View original document

The full text on this page is automatically extracted from the file linked above and may contain errors and inconsistencies.

Special Survey of Bank Stock Loams, Loans to O fficia ls
and M a jo r Stockholders o f Other Banks,
Insider Loans and O verdra fts

1/
' #
Statement by\

%/

l

G eo rge A , L e M a is t r e , Chairman
F e d e r a l D eposit Insurance Corporation

L ibra ry

MAR 2 0 1978
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION

B e fo re

th e

C om m ittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs^
United States Senate

M arch 16, 1978 s

F E D E R A L D EPO SIT IN S U R A N C E C O R PO R A TIO N , 5 5 0 Seventeenth St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429




202-389-4221

M r . Chairman, I w elco m e the opportunity to provide m y own comments
and evaluation o f the results o f the survey on bank stock loans, loans to
o fficia ls and m a jo r stockholders o f other banks, loans to in sid ers of reporting
banks and o v e rd ra fts . The survey represents a substantial undertaking by
the fe d e ra l banking agencies, and one which I fe e l provides som e valuable
insights into the dimensions and ch a ra cteris tic s o f in sider lending and o verd ra ft
policies of c o m m e r c ia l banks.
I would lik e to su m m arize a fe w of the highlights.

Only 902 insured

co m m ercia l banks, 6 .4 percent of aLl reporting banks, had loans secured by
bank stock on their books as of September 30, 1977. A sm a lle r percentage
(4. 2 percent) o f insured nonmem ber banks reported bank stock loans.

The

survey re vea led that bank stock lending is concentrated principally in unit
banking states in the southwestern and central regions of the country. This
is consistent with le g itim a te and understandable m otives fo r borrow ing to
purchase bank stock.

Unit banking states a re gen era lly ch a ra cterized by

a re la t iv e ly la r g e number of sm all banks.

The ability to b o rr o w against

bank stock, with the stock servin g as co lla te ra l, fa cilita tes acquisition of
an equity in te re s t in lo c a l banks by sm all in vestors. Thus, the veh icle of
bank stock lending helps p r e s e r v e sm a lle r, lo c a lly owned, independent
institutions and thereby prevents fu rth er concentration o f banking resou rces.
In addition, by providing a source of liquidity to stockholders in sm all banks,
bank stock loans m o r e read ily fa c ilita te changes in ownership to bring new
management to banks when n ecess a ry.




-

2

-

While recognizin g that there a r e benefits associated with bank stock
lending, such loans also pose a potential f o r m is c h ie f and in sid er abuse.
The in sid er abuse m o st com m only associated with bank stock loans involves
the use of correspondent balances to compensate the correspondent bank fo r
a loan extended on p r e fe r e n tia l term s to an in sid er o f the depositing bank and
which results in an economic detrim en t to that bank.

To determ in e whether

w idespread abuses cu rren tly ex ist in bank stock lending, i t is n ecess a ry
to examine a ll the lending term s o f stock loans in each tim e period .

Com­

parisons between in te re s t rates charged on the loans and the a v e r a g e prim e
rates during the y e a r o f the loan o rigin ation p rovid e som e indication o f the
magnitude of p r e fe r e n tia l treatm ent extended to in sid ers of oth er banks in
connection with bank stock Loans.

The survey showed that, since 1969, 7. 4

percent of rep orted stock loans was made below the a vera g e prim e rate.
M o r e o v e r , since 1975, when m o st of these loans w e r e made, the proportion
was 1.9 percent.
The survey also showed that when a bank has a correspondent r e la ­
tionship with an institution whose stock is pledged by the b o r r o w e r , the
a v e r a g e size of the loan is l a r g e r and the in te re s t rate charged is somewhat
lo w e r than when no correspondent relationship exists.

H o w e ver, it is not

possib le to conclude whether there a r e abuses of correspondent re la tio n ­
ships without examining other in form ation such as the timing of the establish­
m ent of the correspondent relationship and whether the amount o f correspondent
balances held a r e com m ensurate with the s e r v ic e s provided.

H o w e ver, on

balance, the survey data do not indicate to m e that such abuses as m ay
exist in bank stock lending a re w idesp read in the banking system .




- 3 -

In m y testimony b e fo r e this Com m ittee on September 26, 1977, I
commented on the extent of abuses relating to bank stock loans in insured
nonmember banks.

M y rem a rks w e r e based on a sample investigation of

examination reports and a survey of banks under examination at that time.
Because we found that only six banks out of 303, o r 2 percent, demonstrated
p referen tia l p ractices involving correspondent balances, I concluded that such
abuses may b e an isolated phenomenon.

The data fr o m this la r g e r , m o re

com ­

plete survey r e v e a ls that 10 percen t o f the bank stock loans of nonmember
institutions made to in sid ers o f other banks was made at in te rest rates c le a r ly
below the a v e r a g e p r im e rate during the period of loan origination.

The loans

making up this 10 percen t w e r e extended both with and without a correspondent
relationship.

This additional evidence seem s to support m y e a r lie r conclusion

that correspondent abuses associated with bank stock lending, although

perhaps

g r e a te r than I suspected e a r lie r , a re not prevalen t among insured nonmember
banks.
It is im portant to b ea r in mind that abuses related to correspondent
relationships a re not lim ite d to those abuses arisin g out o f bank stock lending.
The survey data p rovid e som e evidence of a link between in sider lending in
general and correspondent banking, that is, a pattern o f system atically lo w e r
in terest rates p r e v a il on loans to in sid ers o f other banks when the other bank
has a correspondent relationship with the lending bank.

This pattern holds

true f o r state m e m b er, national and state nonmem ber banks.
M ost o f the fix e d - r a t e loans to in sid ers of other banks with rates
below the a v e r a g e p r im e rate w e r e made during periods ch a ra cterized by




- 4 -

tight money and rapidly changing in te re s t rates (1970, 1973, 1974, and the
f i r s t half of 197 5).

Under conditions of g r e a t uncertainty, such as occu rred

during these periods, it might not have been unreasonable to make short-term
loans at rates below p r im e to individuals with whom the lending bank has
had business dealings fo r a long tim e.

N e v e rth e le s s , special circumstances

would still have to be dem onstrated to satisfy m e that p re fe r e n tia l treatment
did not exist in such cases.

I m ight add that state nonmem ber banks

charged h igh er rates (both fixed and floating ra te s ) on loans to in sid ers
o v e r the tim e period o f the survey than the national a ve ra g e as reported
in the survey. This was true re g a rd le s s of whether correspondent balances
w e r e maintained at the lending institution.
O vera ll, I find that the survey tables p rovid e in terestin g and relevant,
although as I have stated, in com plete inform ation on insider lending.

Because

o f the special caveats mentioned in the joint agency report, in form ation in the
portion o f the survey dealing with o v e rd ra fts is not as re vea lin g .

What is

apparent to m e is that the volum e o f o v e rd ra fts is g r e a t e r than I would have
expected.

Banks reported a daily a v e ra g e of two m illio n o v e rd ra fts amounting

to a daily a v e r a g e o f approxim ately $1.9 billion .

Based on 1976 estim ates of

the number and d o lla r volum e o f checks debited to the accounts of individuals
and businesses, o v e rd ra fts represen ted 2 p ercen t of the number but 13 percent
o f the d o lla r volum e o f daily checks.

F o r reasons mentioned below, these

fig u r e s m ay not r e fle c t f a i r l y the actual extent o f o v e rd ra fts .
In m y September 26, 1977 testim ony b e fo r e this C om m ittee, I reported
that of the 189 nonmem ber banks that w e r e examined during the week beginning




- 5 -

September 12, 1977, approxim ately 64 percent recorded o verd ra fts of in siders
during the 90-day period preceding the examination date.

By comparison, in

the survey under discussion, about 44 percent of the 8, 580 state nonmember
banks reported o v e rd ra fts o v e r $500, including 2,706 banks (31 percent) with
o verd rafts o f their own in siders, 368 (4 percent) with o verd ra fts of in siders
of other banks, and 735 (9 percen t) with o verd ra fts of public o ffic ia ls .

The

la r g e r o v e r a ll percentage of banks in the 189 sample of state nonmember
banks reporting o verd ra fts o ccu rred because o verd ra fts o f under $500 w e re
included.

N e v e rth e le s s , the percentages o f nonmember banks reporting

overdrafts of in siders o f other banks and public o ffic ia ls w e re about the same
in both surveys.
Although o v e rd ra fts a re perm itted by a la r g e percentage of banks,
abuse o r violations o f law a re not w idespread.

In our re v ie w of o v e rd ra ft

practices f r o m a survey o f 261 bank examination reports which we conducted
last fa ll, we d is c o v e re d that exam iners c r it ic iz e approxim ately 3 percen t
of a ll insured state nonmember banks f o r bank in sid er o v e rd ra ft abuses.
F u rth erm o re, we noted that m ost o verd ra fts a r e not c r itic iz e d because the
in sid ers' accounts a re seldom overd raw n f o r m o re than a fe w days, and
overdrafts occu r infrequently.

O verdra fts that a re substantial o r p e r s is t

o ver tim e a re c r it ic iz e d in the examination rep ort as a m a tter of course.
It is not possible to com pare the size, duration and frequency of
overd ra fts on an individual basis f r o m data reported in the survey tables.
F o r this reason I am skeptical about how meaningful data in Table 5A
showing a substantial number o f banks with la rg e , f r e e o verd ra fts of




-

6

-

in siders are in addressing the question of o v e rd ra ft abuses.

