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April 1987
Second Draft

Silas Keehn Remarks
Vanderbilt Univeristy
Bank Charters:

They Ain't What They Used to Be

In 1934, the largest and most prestigious investment banking
firm, J.P. Morgan & Company, caught Wall Street by surprise when it
decided to choose the commercial banking business over investment
banking.

As I am sure you are all aware, the Banking Act of 1933,

more commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act, forced banking firms
to choose between the securities underwriting business and commercial
banking.

Two-thirds chose to relinquish their bank charters in order

to remain in the securities business, but one notable exception was
J.P. Morgan.

Morgan believed that strong investment banking and

investment advisory backgrounds would provide Morgan with a
comparative advantage as a commercial bank that primarily served
major businesses, foreign governments, and wealthy individuals.

In

addition, in the early 1930s, the underwriting business was
relatively inactive, and an early return to greater activity did not
seem imminent.
Now, some 50 years later, banking organizations are being faced
with the same choice, although not because of a major new banking
bill in Washington, but instead because of market forces.
Ironically, or perhaps fittingly, one of the first banks to have
considered giving up its bank charter was Morgan Guaranty.

Among the

major U.S. banking firms, J.P. Morgan & Co. has one of the highest
returns on assets.

However, most of its profits do not come from its

main line of business, lending to blue-chip companies.
from Morgan's investment banking activities.


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They come

2

Why has this come to pass?

One reason is that blue chip

companies are much more sophisticated now than they were when Morgan
chose commercial over investment banking.

Now they can borrow more

cheaply by directly accessing the capital markets than by going to
......
their commercial bankers.
It's important to realize that this phenomena is only affecting a
specific segment of the banking industry.

The industry's share of

the market for credit to all nonfarm nonfinancial corporations has
grown more or less steadily.
about 24 percent of

i

I~'-

Set¾aml 1960 these firms obtained

their credit from commercial banks.

By 1985,

businesses were obtaining over 42 percent of their credit from
commercial banks.

Nonf arm nonfinancial business loans- at -banks as percent of credit market instruments

~

~-·

_

~

tf0

ipfo~

20

10

so

62

64

66

68

10

72

74

76

1e

80

82

84

86

1 oefined as the ratio of outstanding loans, commercial mortgages,
and multifamily mortages made by banks to nonfarm nonfinancial
corprations, divided by total credit market debt of nonfarm
nonfinancial corporations.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

3

If we narrow our focus to nonfinancial corporations we find that
banks' current market share is well above the 1960 level of 27
percent, and roughly equal to all time high of 36.8 percent, which
was reached in 1974.

These statistics suggest banks are not

generally becoming less competitive as suppliers of credit to
business.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Nonfinancial corporate business loans at
banks as percent of credit market instruments

20

10

60

62

54

66

6l!

70

72

74

76

78

80

82

84

86

4

However, investment grade borrowers have been steadily shifting away
from banks to the commercial paper market.

Since 1975, commercial

paper has grown over sevenfold while business lending by large banks
grew less than threefold.

Commercial paper vs. C&I loans at large banks
Billion S

2751
250

I

225
200
175
150
125
100

75
Commericot paper

15

~

~ •GIi,__
.

~


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

76

n

78

19

80

a,

82

-r

~ -....
/V~ ~ ~ , , r
~ ~-J

as

a,

es

~r

6

LcJJ

~

5

It seems that the largest banks have been particularly hard hit:

In

1975, they held about 67 percent of all bank commercial and
industrial loans, but in 1985, they held less than 51 percent.
Consequently, the outlook for traditional lending to investment grade
borrowers is bleak and Morgan, along with a few other large banking
firms, are toying with the idea of giving up their bank charters to
become investment banks.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

C&I loans at large banks as a percent
of total bank C&I loans

60

55

50~~~~-~-~
75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

5 I 1o

6

Regulation prior to 1970
Over the last 50 years, regulation has served to create an
artificial boundary between banking, other parts of the financial
services industry, and the economy at large.
not always been so sharp.

The delineation

has

Prior to 1927 trust companies and state

chartered banks were active in the securities business.

In 1927

commercial banks, trust companies and their affiliates underwrote 37
percent of

all new bond issues.

In 1927 underwriting became a

permissable activity for National banks.

By 1930 comercial banks and

their affiliates were underwriting 60 percent of all new bond issues.


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Early commercial banks and trust companies
•

1 927 - underwrote 37% of all new bond issues

•

1930 - underwrote 60% of all new bond issues

7

The role of commercial banks in the underwriting business only
came to an end in 1933 with the passage of the Glass Steagall Act.
Glass Steagall prohibited Federal Reserve members and their
affiliates from engaging in underwiting activities. Most states
followed suit.

The separation of banking from other financial and

nonfinancial activities is a more recent event.
passed the Bank Holding Company Act.

In 1956 Congress

Among other things the Act

prohibited multibank holding companies from engaging in any
nonfinancial activities and gave the Federal Reserve the power to
determine which financial activities are permissable for multibank
holding companies to pursue.

An early casualty of this law was the

Transamerica Corporation, then owner of numerous banks located across
the western third of the United States as well as a major insurance
firm.

While the Bank Holding Company Act applied to multibank

holding companies, one bank holding companies were still free to
engage in any other activities except investment banking.

--

In the

late 60s many banks began to take advantage of this legal oversight,
but it was not closed until 1970.


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Commercial banking legislation
•

1933 - Glass-Steagall Act

•

1956 - Bank Holding Company Act

•

1970 - Amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act

8

The effects of this regulatory structure on the organization of
the financial services industry can best be judged by examining three
important financial services firms -- Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and
Sears.

retailer, a retailer.

But each of these types of firms was beginning

to position itself to compete with each other in the "financial
services" industry.

In 1969, J.P. Morgan & Co., recognizing

competition from the commercial paper market for domestic loan
customers,
formed a bank holding company in order to broaden the
r-finance-related services that it was able to offer and made
substantial additions to its international faciltities.

