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FOH RELEASE IN MORNING PAPERS WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 1921*
CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESS OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY9 D . R . CRISSINGER,
BEFORE THE LOUIS M A

BANKERS ASSOCIATION AT NEW ORLEANS, IA«> TUESDAY

APRIL 19, 1921, AT « P . M .

J)
SOARD. .

v f - H G -

A-l
GENTLEMEN OP THE CONVENTION:
I have ccme here to make c. friendly visit and offer a word of cheer to
the people of the South,
your "banks.

I suspect that you have had quite too much of that in the
as .

past to be to your liking.
ing.

I do not intend to tell you bankers how to run

The fundamentals-of banking are/old as bank-

The application of the principles of banking are often necessarily

different in remote parts of the country from .financial centers'.

New York

and Boston requirements are often impossible to the country banker.

My

mission, however, would not serve its purpose or be complete if I failed
to give you my assurance of good will and friendly interest.

I want

to take this occasion to say to you and a l l of the bankers of the South
that the latch-string on the door of the Comptroller's office is hanging
on the outside only awaiting your neighborly and friendly pull.

It is

there for the country and the city banker alike.

I want you to know

and feel that full understanding will be my aim.

Your troubles, if you

repcr t to my office, if you have any troubles, must often necessarily
be my troubles.

I want you to understand that you will always find me

ready and willing to give all assistance consistent with good banking.
It shall be my aim and purpose to at all times assist the honest banker
and I want to assure you that I am starting out my administration with
the belief and faith that bankers as a class are of the highest type of
our citizenship, honest and conscientious in the administration of their
trust.

It seems to me that it is almost criminal to have strained rela-

tions between the National Bankers and the Comptroller.

There should be

instead such a fellowship and brotherhood in our relations as will promote
for the country a safe and efficient banking system.

This will be my aim

and I trust that you will unite your efforts to bring about this achievement.

®

i

>

m

-

1 -

>

i

m

I

sti-ongly Suspect that I am

addressing a gathering in which the majority w i l l sympathise with me
when I confide to you that I am a country canker,

I acknowledge the

corn, or, as perhaps you would prefer down here in Louisiana, the
cotton.

Corn or cotton, nowadays, i t brii^s a vision of troubled

days and worried nights to the country banker.

For I undertake to

say that nobody lives so close to the grass roots, nobody is quite so
intimate with the community about him, nobody is so near to being
the trouble
And,

operator for the whole exchange, as the country banker..

gentlemen, when the country banker suddenly finds himself

transplanted into the comptroller ship of the currency and an ex-of ficio
membership on the Federal Reserve Board, he achieves a prompt and
emphatic realization of the vastness of this exchange.
He has always understood that the currents and tides of
business the world over are a unity, a balanced system; but until he
gets caught up in

the sweep of their bigger forces,

compelled to

regard them as a whole, he rmy have missed the full realization of that
essential unity.

I have liked to think of the parallel between the

tides and currents of the mighty oceans> and the movements of
economic forces that answer to the law of supply and demand.

We know

that a universal system of tides and curror.ts equalizes for our planet
the operations of the attraction of gravitation, the disturbing
influences of varying temperatures in different zones.

Their constant

operation keeps the seas. - at a mean level from which departures are
insignificant; and in doing so they save our physical world from
strains and stresses, from tidal waves and' inundations, that otherwise

- 2

-

would produce vast and cosmic disasters »
It is precisely the same, in this day of the world-wide
neighborhood in economic and financial a f f a i r s .
vacuum, and so does the economic world.
of a vacuum, and
get in.

Nature abhors a

You can't get much out

you can't prevent things outside it from trying to

True, there are tidal waves, caused by momentary disturbances of

the balance; but they never interfere for long, or, if we view them
broadly, very seriously, with the ccherre of tilings.

Likewise

there are times when the compensating forces that maintain the balance
of atmospheric pressures and temperatures are shifted out of gear for a
few minutes, and then we read of a cyclone.