S im ila r ly , Table

7, which appears to show a p o licy o f leniency with re ga rd to w aiving fe e s
and charges to in sid ers of the bank on their o v e rd ra fts , does not take account
o f the relationship between size and frequency of o v e rd ra fts f o r each person
and the fe e p o licy im posed.

H o w ever, no re a l sense o f the extent o f potential

abuses relating to o v e rd ra fts is possible without com paring bank o v e r d r a ft
p o licies f o r in s id e rs and others.
o f the special survey.

Such an inquiry extends beyond the scope

Th ese and other m atters related to the su rvey w ill

be explored by exam in ers.

Examination procedu res and the re p o rt of

examination w ill be re v ie w e d in light of the survey to determ ine what changes
should be undertaken.
Fo llo w -u p P r o c e d u re s
The issue of what constitutes abuse by in sid ers o f their relationship
with their financial institution evokes som e disagreem en t.

M y own v ie w and the

predominant one at the FDIG is that in sid er conduct is abusive and constitutes
an unsafe o r unsound banking p ra c tic e when an in s id e r obtains a ben efit which
is not available to a noninsider o th erw is e s im ila r ly situated and which results
in an econom ic detrim en t to the bank.

W here a bank’ s board tolera tes abusive

conduct, unquestionably f i r m s u p erviso ry action should be taken.

A s the

Supreme Court has stated, the broad visitation al pow er o f fe d e r a l bank
exam in ers is perhaps the m o st e ffe c tiv e weapon o f fe d e r a l regulation of banking
(s e e United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,* 374 U. S. 321, 329 (1965)).
I would lik e to outline some of the steps that the FDIC has taken, and
anticipates taking, to fo llo w up on p o ssib le abusive p ra c tic es indicated by the




- 7 -

survey data.

A s a f i r s t step, the Corporation, in conjunction with the

C o m p tro ller of the Currency and the F e d e ra l R e s e r v e System, undertook
a telephone survey of those banks that reported la r g e o ve rd ra fts . This was
done because of the inform ation gaps on o verd ra fts in the survey as was
indicated in the joint agency staff report.
O riginally, it was planned to contact all those banks that reported
overd ra fts o f $50,000 and above.

H ow ever, because of time constraints,

the telephone ca lls actually made w e r e lim ited to those banks reporting o v e r ­
drafts of $100,000 o r m o r e .

Of the 191 banks reporting such overd ra fts,

130 w e r e contacted.
O vera ll, the results of the telephone follow -u p show that 103 of the
130 banks should not have been included in the survey on o ve rd ra fts , la r g e ly
because o f reporting e r r o r s o r because the o verd ra fts reported w e r e not,
in m y judgment, o verd ra fts .
Of the 130 banks contacted, 38 eith er had no exposure because the
o v e rd ra ft was c o v e re d in a tim e ly fashion o r because the bank was n ever
obligated to pay the o verd ra ft. It should be kept in mind that, in virtu a lly
e v e r y state, banks by statute, clea rin g house rule, o r a greem en t have a
certain p eriod o f tim e to return o r dishonor a demand item without incurring
a le g a l obligation to pay it. In 20 of the 38 banks, the facts ascertained fr o m
the telephone survey indicated that the o verd ra fts reported w e r e co v e re d
within the ge n e ra lly accepted tim e fr a m e in which the bank could have returned
the item .

This tim e fr a m e is usually r e fe r r e d to as the "midnight deadline. "

Thus, the 20 banks w e r e apparently n e v e r le g a lly obligated to pay the







-

8

-

o verd ra fts reported. In any event, even i f they could be considered o v e r ­
drafts, in all 20 cases they w e r e outstanding only one day.
Of the remaining 18 banks, overd ra fts in 8 w e re co v e re d by timely
tra n sfers fr o m oth er bank accounts in the reporting bank, but w e r e reported
as o ve rd ra fts because o f delays in posting the deposit to the c u s to m e r’ s
checking accounts; overd ra fts in 8 w e r e the result of delays in disbursing
loan proceeds o f a p r io r a lrea d y approved loan to the cu s to m e r's checking
account; and overd ra fts in 2 resulted fr o m computer e r r o r which had the effl
o f not posting the deposit to the p ro p e r account in a tim ely manner.
Another 65 o f the 130 banks erro n eo u sly reported o v e rd ra fts to cor­
porate in te rests of in sid ers.

The survey instructions did not include c o r ­

porate in terests within the reporting requ irem en ts.
fo re , by definition, constitute a reporting e r r o r .

Th ese 65 banks there­

Although shortness of tim

precluded detailed questioning about the nature of each co rp o ra te overdraft
some questions w e r e asked which re vea led the sam e lack o f exposure on the
part o f these banks as the 38 discussed above.

Thus, 28 o f the 65 corporate

o ve rd ra fts w e r e c o v e r e d b e fo r e the midnight deadline and 12 others w ere
rep orted because of delays in:

(1) posting intra-bank tra n sfers; (2) disbursii

p r io r approved loan proceed s; o r y|f w ir e tra n sfers f r o m other banks.
In 7 o f the 130 contacted, the banks experienced no exposure on the
o v e rd ra fts because they w e r e c o v e r e d by w ir e tra n sfers.

In each of these

7 ca ses, the w ir e tra n s fe r was delayed f o r technical reasons.

In 6 of the

other instances, the bank reported, o r the F D I C ’ s computer picked up,
an in c o r r e c t amount which, i f reported c o r r e c t ly , would have reduced each
of the 6 below the $50, 000 le v e l.

- 9 With re s p e c t to the remaining 14 o f the 130 banks contacted, 6
appear to in volve an abusive p ractice.

H ow ever, the inform ation obtained

fr o m the telephone contacts indicated that c o rre c tio n has been made in
5 of the 6 instances either through a change in ownership of the bank,
a change in p o licy at the bank, o r resignation o r d ism issa l of the in d iv i­
duals involved. In 1 case, an in te rest charge was imposed.

In the other

8, the o verd ra fts w e r e those of in siders who w e r e significant custom ers
of the bank, and the o ve rd ra fts w e r e of short duration (no m o re than 5 days)
in a ll but one case.

In 2 o f these cases, rates above the bank's norm al

lending rates w e r e charged.

In the one instance which extended beyond

5 days, the o v e r d r a ft was outstanding f o r at lea st 60 days but was
c o lla te ra lize d by m arketable secu rities and was 1 of the 2 on which
in terest was charged (the in te rest rate was 10 percent).
In summ ary, based upon this lim ited and hurried telephone follow -up
of reported o verd ra fts o f $100,000 o r m o re , it seem s c le a r that the numbers
in the tables do not accu rately p o rtra y industry p ra c tic e and m ay be m i s ­
leading.

F u rth e rm o re , only 3 of 86 banks reporting no in te re s t rate assessed

against the o v e r d r a ft showed evidence of abusive p referen tia l treatment.
In 1 of the 3, the o v e r d r a ft was co v e re d in 3 days.

The FDIC w ill instruct

its Regional O ffices to in vestigate each state nonmember bank w here
abusive o v e r d r a ft p ra c tic es a re indicated by the survey data, re g a rd le ss
of the amount reported.
In a m o r e gen era l follow -up, the Corporation w ill identify each state
nonmember bank which reported anything in the survey which im p lie s a
possible abusive p ractice with re s p e c t to loans secured by the stock of other




-

10

-

banks o r bank bolding companies; loans to in sid ers of the lending bank; loans
to in sid ers o f other banks; and o v e rd ra fts to in sid ers of the bank, to in siders
o f other banks, and to public o ffic ia ls .

A l i s t o f these banks w ill be forwardec

to the appropriate Regional O ffice with instructions to take w hatever steps,
a re n e c e s s a r y to determ in e whether the bank has in fa c t engaged in, o r is
engaging in, any o f these p ra c tic es.

This li s t w ill include a ll those state

nonm em ber banks identified in the survey which extended c r e d it to their
own in siders at rates of in te re s t c le a r ly below the a v e r a g e p r im e rate.
The lis t also w ill include those banks on both ends o f stock loans tra n s­
actions which in volved low in te re s t rates and a demand deposit balance
placed at the lending bank by the bank whose stock secures the loan.
In addition, in those cases w h ere abusive p ra c tic e s exist, the Regional
O ffice s w ill be instructed to point out to the bank how c o r r e c tio n can and
should b e effected and then to ensure that c o r r e c tio n is taken.

If n ecessary,

fo r m a l enforcem ent action w ill be instituted.
A s you w ill re c a ll, in m y testim ony b e fo r e this C o m m ittee on
Septem ber 26, 1977, I discussed at length the variou s guidelines provided to
exam in ers and the examination m ethodologies em ployed to a s s is t in the detec­
tion o f abuses relating to in sid ers of a bank; p o ssib le p r e fe r e n tia l treatment
accorded to in s id e rs o f other banks, e sp ecia lly in connection with bank stock
loans and compensating balances; loans to fa v o re d cu stom ers; and o verd ra fts
(s e e H earin gs b e fo r e the Senate C om m ittee on Banking, Housing and Urban
A ffa ir s , 95th C o n g ., I s t S e s s . , pp. 57-79, and 89-99, Sept. 26, 27, and
28, 1977).




