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For release on
Friday, Apr. 21, 1967
at:12 :30 p.m. EST




Monetary Policy and Municipal Finance
Remarks of George W. Mitchell
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
at the
Annual Seminar
of the
California Municipal Treasurers' Association
Anaheim, California
April 21, 1967

Monetary Policy and Municipal Finance
Superficially, municipal finance officers and central bankers
would not seem to have much in common.

But it is not inappropriate

that I should be here speaking about monetary policy, for monetary
policy affects interest rates and interest rates affect your business.
And to be more specific, your response to changing interest rates has
something to do with the efficiency with which you manage your
governments' finances.
No doubt there are many occasions on which you have been
puzzled or exasperated at the trend of monetary policy because of
the uncertainty and frustration it has introduced into your capital
spending plans and financing.

I should confess that there are occasions

on which 1 have been puzzled and exasperated at your behavior, too.
Why is it that you insist on embarking on municipal projects of less,
as well as greater, priority when everyone else in the nation is also
straining to commandeer more resources in manpower, materials and
equipment than are available?

In this environment, prudence and

economic sense point to deferral of marginal projects in the interest
of lower costs and better quality.

But often spending and financing

plans only become more elaborate and costly and administrations more
determined to carry them out promptly.
The tendency of States and localities to ignore the state of
the economy in making their commitments to capital spending or
borrowing has no simple or obvious explanation.

Governments are not

motivated -as are corporations by Large fluctuations in cash flow from
profits or countercyclical tax concessions.




Few sections of the country

-2are under such population pressures for new facilities that they cannot
defer or alter timing of some projects within the period of several
months or even a year.
Despite the fact that States and localities have been doing
a vastly better job of planning public investment than they did 30
years ago, it probably takes the euphoria of sustained good times to
secure final public approval of many shelf-type items.

Moreover, in

such a booming atmosphere lush scales of private expenditures often
have substantial upgrading effects on the quality and type of public
facilities.

Prosperity unleashes exuberance which unblocks long­

standing fiscal and institutional restraints.

Under these buoyant

conditions timing of public works expenditure or borrowing can easily
become a secondary consideration.

Why wait or why not accelerate?

What assurances can be given that there are advantages to altering
time schedules in order to save interest or construction costs?
Most local financial officials have been advised to borrow when they
need the money, not before, and not to attempt to play the bond market.
For perfectly obvious reasons I am not prepared to come
forward with a bond market forecast today.

But I do want to suggest

in a realistic actual context how you might view the past behavior
of long-term interest rates and some of the factors influencing
interest rates for the future.

My hope would be to convince you

that your attitude toward the interest costs of your governments
need not be a know-nothing one and that you can make better judgments
on timing than chance will make for you.




-3To be as specific as possible, I asked Paul F. McGouldrick
of our staff to consider the influences operating on long-term rates over
the next three years. His resulting blend of analysis, forecast, and
prophecy was prepared under a tight deadline, and hence is essentially
speculative and should not be interpreted as more than one expert's
insight.

Nevertheless, the forecast does provide a convenient frame­

work within which to consider the points I want to make today.
His exercise in crystal ball gazing starts with the following
assumptions on the overall state of the nation and the economy:
(1) During the next 36 months taken as a whole, GNP in current
dollars will grow at an average rate sufficient to keep the labor force
close to full employment, but somewhat below the 6.6 per cent per year
average growth rate that prevailed between 1960 and 1966.
(2) There will be no substantial degree of inflation.

While

consumer prices will continue to edge higher, the rate of increase
will be below the 1966 rate; and the wholesale price index will be
close to stable.
(3Expenditures directly and indirectly related to national
security and the war in South Vietnam will remain at about their
current proportion to GNP, or there will be a countervailing expansion
of non-military spending if the Vietnam conflict is settled and other
military outlays (including a possible anti-missile system) do not
offset the consequent saving or a reduction in taxes.
His overall conclusion is that it is very probable that the
long upward trend in the interest cost of borrowing between 1945 and
1960 will not be resumed during the next three years.