But a cyclone, though

painful to the people who get tossed about in i t , and annoying in
the extreme to the modest rcoster who finds himself called upon next
morning, with a l l his feathers blown o f f , to clarion his greeting to the
dawn of a normal day, is a pretty temporary and casual incident when
compared to the mighty scheme of atmospheric currents and pressures
that on the whole maintains the atmospheric equilibrium of the planet.
It is indubitably true that when one finds one's self
grabbed by the cyclone and pitched over into the next quarter-section,
one's convictions about the scheme of cosmic equilibrium sustain, for the
time being, a distinct shock.

One doesn't note any ting about except

debris and agitation, and it is all very disturbing to that philosophic
calm in which we all realise that departures from normal are rather
unimportant,

Nobody

knows, bettor i than the banker, the broad laws of

compensating currents, balanced forces, adjustments and readjustments,
that prevail in the business world.

But, because he is very certain to

i—

3

be at the precise storm center when the trouble starts, the banker
also gets the most acute apprehension of the discomforts that
attend temporary suspens ion of the rules.
V/e all know that the war and the subsequent interregnum
that was neither war nor peace, did decidedly suspend the normal laws
of trade, finance, exchange.

These have not yet resumed their sway.

V/e have had

credits and

overproduction

of

of

printed money, under-

production of pretty nearly everything else; and along with these has
gone an interruption of physical transport end financial exchanges
i

that has depressed the capacity to consume and thus left the appearance
of excess production even in lines in which there was nothing of the sort.
This precisely is what has caused the crisis in American
agriculture.

We confront demands for relief from every quarter.

Middle

Europe, the Near E a s t , China, Ireland - a l l stand in need of the staples
that we possess but cannot sell because those who most urgently need
them cannot buy.

They have neither money that is worthy of that name

in international transactions, nor credit, nor goods to send in barter.
Even in our own country, whose vast market must always be our main
reliance, there has been something ll.ke a consumers' strike against
high prices.

So, facing all these depressing influences, the producer

who turned out goods and staples in a time when prices were high and
war-time's feverish demand seemed unlimited, finds himself unable to sell;
credits are frozen, and their process of thawing is going to be slow,,
depending on the rise of the sun of peace, and the warmth with which
it shall shine on a shivering world.
war, too little to work.

Men's minds still run too much to

The fear of further conflict causes the contin-

uance of barriers against those long-established and easy exchanges on which

great communities have

cane to be dependent; even, in many cases,

the strengthening of old or the erection of new barriers.
There are features in connection with the entire business
of International Trade, that are entirely changed by reason of the war.
It may be doubted whether we Americans have given enough attention to
this re-shaping of the commercial map and business methods of the world.
During the war it became necessary for governments to effect great
consolidations aof business and to place government credit,

shipping,

fiscal and even diplomatic authority to a great extent at the disposal
of business.

Governments created buying and selling agencies that dealt
the

in the necessaries of both the government and/private industry of the
country.

This was necessitated in order 9 somewhat to prevent the excessive

inflation of prices •

The buyer who went into a world market with authority

to purchase a particular line on a huge scale of a great nation*s demand,
and with the financial responsibility of that nation at his back, was in
position to insist upon terms, and to evade payment of the excessive
prices thatconipetitionmight have imposed.

At a later stage, those

buying organizations were even internationalized.
authority was

A single buying

sent out to survey the markets of the world, and to buy

on behalf of governments, and then to allocate to the different national
partners in the enterprise their respective shares,

This concentration of

purchasing power made it possible to play off one against another, so
that, although prices increased rapidly, their inflation was not nearly
ao great as it might have been,if there had been complete freedom of
competition.
industry.

A familiar example may be found in

In the early

the iron and steel

stages, different departments of a single

government, as the Army, the Navy, the Shipbuilding authority, and the
ilunitions organization, found themselves "bidding against each othor for
supplies of iron and steel.