The FDIC b e lie v e s that the cu rren t guidelines and examination

-

11

-

techniques a re adequate to detect the va st m a jo rity of these types of abusive
p ractices.

F u rth erm o re, I am confident that our exam iners assiduously and

conscientiously s triv e to root out abuses com m itted in these and other areas
by banks under the F D IC 's d ir e c t supervision by c a re fu lly commenting on
them in the reports o f examination.
In the cou rse o f each examination, exam iners a re required to lis t all
loans to o ffic e r s o f other banks, except fo r loans of insignificant amounts,
on FDIC F o r m 6500/23.

The f o r m was included as an exhibit to m y testimony

b e fo r e this C om m ittee on September 26, 1977 in the Hearings print r e fe r r e d
to p revio u sly on page 122.

Loans secured by stock of other banks, which

in the agg reg ate amount to 5 percen t o r m o r e of each bank’ s outstanding
shares, must also be lis te d at each examination by exam iners on FDIC
F o r m 6500/22.

This fo r m was also reprinted in the Hearing print o f'

September 26, 1977 on page 121.

F u rth erm o re, Section 7(j ) of the F e d e r a l

Deposit Insurance A c t (12 U. S. C. 1817 (j)) requ ires that fe d e ra l authorities
be notified when there is a change of control of an insured bank o r when
there is a loan secured by 25 percen t o r m o re of an insured bank's outstand­
ing stock.
To detect o verd ra fts to in sid ers, a lis t of bank d ir e c to r s , o ffic e r s
and em ployees is obtained fr o m the bank o r i t is developed independently by
exam iners o r by som e combination o f the two preceding methods.
tion o f in sid er re la tiv e s is a d ifficu lt p r o ce ss.

Id en tifica ­

H ow ever, an adequate lis t

usually can be put together by review in g the stock le d g e r, in sid er transactions
re co rd s, and the minutes o f m eetings o f the loan com m ittee and the board of




-

d ir e c to r s .

12

-

A n y o v erd ra fts to in sid ers a re fla gged to ensure follow -u p action

at a la te r point in the examination.

The o v e r d r a ft listing is also com pared

with loans to individuals made by other departments of the bank to determ in e
t ie - in relationships.

A ls o , since the issuance of the F D IC 's in s id e r regu la ­

tion, which s p e c ific a lly mandates re c o rd keeping requ irem ents f o r in sid er
transactions, the identification o f o verd ra fts , as w e ll as other in sid er
a ctivities, has been enhanced.
E x a m in er r e v ie w and analysis of o v e rd ra fts also resu lt in the detection
o f o v e rd ra fts to o ffic e r s , d ir e c t o r s and stockholders of other banks.

Large

o v e rd ra fts and frequent use of o v e rd ra fts a r e flagged autom atically f o r an
appraisal o f repaym ent capacity.

F u rth e rm o re , it is standard proceduce to

determ in e the o b lig o r 's place o f em ploym ent and position f o r those o verd ra fts
that a re r e la t iv e ly la r g e and a re not repaid during the co u rse of an exam ina­
tion.

This procedu re perm its detection of o v e rd ra fts to other bankers.
I b e lie v e that these p rocedu res a r e ge n e ra lly successful in detecting

in s id e r abuses.

N e v e rth e le s s , in ligh t o f som e o f the findings in the special

survey, I have instructed the staff to re v ie w in detail and, w h ere n ecess a ry,
to take o r recom m en d any requ isite actions to im p ro v e the cu rren t guidelines
provided to exam in ers and examination techniques used in the supervision of
in s id e r o r other p r e fe r e n tia l p ra c tic e s .

We a re also in the p ro c e s s of evalu­

ating the p r a c tic a lity and u tility of incorporating the data gathered f r o m these
various sources into our com puter base f o r ready a ccess and analytical review
in keeping track o f trends.




- 13 -

Regulation and Recom mended L eg isla tio n
I do wish to emphasize that the FDIC is deeply concerned about and
responds v ig o ro u s ly to o verrea ch in g and abusive conduct by bank in siders.
Although I do not b e lie v e that data fr o m the survey indicate basic weaknesses
in the bank regu latory structure, I do b e lie v e that the tools of law and public
policy must evo lve apace with changing tim es and events.

To underscore the*

fact that I am not wedded to the existing fr a m e w o r k and approaches o f bank
regulation, the FD IC published f o r comm ent on January 30, 1978 proposed
amendments to the C orp oration 's regulations dealing with in sider transactions.
Included in the proposal a re a number o f substantive amendments:
1.

A new p rovis ion specifying that an in sid er transaction is an unsafe

o r unsound p ra c tic e i f it is p re fe r e n tia l and results in, o r is lik e ly to result
in, loan lo s s e s , e x c e s s iv e cost, undue risk, o r other economic detrim en t to
the bank.

The amendment also would c la r ify that the FDIC w ill take appro­

p riate s u p erviso ry action against a bank whose in sid er transactions a re found
to be unsafe o r unsound and that technical com pliance with the regulation's
requirem ents would not be a basis f o r justifying an oth erw ise unsafe o r unsound
in sid er transaction.

Thus, the proposed amendments would make it c le a r that

the F D IC w ill not tole ra te any in sid er transaction that affords p re fe re n tia l
treatm ent to an in s id e r o r person related to an in s id e r and results, o r is lik e ly
to result, in econom ic detrim en t to the bank.
2.
accounts.

A new p rovis ion would be added relating s p e c ific a lly to correspondent
A survey finding that troubles m e is that lo w e r rates a re charged

on loans to in sid ers when a correspondent relationship exists with the in s id e r's




- 14 -

bank than when such a relationship does not exist. To determ in e whether
an abuse exists in such cases, we would re qu ire each in sid er to re p o r t in
w riting to the bank's board o f d ir e c t o r s all extensions o f c r e d it that a re
(a) made by a financial institution with which the bank maintains a c o r r e ­
spondent account, and (b) m ade f o r the purpose o f enabling the in sid er
to purchase, c a r r y o r own a b en efic ia l in te re s t in sec u rities issued by the
bank, its holding company, o r any other insured bank o r holding company.
The bank's board would be requ ired to re v ie w , at le a s t annually, a ll o f the
bank's corresponden t accounts with oth er financial institutions to ensure
that these accounts a re f a i r and in the best in terests of the bank.

In making

the re v ie w , the board would have to con sider, among oth er things, bank
stock loans rep orted by in s id e r s . F u r th e r m o re , any deposit placed by a bank
in another financial institution so lely to compensate that institution f o r making
a loan to an in s id e r of the depositing bank would, ipso fa c to , be considered
an in sid er transaction.
3.

The proposed amendments would expand the definition o f "p erson

related to an in s id e r " and substantially r e v is e the definition o f "business
transactions. "
4.

Under the proposed re visio n , the bank's board of d ir e c to r s would

be requ ired to r e v ie w and approve in s id e r transactions when p r a c tic a l p r io r
to consummation o f the transaction.

In any case, r e v ie w and approval would

be requ ired no la t e r than the next re g u la rly scheduled board m eeting following
consummation o f the transaction.




- 15 -

T h ere a re other amendments to the in sid er regulation which a re m ainly
of a cla rify in g nature o r a r e intended to tighten the regulation.

O verdrafts

by in siders of a bank have been and a r e included within the meaning of in sider
transactions under the amended regulation.

We have attached f o r your con­

venience a copy of the January 30, 1978 press re le a s e on the proposed
amendments to the FD IC in s id e r regulation as w e ll as the entire proposal
its e lf.
Focusing s p e c ific a lly on the amendments addressed to bank stock loans
and correspondent accounts, the approach proposed would ensure meaningful
analysis of the bank’ s correspondent relationships by boards of d ire c to rs and
would thereby significantly m in im iz e the likelihood of abuse.

Of even g r e a te r

importance, this approach would also provid e FDIC exam iners with a better
and m o r e convenient data base f o r use in detecting other abuses associated
with bank stock loans.
A s I have a lrea d y testified, I also support passage o f se v e ra l proposed
amendments to the statutory pow ers o f the fe d e ra l banking agencies which a re
now pending in C on gress.
We u rg e the enactment of S. 71.

Our cease end d esist pow er under

Section 8(b) o f the F e d e r a l D eposit Insurance A c t would be m o r e effective i f
it could be used d ir e c tly against the individual o r individuals responsible fo r
the co m m issio n o f the abusive p ra c tic e.

In addition, to suspend o r rem o ve

certain individuals under Section 8(e) of the F D I A ct, the FDIC has the burden
o f proving, among other things, that the individual's act involved personal




- 16 -

dishonesty, a burden o f proo f not unlike that requ ired in a c r im in a l p r o c e e d ­
ing.

It is a d iffic u lt burden to c a r r y and, th e re fo re , inhibits the usefulness

of the suspension o r re m o v a l pow er.

S. 71, as recen tly passed by the Senate,

would la r g e ly rem edy these shortcom ings and ge n e ra lly enhance our ability to
deal with abuse.

Thus, the proposed amendments to Section 8 would enable

the FD IC to p roceed d ir e c tly against o ffic e r s , d ir e c to r s and persons in control
of a bank who abuse the resou rces o f the bank.
S.

71 would also p e r m it

suspension o r re m o v a l o f o ffic e r s , d ir e c to r s

and oth er persons fr o m participating in a bank’ s a ffa irs w h ere th eir actions
evince a w illfu l d is r e g a r d o f the bank's safety and soundness.