Long-term

-4-

interest rates reached near-historic highs during 1966; and a projection
of demands for loanable funds indicates that in the absence of serious
inflation, no unusual circumstances exist that would tend to drive
interest rates above peaks established over nearly a century of
recorded behavior.
From 1900 to 1920, these peaks were reached in yields on
high-grade railroad bonds which averaged slightly under 6.00 per cent;
and the six per cent barrier was breached only for short periods in
1907, 1920, and 1921.

The mistakes in Federal Reserve policy in 1920-21

are unlikely to be repeated.

During most of the 1920's, both high-grade

railroad and high-grade corporate bond yields were somewhat lower than
the levels reached during the late summer of last year.
Looking still further into the past, only in the 1860's did
railroad bond yields break through the highs of last year for broadly
comparable securities today (prime corporate bonds); and the picaresque
forms which railroad financing took a hundred years ago suggest that
quality differences in this comparison are biased in favor of 1861-1870
railroad bonds.
In this documentation of the demand for funds in the three
years ahead, Mr. McGouldrick expects the catch-up demands for housing,
generally forecast for later this year, to slacken off by the end of
1968.

The current trends underlying demand for housing thus suggest

that, taken as a percentage of GNP, net mortgage borrowing should not
rise above 1964 and 1965 levels and, indeed, may even decline
slightly.




-

5-

The current high volume of public issues and private placements
of corporate obligations may be expected to decrease during the summer
and the fall, as corporations adjust their plant and equipment and
inventory spending targets to levels more appropriate to lowered
projections of growth in GNP.

While a subsequent rebound in corporate

debt formation is very likely, as output of goods and services begins
to grow at higher rates, this may very well be offset by the satiation
of catch-up demand in the mortgage market as 1968 progresses.
Household debt formation for the purchase of durables seems
unlikely to rise above the high ratios to disposable income that were
reached during the early 1960fs; and it is probable that even a
sizable absolute increase in the demand for automobiles and other
consumer durable goods can and will;co-exist with a slightly lower
ratio of net consumer debt formation to personal income than was
prevalent two years ago.
On balance, then, it appears to him that corporate, mortgage,
and consumer debt formation will not rise above 1963-1965 average ratios
to GNP.

Indeed, the most probable outcome is that these demands for

funds will be somewhat lower, as a percentage of GNP, than they were
during the early and mid-1960fs.

And since these three types of

borrowing dominate private markets for borrowed funds, it would take
very large Federal debt increases to lift all demands for borrowed
funds except those of State and local governments above their average
1961-1965 relationship to GNP.

Given this absence of pressure on

the demand side, any shortage of funds for State and local borrowers




-

6-

over the next 36 months would require either a decline in the
aggregate propensity to save out of income, or unusual shifts in
flows of funds to nonbank financial intermediaries, or a combination
of both.
On the supply side, he points out that the proportion of
savings to disposable income, in the national income and product
accounts, which has some year-to-year variability, has shown no
significant downward trend since the early 1950's.

Indeed, secular

stability characterizes this ratio for even longer historical periods,
excepting such abnormal eras as the Great Depression and World War II.
It would be out of line with historical experience for the ratio of
savings to disposable income to fall below the 1961-66 floor of
5.0 per cent, during a period of prosperity*

He, therefore, forecasts

that the supply of savings by households will be growing at the same
percentage rate as will disposable income itself, now that the
abnormally low savings rates of early and mid-1966 have been corrected.
Business savings are projected to grow at a slower rate than
that which prevailed between 1959 and 1966.

A substantial part of the

huge increase in corporate after-tax profits, during these seven years,
was due to a shift of the economy towards a higher level of utilization
of non-human capital as well as human resources.

Since idle business

capital is a source of loss rather than profit, this shift increased
after-tax profits by significantly more, proportionately, than it
increased GNP and disposable income.

But once such a shift has occurred

and the economy is around capacity limits, further improvements




-7in profits must occur at about the same rate as that by which output
increases.

Hence, profits are expected to increase, to be sure, but

at a markedly lower rate of expansion than that of the previous seven
years.

