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More on the Changing
Imperatives for U.S.
Monetary Policy
Normalization
James Bullard
President and CEO, FRB-St. Louis
Money Marketeers of New York University
24 February 2016
New York, N.Y.
Any opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee.

Introduction

Main idea*
The case for monetary policy normalization in 2015 rested on
some key assumptions.
Two important aspects of this case have changed in 2016:
 Inflation expectations have fallen further.
 The risk of asset price bubbles over the medium term appears
to have diminished.

These data-based developments have given the Fed more
leeway in its normalization program.

* This is a revised and updated version of J. Bullard Changing Imperatives for U.S. Monetary Policy Normalization,
remarks delivered at the CFA Society St. Louis, February 17, 2016.

Themes in this talk
Have inflation expectations fallen too far for comfort?
Has the global sell-off in equity markets reduced the risk of
asset price bubbles over the medium term?
U.S. growth and labor market prospects remain reasonable.
Monetary policy needs to be more clearly data dependent.
 Should the Fed rethink the Summary of Economic Projections
(SEP)?

Inflation Expectations Declining

Normalization and data developments
The case for normalization in the U.S. during 2015 rested on
several pillars:
1. Stable inflation expectations.
2. Fully recovered labor markets.
3. Further labor market gains putting upward pressure on
inflation over the medium term and returning inflation to
target.
4. Remaining at a zero policy rate with increasingly tight labor
markets risks fueling destabilizing asset price bubbles.

Actual macroeconomic developments during 2016 are calling
1 and 4 into question.

Declining market-based inflation expectations
Modern theory suggests that inflation expectations are a more
important determinant of actual inflation than traditional
“Phillips curve” effects.*
Market-based measures of inflation expectations have been
declining in the U.S. since the summer of 2014.
The decline has been highly correlated with the decline in oil
prices.

* See J.M. Piger and R.H. Rasche. 2008. Inflation: Do Expectations Trump the Gap?
International Journal of Central Banking, 4(4), pp. 85-116.

Crude oil price and expected inflation

Source: Energy Information Administration and Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: February 19, 2016.

Declining CPI inflation breakeven rates

July 1, 2014

February 18, 2016 Difference

2-year *

188

103

– 85

5-year **

200

102

– 98

10-year **

226

124

– 102

5-year forward **

252

146

– 106

*

Inflation compensation: continuously compounded zero-coupon yields (basis points).
Breakeven inflation rates (basis points).

**

Source: Haver Analytics and Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: February 18, 2016.

Too far for comfort
I suggested during 2015 that inflation expectations would
return to previous levels, such as those observed on July 1,
2014, once oil prices stabilized.
Oil prices did not stabilize and instead fell further beginning
in November 2015.
Now I think market-based measures of inflation expectations
have declined too far for comfort, the oil price correlation
notwithstanding.
 The expectations in the previous table are for CPI inflation.
PCE inflation expectations would be approximately 30 basis
points lower.

Inflation expectations need to stabilize
The FOMC’s normalization strategy is predicated on an
environment of stable inflation expectations.
Renewed downward pressure on market-based measures of
inflation expectations during 2016 has called this assumption
into question.
I regard it as unwise to continue a normalization strategy in
an environment of declining market-based inflation
expectations.
A decline in inflation expectations represents an erosion of
central bank credibility with respect to the inflation target.

Decomposing inflation compensation
Some argue that TIPS-based measures of inflation
compensation can be decomposed into components
representing inflation expectations, risk premia and liquidity
premia.
It is then sometimes argued that the components other than
inflation expectations are rather large and volatile.
 N. Gospodinov, P. Tkac and B. Wei. Are Long-Term Inflation
Expectations Declining? Not So Fast, Says Atlanta Fed, macroblog
post of January 15, 2016.
 M.D. Bauer and E. McCarthy, 2015. Can We Rely on Market-Based
Inflation Forecasts? FRBSF Economic Letter 2015-30.

Decomposing inflation compensation
I find these arguments unpersuasive.
This analysis is sensitive to the underlying assumptions.
My preferred interpretation is that risk and liquidity premia
associated with inflation compensation are relatively small
with low volatility.
Hence, I interpret declines in TIPS spreads as reflecting
mostly declines in inflation expectations.

