories and objectives, explicit or implicit, of those who engage in the process. 5» The search for appropriate peacetime organizations and policies - 1921 to 1929 This period will have a number of themes and subthemes which are sometimes woven together and sometimes not. Among the major problems were the following: a. The struggle toward a basic philosophy of central banking: the conflict between the old commercial loan theory which would have prescribed a passive approach and the theory of positive control which would often require actions directly in conflict with those appropriate to the commercial loan theory. b. Changes in the methods of business financing and their impact upon the character of commercial-bank earning assets and upon the volume of brokers1 loans. The need for secondary reserve assets as a factor in the growth of loans from non-banking lenders to the market. c. The role of gold in the System: the continued allegiance to the international gold standard as an ultimate ideal, coupled with actions that were, at least in the short run, in direct violation of the rules of the gold standard game but sometimes with the intent to reestablish the gold standard internationally. d. The frequent conflict of more immediate guides or objectives: the objective of reestablishing an international gold standard and of promoting recovery abroad, the accommodation of commerce, industry and agriculture at reasonable interest rates, a positive policy of stabilizing business conditions, price stabilization, the development of New York as an international financial center, the control of speculation on the stock exchanges. e. The evolution of instruments of Federal Reserve policy: changes in both the techniques and relative importance of instruments such as the discount rate, moral suasion of various types, open market operations, international stabilization credits, development of the "factor analysis" of the money market - member bank reserves and related items. This investigation will necessarily involve the procedures for arriving at decisions and the location of control. f• The process of decision-making and the location of control: this analysis will highlight the fact that the original theory of the Act - that there would be at least the possibility of separate credit policies for the various regions - came under closer scrutiny and was accompanied by many conflicts between the principles of centralized control and of regional autonomy. This involved not only the division of decision-making and control between the Federal Reserve Board and the regional Banks, but also the question as to whether and to what extent a centralized control should be exercised by the Federal Reserve Board or by centralized associations formed by the regional Banks. The weakening of the influence of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the increase of the influence of the Federal Reserve Board following the death of Strong. 6. Federal Reserve actions in a period of deflation and breakdown - 1929 to 1933 In analyzing this period the following important things should be stressed and interrelated: a. The prevailing philosophy of the public at large, the Government, and Federal Reserve officials as to the responsibility of the central bank and of the Government in dealing with conditions in such a period. b. "Sound money" beliefs carried over from pre-1914days that "currency manipulation" should not be used in an attempt to bring about revival, overlooking the fact that a currency must necessarily be managed with respect to some criteria of stability when it is no longer managed with respect to the gold reserve. c. Lack of grasp of -America's place in the world financial structure. Belief that the United States must adjust to world monetary conditions and could do little to determine them. - 5d. The persistence of the belief that the United States could take no positive action to halt deflation even after the international gold standard had ceased to exist and most countries of the world had adopted national currency policies. International developments such as the cessation of foreign loans, international financial panics, breakdown of gold standards, vide changes in exchange rates, etc. e. Business cycle indoctrination which stressed the idea that the forces of depression were fundamentally nonmonetary and that monetary measures could play little part in bringing about recovery. f. On the other hand, there was a latent tradition, sometimes referred to as Bryanism, that monetary action was vital in restoring prosperity. But the monetary procedure contemplated was not primarily central banking procedure. g. The tradition of business cycle theory that depression was healing and beneficent and not degenerative and leading to crack-up. This tradition regarded deliberate monetary expansion to shorten the "recuperative" period as harmful. a. But with the deepening of the depression, the growing popularity of the belief that there were inherent forces in a capitalistic