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For release on delivery
4:00 p.m. EST
November 14, 2014

Monetary Policy Accommodation, Risk-Taking, and Spillovers

Remarks by
Jerome H. Powell
Member
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at
“Global Research Forum on International Macroeconomics and Finance”
Sponsored by the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve Board,
and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Washington, D.C.

November 14, 2014

Our panel’s topic--“Monetary Policy Spillovers and Cooperation in a Global
Economy”--is surely a timely one. I will offer brief introductory thoughts and then
discuss some recent research by Federal Reserve Board economists that has bearing on
these matters. 1
The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy is motivated by the dual mandate, which
calls upon us to achieve stable prices and maximum sustainable employment. While
these objectives are stated as domestic concerns, as a practical matter, economic and
financial developments around the world can have significant effects on our own
economy and vice versa. Thus, the pursuit of our mandate requires that we understand
and incorporate into our policy decision-making the anticipated effects of these
interconnections. And the dollar’s role as the world’s primary reserve, transaction, and
funding currency requires us to consider global developments to help ensure our own
financial stability.
Since the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has pursued a highly
accommodative monetary policy, which has had important effects on asset prices and
global investment flows. With unconventional tools, the scale and scope of these effects
were difficult to predict ex ante. Nor is it possible to predict with confidence how
markets will react day to day as policy returns to normal. The Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) has gone to great lengths to provide transparency about its policy
intentions. Yet, since Chairman Bernanke first discussed the end of the asset purchase
program in mid-2013, volatility has surprised both on the upside (the “taper tantrum”)
and on the downside (the actual taper and the low volatility throughout most of 2014). In

1

The views expressed herein are my own and not necessarily those of other FOMC participants.

-2my view, while market volatility will continue to ebb and flow, these fluctuations are not
likely to have important implications for policy. The path of policy will depend on the
progress of the economy toward fulfilment of the dual mandate.
Overall, accommodative monetary policy seems to have provided significant
support for U.S. growth. And, of course, a strong U.S. economy contributes to strong
growth around the globe, particularly in the emerging market economies (EMEs). But
what of the so-called spillovers in the form of flows into, and out of, EMEs, whose
financial sectors are small compared with global investment flows? Such spillovers
could merely reflect investor responses to changing differentials between rates of return
abroad and in the United States. But these spillovers could also reflect shifts in investor
preferences for risk.
By design, accommodative monetary policy--whether conventional or
unconventional--supports economic activity in part by creating incentives for investors to
take more risk. Such risk-taking can show up in domestic financial markets, in the
international investments of U.S. investors, and even, ultimately, in general risk attitudes
toward foreign financial markets. Distinguishing between appropriate and excessive risktaking is difficult, however.
I now turn to some recent research on whether there has been an increase in the
riskiness of our investments abroad and whether such increases might be traced to the
current low-interest rate environment. Many studies of the pre-crisis period document
the pro-cyclical nature of bank lending and leverage, and the buildup of risk-taking and

-3leverage by banks. 2 It is much harder to find evidence that low interest rates have led to
increased post-crisis risk-taking by U.S. banks. Growth in overall lending by U.S. banks
has been modest at best. However, some pockets of increased risk-taking by banks and
other investors are observable in domestic markets, such as leveraged loans. And on the
international front, there has been a notable increase in syndicated loan originations.
Recent research by Board staff, using a database of loans primarily to U.S.
borrowers but also to some foreign borrowers, suggests that lenders have indeed
originated an increased number of risky syndicated loans post-crisis, based on the
assessed probability of default as reported to bank supervisors (figure 1). 3 Regression
results confirm that the average probability of default is significantly inversely related to
U.S. long-term interest rates. This increase in riskiness of syndicated loans post-crisis
has been accompanied by a shift in the composition of loan holders: An increasing share
is now held not by banks but by hedge, pension, and other investment funds (figure 2).
These nonbank investors also tend to hold loans with higher average credit risk (figure 3).
These data suggest that a tougher regulatory environment may have made U.S.-based
bank originators unable or unwilling to hold risky loans on their balance sheets. Related
work by the same researchers, using a database with more-extensive coverage of loans to

