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THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF MONETARY POLICY

Remarks by
HUGH D. GALUSHA, JR.
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis

at the

49th Annual Conference
National Association of Mutual Savings Banks

Leamington Hotel
Minneapolis, Minnesota
May 26, 1969

THE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF MONETARY POLICY
The announced theme of your conference is enough to give pause even
to one who cut his professional teeth on the Internal Revenue Code.
"How to Disinflate Without Deflating an Overexuberant Economy.11

It is

If I may

translate, Mr. Ensley and his associates have really posed two questions:

Can

we stop inflation without at the same time pushing the unemployment rate up
to 5 per cent, say, or even 6 per cent?
concern about the unemployment rate?

Are there other constraints than

I am to tell you, I believe, how I, as

an officer of the Federal Reserve System answer these questions.

As to my first question:

My difficulty— and in Mr. Stein’s presence,

I admit this with some reluctance— is that I am unsure that we, the Federal
Reserve and the Administration, can stop inflation without sharply increasing
the unemployment rate— or pushing it up to a level which, given the present
unemployment compensation program, would be socially intolerable.

It has been

suggested that we can; I hope we can; but I have been unable to rid myself of
all doubt.
Postwar experience, of the United States and other western countries
as well, suggests that there is an unfortunate relationship between prices and
unemployment— an economic law, if you will— which binds the Federal Reserve
and the Administration.

Simply put, it is this: the lower the unemployment

rate, the more rapidly prices increase.
You will recall that the United States had virtual price stability
for an extended period from the beginning of 1961, or even before, until mid1965.

But during this period, the overall unemployment rate, while trending

down, nevertheless averaged nearly 6 per cent.

Since the beginning of 1966

it has averaged only a little more than half that rate, or about 3 1/2 per
cent.

And over this period, as we are all too well aware, prices have

increased sharply.



To a first approximation, then recent United States

experience is consistent with that unpleasant but seemingly inexorable economic
law I mentioned.

It suggests that a return to reasonable price stability

could well involve a considerable increase in the unemployment rate, and
therefore possibly even more social strife than lately we have had.

The discovery of an apparent relationship between the rate of
inflation and the unemployment rate goes back now quite a few years.

And

for rather a long time after the discovery, until quite recently in fact,
economists were pretty much agreed that this relationship was, as they say,
stable, and therefore afforded policy-makers some limited freedom of choice.
Holding to a particular unemployment rate, 4 per cent perhaps, would ensure
a steady rate of inflation of, say, perhaps 2 or 3 per cent per year —
after year —
a choice.

indefinitely into the future.

year

Policy-makers could therefore make

They might decide to accept a somewhat higher unemployment rate,

and get in exchange a little lower rate of inflation; or they might decide
on a somewhat lower unemployment, if they were willing, as it were, to pay
the price of a little higher, but still steady, rate of inflation.

There are still many economists, the majority perhaps, who believe
that the unemployment/inflation relationship is stable, within some range
anyway, and that, in the medium-term at least, policy-makers do have a certain
freedom of choice.

But increasingly it is being argued that price stability,

accompanied by whatever unemployment rate is required (maybe 5 per cent, or
even 6), is the only lasting alternative.

And why?

Simply because if wage

earners come to count on further price increases, they will demand still
greater money wage increases, with the result that inflation will accelerate.
Thus, the psychology of expectations enters the picture and upsets what other­
wise might be a stable relationship.




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All economists, of whatever persuasion, would agree that runaway
inflation is intolerable.

But if those economists who believe that any in­

crease in prices is bound to accelerate are correct and price inflation
does tend to become self-generating, then there is not only a justification
to accept whatever unemployment rate is required to achieve reasonable price
stability, there is a compulsion to do so.

The argument that policy-makers

have no choice, under conditions of inflation such as we are now experiencing,
but to allow unemployment to increase is therefore convenient.
it may also be correct.

Moreover,

Possibly it is wishful thinking, but I am still

inclined to believe that policy-makers do have at least a limited freedom
of choice, but the fact is that, in the United States anyway, we have not
had enough experience with inflation to know whether this is so.

Here, however, what is important is that few if any economists
would maintain that price stability can be achieved at an unemployment rate
of, say,

3h

per cent, which is about todayTs rate, or even 4 per cent.

Those who believe that the relationship between the rate of inflation and
the unemployment rate is stable would not maintain this.

Nor, so far as I

am aware, would those who believe that the relationship is unstable.

