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Permazero as a Possible
Medium-term Outcome for
the U.S. and the G-7
James Bullard
President and CEO, FRB-St. Louis
FRB of Philadelphia Policy Forum
The New Normal for the U.S. Economy
4 December 2015
Philadelphia, Pa.
Any opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee.

Introduction

Permazero
The title of this conference is “The New Normal for the U.S.
Economy.”
In this spirit, I will discuss some recent “neo-Fisherian” ideas
and what they might mean for the U.S. economy over the
medium term.
 J. Bullard, 2015, “Permazero,” speech delivered at the Cato Institute’s
33rd Annual Monetary Conference, Washington, D.C.
 J. Cochrane, 2015, “Permazero,” blog post on The Grumpy Economist,
November 12.
 J. Taylor, 2015. “Staggering Neo-Fisherian Ideas and Staggered
Contracts,” blog post on Economics One, November 22.

Permazero
These ideas may be quite important for the U.S. and the G-7
over the medium term.
At this point they are untested and remain topics for monetary
policy research.

My Current Policy Recommendations

My current policy recommendations
I continue to be an advocate for beginning policy
normalization.
My argument has been that the FOMC’s goals have been
met, while the FOMC’s policy settings remain extreme.
The goals: Labor markets are close to normal, and inflation
net of the oil price shock is reasonably close to target.
The policy settings: The policy rate remains 325 basis points
below the FOMC’s long-run level, and the balance sheet is
more than $3.5 trillion larger than its pre-crisis level.
Prudent policy suggests edging the policy rate and the
balance sheet toward more normal levels.

The 1984-2007 macroeconomic equilibrium
Implicit in my argument is a desire to return to the 1984-2007
macroeconomic equilibrium. Why?





Relatively long economic expansions.
Relatively shallow recessions.
Relatively good monetary policy.
Well understood by policymakers and financial markets.

That equilibrium was associated with a higher nominal
interest rate structure than we have today.
However, what if we cannot return to such a situation?

Rethinking Monetary Policy

Rethinking monetary policy
Let’s suppose, for the sake of argument, that we will not
return to the 1984-2007 equilibrium.
What are the implications for the future of monetary policy?
This is an interesting scenario because:
 The U.S. has already been at the zero lower bound (ZLB) for
seven years.
 G-7 average short-term nominal interest rates will not be far off
zero over the medium term, even with liftoff in the U.S. and
U.K.
 Negative shocks are always possible, which may push shortterm nominal rates back to the ZLB.

Permazero

ZIRP as an interest rate peg
Zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) has usually been viewed as
temporary and as part of a policy reaction to a very large
macroeconomic shock.
But ZIRP has been in place for seven years, far beyond
ordinary business cycle time.
Arguably, this is an interest rate peg—a constant value of the
policy rate independent of changes in macroeconomic
conditions.

An interest rate peg?

Source: OECD’s Main Economic Indicators, Bank of England’s Inflation Report November 2015
and author’s calculations. Last observation: October 2015.

An interest rate peg as poor policy
1970s view: An interest rate peg is poor monetary policy.
See, for instance, Sargent and Wallace (1975).*
Basic argument: Trying to keep the short-term nominal
interest rate unnaturally low would lead to instability in the
form of very high inflation.
Yet today we have had ZIRP for seven years, and inflation
remains below target.
 Perhaps inflation is still in the pipeline?
 Or, perhaps, is it time for a new model?

* T.J. Sargent and N. Wallace. 1975. “Rational” Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the
Optimal Money Supply Rule. Journal of Political Economy, 83(2), pp. 241-54.

Neo-Fisherian ideas
The core neo-Fisherian idea is that the interest rate peg may
not be unstable as Sargent and Wallace suggested, but instead
can be stable under some circumstances.
ZIRP, far from being a harbinger of runaway inflation, would
instead dictate medium- and long-term inflation outcomes.
The “neo-Fisherian” label comes from emphasizing that the
Fisher equation (nominal interest rate = real rate + expected
inflation) holds in all modern macroeconomic models.
Implication: If the private sector determines the real rate,
then the nominal interest rate policy choice determines the
expected rate of inflation.

Cochrane (2015)

Cochrane (2015)
John Cochrane (2015) provides a recent analysis of this issue
in the most standard of macroeconomic models used for
monetary policy, the linearized three equation New
Keynesian model.
 J.H. Cochrane, 2015. “Do Higher Interest Rates Raise or Lower
Inflation?” Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago
Booth School of Business.

Cochrane’s message: Neo-Fisherian effects can be very
important even in the most ordinary of macroeconomic
models.

Standard NK model *
Intertemporal Euler equation

Phillips curve

𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1 − 𝜎𝜎 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡

 xt: output gap
 it: nominal interest rate
 πt: inflation

* For textbook treatments see J. Galí, 2015, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle, Second ed,
PUP, Princeton, N.J. and M. Woodford, 2003, Interest and Prices, PUP, Princeton, N.J.