Meanwhile, the upward drift of dividend payments may make the

rate of increase in retained earnings lower than that of profits.
Similar trends are likely in depreciation allowances.
Nearly all other factors having to do with both aggregate
flows of loanable funds into institutions and capital markets and
their distribution among intermediaries argue for an abundant supply
of funds for State and local borrowers.
For example, demand for municipals by commercial banks may
be reasonably expected to remain strong, partly because banks show
no signs of losing out to their intermediary competitors (the mutual
savings b a n k s > savings and loan associations, and credit unions).
To grow significantly, large and small banks must expand their inter­
mediary role and the instruments and promotion techniques they have
used to effect their dramatic gains of the past years will not be
abandoned.

And since commercial banks are uniquely good customers

for State-local tax-exempt securities, because they pay the full
corporate income tax on earnings, this would mean a continued and
significant growth in one of the principal components of demand for
municipals of all maturities.
The growing number of higher bracket income recipients will also
add to the demand for tax exempts.

Rising per capita income before

taxes will continue, as before, to increase the pool of individual




-8savings seeking direct investment in municipals at a faster rate than
that by which aggregate personal income rises.

And while brokerage

costs and large face amounts of municipals offer obstacles to direct
investment by upper-middle-income investors, the recent growth of
mutual funds in municipals suggests a more rapid expansion in
aggregate demand by individual investors than has occurred over
the past 10 years.
Over the past six years, there has been a remarkable
narrowing of yield differentials among municipals of different quality
grades (as shown by Moodys and Standard & Poors ratings).

During 1959

and 1960, the differential for Moody's AA and Baa municipals was as
high as 80 basis points; but subsequently it narrowed rather persistently.
During 1966 and the first three months of 1967, it was between 30 and
55 basis points.

Since yields of high-rated municipals did not increase

relative to U.S. and corporate bond yields, over the same seven years,
this decline in the quality yield spread would appear to signify a
greater attractiveness of less than top grade municipals relative
to other investment alternatives.
When Hr. McGouldrick puts all of the foregoing trends and
hypotheses on the U.S. economy together, he comes to the following
broad conclusions.

Demands for borrowed funds by corporations and

households together are not likely to increase at a greater rate than
will current dollar GNP.

Meanwhile, aggregate savings of households

and corporate business are very probably going to increase at the same
rate as GNP; and the possibility of a climb in the savings GNP rate
should be considered.




Finally, a forecast of the changing composition

-9of that saving suggests that a gradually increasing, not a falling,
fraction will be flowing directly or indirectly into markets for
municipal bonds.
If this analysis is correct, yields on municipals ought to
be declining very moderately over the next 36 months (again, allowing
for cyclical fluctuations around the forecast trend), unless State and
local demands for funds rise sharply above their trend rate of increase
over the postwar period.
a number of reasons.

And such a sharp increase is very unlikely for

One is the rapid expansion of Federal grants-in-aid

in connection with the War on Poverty programs.

A second has been the

unexpected success of State and local governments, considered as a group,
in finding new sources of revenue and persuading taxpaying voters to
approve increases in rates on existing taxes, particularly since the
late 1950's.

A third, perhaps more doubtful consideration is the

evidence of a certain tapering off of education needs because of the
passing of the postwar bulge in elementary and secondary school enrollments.
Turning now to the countercyclical timing of construction and
financing by State and local governments, what would be the advantages
and necessary preconditions for a conscious policy of altering the
timing of debt issues with the objective of lowering borrowing costs?
The interest yield trend just forecast is not irrelevant to a discussion
of the advantages and disadvantages of such a policy.

During the long

rise in the interest cost of State and local borrowing which culminated
during the fifties, municipal treasurers who attempted to wait out
periods of tight money were often frustrated by the upward trend




-lOunder lying cyclical fluctuations in bond yields.

For example, a treasurer

might well have concluded, during the last half of 1956, that the current
prosperity was due to be succeeded by a business recession and a consequent
decline in bond yields.

But if he had postponed financing until the first

half of 1958, he would probably have paid a higher, not a lower, cost for
borrowed funds (the average Moody's triple-A bond yield was 2.69 per cent
for July-December 1956 and 2.73 per cent for January-June 1958).

In

theory, of course, the same upward trend in yields might have acted to
encourage accelerated financing during recessions just as it acted to
discourage financing postponements during tight money periods.

