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For release on delivery
10:00 A.M., E.S.T.
March 6, 1985

Statement byPaul A. Volcker
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System




before the
Committee on the Budget
U.S. House of Representatives
March 6, 1985

I am pleased to appear once again before this Committee
to discuss the economic situation and its relationship to the
budgetary choices before you*

I know the task that confronts

you in reconciling budgetary priorities in the context of a
huge deficit is extremely difficult.

I can shed little light

on the choices you must make among national security, social,
and other programmatic objectives.

But from my vantage point,

it does seem clear that an adequate reduction in the overall
deficit must be a critical ingredient in any satisfactory
budget plan.
Last month the Federal Reserve submitted its semi-annual
report on monetary policy to the Congress, and my testimony to
the Banking Committees at that time provided an extensive review
of recent monetary developments and the Federal Reserve's
expectations for the performance of the economy in 1985.
have submitted copies of that earlier testimony to this
Committee, and I shall limit my prepared remarks this morning
to some summary comments on the economic setting*




-2As you know, we have made substantial progress over
the past two years toward our longer-run aims for the economy.
Despite widespread doubts about our economic prospects at the
beginning of the recovery, the expansion that developed has
been the strongest since the Korean War period.

Real gross

national product rose almost 6 percent over the four quarters
of 1984, bringing the cumulative gain in domestic output since
the recession trough in late 1982 to about 12-1/2 percent.

The

rise in production has been associated with large increases in
employment and a sizable decline in the unemployment rate.
As part of that general improvement, there has been a sharp
rebound in profits and a surge in business investment, especially
for innovative, high-technology capital equipment.
also has grown relatively strongly.

Productivity

Taken together, those

factors should bode well for our future growth potential.
I am particularly encouraged by the fact that this
remarkable expansion of activity has been achieved without
any significant increase in the inflation rate from the




-3sharply reduced levels of 1982 and 1983.

To be sure, a

number of factors that may not be lasting have helped to
hold down price increases.

The continuing appreciation of

the dollar and competition from imports have placed considerable downward pressure on prices in some manufacturing and
mining industries.

Declines in prices of some important

commodities, including petroleum and a number of raw materials,
also have played a key role.

But perhaps more fundamentally,

increases in nominal wages are reflecting and supporting the
lower rate of inflation, and there are encouraging signs that
expectations of future inflation have been damped.
At this point, the most common forecasts suggest that
growth will remain strong enough in 198 5 to produce some
further declines in unemployment, with little if any pickup
in inflation.

That, in fact, is the "central tendency" of

the Federal Open Market Committee members1 forecasts.

But

we must not be lulled by these seemingly favorable near-term
prospects.




Despite the strength indicated by the aggregate

-4statistics and favorable near-term expectations for the
economy as a whole, there are some large and unsustainable
imbalances in our economy.

Unless dealt with effectively,

those imbalances will, in time, undercut all that has been
achieved.
The strains in agriculture, the heavy capital equipment
area, and the metals industry are most visible.

To some extent,

the difficulties in these sectors arise out of severe structural
problems that must be dealt with directly.

But there can be

little doubt that these specific problems have been exacerbated
by pressures related to the massive deficits in the federal
budget and in our external accounts.
It is not a coincidence that the unprecedented large
deficits in our trade and current accounts have developed
alongside the internal budget deficit.

In the end, a

government deficit must be financed, either internally or
externally, out of savings.

We do not now, nor are we likely

to in the future, have the capacity to save enough domestically




-5to finance both federal deficits at or approaching the current
size and the rising levels of investment needed to support
growth and productivity.

Thus far in the expansion period,

we have been able to bridge the gap by drawing on a growing
net inflow of foreign saving to supplement our own.
Net domestic saving —

by individuals, by businesses, and

by state and local governments —

has in fact increased quite

rapidly over the past few years, amounting to some 9 percent
of the GNP in 1984, near the higher end of the range prevailing
over the postwar period.

Nevertheless, about a quarter of our

net needs for investment and for deficit financing last year
still had to be met from foreign sources.

So far, that capital

has been readily available and has played a key role in containing
pressures on domestic interest rates.

Even so, interest rates,

as you know, have remained high both historically and relative
to current levels of inflation.

Without the net flow of savings

from the rest of the world, pressures on our financial markets
would have been still greater and interest rates would have
been still higher.



Thanks to the capital inflow, the kinds of obvious
"crowding out" of housing and investment so widely anticipated
a year or two ago largely have been avoided,,

But other key

sectors •— particularly those that are heavily dependent on
export markets or that must compete with imports —
"crowded."

are being

Looking abroad, growth in many industrialized

countries remains relatively sluggish and the depreciation
of foreign currencies vis-a-vis the dollar seems to be one
factor inhibiting the pursuit of more expansionary policies
by our major trading partners, feeding back or* our own export
prospects*

At the same time, the stability of our capital

markets has become hostage to a continuing net inflow of
international funds•
In this context, let me make a few observations about
monetary policy*

In the most general terms, the objective of

the Federal Reserve is to provide sufficient money and credit
to support sustainable growth in real output and employment,
while moving toward greater price stability.

Appreciable

progress was made in these directions in 1984,



We will want

—7 —
to provide enough money this year to sustain orderly growth
in demand and output, and my earlier testimony reviews our
plans in that respect.
However, money creation cannot resolve an underlying
imbalance between domestic saving and investment.

Real savings

release real resources for investment and for use of the government, and growth in savings tends to work against inflation.
But beyond fostering sustainable growth, money creation cannot
release resources to meet investment and Federal needs.
it adds to the demands upon those resources.

Rather

Indeed, should

excessive monetary growth ignite inflationary fears, the
effort to encourage savings and reduce capital market pressures
would be undercut.

As prospects for stability are undermined,

the international capital flows on which, for the time being,
we are dependent would be discouraged.
for interest rates —
would be adverse.

And the implications

probably sooner rather than later —

The risks of more inflation and less growth

over time would be increased, not reduced.




A number of policies •— with monetary and fiscal policies
leading the list —

must be blended together to encourage

sustained and balanced growth .

In practice/ achieving an

optimum blend is seldom easy, and the precise measures to be
taken can be debated.

But what does seem clear now is that

any satisfactory approach is dependent upon substantial cuts
in our massive budgetary deficit,

And, within the range of

practicality/ the larger and sooner the cuts the better.

To

have a real impact this year on markets and the economy the
actions must be large enough and credible enough to have an
impact on expectations and confidence/ even if the measures
taken will be phased in over time.
I o.m sensitive to the practical and political difficulties
of the decisions that must be made.

I realize there is no

natural constituency for specific budgetary cuts or revenue
measures.

But I also know that we are, at present/ on a

course that cannot be sustained indefinitely.
The practical question is whether we act now to build
on the progress of the past and reinforce prospects for future



-9growth and stability or whether, as so often in the past, we
wait for crisis and dislocation to be a catalyst for action.
But then it would be too late, and the longer constructive
action is delayed, the greater the risks and the larger the
task*




*******