Solution via Werning (2012) *
Fundamental (i.e., no sunspots) solution
∞
∞
𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
−𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡+1 =
� 𝜆𝜆1 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 + � 𝜆𝜆2 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆1 − 𝜆𝜆2
𝑗𝑗=0
𝑗𝑗=1
𝜅𝜅𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1

𝜅𝜅𝜅𝜅
=
𝜆𝜆1 − 𝜆𝜆2

∞
𝛽𝛽
−𝑗𝑗
1−
� 𝜆𝜆1 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−𝑗𝑗 +
𝜆𝜆1
𝑗𝑗=0
∞
𝛽𝛽
𝑗𝑗
1−
� 𝜆𝜆2 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡+1 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡+𝑗𝑗
𝜆𝜆2
𝑗𝑗=1

𝜆𝜆2 < 1 < 𝜆𝜆1

* I. Werning, 2012. Managing a Liquidity Trap: Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Unpublished manuscript, MIT.

Aspects of the equilibrium
The policymaker is choosing the interest rate sequence, and
the rest of the model is tracing out the effects on the output
gap and inflation.
Inflation adjusts to the choice of interest rate sequence.
A low interest rate sequence choice, such as a ZIRP, puts
downward pressure on inflation.
This is shown on the right hand side of the following chart.
If the ZIRP continues indefinitely, then nothing further
happens in this economy.
 This is “permazero.”

A 200 bps. policy rate decrease

Source: Author’s calculations based on Cochrane (2015).

Policy implications for current events
The policy implications of neo-Fisherian ideas are profound.
The continuing G-7 ZIRP, far from putting dangerous
upward pressure on inflation, may be leading us to an
outcome with low nominal interest rates and low inflation
that can last for a very long time.
This contrasts sharply with conventional wisdom and central
bank rhetoric, including my own, which emphasizes that the
ZIRP is putting upward pressure on inflation and offers the
best hope for returning inflation to target.
Thus neo-Fisherian ideas provide food for thought.

Reversibility
Authors like Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001)
suggest that a low nominal interest, low inflation equilibrium
is a steady state which is difficult to exit.*
In contrast, Cochrane’s analysis suggests that inflation will
return to target if the interest rate sequence is set
appropriately.
To see this, consider the same policy experiment as in the
previous chart, but after seven years at zero the policymaker
gradually returns the policy rate to its previous level.

* J. Benhabib, S. Schmitt-Grohé and M. Uribe, 2001. The Perils of Taylor Rules.
Journal of Economic Theory, 96(1-2), pp. 40-69.

A gradual policy rate increase

Source: Author’s calculations based on Cochrane (2015).

Empirical Evidence

Empirical evidence
How does it match up with actual experience?
To try to get a handle on this in one graph, I will look at the
G-7 averages for short-term nominal interest rates and
inflation since 2002.
 G-7 policy is unlikely to significantly deviate from ZIRP over
the medium term.

The Lehman-AIG event (September 2008) sent G-7 policy
rates to near zero.
After the crisis, G-7 inflation returned to target.
Since 2012, however, inflation has drifted lower by about
300 basis points.

G-7 countries’ aggregated inflation and policy rates

Source: OECD’s Main Economic Indicators and author’s calculations. Last observation: October 2015.

Interpreting the empirical evidence
This could be interpreted as neo-Fisherian effects taking hold.
 Of course, one has to be careful with any interpretation of the
data, since other shocks have occurred during the last 3.5 years,
including a very large oil price decline.

If ZIRP was sufficient to drive inflation back to target by
2012, why has continued ZIRP not kept inflation close to
target or pushed it even higher?

Consequences

Consequences
Suppose we do remain at zero or near-zero policy rates over
the medium term due to neo-Fisherian effects.
What are the consequences? How should we think of such a
situation?
I can think of six areas on which we may want to focus.

Six possible consequences of neo-Fisherianism
Promises to keep the policy rate at zero simply reinforce the
equilibrium and do not have conventional expansionary
effects. Policymakers would have to come to grips with this.
Inflation remains persistently below target. Policymakers
may wish to lower the inflation target to match actual
outcomes.
Longer-run growth is driven by human capital accumulation
and technological progress. This would continue to be true,
so policymakers could expect normal growth.

Six possible consequences of neo-Fisherianism
The Friedman rule would arguably be achieved. This is a
good outcome in many monetary theory contexts.
The risk of asset price fluctuations may be high, with
unknown consequences.
 A standard theoretical result in the New Keynesian model is
that under an interest rate peg there are many alternative
equilibria which can be highly volatile.

The limits on normal monetary policy through its inability to
adjust short-term nominal interest rates would continue to put
heavy pressure on alternative conceptions of monetary
policy, such as quantitative easing.

Summary

Summary
My current policy position remains in favor of beginning
policy normalization in the U.S.
Consistent with the theme of this conference, I have focused
on issues that may be important for the medium- and longterm monetary policy outlook.
Neo-Fisherian ideas may have an important impact on our
thinking about monetary policy in the future.

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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