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_________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Covid-19 and the Future
of the U.S. Economy
______________________________________________________________________________

Charles L. Evans
President and Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Lakeshore Chamber of Commerce
Hammond, IN
September 3, 2020

_____________________________________

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO
The views expressed today are my own and not necessarily those of the
Federal Reserve System or the FOMC.

Covid-19 and the Future of the U.S. Economy
Charles L. Evans
President and Chief Executive Officer
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Introduction and disclaimer

Thank you for inviting me to offer my views on the economy and the path ahead.
I should state at the outset that these views are my own and do not necessarily
represent the views of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) or others in the Federal Reserve System.

All of us have a role to play in recovering from the pandemic, which has taken a
tremendous human toll and continues to pose many challenges. I am especially
grateful for the services that health care and other essential workers have been
providing throughout this ordeal. Their dedication has been indispensable and
inspiring.

We obviously have lots of work ahead of us. As the economy heals, leadership
by organizations such as yours will be critical in supporting local communities
and businesses and in promoting development opportunities to help us achieve
more vibrant economic outcomes for everyone in society.

My remarks today will focus on a few points that are fundamental for the
economic outlook.

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•

I’ll start with where the economy stands today. Even though growth has
resumed in recent months, we are still far from the robust economy we had
prior to the pandemic. Importantly, the unemployment rate is about 10 percent
now, as compared with 3-1/2 percent last February. We have a long way to go
to get back to normal.

•

The second point is that the future of the recovery is inextricably linked to the
virus. Until we’ve made sufficient progress in controlling its spread, activity is
likely to remain suppressed—indeed, sporadic outbreaks could even result in
further setbacks.

•

Third, monetary policy and, particularly, fiscal policy have key roles to play. To
date, Fed actions, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(CARES) Act, and other programs have provided important support to
households, businesses, nonprofit organizations, and state and local
governments. The expirations of expanded unemployment insurance
provisions, Payroll Protection Program (PPP) lending, and restrictions on
some layoffs for firms receiving special industrial relief aid loom large for the
economy. These reductions will test the true resiliency of the U.S. economy.
The potential hole in aggregate demand may be large, and in my view more
fiscal relief will be needed in order to limit further damage to the economy.

•

My baseline outlook assumes that there will be progress on controlling the
virus and that additional fiscal support is forthcoming. Still, I expect it could be
late 2022 before economic activity returns to pre-pandemic levels. It also will
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be some time before inflation picks up to reach the FOMC’s 2 percent
objective.
•

Of course, there are many unknowns in the outlook, and I will spend some
time today talking about an important one: the potential implications of the
disruptions to our educational system for the development of children’s skills
and for the labor force decisions of their parents. Even a one-year disruption to
education or work can have lasting effects on children and parents, and thus
poses an important risk to the outlook.

•

I’ll conclude with a discussion of monetary policy. The Federal Reserve has
taken strong action to help the economy weather the crisis and is committed to
supporting the recovery. Given my outlook, I expect this means highly
accommodative monetary policy will be appropriate for some time to come.
The revised “Statement on longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy”
should also help clarify and support our policy goals.

Activity is picking up, but the hole is deep

Let me start with where the economy is today. The virus and actions to stem its
spread have upended everyday life and left a huge mark on the economy. After
state and local governments issued stay-at-home orders for all but essential
businesses, all indicators of economic activity logged record declines in the
second quarter. Gross domestic product (GDP) plunged at an annual rate of

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almost 32 percent—the worst quarterly decline in the history of the national
income and product accounts (NIPAs) data going back to 1947.

Activity began to recover through the spring as state and city officials relaxed
restrictions to varying degrees. Starting from such a low base, we can expect to
see a huge positive number for GDP growth in the third quarter: The projections
from outside forecasters are centered at around a 21 percent annual rate. On its
own, a number that large would be remarkable and cause for celebration.
However, even with this anticipated eye-catching rebound, the level of GDP
would still be about 5 percent below its pre-pandemic level. Furthermore, rising
virus counts in some locations have delayed or reversed many reopening plans,
and we are undoubtedly looking at much, much more modest growth in the fourth
quarter.

The unemployment rate sums up the current situation well: It was a horrific 10.2
percent in July, and this was an improvement from the shocking 14.7 percent
high in April—and this might have been closer to 20 percent when you consider
some measurement issues! Today, nearly 18 million people are still
unemployed. 1

Though the labor market remains poor for many, some sectors of the economy
have largely recovered. Retail sales are now above their pre-pandemic level, with

1

Most of the job losses still appear to be temporary layoffs, but the number of permanent job
losers continues to rise and is now up 2.9 million. This represents about 1.8 percent of the labor
force, up from 0.9 percent just before the pandemic, but still well below the 4.4 percent ratio
experienced during the financial crisis.