Later, when i t came to be realized that the

v/ar vas likely to be won by the side which most effectively mobilized
the industrial capacity of the world, means were devised to prevent this
expensive

competition.

Thus came the beginning of price control.

At a

later state, internatioral buying succeeded national, that i s , the allied
nations to a considerable degree pooled their requirements and the
international agency, representing, substantially the consolidated demand
of the entire world, succeeded the merely national authority.
This procedure we all recognize as having contributed greatly to
the victory of the a l l i e s .

Under their war powers, governments rigidly

restricted the use of materials by private business.

The manufacture of

luxuries was ruthlessly limited in order that necessary material might be
conserved for the war industries or those lines of production which were
esteemed necessary to the civil life of the community,
I am firmly convinced that when the economic story of the war can
bo written in detail, it will be recognized that by its participation in
this sort of an organization, the United States made one of the greatest
contributions to the allied cause,

when ovir tremendous agricultural and

industrial, and raw materials capacity, was once effectively consolidated
and then cast into the service of the cannon cause, the Industrial mobilization of the world had been pretty much effectod,Not only was the cause
of the allies assured that the entire producing

capacity of America,

was available, but it v.as also assured against the necessity of paying
those extreme prices which open competition might have enforced in
such an exigency; and, finally, it was assured the financial support

- 6of the consolidated credit of the richest nation in the world.
All this was a mighty contribution yotho winning of the
war.

But it produced an inevitable reaction.

Business men and or-

ganisations wo re irked at realization that they wo r 3 under powerful
restraint; that they were not

f r e e ,

as in other times, to charge a l l

that the traffic would boar, and to earn tho highest possible profit.
^

is truo that tho system of control was organised on tho whole, on a

liberal basis.

Profits wore in many cases unprecedented in volume;

tut the other side i s , that if there had been no such control they would
have boon still greater.

For tho purposes of our present survey of world

conditions it is not necessary to consider so much the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the profits, as to get our minds firmly fixed on the
facts and implications of this system of national and then international
control.

It is a very big and potent fact, but not always an entirely

patent one- Men wore entirely willing to endure inconveniences and restrictions so long as tho war was going on, &nd the great supreme business of
winning inspirod thorn with willingness to make sacrifices of their independence and their business opportunity.

But tho very moment the war was c

over, the victory won, thoro c&mo the inevitable reaction,the denand that
"Tho Government get cut of business", and that the old rule be reestablished.
Nowhere was this demand emphasized as in the United States,
-ro had not been in tho war so long as cur a l l i e s .
so close to us as to them.

The war had never bo&a

The supreme necessity to win had never been

impressed upon us so tremendously as upon them.

Moreover, in the first

two and half years of the war, wo had net participated, but had been free

to earn as great profits as might be possible, from the necessities of chosa
who later became our a l l i e s .

A l l those things united to give particular

insistence to the demand that governmental restrictions bo removed just as
rapidly as possible.
Unprepared for peace as we had been for war., cur government listened perhaps, too willingly to these demands.

The instrumentalities of in-

tegration and centralized control 7/ere "scrapped" with altogether unnecessaryhaste,

Tie might well have stopped, looked ana listened; have noted what

our a l l i e s , and indeed others, were doing in this regard.

But we did not;

we assumed that we might return to peace methods and basis immediately and
without groat difficulty-

It was only when wo had discarded the entire

fabric and structure of war-time restrictions., and returned to the rale
of Laissez-faire, that we realized that others had boon loss precipitate.
Do-control
was not esteemed in other countries the instan($ous sine ciua Ann
to reestablishment of peace.

Their more urgont necessities, their compar-

atively very much greater impoverishment at the end of the struggle, impressed them with the necessity of projecting for an indefinite period into
the era of peace, tho methods which had provod efficacious in time of warC
So i t came about that American business found itself presently,

decentral-

ized and decontrolled, under the necessity of competing in world markets
that continued to bo dominated by tho same highly organized and centralized forces that had ruled during the war.

v7e found ourselves back on a

competitive b a s i s , seeking to s e l l in markets that had not yet been restored
to that basis; and the results for us have not been altogether

satisfactory.