society making for stagnation and blocking the technical possibilities for much higher living standards. This point of view looked toward fundamental changes in the rules in the economic organization for the most part rather than monetary procedures. i. The decline in availability of bankable assets as the depression deepened, indicating the vulnerability to contraction of a monetary system that issues money against debts. The vicious circle of monetary contraction and the decline in the safety of debts and the willingness to go into debt except by distress borrowers, proneness of American banking structure to failure, role of restrictive legislation, such as the collateral requirements behind Federal Reserve notes and restrictions of eligibility of paper for discount. The resulting lack of responsiveness of the economy to central banking measures for expansion. j. The diminishing tolerance of the economy for severe liquidation. -67. Federal Reserve policy from the banking crisis of 1933 to our entry into World War II - 1933 to 1941 The treatment of this period should trace the disillusion of the public and the despair that existing thinking and institutions could provide an adequate solution. It would combine a discussion of actual Federal Reserve policies with a description and analysis of the very important changes in the legislation relating to the Federal Reserve System, It would try to trace out all the lines of development that culminated in actual or proposed changes in the basic law and in the actual structure and operation of the System. Early Recovery Period (JL a. Belief that monetary measures must be mainly outside central banking procedures. (Preparation for the issue of script an extreme instance of blindness to central banking possibilities.) Due partly to lack of understanding of central banking; partly to the loss of prestige of the Federal Reserve during the crisis; and to the historical traditions regarding money of leading groups sponsoring monetary expansion. (For instance, looking back to bimetallism and to greenbacks in the Thomas Amendment.) Establishment of new institutions and procedures, such as deposit insurance, R.F.C., and so on. b. The loss of confidence in business leaders which came with the collapse resulted in greater receptiveness to reform legislation. The popular attitude that greed and dishonesty were in great part responsible for the collapse emphasized the necessity of "driving the money changers from the temples" and diverted attention from the monetary aspects of the collapse. c. Closely related was the idea that the failure to curb speculation by denying credit to speculators specifically was an important cause of the collapse. This belief led not only to reform legislation, but to the search for selective monetary controls; and it made central banking policy very sensitive to a rise of stock prices down to the present day. d. The continued misunderstanding of the place of the United States in the world financial structure was evidenced by some attempt at competitive devaluation. The problem of providing dollars was complicated by the protectionism of strong pressure groups - 7Later Recovery Period a. Abandonment ty the Administration of monetary action as an important means of increasing general demand, and greater emphasis upon fiscal policy, increase of farm income, and upon raising wages and other labor income "by nonmonetary means. b. Foreign totalitarian influences on methods of maintaining prosperity. In such ideology central banks were mere agents through which governments exercised naked power. Liquidity as such was not viewed as an important means of regulating money outlay. The central core of their mechanism was power itself. c. Drop in interest rates to low level as the result of historical accident rather than deliberate action. The drop in long-term rates welcomed by the Federal Reserve. But the large excess reserves, which were mainly responsible for the drop, regarded as a potential danger of inflation. This fear of inflation in the midst of semidepression characterized the attitude of the Federal Reserve until Pearl Harbor. d. The shift in influence over monetary policy toward the Treasury. In part this was due to the new powers of the Treasury over reserves directly, but mainly it was due to the influence acquired by the Administration during the crisis and to the loss of prestige by the Federal Reserve during the depression and crisis. e. The policy of maintaining "orderly markets" in government securities materialized during the restriction of 1937. Though this did not imply pegging of rates, it marked a definite change from the ideas of the twenties, when short rates were supposed to be varied with respect to business conditions. After 1937 the Federal Reserve realized they would allow rates to drift within wide limits and would intervene only to prevent sudden changes. The Federal Reserve seemed "by many to have become merely a check collection agency. This policy of drift was partly the consequence of the unfortunate events following the experiment in tightening in 1936-37. f. Pegging the Market: The policy of maintaining "orderly markets", though not at all contemplating the pegging of rates, prepared the way psychologically and developed a procedure for pegging. (The market became accustomed to the Federal Reserve* s interventions for the purpose of affecting security - 8 prices as such.) The Treasury had decided on pegging many months before Pearl Harbor. The Federal Reserve did not object to the 2-1/2 per cent ceiling on the long-term rate, but objected to the rigidity of the pattern. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York would have preferred a higher long-term rate, but did not advocate raising the ceiling in the situation existing when the rate was pegged. 8. Federal Reserve policy during World War II - 1941 to 1945 a. A thorough description and analysis of the role of the Federal Reserve in World War II finance should stress the contrast with World War I. The contrast should include differences in basic philosophies as to the function of the Federal Reserve, differing techniques of supplying necessary money, differing philosophies as to the proper behavior of interest rates, differing reliances on monetary policy, fiscal policy, and direct controls, and differing estimates as to the nature of the problems which would have to be faced after the culmination of war. b. Some important changes arising out of this period: the tremendous increase in the national debt, the practice of pegging the price of Government securities, the shift of policy-making to the Treasury, the proof that a central bank can control interest rates, changes in the law to facilitate Treasury financing, c. The Federal Reserve position was that credit expansion was inevitable during the War and that it was inflationary, but that raising rates would do little to prevent the expansion. 9. The search for appropriate peacetime organizations and policies - 1945 to 1954 This should include a contrast between the search which grew out of depression and the search which grew out of inflation. Very important background materials for a consideration of this period would include the continued fear of depression in the midst of inflation, the general demand that all the powers of Government be employed to prevent the recurrence of serious depression, the emerging popularity of fiscal policy as an instrument of economic stabilization, the widespread disillusionment as to the power of monetary policy to deal with unemployment and inflation, the greater tolerance of the public for direct controls as a means of obtaining - 9objectives and its equal willingness to see their abolition at the earliest possible moment, a search for extension of powers to reconcile expanding money supply with control of inflation, support of the securities market with control of inflation, development of the concepts of rigidly controlled markets, free markets, and flexibly controlled markets. Karl R. Bopp Lester V. Chandler Elmer Wood January 14, 1955 January 10, 1955 Deer Saris In thinking ahead to the meeting of the 29th, there are two questions which I'd like to ask, one about arrangements, the other about two points on which I need advice. On the arrangements, we are assuming that you and Elmer and Les will went to meet at the Princeton Inn for dinner on Friday, the 28th, in order to do some preliminary discussing during the evening* If you want more time or prefer to meet in Philadelphia rather than in Princeton, would you let me know? I can be at Princeton at any time you want - I would probably be spending the night there in any case. The Committee meeting is scheduled for 10:00 a .a. on Saturday end will probably run through most of the day. (They want an hour out before lunch to discuss the matter of the historian the Executive Committee has been working on this). It would seem to me that any mapping and straightening which remains could be done Saturday evening, leaving us all free on Sunday. But you may have another preference - could you let me know what you think about this? As for my own points at question, they have to do with Federal Reserve Bank archives (if any), a problem with which I've been struggling for some time. Mr. Sproul brought it up early in the game by expressing the hope that we could make a plan not only for finding out what there was in regional bank archives, but also for coordinating that information for future use end guid&nce. In practice, that has led straight to the question "What do you mean by bank archives?" and thus to a consideration of the Board's destruction program and its perils. Vhat I would -2- most gratefully hear would be en indication from you, Elmer and Les, in your role as historians, of what you would like to find in a collection of bank archives if you went at them cold. I'll bring along a list of what is held by the New York Bank as archival material to serve as background* This matter doesn't have to come up now, but it is a continuing problem, and if there is a spare moment, I f d be deeply grateful for advice on it* 11 document And you'll let us know if we are to send out an "experts1 to the Committee* Cordially yours, Mildred Adams P. S. I'm off for Cleveland tonight and hence am asking Mrs* Singer to sign this for me* Dr. Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania January 6, 1955 Deer Saris In looking over notes left from the Princeton conference in Hovember, I find i phrase at the end of them which reads, "Experts' document to cone to us in time to be typed end seat out shortly before January meeting," Judging fro® the size and. sharpness of the h&ndvriting, this m e probably an important idea in November• I wonder vhether you still consider It tn important I d — and whether changes have been mad® in the document by the three of you, so that it is getting on its v&y to be ready for ttl to type and send out. If so, we probably should have it by the 21st of January or by Monday, the 24-th, at the latest* If you have changed your mind on this &nd prefer to present & document verbally rather than h&ving it typed and sent out, there Is every reason vhy you should have a right to your own choice. It Is only my conscience -which, after all the turmoil snd confusion of the holidays, makes me remind you of »dist seemed a good idee in November. Cordially yours, Mildred Adams JDr# Karl Bopp, Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania December 22, 1954 Dear Karl: A wire came earlier in the week from Elmer saying that January 29th, trie date set for the Princeton meeting, comes during the Missouri examination week, end he would prefer a date two weeks later if possible, but if that is not practicable, he would try to arrange for J&nu&ry 29th. By now, we have heard from everyone except Dr. James that the 29th is all right, so I think we must regretfully ask Elmer to things £.bout and come at tn&t time. I am enclosing a carbon of s letter I have just written him* You will probably want to carry on from here and make your own decision as to whether Philadelphia or Princeton would be more convenient for your Friday night meeting* If you decide on Princeton, I will be glad to make the necessary arrangements. Les Chandler tells me that the process of serving a Christmas feast at 4- a*au took irore Christmas spirit than could conveniently be summoned. I hope you have recovered hixd can contemplate beet Christmas wishes in this letter without turning green. Cordially yours, Mildred Adams Dr. Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania c December 20, 1954 Bear Hiss Eowen: X received today from Mr* Sheldon B. Akers, Executive Manager of the Brookings Institution, a letter saying, 8 0a the overtime figure for Miss Bowen we need to know "tte hourly rate and the number of hours worked. Also it will be necessary for Miss Boven to fill out and return the enclosed Internal Revenue Form ««—4 •B I && sorry that I did not realiswr this before so that we could have saved some time* Will you then fill out the enclosed Internal Revenue Form W-4. and send it directly to Mr, Akers together with the other information he needs. My warm wishes for afaapfjyChristmas. Sincerely, Secretary Miss Dorothy Bowen Federal Reserve Bank df Philadelphia Philadelphia l f Pennsylvania December 1, 1954 Dear Karl: I tm hastening to forward to you i copy of the rtenotjyp* record of the Princeton meeting ••••hich c;<ire in this aornlng« There has not been tine to do more than lea:"* through it, but even with such slight scanning it appears both interesting and provocative. When you get a ch-.ree to s o through it you will, I thinK, be reassured that a second meeting of exports and committee is eminently worth while. In the light ct% this record I asay Utkm the liberty of making suggestions as to additions to your rough draft of a document for the CoF-mittee1^ consideration on the 8th. Meanwhile I heve passed on to Don Woodward your suggestion that if an historian is to be soon, the meeting be postponed to include him. Hastily yours, Mildred Adams Dr. Karl R. Bopp Vice President Federal Beservt Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania • December 9> 1954. Dear Karl: I h&ve been re-reeding the verbatim record of Sunday1s conference, and the memo of Monday's discussion, in an attempt to see where they seeded to be headed in terms of the thing to do next» In the process, I nave been again impressed vith the value of the work vhich you three experts did, not only in building the chronological framework which the Coitalttee has been looking for, but also in helping to persuade the Committee members to so ituch active &n& interested discussion. I t i s of the greatest help in many ¥e v i l l knov more about the next step after the Executive Coffiir.ittee meets on December 14-th, Meswhile, say I make two suggestions In view of the importance vnich "key incidents" heve in the minds of the Coissittee, vfeat would you thlok of using the chronological