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United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

Report to Congressional Committees

January 2009

TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM
Status of Efforts to
Address Transparency
and Accountability
Issues

GAO-09-296

January 2009

TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
Accountability Integrity Reliability

Highlights

Status of Efforts to Address Transparency and
Accountability Issues

Highlights of GAO-09-296, a report to
congressional committees

Why GAO Did This Study

What GAO Found

This is the second GAO report on
the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). It follows up on the nine
recommendations from the
December 2, 2008, report (GAO-09161). It also reviews (1) the nature
and purpose of activities that had
been initiated under TARP as of
January 23, 2009; (2) Treasury’s
Office of Financial Stability (OFS)
hiring and transition efforts, use of
contractors, and progress in
developing a system of internal
control; and (3) preliminary
indicators of TARP’s performance.
To do this work, GAO reviewed
signed agreements and other
relevant documentation and met
with officials from OFS,
contractors, federal agencies, and
some participating institutions.

As of January 23, 2009, Treasury had disbursed about $293.7 billion of the $700
billion in program funds (see table). Most of the funds (about $194.2 billion)
went to purchase preferred shares of 317 financial institutions under the
Capital Purchase Program (CPP)—Treasury’s primary vehicle under TARP for
stabilizing financial markets. GAO’s previous report emphasized the lack of
monitoring and reporting for CPP investments and recommended stronger
measures for ensuring that participating institutions use the funds to meet the
program’s purpose and comply with CPP requirements on, for example,
executive compensation and dividend payments. In response to our
recommendation, Treasury developed plans to survey the largest twenty
institutions monthly to monitor lending and other activities and analyze
quarterly monitoring data (call reports) for all institutions. While the monthly
survey is a step toward greater transparency and accountability for the largest
institutions, we continue to believe that additional action is needed to better
ensure that all participating institutions are accountable for their use of
program funds.
Status of TARP Funds as of January 23, 2009 (dollars in billions)
Program
Capital Purchase Program

Disbursed
$194.2

Treasury has taken important steps
to implement all nine previous
recommendations, but has yet to
fully address eight. This report
includes recommendations that
Treasury further expand its efforts
to monitor how CPP recipients are
using program funds and more
clearly articulate and communicate
a strategic vision for the program.
Addressing these and other
recommendations would help
ensure greater accountability and
transparency and better enable
Treasury to effectively manage
TARP. Treasury generally agreed
with the contents of the report and
noted that while progress has been
made in overseeing the program, it
agreed that more work needs to be
done.
To view the full product, including the scope
and methodology, click on GAO-09-296.
For more information, contact Thomas
McCool at (202) 512-2642 or
mccoolt@gao.gov.

40.0

Targeted Investment Program

What GAO Recommends

Systemically Significant Failing Institutions

40.0

Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility
Automotive Industry Financing Program
Citigroup Asset Guarantee
Bank of America Asset Guarantee
Totals

0.0
19.5
0.0
0.0
$293.7

Source: Treasury OFS, unaudited.

Treasury has continued to develop a system for detecting noncompliance with
key requirements of the program but has not yet finalized its plans. Further,
Treasury has made limited progress in formatting articulating and
communicating an overall strategy for TARP, continuing to respond to
institution- and industry-specific needs by, for example, making further capital
purchases and offering loans to the automobile industry. In addition, it has not
yet developed a strategic approach to explain how its various programs work
together to fulfill TARP’s purposes or how it will use the remaining TARP
funds. While GAO does not question the need for swift responses in the
current economic environment, the lack of a clearly articulated vision has
complicated Treasury’s ability to effectively communicate to Congress, the
financial markets, and the public on the benefits of TARP and has limited its
ability to identify personnel needs.

United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-09-296 (continued)
Timeline of Programs and Selected Actions under TARP, October 2008–January 2009
10/3: Congress
passes P
.L. 110-343,
Emergency
Economic
Stabilization Act (the
act), which
authorized TARP
.

10/14: Treasury announces that it will purchase up to $250
billion in financial firms’ preferred stock under TARP via CPP
.
Nine major financial institutions agree to participate in CPP
.
Treasury issues executive compensation guidelines for
three TARP program areas: CPP Troubled Asset Auction
,
Program, and Systemically Significant Failing Institutions
(SSFI).

11/14: Treasury
purchases about
$33.6 billion in
preferred stock and
warrants from 21
financial institutions
under CPP
.

October

11/25: Treasury announces allocation of $20 billion to
back Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF), a $200 billion lending facility for the consumer
asset-backed securities market established by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Treasury purchases $40 billion in preferred stock and
warrants from AIG under SSFI, as announced on
November 10, 2008.

November

2008
10/20: Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issue application guidelines
.
and other documents for all banks wishing to participate in CPP
10/28: Treasury disburses capital injections to 8 of the 9
,
banks slated to participate in the first round of the CPP
resulting in the purchase of $115 billion in preferred stock
and warrants from 8 national financial institutions.

11/10: Treasury announces
that it will purchase $40 billion
in senior preferred stock from
the American International
Group (AIG) under SSFI.

12/31: Treasury purchases about $15 billion in preferred stock
and warrants from seven financial institutions under CPP
.
12/5: Treasury
purchases
about $3.8
billion in
preferred stock
and warrants
from 35 financial
institutions
under CPP
.

Treasury purchases $20 billion in preferred stock and warrants
from Citigroup that it announced on November 23, 2008,
under the newly created Targeted Investment Program (TIP).
Treasury loans $4 billion to GM and commits to loan $5.4
billion on January 16, 2009.
Treasury provides Congress with report on AGP a program to
,
guarantee troubled assets mandated under Section 102 of the
act.

11/21: Treasury
purchases about
$2.9 billion in
preferred stock
and warrants
from 23 financial
institutions under
CPP
.

11/23: Treasury, FDIC, and the Federal
Reserve enter into an agreement with
Citigroup to provide a package of
guarantees, liquidity access, and
capital, including equity investment of
$20 billion in Citigroup.

1/16: Treasury announces that it will make a $1.5 billion loan to a special purpose entity
created by Chrysler Financial to finance the extension of new consumer auto loans as
part of AIFP
.
Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC announce the terms of the guarantee
agreement with Citigroup announced on November 23, 2008, providing protection against
the possible losses on an asset pool of approximately $301 billion of loans and securities.
Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC enter into an agreement today with Bank of
America to provide guarantees, liquidity access, and capital, including protection against
possible losses on approximately $118 billion assets and purchase of $20 billion in
preferred stock under TIP
.
Treasury purchases about $1.5 billion in preferred stock and warrants from 39 institutions
under CPP
.

2009
December

12/12: Treasury purchases about $2.5 billion in
preferred stock and warrants from 28 financial
institutions under CPP
.
12/19: Treasury purchases about $2.8 billion in preferred
stock and warrants from 49 financial institutions under CPP
.
Treasury announces plan for stabilizing the automotive
industry under the Automotive Industry Financing Program
(AIFP).

January

1/2: Treasury provides 1/9: Treasury
1/21:
1/23: Treasury
12/23: Treasury
program description
purchases about
purchases about
Treasury
purchases
for the TIP
.
$14.8 billion in
$386 million in
loans an
about $1.9
preferred stock and
additional
billion in
Treasury completes $4 preferred stock and
$5.4 billion warrants from 23
preferred stock
billion loan transaction warrants from 43
financial institutions
institutions under
to GM.
and warrants
with Chrysler Holding
under CPP
.
CPP
.
from 43
LLC as part of AIFP
.
financial
12/29: Treasury announces purchase of $5 billion in senior preferred equity from GMAC
institutions
LLC and agrees to loan $1 billion to support its reorganization as a bank holding company.
under CPP
.

Source: GAO.

GAO’s previous report also included recommendations about OFS’s management infrastructure, including hiring,
contract oversight, and internal controls. Treasury has taken steps to address our recommendations, but still faces
several challenges. First, it took proactive steps to help ensure a smooth transition to the new administration by
keeping positions filled and using an expedited hiring process, including direct hire authority. Moreover, after losing
some potential candidates because of conflicts of interest, Treasury is asking candidates to address potential conflicts
earlier in the recruitment process to avoid unnecessary delays in finalizing employment offers. However, it continues to
face difficulty providing competitive salaries to attract skilled employees. Also, given the program’s evolving nature and
the likelihood of changes under the new administration, Treasury will need to identify OFS’s long-term organizational
needs. OFS continues to rely on detailees and contractors to carry out program functions. Second, consistent with our
recommendation about contracting oversight, Treasury has enhanced such oversight by tracking costs, schedules, and
performance and addressing the training requirements of personnel who oversee the contracts. As we previously
recommended, Treasury needs to continue to identify and mitigate conflicts of interest in contracting. Similarly, OFS
has adopted a framework for organizing the development and implementation of its system of internal control for
TARP activities, which is consistent with our recommendation. OFS plans to use this framework to develop specific
standards and policies, drive communications on expectations, and measure effectiveness of internal control policies
and procedures. However, it has yet to implement a disciplined risk-assessment process.
Given the recency of program actions and time lags in the reporting of available data, GAO continues to believe that it
is too early in the program’s implementation to see measurable results in many areas. Even with more time and better
data, it will remain difficult to separate the impact of TARP activities from the effect of other economic forces. Some
indicators suggest that the cost of credit has declined in interbank, mortgage, and corporate debt markets since the
December report. However, while perceptions of risk (as measured by premiums over Treasury securities) have
declined in interbank markets, they changed very little in corporate bond and mortgage markets. Finally, as GAO also
noted in December, these indicators may be suggestive of TARP’s ongoing impact, but no single indicator or set of
indicators can provide a definitive determination of the program’s effects because of the range of actions that have
been and are being taken to address the current crisis. GAO will continue to refine and monitor the indicators going
forward.
United States Government Accountability Office

Contents

Letter

1
Scope and Methodology
Background
Treasury Continued to Focus on CPP, but a Variety of Other
Programs Have Been Created or Are in Progress
Efforts to Establish the Office of Financial Stability Are Ongoing
Measuring the Impact of TARP on Credit Markets and the
Economy Continues to Be Challenging
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Analysis

2
5
10
37
61
73
76
77

Appendix I

Comments from the Department of the Treasury

81

Appendix II

CPP Transactions as of January 23, 2009

83

Appendix III

Examples of Programs to Preserve Homeownership

93

Appendix IV

Treasury’s Summary Response to Prior
Recommendations

95

Appendix V

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

105

Tables
Table 1: Status of TARP Funds as of January 23, 2009
Table 2: Capital Investments Made through the Capital Purchase
Program, as of January 23, 2009
Table 3: Number of Treasury and Other Federal Employees
Assigned to OFS
Table 4: Financial Agency Agreement, Contracts, and Blanket
Purchase Agreements Awarded, as of January 20, 2009
Table 5: GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government

Page i

11
12
40
46
56

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program
rogram

Figures
Figure 1: Timeline of Program Activities for TARP, October 2008–
January 2009
Figure 2: OFS’s Framework for Internal Control
Figure 3: TED Spread, 3-Month LIBOR, and 3-Month Treasury Bill
Yield, as of January 22, 2009
Figure 4: Yields on Corporate Bonds (Aaa and Baa) Relative to 10year Treasury, as of January 16, 2009
Figure 5: Mortgage Rates (30-Year Fixed Rate, Conforming),
Mortgage Applications Index, and Treasury Yields, as of
January 16, 2009
Figure 6: Mortgage Originations and Mortgage Applications Index,
as of September 30, 2008
Figure 7: Percentage of Loans in Foreclosure, as of September 30,
2008

9
56
65
67

69
71
72

Abbreviations
ABS
AIG
AGP
AIFP
CBOE
CDFI
CICA
COP
COTR
CPP
FDIC
FAR
FHFA
FHA
FinSOB
FRBNY
GAO
GSA
GSE
GM
HUD

Page ii

asset-backed security
American International Group, Inc.
Asset Guarantee Program
Automotive Industry Financing Program
Chicago Board Options Exchange
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund
The Competition in Contracting Act
Congressional Oversight Panel
Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives
Capital Purchase Program
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Acquisition Regulation
Federal Housing Finance Agency
Federal Housing Administration
Financial Stability Oversight Board
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Government Accountability Office
General Services Administration
government-sponsored enterprise
General Motors Corporation
Department of Housing and Urban Development

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

IDIQ
LIBOR
MBS
OCC
OFS
OMB
OPM
OTS
PEO
QFI
SEO
SES
SSFI
TARP
TALF
TIP

indefinite delivery indefinite quantity
London Interbank Offered Rate
mortgage-backed security
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Office of Financial Stability
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Personnel Management
Office of Thrift Supervision
principal executive officer
qualified financial institution
senior executive officer
Senior Executive Service
Systemically Significant Failing Institutions
Troubled Asset Relief Program
Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility
Targeted Investment Program

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Page iii

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program
rogram

United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

January 30, 2009
Congressional Committees:
On October 3, 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(the act) was signed into law. The act established the Office of Financial
Stability (OFS) within the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and
authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).1 Among other
things, the act provides Treasury with broad, flexible authorities to buy or
guarantee up to $700 billion in “troubled assets,” which include mortgages
and mortgage-related instruments, and any other financial instrument
whose purchase Treasury determines is needed to stabilize the financial
markets.2
The act also created a number of mechanisms to oversee the implementation
and operations of TARP. The U.S. Comptroller General is required to report at
least every 60 days on findings resulting from oversight of TARP’s
performance in meeting the purposes of the act; the financial condition and
internal controls of TARP, its representatives, and agents; the characteristics
of both asset purchases and the disposition of assets acquired, including any
related commitments that are entered into; TARP’s efficiency in using the
funds appropriated for the program’s operation; TARP’s compliance with
applicable laws and regulations; efforts to prevent, identify, and minimize
conflicts of interest of those involved in TARP’s operations; and the efficacy
of contracting procedures.3
Since December 2, 2008, when we issued our first 60-day report on TARP,
OFS has continued to take actions intended to stabilize the U.S. financial
markets, such as purchasing equity in financial institutions and providing
loans to the automobile industry.4 This report, the second in response to this
mandate, follows up on the nine recommendations we made in our December
2008 report and addresses (1) the nature and purpose of activities that have

1

Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008), codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201 et seq.

2

Section 102 of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5212, authorizes Treasury to guarantee troubled assets
originated or issued prior to March 14, 2008, including mortgage-backed securities.
3

Section 116 of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5226.

4

GAO, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure Integrity,
Accountability, and Transparency, GAO-09-161 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2, 2008).

Page 1

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

been initiated under TARP as of January 23, 2009; (2) the status of the
transition to the new administration at OFS and its hiring efforts, use of
contractors, and system of internal controls; and (3) preliminary indicators of
TARP’s performance.

Scope and
Methodology

To determine the nature and purpose of TARP activities from December 2,
2008, through January 23, 2009, we reviewed documents from OFS that
described the amounts, types, and terms of Treasury’s purchases of
preferred stocks and warrants under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP),
the Systemically Significant Failing Institutions Program (SSFI), the
Automotive Industry Financing Program (AIFP), and the Targeted
Investment Program (TIP).5 We reviewed documentation and interviewed
officials from OFS responsible for selecting financial institutions to
participate in CPP. We also contacted officials from the four federal
banking regulators—the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Federal Reserve), and the
Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)—to identify any changes in their
procedures for reviewing CPP applications and determine their plans for
assessing participating institutions’ compliance with TARP requirements.
For the first eight institutions that received CPP funds, we followed up
with senior officials to identify any changes in how they planned to use the
capital injections and whether they intended to report separately on their
activities associated with the capital investments. The institutions
included in this review were the Bank of America Corporation (Bank of
America), Bank of New York Mellon Corporation (Bank of New York
Mellon), Citigroup, Inc. (Citigroup), The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.,
JPMorgan Chase & Company, Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation,
and Wells Fargo & Company. We discussed with OFS and regulatory
officials their plans for ensuring compliance with the requirements of the
agreements between Treasury and CPP participants, including those
limiting executive compensation and restricting CPP participants from
increasing dividend payments or repurchasing common stock. We
reviewed Treasury’s proposed interim final rule and notices implementing
the act’s executive compensation rules. We coordinated with the Special
Inspector General for TARP to discuss his planned work in this area and
participated in Interagency Taskforce meetings and met with FDIC’s

5

A warrant is an option to buy shares of common stock or preferred stock at a
predetermined price on or before a specified date.

Page 2

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Inspector General about relevant work.6 For SSFI and TIP, we reviewed
program terms and closing documentation and contacted officials from
OFS.
To describe the status of Treasury’s efforts to identify and implement a
homeownership prevention strategy, we reviewed relevant sections of the
act, reviewed reports by the Congressional Oversight Panel for Economic
Stabilization and Treasury’s response to the panel’s first report, and
gathered testimonial and documentary information from OFS’s Office of
Homeownership Preservation.7 We reviewed proposals and inquiries
submitted to Treasury related to the development of a homeownership
preservation strategy. We also obtained documents from and held
meetings with representatives of the following organizations: the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA),
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FDIC, OCC, OTS, American Securitization
Forum, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, HOPE
NOW Alliance, NeighborWorks, Moody’s Investors Service, Standard &
Poor’s, and Conference of State Bank Supervisors.8 To determine OFS’s
progress in establishing a program to guarantee troubled assets—a
program that Treasury was required to establish under section 102 of the
act and has chosen to implement through OFS in conjunction with
TARP—we reviewed OFS’s request for public comments on potential
program design and analyzed comments Treasury received from various
industry stakeholders. In addition, we reviewed and summarized
Treasury’s mandated report on establishing a program to guarantee
troubled assets and discussed the program’s potential use with OFS
officials. Finally, we reviewed documentation relevant to OFS’s AIFP and
interviewed appropriate OFS officials.

6
As discussed below, section 121 of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5231, established the Office of the
Special Inspector General for TARP. The Special Inspector General has established an
Interagency Taskforce consisting of representatives from the Offices of Inspector General
at FDIC, the Federal Reserve, OCC, OTS, and Treasury, and a representative from GAO.
7

As discussed later, section 125 of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5233, established the Congressional
Oversight Panel.
8
HOPE NOW is an alliance between Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)-certified counseling agents, servicers, investors, and other mortgage market
participants. It provides free assistance to prevent foreclosures. NeighborWorks is a
national nonprofit organization created by Congress to provide financial support, technical
assistance, and training for community-based revitalization efforts.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

To determine the status of OFS’s hiring and transition efforts, we reviewed
interagency agreements on detailees, OFS’s updated organizational chart,
and a sample of position descriptions used by Treasury to recruit
permanent new hires to OFS. We used our prior work on human capital
flexibilities, organizational transformation, and strategic workforce
planning to assess OFS’s performance. In addition, we met with a variety
of Treasury and OFS officials to discuss their approach to staffing the
office in the short term, as well as any strategies used to recruit individuals
with the set of skills and competencies needed to administer TARP. We
also discussed any recent actions taken to help ensure a smooth transition
to the new administration.
To assess Treasury’s approaches to acquiring services in support of TARP,
we reviewed the contracts Treasury awarded since our last report and all
new task orders awarded under all contracts and other agreements, as
well as related amendments and modifications. In addition, we reviewed
Treasury’s solicitations and other agency documents related to those
actions. We reviewed the steps Treasury has taken to enhance oversight of
contractors and move toward a greater reliance on fixed-price
arrangements. We also reviewed steps Treasury has taken to promote the
use of small business concerns—including those owned and controlled by
women, minorities, veterans, and socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals—in carrying out TARP. In addition, we examined
documentation outlining actual and potential conflicts of interest
identified by the contractors, as well as their proposed plans for mitigation
of conflicts. We also reviewed Treasury’s guidelines and interim regulation
on conflicts of interest related to the authorities granted under the act and
the steps Treasury has taken to enhance management and monitoring of
conflicts of interest.
To assess the status of internal controls related to TARP activities, we
conducted interviews with and made inquiries to officials from OFS,
including the Chief Financial Officer, Deputy Chief Financial Officer,
Deputy Cash Management Officer, and their representatives. We also
reviewed documents provided by Treasury and those publicly available on
Treasury’s Web site. Finally, we conducted interviews with and reviewed
documents provided by contractors, including PricewaterhouseCoopers
and Ernst & Young. For this report, our work was limited to the review of
OFS’s documentation related to internal controls. In future, we plan to
evaluate the design of the controls and their operating effectiveness.
To identify a preliminary set of indicators on the state of credit and
financial markets that might be suggestive of the performance and

Page 4

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

effectiveness of TARP, we consulted Treasury officials and other experts
and analyzed available data sources and the academic literature. We
selected a set of preliminary indicators that offered perspectives on
different facets of credit and financial markets, including perceptions of
risk, cost of credit, and flows of credit to businesses and consumers.9 We
assessed the reliability of the data upon which the indicators are based
and found that, despite certain limitations, they were sufficiently reliable
for our purposes. The data used to construct the indicators in this report
came largely from the Federal Reserve. As these data are widely used,
including by GAO and the Federal Reserve, and are considered to be a
reliable and often definitive source for banking sector data, we conducted
only a limited review of the data but ensured that the trends we found
were consistent with other research. We also relied on data from the
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), Inside Mortgage Finance, and
Global Insight. We have relied on CBOE and Global Insight data for past
reports, and we determined that considered together, these auxiliary data
were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of presenting and analyzing
trends in financial markets.
We conducted this performance audit in December 2008 and January 2009
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Background

This section provides general information about the structure and roles of
the entities that oversee TARP. In addition, figure 1 provides a timeline of
the evolution of the various programs created under TARP, which are
discussed in detail in the first section of this report.

Congressional Oversight
Panel

Section 125 of the act established the Congressional Oversight Panel
(COP) as a legislative branch entity to help provide broad oversight of the
financial markets and financial regulatory system and to provide various

9

No indicator on its own provides a definitive perspective on the state of markets;
collectively, the indicators should provide a broad sense of stability and liquidity in the
financial system and could be suggestive of the program’s impact. However, it is difficult to
draw conclusions about causality.

Page 5

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

reports to Congress on these matters.10 More specifically, the act requires
that COP submit regular reports to Congress on TARP every 30 days.
In its first regular report submitted on December 10, 2008, COP posed a
series of questions to Treasury on the events that had taken place since
the adoption of the act. Topics covered in these questions included the
reason for Treasury’s shift in strategy from purchasing mortgage-backed
securities to providing capital injections to banks; the extent to which
Treasury’s strategies helped stabilize the markets and reduce home
foreclosures; the funds spent to date and whether they were used as
intended; the criteria used to determine CPP participation; and any
reforms imposed by Treasury on financial institutions receiving TARP
funds. On December 30, 2008, Treasury responded to COP’s first report,
but COP said that Treasury did not provide complete answers to several of
its questions and failed to address others.
Consequently, in its second report of January 9, 2009, the panel asked
Treasury to supplement its earlier responses, highlighting four areas that
required additional detail. First, the panel asked Treasury to provide more
information on CPP participants’ use of TARP funds. The panel said that
Treasury needs to make the banks receiving TARP funds accountable in order
to restore investor and taxpayer confidence in the markets. COP encouraged
Treasury to use its authority to make funding conditional upon banks
reporting their use of funds and use of reporting to create performance
benchmarks. COP said that Treasury should either establish formal
procedures for voluntary reporting or create guidelines for participating
institutions’ use of funds. Second, the panel addressed the transparency of
information that would indicate the health of banks receiving TARP funds.
Third, it asked about Treasury’s plans to address foreclosure mitigation.
Fourth, the panel addressed the viability of Treasury’s strategy to stabilize the
financial markets and the broader economy.

10
The Congressional Oversight Panel consists of five members, with the Speaker of the
House, the House Republican Leader, the Senate Majority Leader, and the Senate
Republican Leader each selecting one member. The Speaker of the House and the Senate
Majority Leader select the fifth member jointly. The current members are Richard H.
Neiman, Superintendent of Banks in New York (appointed by the Speaker of the House);
Representative Jeb Hensarling (appointed by the House Republican Leader); Elizabeth
Warren (Chair), Harvard Law School (appointed by the Senate Majority Leader); former
Senator John Sununu (appointed by the Senate Republican Leader); and Damon Silvers,
AFL-CIO Associate General Counsel (jointly appointed by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate Majority Leader). Others with oversight responsibilities include the Congressional
Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

COP recommended that Treasury (1) provide an analysis of the origin of the
credit crisis; (2) establish a set of metrics for evaluating the success of the
TARP strategy; and (3) explain the rationale for making TARP funds available
to all healthy banks, regardless of their lending practices or systemic
significance. Moreover, COP said that it did not believe that Treasury had
made significant efforts to minimize foreclosures and that it would provide
recommendations on how to address this issue in an upcoming report. COP
plans to submit its next report on February 10, 2009.