But

earlier postwar recessions were relatively short, and the reaction time
of State and municipal treasurers was too sluggish to accelerate
financing on a large sc^le.

Therefore, the net effect of the upward

trend in yields prior to 1960 was almost certainly to discourage
countercyclical State and local financing.
However, the trend in municipal bond yields has levelled
off since 1960, and if our forecaster is correct we will have a level
or slightly falling trend up to 1970 at least.

This should encourage

efforts to postpone public works financing in high interest rate
periods and to bunch financing in periods when interest rates are
relatively low, since correct forecasts will no
by an upward drift of yields,
of financing practicable?




longer be penalized

But is such countercyclical timing

- 1 1 -

During the 14 years since the signing of the Korean War
armistice at Panmunjon, our economy has gone through three cycles
in interest rates and the availability of credit.

Each such cycle

culminated in a period of tightness when both short- and long-term
interest rates were much higher than before or for some time afterwards.
If we measure tightness by such indicators as net borrowed reserves of
commercial banks, loan to deposit ratios, and interest rate peaks, and
if we read these indicators so as to exclude the effects of underlying
trends and irregular fluctuations, we can settle on the following
demarcation lines for periods of credit tightness.

The first lasted

from the early fall of 1956 through October 1957.

The second extended

from January or February 1959 to January 1960.

And the most recent

period extended from November or December 1965 to November 1966.

All

three periods had one characteristic in common which is of particular
interest to us.

For each lasted for just about the same period of time--

between 12 and 13 months.
The point of this exercise in postwar history is to suggest,
as strongly as I can, that many State, local, and special authority
officials concerned with financing could have saved substantial sums
in interest costs for their taxpayers if they had elected to wait out
these periods of high interest rates and bond yields, by postponing
financing and starts on construction of projects of less immediate
essentialness to their communities and regions.
Of course, we all know more about events once they have
occurred than we do when they are occurring.




No one could have said

- 1 2 -

then, or can say in advance now, during which precise week or month a
period of credit tightness will start.

Even when such a period has

already started, reasonable men can and will differ on the particular
month to designate as the start.

But during the past 14 years, the

great majority of financial economists and analysts have recognized
periods of credit tightness for what they were after recognition of
a lag of two or three months at the most.

Judged by the aforementioned

duration of tightness, periods of between 12 and 13 months, this still
gave public authorities between 9 and 11 months during which they could
have postponed financing.

And this also suggests that these authorities

will have sufficient time in which to administer such postponements, if
a period of credit tightness should conceivably occur during the next
three or more years.
It has been argued,in another connection, that nearly all
types of public construction are for facilities so essential for the
communities which they serve, that postponements involve higher social
costs than the gain which would accrue from their construction during
periods when interest costs are lower.

School buildings, for example,

must be constructed so as to equate at each time interval the supply
of classrooms with the number of pupils, because doubling-up costs far
exceed the additional interest cost from building in periods of high
interest rates.

While this is undoubtedly true, as far as it goes,

the argument ignores the presence of a non-negligible category of
postponable projects at all times.

Examples of such might be:

replacement facilities; additions to water, sewer or highway capacity







-13for future growth; and marginal projects in the luxury or amenity class.
Obviously, timing adjustments require careful planning and exceptions
based on special circumstances.

For example, rising costs of land

often make it inadvisable for many communities to postpone purchases
of sites for highways, bridges, and schools; so the best course for
them might be to postpone construction but to acquire the sites at once.
Another frequently-cited argument against countercyclical
variation of public construction is that of rising costs.

If, for

example, the cost of a project financed by 20-year serial debt issues
is forecast to increase»by six per cent next year, the bond yield
saving from postponement would have to be a certainty-equivalent of
approximately 60 basis points in order for the interest cost saving
to offset the construction cost increase.

And 60 basis points is a

large year-to-year variation in the municipal bond market.
This, however, assumes no advance in design, technology and
quality over time and that contractors will not figure more closely
in a buyers' market.

It is correct that postponements involved in

a countercyclical capital outlay policy could involve a loss of the
type described. ' But, using the same argument, accelerations of
projects during periods of relatively low interest rates should involve
an offsetting gain.