The Eurozone Experience

What could go wrong?
Suppose market-based measures of inflation expectations
continue to slide—what might be the ultimate result?
Arguably, the euro area reacted too slowly to this type of
development before ultimately committing to a major
quantitative easing program in January 2015.
The result has been uncomfortably low inflation in the euro
area, which is now not projected to rise to target for some
time.
Ten-year bond yields in Europe have dropped to the same
level as those in Japan and Switzerland, arguably because the
credibility of the inflation target has eroded.

The euro area joins Japan and Switzerland

Source: U.S. Treasury, Deutsche Bundesbank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of England, Ministry of Finance of Japan.
Last observation: February 23, 2016.

Interpreting government bond yields since 2012
These countries have similar inflation goals.
Arguably, expected real rates of return on bonds of the same
maturity are equated across these countries.
What is different is that longer-term inflation credibility may
differ across countries.
As of January 2012, the U.S., U.K. and Germany were
considered relatively credible, while Japan and Switzerland
were considered less credible.
Since then, Germany has moved from the relatively credible
group to the less credible group.

Asset Price Bubbles

The specter of asset price bubbles
Asset price bubbles have plagued the U.S. economy over the
last two decades.
Steps toward normalization of U.S. monetary policy help to
lessen the risk that very low interest rates might feed into a
third major asset price bubble in the U.S.
The recent sell-off in global equity markets, along with
increases in risk spreads in corporate bond markets, may have
made this risk less of a concern over the medium term.

Some recent historical context on equity prices

Source: Dow Jones. Last observation: February 19, 2016.

High-yield spread

Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch. Last observation: February 22, 2016.

U.S. Growth and Labor Market Prospects

U.S. growth and labor market prospects
My arguments related to inflation expectations and asset
price developments are not predicated on a particularly weak
U.S. economic outlook.
I expect 2016 U.S. economic growth to be stronger than last
year, and I expect U.S. labor markets to continue to improve.
I also expect global growth to be stronger in 2016 than it was
last year.

U.S. GDP growth

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Blue Chip Economic Indicators. Last observation: 2015.

U.S. unemployment

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Blue Chip Economic Indicators. Last observation: December 2015.

Global GDP growth according to the IMF

Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Update, January 2016. Last observation: 2015.

The FOMC and Data Dependence

The FOMC and data dependence
The FOMC has repeatedly stated in official communication
and in public commentary that future policy adjustments are
data dependent.
Do financial markets believe the data dependence clause?
Based on the following two observations, it is possible to
make a case that they do not:
 The 2004-2006 normalization cycle appeared to be mechanical.
 The Committee’s SEP may be unintentionally communicating a
version of the 2004-2006 normalization cycle.

The FOMC policy rate 2004-2006

Source: Federal Reserve Board. Last observation: week of December 27, 2006.

The median appropriate policy rate in the SEP

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Summary of Economic Projections, December 16, 2015.

The SEP as an inadvertent commitment
Global financial markets might be forgiven if they see
similarities in these two pictures, and therefore essentially
expect a repeat of the 2004-2006 calendar-based
normalization cycle.
The policy rate component of the SEP was perhaps more
useful when the policy rate was near zero.
During some of that period, the Committee wished to commit
to the idea that the policy rate was likely to remain near zero
for some period into the future.

The SEP as an inadvertent commitment post liftoff
But now, post liftoff, communicating a path for the policy
rate via the median of the SEP could be viewed as an
inadvertent calendar-based commitment to increase rates.
While the Committee has certainly stressed data dependence,
its past behavior belies that emphasis and therefore may not
carry as much weight as it should with the financial markets.

Possible changes to the SEP?
The FOMC cannot alter history and change what happened in
2004-2006.
However, the FOMC could change its approach to the SEP in
a way that would cease giving such explicit guidance on the
likely path of the policy rate going forward.
Such a change might help better align the Committee with
financial markets on the idea that policy is data dependent
and does not follow a predetermined path.
This is an important issue for the Committee to consider.

Summary

Summary
Two important pillars of the 2015 case for U.S. monetary
policy normalization have changed.
These changes are that market-based inflation expectations
have fallen further and that the risk of asset price bubbles
appears to have diminished.
These data-dependent changes likely give the FOMC more
leeway in its normalization program.
The Committee may wish to consider changes to the way it
approaches the policy rate projections in the SEP to better
align market expectations of future policy moves.

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