In the early

1970s, Merrill Lynch was also concerned with plans to reorganize in
order to be ready for entry into other finance-related fields.
Unlike the other two firms, Sears did have a major presence in
several segments of the financial services industry--retail
installment credit, insurance and deposit taking--but it too was
preparing to expand further into financial services.


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Positioning of firms in the 1970s

•

J.P. Morgan

•

Merrill Lynch

•

Sears

9

New Developments 1970 to 1980
The 1970s witnessed several major developments.

The first was

the increasing international orientation of the large money center
s ep in this process, the creation of the Eurodollar
market, actually began in the 1960s, but this market grew most
I

rapidly in the 1970s.
Major developments in the 1970s
•

International orientation

•

Overseas investment banking

•

Competition for deposit services

•

Deregulation of securities industry

Several factors were responsible for this growth including the
imposition of Regulation Q ceilings on large certificates of deposit,
the attempt to limit capital outflows from U.S. banks, and the more
favorable treatment of foreign deposits when calculating reserve
requirements.

In 1970. /, overseas deposits of U.S. banks accounted for

about 8 percent of total deposits at U.S. banks.

By 1980. deposits at

overseas branches of U.S. banks accounted for about one quarter of
all deposits at U.S. banks, while for the nine largest U.S. banks
they accounted for a little more than half of deposits.


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Eurodollar market
•

Regulation Q ceilings

•

Limitations on capital outflows

•

Favorable treatment of foreign deposits

10
At the same time American banks began to lay the groundwork to
enter the field of investment banking overseas.
only applied

Since Glass Steagall

to the underwriting of securities within the United

States, the large money center banks began to set up merchant banking
subsidiaries in London, where the underwriting activities of banks
were less tightly restricted.

By 1980 most money center banks had a

significant merchant banking presence in the London markets and were
competing head to head with the major investment banking firms.


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Major developments in the 1970s
•

International orientation

•

Overseas investment banking

•

Competition for deposit services

•

Deregulation of securities industry

11
In the U.S., commercial banks found themselves competing with
brokerage firms and investment banks in the market for deposit
services.

The combination of high rates and regulations restricting

the payment of interest on demand deposits created a demand for an
alternative to bank deposits.
money market mutual funds.

In response~ securities firms created

The money market funds gave securities

firms a way to obtain many of the services provided by bank deposits
while avoiding a regulatory structure that created substantial costs
for bank customers.

By the beginning of 1980, MMMFs acj ounted for a
little over 5.5 percent of transactions balances. 2

· ~

~

~

~

':t ()&.-4/}((if~

,; l<fv •J'
~,f-

~-(4,1_,Z£_

Major developments in the 1970s

•

International orientation

•

Overseas investment banking

•

Compeutton for deposit services

•

Deregu lation of securities industry

2 This includes currency held by the public, demand deposits, other
checkable deposits, savings deposits, overnight repurchase
agreements, and MMMF balances.


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12

Another important development of the 1970s was the deregulation
of the investment banking industry.

Prior to 1975_ stock exchanges
.I

were permitted to set the fees brokers could charge for executing
trades.

This sheltered inefficient brokers and reduced competition.

With the end of rate fixing, less efficient brokers were forced into
merger or bankruptcy while highly efficient brokers experienced rapid
growth.

This shakeout created a securities industry that was better

suited for competing with commercial banks.


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Major deveJopments in the 1970s

•

International orientation

•

Overseas investment banking

•

Competition for deposit services

•

Deregulation of securities industry

Deregulation of securities industry

•

Eliminated inefficient brokers

•

Increased competition

•

Created a more competitive securities industry

13

By 1980, a number of firms were attempting to build a presence
across a wide array of financial services.

On the heels of

deregulation of the brokerage industry came the entry of a major
insurance company, a travel services firm, a retailer, and a money
center bank into the brokerage business.

In 1981, Prudential

acquired Bache; American Express acquired Shearson; Sears acquired
Dean Witter; and BankAmerica announced plans to acquire Charles
Schwab.

At the same time, Merrill Lynch was making headway into the

banking industry;

its cash management account boasted of over half a

million accounts.

The lines of commerce that separated the various

types of financial services providers were fading fast.


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~ ~.

Acquisitions in the early 1980s
•

Prudential acquires Bache

•

American Express acquires Shearson

•

Sears acquires Dean Witter

•

BankAmerica acquires Schwab

Developments in the 80s
The system of bank regulation in place at the beginning of 1980
differed only slightly from the system that was created in 1933.

-----

However, the last seven years have witnessed some dramatic changes.
Some of these changes have been the result of legislation. Other
changes have arisen as a result of reinterpretations of existing
laws.

Legislative changes included the six-year phase out of

Regulation Q beginning in 1980, the reduction in reserve requirements
for commercial banks, the granting of bank powers to the nation's
thrift industry, and the elimination of regulations prohibiting
thrift institutions from engaging in securities, insurance and real
estate brokerage activities.

Several important changes in the

interpretation of existing regulations also occurred.

As a result of

actions by the Federal Reserve, bank holding companies gained many
new powers.

Among them, the right to act as discount brokers,

investment advisors, futures commissions merchants, and Bankers Trust
decision.

However, banks also found themselves facing increasingly

stringent capital requirements.


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Deregulation of the 1980s
•

Phase-out of Regulation Q

•

Reduction in reserve requirements

•

Expanded powers of thrifts

•

Bank holding compan ies gain new powers

-------------

15
Investment banks also benefitted from the reinterpretation of
existing banking legislation.

As a result of litigation it became

possible for firms outside of banking to enter the industry by
acquiring a bank which did not accept demand deposits and make
commercial loans ~

Many investment banking firms, including Merrill

Lynch, availed themselves of this opportunity.

The MMMFs managed by

investment banks also made important inroads into banking.