- 8&*rope in dealing in its highly organized capacity with cur competing
sellers, was able progressively to depress our prices.
Another and perhaps equally important factor in the situation
^as the release of ships,

So long as ships woro sparse and require-

meats imminent, such ships as were available had to be used on the
shortest possible routes,

Curing the war, it was not a question of

Price,, but of getting the largest possible tonnage moved in the shortest time.

So, the more distant markets were nigh deserted and the

United States was called upon to provide everything possible, while
other countries piled up great surplus of their staples against the day
of peace*

When peace came, and i t was possible for ships to bo sent over

the wider seas and longer routes, to get the cheaper goods from more
distant parts, the highly organized buying agencies of needy countries
*uito naturally tended to desert us and to buy elsewhere if they could
sake better terms or secure lower prices.
The depressing effects of this upon out international trade,
WQr

°

not

immediately felt because our financial position was so strong.

Europe was compelled to buy where she could get credit.
givo credit, and wo did give i t .

We were able to

Our business men extended private

credits to the extent of hundreds of millions, then of billions of
dollars.

But the time inevitably came when this could not go on, and

then for the first time wo stood on a basis of parity with others
w

ho had the goods with which to compete and who could give credit.

This climax in the situation was hastened by reason of the disadvantageous
°xchange rates, which tended to make every country seek to buy from some
other country whoso money was cheaper.
V/

As we had the dearest money in the

orld, which means the bost money, the money next to parity with gold,

we became the country with which it was most difficult to do business,
The consolidated buying agencies of Europe found themselves in a
position to take their trade elsehwere, and to a considerable extent
they have done so.
Eut we would be seriously mistake! if we should conclude that
this is a condition that must inevitably continue to our disadvantage.
The close integration of Europe's buying and selling organizations has
possible only through the maintenance of a considerable degree of govern..
m

ent financial responsibility*

tut none the less effectively,

More or less indirectly it is true,
governments have been underwriting

"the international business of their nationals, in order to bring about
"the earliest possible rehabilitation of trade, and to provide employment for their people.

Raw materials have been provided at very low

Prices, to be turned into- manufactured products for the world's markets*
T

he manufacturer who is privileged to u t i l i z e these very cheap materials,

^y

be able to turn out products, for a time, that w i l l undersell ours
the world*s market, and yet net him a modest p r o f i t .

Eut the other

side of the ledger is to bo seen in the financial statement of the
government budget.

When we turn to thi3, we find deficits which, if we

thoroughly understood them, would explain how the national Treasury
has been losing by the policy of subsidizing industry and expanding
trade.

This sort of thing cannot go oil always, there is reason to believe

that it cannot go on much longer-

It is an unhealthy economic condition,

from which on the whole we have been immune.
There are some other conditions that have operated to our
^ntry^

disadvantage*

The long delay in making peaee, due to political

conditions that are thoroughly familiar and dc net roquirc discussion
hero,, has boen prominent among these.

Eut we look forward with much

confidonce to a near future in which peace w i l l be restored to our country
and the interference of war laws with the processes of commerce w i l l be
ended.
This w i l l ,

I am confident, react favorably upon the relations

among other nations and tend toward the earliest possible resumption of
peace conditions.

There is the best of reason for believing that the

recent announcement of this country's support of the a l l i e d powers
in enforcing the p ayment of proper reparations by Germany, w i l l speed
Up that settlement on which so largely depends the restoration of
security, the balancing of budgets, and the establishment of financial
Assurance in Europe.
Eut we must recognize the big facts in this matter.

One is

that European rehabilitation must be slew and its reflection in more
favorable business conditions very gradual.

The other is that our own

country presents to us the market in which we must always do most of our
business and on which we shall chiefly depend for establishment of
industrial prosperity.

There is plenty of consuming capacity here, if

Wo could only make it possible for the potential consumers to buy those
things they would be glad to oonsume.