2

See Tobias Adrian and Hyun Song Shin (2010), “Liquidity and Leverage,” Journal of Financial
Intermediation, vol. 19 (July), pp. 418-37; Valentina Bruno and Hyun Song Shin (2013), “Capital Flows,
Cross-Border Banking, and Global Liquidity,” NBER Working Paper Series 19038 (Cambridge, Mass.:
National Bureau of Economic Research, May); and Valentina Bruno and Hyun Song Shin (2013), “Capital
Flows and the Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy,” NBER Working Paper Series 18942 (Cambridge,
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, April).
3
See Sirio Aramonte, Seung Jung Lee, and Viktors Stebunovs (2014), “Risk-Taking and Low LongerTerm Interest Rates: Evidence from the U.S. Syndicated Loan Market,” paper presented at the 14th Annual
Bank Research Conference sponsored by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Center for Financial
Research and the Journal of Financial Services Research, held in Arlington, Va., September 18-19,
www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/STEBUNOVS%20DAY1_AM.PDF and Seung Jung Lee, Lucy Qian
Liu, and Viktors Stebunovs (2014), “Risk-Taking and Interest Rates: Evidence from Decades in the Global
Syndicated Loan Market,” unpublished paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

-4foreign borrowers, shows a similar pattern of increased risky loan underwriting by
international lenders, an increase that is also significantly inversely related to U.S.
interest rates. Together, these results suggest a potential spillover from accommodative
U.S. monetary policy through increased risk-taking in syndicated loans globally, although
preliminary results also indicate that investors still require extra return for this extra risk.
Another area in which to look for links between low interest rates and risk-taking
is in cross-border securities purchases. The role of low interest rates in advanced
economies in encouraging capital flows to EMEs where returns are higher has been a
familiar theme. 4 And recent studies have found that asset prices in EMEs do respond
systematically to U.S. monetary policy shocks. 5
For evidence of increased risk-taking in cross-border investment, let’s look at the
composition of U.S. investors’ foreign bond portfolios. Although emerging market bonds
remain a relatively small proportion of the aggregate U.S. cross-border bond portfolio
(figure 4), within foreign government bonds, U.S. investors have modestly shifted their
portfolio shares toward higher-yielding bonds of emerging market sovereigns (figure 5).
Ex post, these portfolio reallocations delivered a higher return to U.S. investors on this
part of their portfolio relative to what they would have received if they had left portfolio

4

See Jerome H. Powell (2013), “Advanced Economy Monetary Policy and Emerging Market Economies,”
speech delivered at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 2013 Asia Economic Policy Conference,
San Francisco, November 4, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20131104a.htm.
5
See Shaghil Ahmed and Andrei Zlate (2013), “Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies: A Brave
New World?” International Finance Discussion Papers 1081 (Washington: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, June), www.federalreserve.gov/PubS/ifdp/2013/1081/default.htm; David
Bowman, Juan M. Londono, and Horacio Sapriza (2014), “U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy and
Transmission to Emerging Market Economies,” International Finance Discussion Papers 1109
(Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, June),
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2014/1109/default.htm; and Marcel Fratzscher, Marco Lo Duca, and
Roland Straub (2013), “On the International Spillovers of U.S. Quantitative Easing,” ECB Working Paper
Series 1557 (Frankfurt, Germany: European Central Bank, June),
www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1557.pdf.

-5compositions unchanged at the average shares in 2008 and 2009, but at a cost to the
portfolio’s credit quality (figure 6). Regression results confirm that in choosing among
foreign government bonds, U.S. investors have put more weight on returns since the
crisis. 6
But search for higher returns has not been the only motivation for international
investors post-crisis: Demand for liquid high-grade “safe” or money-like assets has also
increased from foreign official investors for investment of foreign exchange reserves,
from pension funds and other institutions who face portfolio allocation constraints or
regulatory requirements, and from investment strategies requiring cash-like assets for
margining and other collateral purposes. Some shift to safe assets is also seen in U.S.
portfolios: U.S. investors actively rebalanced their holdings of foreign financial sector
bonds toward those with higher credit ratings, but at some cost in returns (figure 7; figure
8). 7
Taken together, developments in U.S. bond portfolios do not indicate a worrisome
pickup in risk-taking in external investments. But it is important to recognize that
portfolio reallocations that seem relatively small for U.S. investors can loom large from
the perspective of the foreign recipients of these flows. At roughly $400 billion at the
end of 2012, emerging market bonds accounted for a tiny fraction of the roughly
$25 trillion in bonds held by U.S. investors. But to the recipient countries, these holdings
can account for a large fraction of their bond markets. Even relatively small changes in

6

See Carol Bertaut and Alexandra Tabova (2014), “Reach for Yield versus Search for Safety,” unpublished
paper, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
7
See Carol Bertaut, Alexandra Tabova, and Vivian Wong (2014), “The Replacement of Safe Assets:
Evidence from the U.S. Bond Portfolio,” International Finance Discussion Papers 1123 (Washington:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, October),
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/ifdp/2014/files/ifdp1123.pdf.