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a notable bounce-back in many goods and services that had seen the largest
declines during the shutdowns. Other sectors still have a way to go. For example,
manufacturing output has picked up 15 percent between April and July. That’s a
good start, but is still only a bit more than halfway out of the hole dug during
shutdown.

Through this time, many companies have made significant efforts to operate
safely. I regularly hear from contacts about their operational changes. Some
describe accelerated adoption of technology, which has enabled many
employees to work remotely. Others talk about creative solutions to help keep
their workers safe, including monitoring employee and visitor health, adopting
more stringent cleaning protocols, and modifying the work environment to
implement social distancing.

Still, challenges remain. For example, some firms face high rates of absenteeism
as workers get sick, are exposed to the virus and need to quarantine, or are
reluctant to come to work because of health concerns. A few of my contacts have
even hired extra workers to cover the high number of absences. Clearly, these
efforts are costly, but they are necessary if businesses are to continue operating
through the public health crisis.

The path of the virus and mitigation efforts will shape the recovery

Ultimately, the course of the recovery depends on the path of the virus and
efforts to contain it. Certainly, solutions to our health issues are necessary for

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businesses, workers, and consumers to safely return to their usual ways.
Importantly, to get the economy moving, these solutions must be effective
enough to restore public confidence. Households need to feel comfortable
reengaging in normal activities, such as going to work or school, riding public
transit, going out to eat, and visiting a doctor’s office. And businesses need to
have confidence in sustainable improvements in demand in order to justify longlasting commitments, such as major capital spending initiatives and workforce
expansion.

Of course, a safe and effective vaccine is the ultimate goal. Until one is available,
things we already know how to do—such as social distancing and wearing
masks—are very important, as are increasing testing and quarantine.
Reintroducing restrictions on social and recreational gatherings, shutting down
potential super-spreader events, and enhancing protections for the elderly would
also help substantially.2

In the meantime, we are likely to see periodic regional outbreaks of infections,
which may require reimposing certain restrictions on activity and may also
undermine consumer confidence and spending. As we’ve experienced over the
past couple of months, this isn’t merely hypothetical. For example, a number of
indicators of economic activity and consumer confidence stalled out in late June

2

For a recent analysis of the effects of economic restrictions and noneconomic,
nonpharmaceutical interventions on mitigating a second wave of Covid-19 infections, see Baqaee
et al. (2020).

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and early July as states that reopened early and saw rising virus counts had to
clamp down on activities.
And while outbreaks may be localized to start, it’s hard to keep them so. Our
nation is highly interconnected. Just think about how difficult it would be to
prevent a surge in the Chicago area from finding its way into Northwest Indiana.
So doing everything we can to keep the virus under control everywhere is crucial
to the recovery.

Fiscal policy is essential

The course of the recovery will also critically depend on receiving substantial
additional support from fiscal policy. The initial policy response in March was
swift, with the Federal Reserve, Congress, and the executive branch working to
provide support to the millions of households and the many thousands of
businesses affected by the shutdowns. The CARES Act included direct aid to
households in the form of stimulus checks and expanded unemployment
insurance, helping put food on the table and pay for rent and other essential
expenses. Loans and grants to businesses enabled them to stay in business,
keeping workers on payrolls, meeting day-to-day expenses, and avoiding costly
bankruptcies. 3

3

When firms go out of business, their relationships with workers, customers, suppliers, and
lenders are destroyed. Rebuilding those connections—many of which have been built up over
years and decades—is extremely costly.

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This support was essential. But the needs remain great, and some important
provisions of the CARES Act have now expired, threatening to put more
vulnerable households and businesses in jeopardy. An inadequate fiscal
response would significantly reduce household spending, further damage
household balance sheets, and put many businesses at risk of failing.

Federal assistance has also been vital for state and local governments. They are
on the front lines of fighting the virus; there is a heightened need today for the
social services they normally provide; and they face the additional costs of
addressing social unrest. These demands come at a time when tax revenues are
down significantly because of the weak economy. Unlike the federal government,
state and local governments cannot run deficits. So unless more federal funding
is provided, state and local governments may be forced to take some difficult
actions. They could cut back on the provision of health resources or other social
services, which would make battling the virus and the recession even more
difficult. And they might end up furloughing workers, which could have large
effects, as state and local governments account for about 13 percent of total
employment. I would note nonprofit organizations face similar challenges trying
to maintain funding to provide food, educational, and other assistance to the
most disadvantaged people. Partisan politics threatens to endanger additional
fiscal relief. A lack of action or an inadequate one presents a very significant
downside risk to the economy today.