Although this

amendment would c e r ta in ly be an im p ro vem e n t o v e r the cu rren t heavy burden
o f showing personal dishonesty, w e would p r e f e r a le s s burdensom e test.
A s we indicated in our comments on S. 71, we would p r e fe r , in addition
to the person al dishonesty standard, to be able to suspend o r re m o v e the
individual within the cla ss c o v e r e d who o perates o r manages the bank in
a g r o s s ly n egligent manner, o r threatens

the safety and soundness of the

bank by evincing a continuing d is r e g a r d f o r its financial safety.
We also fa v o r the various c iv i l penalty provision s contained in S. 71,
e s p e c ia lly the p ro v is io n authorizing the im position o f a m on etary penalty
against individuals and banks f o r vio la tio n o f a fin al cea se and d e s is t o rd e r.
S im ila rly , the proposed amendments to Section 22 o f the F e d e r a l R e s e r v e
A ct, which would im p ose additional re s tric tio n s on loans extended by state
m e m b e r and nonm em ber banks to their own o ffic e r s , d ir e c t o r s and m a jo r
stockholders and to corporations a ffilia ted with those individuals, a re
d es ira b le.




- 17 -

Another d es ira b le le g is la tiv e provision is that which allows the three
fe d e ra l bank regu latory agencies to disapprove changes in bank control on the
basis o f express standards spelled out in the statute. Although I assume the
power to disapprove changes in control would be used sparingly, this type of
legislation, i f p r o p e r ly employed, would enable the agencies to anticipate and
avoid problem s which they can only react to at present. I b e lie v e that its m e re
presen ce would have a fa r-r e a c h in g d eterren t effect and would m in im ize
certain types of abuses.

We would be happy to coordinate drafting of such

legislation with this C om m ittee
A s I have stated on many occasions, I have long fa vo red the elimination
of the prohibition on the payment of in te re s t on demand deposits as w e ll as the
elimination o f in te re s t rate ceilin gs ge n e ra lly on loans and deposits.

I w ill

not burden you at this time with the details of my rationale on this subject.
Suffice it to say that it is m y f i r m b e lie f that allowing the payment of in te rest
on correspondent balances would be a m a jo r step in m inim izing the potential
fo r abuse a risin g out o f the use of correspondent balances in connection with
bank stock loans.
In summ ary, I p e r c e iv e that the m ost pressing le g is la tiv e need at
present is the passage of S. 71, with perhaps the amendment I suggested
previou sly regardin g the a gen cies'

suspension and rem o va l pow er.

of S. 71 would significantly buttress existing enforcem ent tools.




#

#

#

#

Passage

PR-8-78 (1-30-78)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FDIC PROPOSES AMENDMENTS TO INSIDER TRANSACTION REGULATION

Chairman George A. LeMaistre of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation today
announced that the Board of Directors has proposed amendments to Section 337.3
of the Corporation's regulations which deals with "insider transactions" of FDICinsured State-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System
(insured State nonmember banks).
The insider transaction regulation, which has
been in effect since May 1, 1976, is intended to minimize abusive self-dealing and
overreaching by bank insiders through the establishment of procedures designed to
ensure that bank boards of directors supervise insider transactions effectively,
and to better enable FDIC examiners to identify and analyze insider transactions.
The proposed amendments would (1) specify the circumstances under which the FDIC
considers an insider transaction to be an unsafe or unsound banking practice,
(2) make clear that the FDIC will take appropriate supervisory action when it
determines that an insider transaction is an unsafe or unsound banking practice,
(3) clarify what transactions are subject to the regulation's requirements,
(4) clarify the regulation’s recordkeeping requirements, and (5) prescribe specific
reporting and review requirements with respect to correspondent accounts and
certain bank stock loans.
Chairman LeMaistre stated that "The proposed amendments are designed to emphasize
and clarify the FDIC's policy with respect to insider transactions.
The Corporation
believes that transactions with insiders, their close relatives, or their business
interests are not improper per se. Accordingly, the proposed amendments seek to
treat as unsafe or unsound banking practices those transactions in which insiders
or their interests receive preferential treatment not afforded to noninsiders under
comparable circumstances and which result in, or are likely to result in, loan loss,
excessive cost, undue risk, or other economic detriment to the bank. Upon determin­
ing that a bank has entered into an insider transaction which is an unsafe or unsound
banking practice, the Corporation will take appropriate supervisory action against
the bank — ranging from informal efforts to obtain voluntary correction to formal
proceedings under Section 8 of the FDI Act."
(Section 8 of the FDIC Act provides,
among other things, for the issuance of cease and desist orders against banks that
engage in unsafe or unsound banking practices.)
One of the principal proposed amendments is a specific provision relating to
correspondent accounts. The new provision would require each insider to report
in writing to the bank's board of directors all bank stock loans made to the
insider and certain of the insider's relatives by a financial institution with
which the bank maintains a correspondent account.
The bank's board of directors
would be required to review, at least annually, all of the bank's correspondent

- more -

F E D E R A L D EPO SIT IN SU R A N C E CO R PO R A TIO N , 5 5 0 Seventeenth St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429



202-389-4221

2

accounts to ensure that such accounts are fair to and in the best interest of the
bank.
In making the review, the board would be required to consider all relevant
facts, including the bank stock loans reported by the bank’s insiders.
In addition, a number of other amendments are proposed, some having substantive
effect and some simply for purposes of clarity. All the proposed amendments are
being published for comment in the FEDERAL REGISTER.
Interested persons are
invited to submit written data, views, or arguments regarding the proposed amend­
ments no later than March 10, 1978, to the Office of the Executive Secretary,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550-17th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.
20429. All written comments submitted will be made available for public inspection.
A copy of the proposed amendments as submitted for publication in the FEDERAL
REGISTER is available from the Corporation's Information Office at the above
address.

//

//

//

Distribution: Insured State Nonmember Banks (Commercial and Mutual)




//

//

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
[12 C . F .R .

Part

337]

UNSAFE AND UNSOUND BANKING PRACTICES
In s id e r

T ra n s a c tio n s

AGENCY:

Federal

D e p o s it In s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n

ACTION:

P r o p o s e d amendments t o r e g u l a t i o n .

( FD IC ) .

SUMMARY:
The FDIC p r o p o s e s t o amend 12 C . F . R . § 337 .3 d e a l i n g
w i t h " i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s " o f in s u re d S t a t e nonmember banks t o :
( 1 ) s p e c i f y t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e FDIC c o n s i d e r s an
i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n t o be an u n s a fe o r unsound b a n k in g p r a c t i c e ;
( 2 ) make c l e a r t h a t th e FDIC w i l l t a k e a p p r o p r i a t e s u p e r v i s o r y
a c t i o n when i t d e t e r m i n e s t h a t an i n s i d e r / t r a n s a c t i o n i s an u n safe
o r unsound b a n k in g p r a c t i c e ; ( 3 ) c l a r i f y what t r a n s a c t i o n s a r e
s u b je c t to th e r e g u l a t i o n 's re q u ire m e n ts ; (4 ) c l a r i f y th e regu ­
l a t i o n ' s r e c o r d k e e p i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s ; and ( 5 ) p r e s c r i b e s p e c i f i c
r e p o r t i n g and r e v i e w r e q u ir e m e n t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o c o r r e s p o n d e n t ,
a c c o u n ts and c e r t a i n bank s t o c k l o a n s . The p r o p o s e d amendments
a r e g e n e r a l l y d e s ig n e d t o c l a r i f y t h e F D IC 's p o l i c y w i t h r e s p e c t
t o i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s and t o respond t o a u e s t i o n s t h a t h ave been
r a i s e d s i n c e t h e F D I C 's i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n r e g u l a t i o n to o k
e f f e c t on May 1, 1976.
DATE:

Comments must b e r e c e i v e d

on o r b e f o r e March 10,

1978.

ADDRESS:
I n t e r e s t e d p e r s o n s a r e i n v i t e d t o su bm it w r i t t e n
d a t a , v ie w s o r argum ents r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p o s e d amendments
t o t h e O f f i c e o f t h e E x e c u t i v e S e c r e t a r y , F e d e r a l D e p o s it
In s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n , 550 1 7 th S t r e e t , N. W ., W a s h in g to n ,
D. C. 20429.
A l l w r i t t e n comments s u b m itt e d w i l l be made
a v a i l a b l e f o r p u b l i c i n s p e c t i o n a t th e a b o ve a d d r e s s .
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Alan J. K a p l a n , A t t o r n e y ,
F e d e r a l D e p o s i t In s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n , 550 17th S t r e e t , N. W .,
W a s h in g to n , D. C. 20429, t e l e p h o n e (2 0 2 ) 389 -4 4 3 3 .

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
THE F D I C 's i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n r e g u ­
l a t i o n (12 C . F . R . § 3 3 7 .3 ) t o o k e f f e c t on May 1, 1976.
As was
s t a t e d a t th e tim e o f i t s p r o p o s a l and a d o p t i o n , t h e r e g u l a t i o n
i s aimed a t m i n i m i z i n g a b u s iv e s e l f - d e a l i n g by " i n s i d e r s " o f
in s u re d S t a t e nonmember banks th r o u g h t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f
p r o c e d u r e s d e s i g n e d ( 1 ) t o en s u re t h a t bank b o a r d s o f d i r e c t o r s
s u p e r v i s e i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y and ( 2 ) t o b e t t e r
e n a b le FDIC e x a m in e r s t o i d e n t i f y and a n a l y z e such t r a n s a c t i o n s .
The r e g u l a t i o n s e e k s t o a c h i e v e t h e s e g o a l s b y p r e s c r i b i n g
r e v i e w , a p p r o v a l , and r e c o r d k e e p i n g r e q u ir e m e n t s w i t h r e s p e c t
t o c e r t a i n t r a n s a c t i o n s w hich a r e d e f i n e d in th e r e g u l a t i o n as
"in s id e r tra n s a c tio n s ."




