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Still Very Accommodative

James Bullard
President and CEO, FRB-St. Louis
New Directions in Monetary Policy
GIC and FRB-St. Louis

25 September 2015
St. Louis, Mo.
Any opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of others on the Federal Open Market Committee.

Introduction

Note: These remarks are similar to “A Long, Long Way to Go,” remarks delivered on September 19, 2015, at the
Community Bankers Association of Illinois, Annual Meeting, Nashville, Tenn.

A much anticipated FOMC meeting
The FOMC met amid heavy speculation last week.
The Committee decided not to begin policy normalization at
this time.
Committee participants continue to expect normalization to
commence shortly.
Once normalization begins, policy will remain extremely
accommodative through the medium term.

Reaction to the decision
The market reaction to the decision seems to be that it created
rather than reduced global macroeconomic uncertainty.
I argued against the decision at the FOMC meeting and I will
lay out some of my views here.

Normalization is consistent with
continued accommodation

Pressure on the decision to normalize
The commentary around the decision to begin normalization
unfortunately took on a binary tone over the summer.
It is as if the Fed, upon making a single 25-basis-points
move, will suddenly be adopting a restrictive monetary
policy.
But this is far from the truth.
Indeed the Committee has already committed to an
exceptionally accommodative monetary policy over the next
three years.

Press conference quote
Chair Yellen at last Thursday’s press conference:
 “The stance of monetary policy will likely remain highly
accommodative for quite some time after the initial increase in
the federal funds rate in order to support continued progress
toward our objectives of maximum employment and 2 percent
inflation.”

This has been the standard view of the Committee for many
years.

Normalization is consistent with accommodation
Analysts opposed to beginning normalization now tend to
cite certain relatively minor but still fragile aspects of the
U.S. macroeconomic outlook.
 These include inflation below target, a few aspects of labor
market performance, and international concerns as the
Committee statement mentioned.

But the idea of normalization is entirely consistent with
desires to address these concerns through continued policy
accommodation.

It’s all good
In short, even during normalization, the Fed’s highly
accommodative policy will be putting upward pressure on
inflation, encouraging continued improvement in labor
markets, and providing the best contribution to global growth
that we can provide.
I will now turn to the very strong case for normalization.

The strong case for normalization

The case for normalization

The case for normalization is simple: The Committee’s goals
have essentially been met, but the Committee’s policy
settings remain stuck in emergency mode.

Committee goals have essentially been met …

The Committee wants unemployment at its long-run level
and inflation of 2 percent.
The Committee is about as close to meeting these objectives
as it has ever been in the past 50 years.

… but policy remains a long way from normal
The Committee’s policy settings are at emergency levels.
The Fed’s balance sheet has ballooned to about $4.5 trillion.
 The 2006 balance sheet was about $800 billion.

The policy rate remains at about 13 basis points, where it has
been for nearly seven years.
 The Committee thinks the long-run level of the policy rate
should be about 350 basis points.

No satisfactory answer
Why do the Committee’s policy settings remain so far from
normal when the objectives have essentially been met?
The Committee has not, in my view, provided a satisfactory
answer to this question.

Prudent monetary policy
A prudent monetary policy based on traditional central
banking principles would begin normalizing the Committee’s
policy settings gradually, since the goals of policy have
essentially been met.

Still extremely accommodative
For those who still think more accommodation is needed—do
not worry!
Policy will remain exceptionally accommodative through the
medium term no matter how the Committee proceeds.
This means there will continue to be upward pressure on
inflation and downward pressure on unemployment.

The argument in pictures
The remainder of this talk tells this story with pictures.

Committee objectives essentially met

Committee objectives essentially met
Again, the Committee wants unemployment at its long-run
level and inflation of 2 percent.
The Committee is about as close to meeting these objectives
as it has ever been in the past 50 years.

Unemployment relative to Fed objective

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: August 2014.

Labor market conditions above average
Some want to consider broader metrics that get at different
features of labor markets.
A labor market conditions index takes into account many
different aspects of labor market performance.
Labor market conditions by this type of metric are much
better than the long-run average.

LMCI relative to long-run average

Source: Federal Reserve Board and author’s calculations. Last observation: August 2014.

Inflation relative to Fed objective

Source: FRB Dallas and Bureau of Economic Analysis. Last observation: July 2014.

How far is the Fed from its goals?
The distance of the economy from the FOMC’s goals can be
measured with a simple objective function:
Distance from goals = (𝜋𝜋 − 𝜋𝜋 ∗ )2 +(𝑢𝑢 − 𝑢𝑢∗ )2 .

 𝜋𝜋 is inflation and 𝜋𝜋 ∗ is the target rate of inflation, in percentage
points.
 𝑢𝑢 is the unemployment rate and 𝑢𝑢∗ is the long-run average rate
of unemployment.

This version puts equal weight on inflation and
unemployment and is sometimes used to evaluate various
policy options.

Using the objective function
Set 𝜋𝜋 ∗ = 2%, the FOMC’s inflation target.

For 𝜋𝜋 I will use the year-over-year core PCE inflation rate.

Set 𝑢𝑢∗ = 4.9%, the median longer-run value of the September
FOMC Summary of Economic Projections.
Take the square root of the objective function values for
better scaling.
Lower values are better.
How far away is the FOMC from its goals?

Distance from goals since 1960

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics
and author’s calculations. Last observation: July 2015.

Policy settings far from normal

Fed balance sheet

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: week of September 16, 2015.

Fed policy rate

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: week of September 16, 2015.

A long, long way to go
With the balance sheet exceptionally large and the policy rate
exceptionally low, there is little chance monetary policy will
be restrictive any time soon.
The Committee currently expects the policy rate to approach
a long-run normal level several years from now.
To actually implement what would traditionally be viewed as
a restrictive monetary policy—one that would put downward
pressure on inflation—the policy rate would have to exceed
the long-run normal level.
That is not happening for many years.

Prudent monetary policy

Prudent monetary policy

A prudent monetary policy based on traditional central
banking principles would begin to return policy settings to
normal levels over the medium term.
Advantages:
 Policy settings return to historical norms.
 Policy accommodation still provided during the transition.
 Higher probability of a longer expansion.

Conclusions

Conclusions
A large majority of the FOMC projects that policy
normalization will commence this year.
The case for policy normalization is quite strong, since
Committee objectives have essentially been met.
Monetary policy will remain exceptionally accommodative,
putting upward pressure on inflation and downward pressure
on unemployment, even as policy settings are gradually
normalized.

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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