I sometimes find myself thinking that any time all, or most,
economists are agreed, they are almost certainly wrong.
in this instance.

But not, I would bet,

It seems to me reasonable that if inflation is to be

stopped, then a rather considerable increase in the unemployment rate is going
to be necessary.

I do not, particularly with this audience, have to go on at any
length about the desirability of restoring reasonable price stability.




Let

me remind you, though, of what has happened to the United States balance of
payments, and more particularly the so-called balance on goods and services.
In 1964 this balance was roughly $8.5 billion on the plus side; in 1968 it
was a little less than $2 billion.
all practical purposes, zero.

In the first quarter of 1969 it was, for

It would be quite wrong, of course, to chalk up

the whole of this decrease to inflation, but certainly a portion must be.

For some, perfectly flexible exchange rates are the way to deal
with inflation.

No doubt the western world needs greater flexibility of

exchange rates, but that it should have perfectly flexible rates is not
obvious, at least to me.
inflation.

Anyway, what I would stress is the unfairness of

It is a tax, the incidence of which, so far as I can see, is

socially and economically indefensible.

Ultimately, this is why we should

strive for reasonable price stability.

But if inflation is unfair, so is unemployment.
can result in social unrest, so can unemployment.

And if inflation

Of this we must all be

aware.

I may seem to have come round to a rather desperate conclusion:
reasonable price stability and full employment are both well-nigh imperative,
and yet, as objectives, they may well be contradictory.
it.

I want not to believe

Fortunately we have a few options left, for this country has not done

as much as it might to take the sting out of inflation or, more reasonably,
out of unemployment.

The Congress has periodically adjusted social security benefits, and
in so doing has helped make inflation less inequitable in its impact, at least




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for a particular group in our society.
we can go.

I question, however, how much further

We are not altogether sure of what, in detail, the

impact of inflation is.

We should know much more than we do.

But knowing

more, I wonder if the government could, or should, do a great deal more than
it has to take the sting out of inflation.

It is easier after the fact to identify those who are hurt by an
increase in the unemployment rate.

Even before the fact, I suspect,

identifying those who will likely be hurt is not all that difficult.
being a labor market expert, I should not sound too confident.

Not

But this

is my feeling.

What comes to mind, of course, is a considerable expansion of the
country’s unemployment compensation program.

Such an expansion must, how­

ever, in circumstances like those of today, be financed by an increase in
taxes or, as I would prefer, cutbacks in present low-priority governmental
programs, of which there would seem to be quite a few.

And I have in mind

changing our conception of what unemployment compensation is.

For what is

the good of a program which compensates only those who have lost jobs,
when many who are unemployed have never had jobs to lose?

And make no

mistake; an increase in the overall unemployment rate is likely to be
accompanied by a disproportionately large increase in the unemployment rate
for the relatively young, white and black.

Rather than simply doling out

money, it would be better, of course, to spend it on education for the
unemployed.

For older workers, doling out money, even for an extended period,

may be appropriate.

I think not, though, for younger workers.

The essence

of an efficient Workmen's Compensation Program is the rehabilitation and




5

retraining of the physically injured worker.

It would seem useful to at

least explore the same approach to the economically injured worker.

Let me not bore you, however, with details.
a simple point, maybe even an obvious point.
our stabilization dilemma.

I wanted only to make

There is an economic solution to

It carries a price tag of admittedly unknown amounts

in an increase in unemployment.

But the fact it exists means it is an inhibitor

operating on both fiscal and monetary policy.

If we can find ways to take some

of the sting out of unemployment, and free up policy makers, stopping inflation
will be made a lot easier.

It may cost a good deal of money, but inflation is

a sufficient evil and our social problems sufficiently pressing to warrant
reassessing some of our priorities.
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If you want, you can think of what I have said so far as an elaborate
excuse for why has the Federal Reserve System not been more restrictive than it
has.

I might point out parenthetically though, the last few months have seen

an increase in monetary restraint, however defined.

Interest rates are higher,

on average, than they were at the end of 1968.

The rate of growth of the

money stock is nothing like as high as it was.

Nor is the rate of growth of

bank credit.

But still one may ask, though, why we have not had an even

sharper increase in monetary restraint -- if imaginable, an increase sufficiently
sharp to stop the economy dead in its tracks, as it were.

I have spent considerable time explaining one of the constraints which
is the realization that a sharp increase in unemployment would almost certainly
result from any all-out attempt to stop inflation.