Financial Stability
Oversight Board

Section 104 of the act created the Financial Stability Oversight Board
(FinSOB), which consists of the Chairman of the Federal Reserve (who
has been elected board chairman), the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Director of FHFA, the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the Secretary of HUD.11 FinSOB’s purpose is to
review Treasury’s exercise of authority under the act, including the
appointment of financial agents, assets to be purchased, and the structure
of vehicles used to purchase troubled assets. FinSOB is to make
recommendations to Treasury about use of its authority and report any
suspected fraud, waste, or abuse to the Special Inspector General for
TARP or the Attorney General of the United States, as appropriate. In
addition, FinSOB must report quarterly on its oversight of Treasury’s
exercise of authority.
FinSOB’s first report covered Treasury’s policies to implement TARP as of
December 31, 2008. FinSOB stated that the actions Treasury took to
implement TARP improved the ability of financial institutions to avoid
severe funding market pressures that could have led to an escalation of
stresses and disorderly failures. More generally, FinSOB reported that
Treasury’s actions taken under TARP and the authorities granted by the
act helped promote confidence in the financial markets and in U.S.
financial institutions, which it noted was a critical first step to the
restoration of more normal financial market and economic activity.
However, FinSOB noted that significant challenges lay ahead for TARP,
particularly in light of the continuing stresses in the financial sector and
the weakened outlook for the U.S. economy. Given the disproportionate
consequences that instability in the nation’s financial institutions and
markets may have for the broader economy, the board stated that it will be

11

12 U.S.C. § 5214.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

important for Treasury to continue to take actions under TARP to stabilize
financial markets, help strengthen financial institutions, improve the
functioning of the credit markets, and address systemic risks. Moreover,
as additional resources become available it will be important for TARP to
pursue effective strategies for providing resources in support of reducing
preventable foreclosures, due to the harm that foreclosures may have on
the affected borrowers, communities, the housing market, and the
financial system and broader economy. Finally, FinSOB stated that as the
program evolves, it will be important for TARP to pursue strategies
designed to allow it to exit from its financial interests in a timely manner
consistent with the objectives of the act.

Special Inspector General
for TARP

Section 121 of the act created the Office of the Special Inspector General
for TARP. The Special Inspector General’s responsibilities include
conducting audits and investigations of the purchase, management, and
sale of assets under TARP, as well as of the management of the asset
guarantee program mandated under Section 102 of the act.
Additionally, the Special Inspector General must submit quarterly reports
to Congress summarizing purchases, obligations, and revenues associated
with the various TARP activities authorized under the act. The first report
is due no later than 60 days after the confirmation of the Special Inspector
General, which occurred on December 8, 2008. Therefore, the first report
is due to Congress by February 6, 2009.

Summary of Program
Activities under TARP

The figure below summarizes program activity under TARP for programs
such as CPP, as well as newer programs such as AIFP. As noted earlier, we
examine these activities in greater detail in the first section of this report.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Figure 1: Timeline of Program Activities for TARP, October 2008–January 2009

10/3: Congress
passes P.L. 110-343,
Emergency
Economic
Stabilization Act (the
act), which
authorized TARP.

10/14: Treasury announces that it will purchase up to $250
billion in financial firms’ preferred stock under TARP via CPP.
Nine major financial institutions agree to participate in CPP.
Treasury issues executive compensation guidelines for
three TARP program areas: CPP, Troubled Asset Auction
Program, and Systemically Significant Failing Institutions
(SSFI).

11/14: Treasury
purchases about
$33.6 billion in
preferred stock and
warrants from 21
financial institutions
under CPP.

October

11/25: Treasury announces allocation of $20 billion to
back Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF), a $200 billion lending facility for the consumer
asset-backed securities market established by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Treasury purchases $40 billion in preferred stock and
warrants from AIG under SSFI, as announced on
November 10, 2008.

November

2008
10/20: Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issue application guidelines
and other documents for all banks wishing to participate in CPP.
10/28: Treasury disburses capital injections to 8 of the 9
banksa slated to participate in the first round of the CPP,
resulting in the purchase of $115 billion in preferred stock
and warrants from 8 national financial institutions.

11/10: Treasury announces
that it will purchase $40 billion
in senior preferred stock from
the American International
Group (AIG) under SSFI.

12/31: Treasury purchases about $15 billion in preferred stock
and warrants from seven financial institutions under CPP.
12/5: Treasury
purchases
about $3.8
billion in
preferred stock
and warrants
from 35 financial
institutions
under CPP.

Treasury purchases $20 billion in preferred stock and warrants
from Citigroup that it announced on November 23, 2008,
under the newly created Targeted Investment Program (TIP).
Treasury loans $4 billion to GM and commits to loan $5.4
billion on January 16, 2009.
Treasury provides Congress with report on AGP, a program to
guarantee troubled assets mandated under Section 102 of the
act.

11/21: Treasury
purchases about
$2.9 billion in
preferred stock
and warrants
from 23 financial
institutions under
CPP.

11/23: Treasury, FDIC, and the Federal
Reserve enter into an agreement with
Citigroup to provide a package of
guarantees, liquidity access, and
capital, including equity investment of
$20 billion in Citigroup.

1/16: Treasury announces that it will make a $1.5 billion loan to a special purpose entity
created by Chrysler Financial to finance the extension of new consumer auto loans as
part of AIFP.
Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC announce the terms of the guarantee
agreement with Citigroup announced on November 23, 2008, providing protection against
the possible losses on an asset pool of approximately $301 billion of loans and securities.
Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC enter into an agreement with Bank of America
to provide guarantees, liquidity access, and capital, including protection against possible
losses on approximately $118 billion assets and purchase of $20 billion in preferred stock
under TIP.
Treasury purchases about $1.5 billion in preferred stock and warrants from 39 institutions
under CPP.

2009
December

January

1/21:
1/2: Treasury provides 1/9: Treasury
1/23: Treasury
12/23: Treasury
program description
Treasury
purchases about
purchases about
purchases
for the TIP.
loans an
$14.8 billion in
$386 million in
about $1.9
additional
preferred stock and
billion in
Treasury completes $4 preferred stock and
$5.4 billion warrants from 23
preferred stock
billion loan transaction warrants from 43
12/19: Treasury purchases about $2.8 billion in preferred
to GM.
institutions under
with Chrysler Holding financial institutions
stock and warrants from 49 financial institutions under CPP. and warrants
under CPP.b
CPP.
LLC as part of AIFP.
from 43
Treasury announces plan for stabilizing the automotive
financial
industry under the Automotive Industry Financing Program institutions
12/29: Treasury announces purchase of $5 billion in senior preferred equity from GMAC
(AIFP).
LLC and agrees to loan $1 billion to support its reorganization as a bank holding company.
under CPP.
12/12: Treasury purchases about $2.5 billion in
preferred stock and warrants from 28 financial
institutions under CPP.

Source: GAO.
a

The participation of the ninth institution was deferred to allow for completion of its merger with
another institution.

b

This includes funding of the institution who’s funding was initially deferred pending completion of a
merger. The merger was completed on January 1, 2009.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Treasury Continued to
Focus on CPP, but a
Variety of Other
Programs Have Been
Created or Are in
Progress

As of January 23, 2009, Treasury had announced several programs under
TARP with a projected total funding level of $387.4 billion. As shown in
table 1, although the dollar amount of announced initiatives exceeded the
$350 billion limit initially set by Congress, in fact Treasury has reported
entering into agreements legally obligating it to purchase or guarantee
troubled assets totaling only $300 billion.12 In addition, Treasury reported
making actual disbursements for completed purchases of about $293.7
billion. Officers and employees of Treasury may not obligate13 or expend
appropriated funds in excess of the amount apportioned by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) on behalf of the President.14 Of the
funding levels announced for TARP, Treasury stated that OMB had
apportioned about $339.9 billion as of January 23, 2009. Based on this
information, it appears Treasury has not exceeded the troubled asset
purchase limit or obligated funds in excess of those OMB has
apportioned.15 We are continuing to obtain additional information from
Treasury as well as to review the controls that Treasury has in place to
ensure that it complies with these restrictions. We will discuss these issues
in subsequent reports.

12

Section 115(a)(1) and (2) of the act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5225(a)(1), (a)(2), set an initial limit of
$350 billion on the amount of troubled asset purchases Treasury was authorized to make.
That limit has increased to $700 billion under section 115(a)(3) of the act because the
President has requested the remainder of the TARP funds from Congress and Congress has
not enacted specific legislation within the specified time required by the act to disapprove
the President’s request.
13

An obligation is a definite commitment that creates a legal liability of the government,
such as an agreement to purchase troubled assets.
14

31 U.S.C. §§ 1513, 1517. Under section 118 of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5228, Treasury is
authorized to issue Treasury securities and use the proceeds to pay for TARP program and
administrative expenses, and the funds obligated or expended for such expenses are
deemed to be appropriated. Apportionment is an action by which OMB distributes amounts
available for obligation in an appropriation or fund account.
15

The total of the asset purchase prices may not be the same as the amount of obligations.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Table 1: Status of TARP Funds as of January 23, 2009
(Dollars in billions)
Announced
Program
Funding Levela

Apportioned

$250.0

$230.0

$194.2

$194.2

Systemically Significant
Failing Institutions

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

Targeted Investment
Program

40.0

40.0

40.0

40.0

Term Asset-backed
Securities Loan Facility

20.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

Automotive Industry
Financing Program

24.9

24.9

20.8

19.5

Citigroup Asset Guarantee

5.0

5.0

5.0

0.0

Bank of America Asset
Guarantee

7.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

$387.4

$339.9

$300.0

$293.7

Program
Capital Purchase Program

Total

Asset
Purchase
Price Disbursed

Source: Treasury OFS, unaudited.
a

Some of Treasury’s announced transactions are not yet legal obligations.

As Treasury has continued to create programs in an effort to craft an
effective response to challenging institution-specific developments, many
observers believe that it has not effectively communicated its overall
strategy or explained how the various programs work together to meet
TARP’s goals. For example, we noted in our December report that the shift
in focus from buying troubled mortgage-related assets to making
investments in financial institutions underscored the need for an effective
communication strategy that would explain the reasoning behind this
change. Similarly, the programs that have been created to address specific
developments often have similar guidelines and terms that can make it
difficult for Congress, the markets, and the public to understand the
differences between programs and the rationale for each. Further,
Treasury has not yet implemented a program for homeownership
preservation, but according to Treasury officials, they have been in
discussions with the transition team. These issues continue to highlight
the importance of effective communication with participants, the
Congress, and the general public.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

CPP Continues to Be the
Primary Vehicle under
TARP for Attempting to
Stabilize Financial Markets

Treasury has continued to rely on CPP as the primary vehicle under TARP
for attempting to stabilize financial markets. As of January 23, 2009,
Treasury had disbursed more than 75 percent of the $250 billion it had
allocated for CPP to purchase more than $194 billion in preferred shares
of 317 qualified financial institutions (see table 2).16 These purchases
ranged from about $1 million to $25 billion per institution. About $42.7
billion in preferred stock shares of 265 financial institutions has been
purchased since our December report. Appendix II gives a detailed listing
of banks that have received funds as of January 23, 2009.

Table 2: Capital Investments Made through the Capital Purchase Program, as of January 23, 2009

Amount of CPP capital investment

Cumulative percent of allocated
fund used for CPP capital
investment

Number of qualified financial
institutions receiving CPP capital

10/28/2008

$115,000,000,000

46.0%

8

11/14/2008

33,561,409,000

59.4

21

11/21/2008

2,909,754,000

60.6

23

12/5/2008

3,835,635,000

62.1

35

12/12/2008

2,450,054,000

63.1

28

12/19/2008

2,791,950,000

64.2

49

12/23/2008

1,911,751,000

65.0

43

12/31/2008

15,078,947,000

71.0

7

1/9/2009

14,771,598,000

76.9

43

1/16/2009

1,479,938,000

77.5

39

Closing date of
transaction

1/23/2009
Total

385,965,000

77.7

23

$194,177,001,000

77.7%

317a

Source: Treasury and GAO.
a

The total number of financial institutions was reduced by two because SunTrust Banks, Inc.
(SunTrust) and Bank of America both received two capital investments under CPP. SunTrust
received a partial capital investment of $3.5 billion on November 14, 2008, and another of $1.35
billion on December 31, 2008. Bank of America received $15 billion on October 28, 2008, and, after
merging with Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Merrill Lynch), an additional $10 billion on January 9, 2008. As
discussed later in this report, Treasury has made an additional purchase of $20 billion in preferred
shares under TIP.

16
For purposes of CPP, financial institutions generally include qualifying U.S.-controlled
banks, savings associations, and bank holding companies and savings and loan holding
companies.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Initially, Treasury approved $125 billion in capital purchases for nine of
the largest public financial institutions that federal banking regulators and
Treasury considered to be systemically significant to the operation of the
financial system.17 At the time, these nine institutions held about 55
percent of U.S. banking assets. Subsequent purchases were made in
qualified institutions of various sizes (in terms of total assets) and types.
Total assets of participating qualified institutions ranged from about $8
million to more than $2 trillion (see app. I). As of January 23, 2009, the
types of institutions that received CPP capital included 226 publicly held
institutions, 83 privately held institutions, and 8 community development
financial institutions (CDFI).18 These purchases represented investments in
state-chartered and national banks and bank holding companies located in
43 states and Puerto Rico.
According to OFS and the bank regulators, thousands of applications are
under review. As of January 16, 2009, Treasury was in the process of
reviewing approval recommendations from bank regulators for less than
150 qualified financial institutions.19 The bank regulators reported that they
are reviewing applications from more than 2,000 institutions that have not
yet been forwarded to Treasury. Qualified financial institutions generally
have 30 calendar days after Treasury notifies them of preliminary approval
for CPP funding to submit investment agreements and related
documentation. According to OFS officials, there is a backlog of pending
closings, largely because of the time required for institutions to obtain
approval from their shareholders and boards of directors or finalize
closing documents. OFS stated that more than 50 financial institutions that
received preliminary approval have withdrawn their CPP applications.
Moreover, according to OFS officials, some of the institutions said that

17
While Treasury approved $125 billion to the nine largest institutions, as table 2 shows, it
initially disbursed funds to eight of the nine institutions. The $10 billion to Merrill Lynch
was not disbursed until January 9, 2009, after its merger with Bank of America was
completed.
18
A CDFI is a specialized financial institution that works in market niches that are
underserved by traditional financial institutions. CDFIs provide a range of financial
products and services such as mortgage financing for low-income and first-time
homebuyers and not-for-profit developers; flexible underwriting and risk capital for needed
community facilities; and technical assistance, commercial loans and investments to small
start-up or expanding businesses in low-income areas.
19
This figure excludes applications that were withdrawn by the financial institution, were
referred to the bank regulators for further consideration, or were for institutions for which
term sheets have not yet been issued.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

their boards of directors had elected not to participate in the program for
various reasons, including the cost of closing and concerns over what they
viewed as onerous reporting and compliance requirements that may be
imposed on participants. OFS officials also stated that some institutions
want to show that they qualified for CPP funds but did not need the funds.
As of January 23, 2009, Treasury had not denied an application.
Institutions that are not likely to meet the requirements for funding under
the CPP are encouraged not to apply by their appropriate bank regulator.
In the coming months, OFS staff resources will be further strained as they
continue to review and approve recommendations from the banking
regulators for more than 2,000 applications that the regulators have not
forwarded to OFS and, as discussed later in this report, new applications
for CPP funds from other types of financial institutions, such as S
corporations and mutual organizations (mutuals).20

Treasury Developed Additional
Standard Terms to Reflect
Different Ownership Structures
of Financial Institutions

Early on, Treasury created standardized terms for the publicly held
institutions that received CPP funds. Treasury has finalized or begun work
on terms for other types of financial institutions, including privately held
institutions, S corporations, and mutuals. On November 17, 2008, Treasury
established standardized terms for making capital investments in privately
held financial institutions, which were required to submit applications for
CPP funds by December 8, 2008. The terms for privately held institutions
are generally similar to those for publicly held institutions.21 Like the terms
for publicly held institutions, those for privately held institutions stipulate
that

20

An S corporation makes a valid election to be taxed under Subchapter S of Chapter 1 of
the Internal Revenue Code and thus does not pay any income taxes. Instead, the
corporation’s income or losses are divided among and passed through to its shareholders.
A mutual organization is a company that is owned by its customers rather than by a
separate group of stockholders. Many thrifts and insurance companies (for example,
Metropolitan and Prudential) are mutuals.
21

For a detailed discussion of the CPP terms for publicly held institutions, see GAO-09-161,
21-22. The terms relating to dividends and rankings, as well as the limitations on executive
compensation, are similar to those for publicly traded financial institutions. However, the
limitations on common dividends and repurchases are generally extended until the tenth
anniversary of the date of issuance. Private financial institutions are also prohibited from
paying any common dividends or repurchasing any equity securities or trust-preferred
securities after the tenth anniversary, unless the preferred stock has been redeemed or
transferred to a third party.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

•

the preferred shares pay dividends at a rate of 5 percent annually for
the first 5 years and 9 percent annually thereafter;

•

such shares be nonvoting, except with respect to protecting investors’
rights;

•

financial institutions may redeem their shares at their face value after 3
years and earlier if the financial institution has received a minimum
amount from “qualified equity offerings” of any Tier 1 perpetual
preferred or common stock;22 and

•

Treasury generally may transfer the preferred shares to a third party at
any time.

The terms of the warrants, however, differ for publicly and privately held
institutions.23 Treasury receives warrants to purchase common stock in
publicly held financial institutions. But for privately held institutions,
Treasury receives warrants to purchase a specified number of shares of
preferred stock, called warrant preferred, that pay dividends at 9 percent

22
Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a regulator’s point of
view. It consists of the types of capital considered the most reliable and liquid, primarily
common stock and preferred stock. A “qualified equity offering” is the sale and issuance of
Tier 1 qualifying perpetual preferred stock, common stock, or a combination of such stock
for cash. The preferred stock may be redeemed before 3 years has elapsed only if the
institution’s aggregate gross proceeds from “qualified equity offerings” are at least 25
percent of the stock’s issue price.
23

If Treasury purchases troubled assets under the act from a publicly traded financial
institution, section 113(d) of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5223(d), requires that it receive a warrant
giving Treasury the right to receive nonvoting common stock or preferred stock, or voting
stock for which Treasury agrees not to exercise voting power. In the case of any other
financial institution, Treasury must receive a warrant for common or preferred stock or a
senior debt instrument. The act requires that the warrant or senior debt instrument be
designed to provide for the reasonable participation in equity appreciation (in the case of a
warrant) or a reasonable interest rate (in the case of a debt instrument). The warrant is
also to provide additional protection for taxpayers against losses from the sale of assets by
Treasury and the administrative expenses of TARP. Section 113 of the act contains
additional requirements that apply to conversion of warrants, required protections of the
value of the securities, and requirements concerning the exercise price and the shares
authorized by the financial institution to fulfill its obligations with respect the warrants.
Treasury is required to establish de minimis exceptions to the requirements applicable to
warrants and to establish appropriate alternative requirements for institutions that are
legally prohibited from issuing securities or debt instruments.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

annually.24 The exercise price for the warrants is $0.01 per share unless the
financial institution’s charter requires otherwise. Unlike for publicly held
institutions, Treasury exercised these warrants immediately for warrant
preferred because there were no downside risks to exercising the
warrants immediately and it can begin receiving dividends, according to
OFS officials.
On January 14, 2009, Treasury established standardized terms for making
capital investments in S corporations but was still crafting terms for
mutuals. The deadline for S corporations to submit applications to
Treasury for CPP funds is February 13, 2009. The terms for S corporations
are generally similar to those for publicly held institutions, with the
exception that debt (senior securities) is being issued instead of preferred
stock.25 Treasury structured the terms this way to preserve the tax status
of these corporations, which would lose their tax status if they issued a
second class of stock, such as preferred stock, to Treasury. In addition, the
senior securities will count as Tier 1 capital when held at the holding
company level and Tier 2 capital when held by a bank or savings
association. Before Treasury invests in the senior securities issued by a
holding company, it will be necessary for bank regulators to issue an
interim final rule designating the senior securities as Tier 1 capital. The
senior securities will pay interest at a rate of 7.7 percent annually for 5
years and 13.8 percent thereafter.26 Holding companies may defer interest
on the senior securities for up to 5 years, but any unpaid interest will
accumulate and compound at the then-applicable interest rate in effect. In

24
The warrant preferred shares have a 9 percent return compared to 5 percent on the
preferred shares. Also, to promote participation of CDFIs in CPP, Treasury does not
require those institutions to provide warrants if the size of the investment is $50 million or
less. Treasury has established this exception under section 113(d)(3) of the act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5223(d)(3).
25

The term sheet for S corporations specifies that the senior securities are to be senior to
the institution’s common stock and that senior securities issued by a bank or savings
association must be expressly subordinated to claims of depositors and to the institution’s
other debt obligations to its general and secured creditors, unless the debt obligations are
explicitly made equal to or subordinated to the senior securities. Senior securities issued
by a holding company must be subordinated to senior indebtedness in accordance with
holding company regulation, unless the senior indebtedness is explicitly made equal to or
subordinated to the senior securities.
26

According to the term sheet, S corporations’ senior securities have 7.7 percent and 13.8
percent interest rates. The higher rates will equate to after-tax effective rates (assuming a
35 percent tax rate) of 5 percent and 9 percent, respectively—the same rates applied to
securities issued by other classes of institutions participating in CPP.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

addition, these companies cannot pay dividends on shares of equity or
trust preferred securities as long as any interest is deferred. Treasury is
developing standardized terms for mutuals, but OFS officials noted that
there are challenges associated with structuring terms for these types of
organizations and they do not have an expected date for releasing final
terms. While credit unions also are covered under the act, Treasury has
not yet created a program that would enable them to participate in CPP.

Treasury Continues to Rely on
Regulators’ Recommendations
for Approving CPP
Applications

Qualified financial institutions seeking CPP capital continue to be directed
to send their applications directly to their primary federal bank regulators,
and Treasury continues to rely extensively on these regulators’
recommendations in its decision to allow an institution to participate in
CPP.27 Because the program is intended to provide capital to those
institutions that can demonstrate overall financial strength and long-term
viability, OFS is relying on the banking regulators’ examinations and
experience with these institutions in making a final determination
regarding their financial condition and participation.
As we noted in our December 2008 report, Treasury and the banking
regulators developed a standardized process for evaluating the financial
strength and viability of applicants. Banking regulators evaluate
applications based on factors such as examination ratings and selected
performance ratios. The regulators give presumptive approval to
institutions with the higher examination ratings and recommend these
institutions to OFS’s Investment Committee, which makes
recommendations to the Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial
Stability for final approval.28 Institutions with lower examination ratings or
other considerations requiring further review are referred to the CPP
Council, which may consider other factors, such as confirmed private
equity investment, that may offset the effect of lower examination
ratings.29 These institutions may also be recommended to the Investment
Committee. Finally, those institutions with the lowest examination ratings

27
The primary federal regulator is generally the regulator overseeing the lead bank of the
institution. Where the institution is a bank holding company, the primary federal regulator
also consults with the Federal Reserve. For a more thorough discussion of the approval
process, see GAO-09-161, 22-24.
28
The committee membership includes the OFS’s Chief Investment Officer (committee
chair) and the Treasury Assistant Secretaries for Financial Markets, Economic Policy,
Financial Institutions, and Financial Stability.
29

The CPP Council is made up of representatives from the four federal bank regulators,
with Treasury officials as observers.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

receive presumptive denials and may be encouraged to withdraw their
applications.
In December 2008, we also reported that differences exist in the extent to
which bank regulators provided internal guidance (in addition to
Treasury’s guidance) on processing CPP applications that might not be
approved. For example, three bank regulators provided additional written
guidance to staff on how to handle applications that were not likely to be
recommended for approval, while one bank regulator did not provide any
additional guidance. The bank regulators we contacted stated that no new
additional guidance had been developed since our December report.
We are continuing to examine the process for accepting and approving
CPP applications. Specifically, we are developing a methodology to sample
CPP applications that have been funded from October 2008 through
January 2009 to determine the extent to which the regulators and OFS are
consistently applying established criteria for reviewing applications and
adequately documenting the regulators’ recommendations and OFS’s final
decisions. We will also continue to coordinate and leverage the work of
other agencies and offices involved in the oversight of CPP, including the
Congressional Oversight Panel, FDIC’s Office of the Inspector General,
Treasury’s Office of the Inspector General, and the Office of the Special
Inspector General for TARP, all of which have work underway in
monitoring the implementation of CPP.
In addition, we will be examining FDIC’s recent requirement that state
nonmember banks implement a process to monitor their use of capital
injections, liquidity support or financing guarantees obtained through
financial stability programs established by Treasury, FDIC, and the
Federal Reserve.30 The monitoring process is intended to show how
participation in these federal programs has assisted institutions in
supporting prudent lending and efforts to work with existing borrowers to
avoid unnecessary foreclosures. FDIC indicated that institutions should
include a summary of this information in shareholder and public reports,
annual reports, and financial statements, as applicable. While we are
encouraged by FDIC’s initiative, CPP would benefit from the four federal
bank regulators, in collaboration with Treasury, developing a common
approach to ensure that participants are treated the same. As part of our

30

See FDIC, “Monitoring the Use of Funding from Federal Financial Stability and Guaranty
Programs,” FIL-1-2009, January 12, 2009.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

ongoing review of this program, we will leverage work of FDIC’s Office of
the Inspector General, which has work underway on this issue, and
coordinate our activities with the Special Inspector General for TARP. We
will report our results in subsequent reports.