pattern in the memorandum oJf Monday, Novsaber 22nd, as a framework into which' t> throw incidents, any incidents which occur to the minds of any of you as pertinent? S':ch a l i s t , framed in appropriate periods, could provide a sketchy tl*u provocative basis for Cosanittee discussion (and addition) on January oth. Second, may I suggest that the three of you consider, as a basis for your proposed meeting on January 6th, the value of presenting the Coiasittee at the joiu nisetia^ on J ,r.ua.ry 8th, with three documents; 1. A re-cast "grand design*1 of history end monographs to replace the one which they tore &p<- r t on November 21stj 2. The chronological memo embodying period divisions and topics vhich Les dictated on the 22nd, vith any changes you may want mfr.de j 3. A auggestive sketch of key incidents in their chronological frameworkj 4. (though this is tents tive) A trial questionnaire for interviews on & trial period, as Stewart ^suggested at Princeton. This quartet ought to set going discussions that would keep them active and interested far past 3*4$ p»o. They would also be of inestimable aid to the research functions of this office. I'll be eager to knov what you think of these suggestions. Cordially yours, Mildred Adams (Dictated by Miss Adams but 3igned in her absence) Dr# Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PH I LADELPH IA (ZONE I) November 26, 1954 Miss Mildred Adams Committee on the History of the Federal Reserve System 33 Liberty Street New York 45, New York Dear Mildred: I am attaching a copy of the results of our work on rionday. It seemed to me desirable to get this material to you as quickly as possible, and I have not, therefore, made any re visions in the rough draft. You might send me any suggestions that occur to you as you go over this draft so that I can prepare a revised copy for discussion at our next meeting. Sincerely, KRB/b End, Karl R. Bopp Vice President P.S. You might want to give some thought to the questionnaire Questionnaires that Walter Stewart had in mind for interviewers or 11/22/54 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE AUTHOR OF THE COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY AND THE AUTHORS OF THE MONOGRAPHS 1- The author of the comprehensive history should not have formal supervision and control over the authors of the monographs. 2. The authors of the monographs should be selected by the Executive Committee or by someone to whom the Executive Committee has delegated authority. 3- Any relationships between the author of the comprehensive history and the authors of the monographs should be informal and based on cooperation secured through the advantages of mutual assistance. 11/22/54 SOME ASPECTS AM) PURPOSES OF THE COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM I. General approach and purposes A. Some of the major objectives of the Comprehensive History 1. To secure and preserve all the relevant information about the Federal Reserve System that could possibly bear on the evolution of the structure and functioning of the System. 2. To present a comprehensive analysis from an evolutionary point of view, showing the interrelationships of social attitudes, social and economic events, pressure groups, and personalities on the structure and functioning of the System. 3- Some things to be given special attention a. k. B. One of the central interests of the entire study should be the methods and terms on which money was Bade available to the banking system and the economy as a whole. This would include, of course, all major changes in the methods used, such as discounting and open market operations. But it would also give adequate attention to changes of policy represented by changes in methods of administration even though there was no change in the broad method of providing or subtracting funds. This would necessitate adequate attention to the whole question of location of control, the methods of administration, and the basic theory and philosophy of those who make policy. Things to be avoided a. This should not in any sense be considered an officialhistory and the writer should feel perfectly free to criticize, evaluate, and interpret. b. It should not be financial history in the narrow sense but should be considered a social history, giving due emphasis to intellectual and political, as well as the narrower economic and financial, philosophies and events Some of the specific topics and events that might be considered 1. The backgrounds of the Federal Reserve System a. This should include a detailed analysis of all the conditions and thinking that led to the movement for financial reform and that influenced the form of the legislation finally enacted. This would include not - 2 only the legislative history and the conflicts in the Government accompanying the consideration of the legislation "but should also include a consideration of the existing international monetary and financial relationship s, the nature and structure of our own economy, the conflicts