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My baseline outlook

As you can tell from this discussion, two things I see as critical for a sustainable
recovery are 1) the effective control of the virus and 2) adequate additional fiscal
support. My baseline forecast assumes we will achieve both, though the health
solutions, in particular, are not going to happen overnight.

As I noted before, I expect the third-quarter growth number to be big simply
because of the restart of the economy from the most severe shutdowns of last
spring. After this, I expect more moderate growth in the fourth quarter, with the
level of GDP still about 5 percent below its pre-pandemic level at the end of this
year.

Improvements in our control of the virus should allow growth to proceed at a
moderate pace, though I don’t expect activity returning to its pre-crisis level until
later in 2022. Of course, this does not take into account the fact that the economy
would have been growing in the absence of the crisis—it will take much longer to
catch up to that counterfactual. With economic activity remaining well below its
normal level, my baseline forecast has the unemployment rate in the
neighborhood of 9 percent by the end of the year—still extremely high—and
declining gradually to somewhere around 5 or 5-1/2 percent by the end of 2022.
Of course, the uncertainty surrounding these forecasts is extremely high—there
are just so many unknowns about how the virus and the economy will evolve
over the next couple of years.

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Let me say a few words about inflation. Overall consumer inflation stepped down
significantly this spring, as the effects of weak demand for a range of goods and
services far outstripped price increases in food and a few other products. Even
with the recovery of some prices in tandem with the recent improvements in
activity, for the 12 months ending in July, inflation as measured by the index for
core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) was only 1.3 percent—far below
our 2 percent inflation target.4 Given the prolonged period of subpar economic
activity and high unemployment, I expect inflation will run under our 2 percent
target for some time.

To sum up, even with steady progress in controlling the virus and additional fiscal
support, I expect it will be some time before the economy recovers from the hit it
took. Along the way, we face many challenges, uncertainties, and downside
risks. I would like to discuss one of those now.

The virus presents challenges for schooling and childcare

Schooling and childcare bring together many people of different ages with a
variety of health risks in the same space for prolonged periods of time. This
poses enormous public health challenges. The lack of national guidance has led
to a dizzying array of educational arrangements due to differential Covid-19 risks
around the country. Some schools and childcare facilities have fully reopened to

4

While our objective is stated in terms of overall PCE inflation, core inflation—which strips out the
volatile food and energy components—is a better gauge of sustained inflationary pressures and
of where inflation is headed in the future.

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in-person instruction, with a wide variety of social distancing schemes. Some
school districts are opting for a hybrid model rotating online learning with
classroom instruction, while others are pivoting to a fully remote learning
experience. Continuing challenges for the foreseeable future will be that the
health risks vary substantially around the nation and that different risk tolerances
have been selected by the various state and local authorities. Furthermore, given
the enormous uncertainty at this point over the course of the virus, all
arrangements are subject to revision, making it even more difficult for parents to
plan.

For children, the lost learning and socialization costs are potentially enormous.
For some children, even a year of subpar instruction can have lasting effects on
their lifetime educational achievement. Furthermore, the dependence of remote
learning on internet access raises the possibility of students in many rural areas
and disadvantaged households being left further behind their peers. And with
social activity limited by large and uncertain Covid-19 risks, I also worry that
some children will miss important developmental milestones that come through
interactions with other children and adults in a safe environment outside the
home.

Educating students at home also presents enormous challenges for parents. Can
parents who work outside of the home still go to work? Who will be at home to
supervise the children? If parents are able to work remotely, will they be able to
do so effectively? How much flexibility do parents have to adapt to changing

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school demands? And what is the toll on employee and family mental well-being?
These Covid-19 channels risk widespread and truly devastating costs.

The added stress on families is enormous. Weighing the competing needs of
family health, income, schooling, and child supervision, many parents may be
forced to cut back on hours or quit work altogether. The predicament is even
more striking for single parents and poorer households. And in our American
society today, women are particularly vulnerable because they generally
shoulder a disproportionate share of the childcare and household responsibilities.

For the economy, unless offset by other comparably skilled hires, a reduction in
the hours worked by these parents represents a loss of current production.
Furthermore, a decision to withdraw from the labor market for even a year can
have long-term adverse effects on these workers’ human capital and earnings.
This represents not just a loss to them, but the loss of that productivity to the
economy as a whole. The human toll is very large.

