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For release on delivery
Friday, September 22, 1967
6 p.m. , C.D.T.
(7 p.m. ,E,D.T.)


Remarks by
Andrew F . Brimmer
Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System

before the
Annual Convention of the
National Bankers Association

Hotel Continental
Kansas City, Missouri

September 22, 1967


The recent announcement by the nation's leading life
insurance companies that they plan to invest $1 billion in urban
rehabilitation has thrown into sharp focus a number of questions
relating to the role of financial institutions in the core areas of
our cities.

This meeting of bankers who devote their energies almost

entirely to meeting some of the financial needs of the citizens of
these areas provides a good forum for the discussion of several of
these issues.
The principal points in the remarks which follow can be
summarized briefly:


with the steady (though mixed) improvement in employment
opportunities, the income of the Negro community is rising
more rapidly than for the nation as a whole.
this rising income is attracting more and more national
businesses (including life insurance companies and other
financial institutions) to a market which was previously
the primary preserve of Negro businessmen.


The results are not unexpected:

with the decline in the

protective tariff of segregation, Negro business and
professional men in traditional fields are declining relative
to the population.'

- 2 Negro-owned financial institutions, with the exception of
a few recently chartered banks, are making only limited
progress in the face of growing competition from the larger
institutions active in the general market.

The results are also disturbing:

although the Negro middle

class is expanding at a rapid pace, the new job opportunities
are concentrated in the middle grade technical and professional

While these are clearly improvements over the

low-skill and low-paid jobs traditionally held by the average
N e g r o , they ordinarily are not a promising source of community
The vigorous competition of the major institutions


the competition from the life insurance companies) for business
in the Negro community -- combined with their investment
patterns -- may be resulting in a net drain on the savings of
the urban ghetto.

These trends suggest strongly that the n a t i o n s leading
financial institutions should re-examine carefully their techniques of
doing business in the ghetto.

For example, the move by the insurance

companies to invest $1 billion in urban areas could be supplemented
through a more direct involvement with financial institutions already
operating in the ghetto.


As far as I can determine from personal conversations in the
industry, no leading life insurance company has designated a

- 3 Negro mortgage banker as a local correspondent.

Since a

major share of the mortgage origination and servicing
business is done through such correspondents, the establishment of such links would facilitate the flow of investment
into the ghetto.
The Negro-owned banks can also play an expanded role in the
creation of new job opportunities in urban areas through joint ventures
with white-owned banks and other financial institutions.

An actual

project now under active consideration will illustrate clearly how this
can be done.

Trends in Personal Income
Before examining more closely the expanded opportunities for
financial institutions in the ghetto, let us review recent developments
in the income and employment patterns for nonwhites.

In the last few

years, the personal income of the nonwhite community (of which Negroes
make up well over 90 percent) has risen substantially in absolute terms
and in comparison with that for the white community.

The actual figures

showing the median income of families are:

Nonwhite as
per cent of White








































- 4 Several conclusions can be drawn from these figures.


the first three years of the 1960's, the gap between the median income
of white and nonwhite families actually widened; the ratio of nonwhite
to white income fell from .55 in 1960 to .53 in 1963.

This deterioration

was a direct reflection of the slow pace of the economy following the
1960-61 recession.

Between 1960 and 1963, the median income of white

families rose by $713, or by 12 per cent.
nonwhites were $232 or 7 per cent.

The corresponding changes for

However, following the general tax

reduction of 1964, the national economy expanded much more vigorously
and was further stimulated by the acceleration of the military effort in

One result was a sharp climb in personal income.

For white

families, the gain amounted to $1,174 (or 18 per cent) between 1963 and

In this same period, however, the gain in the median income of

nonwhite families was almost as large in absolute terms -- an increase
of $1,163 -- and represented a rise of 34 per cent, or nearly double that
recorded for white families.

In these

most recent years, nonwhites made

substantial gains in employment, and again the gap between white and nonwhite income was narrowed.
These improvements in the income of nonwhite families obviously
have meant a further substantial rise in the aggregate purchasing power
of the Negro community.

In 1963, total money income of families and

unrelated individuals amounted to $371.1 billion, of which $347.5 billion
was earned by whites and $23.6 billion by nonwhites.
accounted for 6.4 per cent of the total.

Thus nonwhites

By 1965, the total had climbed

to $419.1 billion; the income of whites amounted to $391.7 billion
and that of nonwhites to $27.4 billion.
had risen to 6.6 per cent.

So, the nonwhites



With the large relative gains in family

income registered last year, the total purchasing power of the nonwhite
community has undoubtedly expanded further.