-6these U.S. holdings can generate large asset price responses, as was certainly the case in
the summer of 2013. Likewise, a reassessment of risk-return tradeoffs could disrupt
financing for projects that are dependent on the willingness of investors to participate in
global syndicated loan markets.
We take the consequences of such spillovers seriously, and the Federal Reserve is
intent on communicating its policy intentions as clearly as possible in order to reduce the
likelihood of future disruptions to markets. We will continue to monitor investor
behavior closely, both domestically and internationally.

Exhibit Chart 1

11-05-2014

Figure 1

Term Loan Originations by Probability of Default (PD)
$ billions
PD < 1%
1% < PD < 5%
5% < PD < 10%
PD > 10%

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
2010

2011

2012

2013

Note. Only loans with PDs available are shown. Estimates are based on Aramonte, Lee, and Stebunovs (2014) using Shared National Credit Program data.

Exhibit Chart 2

11-05-2014

Figure 2

Syndicated Loan Originations in U.S. Market by Type of Holder
Percent of originations
Banks and bank holding companies
Investment banks
Finance companies

Investment funds
Other

100

80

60

40

20

0
2010

2011

2012

Note. Estimates are based on Aramonte, Lee, and Stebunovs (2014) using Shared National Credit Program data.
Types of lenders identified by primary activity of parent organization.

2013

Exhibit Chart 3

11-05-2014

Figure 3

Credit Risk Proxy by Type of Lender
Average probability of default (percent)

Investment banks

6

5

Investment funds

4

Finance companies
3

2

Banks and bank holding companies
1

0
2010

2011

2012

Note. Estimates are based on Aramonte, Lee, and Stebunovs (2014) using Shared National Credit Program data.

2013

Exhibit

10-31-2014

Figure 4

U.S. Holdings of Foreign Debt Securities
$ billion**

3000

2500

2000

Other

1500

1000

Advanced foreign economy

500

Emerging market economy
0
2003
Source: Treasury International Capital Data.
** All values are as of year-end.

2006

2009

2012

Exhibit

10-31-2014

Figure 5

U.S. Holdings of Foreign Government Bonds
0.4

Share

$ billion**

700

600
0.3

Emerging market economy share

500

400
0.2
300

Advanced foreign economy

200

0.1
100
Emerging market economy
0

0.0
2003

2006

2009

Source: Bertaut and Tabova (2014); Estimates are based on Treasury International Capital Data.
** All values are as of year-end.

2012

Figure 6

Government Bond Portfolio

2009
2010
2011
2012

Yearly returns (%)
Actual
Fixed weight**
8.6
8.6
7.7
7.7
8.5
8.3
10.1
9.2

Source: Bertaut and Tabova (2014).
* AA- or higher.
** at average 2008-09 shares.

High credit quality* (%)
Actual
Fixed weight**
70.1
70.1
65.8
68.9
58.7
62.5
57.1
61.6

Exhibit

10-31-2014

Figure 7

High-Grade* Share in U.S. Holdings of Foreign Financial Bonds
Share

0.5

0.4

Counterfactual
high-grade share,
assuming constant
2008-09 risk portfolio

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0
2006

2008

Source: Bertaut and Tabova (2014); Bertaut, Tabova, and Wong (2014).
* AA- or higher.

2010

2012

Figure 8

Financial Bond Portfolio

2009
2010
2011
2012

Yearly returns (%)
Actual
Fixed weight**
20.9
20.9
7.2
9.5
2.5
0.7
11.7
15.1

High credit quality* (%)
Actual
Fixed weight**
44.5
44.5
49.5
30.9
48.9
20.1
43.3
29.5

Source: Bertaut and Tabova (2014); Bertaut, Tabova, and Wong (2014).
* AA- or higher.
** at average 2008-09 shares.