-

2

-

In a d d i t i o n , t h e r e g u l a t i o n c u r r e n t l y in e f f e c t s t a t e s t h a t
n o t w it h s t a n d in g c o m p lia n c e w it h th e p r e s c r i b e d r e v i e w and
a p p r o v a l r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e FDIC w i l l ta k e a p p r o p r i a t e s u p e r v i s o r y
a c t i o n ( i n c l u d i n g , in an a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e , t h e i n s t i t u t i o n
o f fo r m a l p r o c e e d i n g s under S e c t i o n 8 o f th e F e d e r a l D e p o s it
In su ra n ce A c t ) a g a i n s t th e bank, i t s o f f i c e r s , d i r e c t o r s , o r
t r u s t e e s i f t h e FDIC d e t e r m in e s t h a t an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n i s
i n d i c a t i v e o f u n s a fe o r unsound p r a c t i c e s .
The r e g u l a t i o n
l i s t s s e v e r a l f a c t o r s which t h e FDIC w i l l c o n s i d e r in d e t e r m in in g
the p r e s e n c e o f u n s a fe o r unsound banking p r a c t i c e s i n v o l v i n g
in s id e r t r a n s a c t io n s , but does not s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s c r ib e the
c ir c u m s t a n c e s under which an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n w i l l be
c o n s id e r e d an u n s a fe o r unsound ban king p r a c t i c e .
S in ce th e r e g u l a t i o n to o k e f f e c t , q u e s t i o n s h ave been r a i s e d
from tim e t o tim e as t o t h e p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f v a r i o u s
p r o v i s i o n s and as t o th e FDIC e n fo r c e m e n t p o l i c y w it h r e s p e c t
to t h o s e i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s t h a t may i n v o l v e a b u s iv e
s e lf-d e a lin g .
A c c o r d i n g l v , th e FDIC has r e v ie w e d th e r e g u l a t i o n
in l i g h t o f t h e p u r p o s e s i t was d e s ig n e d t o s e r v e and now p r o p o s e s
to amend th e r e g u l a t i o n t o b e t t e r a c h i e v e th o s e p u rp o se s and t o
prom ote g r e a t e r c l a r i t y and u n d e r s t a n d in g .
Numerous p r o v i s i o n s o f th e r e g u l a t i o n have been r e w r i t t e n f o r
p u rp o se s o f c l a r i t y and r e a d a b i l i t y , w it h o u t a f f e c t i n g t h e s u b s ta n c e
o f the r e g u l a t i o n .
H ow ever, a number o f s u b s t a n t i v e amendments
a re a l s o p r o p o s e d , t h e most s i g n i f i c a n t o f which a r e d e s c r i b e d
as f o l l o w s :
1.
A new d e f i n i t i o n would be added, d e f i n i n g the
term " p r e f e r e n t i a l " as i t i s a p p l i e d t o i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s .
Under t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n i s p r e f e r e n t i a l
i f , in l i g h t o f a l l t h e c ir c u m s t a n c e s , an i n s i d e r o r p erso n
r e l a t e d t o an i n s i d e r o b t a i n s a b e n e f i t o r a d v a n ta g e which
would n o t be a f f o r d e d in a co m p a ra b le a r m 's l e n g t h t r a n s a c t i o n
to a n o n in s id e r o f co m p a ra b le c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s o r o t h e r w i s e
s im ila r ly s itu a te d .
2.
A new p r o v i s i o n would be added to s p e c i f y t h o s e
c ir c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e FDIC c o n s i d e r s an i n s i d e r t r a n s ­
a c t i o n t o be an u n s a fe o r unsound bankina p r a c t i c e .
Under t h i s
p r o v i s i o n , an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n i s an u n s a fe o r unsound bank­
ing p r a c t i c e i f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i s p r e f e r e n t i a l and r e s u l t s i n ,
or i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n , lo a n l o s s , e x c e s s i v e c o s t , undue r i s k ,
or o t h e r econom ic d e t r i m e n t t o the bank.
The r e g u l a t i o n would
a l s o make c l e a r t h a t t h e FDIC w i l l ta k e a p p r o p r i a t e s u p e r v i s o r y
a c t i o n a g a i n s t a bank whose i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s a r e found t o
be u n s a fe o r unsound.
Depending on t h e n a t u r e o f t h e t r a n s ­
a c t i o n and th e c ir c u m s t a n c e s i n v o l v e d , such s u p e r v i s o r y a c t i o n
may ra n g e from i n f o r m a l e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n v o l u n t a r y c o r r e c t i o n
t o , in an a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e , i n s t i t u t i o n o f fo rm a l p r o c e e d in g s
under S e c t i o n 8 o f th e F e d e r a l D e p o s it In s u ra n c e A c t .
T e c h n ic a l
c o m p lia n c e w it h t h e r e g u l a t i o n ' s r e v i e w , a p p r o v a l , and r e c o r d ­
k eep in g r e q u ir e m e n t s would n o t be c o n s i d e r e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r
an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n which i s an u n s a fe o r unsound banking
or a c t i c e .




-3-

Thus , in o r d e r t o d i s p e l any c o n f u s i o n t h a t way e x i s t
w it h r e s p e c t t o th e c u r r e n t r e g u l a t i o n , th e p ro p o s e d amend­
ments would make i t c l e a r t h a t th e FDIC w i l l n ot t o l e r a t e
any i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t a f f o r d s p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t m e n t
t o an i n s i d e r or a p e r s o n r e l a t e d t o an i n s i d e r and r e s u l t s
i n , or i s l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n , econ om ic d e t r i m e n t t o th e bank.
In s u re d S t a t e nonmember banks can and sh ou ld e x p e c t such
t r a n s a c t i o n s , sh ou ld t h e y o c c u r , t o be th e s u b j e c t o f exam in er
comment and FDIC s u p e r v i s o r y a c t i o n .
W ith r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f a c t o r s enum erated in s u b s e c t i o n ( g )
o f t h e c u r r e n t r e g u l a t i o n which th e FDIC w i l l c o n s i d e r in
d e t e r m in in g th e p r e s e n c e o f u n s a fe o r unsound o a n k in g p r a c t i c e s
i n v o l v i n g i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s , two o f t h o s e f a c t o r s have been
d e l e t e d in t h e p r o p o s e d amendments in f a v o r o f a r e v i s e d s i n g l e
stan d ard.
I t sh ou ld be e m p h a s iz e d , h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e r e v i s e d
s i n g l e s ta n d a r d i s n o t in t e n d e d t o be n a r ro w e r in s c o p e than
t h e t h r e e f a c t o r s enum erated in p r e s e n t s u b s e c t i o n ( g ) .
I t sh o u ld a l s o oe em ph a sized t h a t any i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n
t n a t m eets t h e s t a t e d c r i t e r i a w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d an u n s a fe or
unsouno b a n kin g p r a c t i c e , r e g a r d l e s s o f th e d o l l a r amount o f th e
tra n s a c tio n .
The i n c l u s i o n in t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f a s c h e d u le o f
minimum d o l l a r amounts which " t r i g g e r " th e r e g u l a t i o n ' s r e v i e w ,
a p p r o v a l , and r e c o r d k e e p i n g r e q u ir e m e n t s in no way l i m i t s th e
F D IC ' s a b i l i t y t o t a k e s u p e r v i s o r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t a bank t h a t
e n t e r s i n t o an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n which i s an u n s a fe o r unsound
ban king p r a c t i c e , even i f t h e d o l l a r amount o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n
f a l l s o e lo w t h e a p p l i c a b l e " t r i g g e r i n g am ount."
3.
A new p r o v i s i o n would be added r e l a t i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y
to co rresp o n d en t accou n ts.
I t would r e q u i r e each i n s i d e r t o
r e p o r t in w r i t i n g t o th e b a n k 's board o f d i r e c t o r s a l l lo a n s
o r o t h e r e x t e n s i o n s o f c r e d i t t h a t a r e Doth ( a ) made by a
f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n w it h w hich t h e bank m a in t a in s a c o r ­
re s p o n d e n t a c c o u n t , and ( b ) made f o r t h e p u rp o s e o f e n a b l i n g
th e i n s i d e r , th e i n s i d e r ' s s p o u s e , o r any r e l a t i v e o f th e
i n s i d e r who l i v e s in t h e i n s i d e r ' s home t o p u r c h a s e , c a r r y ,
or own a b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t in s e c u r i t i e s is s u e d by t h e bank,
i t s h o l d i n g company, o r any o t h e r in s u r e d bank o r h o l d i n g
company o f an in s u r e d bank.
The r e p o r t would s t a t e t h e term s
and c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e l o a n , i n c l u d i n g c e r t a i n s p e c i f i e d
i n f o r m a t i o n , and would be k e p t w it h t h e b a n k 's i n s i d e r t r a n s ­
a c tio n record s.
The b a n k 's board o f d i r e c t o r s would be r e q u i r e d t o r e v i e w
a t l e a s t a n n u a l l y , a l l o f t h e b a n k 's c o r r e s p o n d e n t a c c o u n ts
w it h o t h e r f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s .
The p u rp o se o f t h e r e v i e w
would be t o en su re t h a t such a c c o u n ts a r e f a i r t o and in th e
b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f t h e bank.
In making th e r e v i e w , t h e board
would be r e q u i r e d t o c o n s i d e r a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t s , i n c l u d i n g
th e bank s t o c k lo a n s r e p o r t e d by i n s i d e r s .
In a d d i t i o n t o t h i s s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n , any d e p o s i t p la c e d
by a bank in a n o th e r f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n t o com pensate t h a t
i n s t i t u t i o n f o r making a lo a n t o an i n s i d e r o f t h e bank would
be c o n s i d e r e d an " i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n " under amended p a ra g ra p h
( a ) ( b ) ( i i i ) and would t h e r e f o r e be s u b j e c t t o t h e r e g u l a t i o n ' s
r e v i e w , a p p r o v a l and r e c o r d k e e p i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s .




