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Discussion of “Evaluating Monetary Policy
Operational Frameworks” by Ulrich Bindseil
Jackson Hole Symposium
Simon M. Potter
August 26, 2016
The views presented here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System

Figure 1 – Federal Reserve Balance Sheet
August 1, 2007
($ Billions)

Assets
Securities held outright

Liabilities
Federal Reserve notes
Reverse repurchase agreements
Reserve balances (incl. clearing balances)
Deposits, other than reserves
Other liabilities
Total liabilities
Capital
Total liabilities and capital

791

U.S. Treasury securities

791

Federal agency debt

0

Agency MBS

0

Repurchase agreements
Foreign currency denominated assets
Other assets
Total assets

25
21
34
871

777
32
17
5
6
837
34
871

August 3, 2016
($ Billions)

Assets
Securities held outright

4,226

U.S. Treasury securities

2,463

Federal agency debt

22

Agency MBS

1,741

Repurchase agreements
Foreign currency denominated assets
Other assets
Total assets
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release (H.4.1)
Notes: Balance sheet figures indicate Wednesday level.

0
21
220
4,467

Liabilities
Federal Reserve notes
Reverse repurchase agreements
Reserve balances
Deposits, other than reserves
Other liabilities
Total liabilities
Capital
Total liabilities and capital

1,419
311
2,403
286
8
4,427
40
4,467

1

Figure 2 – Federal Funds Target Range
Federal Funds Target Range

BPS
75

EFFR

IOER Rate

RRP Rate

50

25

0
08/15

09/15

10/15

11/15

12/15

01/16

02/16

03/16

04/16

05/16

06/16

07/16

08/16

Source: Bloomberg, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Notes: Light dashed vertical lines indicate month-ends, dark dashed lines indicate quarter-ends. Data source switches from brokered
federal funds data to FR 2420 data in March 2016.

2

Figure 3 – Lower Volatility in Federal Funds Trades
BPS
300

Spread Between the 75th and 25th Percentile Rate

250
200
150
100
50

0
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Magnified view (0-15 bps)

15
10
5
0
2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Notes: Figures represent federal funds rate spread between the volume-weighted 75th and 25th percentile. Data source switches
from brokered federal funds data to FR 2420 data in March 2016.

3

Figure 4 – Banking Sector Balance Sheet
Before

Scenario 1 - Bank A lends to Bank B
Bank A
Assets
Liabilities
Reserves
200 Deposits
200

Bank B
Assets
Reserves

Liabilities
80 Deposits

Total Assets
80

280

After

Bank B borrows $20m from Bank A to satisfy reserve requirement of $100m.
Assets
Liabilities
Reserves
180 Deposits
200
Loan Receivable 20

Assets
Reserves

Liabilities
100 Deposits
Loan Payable

(+20)

80
20

300

Total Reserves remained unchanged while Total Assets increased by $20m.

Before

Scenario 2 - A nonbank transfers deposits from Bank A to Bank B
Bank A
Assets
Reserves

Liabilities
200 Deposits
200

Assets
Reserves

Bank B
Liabilities
80 Deposits

Total Assets
80

280

Liabilities
100 Deposits
100

(+0)

After

A nonbank pulls $20m in deposits from Bank A and places them in account at Bank B.
Assets
Reserves

Liabilities
180 Deposits
180

Total Reserves and Total Assets remained unchanged.

Assets
Reserves

280

4

Figure 5 – Discount Window Stigma
Percent of Federal Funds Daily Volume Traded Above Discount Rate

Percent
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Notes: Data source switches from brokered federal funds data to FR 2420 data in March 2016.

2014

2015

2016

5

Figure 6 – Liquidity Provision and Regulation

“…managing liquidity risk is a core activity of banking, and it
seems unlikely that centralizing this subtle activity through liquidity
regulation can be done without efficiency costs. Therefore liquidity
regulation must not be overburdened, and central banks providing
some well-designed and rule based economic counterincentives to
an excessive reliance on the [lender of last resort] is an important
contribution to reduce the burden put on regulation.”
- Ulrich Bindseil (2016)

6

Figure 7 – Projected SOMA Domestic Securities Holdings
December 2014
December 2015
August 2016 (Reinvestment Policy Median)
August 2016 (Reinvestment Policy Mean)

$ Billion
4,500
4,000
3,500

3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500

Historical Values
0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Projections (rounded)

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

2024

2025

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York staff projections
Notes: As presented in the FRBNY’s Report on Domestic Open Market Operations for 2014 and 2015. August 2016 projections are
based on interest rate path assumptions drawn from market forward rates and expectations for changes in reinvestment policy drawn
from the FRBNY’s July 2016 Survey of Primary Dealers. For the mean reinvestment expectation, survey responses suggesting no
end to reinvestments were assigned the date at which staff project the size of the portfolio to normalize assuming normal currency
growth and no end in reinvestments.

7