over broad economic policies} the structure and functioning of our banking system, the economic theories underlying the various proposals, and the personalities that were involved in the whole movement. b. 2. A similar study relating to the organization of the Federal Reserve Districts, of the Federal Reserve Board, and of the Federal Reserve Banks before the banks were actually opened for business. Period of organization and growth - November 191^ to April 1917 a. The whole process of determining the structure and organization of the Federal Reserve Banks, the selection of personnel for the Federal Reserve Banks, the division of control between the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks, the location of control within the Federal Reserve Banks, the process of arriving at decisions as to the appropriate objectives of the Federal Reserve Banks for the longer run and for the existing situation, and the relationship between Federal Reserve operations and American foreign policy. Worthy of special consideration is not only the objectives of longer term growth considerations, such as building of the prestige of the System, but the desirability of making earnings in order both to build prestige and to attract members. 3. War and inflation - 1917 to 1920 a. A comprehensive analysis of the entire war financing program and of ideas relating to it and the relationship of the Federal Reserve to the whole process. !The effect of the prevailing economic theory on the types of assistance given by the Federal Reserve to both public and private financing. b. In addition, adequate attention should be paid to such things as the effect of the war period on membership in the Federal Reserve System, the prestige of the Federal Reserve System, the relationship between the [Treasury and the Federal Reserve, the tendency to concentrate power in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the subordination of the Federal Reserve Board in dealing with monetary problems, the growth of relations with foreign central banks and governments, the impact of this experience on the earlier philosophy of the Federal Reserve Act and of Federal Reserve policy, and contemporary ideas as to ultimate developments. -3 k. The Federal Reserve and Deflation - 1920 to 1921 Analysis of events during period and of Federal Reserve policies* A satisfactory treatment would include not only actual Federal Reserve actions but a close scrutiny of the changing role of Treasury financing, of basic philosophy and theory of the public at that time., and of the Federal Reserve officials. It would also include a detailed analysis of the process of decision-making and of the theories and interests explicit or implicit of those who engage in the process. 5. The search for appropriate peacetime organizations and policies - 1921 to 1929 This period will have a number of themes and sub-themes which are sometimes woven together and sometimes not. Among the major problems were the following: a. The struggle toward a basic philosophy of central banking: the conflict between the old commercial loan theory which would have prescribed a passive approach and the theory of positive control which would often require actions directly in conflict with those appropriate to the commercial loan theory. b. The role of gold in the System: the continued allegiance to the international gold standard as an ultimate ideal coupled with actions that were, at least in the short run, ±1 direct violation of the rules of the gold standard game but sometimes with the intent that the purpose vas to reestablish the gold standard. c. The freqiaent conflict of more immediate guides or objectives: the objective of reestablishing an international gold standard and of promoting recovery abroad, the accommodation of commerce, industry and agriculture at reasonable interest rates, a positive policy of stabilizing business conditions, price stabilization, the development of New York as an international financial center, the control of speculation on the stock exchanges. d. The evolution of instruments of Federal Reserve policy: changes in both the techniques and relative importance of instruments such as the discount rate, moral suasion of various types, open market operations, international stabilisation credits. This investigation will necessarily involve the procedures for arriving at decisions and the location of control. e. The process of decision-making and the location of control: this analysis will highlight the fact that the original theory of the Act - that there would be at least the possibility of separate credit policies for the various regions came under closer scrutiny and the result was accompanied by many conflicts between the principles of centralized control and of regional autonomy. This involved not only the division of decision making and control between the Federal Reserve Board and the regional Banks, but also the question as to whether and to what extent a centralized control should be exercised by the Federal Reserve Board or by centralized associations formed by the regional Banks. 