If we can find means to keep our own

people working, producing, earning, they will spend their earnings buying
tho things they have produced, and we w i l l presently see the tides of prosperity running stronger.
I am not among those who greatly fear a so-called unfavorable

balance of international trade,

J. have never been able to understand

the reasoning of those who would have us believe that if other peoples
send us more goods than we send them, we are being impoverished*
hi© that we are
am

„iruch. of the time rather being further enriched.

It seems to
Neither

I one of those who note with complete satisfaction the tendency of the

world's gold to bank itself up on this side the It la n ^ c.-

There is a

certain sort of reasoning on these subjects that, if carried to its
final conclusions, would have us believe that if we never imported anything, but always exported heavily, we should be getting rich' at a tremendous rate*

Because, they seem to believe, we would compel the outside

world to koep on everlastingly sending us its gold in payment for our goods;
ie
and that, in this process of reasoning/regarded, as the sunmm bonum . To me,
it has always seemed that if too rr.uch of the gold got piled up in one
place, there would have to be too little in other places.

Gold is not

particularly useful as an article of *diet or clothing or housing.

Its

function is to provide a generally accepted basis of the money systems
on which exchanges depend; and when one country's system is inflated with
too imch gold, others rrust bo inflated with paper whose relation to gold
w i l l necessarily be vaguo»

So there will bo difficulties about exchanges;

the dollar, with the' larger reserve of gold back of i t , will be out of
joint with the pound, the xranc, the lire, the rrark, and thus the very international exchanges that a gold standard was intended to facilitate will be
hampered.
Lot mo make application of these observations to our'present
business situation.
keep our

machinery

If I am correct in the impression that we nr\od to
of production working, then wo raist do everything

possible to enable our farms and irincs and mills to keep bus;'.
rcust help our own people to be able to buy their products.

?»e

We must also

help the cutsidc world to maintain a money system in such relation to
gold that exchanges will be possible.

Therefore, as to the domestic

problem, we must extend- through cur financial instiumer'tal»ties, every
onoouragQiuent to the producer.

'i'b© i'arfcier mast be asoiirj^

ignt now.,

that in bis effort to buy fertilizers and seed and implements and labor
for the next crop, he will be given tho fullest support, the brcai#§t
credit, that can possibly be extended through the banks, and that the federal government and its banking structure w i l l stand squarely back of
individual banks that wisely and in moderation extend neoessary credits
foxr these purposes.

Credit as a basis of production there must be;

credit as an incentive and m a n * to mere unproductive speculation^ tho re
^ s t not be.

I can say to you barkers- and to the great agricultural

community behind you, that this is and will, be tho policy of those responsible for the supervision of national banks.

-13-

It would be difficult

to nam3 an A f r i c a n

industry that so

thoroughly deserves or so safely could b3 extended assistance at a
time of temporary stress as that of cotton production.

For many

decades our exports of cotton have been responsible for k e e p i n g us
in secure possessions of a favorable trade balance.
our South produce,

You people of

I balieve, about sixty percent of the entire

output of the world.

Without you,

the civilization of the

Temperate Zones would be impossible, bacause without you, people
would be going naked, and it never has been found feasible to
maintain a highly cultured state among folks who chase about in
/

winter time in openwork beads and diaphanous smiles.

The World's

shelves and warehouses are just about denuded of those goods which
represent your great agricultural industry.

Consumers have been

more or less on an enforced strike, but they must come back into
the market and they are already doing so»

The continuance of the

world's great and increasing demand for cotton and cotton fabrics
is just as certain as the continuance of civilization

itself.

You

may take it from me that those who are vested with some measure of
authority to guide tha broader financial policies of this country
have a fairly accurate conception of the vital necassity to encourage
and sustain the production of our cotton crop and of every other
agricultural staple.

They are deterained that in behalf of American

industry there shall be exerted whatever power and influence may be
necessary to bring this vital industry back to a basis of assured
prosperity.

