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Rotary Club
Gadsden, Alabama
7-14-66
INTEREST RATES

IN A F R E E

ECONOMY

Gadsden and Atlanta may seem close to an astronaut, but they are hardly
neighbors.

Yet they seem like neighbors to me, because I have been fortunate

enough to have a good friend in Cooper Wadsworth, President of the American
National Bank of Gadsden.

Cooper and I have worked together on the Board of

the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank.

Through my association with him, I have

come to feel as though Gadsden were just a stone's throw from Atlanta.
We at the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank must constantly assess the relative
economic "health" of the territory encompassed by the Sixth Federal Reserve
District.

Our diagnosis is that Gadsden's economic "pulse" is strong and

vigorous.

Gadsden unemployment, estimated at 4.9 percent of the work force in

May, is down from 5.5 percent a year earlier.

Bank debits, a good measure of

total spending, have been running 9 percent ahead since the first of the year.
May demand deposits of banks in the Anniston-Gadsden area were 19 percent highe
than in May 1965.

Savings deposits were up nearly 15 percent.

Of course, these figures are probably old hat to you.

And certainly no

statistics are necessary for you to recognize Gadsden's substantial economic
growth in recent years.

In light of the persistence of this growth, you may

even have allowed yourself the luxury of accepting rapid economic development
as a matter of course.
Gadsden is certainly far from being alone in experiencing unusually rapid
economic growth, which is typical throughout the nation.

Cities from Maine

to California have been enjoying phenomenal economic gains.

As you know, the

nation is now well into its sixth year of economic expansion, a record for any
peacetime period in this country.

Our output of goods and services, measured

in dollars of constant purchasing power, is now one-third greater than it was




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in 1960.

Unemployment has been reduced from a rate of 6.7 percent in 1961

to around 4 percent today.

Moreover, until 1965, this economic growth was

achieved with relatively stable prices.
Since economic growth is not just a matter of luck, it is important to
note how this tremendous growth occurred without drastic price increases and
why we must prevent such increases.

We were able to grow without a significant

rise in the general price level because we put to work previously unused man­
power and productive capacity.

Also contributing to this noninflationary

growth was a steady increase in the nation’s productivity.
Experience and theory tell us that if the demand for goods exceeds the
ability of our economy to produce them, inflation is inevitable.

In order to

get additional men and machines under these circumstances, producers will have
to bid them away from other employment.

This increase in cost of production

will raise prices, and before you know it, price pressures here and everywhere
become strong and general inflation sets in.
There are no "winners" during an inflation.

Creditors lose because they

are repaid with dollars worth less than those they lent.

Savers lose because

the dollars they withdraw are worth less than those they deposited.
lose because prices rise.

Consumers

Businessmen find costs higher, planning more difficult,

and risk increased due to the greater uncertainty of future conditions.

Many

of the nation's resources are funneled into wasteful uses.
Higher prices make the goods we sell for foreigners more expensive, reducing
our sales to foreigners.

On the other hand, their products become relatively

cheaper, increasing our purchases from foreigners.

At present, such a shift

will harm our country because we are already spending more abroad than foreigners
spend here.




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So far, I've been talking about prices of goods.

But there is another

price of equal importance which I have not touched upon:

the interest rate.

We don't usually think of the interest rate as a price, but it is.

It is the

price of money.
Through the interest rate, economic and financial conditions are related.
This is why monetary policy is so important.
Reserve System comes into the picture.

And this is where the Federal

The Federal Reserve can influence the

supply of money and credit chiefly by affecting the amount of reserves avail­
able to its member banks.

It does this by buying or selling U.S. Government

securities or by changing the interest rate the Federal Reserve Banks charge
for loans to banks.

Since the reserves of commercial banks provide the basis

upon which they extend credit,

the Federal Reserve System can indirectly

influence, to a certain extent, the amount and cost of credit extended.
Just before the 1961 business expansion, the Federal Reserve System
started to follow a policy of supplying increasing amounts of reserves to its
member banks, chiefly through the purchase of U.S. Government securities.
This policy made possible the steady increase in bank credit.
The Federal Reserve System pursued such a policy in order to stimulate
economic expansion.

Why?

one wheel in a factory.

Because your desire for goods doesn't turn even
Only if you have money and credit to back up this

desire do the wheels begin to turn.
In the early sixties the rate of unemployment was relatively high and
the nation's factories were operating at less than capacity.

Greater demand

could be met by starting up idle machines and hiring the unemployed.

Increasing

the supply of money and credit could stimulate the recovery toward full employ­
ment without pushing up prices.
The credit supplementing the savings of the American people and business




- 4 -

put more men and resources to work and added to our productive capacity.

We

rate this expansion of the supply of money and credit an eminently successful
policy.

But no monetary policy is correct under all conditions, and in the

latter part of 1965, conditions began to change.

Earlier, as I pointed out,

the economy had been characterized by a great deal of unutilized capacity, but
in 1965 we were approaching full capacity throughout the country.

This led to

a rapidly increasing tempo of business activity and thus an upsurge in the
demand for credit.

Even though savings continued to expand, the acceleration

in credit demand was far greater than the growth in supply, leading to an
excess of demand over supply.

Financial institutions, in other words, had more

borrowers at the going rate of interest than they could satisfy.
It is my thesis that the unusually high interest rates which have been
arousing so much concern are the result of this increase in tempo.

We can

certainly all agree that interest rates are now at levels not reached since
the 1920's.

High-grade corporate bonds and some types of U.S. Government

bonds are yielding well over 5 percent.