Despite

the lifting of regulation Q, MMMFs share of total transactions
balances doubled between 1980 and 1987
percent.
_____...

ercent to over 10

Investment banks also found themselves competing head on

with commercial banks in the provision of customized products for
managing interest rate and exchange rate risk.

The most important of

these are interest rate swaps.

In 1987, an insurance company is no longer just an insurance
company; a securities firm is no longer just a securities firm; and a
retailer is no longer just a retailer.

Prudential, for example, is

now fully entrenched in the securities business and is planning to
expand into real estate brokerage.

Merrill Lynch, as well as other

securities firms, competes with banks in deposit taking through
mutual funds and some securities firms even own banks due to the
"nonbank bank" loophole.

Sears is very close to providing one-stop

shopping; it offers securities and real estate brokerage services as
well as insurance, deposit services, and retail credit at its many
retail outlets throughout the country.

These firms and many

others--General Motors Ford, Westinghouse, General Electric,


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16
etc.--compete with commercial banks in banks' traditional areas of
lending and deposit taking.

The lines that separate commercial banks

from other lines of commerce have faded, and commercial banks are
beginning to look elsewhere for profits.
three areas:

off-balance-sheet guarantees, investment banking, and

hedging products.


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Banks have concentrated on

►Also
Banks
see
Financial services
Investment firms
Stock brokers
Insurance companies
Credit unions
Savings & loans
Retailers

17
The decline of traditional banking
Despite serious restrictions, nontraditional activities are
already a major source of profits for banks.

A large part of

noninterest income at banks is a result of their investment banking
activities.

Fee income (excluding capital gains from trading

accounts) as a percent of total operating income for bank holding
companies with assets over $1 billion increased steadily from 1981 to
1984.

For these organizations, noninterest income's share of total

income has increased by over 30 percent.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Noninterest income as a percent of
total income at large banks
Pere~)

,J

'0.1

I

i

19 8J

19 84

18
Commercial banks already play an important, though sharply
restricted, role in the the domestic market for investment banking
services.

They underwrite state and municipal securities, manage

investment funds through trust accounts, act as advisers in mergers
and acquisitions, and privately place securities.

The top ten

commercial banks that acted as advisers in mergers and acquisitions
in 1985 were involved in over 100 deals valued at $6 billion.

The

top 10 banks in public financing underwrote over 2,000 issues of
tax-exempt securities in 1985, valued at $22.5 billion.

In private

placements, the top 10 banks managed over 700 issues valued at $11

billion, an@rcent market share.

Investment banking activities of 10 largest
U.S. banks

Value

Number of Deals

($ billions)

5.94

115

Tax-exempt bonds

22.50

2.471

Private placements

13.16

713

Mergers & Acquisitions


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

19

outside the United States, commercial banks compete directly with
investment banks in several types of activities, including
underwriting Eurobonds, Eurocommercial paper and equity issues.

Nine

of the top ten bank holding companies underwrite Eurobonds; they
managed over 140 issues valued at $15 billion (an 11 percent market
share).

Each of the top ten bank holding companies underwrite

Eurocommercial paper, and seven of the top ten underwrite
international equity issues.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Investment banking activities of
U.S. banks overseas
Eurocommercial
Eurobonds

II

~

Citicorp

X

X

BankAmerica
Chase Manhattan

X

X

X

X

Manufacturers Hanover

X

J . P. Morgan & Co.

International
Equities
X
X
X

X

X
X

Chemical NY Corp.

X

X

Security Pacific Corp.

X

X

Bankers Trust Co.

X

X

X

X
X
X

9

10

7

First Interstate Bancorp.
First Chicago

X

X
X

20

Commercial banks are also becoming more like investment bankers
by increasing their sale of loans.

Rather than booking loans, they

are essentially underwriting them by extending credit and temporarily
warehousing loans before selling them to third-party investors.

Loan

sales represent an unbundling of traditional bank lending services.
The selling bank originates and services the loan, but an investor
funds the loan and assumes the credit, liquidity and interest-rate
risk in exchange for a portion of the principle and interest paid to
the bank under the loan agreement.

Loan sales, therefore, allow a

bank to operate more like an investment bank than a traditional
commercial bank.
Selling loans is not a new activity for commercial banks.
Commercial loan participations and overlines are quite common, but
there is some evidence that commercial and industrial loan sales are
increasing in volume and importance.

From 1983 to 1985, the amount

of C&I loans sold, excluding overlines and syndications, jumped
nearly sevenfold to roughly $35 billion.


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Loan sales

•

Unbundling

•

Originating ;c, servicing loans

•

Funding loans

21

Sales of securitized loans are also picking up.

Securitization

is the pooling and repackaging of loans into securities, which are
then sold to investors.

While securitization contracts can become

quite detailed, the basic idea is simple.
originates a number of loans.
coled together.

A financial intermediary

The cash flow of these loans are then

Claims to these cash flows are then sold to a thir~

party, either by actually selling the loans or by issuing a liabilit
with payments that are tied to the pool's cash flow.
Like whole loan sales and participations, securitization provides
an additional funding source and eliminates assets from a bank's
balance sheet.

Unlike whole loan sales and participations,

securitization is often used to market small loans that would be
difficult to sell on a stand-alone basis.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Turning mortgages into securities

-··- -

□

□ no □ □ 1

Financial institutions make
mart a e loans

Mortgages are bundled
and sold as securities

-~ ill

J
J

r

22

There are three basic types of loan-backed securities, each of
which developed out of the secondary mortgage market.
is the pass-through security.

The first type

It represents direct ownership in a

portfolio of loans that are similar in term to maturity, interest
rate, and quality.

The portfolio is placed in trust, and

certificates of ownership are sold to investors.

The loan originator

services the portfolio and collects interest and principal, passing
them on, less a servicing fee, to investors.

Ownership of the loans

in the portfolio lies with the investors; thus, pass-throughs are not
debt obligations of the originator and do not appear on the
originator's financial statement.