Monetary policy and revisions to the framework

Though I spent a good deal of time discussing the necessity of fiscal policy,
monetary policy is also playing an important role in supporting the economy
during this unprecedented and challenging time.

The pandemic demands an all-hands-on-deck response. Our response has been
both rapid and strong in order to limit any long-lasting damage to the economy
from the challenges the pandemic poses. In March, the FOMC quickly cut policy
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rates to their effective lower bound, putting the federal funds rate target range at
0 to 1/4 percent. As the Committee has repeatedly stated, the federal funds rate
is likely to remain in that range until we are confident the economy is on the path
to recovery. In addition, in order to address distress in crucial financial markets,
the Fed conducted repurchase agreements and purchased large quantities of
U.S. Treasury and mortgage-backed securities. We also activated special
lending facilities to support the flow of credit to businesses, households,
nonprofits, and state and local governments. These programs, which are
deployed only in very unusual circumstances, rely on emergency lending powers
that require the approval and financial backing of the U.S. Department of the
Treasury. To broaden their scope, we have adjusted the terms on a number of
facilities as appropriate.

These actions have clearly provided important support to the economy by easing
financial conditions across the economy. The Fed will continue to provide such
support as long as needed. As always, we remain focused on the achievement of
our dual mandate objectives of maximum employment and price stability as
expeditiously as possible.

To help us achieve these goals, in early 2019 the Federal Reserve embarked on
a comprehensive effort to review the way we conduct monetary policy. In large
part, the impetus for the review came from the realization that we live in a world
where interest rates are much lower than they were in the past, which limits how
much room the Fed has for using our usual tool—cutting the federal funds rate—

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to support the economy during economic downturns. An important part of this
process was a series of Fed Listens events, in which we heard from a wide range
of workforce development, small business, and community leaders on how
monetary policy affects their lives. 5
Last week Chair Powell introduced a revised “Statement on longer-run goals and
monetary policy strategy,” the document that lays out the FOMC’s goals and
articulates our framework for conducting monetary policy. 6

Among the noteworthy changes, the new statement emphasizes that maximum
employment is a broad-based and inclusive goal and that the Committee would
not be concerned with what might look like very tight labor markets as long as
they were not generating unwanted inflation or other risks. The new statement
also indicates that following a period when inflation has persistently run below
our 2 percent target, policy will likely aim to generate a period of above 2 percent
inflation. We’re not tied to a strict formula, but roughly speaking, we’re looking for
inflation to average 2 percent over time.

These principles are consistent with the type of outcome-based forward guidance
that I advocated and that the Committee used to speed the recovery after the
Great Financial Crisis, when we were far away from both our inflation and our
employment goals. We are in a similar position today. And I expect that

5

For a summary of Fed Listens events, see Federal Reserve System (2020).
See Federal Open Market Committee (2020a) for the revised statement. See Federal Open
Market Committee (2020b) for a comparison of this revised statement with the previous version
from January 2019.
6

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articulating outcome-based forward guidance for the rate path and asset
purchases could be beneficial in the not-too-distant future.

One of the lessons that monetary policymakers have learned is that policy is
most effective when it is clearly understood by the public. I think our new
consensus strategy is another important step in providing this kind of
transparency and, hence, in helping us to more effectively achieve our policy
goals. Of course, strategies need to be implemented with actions, and it is
important that our future monetary policy actions are true to the principles laid out
in the new consensus statement.
Thank you. And I’d now be happy to take your questions.

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References

Baqaee, David, Emmanuel Farhi, Michael Mina, and James H. Stock, 2020,
“Policies for a second wave,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, special
edition, Vol. 51, Summer, forthcoming, available online,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Baqaee-et-alconference-draft.pdf.
Federal Open Market Committee, 2020a, “Statement on longer-run goals and
monetary policy strategy,” Washington, DC, as amended effective August 27,
available online, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/review-ofmonetary-policy-strategy-tools-and-communications-statement-on-longer-rungoals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm.
Federal Open Market Committee, 2020b, “Guide to changes in the ‘Statement on
longer-run goals and monetary policy strategy,’” Washington, DC, August 27,
available online, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/guide-tochanges-in-statement-on-longer-run-goals-monetary-policy-strategy.htm.
Federal Reserve System, 2020, Fed Listens: Perspectives from the Public,
report, Washington, DC, June, available online,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/fedlistens-report-20200612.pdf.

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