The minimum lending charge on business

loans by New York and Chicago banks was recently hiked to 5-3/4 percent, and
for most borrowers, is considerably higher.

Mortgage rates in excess of

6 percent are common.
Altogether, these interest rate levels are quite remarkable.

However,

not all of us may remember that prior to recent increases in interest rates,
we experienced a period of relatively stable interest rates unprecedented in
length for an economic expansion.
Why should this have been so?

As long as the supply and demand for money

are roughly the same, interest rates will not increase.

But interest rates

will rise when mounting credit demands exceed the funds available for lending.




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During the early years of the economic expansion, funds available for lending
did increase in step with increases in demand.

This was made possible by the

increasing amount of savings put aside by the general public and the expan­
sionary policy of the Federal Reserve System.

But as men and machines became

relatively scarce, the demand for credit began to outrun its supply.
Reflecting this situation, interest rates began to creep upward.

This,

mind you, occurred well before the Federal Reserve’s December 1965 increase
in the discount rate, which is the rate it charges commercial banks borrowing
from Reserve Banks.

And so, the primary explanation for the increase in

interest rates during the latter half of 1965 must be laid to the rapid rise
in credit demand.
Today, even some of the critics of this tightening of the economy's
monetary reins are saying the Federal Reserve’s December action was taken just
in the nick of time.

Unemployment was down about as far as possible when

there is little unutilized productive capacity.

Thus, added purchasing power

would raise the demand for goods without bringing forth much increase in
production.

Bursts of more credit would go in large measure into higher prices

as consumers tried to outbid one another for the relatively scarce supply of
goods.

That such a situation was developing is illustrated by the nation's

Gross National Product in the first quarter of 1966.

GNP, as we call it,

increased by $17 billion from the final quarter of 1965.

Yet, this increase,

larger than in any quarter experienced in the previous year and largest in many,
was greeted--not with applause--but with cries of dismay by serious students
of our economy.

The reason was that over 40 percent of this $17-billion increase

was accounted for by higher prices.

The pressure of demand against limited

resources had brought about the inevitable result--higher prices.

To be sure,

some of this increase can be explained by higher prices for food, but this is




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only a partial explanation.
Another distressing feature of the Gross National Product and income
statistics for the first quarter of 1966 was the decline in the rate of
consumer savings, the principal source of loanable funds.

The ratio of savings

to disposable income stood at 4.8 percent--lower than it had been in any
quarter in 1965 or during any year of the current economic expansion.
I think we ought to recognize that the Federal Reserve saw the economy
rapidly approaching the point where it would press against its physical ceiling
on output before others came to the same conclusion.

The Reserve Board's

action to raise the discount rate was designed to reinforce other efforts to
maintain price stability and thus to foster balance in the economy's continued
growth.

Its purpose was also to strengthen the dollar's international standing--

a standing which is endangered by the current deficit in our international
accounts.
Since this highly publicized increase in the discount rate came many
weeks after other interest rates had risen, it was not, as I have pointed
out, the cause for the general rise in interest rates.

It was the Federal

Reserve's necessary response to rising interest rates charged by other lenders.
And these rising interest rates were the monetary signal that we were approaching
full use of all our men and machines.

Because the Federal Reserve System's

responsibility is to foster economic growth and stable prices, it must change
its policies when the economy begins to approach the physical ceiling on output.
In these circumstances the supply of money must be restrained if the demand for
goods is not to outrun the supply of goods.
To meet the challenge posed by other, more profitable uses of funds, the
Federal Reserve Board last December also increased the maximum rate of interest
permitted to be paid by member banks on time deposits and certificates of deposit.




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This was to make it possible for banks to attract and retain deposits of
businesses and individuals and thus to make more effective use of savings
funds already available in the economy for financing loan expansion.
More recently, the Federal Reserve Board took further action to restrict
credit by making it necessary for some banks to set aside larger reserves.
This will reduce possible credit expansion.
Figures covering the second quarter of 1966 indicate that these "medicines"
are working.

Economic expansion has become less feverish in the past few months.

Gross National Product undoubtedly advanced less in the second quarter of 1966
than in the first quarter.

The pace of industrial production and personal

income has slowed down, and increases in wholesale prices have moderated.
These changes imply a noticeable drop in the excess of demand over supply which
existed in the last quarter of 1965 and the first quarter of 1966.
This does not mean we are headed for a recession.
growing.

The economy is still

Heavy business investment and government spending promise to continue

their support of real economic growth.

But the rate of growth has slowed,

leading us to hope that growth without inflation--stable, real growth--can be
achieved.
In our American economic system, we rely heavily upon the price system to
allocate resources between competing users.

We prefer this to setting up some

kind of board or planning agency to dictate prices and quantities sold.

We

are convinced that relying upon the price system is, by and large, the most
efficient way of getting the job done.
In the present state of our economy, funds are scarce in relation to demand,
although, as we have noticed, there has been no actual cutback in available
funds.

We simply do not have enough to satisfy everyone who wants to borrow.




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The American economy has a tremendous economic potential.

Given time,

I have no doubt that it will be able to supply us with more and more.

But

we cannot have everything we want right now.
To some extent, the reduced availability of credit can help us bring
our demands down to the capacity of our economy.

I think we ought to

recognize, however, that actions to moderate credit demands alone cannot do
the job.

This job requires the complete cooperation of business, labor,

financial institutions, government, and the Federal Reserve System.

Prudence

on the part of all may be far more effective than Federal Reserve policy alone
and indeed is essential for Federal Reserve policy to work.