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INTERNATIONAL BANK COMPETITION & SUPERVISION,
vAN ADDRESSxBY

É

L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN
CHAIRMAN
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
BEFORE THE
CHICAGO COUNCIL
ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS,

f

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS.
DECEMBER 4, 1986^

Good afternoon, it is a pleasure to be here today. Chicago is
"my kind of town" - a great sports town (especially in football),
the financial center of the midwest and . . . balmy breezes. A
perfect setting for discussing international banking. Chicago is
not only the hub of commerce for the entire central region of the
U.S., but it is a beehive of international banking activity.
As honored as I am to speak before such a prestigious group, I
think it's somewhat telling that I'm here at all. Not too long ago
there was relatively little focus on international activity at the
FDIC. Our agency functioned almost exclusively as the supervisor of
smaller state chartered banks which were not really affected by what
happened in Hong Kong or London. What happened on the international
scene was left to others. A lot has changed. International banking
and its repercussions can and does affect the entire U.S. financial
system, even to its smallest units.
For example, a number of insured banks have become heavily
exposed, through their lending operations, to the economic progress
of other nations. And, a number of smaller agricutural banks
complain that efforts to collect this foreign debt are hurting their
ability to sell abroad. Banks, along with the rest of the country,
have become increasingly dependent on foreign sources for funding.
In a few cases the dependency is very high, causing us some concern
about the stability of the funding situation. Since this is the
hometown for Continental Illinois National Bank, I am sure I don't
have to explain to you why we get concerned.
The world is getting smaller; banking is becoming more global.
The approach to banking taken by other countries will influence the
longer term outlook for our own banking industry. Head-on
competition between U.S. banks and foreign controlled banks has
increased considerably over the last several years - not only abroad
but here in this country as well. Again, you see this in your home
town where a number of foreign banks compete.
We don't always like the changes we see. But usually we can't
prevent them. As Alvin Toffler said, "The problem is not,
therefore, to suppress change, which cannot be done, but to manage
it."
Today, I'd like to cover some aspects of international
competition in banking, particularly in its newest form, the
deregulation of competition in England - known by a typical English
decription as the "Big Bang." First, competition.
The increase in foreign bank activity in the U.S. in recent
years has been impressive. In 1978, foreign banks held about $46
billion in deposits in this country. By 1985, the volume of
deposits had grown fivefold to $245 billion. Their market share of
U.S. deposits jumped from 4.5 percent to over 12 percent. The
competition is not one-sided. U.S. banks are still going abroad.




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At last count, over 260 U.S. banks had foreign offices with deposits
totaling $322 billion, compared to $221 billion in 1978. But, in
recent years, the growth of foreign bank offices on U.S. soil has
far outpaced the growth of U.S. bank offices abroad.
I think this competition is healthy, and - provided it's fair good for the economy. Further, from a somewhat selfish standpoint
as Chairman of the FDIC, I welcome foreign interest in U.S.
banking. Finding buyers for failing banks gets harder all the
time. We can always use a few more . . . buyers, not failing banks.
International competition is not always fair. In this country,
entry and operations of foreign banks are, for the most part,
governed by a regulatory framework based on the principle of
national treatment. Essentially, this means foreign banks are given
competitive equality with domestic banks. Not all countries adhere
to this principle.
Since Congress adopted the principle of
national treatment with the International Banking Act of 1978, it
has asked for reports on how foreign governments treat U.S. banks.The studies have concluded that U.S. banks generally receive
substantial access to most major foreign markets, both in terms of
entry and subsequent operations - although significant restrictions
were noted. Since the first report, a number of countries have made
substantial progress toward national treatment, although some
countries still have a ways to go.
For example, let's look at Canada. As you know, Harris Bank and
Trust, Chicago's third largest bank, is owned by the Bank of
Montreal. But, foreigners cannot acquire more than a minority
interest in any widely held, domestic bank in Canada (known as
Schedule A Banks). The only exception in over 20 years is the
recent approval for Lloyds Bank to acquire the assets of Continental
bank. Foreign banks cannot enter Canada as branches. For all
practical purposes, foreign banks can only enter Canada by
establishing a Schedule B bank, which is subject to different
chartering provisions. Moreover, there are a number of restrictions
and limitations relating to capitalization, funding and lending
which limit the opportunities of foreign banks to compete fully in
the Canadian market.
As of year-end 1985, 17 U.S. banking subsidiaries and four
representative offices of three U.S. banks operated in Canada.
Their assets total about $8.4 billion. Conversely, eight Canadian
banks operate in the United States with 18 branches, 11 agencies, 32
representative offices and 20 subsidiaries. They held $40 billion
in assets.
Financial regulatory reform is expected in 1987 and Canadian
authorities have indicated a willingness to engage in bilateralnegotiations on issues of trade in financial services.
Japan is another interesting case. Currently, 27 Japanese banks
operate in the United States, through 25 subsidiaries, 70 branches
and 51 representative offices. At the end of 1985, these banks held