Treasury Has Made Some
Progress in Monitoring Banks’
Use of CPP Funds and
Ensuring Compliance with
Purchase Agreements but Has
Not Finalized Its Plans

Our December 2008 report recommended that Treasury work with bank
regulators to establish a systematic means of monitoring and reporting on
financial institutions’ activities to ensure that they are consistent with the
goals of the CPP standard agreement, including expansion of the flow of
credit and the modification of the terms of residential mortgages. Treasury
has made some progress in responding to the recommendation, but more
needs to be done to ensure an appropriate level of accountability and
transparency.31 Specifically, Treasury has taken several steps in responding
to our recommendation:
•

Treasury has worked with the regulators and CPP participants to
develop a survey for the 20 largest institutions that will collect monthly
data on loan balances, new loan originations by different categories
(that is, consumer and commercial lending), and purchases of
mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. The survey will also
require institutions to provide a narrative discussion of trends in their
lending activities and changes in their lending standards and terms.
OFS officials said that they have begun surveying these institutions.

•

Working with the bank regulators, Treasury announced that it was
developing an approach to analyzing quarterly call report data for all
financial institutions that received CPP funds to gauge changes in
lending activity and compare them with changes at nonparticipating
financial institutions.

•

Treasury has also taken steps to establish a team focused on
monitoring and reporting issues.

Treasury’s efforts will provide some useful insights on lending activities of
the participating institutions, but because only the 20 largest participants
will be surveyed, analysis for most of the participants will come from
quarterly data submitted by the institutions and will have a significant

31
The standard terms of the CPP Securities Purchase Agreement between Treasury and
participating institutions include provisions in the “recitals” section stating “the Company
agrees to expand the flow of credit to U.S. consumers and businesses on competitive
terms” and “agrees to work diligently, under existing programs, to modify the terms of
residential mortgages.”

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

reporting lag, thereby limiting its usefulness as a monitoring mechanism
for the vast majority of CPP participants. Depending on the results of the
call report and survey analysis, Treasury said that it will also work with
the regulators as they develop examination procedures to collect
information about how the funds are being used by participating
institutions.
During this period, we again contacted representatives of the eight large
institutions that initially received funds under CPP to discuss any changes
in their strategy for using and tracking CPP funds. One of the two
institutions that track CPP funds reported that it had used the funds to
increase interbank lending and purchase mortgage-backed securities and
provided us with a report on its planned use of funds. The other institution
stated that it would use CPP funds primarily to support consumer banking
(for example, credit cards and mortgages) and also to purchase mortgages
in the secondary market to increase market liquidity. This institution will
be providing us with a management report detailing the status of the use of
CPP funds. Officials from all eight institutions discussed using the funds in
a manner that they viewed as generally consistent with the goals of CPP,
such as increasing the flow of credit to consumers and businesses and
modifying the terms of existing residential mortgages. However, as we
reported previously, six of these institutions did not intend to track or
report CPP capital separately. Further, the institutions continued to note
that CPP capital would not be viewed any differently from other capital—
that is, the additional capital would be used to strengthen the institutions’
capital bases, make business investments and acquisitions, and lend to
individuals and businesses—and all of the institutions stated this is what
they have done. For example, officials described and have publicly
reported that the additional funds have enabled them to increase or
maintain lending, invest in projects (such as housing projects), increase
capital base, and support secondary market activities.
Treasury also has made some progress in addressing our recommendation
that it should develop a way to ensure that institutions participating in
CPP are complying with key requirements of program agreements,
including limitations on executive compensation, dividend payments, and
repurchase of stock. OFS officials told us that certification by senior
executives will be a key part of ensuring compliance. Specifically,
Treasury proposed interim regulations establishing reporting and
recordkeeping procedures that will require that the principal executive
officers (PEO) of participating institutions certify compliance with the
compensation restrictions and that the certification be provided to the
TARP Chief Compliance Officer. According to Treasury officials, they have

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identified options for detecting noncompliance and taking enforcement
actions but have not finalized their plans in this regard. In addition,
Treasury is implementing a plan to ensure that financial institutions are
making accurate and timely dividend payments to Treasury by reconciling
anticipated dividend payments with actual amounts received from the
institution. However, Treasury has not selected equity asset managers that
could be responsible for monitoring these other aspects of compliance.
Each of the four federal bank regulators also is developing procedures for
bank examiners to monitor and assess compliance with program
requirements, such as limitations and restrictions on executive
compensation and dividend payments, through their bank examination
process. These procedures are still in the development phase, and one of
the regulators expects to complete its work before the end of the first
quarter of 2009.
As noted previously, Treasury has made some progress in establishing
specific guidance on executive compensation. Treasury plans to issue
additional interim final rules on executive compensation that provide a
technical amendment and two clarifications to the interim final rules
issued in October and provide new reporting and recordkeeping
requirements for the CPP executive compensation standards.32 The new
rules will require that the PEO of the financial institution provide
certifications to the TARP Chief Compliance Officer regarding compliance
with the CPP executive compensation restrictions applicable to senior
executive officers (SEO),33 as follows:
•

Within 120 days of the purchase of securities by Treasury, the PEO
must certify that the compensation committee has reviewed the SEOs’
incentive compensation arrangements with the senior risk officers to
ensure that these arrangements do not encourage unnecessary risktaking that could threaten the value of the institution.

32
The new interim final rule will amend the October rule to mandate that the required
compensation committee certifications be provided in a different section of an institution’s
SEC filing. The new rule also will clarify that for purposes of the “clawback” or recovery
requirements, bonus and incentive compensation is considered paid to a senior executive
officer when the officer obtains a legally binding right to the payment, even if the payment
is not made during a period when Treasury holds an interest in the financial institution.
Finally, the new rule will clarify the comparison of the act’s and Treasury’s rules on the
clawback provisions with the clawback provisions in section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
33

Senior executive officers are generally the PEO, the chief financial officer, and the three
most highly compensated executive officers.

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•

Within 135 days of the end of each fiscal year, the PEO must certify
that (1) the compensation committee has met at least once during the
year with the senior risk officers to review the relationship between
risk management policies and practices and the SEOs’ incentive
compensation arrangements, and the compensation committee has
certified to this review; (2) the financial institution has complied with
the requirements of the interim regulations for recovery or “clawback”
of SEOs’ bonus or incentive compensation based on earnings, gains, or
other measures that are later proven to be based on materially
inaccurate performance metric criteria; (3) the financial institution has
prohibited “golden parachute” payments to SEOs; and (4) the financial
institution has instituted procedures to limit the income tax deduction
for payments to each senior executive officer to $500,000. The PEO
must also provide the names of individuals who are the financial
institution’s SEOs for the current fiscal year.

•

Within 135 days of the completion of each annual fiscal year, the PEO
must certify that the income tax deduction for payments to each SEO
was in fact limited to $500,000.

If the PEO is unable to provide any of these certifications in a timely
manner, the PEO must provide an explanation to the TARP Chief
Compliance Officer. Financial institutions must preserve appropriate
documentation and records to substantiate each certification for at least 6
years after the certification, and for the first 2 years these documents must
be in an easily accessible place. Any individual providing false information
or certifications to Treasury relating to a purchase under the act’s
executive compensation restrictions or required under the interim final
rules is subject to criminal penalties.

Treasury Has Established
the Auto Industry
Financing Program to
Stabilize Auto Makers and
Auto Financing Companies

Treasury established the Auto Industry Financing Program in December
2008 to prevent a disruption of the domestic automotive industry that
would pose systemic risk to the nation’s economy. Treasury established
the program in response to business plans that General Motors
Corporation (GM) and Chrysler Holding LLC (Chrysler) submitted to
congressional committees and public statements made by GM and
Chrysler officials indicating that their companies needed immediate

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federal financial assistance to remain solvent.34 On December 19, 2008,
Treasury announced it had agreed to lend up to $18.4 billion under this
program—including $13.4 billion to GM and $4 billion to Chrysler.35
According to program guidelines, eligibility for AIFP is determined on a
case-by-case basis and takes into account the following factors:
•

the importance of the institution to production by, or financing of, the
American automotive industry;

•

the likelihood that a major disruption of the institution’s operations
would have a materially adverse effect on employment and produce
negative spillover effects to the overall economy;

•

the likelihood that the institution is important enough to the nation’s
financial and economic system that a major disruption of its
operations could cause major disruptions to credit markets and
significantly increase uncertainty or cause a loss of confidence that
would materially weaken overall economic performance; and

•

the extent and probability of the institution’s ability to access
alternative sources of capital and liquidity.

Treasury’s loan agreements with GM and Chrysler include a number of
provisions to protect taxpayers’ interests and put the companies on the
path to financial viability. For example, the agreements limit executive
compensation; require concessions from parties including management,
labor, and debt holders; subject the companies to periodic reviews by
government entities including GAO; require collateral for the loans; and
subject business and other transactions of more than $100 million to
government approval.

34
GM, Chrysler, and Ford Motor Company (Ford) officials testified before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on December 4, 2008, and before the
House Committee on Financial Services on December 5, 2008. In the testimony statements
and business plans submitted to the committees, the GM, Chrysler, and Ford CEOs
reported that their companies needed $18 billion, $7 billion, and $9 billion, respectively, in
federal assistance. Ford subsequently determined that it would not request assistance from
Treasury at this time.
35

Specifically, Treasury agreed to purchase GM and Chrysler debt securities—TARP
“troubled assets” under section 3(9) of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5202(9).

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In addition, the agreements call for the appointment of a “President’s
Designee” to oversee the restructuring of the American auto
manufacturers (an appointment not yet made). As a condition of receiving
the loans, GM and Chrysler must submit restructuring plans and term
sheets to the President’s Designee by February 17, 2009. The restructuring
plans must include a business plan for repaying the loans, evidence of the
companies’ ability to comply with federal corporate average fuel economy
standards, evidence of a new product mix and cost structure that is
competitive in the U.S. marketplace, and evidence that the companies can
become financially viable. The terms sheets must include agreements
between the companies and their unions, public debt holders, and
voluntary employees’ benefit associations on labor modifications, debt
restructuring, and benefit modifications, respectively. By March 31, 2009,
GM and Chrysler must report to the President’s Designee on their progress
in implementing these restructuring plans, including showing final
agreements with union and other stakeholders. The President’s Designee
will then determine whether the companies have made sufficient progress
in implementing the restructuring plans; if they have not, the loans are
automatically accelerated and become due 30 days later.
As part of our responsibilities for providing oversight of TARP, we plan to
monitor Treasury’s implementation and oversight of AIFP, including the
auto manufacturers’ use of federal funds and development of the required
restructuring plans. We plan to issue a separate report on the program
early this spring.

AIFP Loans Related to GMAC

On December 29, 2008, after the Federal Reserve approved an application
by GMAC LLC to become a bank holding company, Treasury committed to
lend up to $1 billion of TARP funds to GM (one of GMAC’s owners), to
enable GM to participate in GMAC’s new rights offering related to its
reorganization as a bank holding company. 36 The actual level of TARP
funding to GM was to depend on the level of current investor participation
in GMAC’s offering, and on January 22, 2009, Treasury announced the final
loan amount to GM of $884,024,131. At Treasury’s option, this loan can be
exchanged at any time for the GMAC ownership interests acquired by GM
in the new rights offering.

36

GMAC specializes in automotive finance, real estate finance, insurance, commercial
finance, and online banking. As of September 30, 2008, GMAC had $211 billion in total
assets. This loan commitment is in addition to the $13.4 billion loan announced on
December 19, 2008.

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On December 29, 2008, Treasury purchased $5 billion of senior preferred
membership interests from GMAC with an annual 8 percent dividend,
payable quarterly. Under the agreement, GMAC issued warrants to
Treasury to purchase, for a nominal price, additional preferred interests in
an amount equal to 5 percent of the preferred interests purchased. The
warrant preferred shares provide an annual 9 percent dividend payable
quarterly. According to Treasury, because the exercise price for the
warrants is equal to one cent per $1,000 ownership unit (equivalent to a
share) and there were no downside risks to exercising the warrants
immediately, Treasury exercised the warrants at closing so that it could
begin receiving the dividends.37 Under the funding agreement, GMAC must
comply with all executive compensation restrictions applicable to
qualifying financial institutions under CPP, except that the definition of a
“golden parachute” payment is broader: it generally means any payment to
an SEO on account of severance from employment. GMAC also must
comply with enhanced restrictions as long as Treasury owns any preferred
interests or warrant interests. In particular, GMAC
•

must reduce by about 40 percent the aggregate amount of bonus
compensation that may be paid to SEOs or senior employees in 2008
and 2009 from the 2007 bonus level;38

•

cannot adopt or maintain any compensation plan that would
encourage manipulation of its reported earnings to enhance the
compensation of any of its employees; and

•

must maintain all suspensions and other restrictions of contributions
to benefit plans that are in place or initiated as of the closing date of
the transaction.

Treasury also has the right to require GMAC to clawback any bonuses or
other compensation (including golden parachutes) that are paid in
violation of the agreement. Finally, GMAC must certify in writing to the
TARP Chief Compliance Officer that the compensation committee has
reviewed the compensation arrangements of the SEOs with its senior risk
officers and determined that the compensation arrangements do not

37

GMAC is a limited liability corporation, and its warrants are not publicly traded and have
no ready markets.
38

Senior employees are the 20 most highly compensated employees, other than the SEOs.

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encourage these officers to take unnecessary and excessive risks that
threaten the value of the company.

AIFP Loans to Chrysler

On January 16, 2009, as part of a broader program to assist the domestic
automotive industry in becoming financially viable, Treasury announced
that it would make a $1.5 billion loan to a special purpose entity created by
Chrysler Financial Services Americas LLC (Chrysler Financial) to finance
the extension of new consumer automotive loans. The loan will be payable
over 5 years and will be secured by a senior secured interest in a pool of
newly originated consumer automotive loans, with Chrysler serving as
guarantor for certain covenants of Chrysler Financial.39
Under the agreement, Chrysler Financial must be in compliance with the
executive compensation and corporate governance requirements of
Section 111 of the act, as well as enhanced restrictions on executive
compensation.40 In lieu of warrants, the special purpose entity created by
Chrysler Financial will issue additional notes to Treasury in an amount
equal to 5 percent of the total size of the loan. The additional notes will
vest 20 percent on the closing date and 20 percent on each anniversary of
the closing date and will have other terms similar to the loan terms.

Treasury Has Established
Programs to Address
Problems at Specific
Financial Institutions

Although CPP has remained the primary vehicle under TARP to assist
financial institutions, Treasury has several other programs that target
specific types of financial institutions in response to changing conditions
in the markets. However, Treasury has yet to clearly articulate and
communicate a vision for TARP, which has adversely affected its ability to
communicate with Congress, financial markets, and the public. For
example, a number of the programs established under TARP have similar
guidelines and terms, which highlights the need to effectively articulate
and communicate the overall strategy behind creating each program and
show how the programs will work together to achieve TARP’s goals.

39

Accrued interests will be payable by the end of the five-year term on January 16, 2014.
The loan’s interest rate will be equal to the one-month LIBOR plus 100 basis points for the
first year and one-month LIBOR plus 150 basis points for the remaining four years. LIBOR
is the interest rate offered for dollar deposits in the London interbank market for 3-month,
dollar-denominated loans.
40

12 U.S.C. § 5221.

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Systemically Significant Failing
Institutions Program

As we previously reported, on November 25, 2008, Treasury issued
guidelines for the SSFI Program. According to Treasury, this program is
designed to provide stability in financial markets and prevent disruption
caused by the failure of an institution of significant size that is deemed to
be important to the financial system. Unlike CPP, SSFI has no deadlines
for participation, which is determined on a case-by-case basis, and terms
are generally more stringent. Treasury considers a variety of factors when
assessing an institution for participation in SSFI, including
•

the extent to which the institution’s failure could threaten the viability
of its creditors and counterparties because of their direct exposure to
the institution;

•

the number and size of financial institutions that investors or
counterparties see as situated similarly to the failing institution, or that
they believe would otherwise be likely to experience indirect
contagion effects from the institution’s failure;

•

the institution’s importance to the nation’s financial and economic
system—for example, whether a disorderly failure would, with a high
probability, cause major disruptions to credit markets or payments and
settlement systems, seriously destabilize key asset prices, and
significantly increase uncertainty or losses of confidence, thereby
materially weakening overall economic performance; and

•

the extent and probability of the institution’s ability to access
alternative sources of capital and liquidity from either the private
sector or other sources.

In November 2008, American International Group, Inc. (AIG) became the
first institution assisted under this program. Treasury’s concerns about
AIG predated the establishment of TARP. In mid-September 2008, the
Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY),
and Treasury agreed that the failure of AIG—a diversified financial
services company that provides asset management, general insurance, life
insurance and retirement services through its subsidiaries—would pose a
systemic risk to the global financial markets and the economy. On
September 22, 2008, FRBNY and AIG entered into a credit agreement and a
guarantee and pledge agreement. Under these agreements, FRBNY
established a 2-year revolving credit facility that could lend AIG up to an
aggregate of $85 billion outstanding at any one time. All outstanding
balances under the credit agreement were secured by a pledge of a
substantial portion of the assets of AIG and its primary nonregulated

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subsidiaries, including its ownership in its regulated U.S. and foreign
subsidiaries. AIG’s obligations under the credit facility also are guaranteed
by certain of AIG’s domestic subsidiaries. AIG also agreed to issue 100,000
shares of a new series of convertible preferred stock to a trust that will
hold the stock for FRBNY, with Treasury designated as the ultimate
beneficiary. The preferred stock was originally to be convertible into 79.9
percent of the shares of AIG’s common stock, later reduced to 77.9
percent. Outstanding advances made to AIG under the credit facility bore
interest at a quarterly rate equal to 3-month LIBOR plus 8.5 percent.41 On
October 6, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board also authorized FRBNY to
engage in securities borrowing transactions with AIG through which
FRBNY could lend up to $37.8 billion to AIG in exchange for collateral in
the form of investment-grade debt obligations.
On November 10, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board, acting in conjunction
with Treasury, announced the restructuring of these AIG credit facilities.
FRBNY restructured the credit facility established in September in three
ways: by increasing the loan maturity from 2 to 5 years; by reducing the
interest rate payable on outstanding advances to 3-month LIBOR plus 3
percent; and by reducing the maximum credit that AIG could have
outstanding to $60 billion. The reductions went into effect after the
Treasury’s investment of $40 billion in TARP funds to pay down the credit
facility.
The investment was made pursuant to Treasury’s agreement to purchase
$40 billion in perpetual senior preferred shares from AIG as part of SSFI.
The senior preferred shares will accrue dividends at an annual rate of 10
percent and the dividends are payable quarterly in arrears. Treasury also
will receive a warrant to purchase a number of shares of common stock
equal to 2 percent of the AIG common stock on the date of Treasury’s
purchase. The warrant has a 10-year term and an initial exercise price of
$2.50 per share. Treasury’s consent will be required for increases in
dividends on common stock and repurchases of certain securities until 5
years after the date of purchase. The senior preferred stock is nonvoting
except for class-voting rights on certain corporate actions that may affect
the value of the stock or the investors’ rights. Additional restrictions
include AIG’s agreement to

41

LIBOR is the interest rate offered for dollar deposits in the London interbank market for
3-month, dollar-denominated loans.

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•

limit any golden parachute payments to employees of AIG and
subsidiaries who participate in AIG’s senior partners plan to the
amounts permitted under the restrictions for CPP;

•

forego increases to the annual bonus pools payable to SEOs and senior
partners for 2008 and 2009 beyond the average of the 2006 and 2007
annual bonus pools, with certain exclusions;

•

confirm that none of the proceeds of the purchase of preferred stock
will be used to pay annual bonuses or other future cash performance
awards to executives or senior partners (Treasury and AIG agreed that
this confirmation should be auditable);42

•

ensure that none of the proceeds of the purchase price will be used to
pay any electively deferred compensation resulting from termination
of the certain deferred compensation plans by AIG;

•

maintain and implement a comprehensive written policy on lobbying,
government ethics, and political activity; and

•

give Treasury the right to consent to material amendments to AIG’s
written policies on corporate expenses.

We will continue to monitor implementation of this agreement between
Treasury and AIG in subsequent reports. We have recently initiated an
effort to, among other things, assess any impact of the assistance to AIG
on insurance markets and to determine, to the extent possible, whether
the rescue package has achieved its desired goals.

Targeted Investment
Program

On January 2, 2009, Treasury released the program description, eligibility
considerations, and justification for TIP. According to Treasury’s
announcement, the program is designed to prevent a loss of confidence in
financial institutions that could result in significant market disruptions,
threaten the financial strength of similarly situated financial institutions,
impair broader financial markets, and undermine the overall economy.
Treasury will determine the forms, terms, and conditions of any

42
The agreement requires that no funds from the stock purchase agreement or the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Credit Agreement be used to pay annual bonuses or other
performance awards, and establishes a methodology for auditing and confirming
compliance with this requirement, whereby the dividends from subsidiaries or net income
to the company must exceed the bonus payment amounts.

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investments made under this program and will consider institutions for
approval on a case-by-case basis based on the threats posed by the
potential destabilization of the institution, the risks caused by a loss of
confidence in the institution, and the institution’s importance to the
nation’s economy. In evaluating applications, Treasury will obtain and
consider information from a variety of sources and take into account
recommendations from the institution’s primary federal regulator, other
regulatory bodies, and private parties that could provide insight into the
potential consequences if confidence in a particular institution
deteriorated.

TIP Transactions with
Citigroup

On January 2, 2009, Treasury stated that the previously announced
purchase of senior preferred shares of Citigroup would fall under TIP. As
we previously reported, on November 23, 2008, Treasury had announced
that it would invest $20 billion in senior preferred shares of Citigroup.
Citigroup, which already had received $25 billion on October 28, 2008,
under CPP, was the first participant in this program. This investment was
part of a multi-pronged federal approach to stabilizing the financial
markets. Treasury also indicated that it guaranteed qualified assets under
AGP as discussed later in this report. Treasury and Citigroup signed the
final agreement on January 15, 2009. We are in the process of reviewing
that agreement and will report on its terms and conditions in our next
report.
Treasury will require any institution participating in TIP to provide
Treasury with warrants or alternative consideration, as necessary, to
minimize the long-term costs and maximize the benefits to the taxpayers
in accordance with the act. Treasury also will require any institution
participating in the program to adhere to more rigorous executive
compensation standards than those required under CPP. In addition,
Treasury will consider other measures to protect the taxpayers’ interests,
including limitations on the institution’s expenditures or other corporate
governance requirements. As the agreement requires, under TIP Citigroup
•

will pay dividends at an annual rate of 8 percent, payable quarterly;

•

can redeem shares only after the preferred shares received in the
October CPP purchase have been redeemed; and

•

will provide warrants to Treasury to purchase shares of common stock
equal to 10 percent of the total preferred shares issued.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Citigroup also agrees to use its reasonable best efforts to account for use
of the $20 billion purchase price and to report to Treasury on a quarterly
basis until use of all of the purchase price has been accounted for. In
addition, Citigroup will be subject to executive compensation
requirements that are more stringent than those under CPP. The additional
executive compensation standards include the following:
•

Limits on bonus compensation. Unless all debt and equity securities
owned by Treasury are redeemed, Citigroup must implement a bonus
pool cap for SEOs and employees who are members of the Senior
Leadership Committee for fiscal years 2008 and 2009 that may not
exceed 60 percent of the prior year’s bonus compensation.43 For 2009,
the bonus pool cap may be increased with Treasury’s approval.44

•

Limits on golden parachutes payable to senior leadership members.
The limits on golden parachute payments that apply under CPP will
apply to members of the Senior Leadership Committee.

•

Clawback requirements. If any senior executive officer or senior
leadership member receives a payment in contravention of the
restrictions on executive compensation, Citigroup promptly must
provide the individual with written notice that payment must be repaid
within 15 business days and inform Treasury of the repayment.