Major types of loan-backed securities
•

Pass-throughs

•

Mo, tgage backed

•

Pay-throughs

The second type of loan-backed security, the collateralized
security, related to mortgage-backed bonds.

Like pass-throughs,

collateralized securities are backed by a portfolio of loans, but
unlike pass-throughs, collateralized securities are debt obligations
of the issuer, so the portfolio of loans used as collateral remain on


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

23

the issuer's books as assets and the collateralized securities are
reported as liabilities of the issuer.

The cash flows from the

collateral are not dedicated to the payment of principal and interest
on the securities.
The third type of loan-backed security is the pay-through
security.

This security combines some of the features of the

pass-through with some from the collateralized bond.

The pay-through

is collateralized by a portfolio of loans and appears on the issuer's
financial statements as debt.

The cash flows from the portfolio,

however, are dedicated to servicing the bonds in a way similar to
that of pass-throughs.
These instruments were first used w i y i ~ e s .

The market in

shroomed from ~ l i o n industry in
1981 into

• dustry in 1985, based on trading volume.

currently, about 31 percent of all residential mortgages outstanding
are held in the form of securities.
securitized.

In 1980, only 13 percent were

While S&Ls and the federal mortgage agencies are the

biggest players, banking firms are also active in mortgage banking.
And some of the nation's largest banks are trying to move into the
business of underwriting mortgage securities.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Federal agency pass-throughs as a
percent of residential mortgages
Percent
J5

JO

25

10

eo

e,

82

64

24

In the last year or so, the market for other "securitized"
consumer loans has also been expanding.

Packages of auto loans and

credit card receivables are increasingly being sold to third-party
investors.

In 1985, only $1 billion in auto loans were securitized.

In 1986 $10 billion were sold under this method.

Salomon Brothers

estimates that $15 billion in auto loan-backed securities will be
issued this year.

Last year, an estimated $50 million in credit card

receivables were securitized; this figure is expected to double by
the end of this year.

Several banking firms have set up separate

subsidiaries to securitize such assets.
privately place securitized assets.

Morgan Guaranty has begun to

And the top U.S. banks are vying

for the job of adviser in selling government loans.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Securitized consumer credit

t ,s-f~

. ~,•

Auto loans

15

10

Crltdit
cord
loa ns

~

198 5

0

1986

198 7 . projK le>d

25

Off-balance sheet activities
Commercial banks are also supporting their customers in the
capital markets through off-balance-sheet activities.

Most

off-balance-sheet items can be classified into three categories:
Trade-related, credit-related, and hedging-related.
Trade-related OBS activities
Commercial letters of credit (CLC) are the most common
trade-related off-balance-sheet item.

Used mostly to facilitate

foreign trade, CLCs are essentially payment guarantees. A CLC
guarantees the seller payment by the issuing bank when certain
documents specified in the letter of credit are presented to the bank
in accordance with the terms of the CLC.

CLCs, in effect, substitute

the creditworthiness of the issuer, usually a bank, for that of the
buyer or importer.

Since the creditworthiness of the bank is,

generally, better known than that of the importer, trade is
facilitated.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Commercial letter of credit

1a . lrnoort er orders qooda

i---2-_ !::x_oon
_.,,_,n,_o•g
_OOd
_ s ,_o ,m
_ oort_.,.
__

.l. E:xoorter sends

dratt and cocuments

4. Bonlic occ eols drof tI and pays
iucporter face valu e ,... diK:ount

lnlportar

5. Bonlt forwonla
docum.,, t1

6. Importer pays bOnlt

26

CLCs are issued at the request of the buyer (importer) by his
bank.

The beneficiary of the CLC is the seller (exporter).

An

importer orders goods and then has his bank issue a CLC naming the
exporter as beneficiary.

The exporter ships the goods to the

importer and sends draft and documents to the issuing bank.

A

bankers acceptance is created when a time draft is presented to the
bank by the exporter and the bank stamps it "accepted."

Usually, the

accepting bank discounts the draft and pays the exporter in cash.
The bank then either holds the acceptance in its portfolio as it
would a loan or sells it in the secondary market.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

27

Credit-related OBS activities
Credit-related off-balance-sheet items include loan commitments,
standby letters of credit, note issuance faciltities, and asset sales
with recourse.

Each of these serve as a substitute for traditional

bank lending.
Loan commitments are perhaps the most common off-balance-sheet
items.

A loan commitment is a lender's promise to make a loan up to

some maximum amount for a certain period of time at agreed-upon
terms.

In exchange for this promise, the lender receives a fee or

compensating balances.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Credit-related OBS activities
•

Loan commitments

•

Standby letters of credit

•

Note issuance facilities

•

Asset sales with recourse

28

Standby letters of credit {SLCs) are similar to commercial
letters of credit, although there are a few key differences.

The

most important difference is that standbys often expire unused.
guarantee either financing or performance.

SLCs

For example, they have

traditionally guaranteed municipal bonds and commercial paper, and
they often guarantee performance on construction contracts.

As long

as the party who obtains a SLC fullfills his financial or contractual
obligation specified in the SLC, the SLC expires unused.
Like commercial letters of credit, standby letters of credit
involve three parties--the account party, the issuer, and the
beneficiary.

The account party, such as an issuer of commercial

paper or municipal bonds, obtains a SLC from a bank, the issuer,
naming the third party, such as a creditor, beneficiary.

The SLC is

payable upon presentation of evidence of default or nonperformance by
the account party.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The bank is legally bound to pay the beneficiary

Credit-related OBS activities

•

Loan commitments

•

Standby leners of credit

•

Note issuance facilities

•

Asset sales with recourse

Standby letter of credit

l!lanll:
{Issues
SLOC J

29

if the account party defaults or does not perform according to some
contract whether or not the bank knows that the account party is
unable to repay the bank.

In other words, a SLC is irrevocable.

Note issuance facilities.