I do not want to be understood as suggesting that

government can be relied upon to do

-1U-

ttie things that private enterprise,

thrift and effort must do, bit I am

willing that you should very definitely understand me to mean that every possiole support and encouragement, consistent with sanity and soundness, based
on the consolidated credit and authority of American business and the .American
government, will be Held out in this time of trial and stress,
It is useless

to worry now about the grists that might have been

ground with water that has already gone over the dam,

Not much will be gained

by dwelling upon the omissions of the past, the failures to deal in proper
time with the great problems that related to the restoration of peace and
Peace conditions in a disorganized and distorted world.
the present to say that, although indeed tardily,

It is enough for

those problems are going

to receive the most prompt and intelligent attention that can be given to them.
Among all our American staples, perhaps none is so important in
international trade as cotton.
country,

There is no continent,

there is no significant

that can hold itself independent of America as to its requirements

of this American staple.
as the world*

They must all come to us.

Our market is as wide

Therefore our ability to sell must largely depend upon the

ability of the world at large to buy.

In this regard there has already

been set afoot a renewed effort through instruments of the government
end also through private financial agencies,

to aid in extending the larger

and longer credits that are needed in order to enable foreign buyers to
continue taking our products.

These efforts you can be assured will

receive every feasible and safe encouragement.

I am confident that the

readjustment of affairs in Europe and in the world at large gives
gratifying promise of moving forward in the near future more rapidly and on
safer lines than at any time since the armistice.
justified in view of recent demonstration of the

This is particularly

-15solidarity of this nation with its allies on the other side.

The

settlement of problems connection with the indemnities assessed
by

^ e peace conference would be a long step toward a proper fiscal

and economic adjustment in the old world.
w i

H

With that readjustment there

come a reduction of public burdens in all countries, freeing of

industry from those forms of government control that have been
folding i t , and the resumption of something nearer of what we think
ar

e normal conditions.

This is absolutely necessary.

armaments have been costing too much.

Governments

We see ahead the hopeful

Prospects that they will presently begin to cost less and continuingly still less; that the burden of taxation on industry and
Production will he progressively lessened;

that therefore the capacity

the prople to buy and consume will increase.
From the best informed sources abroad come assurances that
conditions there are improving;
the

United

are

S11c h

m

that the outlook for increasing trade with

States is decidedly hopeful;

that requirements for our materials

that their satisfaction cannot be much longer postponed,

ea S ures can be devised to enable the business to be carried on.

if
At this

Point, again, I can give assurance that the utmost support will be given
tne government's financial authorities to every effort at extension of
credits by which foreign trade may be developed.
a

Of government credits

nd money we have given all that can safely be permitted.

The

task must be handled hereafter through the processes of commercial
transaction; of those transactions which represent the ^ c e a s i n g flow
supplies and the constant, if at times postponed, liquidation of
ac

counts.

There can be no more consideration of vast blocks of credit,

to "be expended perhaps in purchases which represent the least prospect for
0

^rly liquidation*

The streams of international exchanges must be

clarified and invigorated.

V.'ithin the limits which prudence dictates, the

financial and economic system of this country must ana will be encouraged
tr>
open new markets,

encourage new demands, sustain enterprise

wherever

it gives satisfactory promise.
The national credit reservoir is still spl3ndidly filled,
I

t is capable of sustaining further drafts, if the streams that flow away

f

rom it can be certain of enriching, fructifying, producing - and then

returning that which has been withdrawn.

That is all we need to make

sure that henceforward the withdrawals from it shall be for useful,
r

^productive, supporting purposes.

v/

orld,

and

This is, indeed, true of the whole

there is good cheer for us in the fact that the

realizing the necessity to conserve, to u t i l i z e ,

world

is

to save its resources.

If I were to ask one particular service of every banker,
every business man, farmer, worker, capitalist - every intelligent person
in -America - it would be to inculcate the ideals of thrift and prudence
and saving.