•

Restrictions on lobbying. Citigroup is required to maintain and
implement a comprehensive lobbying policy that is distributed to and
implemented by all company employees and lobbying firms doing
business with the institution.45

43
The Senior Leadership Committee includes anyone who is a member of the policy
committee composed of senior officers from various Citigroup subsidiaries (covering 52
senior executives) and the SEOs.
44

Citigroup must submit a written detailed recommendation to Treasury’s Assistant
Secretary for Financial Stability describing the basis for any proposed change in the bonus
pool cap.
45
The lobbying policy will be applied to Citigroup and its subsidiaries and will relate to the
provision of items of value to U.S. government officials, lobbying of U.S. government
officials, U.S. political activities, and contributions. The policy must provide for internal
reporting, oversight, and enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance. Any material
amendments to the policy require Treasury’s written approval.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

•

Restrictions on expenses. Citigroup is required to implement and
maintain a policy on corporate expenses and a wide range of company
expenditures that is distributed to all employees.46

•

Compliance certifications. Citigroup is required to submit a
certification on the last day of each fiscal quarter stipulating that it has
complied with and is in compliance with the executive compensation
provisions set forth in the agreement. The certification will be issued
to the TARP Compliance Officer by a senior executive officer of
Citigroup and will commence on the last day of the first fiscal quarter
of 2009.

TIP Transactions with Bank of
America

On January 16, 2009, Treasury announced that Bank of America would
receive $20 billion under TIP. Under CPP, Bank of America had previously
received $15 billion on October 28, 2008, and $10 billion on January 9,
2009.47 Similar to the terms for the Citigroup transaction under TIP, Bank
of America will make dividend payments of 8 percent to Treasury and will
comply with enhanced executive compensation restrictions.48 We plan to
provide more information on the terms of this transaction in our next
report, once we obtain and review executed closing documents.

Treasury and Federal
Reserve Established a
Program to Improve
Availability of Consumer
Credit

As we previously reported, on November 25, 2008, Treasury and FRBNY
announced the creation of the Term Asset-backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF) program. TALF is intended to increase the availability of credit for
consumers. The Federal Reserve is setting up a $200 billion program to
support consumer finance securitization markets—specifically, credit
cards, auto loans, student loans, and small business loans—and Treasury
would provide $20 billion of TARP funds to this facility. FRBNY believes
this facility will enable a broad range of institutions to increase their

46

The expense policy will be applied to Citigroup and its subsidiaries and will govern the
hosting and sponsoring of or payment for conferences and events, the use of corporate
aircraft, travel accommodations and expenditures, consulting arrangements with outside
service providers, any new lease or acquisition of real estate, expenses relating to office or
facility renovations or relocations, and expenses relating to entertainment or holiday
parties. The policy must provide for internal reporting, oversight, and enforcement
mechanisms for noncompliance.
47

Bank of America received the additional $10 billion once its merger with Merrill Lynch
was completed on January 1, 2009.
48
In addition, Treasury announced that Bank of America’s pool of specific assets (including
residential mortgages) would be protected against unusually large losses. We discuss the
announced guarantee program in a later section of this report.

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lending and will give borrowers access to lower-cost consumer and small
business loans. The credit facility is intended to support consumer credit
by providing liquidity to issuers of asset-backed securities so that they can
issue new consumer credit-driven securities. The credit facility may
expand to include other asset classes, such as commercial and certain
residential mortgage-backed assets.
Treasury and the Federal Reserve continue to develop the specific
structure and terms of TALF. The program consists of two related but
distinct parts: a lending facility and an asset disposition facility. Both will
be established and operated by FRBNY, and through its TARP authority,
Treasury will participate only in the asset disposition facility. Under the
lending facility, FRBNY will make available up to $200 billion for
nonrecourse loans secured by consumer asset-backed securities.49
Borrowers will be required to pay monthly interest on loans and to repay
the outstanding principal balance at the end of the loan term. If the
borrower makes all interest payments and repays the loan, FRBNY will
release its lien on the asset-back securities and return them to the
borrower. If the borrower defaults, FRBNY will foreclose on the assetback securities. Treasury will have no role in any of the transactions under
the TALF lending facility.
The asset disposition facility is intended to purchase, hold, and ultimately
liquidate asset-backed securities that were posted as collateral under the
loan facility but were later foreclosed on by FRBNY. Following
foreclosure, FRBNY can sell the asset-backed securities to a special
purpose vehicle owned and managed by FRBNY. Treasury will make a
subordinated loan to the special purpose vehicle for up to $20 billion in
TARP funds, but will not have any ownership interest in it. If purchases of
foreclosed assets exceed $20 billion, FRBNY will make a senior loan to the
special purpose vehicle to fund the additional purchases. All cash flows
from special purpose vehicle-owned assets will be used first to repay
FRBNY’s senior loan and then Treasury’s subordinated loans.
FRBNY has agreed to impose executive compensation requirements under
TALF that are comparable to those imposed on financial institutions that
receive CPP investment. The requirements will be imposed on sponsors of

49
A nonrecourse loan is one in which, in the event the loan is not repaid, the lender is
repaid by taking the collateral. The unpaid balance on the loan must be absorbed by the
lender.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

asset-backed securities as a condition of allowing their securities to be
pledged as collateral for loans made by FRBNY. Further, Treasury will
require that the business records and management of the special purpose
vehicle be available to Treasury and its agents, to the Comptroller of the
Currency, and to the Special Inspector General for TARP. Treasury
expects to have the program operational in February 2009. Unless
otherwise extended, the facility will cease making new loans on December
31, 2009.

Treasury Deferred Action
on a Program to Preserve
Homeownership until the
Incoming Administration

One of the stated purposes of the act is to ensure that the authorities and
facilities provided by the act are used in a manner that, among other
things, preserves homeownership. While OFS has taken steps to identify
and implement a homeownership preservation strategy, as of January 20,
2009, Treasury had neither specified its strategy for preserving
homeownership nor announced any specific program. According to
Treasury officials, Treasury has deferred taking action on a program until
the new administration was in place. The act authorized the Secretary of
the Treasury to purchase and insure troubled mortgage-related assets held
by financial institutions and to the extent that such assets were acquired,
required Treasury to implement a plan that sought to “maximize assistance
for homeowners.” When recently asked by COP to describe its strategy
under TARP to reduce foreclosures, Treasury pointed to actions it has
taken in collaboration with other entities outside of the TARP program—
for example, working with the Federal Reserve and FHFA to prevent the
failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac; helping to establish the HOPE
NOW Alliance, a coalition of mortgage market participants and housing
counselors; and working with the HOPE NOW Alliance, FHFA, Fannie
Mae, and Freddie Mac to develop the Streamlined Loan Modification
Program, through which servicers can modify existing loans into a Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac loan.50 Examples of these and other programs to
preserve homeownership are described in Appendix III.
As we previously reported, OFS has established the Office of
Homeownership Preservation, and efforts to hire permanent staff are
ongoing.51 Currently, the Office of Homeownership Preservation operates

50

Department of the Treasury, Responses to Questions of the First Report of the
Congressional Oversight Panel for Economic Stabilization (Washington, D.C.: December
30, 2008).
51

See GAO-09-161.

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with an interim chief and interim staff in all but one administrative
position. According to its chief, the office has received and evaluated more
than 70 proposals and inquiries related to TARP-sponsored
homeownership preservation strategies or actions from private-sector,
nonprofit, and governmental organizations and individuals. These
proposals have covered a range of suggested approaches, including direct
federal purchase of residential whole loans held by financial institutions,
an insurance program to provide credit support for community
development loans and securities, a proposal to identify troubled
mortgages before they default, direct payments to borrowers to pay down
mortgages to an affordable rate, and a federally sponsored loan
modification program. According to Treasury officials, they have
discussed homeownership preservation options with the transition team.
The transition team has mentioned a variety of proposed actions involving
homeownership preservation, including setting aside from $50 billion to
$100 billion for this program. We plan to continue to monitor Treasury’s
actions related to homeownership preservation under TARP in subsequent
reports.

Treasury Has Established
the Asset Guarantee
Program but Plans to Limit
Its Use

As the act requires, Treasury has taken steps to establish an insurance
program—AGP—to guarantee troubled assets.52 Treasury has flexibility in
structuring the insurance program but must meet several specific
requirements. For example, Treasury must collect premiums from any
participating financial institution and use actuarial analysis to set premium
rates to ensure that the expected value of the premium is no less than the
expected value of the losses to TARP from the guarantee and that
taxpayers will be fully protected. The act also requires that Treasury adjust
its purchase authority under TARP to reflect use of the guarantee
program.53 As required by the act, on December 31, 2008, Treasury
provided a report to Congress on the establishment of its insurance

52

Section 102 of the act, 12 U.S.C. § 5212, requires Treasury to create an insurance program
to guarantee the timely payment of principal and interest for troubled assets originated or
issued prior to March 14, 2008, including mortgage-backed securities. The requirement for a
program to guarantee troubled assets is contingent on Treasury establishing a program to
purchase troubled assets.
53
Specifically, Treasury’s purchase authority would be reduced by the total value of the
outstanding guaranteed assets minus the balance of the Troubled Asset Insurance
Financing Fund, or any cash premiums received. The act requires that Treasury establish
this fund to collect premiums for the program. The Secretary must invest the amounts
collected in Treasury securities or keep cash on hand or on deposit.

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program. The report includes a proposal for the AGP’s structure, including
program objectives and eligibility considerations, but does not define
specific terms of how a guarantee would be structured and other aspects
of the program.
Based on Treasury’s December 2008 report, the program appears to be
limited in scope. Specifically, Treasury plans to limit participation to
systemically significant institutions and other select institutions chosen to
participate on a case-by-case basis. In determining which institutions will
be eligible, Treasury plans to consider a variety of factors, including (1)
the extent to which destabilization of the institutions could present
counterparty risks; (2) whether an institution is at risk of a loss of
confidence and the extent to which such stress might be caused by a
portfolio of troubled assets; (3) the number and size of institutions that
would likely by affected by destabilization of the institution; (4) whether
the institution is sufficiently important to the nation’s financial and
economic system; and (5) the extent to which the institution has access to
alternative forms of capital. Treasury also plans to coordinate with the
institution’s primary federal regulator in determining eligibility for
program participation. Treasury also stated that guarantees provided
under AGP may be used in coordination with other programs or with a
broader guarantee involving one or more agencies of the U. S. government.
Prior to issuing its December 2008 report, Treasury sought input from the
general public on how to structure the insurance program. On October 10,
2008, Treasury posted a notice inviting the general public to provide
comments on the program by October 28, 2008. The notice listed specific
issues on which Treasury sought comment, including what types of assets
it should insure under the program, how to structure premiums, and what
administrative and operational challenges the program might create.
According to Treasury, it received 85 comments from a wide variety of
individuals, academics, financial institutions, municipalities, and trade
groups. While most respondents suggested that Treasury use the program
primarily to guarantee existing individual whole loans, mortgage-backed
securities, or both, other respondents suggested including asset-backed
securities (including those backed by student loans, auto loans, and credit
card receivables), collateralized debt obligations, auction rate securities,
municipal bonds, reinsurance, and transit leasing agreements in the
program.
Many respondents suggested that Treasury consider assets for the
guarantee program that differed from those assets purchased under
section 101 of the act (thus far, primarily capital purchases from financial

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institutions) and that the guarantee program could be more efficient than
asset purchases under some circumstances. For example, one industry
group commented that some assets that might be purchased under TARP
would not be suitable for guarantees, such as loans that lack good
collateral, adding that the guarantee should be used to increase confidence
in the markets for buying and selling assets that generally are performing
well. Also, several respondents commented that a guarantee program
could offer more flexibility than an asset purchase program because it
could limit the risk taken on by Treasury, such as by incorporating losssharing into guarantees.
Several respondents acknowledged a variety of challenges that Treasury
would encounter in setting up the program. For example, while the
majority of respondents recommended that Treasury set the premiums to
reflect the risk assumed by insuring each asset, many stated that
determining risk and pricing premiums based on risk would be very
difficult. Moreover, respondents acknowledged that managing the program
would itself be challenging, including the selection and monitoring of
institutions and assets to be guaranteed.
Treasury used AGP for the first time to guarantee certain Citigroup assets
as part of an agreement it announced on November 23, 2008. The
guarantee agreement, finalized in January 2009, provides protection
against the possibility of unusually large losses on an asset pool of
approximately $301 billion in loans and securities backed by residential
and commercial real estate and other such assets, which will remain on
Citigroup’s balance sheet. On January 16, 2009, Treasury announced its
development of a similar agreement with Bank of America for providing
protection against approximately $118 billion in loans, securities and other
assets. We plan to discuss the final terms of these agreements more fully in
our next report.

Efforts to Establish
the Office of Financial
Stability Are Ongoing

Treasury has made efforts to ensure that key leadership positions remain
filled after the transition to the new administration. In our last 60-day
report, we noted that soon after establishing OFS and appointing an
Interim Assistant Secretary of Financial Stability as its head in October
2008, Treasury created several functional areas within the office and hired
interim chiefs from across government and the private sector to manage
each of the major OFS functions.54 We recommended that Treasury

54

See GAO-09-161, 32-34.

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develop a definitive transition plan, including steps to ensure that key OFS
leadership positions remain filled during and after the transition to the
new administration. In general, Treasury has taken steps either to (1)
confirm that the interim chief will stay for a period covering the transition
to the new administration; or (2) in cases where a leader was unlikely to
stay beyond the transition, to work with the interim chief to find potential
candidates to serve in the role on a permanent basis. As of January 16,
2009, Treasury confirmed the following:
•

The Interim Chief Investment Officer will serve in this role until the
new administration identifies a permanent successor. According to
Treasury, the transition team asked the Interim Chief Investment
Officer to remain in his post for up to 2 months, or until Treasury hires
sufficient permanent staff to help run the office. Treasury anticipates
that the permanent successor may be a political appointee.

•

The Interim Chief Homeownership Officer will serve in this role
through the transition.55 Treasury anticipates that the new
administration will identify a permanent successor who may be a
political appointee.

•

The Deputy Chief Compliance Officer, who is on detail from Treasury’s
Bureau of the Public Debt, temporarily has assumed the role and
responsibilities of the Interim Chief Compliance Officer until Treasury
identifies a permanent successor.

•

The Interim Chief Risk Officer may not stay in this role until a
permanent successor is found. OFS has interviewed potential
replacements for the Chief Risk Officer position but has not made a
selection. While aggressively searching for a permanent successor,
Treasury anticipates that it will take time to find a candidate with the
right balance of public- and private-sector expertise to serve in this
position. According to Treasury, the transition team agreed with this
approach and agreed that OFS could administer risk-management
functions sufficiently if the position were unfilled for a brief period,
because a permanent Deputy Risk Officer has been appointed.

55

According to Treasury officials, they were able to retain this individual in the position
partly because she was already a Treasury official.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

•

The Interim Chief Financial Officer recently was replaced by an
individual who will serve as the Chief Financial Officer on a permanent
basis.

Treasury has facilitated continuity of operations through the transition for
a number of other key positions. In particular, Treasury said that the
Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability has agreed to the
transition team’s request to stay on in the position until a successor is in
place. Also, when Treasury replaced the interim manager for CPP with a
permanent successor in early January, it was able to keep the interim
manager for a short time to ensure seamless administration of the
program. Treasury also identified individuals to fill a number of other
senior positions within OFS. In our prior work, we have noted that key
practices of successful organizations include taking steps to ensure
continuity of leadership and sustain a learning environment that drives
continuous improvement in performance.56 We will continue to monitor
OFS’s leadership positions and OFS’s efforts to establish a performanceoriented culture.
As another approach to help ensure continuity in operations, OFS
continues to use staff and other existing resources from other parts of
Treasury and the federal government, as well as from the private sector. In
our last 60-day report, we described how Treasury employed a short-term
strategy for staffing high-level officials in OFS by identifying government
employees within Treasury and other federal agencies who could fill
senior positions on a temporary basis. As of January 26, 2009, OFS had
approximately 52 detailees and 38 permanent staff on board, indicating
significant growth in the number of OFS positions filled since our last
report (see table 3). Current detailees include staff from Treasury
departmental offices and bureaus, including the U.S. Mint, the Bureau of
the Public Debt, the Internal Revenue Service, OTS, OCC, and the Office of
Domestic Finance. Also, Treasury arranged for several employees from
other federal agencies—including SEC, FDIC, Federal Reserve, HUD, and
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation—to serve as detailees to
OFS. According to Treasury, some detailees served short-term
organizational needs while others filled longer-term needs until permanent
staff replaced them. According to Treasury, these staff exhibit a high level
of competence in performing the work required of them and, in some

56

GAO, Securities and Exchange Commission: Some Progress Made in Strategic Human
Capital Management, GAO-06-86 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2006).

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

cases, have accepted offers to stay in OFS permanently. Treasury officials
also noted that detailees may be especially appropriate for certain OFS
positions because TARP is not a permanent Treasury function and that its
program activities are still evolving.
Table 3: Number of Treasury and Other Federal Employees Assigned to OFS

Type of Staff
Staff detailed to OFS from other
areas of Treasury and other
a
federal agencies (temporary)
Permanent staff (includes
limited-term appointments)
Total

Approximate number of
positions filled as of
November 21, 2008

Approximate number of
positions filled as of
January 26, 2009

43

52

5

38

48

90

Source: Treasury.
a

As of January 16, 2009, Treasury reported that it had finalized interagency agreements with SEC,
HUD, and OTS that provide for four employees from these agencies to support OFS for periods
ranging from 30 days to 2 years. Treasury officials said that the agreements address how Treasury
will reimburse the agencies for detailed employees.

In addition to detailees, numerous other Treasury employees support OFS
by taking on responsibilities to help administer TARP. According to
Treasury, these staff dedicate significant portions of their time to OFS
activities. For example, personnel providing assistance in human
resources administration, legal support, financial reporting and budgeting,
and information technology spend varying amounts of time supporting
OFS’s day-to-day operations. While Treasury officials said that OFS is
becoming more self-reliant, certain staff always will provide part-time
assistance to OFS (in such areas as human resources), as they do for every
office within Treasury.
OFS’s financial agents and contractors also have remained in place
throughout the transition, providing institutional knowledge of past
practices, continuity of operations, and expertise needed to carry out OFS
policies and operations. For example, Treasury awarded a contract to
PricewaterhouseCoopers to help establish a comprehensive set of internal
controls, and the firm will continue to support this effort.
Treasury has taken a variety of other measures to support the transition to
the new administration. In our last 60-day report, we recommended that
Treasury facilitate a smooth transition to the new administration by

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

building on and formalizing ongoing activities. According to Treasury,
since our last report, Treasury has continued to provide updates to the
transition team on TARP developments, and the team has met with key
leaders, including each of the Interim Chiefs described above. An official
from the new administration’s transition team confirmed that OFS officials
have briefed transition team members regularly on operational and policy
issues in an effective manner. In addition, and as discussed in more detail
below, OFS continues to establish processes and document internal
controls used to carry out the various new programs established under
TARP and the associated financial transactions. Specifically, Treasury
documented processes used to administer CPP and established program
guidelines for TARP investments to guide the next administration’s use of
TARP funds. OFS management is still in the preliminary stages of
developing and implementing a comprehensive set of policies and
procedures to manage TARP activities.

Treasury Has Used Hiring
Flexibilities to Staff the
Organization, but the
Hiring Process Still
Presents Challenges

Although Treasury has used hiring flexibilities to expedite the process for
finding permanent employees for OFS, Treasury still faces challenges in
hiring the full complement of staff needed to administer the office. In our
last report, we recommended that Treasury expedite OFS’s hiring efforts
to ensure that the office has the personnel needed to carry out and oversee
TARP.
OFS officials stated that they continue to aggressively hire additional
permanent staff at the highest levels of the organization to provide a
corporate culture and stabilize leadership within OFS. As of January 26,
2009, Treasury had brought 38 permanent staff on board through a variety
of mechanisms, including direct-hire authority, merit promotion
appointments, limited-term Senior Executive Service (SES), and Schedule
A appointments, and reassignments.57 This level of staffing is a substantial
increase from the five permanent hires that were in place approximately at
the time of our last report. Nonetheless, according to Treasury’s January 8,
2009, organizational chart for OFS, Treasury estimates that OFS will need
approximately 131 staff on board to operate at full capacity, although
hiring for some aspects of the projected organization will be dependent

51
Under authorization by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), agencies may make
appointments for positions which are not of a confidential or policy-determining character,
not in the SES, and not practical to examine. These are referred to as Schedule A
appointments, and are exempt from examination requirements typically required for
competitive service positions. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 213.3101-3102.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

upon further program developments. Treasury may be able to fill several
of these positions with detailees; however, in its organizational chart,
Treasury identified a number of unfilled positions best suited for
permanent staff. In order to continue to fill key vacancies within the
organization, OFS has used its direct-hire authority in coordination with
OPM, which Congress explicitly authorized for TARP under section 101(c)
of the act.58 Such direct-hire authority helps to expedite the hiring process
by exempting OFS from certain competitive examination requirements.
While Treasury is required to publicly announce all jobs for which it uses
direct-hire authority, the department may interview and hire candidates
without conducting a formal rating and ranking process normally required
for competitive service appointments. Also, Treasury has worked with
OPM to obtain specific Schedule A authority to make appointments
exempt from examination requirements for positions requiring unique or
highly specialized qualifications. According to Treasury, direct-hire and
Schedule A authorities have permitted the department to recruit
individuals from a pool of candidates who have submitted their resumes
directly to Treasury via e-mail, as discussed below, as well as in response
to specific vacancy announcements. In addition, Treasury has used other
tools to enhance its recruitment efforts, such as its existing automated
recruitment system, and is working with information technology staff to
automate categorization of candidates who have submitted resumes.
Despite making use of these human capital flexibilities, Treasury
continues to face challenges in hiring. First, conflict-of-interest
considerations have increased the time needed to recruit and hire
individuals for OFS, and, in some cases, have caused qualified candidates
to withdraw their names from consideration for positions within the
organization. According to Treasury, it requires all senior executives and
senior-level staff to complete a form listing their financial interests to
identify potential conflicts of interest. Treasury also requires all general
schedule-level positions, with the exception of administrative support
staff, to complete a similar form. Some qualified candidates were unaware
when they applied for an OFS position that their financial investments
could pose conflicts and subsequently made the decision not to pursue
employment with OFS. According to Treasury, ethics reviews of this
information can add substantial time to the hiring process. To avoid
unnecessary delays and complications in finalizing offers of employment,

58

12 U.S.C. § 5211(c).

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Treasury is obtaining information on potential conflicts as early as
possible in the recruitment process.
Second, Treasury said that candidates with the right skills and abilities to
fill positions in OFS often work for a financial regulator that can offer a
more competitive salary than OFS.59 OFS may be competing for the same
candidates as the financial regulators because these organizations recruit
individuals with skills and experience similar to those needed to
administer TARP. For example, regulatory agencies recruit financial
economists with expertise in risk measurement and quantitative analysis.
Treasury’s Human Resources division continues to consider other hiring
flexibilities that may help them offer enhancements needed to recruit the
right talent for OFS, but officials said they are limited by the terms of
current law and OPM regulations.
Furthermore, Treasury has hired a contractor to provide human capital
support to the organization and has used a variety of methods to recruit
talent to the organization, but it is unclear when Treasury will begin to
develop a more formal human capital plan for OFS. In prior work, we have
noted that aligning an organization’s human capital program with its
mission and programmatic goals requires identification of the critical skills
and competencies needed to achieve current and future programmatic
results.60 Thus far, Treasury’s main strategy for identifying these skills has
been to write position descriptions for key OFS vacancies, and the primary
work of the human capital services contractor most recently has been
writing such position descriptions for OFS. As of January 26, 2009,
Treasury finalized 28 position descriptions. Treasury noted that it
previously drafted other position descriptions, but because of the
evolution of strategies under TARP, it determined that several of the
positions were no longer relevant.
In addition, to help recruit talented individuals before position
descriptions are finalized, Treasury posted information on its Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act Web page requesting that individuals

59
The financial regulatory agencies have authority to establish their own compensation
programs without regard to statutory requirements on classification and pay applicable to
executive branch agencies under Title 5 of the U.S. Code. See GAO, Financial Regulators:
Agencies Have Implemented Key Performance Management Practices, but Opportunities
for Improvement Exist, GAO-07-678 (Washington, D.C.: Jun. 18, 2007).
60

GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning,
GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).