While there are many variations on

note issuance facilities, a NIF, in general, is a medium-term
arrangement between a borrower and an underwriter or a group of
underwriters.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Credit-related OBS activities
•

Loan commitments

•

Standby letters of credit

•

Note issuance facilities

•

Asset sales with recourse

30
Under this arrangement the borrower can issue short-term paper,
known as Euronotes, usually with maturities of three or six months,
over a period of usually five to seven years.

These notes are

usually in denominations of $500,000 or more.

For a fee, the

underwriter commits to either purchase the notes or provide standby
credit.

Often the underwriter then places the notes with investors

at a price higher than he paid for them.

For example, according to

one scenario, a group of managing banks fully underwrite the issue,
purchasing it at a discount.

The notes then are either held by the

managing banks or sold to investors.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Note issuance facilities
•

Medium-term arrangement between borrower and underwriter

•

Borrower issues short-term paper

•

Underwriter commits to purchase notes or provide standby credit

•

Underwriter keeps notes or places them with investors

31

Asset sales with recourse involve the sale of assets, usually
loans, from a firm's balance sheet with some type of guarantee or put
option.

While commercial loans are typically sold without any

explicit guarantees, banks sometimes guarantee portfolios of consumer
loans sold to investors, since it is difficult for individual
investors to evaluate the quality of these loans.

This practice has

become less common in recent years since bank regulators began
requiring banks to treat these guarantees as loans when calculating
the bank's capital requirement.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Credit-related OBS activities
•

Loan commitments

•

Standby letters of credit

•

Note issuance facilities

•

Asset sales with recourse

32

Hedging-related OBS activities
Investment-related off-balance sheet items include options,
futures and forward contracts, and swaps.
An option is the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell
securities or commodities at a specified price on or before a certain
date in the future.

A "put" option is the right to sell; a "call"

option is the right to bl;!Y.
Futures and forward contracts are agreements to buy or sell
securities or commodities at an agreed-upon price on a specified date
in the future.

The primary differences between forward contracts and

futures are that futures are traded on organized exchanges, have
standard terms, and generally require margin.
A swap is a transaction in which two parties, known as
counterparties, agree to exchange cash flows over a period of time.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Hedging-related OBS activities
•

Options

•

Futures and forward contracts

•

Swaps

33

There are two basic types of swaps:
rate swaps.

currency swaps and interest

In a currency swap, two counterparties agree to exchange

specific amounts of two different currencies at the outset and repay
the amounts over time according to a predetermined rule which
reflects interest payments and amortization.

Sometimes, however, no

exchange of currency takes place initially or at maturity.

In an

interest rate swap, no principal is ever exchanged, but interest
payments of differing character (e.g., floating rate and fixed rate)
are exchanged according to a predetermined rule and based on an
underlying notional amount.
Intermediaries are often involved in swaps.

Originally,

intermediaries merely brought the two counterparties together.

But

as the number and types of end-users increased, they became reluctant
to assume the credit risks associated with purely brokered swaps.
Consequently, large commercial banks and investment banks
intermediated by entering into two offsetting swaps.
high credit ratings often bypass such intermediation.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Example of interest rate swap

End-users with

34

Trends in OBS activities
Off-balance-sheet banking appears to be widespread, and becoming
more so, yet banks with more than $25 billion in assets commanded 70
percent of the OBS market over the 1983-85 period.

The average ratio

of all off-balance-sheet items to assets for the dozen largest banks
was 147 percent.

In 1985, the ratio of commercial loans to assets

for these banks remained about the same as the ratio for 1978; while,
during this period, the ratio of standby letters of credit to assets
and the ratio of loan commitments to assets increased 11 and 13
percentage points, respectively.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

C&I loans, standby letters of credit and
loan commitments at money center banks
? erc enl ol os~•~i

:1
!01

I
251

20

10

::~ 1,,'lns

:.!ti loon -:o .,,m,rments

SLOCs

35
Although the lion's share of off-balance-sheet banking belongs to
the largest institutions, the number of banks that engage in
off-balance-sheet activities has been increasing, so that in 1985, 75
percent of all banks participated in off-balance-sheet activities.
Banks with $5 to 25 billion in assets, the so-called "Super
Regionals", increased their share of the overall market by more than
4 percentage points between 1983 and 1985, largely at the expense of
the money centers. The Super Regionals' increased share of the OBS
pie is due to an increased share in a broad range of activities.
Participation in off-balance-sheet banking among smaller banks
has grown steadily.

The number of banks with assets under $500

million that engage in off-balance-sheet banking grew by more than
600 banks from 1983 to 1985, with over 10,000 banks in this size
class participating in at least one OBS activity.

Nevertheless,

overall OBS activity has grown much faster than activity at small
banks.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Share of the OBS market by bank size, 1985

36
Trade-related off-balance-sheet activities have become less
important for banks in every size category.

Except at the money

centers, hedging activities have become more important and financial
guarantees have become more important.

Financial guarantees include

loan commitments, standby letters of credit (SLCs), and
participations in SLCs.

The increase in financial guarantees is due

to increases in loan commitments as a percent of OBS items, whereas
SLCs as a percent of OBS items have declined.
The reverse trend for investment-related and finance-related
activities occurs for the money centers, which are more heavily
concentrated in off-balance-sheet investment-related or hedging
items.

Much of the increase in hedging activities for the money

centers is due to the rise in commitments to purchase foreign
currency and U.S. dollar exchange, which make up more than 85 percent
of their hedging activites.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Types of OBS activity by bank size, 1985
Pen:ent shore

:001

5 - 5$B

901
I

eo 1

, S!B

70
60

40

JO

20

L---

Trade -----1

_

:-;"onc e ----'

37

Why are traditional banking activities becoming less important?
Why are some commercial banks moving away from traditional
banking activities?

Some fingers have been pointing to regulation.

Those doing the pointing argue that banks have a comparative
advantage in originating loans, but a disadvanatage in warehousing
them--keeping them on their books.