-4 -

4.
The d e f i n i t i o n o f '‘ p e r s o n r e l a t e d t o an i n s i d e r " would
be expanded t o i n c l u d e c e r t a i n r e l a t i v e s o f an i n s i d e r n ot
c o v e r e d by t h e p r e s e n t r e g u l a t i o n ( e . g . , b r o t h e r s , s i s t e r s ,
s p o u s e 's p a r e n t s ) .
5.
The d e f i n i t i o n o f " b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s " would be
s u b s ta n tia lly re v is e d .
I n s t e a d o f l i s t i n g c e r t a i n exam ples
o f such t r a n s a c t i o n s , as th e p r e s e n t r e g u l a t i o n d o e s , th e
r e v i s e d r e g u l a t i o n would s im p ly d e f i n e " b u s i n e s s t r a n s a c t i o n "
to mean " a n y a r r a n g e m e n t , a c t i v i t y , o r t r a n s a c t i o n , " e x c e p t
th o s e s p e c i f i c a l l y e x c lu d e d .
The " e x c e p t i o n s " r e l a t i n g to
t r u s t a c t i v i t i e s and a c t i v i t i e s und ertaken in th e c a p a c i t y
o f s e c u r i t i e s t r a n s f e r a g e n t o r m u n ic ip a l s e c u r i t i e s d e a l e r
would be d e l e t e d .
In a d d i t i o n , t h e e x c e p t i o n f o r " c r e d i t
card t r a n s a c t i o n s " would be r e s t r i c t e d t o t h o s e which a re
"p u rsu a n t t o s ta n d a rd c r e d i t p r o v i s i o n s a p p l i e d and e n fo r c e d
e q u a l l y as t o a l l c r e d i t c a r d cu sto m ers o f t h e b a n k ," and
the e x c e p t i o n f o r " d e p o s i t a c c o u n t a c t i v i t i e s " would be
r e s t r i c t e d t o t h o s e " i n v o l v i n g t h e bank as d e p o s i t o r y ( o t h e r
than payment b y t h e bank o f i n t e r e s t on t im e d e p o s i t s o f
$100,000 o r m o r e ) . "
6.
The d e f i n i t i o n o f " s e r i e s o f r e l a t e d b u s in e s s t r a n s ­
a c t i o n s , " c u r r e n t l y in a f o o t n o t e , would be p la c e d in t h e main
tex t.
7.
In th e d e f i n i t i o n o f " i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n , " th e
p h ra se " i n u r e s t o t h e t a n g i b l e econ om ic b e n e f i t o f " would be
changed t o " r e s u l t s in econom ic b e n e f i t t o . "
I t is b e lie v e d
t h a t t h e new la n g u a g e would b e more e a s i l y u n d e r s to o d .
8.
The b a n k 's board o f d i r e c t o r s would be r e q u i r e d to
r e v i e w and a p p r o v e an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n p r i o r t o consummation
o f th e t r a n s a c t i o n , u n le s s p r i o r r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l a r e c l e a r l y
i m p r a c t i c a l , in w hich c a s e r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l would be r e q u i r e d
to o ccu r no l a t e r than th e n e x t r e g u l a r l y s c h e d u le d board m e e tin g
f o l l o w i n g consummation o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n .
In t h o s e c a s e s in
which a p p r o v a l i s g i v e n f o l l o w i n g consummation o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n ,
t h e b o a r d ' s m in u tes would b e r e q u i r e d t o in c lu d e a s t a t e m e n t o f
the r e a s o n s why t h e bo a rd found p r i o r r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l t o be
c le a r ly im p ra c tic a l.
9.
The f o l l o w i n g a d d i t i o n a l amendments t o th e r e g u l a t i o n ' s
r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l r e q u ir e m e n t s a r e p r o p o s e d :
( a ) t h e ph rase
" [ a n i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n ] i n v o l v i n g a s s e t s o r s e r v i c e s h a v in g
a f a i r m a rk et v a l u e amounting t o more th a n " would be r e p l a c e d
by th e p h ra se " [ a n i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t ] i n v o l v e s an amount
g r e a t e r t h a n , " a lo n g v/ith a c l a r i f y i n g f o o t n o t e ; ( b ) t h e m in u tes
o f th e m e e t in g a t which a p p r o v a l i s g i v e n would be r e a u i r e d t o
e x p r e s s l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e board r e c o g n i z e d t h e t r a n s a c t i o n to
be an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n ; and ( c ) r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l o f a
" s e r i e s o f r e l a t e d b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s " would be r e q u i r e d to
occur a t l e a s t a n n u a l l y .




-5 10.
The r e g u l a t i o n ' s r e c o r d k e e p i n g p r o v i s i o n s would
be amended in th e f o l l o w i n g r e s p e c t s :
( a j each f i l e c o n t a i n ­
in g documents o r i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o an i n s i d e r t r a n s ­
a c t i o n would h ave t o b e c o n s p i c u o u s ly marked as such and
would have t o b e c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e d t o t h e m in u te s o f t h e
m e e tin g a t w hich t h e b o a rd a p p rove d th e t r a n s a c t i o n ? and
( b ) each such f i l e would b e r e q u i r e d t o i n c l u d e s u f f i c i e n t
i n f o r m a t i o n and d o c u m e n t a tio n t o e n a b le t h e b o a rd t o make
an in fo rm e d d e c i s i o n as t o a p p r o v a l o r d i s a p p r o v a l , i n c l u d i n g
such i n f o r m a t i o n and d o c u m e n ta tio n as t h e bank would r e q u i r e
o f a n o n i n s i d e r in a c o m p a ra b le t r a n s a c t i o n .
11.
The e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n r e l a t i n g t o th e d i s c o v e r y b y
t h e bank o f an i n s i d e r r e l a t i o n s h i p a f t e r e n t e r i n g i n t o a
t r a n s a c t i o n r e q u i r i n g r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l would be d e l e t e d .
A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e Board o f D i r e c t o r s o f t h e F e d e r a l D e p o s it
In s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n h e r e b y p r o p o s e s t o amend 12 C . F . R . P a r t 337
by r e v i s i n g § 337.3 t o re a d as f o l l o w s :
S ec tio n

337.3 I n s i d e r

(a)

D e fin itio n s .

T ra n s a c tio n s .

(1 )
Bank. The term "ba n k " means an in s u re d S t a t e nonmember
c o m m e rc ia l o r mutual s a v i n g s bank and any m a j o r i t y - o w n e d s u b s i d i a r y
o f such bank.
(2 )
Per so n .
The term " p e r s o n " means a c o r p o r a t i o n ,
p a r t n e r s h ip , a s s o c i a t i o n , o r o th e r b u s in e s s e n t it y ? a tr u s t? or a
n atu ra l p erson .
(3 )
C o n t r o l . The term " c o n t r o l " ( i n c l u d i n g th e term s
" c o n t r o l l in g " , ' ' c o n t r o l l e d b y " , and "u n d e r common c o n t r o l w i t h " )
means t h e p o s s e s s i o n , d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , o f t h e power t o
d i r e c t o r c a u s e t h e d i r e c t i o n o f management and p o l i c i e s o f a
p e r s o n , w h e th er th r o u g h t h e o w n e r s h ip o f v o t i n g s e c u r i t i e s , by
p r o x y t o v o t e such s e c u r i t i e s , b y c o n t r a c t , o r o t h e r w i s e .
(4 )

In s id e r.
(i)

The term " i n s i d e r "

means:

Any d i r e c t o r o r t r u s t e e o f

(ii)
o r has a u t h o r i t y t o p a r t i c i p a t e
th e bank?

a bank?

Any o f f i c e r o r em p lo y ee o f a bank who p a r t
in m a jo r p o l i c y - m a k i n g f u n c t i o n s o f

(iii)
Any p e r s o n who has d i r e c t o r i n d i r e c t c o n t r
t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s o f t e n p e r c e n t o r more o f t h e s h a r e s o f any c l a s s
o f v o t i n g s t o c k o f a bank? o r




(iv )

Any p e r s o n who o t h e r w i s e c o n t r o l s a bank.

-

(5 )
Person r e la t e d
t o an in s id e r * ' means:

6

-

t o an i n s i d e r .