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interested in working for OFS transmit their resumes directly to Treasury
at a specific e-mail address, without having to respond to job
announcements through OPM’s Web site.61 Treasury later refined this
strategy by creating a series of e-mail boxes organized by area of
expertise-–such as compliance, risk management, and economic
analysis—and asked individuals to transmit resumes by using the
addresses that best aligned with their background and experience.
Treasury officials said that this approach enhanced Treasury’s recruitment
efforts, but that it still did not eliminate the submission of resumes by
individuals that were not qualified. They still required time to review the
resumes and identify those that reflect the needed skills and abilities for
OFS.
Although it is likely that OFS will continue to need both temporary and
permanent staff to administer TARP, Treasury has not yet developed a
formal workforce plan that balances the need for long- and short-term
assistance because the program is still evolving. As noted above, some
temporary staff will serve the short-term needs of the organization, while
others may continue to serve long-term needs until permanent hires can
replace them. As described in table 3, of the 90 staff working in OFS as of
January 26, 2009, 52, or 58 percent, have been detailed to OFS from other
areas of Treasury and the federal government. In addition, Treasury has
relied on a number of financial agents and contractors to conduct the dayto-day operations of OFS. In prior work, we have found that temporary
employees can provide the flexibility needed to effectively manage an
agency’s workforce by fulfilling the short-term needs of the organization.62
Because TARP has added many new programs since it was first
established in October 2008 and that the number and types of program
activities may expand or change under the new administration, we
recognize that Treasury may find it difficult to determine OFS’s long-term
organizational needs at this time. For example, it is not clear how many
staff will be needed to work on CPP efforts once the transactions are all
completed. However, such considerations will be vital to retaining
institutional knowledge within the organization as programs evolve. We
will continue to track OFS efforts to engage in workforce planning,
including any workforce planning efforts undertaken by OFS’s contractor.

61

See http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/jobs.shtml, last visited on January 24, 2009.

62

GAO, Human Capital: Effective Use of Flexibilities Can Assist Agencies in Managing
Their Workforces, GAO-03-2 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2002).

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Treasury Has Continued to
Rely on Contractor
Support, While Taking
Steps to Improve
Contracting Practices and
Enhance Oversight

Treasury has continued to award contracts in support of TARP and has
taken steps to improve its contracting practices and enhance its oversight
of contractors. In one recent case, Treasury awarded a contract using
other than full and open competition procedures, as permitted by the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), but it took steps to promote
competition and received multiple offers as a result. Treasury also
continues to use contract structures and pricing arrangements, such as
time-and-materials pricing, that allow for flexibility in ordering the
services it requires. In part because these pricing arrangements are
inherently risky, Treasury has taken measures to enhance contract
oversight. In addition, Treasury has continued its efforts to promote small
business participation in TARP.

Additional Contracts Have
Been Awarded to Help
Implement TARP

Since TARP was established, Treasury has entered into one financial
agency agreement and awarded a total of 14 contracts and blanket
purchase agreements. It has issued a total of 10 task orders under those
instruments. Since November 25, 2008, the cut-off date for our last report,
Treasury has awarded a contract for legal services related to TALF, 63 one
to advertise for TARP position openings, and two leases for space.64 In
addition, since November 25, Treasury issued three task orders for a range
of services related to the implementation of TARP, and has modified
existing contracts and task orders. Details of the agreement and all
contracts, task orders, and modifications are summarized in table 4. As of
December 31, 2008, Treasury had expended $8,987,153 for the financial
agency agreement and contract actions.65

63
As a result of this contract award, Treasury had two contracts for legal services with the
same law firm (Thacher, Profitt & Wood). The first contract was for legal services related
to providing TARP funds to companies in the auto industry, and the second was for
services in connection with TALF. It is not unusual for the government to have multiple
contracts for different purposes with the same entity. In January, 2009, Thacher, Proffitt, &
Wood dissolved and its responsibilities under existing contracts were transferred to
another firm (Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal). Treasury agreed to this transfer through a
novation agreement.
64
Additionally, Treasury has entered into agreements with other agencies for a variety of
other services, such as personnel detailees, and awarded a contract for the painting of
leased space.
65

This total excludes the interagency agreements for such services as personnel detailees
and the contract for the painting of leased space.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Table 4: Financial Agency Agreement, Contracts, and Blanket Purchase Agreements Awarded, as of January 20, 2009
Action

Value/
Obligation

Period of
Performance

Pricing
Structure

10/14/2008

Estimated $20
million over 3
years

10/14/2008 –
10/14/2011

Flat fee and
fixed percentage
of asset values

Purpose

Date of Action

Custodian and
cash
management

Financial Agency Agreement
Bank of New York
Mellon

Financial
Agency
a
Agreement

Contracts and Blanket Purchase Agreements
Simpson, Thacher &
Bartlett, LLP

Legal services
for the
implementation
of TARP

10/10/2008

Maximum value
of $500,000.00

10/10/2008 –
04/09/2009

Time and
c
materials or
fixed-price task
orders

Task Order
0001

To initiate workd

10/10/2008

$300,000.00

10/10/2008 –
04/09/2009

Time and
materials

1st Modification
to Task Order
0001

To add funds

11/26/2008

Net increase:
$200,000.00

10/10/2008 –
04/09/2009

N/A

1st Modification
to Contract
TOS09007

To increase
contract ceiling

12/19/2008

Net increase:
$400,000.00

10/10/2008 –
04/09/2009

N/A

2nd Modification To add funds
to Task Order
0001

12/19/2008

$400,000.00

10/10/2008 –
04/09/2009

N/A

2nd Modification To increase
to Contract
contract ceiling
TOS09007

01/09/2009

$125,000.00

10/10/2008 –
04/09/2009

N/A

3rd Modification
to Task Order
0001
EnnisKnupp &
Assoc., Inc.

Indefinite
Delivery
Indefinite
Quantity (IDIQ)
b
Contract
TOS09007

To add funds

01/09/2009

$125,000.00

10/10/2008 –
04/09/2009

N/A

Indefinite
Delivery
Indefinite
Quantity (IDIQ)
Contract

Investment and
advisory
services

10/11/2008

$2,495,190.00

10/11/2008 –
10/11/2009

Fixed-price task
orders

Task Order
0001

To initiate work

10/11/2008

$227,387.30

10/11/2008 –
10/25/2008

Fixed price

1st Modification
to Task Order
0001

To extend the
period of
performance
and add funds

10/26/2008

Net increase:
$356,831.00

Extended period Fixed price
of performance:
10/11/2008 –
11/30/2008

2nd Modification To extend the
to Task Order
period of
0001
performance
and add funds

12/01/2008

Net increase:
$356,831.00

Extended period Fixed price
of performance:
10/11/2008 –
12/31/2008

T0S09008

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Value/
Obligation

Period of
Performance

12/31/2008

Net increase:
$178,416.00

Extended period Fixed price
of performance
through
1//31/2009

Internal control
services

10/16/2008

N/A

10/16/2008 –
09/30/2011

Time and
materials or
fixed-price task
orders

Task Order 1

To initiate work

10/16/2008

$191,469.00

10/16/2008 –
02/01/2009

Time and
materials

1st Modification
to Task Order 1

To add funds
and modify
period of
performance

11/02/2008

Net increase:

10/16/2008 –
11/14/2008

Time and
materials

2nd Modification To extend the
to Task Order 1 period of
performance

11/17/2008

N/A

Extended period Time and
of performance: materials
10/16/2008 –
12/05/2008

Task Order
0002

To continue
work

12/01/2008

$930,133.98

12/01/2008 –
01/31/2009

Time and
materials

Modification to
Task Order
0002

For additional
services and
funding

01/08/2009

$57,490.40

12/01/2008 –
01/31/2009

N/A

Blanket
Purchase
Agreement

Accounting
services

10/18/2008

N/A

10/18/2008 –
09/30/2011

Time and
materials or
fixed-price task
orders

10/18/2008

$492,006.95

10/18/2008 –
01/17/2009

Time and
materials

01/02/2009

$1,476,005.33

01/02/2009 –
09/30/2009

Time and
materials

Property lease

10/23/2008

$168,308
(negotiated
settlement
agreement)f

10/27/2008 –
12/10/2008

For process
mapping
consultant
services

10/23/2008

$9,000.00

10/24/2008 –
11/07/2008

Action

Date of Action

3rd Modification
to Task Order
0001
PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP

Purpose
To extend the
period of
performance
and add funds

Blanket
Purchase
Agreemente
BPA-2009TARP-0001

Ernst & Young, LLP

$384,894.00

BPA-2009TARP-0002
Task Order 1
To initiate work
Task Order 2
To continue
work
Regus

Lease
GS-11B-02059

Turner Consulting
Group, Inc.

Interagency
Agreement with
General
Services
Administration
(GSA) 08PA224

Page 47

Pricing
Structure

Time and
materials

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Action

Purpose

Date of Action

Value/
Obligation

Period of
Performance

Pricing
Structure

Blanket
Purchase
Agreement

Legal services

10/29/2008

$5,645,161.75

10/29/2008 –
04/28/2009

Time and
materials or
fixed-price task
orders

Task Order 01

To initiate work

10/29/2008

$1,411,300.00

10/29/2008 –
04/28/2009

Time and
materials

Blanket
Purchase
Agreement

10/29/2008

$5,520,000.00

10/29/2008 –
04/28/2009

09BPA001

Legal services
for the Capital
Purchase
Program

Time and
materials or
fixed-price task
orders

Task Order 01

To initiate work

10/29/2008

$1,380,000.00

10/29/2008 –
04/28/2009

Time and
materials

10/31/2008

$710,528.00
10/31/2008 –
total value
09/30/2010
including options

Labor hours

Base period

10/31/2008

$174,720.00

10/31/2008 –
04/29/2009

Labor hours

Legal services
related to auto
industry loans

11/07/2008

$233,662.84

11/07/2008 –
02/28/2009

Labor hours

To incorporate
statement of
work and
contractor’s
proposal into
contract and to
add funds

12/10/2008

Net increase:
$223,662.84

12/10/2008 –
02/28/2009

N/A

2nd Modification To clarify
12/11/2008
to TOS09010
language in
Modification 1 to
increase
contract ceiling
price

Increase in
contract ceiling
price to:
$457,325.68

N/A

N/A

3rd Modification
to TOS09010

Increase
contract ceiling
amount

12/31/2008

Increase in
contract ceiling
price to:
$1,457,325.68

N/A

N/A

Washington Post

Purchase Order
TD009040

Human
resources
advertisement

12/05/2008

$395.00

12/07/2008 –
01/07/2009

Fixed price

Sonnenschein, Nath &
Rosenthal, LLP II

IDIQ contract

Legal services
12/12/2008
for the purchase
of asset-backed
securities

1,300 hours
ceiling

12/10/2008 –
06/09/2009

Time and
materials or
fixed-price task
orders

Hughes Hubbard &
Reed, LLP

09BPA002

Squire Sanders &
Dempsey, LLP

Lindholm & Associates

DO-TARP-2009- Human
resources
0003, under
GS-15F-0056M services
Task Order
DO-TARP-20090003

Sonnenschein, Nath &
Rosenthal, LLP I

Contract
TOS09010
1st Modification
to TOS09010

TOS09014B

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Action

Purpose

Date of Action

Value/
Obligation

Period of
Performance

Pricing
Structure

Task Order
0001

To initiate work

12/12/2008

$249,999.00

12/10/2008 –
03/10/2009

Time and
materials

1st Modification
to TOS09014B

To incorporate
novation
agreement and
new conflict-ofinterest
disclosures

12/31/2008

N/A

N/A

N/A

Eleven Eighteen LLP
c/o Cushman &
Wakefield

GSA Lease, GS- Property lease,
11B-02075
9-month term

12/16/2008

$1,047,672

12/30/2008–
09/30/2009

Fixed price

Property lease
for expanded
space, 1-year
term

12/16/2008

$3,028,642

10/01/2009 –
09/30/2010

Fixed price per
annum plus
annual operating
costs

Colonial Parking

Contract with
Options,
TOS09017

Lease of parking 01/07/2009
spaces

$75,850.00

01/02/2009 –
09/30/2009

Fixed price

Source: GAO analysis of Treasury documents.
a

This agreement has been amended five times to add additional responsibilities as the different TARP
programs, such as CPP, SSFI, TALF, TIP, and AIFP, were established.
b

Indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts provide for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits,
of supplies or services during a fixed period. These contracts establish the basic terms of the
contracts in advance, enabling agency personnel to issue subsequent task or delivery orders for
specific services or goods expeditiously. Orders must be within the contract’s scope, issued within the
period of performance, and be within the contract’s maximum value.

c

A time-and-material pricing mechanism provides for payments to the contractors based on set labor
rates and the number of hours worked, plus the cost of any materials. Our prior work on such
contracts recognized both the inherent flexibility of such arrangements and the need for close
government supervision to ensure that costs are contained. Specifically, time-and-materials contracts
are considered high-risk for the government because they provide no positive incentive to the
contractor for cost control or labor efficiency. Thus, the onus is on the government to monitor
contractors to ensure that they are performing the work efficiently and controlling costs.
d

The initial task order initiates the contract work.

e

A blanket purchase agreement is a method of filling anticipated repetitive needs for supplies or
services by establishing charge accounts with qualified sources of supply. The agreement contains
the basic terms and conditions governing the types of services the firms will provide. As specific
needs arise, blanket purchase agreements allow Treasury to issue task orders to the firms describing
the specific services required, establishing time frames, and setting pricing arrangements.

f

This contract has been terminated. The Government has agreed to a one-time lease termination
settlement of $168,308.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Treasury Has Continued to Use
Expedited Contract Award
Procedures and Has Taken
Steps to Ensure Competition

The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) requires, with certain limited
exceptions, that contracting officers shall promote and provide for full and
open competition in soliciting offers and awarding government contracts.66
The process is intended to permit the government to rely on competitive
market forces to obtain needed goods and services at fair and reasonable
prices. Treasury has continued to expedite the award of contracts using
other than full and open competition based on one of the limited
exceptions provided for by statute. The statutory exception Treasury
generally utilizes is “unusual and compelling urgency.” Since our last
report, it cited this authority as a basis for awarding a contract for legal
services.
CICA and FAR provide that, even when agencies meet the requirements
for other than full and open competition, such as in the case of unusual
and compelling urgency, they nonetheless are required to request offers
from as many potential sources as is practicable under the
circumstances.67 To aid in the solicitation of offers, agencies conduct
market research to identify potential sources.68 Treasury has conducted
market research to identify potential vendors to solicit, which resulted in
the receipt of multiple offers for each solicitation, including the most
recent solicitation for legal services. In addition, Treasury generally used a
best-value approach for evaluating offers received, based on a number of
technical evaluation factors such as experience, management and staffing
plans, small business utilization, and mitigation of identified conflicts of
interest. These factors were reviewed by technical evaluation panels and,
taken together, were considered by Treasury as more important than
price. Treasury also generally sought and received from its contractors
discounts from their standard commercial prices. Furthermore, where it
has awarded contracts using other than full-and-open competition
procedures, Treasury has stated its intention to procure future
requirements using full and open competition. Treasury intends to
transition ongoing services to more competitively awarded contracts, if
feasible, within 3–6 months after award.

66
CICA authorizes agencies to limit competition when an unusual and compelling urgency
precludes the use of full and open competition and delaying the contract would result in
serious financial or other harm to the government. 10 U.S.C. § 2304; 41 U.S.C. § 253.
67

41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(2); 48 C.F.R. § 6.302-2(c)(2) (2008).

68

48 C.F.R. § 10.001 (2008).

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Treasury Has Continued to Use
Flexible Contract
Arrangements

Treasury has continued to use contract structures and pricing
arrangements designed to allow for flexibility in ordering the services
required. For example, Treasury awarded an indefinite delivery/indefinite
quantity contract for legal services, allowing it to issue task orders as
specific needs arise. In addition, Treasury has continued to use time-andmaterials pricing arrangements for most of the task orders it awards.
Because of the inherent risk in such pricing arrangements, we
recommended in our prior report that Treasury move toward greater
reliance on fixed-price arrangements, whenever possible, as program
requirements were better defined over time. A Treasury procurement
official stated that Treasury plans to convert work requirements to fixedpriced orders where appropriate and when the extent of the work involved
becomes more predictable. Since our last report, Treasury has yet to issue
any new task orders on a fixed-price basis.

Treasury Has Taken Initial
Steps to Enhance Contract
Management

In part because of Treasury’s use of time-and-materials pricing
arrangements, we recommended in our last report that Treasury ensure
that sufficient personnel were assigned and appropriately trained to
oversee contractor performance. In addition to a number of planned hiring
actions, ranging from contracting officer to senior management positions,
Treasury has taken steps to improve its oversight of contractors during the
implementation of TARP. For example, Treasury convened a Procurement
Summit in early December 2008 on a number of contract management
issues, including training requirements and the initiation of contract
management reviews to address the use of time-and-materials pricing
arrangements.
Treasury originally assigned a number of its executive-level officials as
Contracting Officer’s Technical Representatives (COTR).69 In addition to
their other responsibilities, Treasury’s internal guidance requires that
COTRs be trained in their acquisition-related responsibilities prior to their
appointment, with certain limited exceptions. While not all of the COTRs
have received formal training (certification), given the limited time frame
for executing the program, a Treasury procurement official believes the
current COTRs have the experience necessary to perform their duties.
Treasury has begun to replace the executive-level COTRs with certified
COTRs, and we plan to continue to monitor Treasury’s efforts in this area.

69

COTRs act as the contracting officer’s technical experts and representatives in the
administration and monitoring of contracts.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

To facilitate the COTRs’ oversight of contracts, Treasury developed and
has begun to use a Contract Management Reporting Form to track the
cost, schedule, and performance of the contracts awarded under TARP.
The forms are prepared by the COTRs and submitted to the contracting
officers at the middle and end of each month. These forms cover a number
of issues we raised in the last report, including the status of COTR
certification, the use of fixed-price pricing arrangements, and the review
of contractor conflicts of interest. At the end of the second contract
management reporting period, which ran through December 31, 2008,
Treasury determined that the majority of contracts were performing on
schedule and within budget, but it identified COTR certification, the move
toward fixed-price requirements, and higher-than-anticipated costs on two
contracts as issues in need of additional attention by Treasury.

Treasury Has Continued Efforts
to Promote Small Business
Participation

As we noted in our previous report, for its financial agency agreement and
some of its contracts, Treasury considered offerors’ efforts to utilize small
businesses as part of its contract award selection criteria in an effort to
promote the use of small businesses in carrying out TARP. As of January
20, 2009, Treasury has contracted directly with two small businesses—one
for human resources support and another for a budget formulation
model—while other entities have become involved through subcontracting
opportunities with Treasury contractors and its financial agent.
Specifically, Treasury’s financial agent engaged the support of two
individual consultants to provide advice on asset purchase protocols, and
one of Treasury’s legal services contractors subcontracted legal support to
a minority- and women-owned small disadvantaged business. Treasury’s
financial agent also has identified several disadvantaged or minorityowned small businesses to provide temporary services if necessary.
Treasury currently is reviewing proposals from the firms that responded to
its solicitation for equity asset managers. Treasury officials noted that they
developed an inclusive approach to acquiring the services of equity asset
managers to allow both large and small firms to compete for business,
including minority- and women-owned firms. Specifically, Treasury’s
solicitation requires prospective asset managers to have an existing
portfolio of at least $100 million in assets under management, a threshold
that Treasury officials say is high enough to ensure that an asset manager
can handle a large portfolio, but not so high as to preclude participation by
institutions of modest size. Treasury also announced that in connection
with its original solicitations for managers of troubled mortgage-backed
securities and whole loans, it may decide to issue separate notices
targeted at smaller institutions that would serve as submanagers within a
portfolio of assets.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Treasury Has Been
Addressing Conflicts of
Interest Issues and Plans
to Continue That Effort

In our prior report, we noted that Treasury had issued guidelines on
conflicts of interest but had not yet issued a related regulation. We
recommended that Treasury issue regulations on conflicts of interest
involving its agents, contractors, and their employees and related entities
as expeditiously as possible. On January 21, 2009, Treasury issued an
interim regulation on TARP conflicts of interest, which was effective
immediately.70 The notice in the Federal Register solicits public comments
by March 23, 2009, and says that Treasury will consider all comments
before issuing a final regulation.
Treasury’s interim regulation outlines the process for reviewing and
addressing actual or potential conflicts of interest reported by the entities
retained to perform services in connection with the act. The interim
regulation covers only contractors and financial agents. Among various
other issues, the regulation addresses the following:
•

organizational conflicts of interest, which can arise when, for example,
an entity has a business relationship potentially inconsistent with the
entity’s obligations to Treasury or that calls into question the entity’s
objectivity or judgment;

•

personal conflicts of interest, which can be triggered by stock
ownership or other financial interests on the part of an entity’s
management officials, key individuals, or certain immediate family
members, and which could adversely affect an individual’s objectivity
or judgment;

•

limitations on the conduct of entities retained by Treasury, which
include restrictions on giving and accepting gifts, making unauthorized
promises, and improper uses of government property;

•

the obligation to keep nonpublic information confidential;

•

the applicability of conflict-of-interest requirements to subcontractors;

•

the criteria for granting waivers of the application of the conflict-ofinterest restrictions where a conflict cannot be adequately mitigated;
and

70

74 Fed. Reg. 3431 (Jan. 21, 2009) (to be codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 31).

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

•

measures available to Treasury to enforce the regulation, including
default terminations, debarments, and referrals for criminal
prosecution.

The interim regulation establishes a continuing obligation to monitor and report
conflicts should they arise during the performance of a contract or agreement.
We plan to monitor Treasury’s implementation of this regulation.
The interim regulation became effective on January 21, 2009, and will
apply to all actions occurring on or after that date. In our first report, we
recommended that Treasury review and renegotiate as necessary existing
mitigation plans to ensure conformity with the new regulation once issued.
We continue to believe that such a review and renegotiation would be
appropriate, and Treasury officials informed us that they intend to conduct
such a review.
The regulation does not cover some administrative services, as identified
by the TARP Chief Compliance Officer, because they do not involve
“substantial decision-making authority.” The Chief Compliance Officer
said such administrative services include, for example, the design of office
space for OFS. In addition, as noted in Treasury’s supplemental
information to the interim regulation, the regulation does not address postemployment restrictions on Treasury employees because Treasury
believes this issue is already adequately covered by existing law.71 We note
that section 207 of title 18 of the U.S. Code imposes restrictions on postfederal employment for certain former federal employees.72 These
restrictions apply to all covered federal employees, including those
formerly employed by Treasury or detailed to Treasury from other
agencies to work on TARP.73
In response to another recommendation from our prior report, Treasury has
taken some steps to institute a system to manage and monitor conflicts of

71

74 Fed. Reg. 3431 (Jan. 21, 2009).

72

GAO, Defense Contracting: Post-Government Employment of Former DOD Officials
Needs Greater Transparency, GAO-08-485 (Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2008).

73

These and other restrictions that apply to federal employees do not apply to contractor
employees. See GAO, Defense Contracting: Additional Personal Conflict of Interest
Safeguards Needed for Certain DOD Contractor Employees, GAO-08-169 (Washington,
D.C.: Mar. 7, 2008). Nevertheless, Treasury’s TARP contracts impose post-employment
restrictions on contractor employees in areas such as nondisclosure of nonpublic
information.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

interest. Treasury has focused many of its efforts to date on preventing
potential conflicts from becoming actual conflicts requiring mitigation. For
example, Treasury contracted with two legal firms to conduct closings under
CPP. If one legal firm has a potential conflict related to the institution
involved in the closing, Treasury may assign the other legal firm to conduct
the closing. If both legal firms have a potential conflict of interest with the
institution involved, Treasury may assign a third legal firm to conduct the
closing. In addition, the TARP Chief Compliance Officer has assigned staff to
review TARP contracts with all legal firms to ensure that confidentiality
agreements and conflict-of-interest disclosures are in place, and ensure that
required ethics training is being delivered. As it brings new staff on board,
Treasury intends to perform the same review for other contracted services.
Treasury also is developing a set of internal procedures for its compliance
personnel to apply if conflicts arise as contractors or agents are carrying out
their responsibilities.

OFS’s Internal Control
System Continues to
Evolve

Since our last report, OFS has taken some important steps toward developing
a system of internal control over TARP activities. Effective internal control is
a major part of managing any organization to achieve desired outcomes and
manage risk. Internal controls include the program’s policies, procedures, and
guidance that help management ensure effective and efficient use of
resources; compliance with laws and regulations; prevention and detection of
fraud, waste, and abuse; and the reliability of financial reporting. Using GAO’s
standards for internal control and the guidance in OMB Circular No. A-123,
Management’s Responsibility for Internal Control, OFS has adopted a
framework for organizing the development and implementation of its system
of internal control for TARP activities.74 OFS anticipates that this framework
will continue to evolve as new programs are added and as its internal control
infrastructure matures. OFS plans to use this framework to develop specific
policies, drive communications on expectations, and measure compliance
with internal control standards and policies. As shown in figure 2, this
framework currently includes three identified business functions and five
support functions. Figure 2 also depicts how the OFS framework incorporates
the five key elements of internal control that are defined in GAO’s standards
for internal control: control environment, risk assessment, control activities,
information and communication, and monitoring.