The community would benefit twice, once by the

lower interest rates on bond issues, and, secondly, from lower
construction costs then than in the future.

Since 1960, at least,

periods when yields of municipal bonds to investors have been below
their 1960-1966 average have actually been longer than periods when

-

14-

yields were above that seven-year average.

If this pattern continues

as has been argued, State and local communities will have adequate
lead time for accelerating, as well as postponing, construction of
less essential roads and highways, buildings, and facilities.
Another reason for States and communities to study how to
adjust part of their capital spending and borrowing to capital market
conditions is that taxpayers bear the full cost of increases in the
interest cost of public borrowing while corporations and individuals
can pass on a substantial part of increases in their interest payments
to the Federal Government (since interest costs are deductible from
gross income, for tax purposes).

This difference in the impact of

higher interest rates also makes corporate borrowing rather insensitive
to interest rate changes, so that direct and indirect impacts of tight
money tend to fall with peculiar force on supplies of funds for public
purposes.

While regrettable and even deplorable, this is yet another

argument for the proposition that public authorities should pay more
attention to capital market conditions in their construction planning.
If we focus on borrowing instead of construction spending
several additional advantages of countercyclical variations emerge.
Even projects of a highly essential nature could, with proper advance
planning, be financed more cheaply if public authorities attempt,
under favorable market conditions, deliberately first to accumulate
stocks of interest-paying liquid assets and then to use these as
buffer stocks, so as to permit discontinuities between construction
outlays and financing.




Borrowing and reinvesting the proceeds in liquid

-15assets would appear to be in consonance with the spirit as well as the
letter of policies giving public authorities the privilege of borrowing
at tax-exempt rates to lenders, as long as there is no primary intent
on the part of State and local authorities to profit from the favorable
spread between yields of short-term taxable securities (which would
constitute their liquid assets) and yields on municipals (which would
constitute their liabilities).

And the aforementioned spread, which

has been moderately favorable during most postwar years, would help
to assure authorities that they would not lose by borrowing in order
to build up buffer stocks of liquid assets.
Such stocks would obviously give communities more latitude
in the timing of bond issues than hitherto.

And such latitude would

be advantageous not only with respect to countercyclical timing but
also for variations in timing of bond issues over shorter periods.
One thinks, for example, of recent and large "irregular" variations
in new issue yields, such as that occurring during the two middle
weeks in February when a Western public authority issue of $70 million
involved an interest cost about 30 basis points higher than that
prevailing on similar obligations issued two weeks earlier.

More

alertness to such variations would be encouraged, as well as permitted,
by accumulations of liquid assets for the purpose just described.




-16-

To sum up, as a general rule, you should be able to realize
significant cost savings in your capital spending programs by adjusting
their timing to changing economic and credit conditions.

Even though

a flexible planning approach of this type might not have had much
success during the 1953-60 period of steeply rising bond yields,
since 1960--although short-run fluctuations in yields have been large-the underlying trend has been virtually flat.

And if Mr. McGouldrick1s

forecast is right for the years immediately ahead the trend may
actually tip downward.

Thus, the potential cost savings to be

derived from flexible timing of future capital programs may be
quite large.
In future periods of relative economic slack, planned
outlays on flexible-type programs could be accelerated profitably^producing savings in both construction and financing costs.

And

more generally, borrowing in periods of relatively low interest
rates would add to financial flexibility by creating a cushion of
liquid assets.

This cushion could be maintained at a positive net

interest carry and would be available for the financing of urgent
programs in periods when demand pressures on capital markets made
it profitable to defer borrowing.
To some of you these suggestions may seem a bit gratuitous,
like putting my mouth where your money is or substituting a detailed
overall view for your accumulated specific experience and responsibility.
What you do, however, in response to changes in interest rates and




-

17-

credit conditions in a general way is my business, as a central banker.
For monetary policy, to be effective, changes in the cyclical pattern
of aggregate spending are sometimes needed.

Thus, in effect, I am

urging you to act in your own self-interest, and, in so doing, to
help make the impact of public economic policy more effective.