This disadvantage stems from the

"regulatory taxes" that banks must pay in the form of federal deposit
insurance premiums, foregone interest from holding required reserves,
and mandatory capital requirements that exceed those that would be
maintained in the absence of regulation.

By underwriting securities

or issuing off-balance-sheet guarantees, banks can still offer
financing services to their customers, and they can also avoid
"regulatory taxes."
Avoidance of regulatory taxes is not new.

In the 1970s, the

Fereral Reserve System found its membership shrinking as banks sought
to escape the competitive disadvantages created by the combination of
burdensome reserve requirements and high interest rates.

By 1980 the

cost of funding a riskless domestic loan through a commercial bank
was 61 basis points higher than funding it through the commercial
paper market. 3

More and more banks were finding Fed membership

unattractive.
Congress' response to the membership problem was to pass the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
which drastically lowered reserve requirements and required all
financial institutions to hold reserves with the Fed.

Banks should

3 see the attached table for a summary of changes in the regulatory
taxes over time.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

38

have found themselves in a stronger position vis a vis
nondepository-based financial intermediaries.

As a result, having a

banking charter should have become more attractive.

But if this is

the case why are several large institutions publicly discussing the
merits of giving up their bank charters?
One possible reason is that total regulatory taxes have increased
even though the reserve requirement tax has decreased.

Aside from

reserve requirements, there are two other components to the
regulatory tax, requirements to hold equity capital and requirements
to pay a deposit insurance premium that does not vary with bank
risk.

Against these costs, banks must balance the benefits from a

bank charter--federal deposit insurance and access to the discount

--..--------:----:-window.
These two advantages,
especially deposit insurance, allow a
bank to attract deposits at a lower rate than would otherwise be
possible given the risks that it is taking.

However, for low-risk

assets, this lower rate may not be sufficiently low to compensate the
bank for the regulatory taxes.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

39

Reserve requirements generate a tax by forcing banks to hold
noninterest-bearing balances with the Federal Reserve.

At one money

center bank, required reserves as a percent of total domestic assets
fell by approximately 50 percent between 1980 and 1986.

Holding

interest rates constant at their 1980 level the reserve requirement
tax would have fallen from 44 basis points to 22 basis points.
However, during the same period the average rate on Fed funds fell
from 12 percent to less than 6 percent.

This reduced the funding

disadvantage created by reserve requirements to 11 basis points
today.


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Composition of regulatory taxes
on domestic loans 1980-1985
Burden of
reserve
requirements

~-

Burden of
depas1t insurance
premiums

Burden of
capital
requirements

- - - - - - - - • b•sispoints • ~ • • •

To111I

•0

1980

44

13

61

1985 holding tax structure
and interest rates consunt
at the 1980 level■

22

21

51

1985 holding i n t - rate■
constant at the 1980 level■

22

1s·

45

1985 actual

11

1985 assuming 1987
tax structure

11

..

28
20

39

40

When funding a riskless asset, deposit insurance premiums
While the FDIC had always levied a fee of a basis

represent a tax.

points per dollar of domestic deposits, it traditionally rebated up
to half the charge at the end of the year.

Under financial pressure

due to a mounting number of failing banks, this practice was
terminated in 1985.

The net result, a 4 basis point increase in the

regulatory tax.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Composition of regulatory taxes
on domestic loans 1980-1985

rewrve

Burden of
dePOsrt insurance

Suroen of
capnal

~

Suroen of

premiums

~

( • • • • - - • - - - • - ••• • • bHl6

1980

~

pamts • • • • • • • • • • - • • - • )

44

13

61

1985 holding tax Structure

and interest rates constant

22

21

51

1985 hola,ng 1nt-1 ratN
consuint at the 1980 1...,.1,

22

15•

45

1985 actual

11

at tne 1980 1.-1

26

1 985 assuming 1987
tilll 5U\Jcture

11

20

39

41

The burden created by capital requirements arises because
payments to debt holders are not treated as corporate income for tax
purposes.

If banks are forced to raise their equity-to-debt ratios,

then their cost of funds will rise by the amount of the additional
taxes paid.

Between 1980 and 1986 bank equity capital ratios have

risen from 3.6 percent of assets to 4.8 percent of assets.

If banks'

ability to shelter income had remained unchanged, the funding
disadvantage generated by the reliance on equity capital would have
risen from 13 basis points per dollar of assets to 21 basis points.
However, taking changes in market rates, rates on tax exempt
securities, and changes in the taxation of banks into account, the
burden of bank capital requirements in 1985 was about 7 basis points
in 1985.

Unfortunately, the 1986 tax act dramatically alters the

ability of banks to shelter income, making it likely that the burden
of capital requirements will take a sharp jump -- to perhaps 20 basis
points.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Composition of regulatory taxes
on domestic loans 1980-1985
Buroen of
f90u w- n

f · .. . ...... .
1980

1985 holdin<J taa structu,e
at tfle

1980 ,_

c _ , at the 1 tl0

1985 actual

13

81

22

•

21

51

22

8

15•

45

r.CN

-

Su,den of
apnal

premiums
~
Toial
.... . . ~poinu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·)

•

"

and interest rat• conaant

1985 hol01ng i n t -

8un1en of

/

11

26

1 985 assuming 1987
tax lill'Ueture

11

0

39

42

Taking all these factors into account, one concludes that between
1980 and 1985 regulatory taxes for funding a riskless asset have
fallen from 61 basis points to 26 basis points.

Composition of regulatory taxes
on domestic loans 1980-1985
Burden of
reou1rements

Buroen of

Burden of

deoo111 insurance

capital

premiums

rec,u11ement1

~ . - •••• - • • • buupomu • ~ • • •

1980

Total

·0

u

13

81

1985 holding 1u structure

ancs interest rares constant

22

21

51

1985 holding 1n1entSt rat"
consc.ant II u,e 1980 ,.,,..,

22

15•

45

1985 .ctual

11

at UM I 980 level•

1985 assuming 1987
t aa scn.icture


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

11

28

20

39

43

However, this may not have significantly improved the competitive
position of banks.