74

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Figure 2: OFS’s Framework for Internal Control
Establish control environment
Execute senior management
control activities

Senior management committee

Internal governance activities

Information technology

Conduct risk assessments

Human resources

Reporting/Compliance

Budget/Accounting

Procurement

Potential new functions

Asset sales

Asset management

Asset purchases/Gtys

Deputy-level assessment team

Perform control
activities by function

Support functions

Business functions

Monitoring
Support entire control
framework and organization

Information and communication

Source: Treasury.

Table 5 defines these five key elements of internal control. The progress
OFS has made in each of these elements of internal control is discussed
below.
Table 5: GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government
Control environment—creating a culture of accountability by establishing a positive and
supportive attitude toward improvement and the achievement of established program
outcomes.
Risk assessment—performing comprehensive reviews and analyses of program
operations to determine if risks exist and the nature and extent of risks have been
identified.
Control activities—taking actions to address identified risk areas and help ensure that
management’s decisions and plans are carried out and program objectives are met.
Information and communication—using and sharing relevant, reliable, and timely
financial and nonfinancial information in managing programs.
Monitoring—tracking improvement initiatives over time and identifying additional actions
needed to further improve program efficiency and effectiveness.
Source: GAO.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Control environment: OFS has developed an organizational structure that
defines lines of authority and hired permanent staff to fill most of its key
management positions, including a permanent Chief Financial Officer,
who has experience with government internal controls and credit reform
accounting. At the recommendation of PricewaterhouseCoopers,
contracted by OFS to assist in the design and implementation of a system
of internal control for TARP, OFS is creating a Middle Office function
(under the Chief Operating Officer) to segregate important reconciliation
controls.75 OFS believes this separation will enhance the current control
environment for the different types of investment program transactions
(for example, CPP, SSFI, TIP). Middle Office responsibilities include
validating transaction approvals, reconciling daily transaction activities,
and monitoring Bank of New York Mellon activities concerning the
securing of the government’s shares of stock and related warrants. OFS
officials told us an informal Middle Office function has been in place and
maturing since the initial CPP transaction was completed on October 28,
2008. OFS acknowledges that a key action item for OFS senior
management will be to develop and implement comprehensive policies
and procedures for the office that will include provisions for training and
periodic assessment.
Risk assessment: OFS officials told us that they recognize the need for an
effective risk-management process, but that the process has not yet been
documented. OFS has established an Office of the Chief Risk Officer and
has begun to fill the senior-level positions in that office. As shown in figure
2, OFS also has established a Senior Management Committee and the
Deputy-level Senior Assessment Team (OFS indicated that the name of
this group will likely change). The management committee includes the
Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability and all chiefs (and others as
deemed appropriate). OFS officials stated that they anticipate establishing
responsibilities and authorities for the committee more formally in the
coming months. The Deputy-level Assessment Team will include all deputy
chiefs and others if deemed appropriate. This team is charged with
planning and executing OFS’s A-123 review process. OFS stated that this

75
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers, it is using the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission’s—Enterprise Risk Management–Integrated
Framework as the basis for providing assistance in developing the internal control model.
The committee is a voluntary private-sector organization whose purpose is to help
businesses and other entities assess and enhance their internal control systems. As of
January 24, 2009, this framework was consistent with GAO’s Standards for Internal
Control.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

working group will be formalized with a charter and will become active in
the next few months as more deputy positions are filled and the A-123
process gets underway. If properly structured and implemented, these two
groups will be essential to establishing a disciplined approach to TARP’s
overall risk-assessment process and will complement the activities of its
Office of the Chief Risk Officer. Since OFS recently adopted its framework
for organizing the development and implementation of its system of
internal control, it is still too early to assess whether OFS’s risk
assessment process for using TARP funds include consideration of all
significant interactions between OFS and other parties (including banks
receiving funds under CPP and the custodian for TARP activities), as well
as internal factors that increase risk, which were concerns we raised in
our last report.
A key component to managing risk within TARP is determining how to
implement Treasury’s $700 billion troubled asset purchase authority and
ensure that the department does not exceed the authorized amount. OFS
officials told us that they have mechanisms to ensure that TARP purchases
do not exceed the $700 billion limit. One mechanism that OFS officials
provided to us was a tracking spreadsheet that, they asserted, maintains
current data of the status of TARP funds. One aspect of an effective risk
assessment process would be to establish and re-evaluate, as needed, the
original estimates and funding levels for the various programs. Early on,
OFS decided to apply $250 billion of the initially authorized $350 billion to
CPP, but there was no documented methodology followed to establish that
targeted amount, and no subsequent estimates or updates to address
whether that amount will be sufficient to achieve the objectives of CPP.
OFS officials told us that the combination of applications submitted from
several large insurance and bank holding companies, S corporations and
mutuals may require additional funding that exceeds the $250 billion
already estimated and allocated to CPP. It is important that OFS develop
and implement a well-defined and disciplined risk-assessment process
because such a process is essential to monitoring program status and
identifying any risks of potentially inadequate funding of announced
programs. We will begin evaluation and testing of key elements needed in
OFS’s risk-assessment process, including controls and procedures that
OFS has in place to help ensure that OFS programs do not exceed their
authorized funding amounts.
Control activities: OFS initially identified three business functions and
five support functions that constitute TARP’s control activities. The
business functions include asset purchases/guarantees, asset management,
and asset sales. An OFS official told us that, given the quick time frames

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associated with TARP initiatives, one of OFS’s goals and challenges in
establishing and implementing internal controls is working in a just-in-time
environment as business decisions are made and implemented.
Consequently, because the business functions are at various stages of
activity, so is the development of control activities for each of these
business functions. For example, most of OFS’s activity to date has
occurred in the asset purchase/guarantee function and control activities
associated with the asset purchase/guarantee function are the most
developed. Although OFS still needs to develop written policies and
procedures governing asset purchases, OFS officials informed us that they
have established alternative mechanisms or controls over the purchases
until such policies and procedures can be developed. For example, OFS, in
close coordination with PricewaterhouseCoopers, has developed or is
developing desk procedures, key control points, risk matrixes, and
process flows for CPP acquisition activity and the monitoring and receipt
of dividends. OFS officials told us they were confident that internal
controls over the asset purchase transactions have been identified and
documented. OFS officials also told us that for asset purchases, OMB has
approved the cash flow models for all credit reform initiatives to date, and
Investment Committee decisions, such as approving institutions and the
equity purchase amounts in CPP, have been reconciled to completed
transactions.76 OFS officials noted they are addressing other activities
related to the asset purchases, including developing budget and
accounting controls, coordinating with Treasury on internal control
requirements under OMB Circular No. A-123, and filling management and
staff Middle Office positions.
Ernst & Young, contracted by OFS to perform accounting support
functions, is preparing position papers on the accounting methodology
and policies for equity investments in financial institutions and other
entities and on credit reform accounting. Accounting position papers are a
first step in assisting OFS in determining accounting policies that will
govern financial reporting for TARP. For the functional areas of asset
management, OFS officials told us that they are hiring asset managers and
are drafting or have drafted the corporate actions and dividend process
flows and controls. OFS is scheduled to receive significant dividend
payments in February 2009. We plan to evaluate and test OFS’s controls
and procedures for this process as part of our next review. As the asset

76

Accounting for troubled assets under the Federal Credit Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 661c,
involves the estimation of cash flows over time.

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manager positions are filled, it will be important that the valuation of
previous transactions be completed promptly and future transactions
valued on a timely basis. At this time, there has been no activity related to
the business function pertaining to asset sales. Accordingly, OFS has
deemed this area a lower priority and has not addressed it. OFS currently
is relying primarily on Treasury’s departmental offices for the support
functions of procurement, budget/accounting, reporting/compliance,
human resources, and information technology.
Information and communication: OFS has put in place mechanisms for
communicating internal control matters and the ongoing development of
internal control policies. For example, internally, OFS conducts informal
weekly meetings with PricewaterhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young to
discuss progress in establishing and documenting internal controls and
financial accounting processes. Externally, OFS officials told us they are
in constant communication with OMB and Treasury officials on the
availability of TARP funds prior to incurring an obligation. OFS also has
met with officials from FinSOB on various topics including internal
controls. In addition, OFS posts information on Treasury’s Web site,
speaks at industry events, and testifies at congressional hearings.
According to OFS, as of January 23, 2009, they have issued all reports
required under the act.
Monitoring: OFS officials stated they are in the planning stage of
developing and implementing comprehensive policies and procedures for
monitoring. OFS plans to include provisions for periodic assessments by
management to determine if the policies, procedures, and established
controls are operating effectively. They expect this will occur formally
through the A-123 review and assurance statement process and informally
on an ongoing basis through information provided during the course of
normal business operations. In addition, OFS officials told us they are
continuing to leverage the work of PricewaterhouseCoopers to actively
monitor the execution of controls by OFS in relation to each CPP
transaction. OFS believes such active monitoring results in a regular
evaluation of control design and effectiveness, which is necessary to
ensure controls are appropriate and working as intended.
Continuing to develop a comprehensive system of internal control is a key
challenge facing OFS because it has had to develop internal controls while
simultaneously reacting quickly to financial market events and
implementing TARP initiatives. OFS recognizes there may be situations in
which the organization will be unable to fully execute the controls as
designed. Therefore, OFS plans for its internal control design to include

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compensating controls for such situations. By adopting a framework for
organizing the development and implementation of its system of internal
control, OFS has made an important start to providing a common
understanding of, and clear structure for, that system. This framework,
although still evolving, should provide OFS with the ability to
communicate expectations and measure performance on internal controls
and develop mechanisms for compliance with internal control standards.
Our ongoing monitoring efforts will focus on the steps OFS is taking to
develop and implement an effective internal control structure. We also
plan to test the design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of
internal controls over TARP activities, such as the approval and recording
of CPP transactions and the receipt of dividends on preferred stock.

Measuring the Impact
of TARP on Credit
Markets and the
Economy Continues
to Be Challenging

TARP’s activities could improve market confidence in banks that choose
to participate and have beneficial effects on credit markets, but several
factors will complicate efforts to measure any impact. If TARP is having its
intended effect, a number of developments might be observed in credit
and other markets over time, such as reduced risk spreads, declining
borrowing costs, and lending activity higher than it would have been in the
absence of TARP. Credit market indicators we have identified suggest that
the cost of credit has declined since our last report in interbank, mortgage,
and corporate debt markets, while perceptions of risk (as measured by
premiums over Treasury securities) have declined in interbank markets,
but changed very little in corporate debt and mortgage markets. Several
factors will make isolating and measuring the impact of TARP challenging,
including changes in monetary and fiscal policy, other programs
introduced by Treasury, the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and FHFA, and
general market forces. For example, the Federal Reserve’s announcement
that it will purchase mortgage-backed securities has been associated with
a large drop in mortgage rates. As a result, any changes in capital markets
cannot be attributed solely to TARP. Similarly, slow recovery does not
necessarily reflect its failure because of the effects of market forces and
economic conditions. We have identified a number of other indicators that
we are monitoring and may include in future reports.

TARP Could Have a
Number of Effects on
Credit Markets and the
Economy

TARP activities as of January 22, 2009—specifically CPP—could continue
to improve market confidence in participating banks by improving their
balance sheets, cash flows, and capital positions; reducing their perceived
risk; and allowing them to borrow and raise capital at more favorable
rates. To the extent that confidence in participating banks improves, the
banks should be able to pass on some of their lower funding costs to their

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own customers in the form of lower rates. Moreover, the capital infusions
also could increase the willingness and ability of participating banks to
increase lending to creditworthy businesses and consumers rather than
hoarding the capital or using it to purchase low-risk assets.
Some tension exists between the goals of improving banks’ capital
positions and promoting lending—that is, the more capital banks use for
lending, the less their overall capital positions will improve. The current
crisis involves issues of liquidity and solvency and it is difficult to
determine which factor most challenges the viability of a given financial
institution, especially since the values of the underlying mortgage-related
securities at the root of the turmoil are unknown. A financial institution
experiencing liquidity problems may have adequate capital (the value of its
assets significantly outweighs liabilities) and therefore might be expected
to use CPP capital to increase lending. Some institutions likely would use
CPP capital to improve their capital ratios by holding the additional capital
as Treasuries or other safe assets, rather than leveraging new capital to
support additional lending. Using the capital in this manner could allow
institutions to absorb losses or write down troubled assets.
Since the onset of the crisis, it appears that banks have experienced
liquidity and capital adequacy problems, complicating expectations about
the immediate impact of TARP on lending. While Treasury has stated that
CPP funds are intended for healthy institutions, continued uncertainty in
financial markets, deteriorating economic conditions, and difficulty
determining solvency suggest that some apparently healthy institutions
may not leverage new capital at the expense of their own capital adequacy.
For example, while Citigroup received $25 billion in CPP funds in October
2008, Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC provided additional capital
in November 2008 and insured a pool of approximately $300 billion in
assets against large losses, amidst concerns about Citigroup’s viability.
Similarly, it was announced on January 16, 2009, that Bank of America
would receive an additional $20 billion in TARP funds as well as additional
insurance assistance from Treasury and FDIC on an asset pool of $118
billion. However, if CPP funds contribute to improving solvency rather
than increasing lending, overall financial stability likely still would
improve in the near term, as systemic or disruptive institutional failures
could be prevented.
As discussed in our last report, if TARP does have its intended impact, a
number of effects should appear in credit and other markets over time,
including declining risk premiums (the difference between risky and riskfree interest rates, such as rates on U.S. Treasury securities) for interbank

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lending and bank debt and lower borrowing costs for business and
consumers. While these developments may raise volumes of consumer and
business lending and permit some households to avoid foreclosures, the
impact on overall lending could be diminished by the decline in the
creditworthiness of borrowers or a tightening of lending standards. Given
that credit quality in the economy is deteriorating and confidence remains
low, banks may remain cautious about extending credit, lending only to
low-risk borrowers and converting the additional funds into low-yield, safe
assets. Similarly, with confidence low, consumers and business will
remain cautious about taking on new loans. Under these circumstances,
low interest rates and lower premiums may not translate into increased
lending. Additionally, as Treasury has acknowledged, it may take more
time before the injections have the desired effect. According to a Treasury
statement on January 13, 2009, $189 billion of the initial $250 billion
allocated to CPP has been invested. Because the economy is experiencing
a downturn, during which lending and borrowing levels normally drop,
lending may not occur immediately but may occur faster than would be
the case if the equity injections had not taken place. Overall, determining
the specific effect of TARP will be a challenge, because no one can know
with confidence what would have happened in its absence.
Changes in credit market conditions may not provide conclusive evidence
of TARP’s effectiveness, as other important policies and interventions can
influence these markets. We discussed the collaborative efforts
government agencies have undertaken to restore financial stability, as well
as the general market forces that also will complicate a determination of
TARP’s specific effectiveness. Both factors continue to affect markets. For
example, since our last report the Federal Reserve lowered the federal
funds target and the discount rate partially in response to strained
financial markets and tight credit conditions. Additionally, on November
25, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced that it would begin to purchase
up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae and $100 billion in governmentsponsored enterprise debt to support the mortgage and housing markets
and foster improved conditions in financial markets more generally.77
Moreover, FHFA, in partnership with Treasury, continues to implement a
supplemental loan modification program for at-risk borrowers to prevent
foreclosures and mitigate default-related losses. To these ends, Fannie

77

The relevant government-sponsored enterprises are Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the
Federal Home Loan Banks.

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Mae and Freddie Mac—under FHFA conservatorship—announced that
they would extend the suspension of foreclosure sales and evictions from
some single-family properties through January 31, 2009.78 Moreover,
housing values may continue to fall to levels consistent with incomes and
rents in local areas, possibly leading to additional foreclosures, asset
write-downs, and an increase in the perceived risk of banks and other
financial institutions with exposure to mortgage assets.

Changes in Select
Indicators Suggest
Improvement in Credit
Market Conditions, but
These Changes Cannot Be
Attributed Exclusively to
TARP

We considered a number of indicators that, although imperfect, may be
suggestive of TARP’s impact on credit and other markets. Currently, we
have identified preliminary indicators that are likely to capture interbank,
mortgage, and nonbank lending activity as well as financial market risk
perceptions and variables that are predictive of future real economic
activity. At the very least, improvements in these measures would indicate
improving conditions in credit markets. Further, given that CPP’s goal is to
improve the capital position of banks and promote lending, we expect to
monitor indicators that can provide some insight into the potential effects
of the plan on capital ratios, the structure of liabilities, and net changes in
lending at participating institutions. We continue to consider a variety of
additional indicators, and as more data become available and economic
and credit conditions evolve, we plan to include them in future reports.

Treasury-London Interbank
Offered Rate Spread

As noted in our last report, the TED spread is the difference between an
average of LIBOR and the interest rate on U.S Treasury bills with the same
maturity. It is considered a key indicator of credit risk that gauges the
willingness of banks to lend to other banks. Increases in the TED spread
imply a bigger aversion to risk. That is, investors have a preference for
safe investments (such as Treasury securities) and charge a higher
premium for loans to other institutions to compensate for greater
perceived default risk. Figure 3 shows the 3-month LIBOR, 3-month
Treasury, and TED spread. The daily TED spread peaked at more than 450
basis points on October 10, 2008.79 Between October 13, 2008 (the day
before the announcement of the creation of CPP), and January 20, 2009,
the spread declined by more than 350 basis points to its lowest level since

78

The original announcement occurred on November 20, 2008, suspending foreclosures and
evictions through January 9, 2009.
79
A basis point is a common measure used in quoting yield on bills, notes, and bonds and
represents 1/100 of a percent of yield. It should be noted that while the spread is large, the
actual LIBOR rate is lower than the average rate from 2005 through mid-2007.

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August 2008. Decreases in the TED spread could reflect that banks are
more willing to lend to other banks on terms that reflect greater
confidence in the banking system (that is, without demanding a large
interest rate premium) for the time being. LIBOR itself has declined to
levels not seen since 2004. These declines could be attributed to TARP, the
collaborative efforts government agencies have undertaken to restore
financial stability, or both. Since falling below 100 basis points on January
20, the TED spread has begun to rise somewhat reaching 1.06 percent as of
January 22, 2009.
Figure 3: TED Spread, 3-Month LIBOR, and 3-Month Treasury Bill Yield, as of January 22, 2009
Interest rates
5
1
4

3
3
2
2

1
1
0

2
3

2008

2009

Year
LIBOR
3-month Treasury
TED spread
Federal Reserve interest rate reductions (10/29/08, 12/16/08)

1
2
3

CPP injections (10/28/08, 11/14/08, 11/21/08, 12/5/08, 12/12/08,
12/19/08, 12/23/08, 12/31/08, 1/9/09, 1/16/09)
10/14/2008: Treasury Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and FDIC and Federal
Reserve programs announced.
11/23/2008: Treasury, FDIC and Federal Reserve announce agreement to provide capital
and protect against large losses at Citigroup.
11/25/2008: Federal Reserve program to purchase mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
and government sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt announced

Source: Global Insight and Federal Reserve System.

Note: Rates and yields are daily percentages. Area between LIBOR and Treasury yield is the TED
spread. The Federal Reserve announced an early January start for MBS and GSE debt purchases on
December 30, 2008.

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Corporate Spreads

The economy-wide risk premium is measured in a number of ways, most
commonly as the spread between Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s)
Baa bond rate and Moody’s Aaa rate or between these rates and the
relevant government bond yield.80 These spreads represent a premium
lenders demand for taking on risk—that is, when spreads are high, market
participants perceive more risk, warranting a higher rate of return. When
credit market conditions improve, some narrowing of these spreads would
be expected.81 Moody’s describes Aaa bonds as “of the highest quality, with
minimal credit risk” and Baa bonds as “subject to moderate credit risk”
that “may possess certain speculative characteristics.” As shown in figure
4, the various interest rate spreads show a common pattern—an increase
in negative perceptions about risk, resulting in increasing spreads as seen
over the past year. Declines in these spreads would be indicative of
improving credit conditions, but because these spreads may have been too
narrow during the period leading up to the credit market turmoil (risk was
underpriced), it is not clear that these premiums would decline to those
previous levels. Since our last report, which reported data as of the week
of November 21, 2008, perceptions of risk (represented by the Aaa- and
Baa-Treasury spreads) in corporate debt markets have declined modestly
(roughly 10-35 basis points), while the cost of credit has fallen more
markedly (roughly 90-115 basis points).

80

Moody’s Investors Service performs financial research and analysis on commercial and
government entities. It also ranks the creditworthiness of borrowers using a standardized
rating scale. These spreads also can reflect a liquidity or prepayment premium.
81

Moreover, economic research also suggests that such interest rate spreads have
predictive power for several real economy variables, such as industrial production, durable
orders, the unemployment rate, personal income, capacity utilization, and consumption.

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Figure 4: Yields on Corporate Bonds (Aaa and Baa) Relative to 10-year Treasury, as of January 16, 2009
Interest rates

12

10

8

6

4

2

0
2008

2009

Year

Moody’s Baa
Moody’s Aaa
10-year Treasury
Aaa/Baa-Treasury spread
Sources: Federal Reserve System.

Note: Rates and yields are weekly percentages.

Mortgage Rates

The credit turmoil has raised concern about consumers’ abilities to obtain
funds, including mortgages, at rates consistent with economic
fundamentals and individual risk characteristics. One of TARP’s explicit
goals is to enhance liquidity and promote lending to consumers, but high
spreads between mortgage rates and Treasury yields indicate relatively
high risk and low liquidity. Therefore, to the extent that credit and
economic conditions improve, these spreads would narrow. Figure 5
shows that since our last report, which reported data as of the week of
November 21, 2008, perceptions of risk (represented by the mortgageTreasury spread) in mortgage markets are unchanged. However,
conforming mortgage rates have fallen dramatically—by more than 90
basis points.82 As figure 5 shows, a significant drop in mortgage rates

82

Conforming mortgages are mortgage loans that can be purchased by Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.

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occurred shortly after the Federal Reserve’s announcement that it would
purchase mortgage-backed securities, suggesting that stabilization policies
outside of TARP may have been an important force behind this significant
decline. The figure also illustrates that mortgage applications increased
significantly after mortgage rates declined. However, the biggest increase
in applications was for borrowers attempting to refinance existing
properties rather than purchase new homes. Although not illustrated here,
the refinance application index grew roughly 418 percent from November
21, 2008, to January 16, 2009, while the purchase application index rose by
approximately 16 percent.

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Figure 5: Mortgage Rates (30-Year Fixed Rate, Conforming), Mortgage Applications Index, and Treasury Yields, as of January
16, 2009
Interest rates

Mortgage application index

8

1,400

7

1,200
1

6

2
3

1,000

5
800
4

1
600

2
3

3

1
400

2

200

1
0

0
2008

2009

Year
30-year fixed rate mortgage
10-year Treasury
Mortgage-Treasury spread
Mortgage applications
Federal Reserve interest rate reductions (10/29/08, 12/16/08)

1
2
3

CPP injections (10/28/08, 11/14/08, 11/21/08, 12/5/08, 12/12/08,
12/19/08, 12/23/08, 12/31/08, 1/9/09, 1/16/09)
10/14/2008: Treasury Capital Purchase Program (CPP) and FDIC and Federal
Reserve programs announced.
11/23/2008: Treasury, FDIC and Federal Reserve announce agreement to provide capital
and protect against large losses at Citigroup.
11/25/2008: Federal Reserve program to purchase mortgage-backed securities (MBS)
and government sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt announced

Sources: Federal Reserve System and Global Insight.

Note: Rates and yields are weekly percentages. The Federal Reserve announced an early January
start for MBS and GSE debt purchases on December 30, 2008.

Mortgage Originations

Like other bank interest rates, mortgage rates may reflect the customers to
whom banks choose to lend, rather than the cost of credit for all potential
customers. As such, the volume of new mortgage lending also may
indicate the availability of credit, changes in credit risk, or demand for
credit. As shown in figure 6, quarterly mortgage originations in the United

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States have fallen by more than 50 percent since 2005.83 While mortgage
interest rates have fallen, mortgage lending has decreased. To the extent
that credit and economic conditions improve over time and interest rates
remain stable, we would expect mortgage originations to stop declining
and eventually rise, although it is not clear that this measure would or
should return to the level seen in the period leading up to the credit
market turmoil. As figure 6 shows, the decline in origination was
associated with a decline in mortgage applications—from the first quarter
to the third quarter of 2008 both the average applications index and
mortgage originations declined by 39 percent. While mortgage applications
increased significantly during the fourth quarter of 2008, we do not have
recent data on originations for comparative purposes. In subsequent
reports, we will provide an update on mortgage originations as the
quarterly data become available.84

83

This dropoff is consistent with the change in household mortgage debt as measured by
the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds data.
84
The mortgage application index is not seasonally adjusted here to provide a more
appropriate comparison to the unadjusted mortgage origination data. Because the seasonal
patterns in the data might be different for each series, we also analyzed year-over-year
changes. Originations were roughly 47 percent lower in the third quarter of 2008 than in the
third quarter of 2007, while the average mortgage application index fell 24 percent.