6. Federal Reserve actions in a period of deflation and breakdown - 1929 to 1933 In analyzing this period the following important things should be stressed and interrelated: 7- a. The prevailing philosophy of the public at large} the Governiaent, and Federal Reserve officials as to the responsibility of the central bank in dealing with such a period. This would stress the concept of a very limited positive role and would apply not only to Federal Reserve policy actions but also to the establishment of new institutions and procedures, such as deposit insurance,, RFC type institutions, and so on. b. The importance of the international situation: the cessation of foreign loans, international financial panics, the breakdown of gold standards, wide changes in exchange rates, etc. c. The relevance of the American banking structure: its proneness to failure, the lack of holdings of safe eligible paper. d. The role of restrictive legislation, such as the collateral requirements behind Federal Reserve notes and restrictions of eligibility of paper for discount. Federal Reserve policy from the banking crisis of 1933 "to our entry into World War II - 1933 to 19*U The treatment of this period should trace the disillusion of the public and the despair that existing thinking and institutions could provide an adequate solution. It would combine a discussion of actual Federal Reserve policies with a description and analysis of the very important changes in the legislation relating to the Federal Reserve System. It would try to trace out all the lines of development that culminated in actual or proposed changes in the basic law and in the actual structure and operation of the System. a. Important legislation of the period: this should include not only the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 but also changes relating to the role of silver, the gold standard, deposit insurance, greenbacks, and requirements as to membership of commercial banks in both the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. Light should "be thromn on the question of why all "banks were not in fact required to join the Federal Reserve, why the Federal deposit insurance was not made a function of the Federal Reserve, and why more discretionary power over such things as the price of gold, the role of silver, and greenbacks was not entrusted to the Federal Reserve. b. Federal Reserve policies during the period: though all aspects of Federal Reserve policy and Government monetary and fiscal policy would be explored, special emphasis would be placed on the emerging new philosophy as to the role of fiscal policy, the use of the new power to alter member bank reserve requirements, and open market operations. Especially important within this category would be the changing philosophy relating to open market operations. Attention would also be given to proposed changes in Federal Reserve power that grew out of the tremendous volume of excess reserves. 8. Federal Reserve policy during World War II - 19^-1 to 19^5 9- a. A thorough description and analysis of the role of the Federal Reserve in World War II finance should stress the contrast with World War I. The contrast should include differences in basic philosophies as to the function of the Federal Reserve, differing techniques of supplying necessary money, differing philosophies as to the proper behavior of interest rates, differing reliances on monetary policy, fiscal policy, and direct controls, and differing estimates as to the nature of the problems which would have to be faced after the culmination of war. b. Some important changes arising out of this period: the tremendous increase in the national debt, the practice of pegging the price of Government securities, the shift of policy making to the Treasury, the proof that a central bank can control interest rates, changes in the law to facilitate treasury financing. The search for appropriate peacetime organizations and policies - 19^5 to This should include a contrast between the search which grera out of depression and the search which grew out of inflation. Very important background materials for a consideration of this period would include the continued fear of depression in the midst of inflation, the general demand that all the powers of Government be employed to prevent the recurrence of serious depression, the emerging popularity of fiscal policy as an instrument of economic stabilization, the widespread disillusionment as to the power of monetary policy to deal with unemployment and inflation, the greater tolerance of the public for direct controls as a means of obtaining objectives and its equal willingness to see their abolition at the earliest possible moment, a search for extension of powers to reconcile expanding money supply with control of inflation, support -6of the securities market with control of inflation confusion between flexible control and free market^ development of the concepts of controlled markets, free markets, and flexible markets. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK c OF PH I LADELPH IA (ZONE I) November 26, 1954 Miss Mildred Adams Research Director Committee on the History of the Federal Reserve System 33 Liberty Street New York 4.5, New York Dear Miss Adams: As you requested, I am enclosing an itemized expense account for Mr. Bopp and myself for the Princeton Conference. I really enjoyed being there and want to thank you for your thoughtfulness and many kindnesses to me. "We arrived at the airport on Monday in plenty of time for Dr. Wood's plane and I understand that it arrived in St. Louis practically on time. He was delighted to see our new airport building and was looking forward to seeing Pittsburgh1s even newer terminal, which Mr. Bopp told him was quite a nice one. If I can be of help in any small way at any time, please let me know. Sincerely, Secretary to Mr. Bopp Encl. EXPENSE ACCOUNT Karl R. Bopp. Out of pocket expenses - dinner on 11/22/54 for D. Bowen and K. R. Bopp $6.00 Dorothy Bowen Transportation for K. R. Bopp, Elmer Wood, and Dorothy Bowen: 219 miles at 6/ per mile $13.14 (11/20 - Phila. to Drexel Hill to Princeton & return to Phila. 11/22 - Phila. to Princeton & return to International Airport, to Drexel Hill, to Phila.) Services of secretary on Saturday, 11/20 (time and a half rate) 26.25 TOTAL $39.39 $45.39 November <-A$ 1954 Dear Er, Boppx I know that I KB speaking for the entire Goiaiaittee when I tell you how vvry grateful we all are for the skill, knowledge and judgement which you poured so generously into the recent three-day meeting at Princeton. Those of us who enjoy~d the benefit of your wisdom on Sunday can only guess at wh&t we missed by not being able to sit in on your expert sessions Saturday and Monday. In addition to acknowledging the value of the fresh viewpoints vhich you brought to Committee members, Miss Adams tells me that we also owe you gratitude for the clearer definition and sharper focustffelchyou brought to the research functions in which she ia engaged* She would like me to add her thanks to ours. We will be looking forward with great interest to the second session in January, Sincerely yours, Donald Woodward Dr. Karl Bopp Vice President Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania 4 c » 1*54 As I think jo» know, taHl*y# Kovosbor aiat* ?rovod to bo tho »o«t goaorftlly pttiifeta <foi# f@r tbo sorting with you «IMI your i end Er, $rooi# Dotallo of tho plom *r« us 21, to «rriv* S«tiirdajr «if^t sad/or t i l i ^ T i t ^ to do so at Coftaittoo g T®&$&M- 'with \mtb hajt bomi w i m c l *JQ4 w i l l for tm m i l l lov«al»i' 15th$ If j&u would Ilk® sm© of th»s«, #r ABijr ©tt#F %p® of s4auNM»ii*tlo&f *f* will bo gl*^ to !IAM« oo.ro of i t os w r i fn>« jT0ii.* If i t i s OMMV to s«.k# your mm aiTM%goftoiitof d f l i l l f t it ) y | h»4 word Uttft aoot of tho Coawittoo ®xp#ct to fttto&d and will toko port in ifeo ooaforonoo vith you throo* g «.ryitD^fi«atf - ftm MootiiOif i t s o l f v i l l b® i a a privet* ag>^f«r#ft0o rooei «.t B M Ettb f^« Cos»ttt#« h»o boon toldi th»t 70U oaspoot t» tsav© for Coatittoo moKbors ** rough r#«i*i!» of i& tho 3 - B « S dloouosios tho d®f btl^HMI - this to s#rv» for SjMMrtttMf aissw^rs, opinions. B«oau»# Dr. Bmpp 1* oagor tfcftt •* b i t i f MM Coanittoo** ©»t»»el sfe*ll b# l o s t , fee h « us to tam * ^t«aotjpitt on IMM to rooard tfta tts)O«Mtatt« This toolmi^uo obvlotos tho toking of sotoa vlth th« «%.e«s»p©isyiRg d^mgors of sdottsdorst^s^imf, Tho StOMtfyt r#eorti i s Mlulf for tho g*iid*&eo of Br. Bopp « s i b i s group wad I t s ttg« v i l l bo l i s i t o d to ikat |MlpMs>« I t i limit ^isomsiloB i» s c s Cottf - BaliaTiiig thl» eonfarance to b« ft v i t a l *%*p in our plftni, tb« Co?a«iita* will ohar*a i t » « l f v i i b a l l coats, Including transportation, lodging wh«a rtqtmtad, w*ai§, «tc. 31X19 at th« Prtnc*t«fi Ian v i l l b« r«nd«r*rf dlrsot to ia#« I f you v l l l hand «• a tt«t«f9«nt of Tour trantportntlom costs» I will »•« th*t th«y r»fimd#d to I h®p« th^a* armafinwiitt :m#*t v.it\i your upproTal* I tvo esrfeon eoi[>l#ii of this Xtttur in ca»« you want to forward t***» to Drt Woo«S md Dr» CluuskUL*rv Vitb high hop** for thm Cordially youra, Dr. Karl H« p ent Baak of Fbilad«lphia BOPP, Karl R. May 28, 1954 Dear Dr. Bopp: When I saw you recently in Philadelphia I promised to send you vorcl when we had heard from the Rockefeller Foundation. You will understand that it is with great pleasure that I can now tell you that the longer term grant has come through and we are now turning our attention to the individual studies of which you Ifid I talked. If you are still beguiled by the idea of doing something atxsut "The Art and Practices of Central Banking", I trust you will let me know. Very sincerely yoursf Mildred Adams Research Director Dr. Kerl Bopp Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Philadelphia 1, Pennsylvania
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