Monetary policy has also

been constrained, although to a lesser extent, by the knowledge of what happened
in 1966.

In that context, I should like to say a few words about monetary

policy and thrift institutions.




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What I argued a few moments ago was that we have to change our
unemployment compensation program, and thereby unfetter stabilization
policy, or free it so that it can be used vigorously to deal with inflation.
And what I shall argue now is that we require a modification of the
practices of thrift institutions, so that the Federal Reserve can be freer
than it has been to do what the economic outlook seems to demand -- and
freer, I might add, to keep the growth of the money stock within reasonable
bounds.

We are all familiar with what happened to housing starts in 1966.
It is rather remarkable, in light of what happened then, that in April, 1969
housing starts were about what they were in July, 1968.
many explanations:
units.

There are probably

among them, the switch from single- to multiple-family

Nor can the Interest Rate Control Act, passed in September, 1966,

be ignored.

The decrease in housing starts in 1966, which began not at the

time of the crunch in August and September, but almost six months earlier
in March, 1966, must be traced in part to commercial banks having success­
fully competed funds away from thrift institutions, mutual savings banks and
savings and loan associations.

This time, however, they have not been able

to do so, largely perhaps because of the 1966 law which has prevented them
from increasing deposit rates.

As a result, the supply of single-unit

mortgage funds has not contracted as much as it did in 1966.




It is not slighting the managements of savings banks and savings

7

and loan associations to say that, collectively, their institutions lost funds
to commercial banks in 1966.
not at issue.

The competence of these managements is certainly

There are other reasons.

Among those frequently heard is that

these institutions lend longer, on average, than do commercial banks, so
their portfolio rates of return change more slowly than do those of commercial
banks.

This undoubtedly explains, at least in part, what happened in 1966 —

why commercial banks were able to gain funds at the expense of savings banks
and savings and loan associations, and why a few savings and loan associations,
in trying to keep their funds, almost went under.

What I cannot grasp, however, is why their lending longer, on
average, than commercial banks means that savings banks and savings and
loan associations can never compete successfully for funds during periods
when interest rates are increasing.

Or why their lending longer, on

average, means we need to regulate rates paid by thrift institutions, and
stifle competition.

As a supporter of the market place, I must confess to

not liking the Interest Rate Control Act, although I did in 1966 see the need
for temporarily limiting competition.

What I am not persuaded of is the

long-term need for the Act.

The point is surely that if savings banks and savings and loan
associations are relatively bad off during periods when interest rates are
increasing, they are relatively well off during periods when interest rates
are decreasing.

Unless it is insisted that there is a trend to interest

rates, then over the cycle these institutions are not, by virtue of the kind
of loans they make, at any competitive disadvantage.




8

It might help if thrift institutions were able to diversify their
liabilities more than they have, and lengthen their average maturity.

It

might also help if they were able to diversify their assets, and perhaps
shorten their average maturity.

It is not inconceivable some totally new

approaches might not be useful.

At the risk of raising a few eyebrows, I

might suggest securing authority to make variable-interest mortgage loans.
Or authority to pay out on occasion more than they earn.

This would also

require, on occasion, paying out less than is earned, so that, on average,
no more would be paid out than is justified by what is earned on loans.
Financing could be required, of course.
pay more attention to liquidity.

Thrift institutions might have to

But to repeat, what is fundamental is that

thrift institutions be enabled to take the long view.

If they do, then gov­

ernmental agencies will not need to regulate interest payments, which I
dislike our doing.

And the Federal Reserve will be able to tolerate greater

fluctuations in interest rates, as it must if it is going to pay more attention
to how the money stock behaves and if, as I hope, we are sometime going to
try to get by with fewer direct controls on international capital flows.
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It was not my intention to come here and, as the saying goes,
leave you laughing.
provocative.

I have not meant to be outrageous, but rather responsibly

I hope I have given you something to think about.

It turns out that I have been faithful in a way to the title
Mr. Ensley gave me.

I have talked, if not about what effective monetary policy

is, then about how monetary policy can be made more effective -- or how it
can be freed from some of the present constraints.
seems to me, is to do just that.




The important thing, it

The Federal Reserve does not lack the will.

9

It is just that its world is very complex, more complex than that of its
critics.

But with certain changes in institutions, its world would be

simpler and it would be freer to seek reasonable price stability and a
more satisfactory balance on international account.




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