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Figure 6: Mortgage Originations and Mortgage Applications Index, as of September 30, 2008
Mortgage originations (dollars in billions)

Mortgage applications index

900

900

800

800

700

700

600

600

500

500

400

400

300

300

200

200

100

100

0

0
Q1
2004

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

2005

Q1

Q2

2006

Q3

Q4

Q1
2007

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

2008

Mortgage originations
Mortgage applications
Sources: Inside Mortgage Finance estimates and Global Insight.

Note: Estimates of originations are based on information from the Federal Housing Administration,
Veterans Administration, and mortgage-backed securities and lenders and include refinances.

Mortgage Foreclosures and
Defaults

We will continue to report on trends in foreclosures and delinquencies. As
we have testified, foreclosures not only affect those losing their homes but
also their neighborhoods, and have contributed to increased volatility in
the financial markets.85 Treasury officials have urged banks to modify and
restructure loans whenever reasonable to avoid preventable foreclosures.86
Moreover, if TARP is effective, banks may be more able to refinance
mortgage loans for creditworthy borrowers to keep monthly payments

85

GAO, Troubled Asset Relief Program: Status of Efforts to Address Defaults and
Foreclosures on Home Mortgages, GAO-09-231T (Washington D.C.: Dec. 4, 2008).

86

FDIC, Treasury, and the Federal Reserve have stated that lenders and servicers should (1)
determine whether a loan modification would enhance the net present value of the loan
before proceeding to foreclosure; and (2) ensure that loans currently in foreclosure have
been subject to such analysis.

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affordable. While it is too early to expect material changes in foreclosures,
and the most recent data preclude an assessment of trends since TARP
began, figure 7 establishes the historical context for continued monitoring.
As the figure shows, the percentage of total loan foreclosures reached 2.97
percent at the end of the third quarter of 2008—a level unseen in the 29
years for which complete data on defaults and foreclosures have been
kept. As noted earlier, a variety of parties outside of TARP are taking
actions to address the rising foreclosure rate.
Figure 7: Percentage of Loans in Foreclosure, as of September 30, 2008
Q2 2005 – Q3 2008

First quarter 1979 – third quarter (Q3) 2008

Percentage

3.00

3.00

2.75

2.75

2.50

2.50

2.25

2.25

2.00

2.00

1.75

1.75

1.50

1.50

1.25

1.25

1.00

1.00

0.75

0.75

0.50

0.50

0.25

0.25

0

0.00

19

79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
(Q 08
3)

Percentage

Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
2005

2006

2007

2008

Source: GAO analysis of Global Insight data.

In addition to the preliminary indicators previously identified, we continue
to evaluate the potential usefulness of other indicators. This list is not
definitive or exhaustive, and we expect to add new indicators and modify
or drop others as we engage with Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and other
informed market participants. Moreover, some measures included may
become more appropriate indicators as time progresses. The indicators we
are monitoring include the federal funds and prime lending rates, the
Federal Reserve’s survey of lending standards, commercial paper interest
rates, changes in assets held by commercial banks, changes in household
and business debt, stock prices and volatility, and housing prices. Many
data sources are updated only on a quarterly basis and with a lag (for

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example, the Federal Reserve’s flow of funds); thus, we are not yet able to
assess the impact of TARP from many of these sources.

Conclusions

Treasury has taken important steps to implement all nine
recommendations in our previous report. In particular, our
recommendation calling for Treasury to facilitate a smooth transition to
the new administration largely has been completed. However, due in part
to the short time frame since our last report, continued action is needed to
fully address the remaining eight. Appendix IV provides a high-level
summary prepared by Treasury of the progress it has made on each
recommendation since our last report as well as some planned next steps.
During this period, Treasury has begun to take a number of important
steps toward better reporting and monitoring of CPP, in accordance with
our prior recommendations that Treasury bolster its ability to determine
whether institutions were using the proceeds consistent with the purposes
of the act and that it establish mechanisms to monitor compliance with
program requirements, but more needs to be done. First, while Treasury
has announced plans to survey the largest institutions monthly to monitor
their lending and other activities by collecting qualitative and quantitative
information, Treasury plans to rely on quarterly financial (call report) data
from the other participating institutions. While the monthly survey is a
step toward greater transparency and accountability for the largest
institutions, we continue to believe that additional action is needed to
better ensure that all participating institutions are accountable for their
use of the funds. Without more frequent information on all participants,
Treasury will have little timely information about the effectiveness of the
overall program and the changing condition of the institutions and may
limit the ability of its newly created team of analysts to analyze how the
infusions are being used by the institutions and the effectiveness of the
program. In addition, without ensuring that future CPP agreements include
a mechanism that will better enable Treasury to track the use of capital
infusions and seeking to obtain similar information from existing CPP
participants, Treasury may have difficulty taking action should it later
determine that an institution has not used the funds in a manner consistent
with the intent of the program.
Second, Treasury has continued to take steps to increase its planned
oversight of compliance with terms of agreements such as executive
compensation and limitations on dividends and stock repurchases,
including plans to issue new interim final rules that amend and clarify the
past interim rules on executive compensation and naming an Interim Chief
Compliance Officer. However, Treasury has not yet finalized these plans.

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Without a more structured mechanism in place to ensure compliance with
all CPP requirements, including limitations on dividends and stock
repurchases—and as more institutions continue to participate in the
program— ensuring compliance with these aspects of the program will
become increasingly important and challenging.
Treasury has made less progress in improving the transparency of the
program and has not yet articulated a clear strategic vision for TARP. In
our December 2008 report, we raised questions about the effectiveness of
Treasury’s communication strategy for TARP with Congress, the financial
markets, and the public. These questions were further heightened in COP’s
January report, which also raised questions about Treasury’s strategy for
TARP. In response to our recommendation about its communication
strategy, Treasury noted numerous publicly available reports, testimonies,
and speeches. However, even after reviewing these items collectively,
Treasury’s strategic vision for TARP remains unclear. For example, early
on Treasury outlined a strategy and approach to purchase whole loans and
mortgage-backed securities from financial institutions, but changed
direction to making capital investments in qualifying financial institutions
as the global community opted to move in this direction. Moreover, once
Treasury determined that capital infusions were preferable to purchasing
whole mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, Treasury did not clearly
articulate how the various programs (such CPP, SSFI, and TIP) would
work collectively to help stabilize financial markets. For instance,
Treasury has used similar approaches—capital infusions—to stabilize
healthy institutions under CPP as well as SSFI and TIP, albeit with more
stringent requirements. Moreover, with the exception of institutions
selected for TIP being viewed as able to raise private capital, both SSFI
and TIP share similar selection criteria. Finally, the same institution may
be eligible for multiple programs—at least two institutions currently
participate in more than one program—and this has added to confusion
about Treasury’s strategy and vision for the implementation of TARP.
Other actions have raised additional questions about Treasury’s strategy.
First, the funding of the first institution to receive funding under TIP was
announced weeks before the program was established. Similarly, the Asset
Guarantee Program was established after Treasury announced that it
would guarantee assets under such a program, and many of the details of
the program have yet to be worked out. Second, Treasury’s efforts to
mitigate residential foreclosures, which have contributed to increased
volatility in financial markets, remain in the design phase with no clearly
articulated strategy. Finally, while Treasury has continued to publicly
report on individual issues, testify, and make speeches about the program,

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

it continues to struggle to convey a clearly articulated and overarching
message about its efforts, potentially hampering TARP’s effectiveness and
underscoring ongoing questions about its communication strategy.
Without a clearly articulated strategic vision, Treasury’s effectiveness in
helping to stabilize markets may be hampered.
Treasury also has made progress in establishing its management
infrastructure, which included hiring, contracting oversight, and internal
controls.
•

In the hiring area, Treasury took steps to help maintain leadership
within OFS during and after the transition to the new administration,
one of the areas we highlighted in our first report. Specifically,
Treasury ensured that interim chief positions would be filled to ensure
a smooth transition and used direct-hire and various other
appointments to bring a number of career staff on board quickly. While
making progress since our last report in establishing the TARP
organization, the number of temporary and contract staff who will be
needed to serve long-term organizational needs remains unknown.
Because TARP has added many new programs since it was first
established in October and the number and types of program activities
may expand or change under the new administration, we recognize
that Treasury may find it difficult to determine OFS’s long-term
organizational needs at this time. However, such considerations will be
vital to retaining institutional knowledge within the organization as
programs evolve.

•

Treasury’s use of existing contract flexibilities has enabled it to enter
into agreements and award contracts quickly in support of TARP.
However, Treasury’s use of time-and-materials contracts, although
authorized when flexibility is needed, can increase the risk of wasted
government dollars without adequate oversight of contractor
performance. Although Treasury has improved its oversight of
contractors, the department itself has identified COTR certification
and the use of time-and-materials pricing to be high-risk issues that
still need attention. In addition, while Treasury has taken the
important step of recently issuing an interim regulation outlining the
process for reviewing and addressing conflicts of interest among new
contractors and financial agents, it is still reviewing contracts or
agreements that existed prior to issuance to ensure conformity with
the new regulation. We believe this is a necessary component of a
comprehensive and complete system to ensure that all conflicts are
fully identified and appropriately addressed.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

•

In the area of internal controls, Treasury has taken some important
steps, including OFS adopting a framework for organizing the
development and implementation of its system of internal control for
TARP activities. OFS plans to use this framework to develop specific
policies, drive communications on expectations, and measure
compliance with internal control standards and policies. However, it
has yet to develop comprehensive written policies and procedures
governing TARP activities or implement a disciplined risk-assessment
process.

Finally, because TARP is still in the early stages of implementation as well
as other complicating factors, isolating its impact on credit markets
continues to be difficult. However, some indicators demonstrate that since
our last report, the cost of credit has declined in interbank, mortgage, and
corporate debt markets. Conversely, while perceptions of risk (as
measured by premiums over Treasury bonds) have declined in interbank
markets, they appear to have changed little in the corporate bond and
mortgage markets. Attributing any of these changes directly to TARP
continues to be problematic because of the range of actions that have
been and are being taken to address the current crisis. For example, a
large drop in mortgage rates occurred shortly after the Federal Reserve
announced it would purchase up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed
securities, highlighting that policies outside of TARP may have important
effects on credit markets. While these indicators may be suggestive of
TARP’s ongoing impact, no single indicator or set of indicators will
provide a definitive determination of the program’s impact.

Recommendations for
Executive Action

As with our previous 60-day report, we continue to identify a number of
areas that warrant Treasury’s ongoing attention concerning TARP.
Therefore, we recommend that Treasury take the following nine actions to
further improve the integrity, transparency, and accountability of the
program and more clearly articulate and communicate a strategic vision:
•

Expand the scope of planned monthly CPP surveys to include
collecting at least some information from all institutions participating
in the program.

•

Ensure that future CPP agreements include a mechanism that will
better enable Treasury to track the use of the capital infusions and
seek to obtain similar information from existing CPP participants.

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

•

•

Establish a process to ensure compliance with all CPP requirements,
including those associated with limitations on dividends and stock
repurchase restrictions.
Communicate a clearly articulated vision for TARP and how all
individual programs are intended to work in concert to achieve that
vision. This vision should incorporate actions to preserve
homeownership. Once this vision is clearly articulated, Treasury
should document needed skills and competencies.

•

•

Expedite efforts to ensure that sufficient personnel are assigned and
properly trained to oversee the performance of all contractors,
especially for contracts priced on a time-and-materials basis, and move
toward fixed-price arrangements whenever possible as program
requirements are better defined over time.

•

Develop a comprehensive system of internal control over TARP
activities, including policies, procedures, and guidance that are robust
enough to ensure that the program’s objectives and requirements are
met.

•

Develop and implement a well-defined and disciplined risk-assessment
process, as such a process is essential to monitoring program status
and identifying any risks of potential inadequate funding of announced
programs.

•

Agency Comments
and Our Analysis

Continue to expeditiously hire personnel needed to carry out and
oversee TARP.

Review and renegotiate existing conflict-of-interest mitigation plans, as
necessary, to enhance specificity and conformity with the new interim
conflicts of interest regulation, and take continued steps to manage
and monitor conflicts of interest and enforce mitigation plans.

We provided a draft of this report to the Department of the Treasury for
review and comment. We also provided segments of the draft to the
Federal Reserve, FDIC, OCC, and OTS for review and comment. In written
comments, Treasury generally agreed with the report and noted that the
recommendations were constructive (see app. I). They also noted that
while TARP has only been in existence for 120 days, Treasury had made
significant progress implementing internal controls, promulgating
regulations, hiring staff, and communicating its activities to the public.
Moreover, they noted that Treasury has taken steps to measure lending

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

activities of the banks that have received TARP capital. However, they
agreed that more work remains to be done in each of the areas highlighted
in the report. Treasury also mentioned its recent actions involving the auto
industry and additional investments in Citigroup and Bank of America.
While we describe the programs established to make these investments,
we have not evaluated the need for any of the programs. In subsequent
reports we plan to focus on the process used to make the decisions to
establish those programs, whether Treasury has systems in place to ensure
that the institutions are complying with the terms and conditions of the
agreements, and whether the programs are achieving their stated goals.
Treasury and three of the federal regulators also provided technical
comments that we incorporated, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Special Inspector General for
TARP and interested congressional committees and members, Treasury,
the federal banking regulators, and others. The report also is available at
no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact
Richard J. Hillman at (202) 512-8678 or hillmanr@gao.gov, Thomas J.
McCool at (202) 512-2642 or mccoolt@gao.gov, or Orice M. Williams at
(202) 512-8678 or williamso@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are
listed in appendix V.

Gene L. Dodaro
Acting Comptroller General
of the United States

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

List of Congressional Committees
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
The Honorable Thad Cochran
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd
Chairman
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Ranking Member
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Kent Conrad
Chairman
The Honorable Judd Gregg
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget
United States Senate
The Honorable Max Baucus
Chairman
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
The Honorable David R. Obey
Chairman
The Honorable Jerry Lewis
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
The Honorable John M. Spratt, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable Paul Ryan
Ranking Member
Committee on the Budget
House of Representatives

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

The Honorable Barney Frank
Chairman
The Honorable Spencer Bachus
Ranking Member
Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel
Chairman
The Honorable Dave Camp
Ranking Member
Committee on Ways and Means
House of Representatives

Page 80

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix I: Comments from the Department
of the Treasury

Appendix I: Comments from the Department
of the Treasury

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix I: Comments from the Department
of the Treasury

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

NC

$15,000,000,000

$1,831,000,000,000

NY

3,000,000,000

268,000,000,000

Citigroup Inc.

NY

25,000,000,000

2,050,000,000,000

10/28/08

JPMorgan Chase & Co.

NY

25,000,000,000

2,251,000,000,000

10/28/08

Morgan Stanley

NY

10,000,000,000

987,000,000,000

10/28/08

State Street Corporation

MA

2,000,000,000

286,000,000,000

Date

Bank

State

10/28/08

Bank of America Corporation

10/28/08

Bank of New York Mellon Corporation

10/28/08

10/28/08

The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.

NY

10,000,000,000

1,082,000,000,000

10/28/08

Wells Fargo & Company

CA

25,000,000,000

1,371,000,000,000

115,000,000,000

10,126,000,000,000

11/14/08

Subtotal
1st FS Corporation

NC

16,369,000

670,000,000

11/14/08

Bank of Commerce Holdings

CA

17,000,000

651,000,000

11/14/08

BB&T Corp.

NC

3,133,640,000

137,041,000,000

11/14/08

Broadway Financial Corporation

CA

9,000,000

$404,000,000

11/14/08

Capital One Financial Corporation

VA

3,555,199,000

154,803,000,000

11/14/08

Comerica Inc.

TX

2,250,000,000

65,153,000,000

11/14/08

First Horizon National Corporation

TN

866,540,000

32,804,000,000

11/14/08

Huntington Bancshares

OH

1,398,071,000

54,661,000,000

11/14/08

KeyCorp

OH

2,500,000,000

101,290,000,000

11/14/08

Marshall & Ilsley Corporation

WI

1,715,000,000

63,501,000,000

11/14/08

Northern Trust Corporation

IL

1,576,000,000

79,244,000,000

11/14/08

Provident Bancshares Corp.

MD

151,500,000

6,410,000,000

11/14/08

Regions Financial Corp.

AL

3,500,000,000

144,292,000,000

11/14/08

SunTrust Banks, Inc.

GA

3,500,000,000

174,777,000,000

11/14/08

TCF Financial Corporation

MN

361,172,000

16,511,000,000

11/14/08

U.S. Bancorp

MN

6,599,000,000

247,055,000,000

11/14/08

UCBH Holdings, Inc.

CA

298,737,000

13,044,000,000

11/14/08

Umpqua Holdings Corp.

OR

214,181,000

8,328,000,000

11/14/08

Valley National Bancorp

NJ

300,000,000

14,288,000,000

11/14/08

Washington Federal Inc.

WA

200,000,000

11,795,000,000

11/14/08

Zions Bancorporation

UT

1,400,000,000

53,974,000,000

33,561,409,000

1,380,696,000,000

11/21/08

Subtotal
Ameris Bancorp

GA

52,000,000

2,258,000,000

11/21/08

Associated Banc-Corp

WI

525,000,000

22,487,000,000

11/21/08

Banner Corporation

WA

124,000,000

4,650,000,000

11/21/08

Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc.

MA

154,000,000

7,022,000,000

11/21/08

Cascade Financial Corporation

WA

38,970,000

1,552,000,000

Page 83

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

State

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

Date

Bank

11/21/08

Centerstate Banks of Florida Inc.

FL

27,875,000

1,235,000,000

11/21/08

City National Corporation

CA

400,000,000

16,331,000,000

11/21/08

Columbia Banking System, Inc.

WA

76,898,000

3,105,000,000

11/21/08

First Community Bankshares Inc.

VA

41,500,000

1,967,000,000

11/21/08

First Community Corporation

SC

11,350,000

634,000,000

11/21/08

First Niagara Financial Group

NY

184,011,000

9,008,000,000

11/21/08

First PacTrust Bancorp, Inc.

CA

19,300,000

846,000,000

11/21/08

Heritage Commerce Corp.

CA

40,000,000

1,512,000,000

11/21/08

Heritage Financial Corporation

WA

24,000,000

905,000,000

11/21/08

HF Financial Corp.

SD

25,000,000

1,128,000,000

11/21/08

Nara Bancorp, Inc.

CA

67,000,000

2,598,000,000

11/21/08

Pacific Capital Bancorp

CA

180,634,000

7,689,000,000

11/21/08

Porter Bancorp Inc.

KY

35,000,000

1,596,000,000

11/21/08

Severn Bancorp, Inc.

MD

23,393,000

964,000,000

11/21/08

Taylor Capital Group

IL

104,823,000

4,075,000,000

11/21/08

Trustmark Corporation

MS

215,000,000

9,086,000,000

11/21/08

Webster Financial Corporation

CT

400,000,000

17,516,000,000

11/21/08

Western Alliance Bancorporation

NV

140,000,000

5,229,000,000

2,909,754,000

123,393,000,000

Subtotal
12/5/08

Bank of Marin Bancorp

CA

28,000,000

985,000,000

12/5/08

Bank of North Carolina

NC

31,260,000

1,263,000,000

12/5/08

Blue Valley Ban Corp.

KS

21,750,000

788,000,000

12/5/08

Cathay General Bancorp

CA

258,000,000

11,055,000,000

12/5/08

Central Bancorp, Inc.

MA

10,000,000

542,000,000

12/5/08

Central Federal Corporation

OH

7,225,000

281,000,000

12/5/08

Coastal Banking Company, Inc.

FL

9,950,000

441,000,000

12/5/08

CVB Financial Corp.

CA

130,000,000

6,422,000,000

12/5/08

Eagle Bancorp, Inc.

MD

38,235,000

1,458,000,000

12/5/08

East West Bancorp, Inc.

CA

306,546,000

11,722,000,000

12/5/08

Encore Bancshares, Inc.

TX

34,000,000

1,478,000,000

12/5/08

First Defiance Financial Corp.

OH

37,000,000

1,922,000,000

12/5/08

First Financial Holdings, Inc.

SC

65,000,000

2,974,000,000

12/5/08

First Midwest Bancorp, Inc.

IL

193,000,000

8,247,000,000

12/5/08

FPB Bancorp, Inc.

FL

5,800,000

231,000,000

12/5/08

Great Southern Bancorp, Inc.

MO

58,000,000

2,528,000,000

12/5/08

IBERIABANK Corporation

LA

90,000,000

5,351,000,000

Page 84

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Bank

State

12/5/08

Manhattan Bancorp

CA

1,700,000

72,000,000

12/5/08

MB Financial, Inc.

IL

196,000,000

8,359,000,000

12/5/08

Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc.

IL

84,784,000

3,583,000,000

12/5/08

Oak Valley Bancorp

CA

13,500,000

490,000,000

12/5/08

Old Line Bancshares, Inc.

MD

7,000,000

286,000,000

12/5/08

Popular, Inc.

PR

935,000,000

40,390,000,000

12/5/08

Sandy Spring Bancorp, Inc.

MD

83,094,000

3,195,000,000

12/5/08

Southern Community Financial Corporation

NC

42,750,000

1,798,000,000

12/5/08

Southern Missouri Bancorp, Inc.

MO

9,550,000

429,000,000

12/5/08

Southwest Bancorp, Inc.

OK

70,000,000

2,832,000,000

12/5/08

State Bancorp, Inc.

NY

36,842,000

1,593,000,000

12/5/08

Sterling Financial Corporation

WA

303,000,000

12,623,000,000

12/5/08

Superior Bancorp Inc.

AL

69,000,000

3,104,000,000

12/5/08

The South Financial Group, Inc.

SC

347,000,000

13,695,000,000

12/5/08

TIB Financial Corp.

FL

37,000,000

1,563,000,000

12/5/08

United Community Banks, Inc.

GA

180,000,000

8,073,000,000

12/5/08

Unity Bancorp, Inc.

NJ

20,649,000

864,000,000

12/5/08

Wesbanco Bank Inc.

WV

75,000,000

5,150,000,000

3,835,635,000

165,787,000,000

Subtotal

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

Date

12/12/08

Bank of the Ozarks, Inc.

AR

75,000,000

3,071,000,000

12/12/08

Capital Bank Corporation

NC

41,279,000

1,594,000,000

12/12/08

Center Financial Corporation

CA

55,000,000

2,035,000,000

12/12/08

Citizens Republic Bancorp, Inc.

MI

300,000,000

13,116,000,000

12/12/08

Citizens South Banking Corporation

NC

20,500,000

823,000,000

12/12/08

Fidelity Bancorp, Inc.

PA

7,000,000

727,000,000

12/12/08

First Litchfield Financial Corporation

CT

10,000,000

507,000,000

12/12/08

HopFed Bancorp

KY

18,400,000

843,000,000

12/12/08

Independent Bank Corporation

MI

72,000,000

3,139,000,000

12/12/08

Indiana Community Bancorp

IN

21,500,000

943,000,000

12/12/08

LNB Bancorp Inc.

OH

25,223,000

1,110,000,000

12/12/08

LSB Corporation

MA

15,000,000

729,000,000

12/12/08

National Penn Bancshares, Inc.

PA

150,000,000

9,317,000,000

12/12/08

NewBridge Bancorp

NC

52,372,000

2,108,000,000

12/12/08

Northeast Bancorp

ME

4,227,000

605,000,000

12/12/08

Old National Bancorp

IN

100,000,000

7,568,000,000

12/12/08

Pacific International Bancorp

WA

6,500,000

247,000,000

Page 85

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Bank

State

12/12/08

Pinnacle Financial Partners, Inc.

TN

95,000,000

4,338,000,000

12/12/08

Signature Bank

NY

120,000,000

6,699,000,000

12/12/08

Sterling Bancshares, Inc.

TX

125,198,000

4,947,000,000

12/12/08

Susquehanna Bancshares, Inc.

PA

300,000,000

13,636,000,000

12/12/08

SVB Financial Group

CA

235,000,000

8,071,000,000

12/12/08

The Bancorp, Inc.

DE

45,220,000

1,781,000,000

12/12/08

TowneBank

VA

76,458,000

3,016,000,000

12/12/08

Valley Financial Corporation

VA

16,019,000

643,000,000

12/12/08

Virginia Commerce Bancorp

VA

71,000,000

2,662,000,000

12/12/08

Wilmington Trust Corporation

DE

330,000,000

12,134,000,000

12/12/08

Wilshire Bancorp, Inc.

CA

62,158,000

2,387,000,000

Subtotal

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

Date

2,450,054,000

108,796,000,000

12/19/08

Alliance Financial Corporation

NY

26,918,000

1,347,000,000

12/19/08

AmeriServ Financial, Inc.