The term “ p e rs o n r e l a t e d

(i)
A c o r p o r a tio n , p a rtn e rs h ip , a s s o c ia t io n , oth er
b u s in e s s e n t i t y , o r t r u s t which c o n t r o l s , i s c o n t r o l l e d b y , o r i s
under common c o n t r o l w it h an i n s i d e r ; and
(ii)

A n a t u r a l p e rs o n who i s
(A )

an i n s i d e r ' s

spouse ( e x c e p t where l e g a l l y

(B )

a p a r e n t o r s t e p p a r e n t o f an i n s i d e r ' s

sep a ra ted );
s p o u se;

(C ) an i n s i d e r ' s p a r e n t , s t e p p a r e n t , c h i l d ,
s t e p c h i l d , b ro t h e r , s t e p b r o t h e r , h a l f - b r o t h e r , s i s t e r , s t e p s i s t e r t
or h a l f - s i s t e r ; o r
in t h e

(D ) any o t h e r r e l a t i v e o f an i n s i d e r who l i v e s
i n s i d e r ' s home.

(6 )
B u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n .
The term “ b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n "
means any a r r a n g e m e n t, a c t i v i t y , o r t r a n s a c t i o n , e x c e p t :
c h a rita b le
t r a n s a c t i o n s ; d e p o s i t a c c o u n t a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g th e bank as
d e p o s i t o r y ( o t h e r than payment by t h e bank o f i n t e r e s t on tim e
d e p o s i t s o f $100,000 or m o r e ); s a f e k e e p i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s ; and c r e d i t
ca rd t r a n s a c t i o n s p u rs u a n t t o sta n d a rd c r e d i t p r o v i s i o n s a p p l i e d
and e n f o r c e d e q u a l l y a s t o a l l c r e d i t c a rd cu stom ers o f t h e bank.
(7 )
S e r i e s o f r e l a t e d b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s .
The phrase
" s e r i e s o f r e l a t e d b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s " I n c lu d e s b u s in e s s t r a n s ­
a c t i o n s w hich a r e in s u b s ta n c e p a r t o f an i n t e g r a t e d b u s in e s s
a rran gem en t o r r e l a t i o n s h i p , such as b o r r o w in g s under a s i n g l e l i n e
o f c r e d i t , la w f i r m b i l l i n g s , o r r e c u r r i n g t r a n s a c t i o n s o f a s i m i l a r
n a tu re w i t h i n a h o ld in g company sy s te m .
(8 )
In s id e r tra n s a c tio n .
The term " i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n ”
means any b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n o r s e r i e s o f r e l a t e d b u s in e s s t r a n s ­
a c t i o n s betw een a bank and:
(i)
(ii)

an in s id er o f th e bank ?
a per son r e i a te d t o an in s i d e r o f t h e bank ;

any o the r per son where th e t r a n s a c t i o n r e s u l t s
( iii)
in econom i<: b e n e f:I t t o an in s id e r o f t h e ban k o r a p e rs o n r e l a t e d
an i n s i d e r o f t h e bank ; o r

to

any o the r per son where th e t r a n s a c t i o n i s engaged
( iv )
in o r made in co n tem p la t io n o f such p e r s o n b ecom ing an i n s i d e r o f
the b a n k .
(9 )
P r e fe r e n tia l.
An i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n i s " p r e f e r e n t i a l "
i f , in l i g h t o f a l l t h e c ir c u m s t a n c e s , an i n s i d e r o r p e r s o n r e l a t e d t o
an i n s i d e r o b t a i n s a b e n e f i t o r a d v a n ta g e which would n o t be a f f o r d e d
in a co m p a ra b le a r m 's l e n g t h t r a n s a c t i o n t o a n o n in s id e r o f com­
p a r a b le c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s o r o t h e r w i s e s i m i l a r l y s i t u a t e d .




-7(b)
U n s a fe or Unsound Bankin g P r a c t i c e s
T r a n s a c t i o n s;_S u p e r v i s o r y A c t i o n .

In v o lv in g

In s id e r

(1 )
An i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n i s an u n s a fe o r unsound banking
p r a c t i c e i f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i s p r e f e r e n t i a l and r e s u l t s i n , o r i s
l i k e l y t o r e s u l t i n , lo a n l o s s , e x c e s s i v e c o s t , undue r i s k , o r o t h e r
econ om ic d e t r i m e n t t o t h e bank.
(2 )
The C o r p o r a t i o n w i l l ta k e a p p r o p r i a t e s u p e r v i s o r y
a c t i o n a g a i n s t a ban k, i t s o f f i c e r s , o r i t s d i r e c t o r s o r t r u s t e e s
when th e C o r p o r a t i o n d e t e r m in e s t h a t an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n , a l o n e
o r when a g g r e g a t e d w i t h o t h e r i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s , i s an u n s a fe
o r unsound ban kin g p r a c t i c e .
Such s u p e r v i s o r y a c t i o n may c o n s i s t
o f in fo r m a l e f f o r t s t o o b t a i n v o l u n t a r y c o r r e c t i o n o f t h e u n s a fe
o r unsound ban kin g p r a c t i c e o r , in an a p p r o p r i a t e c a s e , may i n v o l v e
i n s t i t u t i o n o f fo r m a l p r o c e e d i n g s under S e c t i o n 8 o f t h e F e d e r a l
D e p o s it In s u r a n c e A c t .
C om p lian ce w it h t h e r e v i e w , a p p r o v a l , and
r e c o r d k e e p i n g r e q u ir e m e n t s o f t h i s s e c t i o n w i l l n o t r e l i e v e t h e
o f f i c e r s , d i r e c t o r s , o r t r u s t e e s o f a bank o f t h e i r d u t i e s t o conduct
t h e b a n k 's o p e r a t i o n s in a s a f e and sound manner, and w i l l n o t be
c o n s i d e r e d j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n which i s found
t o be an u n s a fe o r unsound b a n k in g p r a c t i c e .
(c)

R e v ie w and A p p r o v a l o f C e r t a i n

In s id e r T ra n s a c tio n s .

(1 )
A b a n k 's b o a rd o f d i r e c t o r s o r b o a rd o f t r u s t e e s
s h a l l s p e c i f i c a l l y r e v i e w and a p p r o v e each i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n t h a t ,
e i t h e r a l o n e o r when a g g r e g a t e d in a c c o r d a n c e w it h p a ra g ra p h ( d ) o f
t h i s s e c t i o n , i n v o l v e s an amount 1/ g r e a t e r than
(i)
in t o t a l a s s e t s ;

$ 2 0 ,0 0 0 ,

if

t h e bank has n o t more than $100,000,000

$ 5 0 ,0 0 0 , i f t h e bank has more than $100,000,000
( ii)
b u t n o t more than $50 0,00 0,000 in t o t a l a s s e t s ; o r
( iii)
in t o t a l a s s e t s .

$ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,

if

t h e bank has more than $50 0,00

Such r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l s h a l l o ccu r p r i o r t o consummation o f t h e
t r a n s a c t i o n , u n le s s p r i o r r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l a r e c l e a r l y i m p r a c t i c a l ,
in which c a s e r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l s h a l l o ccu r no l a t e r than th e n e x t
r e g u l a r l y s c h e d u le d m e e t in g o f t h e b a n k 's b o a rd o f d i r e c t o r s or
board o f t r u s t e e s f o l l o w i n g consummation o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n .

1/ I f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v e s a d is b u r s e m e n t o f fu n ds o r an o b l i ­
g a t i o n t o d i s b u r s e fu n d s b y t h e ban k, th e n t h e "amount" r e f e r r e d t o
in th e t e x t i s t h e amount d is b u r s e d o r th e maximum amount w hich th e
bank i s o b l i g a t e d t o d i s b u r s e .
I f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n i n v o l v e s payment
b y t h e bank o f i n t e r e s t on t im e d e p o s i t s o f $100,000 or m o re , then
t h e "amount" r e f e r r e d t o in t h e t e x t i s t h e p r i n c i p a l amount o f th e
t im e d e p o s i t .




-

8

-

(2 )
When an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n i s p a r t o f a s e r i e s o f
r e l a t e d b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s i n v o l v i n q th e same i n s i d e r , a p p r o v a l o f
each s e p a r a t e t r a n s a c t i o n i s n o t r e q u i r e d so lo n g as t h e b a n k 's
board o f d i r e c t o r s o r board o f t r u s t e e s has r e v ie w e d and approved
t h e e n t i r e s e r i e s o f r e l a t e d t r a n s a c t i o n s and t h e term s and c o n d i t i o n s
under which such t r a n s a c t i o n s may t a k e p l a c e .
Any s e r i e s o f r e l a t e d
b u s in e s s t r a n s a c t i o n s s h a l l be r e v ie w e d and ap p roved a t l e a s t a n n u a llv .