Over half the decline in the regulatory tax has

been the result of changes in the level of rates, not changes in
regulation.

If interest rates had remained at their 1980 levels,

regulatory taxes would have only fallen by 10 basis points.
would still have been at a 51 basis point disadvantage.

Banking

Second,

there have been dramatic changes in the composition of the regulatory
tax.

In 1980 reseve requirements generated over 70 per cent of the

tax.

Reserve requirements could be avoided, in part, by reducing

reliance on reservable funds--either by shifting lending activity
into overseas branches of the bank or by shifting from deposits to
nondeposit sources of funds.

In 1985 reserve requirements only

account for about 40 percent of the tax.

After the new tax bill is

phased in, equity capital requirements could be responsiable for as
much as 50 percent of the regulatory burden.

The burden created by

equity capital requirements cannot be reduced by changing the
composition of liabilities.

It can only be neutralized by reducing

warehousing activities.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

The changing composition of
regulatory taxes
Burden of
reserve

deposit insurance

~

premiums

Burden of

Burden of
capnal
~

( • • • • • • • · • · • • • · •• pMC8nt•• · • • · · · · · • · )

1980

72

19B5 holding tax structure
and interest rat• constant
at the 1980 lewis

21

43

HI

41

1985 holding interest rates
constant at the 1980 levels

49

17

33

1985 actual

42

31

27

1985 assuming 1987
tax structure

28

20

51

44

While regulatory taxes have decline, most of the
rates, not changes in
remains large relative to bank prof

ing banks have
of even 26 basis points. Thus the
-

.,......,--~~-·- - -ial services without using the banking system.

away from traditional activities


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

45

Not just regulation
There is considerable variation in bank's reliance on
off-balance-sheet activities.

If the regulatory tax argument is

correct then the higher a bank's regulatory taxes, the more it should
rely on off-balance-sheet activities.

Our study of guarantee

products--loan commitments, standby letters of credit, and commercial
letters of credit indicates that banks with higher regulatory taxes
are more likely to issue these guarantees.

However, bank soundness

is an even more important factor. The reason is simple, these
guarantees are more valuable the greater the probability that the
issuer will remain solvent.

Factors in issuance of guarantees


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

•

High regulatory taxes

•

Bank soundness

46

We have also tried to identify why banks engage in loan sales.
We found that banks with greater regulatory taxes sold more loans.
However, regulatory taxes are not the sole force driving loan sales,
nor are they the strongest.

A bank's comparative advantage in

originating and servicing loans, as measured by the ratio of
noninterest expense to loans, has a large impact on a bank's
probability of selling loans, and it has the largest impact in
determining the amount of loans that a bank will sell.

We also found

that banks with poorly diversified asset portfolios were more likely
to find loan sales to be an attractive alternative.
Among the regulatory taxes, the most important determinants of
loan sales seem to be capital requirements and deposit insurance
premiums.

Reserve requirements have a smaller impact.

In the case

of off-balance-sheet guarantees, capital requirements and deposit
insurance premiums have the strongest impact on a bank's decision to
offer standby letters of credit, but reserve requirements are the
only significant regulatory tax for commercial letters of credit and
loan commitments.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Factors in loan sales/'
•

Originatin~and servicing loans

•

Diversification

•

Regulatory taxes

47

The desire to avoid regulatory taxes, to reduce risk and to
benefit from unique cost advantages are all important factors in
explaining why some commercial banks' desire to function as
investment banks.
role

However, other factors must also be playing a

since nonbank financial firms are also increasing their

reliance on off balance sheet activities.

General Motors Acceptance

Corporation, the largest auto lender in the United States, has been
the largest issuer of CARs (Collateralized Automobile Receivables).
Ford's and Chrysler's captive finance companies have also sold issues
of CARs.

And several computer companies have sold debt

collateralized by computer leases.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Nonbank financial firms and OBS activities
•

GM , Ford, and Chrysler

•

Computer companies

•

Property and casualty insurers

48

Property and casualty insurers guarantee such things as commercial
paper, municipal bond issues and lease contracts as well as
securitized loan sales.

Since 1980, property and casualty insurers

have increased premiums written on financial guarantees nearly
threefold to $2.3 billion.

That is 1.6 percent of net property and

casualty premiums written, compared to just under 1 percent in 1980.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Financial guarantees by property / casualty insurers
l,l; lhona $

3000

o~ - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - -

Ratio

Ratio

1•

15

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

8•

85

49

Several factors account for this rush to adopt new ways of doing
business.

Macroeconomic forces, such as increased interest rate

volatility and inflation, have encouraged the development of many
financial innovations that allow investors to hedge existing
financial positions.

Trading of financial futures contracts has

increased twendivefold since 1977, and financial futures now accoun

"

for about 40 percent of all futures contracts traded, compared to 2
ercent in 1977.
been dramatic.

Growth in options on financial instruments has also
In 1979, 3.6 million contracts were traded on the

CBOT, and in 1984, nearly 41 million were traded.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Futures and options contracts on
financial instruments
~1illions

,;o

j

I
50

JO

20

10

77

78

79

l!O

81

82

IIJ

50

Technology has also played a very important role in financial
innovation.

Many financial innovations, including financial futures,

-----------..
swaps and NIFs,
technology.

were made possible because of advances in computer

By making the same information available simultaneously

to many market participants, technology has reduced the need for many
of the traditional services provided by financial intermediaries,
such as credit evaluation and monitoring.

This has put pressure on

banks and other financial services providers to innovate, to stay
ahead of the competition, and to pay attention to the demands of the
marketplace.
Increased competition among financial services providers has
also played a role in fostering the rapid innovation of financial
products.

Many types of suppliers now offer the same products at

competitive prices over a much broader geographic area.

Retailers,

manufacturers, and insurers compete with banks in the traditional
areas of lending and deposit-taking, but they also compete in some of
the newer nontraditional areas as well.