Thus, the Negro market

offers an even stronger inducement for merchants selling to the general

Trends in Middle Class Employment Among Nonwhites
The pattern of income changes described above has been the
result of significant progress in the upgrading of nonwhite employment

Between 1963 and 1966, employment of nonwhite workers

increased by 10.1 per cent —
to 7,968 thousand.
per cent —

from a monthly average of 7,234 thousand

For white workers, the corresponding gain was 7.3

from 61,575 thousand to 66,097 thousand.

Thus, Negroes

obtained about 14 per cent of the net increase in employment, although
they represented just over 10 per cent of the total labor force.


unemployment rate for nonwhites fell by one-third between 1963 and 1966 from 10.8 per- cent to 7.3 per cent of the labor force.

White workers

experienced the identical relative decline in their unemployment rate -from 5.0 per cent to 3.3 per cent.
B u t , as also mentioned above, there was a noticeable change
in the pattern of employment growth among nonwhites.
1966, total nonwhite employment rose by 734 thousand.

Between 1963 and
About one-half of

this gain centered in white collar jobs, although only 18 per cent of

- 6 employed rionwhites were holding such jobs in 1963.

Among white collar

occupations, the gains were particularly striking for clerical and
professional and technical workers.
In contrast, the increases registered for managers, officials
and proprietors were quite modest.

Those receiving salaries rose by

22 thousand, but there was a decrease of 6 thousand among those who were
self-employed —

all of which was concentrated in the retail trade sector.

T h u s , nonwhite businessmen in areas other than retail trade apparently
about held their own.

If this pattern of employment changes can be

believed, it is of some significance.

It could mean that the apparent;

downtrend in self employment among nonwhites observed since about 1950
may be moderating.

While the tendency for the number of nonwhite owner-

operators in the retail sector to decline as public accommodations become
generally open to Negroes may continue, other business opportunities may
grow more rapidly.
But the adverse changes in white collar employment have not
been restricted to businessmen.. The number of Negro lawyers is growing
slowly, while the number of Negro physicians and dentists is actually
declining in relation to total Negro employment.

Even the number of

school teachers is declining relative to the Negro labor force,


contrast, as observed above, the number of Negro clerical, sales and
non-professional technical workers has shown remarkable expansion in
recent years.

By 1966, nortwhites (who constituted 10.8 per cent of total

employment) represented 5.0 per cent of all white collar workers and

- 7 6.3 per cent of all clerical workers.

On the other hand, they repre-

sented only 4.3 per cent of the professional and technical workers,
aside from those employed in teaching and the health professions.
Other examples could be cited, but the basic point still holds:
collar employment among


Negroes is becoming increasingly concentrated

in the middle grade salary categories, especially in nursing, retail
sales, data processing, clerical and similar activities.
These trends are disturbing.

While these occupations are

obviously improvements over the traditional low-paying jobs as operatives,
laborers and service workers, they are not particularly promising sources
of community leadership.

For instance, although a computer programmer

may earn as much (or more) than a high school principal, he clearly has
less weight in the community's affairs.

A Negro reservations clerk in

a leading downtown hotel is in the same business as the former Negro
hotel owner, but here, also, his community role is less significant.
In my opinion, the expansion of opportunities for Negroes in the truly
professional and managerial occupations should be a prime goal of the
Negro business community.
Trends Among Negro-Owned Financial Institutions
At this point, let us return to the promising role which
financial institutions can play in the reconstruction of our urban

As I stressed above, the Negro-owned financial institutions,

with the exception of the newly-chartered banks, have been falling behind
relative to the growth of.the income of the Negro community at large.

- 8 This can be seen clearly in the following summary table:

Compounded Annual Average Rates of Change —

Personal Income

In Per Cent







Life Insurance Companies




Insurance in force
A l l companies
Negro-owned companies




Total Assets
All companies
Negro-owned companies

















Insured Commercial Banks -- Total Assets

A l l banks
Federal Reserve members with
total deposits between $5 and
$10 million
Negro-owned banks
Excluding newly-chartered


The first thing to note is that, as shown earlier, the personal
income of the nonwhite community has grown about one-quarter to one-third

faster than that of the nation as a whole since the beginning of the 1960 s,
On the other hand, the Negro-owned life insurance companies have grown
only about one-third to one-half as fast as the life insurance industry as

- 9 a whole.

The experience of the Negro-owned banks has been mixed.
Those institutions which were in business prior to 1963 have

grown much more slowly than all insured commercial banks.


their growth rate has exceeded that for the small member banks of the
Federal Reserve System.

The four or five newly chartered Negro-owned

banks (mainly national banks) have expanded rapidly, and one of them is
now the third or fourth largest among the group of 17 Negro-owned
What factors underlie these trends?

How does one account for

the extremely modest progress of the Negro-owned life insurance companies?
Why have the Negro-owned banks registered such a diverse pattern of
First, let us look at the life insurance companies.

For much

of the last decade, the large national institutions have been making a
special effort to tap the expanding market for insurance among middle
class Negroes.