I

0

1,

(3 )
The m in u tes o f th e m e e tin g a t which a p p r o v a l i s g i v e n
s h a l l ( i ) i n d i c a t e t h e n a t u r e o f th e t r a n s a c t i o n and t h e p a r t i e s
t h e r e t o , ( i i ) e x p r e s s l y i n d i c a t e t h a t th e board r e c o g n iz e d the
t r a n s a c t i o n t o be an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n , t h a t r e v i e w was u n d e rta k e n ,
and t h a t t h e t r a n s a c t i o n was approved or d i s a p p r o v e d , and ( i i i ) s t a t e
t h e names o f ea ch d i r e c t o r o r t r u s t e e who v o t e d t o a p p r o v e o r d i s ­
a p p ro v e th e t r a n s a c t i o n o r a b s t a in e d from v o t i n g .
In th e c a s e o f
n e g a t i v e v o t e s , a b r i e f s t a t e m e n t o f ea ch d i s s e n t i n g d i r e c t o r ' s
o r t r u s t e e ' s r e a s o n f o r v o t i n g t o d i s a p p r o v e th e p roposed i n s i d e r
t r a n s a c t i o n s h a l l be in c lu d e d in t h e m in u tes i f i t s i n c l u s i o n i s
r e q u e s t e d by t h e d i s s e n t i n g d i r e c t o r o r t r u s t e e .
In th o s e c a s e s
in w hich a p p r o v a l i s g i v e n f o l l o w i n g consummation o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n ,
the m in u tes s h a l l a l s o i n c lu d e a s t a te m e n t o f th e r e a s o n s why th e
board found p r i o r r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l t o be c l e a r l y i m p r a c t i c a l .
(d )
A g g re g a tio n o f In s id e ^ T ran s a c tio n s .
For o u r p o s e s o f
s u b s e c t i o n ( c ) o f t h i s s e c t i o n , any l o a n o r ” e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t
i n v o l v i n g an i n s i d e r s h a l l be a g g r e g a t e d w it h t h e o u t s t a n d in g
b a la n c e s o f a l l o t h e r l o a n s o r e x t e n s i o n s o f c r e d i t i n v o l v i n g t h a t
in s id e r.
A lo a n o r e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t i n v o l v e s a s p e c i f i c i n s i d e r
when t h e l o a n o r e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t i s made t o t h a t i n s i d e r , to
a p e r s o n r e l a t e d t o t h a t i n s i d e r , o r t o any o t h e r p e rs o n where th e
lo a n o r e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t r e s u l t s in econ om ic b e n e f i t t o t h a t
in s id e r o r a person r e l a t e d to th a t i n s i d e r .
e)

R e c o r d s and I n f o r m a t i o n P e r t a i n i n g

to In s id e r T ra n s a c tio n s

(1 )
Each bank s h a l l m a in t a in a r e c o r d o f , and in f o r m a t i o n
p e r t a i n i n g t o , i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s r e q u i r i n g r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l under
th is s e c tio n .
To f a c i l i t a t e exam iner r e v i e w , such r e c o r d s and in fo r m a ­
t i o n s h a l l ( i ) b e r e a d i l y a c c e s s i b l e t o e x a m in e rs , ( i i ) be k e p t in a
manner and form t h a t w i l l e n a b le e x a m in ers t o r e a d i l y i d e n t i f y a l l
i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s w hich r e q u i r e r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l under t h i s
s e c t i o n , and ( i i i ) be c r o s s - r e f e r e n c e d t o th e m in u tes o f t h e board
o f d i r e c t o r s ' o r b o a rd o f t r u s t e e s ' m e e tin g a t which t h e i n s i d e r
t r a n s a c t i o n was a p p r o v e d .
Each f i l e c o n t a i n i n g documents o r o t h e r
i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s h a l l be c l e a r l y and
c o n s p i c u o u s ly marked as such.
(2 )
The r e c o r d s and in f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o i n s i d e r
t r a n s a c t i o n s s h a l l d e s c r i b e f u l l y and a c c u r a t e l y a l l i n s i d e r t r a n s ­
a c t i o n s r e q u i r i n g r e v i e w and a p p r o v a l under t h i s s e c t i o n , and s h a l l
in c lu d e a l l documents and o t h e r m a t e r i a l r e l i e d upon by t h e board
in a p p r o v in g each such t r a n s a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g th e name o f th e
i n s i d e r , t h e i n s i d e r ' s p o s i t i o n o r r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t ca u s e s him
t o be c o n s i d e r e d an i n s i d e r , t h e d a t e on which t h e t r a n s a c t i o n was




-9
a p p ro v e d by t h e b o a r d , t h e t y p e o f i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n , and th e
r e i e v a n t term s o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n .
The f i l e r e l a t i n g t o each such
t r a n s a c t i o n s n a i l i n c l u d e s u f f i c i e n t i n f o r m a t i o n and d o c u m e n ta tio n
t o e n a b le th e board t o make an in fo r m e d d e c i s i o n as t o a p p r o v a l
o r d i s a p p r o v a l , i n c l u d i n g such i n f o r m a t i o n and d o c u m e n ta tio n as
tn e bank would r e q u i r e o f a n o n i n s i d e r in a co m p a ra b le t r a n s a c t i o n .
(f )
D is c lo s u r e o f Proposed In s id e r T r a n s a c t io n s .
Any
i n s i d e r h a v in g kn ow led ge o f an i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n o r a p ro p o s e d
in s id e r tr a n s a c tio n in v o lv in g th a t in s id e r or a person r e la t e d to
t h a t i n s i d e r s h a l l g i v e t i m e l y n o t i c e o f such t r a n s a c t i o n t o th e
b a n k 's bo a rd o f d i r e c t o r s o r b o a rd o f t r u s t e e s .
(g )

C o r r e s p o n d e n t A c c o u n t s . 2/

( 1 ) A b a n k 's bo a rd o f d i r e c t o r s o r board o f t r u s t e e s
s h a l l p e r i o d i c a l l y r e v ie w ( a t l e a s t a n n u a lly ) a l l o f the bank' s
c o r r e s p o n d e n t a c c o u n ts w it h o t h e r f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i ons t o en su re
t h a t such a c c o u n ts a r e f a i r t o and in t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s o f th e
bank.
In making t n e r e v i e w , t h e b oa rd s h a l l c o n s i d e r a l l r e l e v a n t
f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i n c l u d i n g t h e lo a n s and o th e r ex t e n s i o n s
o f c r e d i t r e p o r t e d under p a ra g ra p h ( 2 ) o f t h i s su bsec t io n ( g ) .
The b o a r d ' s m in u tes s h a l l r e c i t e t h e d e t a i l s and f i n d i n g s o f th e
re v ie w .
(2 )
Each i n s i d e r s h a l l r e p o r t in w r i t i n g t o th e
b o a rd o f d i r e c t o r s o r bo a rd o f t r u s t e e s o f t h e Dank a l l lo a n s
o r o t h e r e x t e n s i o n s o f c r e d i t t h a t a r e b o th ( A ) made b y ’ a f i n a n c i a l
i n s t i t u t i o n w it h which t h e bank m a in t a in s a c o r r e s p o n d e n t a cco u n t
and (B ) made f o r th e p u rp o se o f e n a b l i n g t h e i n s i d e r , th e
i n s i d e r ' s s p o u s e , o r any r e l a t i v e o f t h e i n s i d e r who l i v e s in th e
i n s i d e r ' s home t o p u r c h a s e , c a r r y , o r own a b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t
in s e c u r i t i e s is s u e d by t h e bank, i t s h o l d i n g company, o r any
o t h e r in s u r e d bank o r h o l d i n g company o f an in s u r e d bank. 3/
The r e p o r t s h a l l be k e p t w i t h t h e r e c o r d s m a in t a in e d by th e bank
w it h r e s p e c t t o i n s i d e r t r a n s a c t i o n s and s h a l l s t a t e t h e term s and
c o n d i t i o n s o f each lo a n o r e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t , i n c l u d i n g t h e
fo llo w in g in fo rm a tio n :

2/ C o m p lia n ce w it h t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h i s s u b s e c t i o n ( g ) , o r o f
s e c t i o n 337.3 g e n e r a l l y , s h o u ld n o t be c o n s t r u e d t o a f f e c t in any
manner t h e l i a b i l i t y o f any p e r s o n under 18 U .S .C . § 656 f o r w i l l f u l
m i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f bank fu n d s .
3/ As used in t h i s s e n t e n c e , t h e term " i n s u r e d bank" i n c l u d e s any
n a t i o n a l bank, S t a t e member bank, o r in s u r e d S t a t e nonmember bank.




-

(i)
e x te n s io n o f c r e d i t ;
(ii)
in s id e r

(iii)
in v o l v e d ? and

10

-

a b r i e f d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e lo a n o r o t h e r
th e p a r t i e s t h e r e t o o r a f f e c t e d
the

thereby?

i d e n t i t y and r e l a t i o n

t o t h e bank o f th

(iv)
th e p r i n c i p a l term s and c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e
o r o t h e r e x t e n s i o n o f c r e d i t ( i n t h e c a s e o f a l o a n , t h e s e would
in c lu d e th e p r i n c i p a l amount? term o r m a t u r it y ? i n t e r e s t r a t e ?
d e s c r i p t i o n and v a l u a t i o n o f c o l l a t e r a l p le d g e d ? p u rp o s e o f lo a n ?
repayment s c h e d u le ? and s o u r c e o f r e p a y m e n t ).
(S e c . 2 [ 8 ] , Pub. L. 797, 64 S t a t . 879, as amended, Pub. L. 89-695,
80 S t a t . 1046 (12 Ü .S .C . 1818)? sec 2 [ 9 ] , Pub. L. 797, 64 S t a t .
831-82 ( 12 Ü .S .C . 1819) ) .

By o r d e r o f t h e Board o f D i r e c t o r s d a t e d

J

X

9 1978.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

A la n R. M i t r e r
~
E x e c u tiv e S e c r e ta r y

(SEAL)