Catalysts for financial innovation


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

•

Technology

•

Competition

51

Conclusions
Over the last ten years commercial banks have attempted to find
ways to compensate for their limited abilities to engage in
underwriting, have developed important new products for managing
interest and exchange rate uncertainty, and changed the role they
play in the lending process,

shifting from funding loans to simply

originating and/or guaranteeing them.

In my opinion, the first two

developments are of concern only because they challenge regulators to
develop a supervisory system that is suited for these activities.
The push to obtain underwriting and brokerage powers is simply an
attempt by

u.s

banks to resume a role that they lost as a result of

the passage of Glass-Steagall in 1933.

The major challenge here is

for regulators to develop ways of regulating these activities that do
not increase the risk to the FDIC.

This can be done in two ways.

First, we can permit large bank holding companies to go bankrupt and
make sure that the underwriting subsidiary is segregated from the
banking subsidiary.

Alternatively, we can permit underwriting to go

on within the bank and make sure that banks are closed as soon as
they become insolvent.
The movement into risk management products -- swaps, caps,
futures, and options -- is again mostly of concern because these new
products require regulators to develop new areas of expertise.

The

risks that need to be taken into account are somewhat different than
those that need to be taken into account when valuing floating rate
loans.

However, it is clear to me that these products are a natural

outgrowth of developments in the nation's futures and options


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

l
1,

..

I
I

11
!'

if

Tir ,!
'.

!;
!;
:'.

~ Jt-, A/2p,-n' •

··-v-·~o


https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
p
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

•

..

~_j'

•

A.~~

.

l.

~~~~
o.. .

~

C-#lU ~

-4-

b-.Jc:-.c;.

A ~ - ' ~-~

I

I i! ~ ~ i ~ A ~~.
A-

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{

u,A,U

~ ~~ _$

~ .. / C -

.3 -

~ ~~
/

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t!.-/ ~ O

,

13~~ ~ ~
L

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II[

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https://fraser.stlouisfed.org
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

~~~ p ~ s ,

11 P o £ , ~ .

52

markets.
on the other hand, I do find the growth in credit guarantee
activity and asset sales to be of possible concern.

Yet even here,

there is evidence that suggests that these products should be viewed
in a positive light. It is a fact that the marketplace's willingness
to accept a bank's off-balance-sheet guarantees is positively
correlated with bank safety.

It is also true that banks have a

strong incentive to issue these guarantees to their most creditworthy
customers.
Loan sales also seem to have positive implications for bank
soundness.

They allow banks to do what they do best--originate and

service loans--rather than warehouse them.

Also, loan sales allow

banks to diversify their portfolios, which will improve the safety
and soundness of individual banks.

And since a substantial portion

of loans that are being sold are reportedly going to foreign and
nonbank investors, loan sales should improve the safety of the whole
banking system. 4
These factors all suggest that the movement of banks away from
the funding of loans does not seem as detrimental to the banking
system as some might believe.

In fact, there is evidence that

indicates that such a move may be an improvement.

However, bankers

and regulators are going to have to develop better methods for
understanding and evaluating the risks of banks' off-balance-sheet
4 A recent Senior Loan Officer Opinion survey indicated that only 25
percent of loans sold by large banks were sold to other American
banks.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

~~~

~

/1:,~ ~ -

53

activities.

This need is particularly acute since there is evidence

that these new banking products would not disappear if regulatory

taxes were greatly reduced or even eliminated.

Also, recent changes

in the tax code make it likely that the incentives for banks to shift
into investment banking are only going to increase.
Despite the obvious merits of credit guarantees and asset sales,
regulators cannot afford to ignore the possibility that their rapid
growth is largely explained by our existing system of taxes and
subsidies.

In general, the higher the regulatory taxes on low risk

assets relative to the regulatory subsidies for holding risky assets,
the more likely banks are to move toward riskier assets and riskier
activities.
In general, it is better to eliminate bad regulation than to
simply permit banks to evade it.

This suggests that we should take

steps to reduce the taxes imposed on low-risk assets and the
subsidies for holding high risk assets.

Regulatory taxes could be

reduced by reducing reserve requirements, paying interest on
reserves, and permitting banks to substitute long term debt for
equity capital.

Such steps have been presented in a recent proposal

by the New York Fed and I hope that they are adopted.

One way to

reduce the subsidy for risk taking would be to take our newly
proposed risk-based capital requirement a step further and begin to
distinguish between low- and high-risk loans.

This would reduce the

regulatory tax on low-risk assets as well as reducing incentives for
banks to take risk.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

54
I also believe that if reform is going to be made, we should take
the opportunity to simplify the existing regulatory structure.

With

the advent of interstate banking, it is conceivable that a single
bank holding company will have to deal with the Comptroller, the
FDIC, The Federal Reserve Board, twelve Federal Reserve Banks, and 50
state regulators.
to administer.

This system is aggravating to bankers and costly

I believe we have to do something to decrease the

number of regulators in the picture.
Just as J.P. Morgan's decision to concentrate on commercial
banking was based on gaining a competitive advantage and on the
future prospects of underwriting, so too are the decisions by some
commercial bankers today to move away from traditional banking
activities.

While regulatory taxes have played a key role in today's

decisions, other factors such as risk management, efficiency,
technology, and a natural desire to resume their pre 1933 role in the
securities markets are also important.

Because many of these

activities can be conducted without a bank charter, charters have
become less valuable.

This new environment should lead regulators to

step back and re-evaluate the costs and the benefits of current
regulation.

At this point the ball is really in our court.

Regulators have a responsibility to the banks they regulate to
determine the feasibility of
investment banking activities

regulating banking firms that engage in
and to reexamine regulations which

penalize banks for holdlong low risk assets.


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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

!

4

ji

h
itI!
.,
l•

·1'

1, ~-.., C-# ·.,.t~ ~

l,

'j
,j

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