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almost $180 billion in U.S. assets, up 41 percent from 1983. Japan
now controls about 6.5 percent of the bank assets in this country.
Two years ago their share was about 5.5 percent. Eight Japanese
banks have assets in U.S. offices that would rank them among the top
50 banks in this country. As Lawrence Peter (of the Peter
Principle) once said, "America is the land of opportunity if you're
a businessman in Japan."
How are foreign banks doing in Japan? Foreign banks account for
about 4 percent of all bank assets in Japan. U.S. banks hold a
little over one percent.
Japan has taken numerous steps to liberalize its financial
markets and expand the scope of opportunities for foreign banks.
Nevertheless, outsiders have found Japanese markets very difficult
to penetrate. There are a number of reasons for this. Competition
has intensified. Asset securitzation has spread rapidly. Japanese
banks now make foreign currency loans, which prior to 1980 could
only be done by foreign banks. Prevailing loan rates are largely
based on the blended cost of funds to Japanese banks, and 80 percent
of Japanese deposits are subject to rate controls. Foreign banks,
which rely largely on funds purchased at market rates, have found it
difficult to be competitive. Japan is a situation where a very
guarded pace of deregulation makes it very difficult for foreign
banks to compete.
There are other developed and developing countries where foreign
bank restrictions exist. Several Latin American countries have
significant limitations against entry or operations by foreign banks.
Moving on to the good news, a number of countries have opened
their markets to wider competition.
The biggest move toward open markets and freer competition for
all types of financial services institutions was taken by England in
October of this year.
October witnessed the arrival of the United Kingdom's "Big Bang"
— an apt catchphrase for a major change in the regulatory structure
for that country's (and the world's) financial services industry.
Banks from any country in the free world can operate in
England. They can offer a wider range of financial services.
Previously, such products could only be obtained separately from
investment bankers, securities brokers, market makers and commercial
banks. The wide scope of the deregulatory effort will bring the
"supermarket" flavor to the financial markets.
England's "Big Bang" should help demonstrate the benefits of a
deregulated and diversified financial services industry. Hopefully,
it will motivate some progress in this country, where Congress has
been in deadlock over these issues since 1982. The British
experience may provide other insights. It should help us in
developing the appropriate supervisory approach as we go toward a




worldwide competitive financial system. I think it will illustrate
the essentiality of developing new, and more effective, safety
surveillance and supervisory programs in a deregulated environment.
As airline deregulation has shown, free markets encourage
competition and innovation, which in turn result in tremendous
benefits for the consuming public. But deregulation of airlines
also illustrates the need for reinforced "safety surveillance."
Increased freedom of airline companies to fly where they like and
charge what the market will bear, puts pressure on these competitors
to increase risk by cutting safety spending. Supervision directed
primarily toward safety surveillance will differ from the old
compliance regulation, which emphasized the control of all prices
and activities. Safety surveillance means an aggressive,
case-by-case approach designed to control excessive risk-taking by
the few who ignore safe operation and threaten the stability of the
financial marketplace.
In conjunction with the Big Bang, the United Kingdom is changing
its regulatory apparatus to emphasize surveillance for safety.
Britain is not moving back into the environment of the Roaring
Twenties, when banking entreprenuers were free to carry on their
affairs as they saw fit. Instead, the United Kingdom intends to
emphasize "safety surveillance" through self-regulation by
specialized industry panels. Such an approach may be a useful guide
for our own regulatory system as it meets the challenge and dangers
of a more deregulated financial system.
Deregulation will challenge the regulators of the world's
financial systems to develop ways to maintain a margin of safety in
the new freer environment. And, because of the growing global
interdependence of banking, cooperation among supervisors and
consistency in approach will become increasingly beneficial. Lest I
leave you with the wrong impression, I must emphasize that progress
has been made toward international regulatory cooperation.
The effort began in 1974 with the creation of a standing
committee of bank supervisors from the G10 countries and
Switzerland. The FDIC joins the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller
of the Currency in representing the U.S. This committee (often
called the Cooke Committee after its Chairman, Peter Cooke of the
Bank of England) meets regularly to coordinate surveillance over the
international banking network.
One accomplishment of the Cooke Committee was to establish
guidelines known as the "Basle Concordat" for dividing supervision
responsibilities between host and home supervisory authorities.
The Concordat also encouraged cooperation between host and
parent supervisory authorities, through the exchange of information
and by authorizing bank inspections in the host country, by or on
behalf of, the parent supervisors. Although more needs to be done,
the "Basle Concordat" has done much to improve cooperation and
coordination among supervisors. International Supervisory
conferences and Cooke Committee meetings have put us on a first-name




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basis with supervisors in the industrialized nations. The closeness
of relationships helps retain the confidentiality of sensitive
information and enhances the informal communications network.
One area receiving considerable attention by the Cooke Committee
has been development of a uniform standard for the level and quality
of bank capital. Bank capital ratios declined on a worldwide basis
over the 1960s and 1970s. After the LDC debt crisis surfaced a few
years ago, the Committee looked for ways to prevent further capital
erosion.
The committee has emphasized the advantages of a risk-based
capital system; i.e. one where capital requirements are determined
by assigning predetermined risk factors to different types of bank
activity. A system of this kind is already the primary capital
measurement device within many G10 countries.
In this country, capital standards are expressed solely in terms
of capital-to-total-book-value assets, called a "gearing ratio" by
those in the trade in other countries.
Several months ago, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
OCC all advanced similar risk-based capital proposals for public
comment. The three agencies are now close to developing a joint
proposal which, with a little luck, will be ready for public comment
shortly. A good example of the close cooperation between the
Federal regulators which, hopefully, will move toward a more uniform
standard worldwide.
Conclusion
In summary, The "One World" economy has arrived. Financial
institutions are scrambling to meet its challenges and take
advantage of its opportunties. Regulators are scrambling to keep up
with the changes and, as usual, they're a little behind.
International finance certainly confirms that we do live in
"interesting times".