PA

21,000,000

911,000,000

12/19/08

Bancorp Rhode Island, Inc.

RI

30,000,000

1,490,000,000

12/19/08

BancTrust Financial Group, Inc.

AL

50,000,000

2,089,000,000

12/19/08

Berkshire Hills Bancorp, Inc.

MA

40,000,000

2,566,000,000

12/19/08

Bridgeview Bancorp, Inc.

IL

38,000,000

1,428,000,000

12/19/08

Citizens First Corporation

KY

8,779,000

360,000,000

12/19/08

CoBiz Financial Inc.

CO

64,450,000

2,606,000,000

12/19/08

Community Bankers Trust Corporation

VA

17,680,000

695,000,000

12/19/08

Community Financial Corporation

VA

12,643,000

491,000,000

12/19/08

Community West Bancshares

CA

15,600,000

640,000,000

12/19/08

Enterprise Financial Services Corp.

MO

35,000,000

2,236,000,000

12/19/08

Exchange Bank

CA

43,000,000

1,666,000,000

12/19/08

FCB Bancorp, Inc.

KY

9,294,000

353,000,000

12/19/08

FFW Corporation

IN

7,289,000

316,000,000

12/19/08

Fidelity Financial Corporation

KS

36,282,000

1,854,000,000

12/19/08

Fidelity Southern Corporation

GA

48,200,000

1,760,000,000

12/19/08

First California Financial Group, Inc

CA

25,000,000

1,125,000,000

12/19/08

Flushing Financial Corporation

NY

70,000,000

3,617,000,000

12/19/08

Hawthorn Bancshares, Inc.

MO

30,255,000

1,285,000,000

12/19/08

Heartland Financial USA, Inc.

IA

81,698,000

3,446,000,000

12/19/08

Horizon Bancorp

IN

25,000,000

1,189,000,000

12/19/08

Intermountain Community Bancorp

ID

27,000,000

1,049,000,000

12/19/08

Marquette National Corporation

IL

35,500,000

1,644,000,000

Page 86

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Bank

State

12/19/08

Mid Penn Bancorp, Inc.

PA

10,000,000

552,000,000

12/19/08

Monadnock Bancorp, Inc.

NH

1,834,000

111,000,000

12/19/08

Monarch Financial Holdings, Inc.

VA

14,700,000

595,000,000

a

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

Date

12/19/08

NCAL Bancorp

CA

10,000,000

407,000,000

12/19/08

OneUnited Bank

MA

12,063,000

625,000,000

12/19/08

Pacific City Finacial Corporation

CA

16,200,000

566,000,000

12/19/08

Patapsco Bancorp, Inc.

MD

6,000,000

262,000,000

12/19/08

Patriot Bancshares, Inc.

TX

26,038,000

934,000,000

12/19/08

Plains Capital Corporation

TX

87,631,000

3,343,000,000

12/19/08

Santa Lucia Bancorp

CA

4,000,000

254,000,000

12/19/08

Seacoast Banking Corporation of Florida

FL

50,000,000

2,225,000,000

12/19/08

Security Federal Corporation

SC

18,000,000

905,000,000

12/19/08

StellarOne Corporation

VA

30,000,000

2,986,000,000

12/19/08

Summit State Bank

CA

8,500,000

350,000,000

12/19/08

Synovus Financial Corp.

GA

967,870,000

34,339,000,000

12/19/08

Tennessee Commerce Bancorp, Inc.

TN

30,000,000

1,106,000,000

12/19/08

The Connecticut Bank and Trust Company

CT

5,448,000

223,000,000

12/19/08

The Elmira Savings Bank, FSB

NY

9,090,000

463,000,000

12/19/08

Tidelands Bancshares, Inc.

SC

14,448,000

668,000,000

12/19/08

Tri-County Financial Corporation

MD

15,540,000

677,000,000

12/19/08

Union Bankshares Corporation

VA

59,000,000

2,448,000,000

12/19/08

VIST Financial Corp.

PA

25,000,000

1,182,000,000

12/19/08

Wainwright Bank & Trust Company

MA

22,000,000

980,000,000

12/19/08

Whitney Holding Corporation

LA

300,000,000

10,987,000,000

12/19/08

Wintrust Financial Corporationa

IL

250,000,000

9,865,000,000

2,791,950,000

Subtotal

113,216,000,000

12/23/08

1st Constitution Bancorp

NJ

12,000,000

514,000,000

12/23/08

BCSB Bancorp, Inc.

MD

10,800,000

567,000,000

12/23/08

Bridge Capital Holdings

CA

23,864,000

855,000,000

UT

4,767,000

200,000,000

12/23/08

a

Cache Valley Banking Company
a

12/23/08

Capital Bancorp, Inc.

MD

4,700,000

198,000,000

12/23/08

Capital Pacific Bancorpa

OR

4,000,000

136,000,000

12/23/08

Cecil Bancorp, Inc.

MD

11,560,000

457,000,000

12/23/08

Central Jersey Bancorp

NJ

11,300,000

555,000,000

12/23/08

Citizens Bancorpa

CA

10,400,000

366,000,000

12/23/08

Citizens Community Bank

VA

3,000,000

150,000,000

Page 87

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Bank

State

12/23/08

Community Investors Bancorp, Inc.a

OH

2,600,000

143,000,000

12/23/08

Emclaire Financial Corp.

PA

7,500,000

357,000,000

12/23/08

Financial Institutions, Inc.

NY

37,515,000

1,946,000,000

12/23/08

First Community Bank Corporation of America

FL

10,685,000

476,000,000

12/23/08

First Financial Bancorp

OH

80,000,000

3,512,000,000

12/23/08

First Sound Bank

WA

7,400,000

267,000,000

12/23/08

Fulton Financial Corporation

PA

376,500,000

16,136,000,000

12/23/08

Green Bankshares, Inc.

TN

72,278,000

3,012,000,000

12/23/08

HMN Financial, Inc.

MN

26,000,000

1,129,000,000

12/23/08

International Bancshares Corporation

TX

216,000,000

11,545,000,000

12/23/08

Intervest Bancshares Corporation

NY

25,000,000

2,181,000,000

a

12/23/08

Leader Bancorp, Inc.

12/23/08

M&T Bank Corporation

12/23/08

Magna Bank

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

Date

MA

240,000,000

600,000,000

65,247,000,000

TN
a

5,830,000

NY

13,795,000

530,000,000

12/23/08

Mission Valley Bancorp

CA

5,500,000

220,000,000

12/23/08

MutualFirst Financial, Inc.

IN

32,382,000

1,399,000,000

12/23/08

Nicolet Bankshares, Inc.

WI

14,964,000

641,000,000

12/23/08

Pacific Coast Bankers’ Bancshares

CA

11,600,000

555,000,000

12/23/08

Pacific Commerce Bank

CA

4,060,000

165,000,000

12/23/08

Park National Corporation

OH

100,000,000

6,800,000,000

12/23/08

Parkvale Financial Corporation

PA

31,762,000

1,828,000,000

12/23/08

Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina, Inc.

NC

25,054,000

964,000,000

12/23/08

Saigon National Bank

CA

1,549,000

55,000,000

12/23/08

Seacoast Commerce Bank

CA

1,800,000

75,000,000

12/23/08

Sterling Bancorp

NY

42,000,000

2,117,000,000

12/23/08

TCNB Financial Corp.a

OH

2,000,000

96,000,000

12/23/08

Tennessee Valley Financial Holdings, Inc.

TN

3,000,000

204,000,000

12/23/08

The Little Bank, Incorporated

NC

7,500,000

317,000,000

12/23/08

Timberland Bancorp, Inc.

WA

16,641,000

682,000,000

12/23/08

United Bancorporation of Alabama, Inc.

AL

10,300,000

464,000,000

12/23/08

Uwharrie Capital Corp.

NC

10,000,000

425,000,000

12/23/08

Western Community Bancshares, Inc.a

CA

7,290,000

323,000,000

12/23/08

Western Illinois Bancshares Inc.a

IL

6,855,000

346,000,000

1,911,751,000

Subtotal

128,395,000,000

12/31/08

CIT Group Inc.

NY

2,330,000,000

80,845,000,000

12/31/08

Fifth Third Bancorp

OH

3,408,000,000

116,294,000,000

Page 88

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

MO

295,400,000

10,833,000,000

VA

80,347,000

918,000,000

SunTrust Banks, Inc.

GA

1,350,000,000

174,777,000,000

12/31/08

The PNC Financial Services Group Inc.

PA

7,579,200,000

145,610,000,000

12/31/08

West Bancorporation, Inc.

IA

36,000,000

1,464,000,000

15,078,947,000

530,741,000,000

Date

Bank

State

12/31/08

First Banks, Inc.

12/31/08

Hampton Roads Bankshares, Inc.

12/31/08

Subtotal
1/9/09

American Express Company

NY

3,388,890,000

127,218,000,000

1/9/09

American State Bancshares, Inc.

KS

6,000,000

271,000,000

1/9/09

Bank of America Corporation

NC

10,000,000,000

1,831,177,000,000

1/9/09

C&F Financial Corporation

VA

20,000,000

846,000,000

1/9/09

Cadence Financial Corporation

MS

44,000,000

1,985,000,000

1/9/09

Carolina Bank Holdings, Inc.

NC

16,000,000

591,000,000

1/9/09

Center Bancorp, Inc.

NJ

10,000,000

1,043,000,000

1/9/09

Central Pacific Financial Corp.

HI

135,000,000

5,504,000,000

1/9/09

Centrue Financial Corporation

MO

32,668,000

1,342,000,000

1/9/09

Codorus Valley Bancorp, Inc.

PA

16,500,000

650,000,000

1/9/09

Colony Bankcorp, Inc.

GA

28,000,000

1,215,000,000

1/9/09

Commerce National Bank

CA

5,000,000

639,000,000

1/9/09

Community Trust Financial Corporation

LA

24,000,000

945,000,000

1/9/09

Congaree Bancshares, Inc.

SC

3,285,000

131,000,000

1/9/09

Crescent Financial Corporation

NC

24,900,000

956,000,000

1/9/09

Eastern Virginia Bankshares, Inc.

VA

24,000,000

1,031,000,000

1/9/09

F.N.B. Corporation

PA

100,000,000

8,457,000,000

1/9/09

Farmers Capital Bank Corporation

KY

30,000,000

2,154,000,000

1/9/09

First Bancorp

NC

65,000,000

2,701,000,000

1/9/09

First Financial Service Corporation

KY

20,000,000

991,000,000

1/9/09

First Security Group, Inc.

TN

33,000,000

1,282,000,000

1/9/09

FirstMerit Corporation

OH

125,000,000

10,685,000,000

1/9/09

GrandSouth Bancorporation

SC

9,000,000

377,000,000

1/9/09

Independence Bank

RI

1,065,000

66,000,000

1/9/09

Independent Bank Corp.

MA

78,158,000

3,477,000,000

1/9/09

LCNB Corp.

OH

13,400,000

667,000,000

1/9/09

MidSouth Bancorp, Inc.

LA

20,000,000

917,000,000

1/9/09

Mission Community Bancorp

CA

5,116,000

219,000,000

1/9/09

New York Private Bank & Trust Corporation

NY

267,274,000

13,693,000,000

1/9/09

North Central Bancshares, Inc.

IA

10,200,000

475,000,000

Page 89

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Date

Bank

State

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

1/9/09

Peapack-Gladstone Financial Corporation

NJ

28,685,000

1,369,000,000

1/9/09

Redwood Financial Inc.

MN

2,995,000

141,000,000

1/9/09

Rising Sun Bancorp

MD

5,983,000

236,000,000

1/9/09

Security Business Bancorp

CA

5,803,000

215,000,000

1/9/09

Security California Bancorp

CA

6,815,000

238,000,000

1/9/09

Shore Bancshares, Inc.

MD

25,000,000

1,037,000,000

1/9/09

Sound Banking Company

NC

3,070,000

127,000,000

1/9/09

Sun Bancorp, Inc.

NJ

89,310,000

3,425,000,000

1/9/09

Surrey Bancorp

NC

2,000,000

206,000,000

1/9/09

Texas National Bancorporation

TX

3,981,000

166,000,000

1/9/09

The First Bancorp, Inc.

ME

25,000,000

1,311,000,000

1/9/09

The Queensborough Company

GA

12,000,000

848,000,000

1/9/09

Valley Community Bank

CA

5,500,000

211,000,000

14,771,598,000

2,031,235,000,000

Subtotal
1/16/2009

Bank of Commerce

NC

3,000,000

125,000,000

1/16/2009

Bar Harbor Bankshares/Bar Harbor Bank & Trust ME

18,751,000

942,000,000

1/16/2009

BNCCORP, Inc.

ND

20,093,000

838,000,000

1/16/2009

Carver Bancorp, Inc.

NY

18,980,000

791,000,000

1/16/2009

Centra Financial Holdings, Inc./Centra Bank, Inc. WV

15,000,000

1,204,000,000

1/16/2009

Citizens & Northern Corporation

PA

26,440,000

1,289,000,000

1/16/2009

Community 1st Bank

CA

2,550,000

97,000,000

1/16/2009

Community Bank of the Bay

CA

1,747,000

69,000,000

1/16/2009

Dickinson Financial Corporation II

MO

146,053,000

5,602,000,000

1/16/2009

ECB Bancorp, Inc./East Carolina Bank

NC

17,949,000

768,000,000

1/16/2009

First BanCorp

PR

400,000,000

19,304,000,000

1/16/2009

First Bankers Trustshares, Inc.

IL

10,000,000

489,000,000

1/16/2009

First Manitowoc Bancorp, Inc.

WI

12,000,000

768,000,000

1/16/2009

Home Bancshares, Inc.

AR

50,000,000

2,651,000,000

1/16/2009

Idaho Bancorp

ID

6,900,000

239,000,000

1/16/2009

MainSource Financial Group, Inc.

IN

57,000,000

2,867,000,000

1/16/2009

MetroCorp Bancshares, Inc.

TX

45,000,000

1,594,000,000

1/16/2009

Morrill Bancshares, Inc.

KS

13,000,000

660,000,000

1/16/2009

New Hampshire Thrift Bancshares, Inc.

NH

10,000,000

829,000,000

1/16/2009

OceanFirst Financial Corp.

NJ

38,263,000

1,876,000,000

1/16/2009

Old Second Bancorp, Inc.

IL

73,000,000

2,950,000,000

1/16/2009

Pacific Coast National Bancorp

CA

4,120,000

138,000,000

Page 90

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

Date

Bank

State

1/16/2009

Puget Sound Bank

WA

4,500,000

154,000,000

1/16/2009

Pulaski Financial Corp

MO

32,538,000

1,304,000,000

1/16/2009

Redwood Capital Bancorp

CA

3,800,000

147,000,000

1/16/2009

S&T Bancorp, Inc.

PA

108,676,000

4,461,000,000

1/16/2009

SCBT Financial Corporation

SC

64,779,000

2,767,000,000

1/16/2009

Somerset Hills Bancorp

NJ

7,414,000

287,000,000

1/16/2009

Southern Bancorp, Inc.

AR

11,000,000

586,000,000

1/16/2009

State Bankshares, Inc.

ND

50,000,000

1,969,000,000

1/16/2009

Syringa Bancorp

ID

8,000,000

293,000,000

1/16/2009

TCB Holding Company, Texas Community Bank

TX

11,730,000

432,000,000

1/16/2009

Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc.

TX

75,000,000

4,743,000,000

1/16/2009

The Baraboo Bancorporation

WI

20,749,000

781,000,000

1/16/2009

Treaty Oak Bancorp, Inc.

TX

3,268,000

122,000,000

1/16/2009

United Bancorp, Inc.

MI

20,600,000

815,000,000

1/16/2009

United Financial Banking Companies, Inc.

VA

5,658,000

227,000,000

1/16/2009

Washington Banking Company/ Whidbey Island
Bank

WA

26,380,000

912,000,000

1/16/2009

Yadkin Valley Financial Corporation

NC

36,000,000

1,469,000,000

1,479,938,000

67,559,000,000

111,000,000

4,410,000,000

3,500,000

174,000,000

Subtotal
1/23/2009

1st Source Corporation

IN

1/23/2009

AB&T Financial Corporation

NC

1/23/2009

Alarion Financial Services, Inc.

FL

6,514,000

254,000,000

1/23/2009

BankFirst Capital Corporation

MS

15,500,000

672,000,000

1/23/2009

California Oaks State Bank

CA

3,300,000

123,000,000

a

1/23/2009

Calvert Financial Corporation

MO

1,037,000

47,000,000

1/23/2009

CalWest Bancorp Ranchoa

CA

4,656,000

208,000,000

1/23/2009

Commonwealth Business Bank

CA

7,701,000

296,000,000

1/23/2009

Crosstown Holding Company

MN

10,650,000

N/A

1/23/2009

Farmers Bank

VA

8,752,000

345,000,000

1/23/2009

First Citizens Banc Corp.

OH

23,184,000

1,100,000,000

1/23/2009

First ULB Corp.

CA

4,900,000

247,000,000

LA

3,240,000

155,000,000

a

1/23/2009

FPB Financial Corp.

1/23/2009

Fresno First Bank

CA

1,968,000

96,000,000

1/23/2009

Liberty Bancshares, Inc.

AR

57,500,000

2,573,000,000

1/23/2009

Midland States Bancorp, Inc.

IL

10,189,000

409,000,000

a

1/23/2009

Moscow Bancshares, Inc.

TN

6,216,000

248,000,000

1/23/2009

Pierce County Bancorp

WA

6,800,000

272,000,000

Page 91

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix II: CPP Transactions as of
January 23, 2009

Date

Bank

State

Capital Purchase

Total assets as of
9/30/08

1/23/2009

Princeton National Bancorp, Inc.

IL

25,083,000

1,124,000,000

1/23/2009

Seaside National Bank & Trust

FL

5,677,000

243,000,000

1/23/2009

Southern Illinois Bancorp, Inc.

a

IL

5,000,000

233,000,000

1/23/2009

Stonebridge Financial Corp.

PA

10,973,000

493,000,000

1/23/2009

WSFS Financial Corporation

DE

52,625,000

3,255,000,000

385,965,000

16,977,000,000

$194,177,001,000

$14,792,795,000,000

Subtotal
Grand total

Sources: Treasury, SEC (10-Qs, 10-Ks), iBanknet.com (Call Reports) and company press releases.
a

Total assets were reported from the related bank rather than the banking holding company.

Page 92

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix III: Examples of Programs to
Preserve Homeownership

Appendix III: Examples of Programs to
Preserve Homeownership

Institution

Program or Effort

Selected Program Characteristics

IndyMac Loan
Modification
Programa

Eligible borrowers are those with loans owned or serviced by IndyMac Federal Bank
•
Affordable mortgage payment achieved for the seriously delinquent or in default
borrower through interest rate reduction, amortization term extension, and principal
forbearance
•
Payment must be no more than 38 percent of the borrower’s monthly gross income
•
Losses to investor minimized through a net present value test that confirms that the
modification will cost the investor less than foreclosure

FDIC Loss Sharing
Proposal

Proposal is designed to promote wider adoption of a systematic loan modification
program by paying servicers $1,000 to cover expenses for each loan modified according
to the required standards; and sharing up to 50 percent of losses incurred if a modified
loan should subsequently default again
•
Eligible borrowers need to have loans secured by owner-occupied properties
•
Government loss sharing would be available only after the borrower has made six
payments on the modified mortgage
•
Affordability standards are provided based on a 31 percent borrower mortgage
debt-to-income ratio
•
For loan-to-values (LTV) above 100 percent, the government loss share will be
progressively reduced from 50 percent to 20 percent as the current LTV rises. If the
LTV for the first lien exceeds 150 percent, no loss sharing would be provided.
•
The loss sharing guarantee ends 8 years after the modification

Hope for
Homeowners

Borrowers can refinance into an affordable loan insured by FHA
•
Eligible borrowers are homeowners who did not intentionally default, do not have an
ownership interest in other residential real estate, have not been convicted of fraud
in the last 10 years under federal and state law, and have not provided false
information to obtain the mortgage
•
Eligible borrowers are those who, as of March 2008, had total monthly mortgage
payments due of more than 31 percent of their gross monthly income
•
New insured mortgages cannot exceed 96.5 percent of the current LTV for
borrowers whose mortgage payments do not exceed 31 percent of their monthly
gross income and total household debt not to exceed 43 percent; alternatively, the
program allows for a 90 percent LTV for borrowers with debt-to-income ratios as
high as 38 (mortgage payment) and 50 percent (total household debt)
•
Requires lenders to write down the existing mortgage amounts to either of the two
LTV options mentioned above
•
Simplifying the process to remove subordinate liens by permitting up-front
payments to lien holders
•
Allowing lenders to extend mortgage terms from 30 to 40 years

FHASecure

FHASecure is a refinancing option that gives homeowners with non-FHA adjustable rate
mortgages (ARM), current or delinquent and regardless of reset status, the ability to
refinance into a FHA-insured mortgage
•
If the borrower is delinquent, the default must have been due to the payment shock
of an interest rate reset or, in the case of an option ARM, the recasting of the
mortgage to fully amortizing
•
Program ended December 31, 2008

Federal Government
Federal Deposit
Insurance
Corporation (FDIC)

Federal Housing
Administration (FHA)

Page 93

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix III: Examples of Programs to
Preserve Homeownership

Institution

Program or Effort

Selected Program Characteristics

Federal Housing
Finance Agency
(FHFA)

Streamlined Loan
Modification
Programb

Eligible borrowers are those who have missed three payments or more, own and occupy
their property as a primary residence, and are not in active bankruptcy
•
Servicers can modify existing loans into a Freddie Mae or Fannie Mac loan, or a
portfolio loan with a participating investor
•
An affordable mortgage payment, of no more than 38 percent of the borrower’s
monthly gross income, is achieved for the borrower through reducing the mortgage
interest rate, extending the life of the loan, or deferring payment on part of the
principal
•
The borrower will be required to remit the proposed affordable payment for a threepayment trial period prior to the modification of the mortgage, to demonstrate his or
her capacity and desire to sustain those payments under the modified mortgage

Foreclosure
prevention
assistance
programs

HOPE NOW is an alliance between Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) certified-counseling agents, servicers, investors, and other mortgage market
participants that provides free assistance for foreclosure prevention
•
Forms of assistance include hotline services to provide information on foreclosure
prevention, and access to HUD approved housing counselors for debt
management, credit, and overall foreclosure counseling. According to HOPE NOW,
the hotline receives an average of more than 8,000 calls per day
•
Coordinates a nationwide outreach campaign to at-risk borrowers and states that it
has sent nearly 3 million outreach letters
•
According to HOPE NOW, since March 2008, it has hosted workshops in 27 cities
involving homeowners, lenders, and HUD-certified counselors

Private Sector
HOPE NOW Alliance

Source: Publicly available information from agencies and organizations listed above.
a

On December 31, 2008, FDIC signed a letter of intent to sell the banking operations of IndyMac
Federal Bank to a thrift holding company controlled by IMB Management Holdings LP.

b

This program was created in consultation with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, HOPE NOW and its 27
servicer partners, the Department of the Treasury, FHA, and FHFA.

Page 94

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

Page 95

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

Page 96

GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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GAO-09-296 Troubled Asset Relief Program

Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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Appendix IV: Treasury’s Summary Response
to Prior Recommendations

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Appendix V: GAO Contacts and
Staff Acknowledgments

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff
Acknowledgments
GAO Contacts

Richard J. Hillman, (202) 512-8678
Thomas J. McCool, (202) 512-2642
Orice M. Williams, (202) 512-8678

Staff
Acknowledgments

In addition to the contacts named above; Susan Fleming, Jeanette Franzel,
Mathew Scire, and William Woods (Lead Directors); Cheryl Clark, Nikki
Clowers, Daniel Garcia-Diaz, Lawrence Evans, Jr., Kay Kuhlman, Kimberly
McGatlin, Harry Medina, Carol Dawn Petersen (Lead Assistant Directors);
and Alison Abrams, Marianne Anderson, Benjamin Bolitzer, Patrick
Breiding, Angela Burriesci, Mason Calhoun, Emily Chalmers, Clayton
Clark, Rachel DeMarcus, Matt Drerup, Abe Dymond, Gary Engel, Heather
Halliwell, Michael Hoffman, Joe Hunter, Elizabeth Jimenez, Casey
Keplinger, Christopher Klisch, Steven Koons, John Krump, J. Andrew
Long, Robert Lunsford, Sean Merrill, Susan Michal-Smith, Marc Molino,
Susan Offutt, LaSonya Roberts, Barbara Roesmann, Susan Sawtelle,
Jennifer Schwartz, Raymond Sendajas, John Treanor, Katherine Trimble,
Julie Trinder, James Vitarello and Charles Wilson, Jr.

(250430)

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