If we would all live on a little less than we earn,

-^nd consolidate our savings into a great stock of liquid capital,

it

^ould finance a vast and increasingly vaster expansion of production at home
a

nd trade abroad.

needs.

Our help in this regard the whole world distressingly

We would not have to meet constant calls for charity - to which as a

P'-ople we have responded with noble generosity - if we •"ould instead save,
and use the capital thus aggregated together, in putting our transactions
on the basis of business instead of charity.

The rest of the world would

-17-

^

t h a n

h 3

s

Of

in order to buy.
';3 ' 7 i l 1

3na

us..

a

At the moment it needs our encouragement and

V/e con give it that help, if we will save; as we do

b l i n g other lands and peoplas to resume their own

busina-q o "T
•
oi producing and saving and paying.
a

This reciprocal effort means

return to legitimate business bases -at a faster rate than we can quite

re

e.lize*
This is a time in which banks have opportunity to render their

SUnT'fSrno

•

- service to the community.
ma

Through them the small surpluses of capital

y be drawn together; bits that in themselves would be of no practical
for financing the country's business and yet that, i f heaped together

ln

a

bu
the

the form of bank deposits, would represent the differance between ample

Pital and financial shortage; between tight money and easy money; between
smess depression and business activity.
I have seen a good deal of
ra rl-r
4. •
•
ertismg matter that banks employ, and it has often occurred to me that

u

makes too little appeal along this line.

There never was a better time

fo
r

rai

banks to engage in educational effort of this kind.

the people - to understand the fundamental character, purpose, aims,

'-^vices, of the bank.
ls

Teach the people -

Induce them to keep their money in i t .

Billions of

teful expenditure would be avoided every year - I say, .and I mean it

Morally, billions - if everybody antitled to a bank account would maintain
Xt

tijQ

and rely on it.
i .

Most of the monay that is wasted is "loose money" from

jveople s pockets.
Ca

I t ' s almost unbalieveable how much less is the

^ice of wasteful expenditure of "chicken feed" sums, if the spender

'

-18-

under the necessity of drawing a check before he can spend.
Coul:

-

I f we

the people to kno"" this, and to realise the satisfaction

saving by the simple expedient of not spending because it's easy to
s

^end, we should have gone a long way toward restoring financial assurance.
The other day my attention was called to a letter written

b

y a government official,

Soing to quote it hare.

that so exactly illustrated my point that I am
Tie ' T i t e r said:

"I have for many years "be2n pretty r 'ell
convinced that saving money is largely a matter
of habit, and people who make a good beginning at
it presently discover that it is by no means
impossible, and it is altogether a good thing
to do. Just at this juncture in the '"orld's
and our country's affairs it is certainly one
of the most useful contributions that people
could possibly make to putting the world
right.
I do not believe there is any other
way to straighten out the tangle of financial
and economic concerns into which the "'orld
has been precipitated by the war, than to
produce a good deal more than v/e consume, which
means, to save, end by our savings to reestablish
the "'orld ! s stores of "'orking capital.
I have
no more earnest hope than that the public may
take this lesson to heart and learn to save
as, in view of our great national good fortune,
they could be able to d o . "
I have not often seen the case for personal saving
niore cogently put, and therefore I have especial pleasure in telling
you who signed that letter.

It was a man of -"horn the people of the

South have seen a good deal in recent time; for whom the South has
given multiplied testimonies of its affection and confidence; a man
who for many years has bean the earnest anl understanding friend of

-19-

this great section, and who is today particularly anxious to help
the South to deal with the problems that are bearing heavily
upon i t .

He is an untiring advocate of a united -America; an

eloquent spokesman for a unity that shall know no sections, no
ancient prejudices, no old animosities;
conviction that such an America,

a very evaneel for the

thus unified and glorified and

illuminated, shall move unfalteringly forward to the helpful,
"unselfish and fraternal leadership of the world.
re

Gentlemen, I have

a d you a letter that was written by my chief, and yours, and our

country's by President Warren G„ Harding.

*