Many of them have adopted special promotional programs

directed at this market:

They have bid successfully for some of the most

promising officials of Negro insurance companies, and a fairly large
number have established district offices in the heart of the urban areas
populated primarily by Negroes.

For example, it is reported that' one such

office of a national company was recently located in Chicago's Southside,
with the expectation of building up to a force of 22 salesmen and underwritings of about $30 million in a few years.

B u t , let me repeat, this

type of competition with the Negro-owned companies has been underway for
almost a decade.

The result is that many Negroes active in the industry

- 10 believe that any one of the largest five or six life insurance companies
in the country is now carrying on its own books more coverage on the
lives of Negro citizens than is carried by all of the Negro-owned
companies combined.

This assertion is not difficult to believe when

we note that the 48 Negro-owned companies had $2.2 billion of insurance
in force and total assets of $390 million at the end of 1966.
This new interest in the Negro market represents a significant
change in itself.

Until a few years ago, virtually all of the national

companies avoided entirely or were highly selective in the issuance of
policies on Negro lives, a practice which they felt was necessitated by
excessively high mortality rates in the Negro community.

As we know,

this practice on the part of the national companies was the main reason
that Negrorowned life companies found such promising markets for so many

With the change in practice, the nation-wide companies are now

concentrating on expanding coverage in the Negro community —
among the members of the growing middle class.


While the average Negro

policy is undoubedly smaller than the average for white policyholders,
in the aggregate the volume of net premiums (and the net savings component)
collected in the Negro community is sizable and growing.

The over-all

result has been a marked slow-down in the progress of the Negro-owned

B u t , more fundamentally, these developments also have a

number of serious implications for the availability of funds for investment
in the ghetto.

I shall return to this point before closing these remarks.

- 11 Turning to Negro-owned banks, the first thing to observe is
that —

taken as a group —

they are not appreciably different from

other banks of comparable size.

At the end of 1966, the 17 Negro-owned

institutions had total assets of $122 million and held total deposits of
$108 million.

Thus, they represented 0.033 per cent of the total assets

of insured commercial banks in the country.

But even this small figure

reflected modest but steady improvement, because in 1963 their share of
such assets was 0.021 per cent, and in 1957 it was 0.018 per cent.


mentioned above, a large proportion of the relative gain recorded by the
Negro-owned banks can be traced to the four or five recently chartered
national banks, which were able to get underway mainly because of more
liberal policies followed by the Comptroller of the Currency during the

early 1 9 6 0 s .

More recently, a few States have also chartered Negro-owned

institutions which will operate in the ghettos of several of our large cities.
Further insight into the characteristics of the Negro-owned banks
can be seen by comparing a few key ratios for the banks in 1966 as shown
below (per cent):



FR Members with
Assets of $5-10

All Insured
Commercial Banks

Cash and U . S . Gov't./total assets
Cash/total assets
U.S. Gov't./total assets




Loans/total deposits




Time deposits/total deposits




Capital/risk assets




- 12 The Negro-owned banks are compared with all insured commercial
banks as well as with Federal Reserve member banks of approximately the
same size as the Negro-owned institutions.

(The mean asset holding of

the Negro-owned banks was $7.2 million against $29.8 million for all
insured commercial banks).

In relation to total assets, the Negro banks

tend to hold a smaller proportion of cash and loans and a larger proportion
of IT. S . Government securities than do other banks -- except that their
loan-deposit ratio is higher than for smaller member banks of the Federal
Reserve System.

They also seem to rely on time deposits as a source of

funds to about the same extend as do other banks.

However, as a group,

the Negro-owned banks seem to be somewhat more heavily capitalized.
But this global review does not tell us very much of what we
need to know about the performance of the Negro-owned institutions.


the last few months, with the assistance of a number of people in several
of the Federal Reserve Banks, I have spent a considerable amount of time
studying the experiences of the Negro-owned banks.

Without going into

details concerning particular banks, the findings can be summarized briefly
in the following observations on asset quality and the problems faced by
their managements.
Over-all the asset quality of the banks seems to be fair.
However, the banks chartered prior to 1960 appear to follow somewhat less
venturesome policies than do the newly-chartered institutions, and this
shows up in a number of differences among them.

For example, among these

older institutions, there is a heavy reliance on savings accounts of
individuals and less reliance on demand deposits -- especially of partnerships

- 13 and corporations.

They rarely make unsecured loans, with the bulk of

their lending activity centering in loans secured by real estate.
loan loss record is good.


The ratio of loans to deposits in these banks

is somewhat low, averaging 53 per cent, compared with an average of 58
per cent and a range of 42 per cent to 75 per cent for all Negro-owned

This lower average ratio probably reflects primarily the

policy of making basically only secured loans.

As a group, the asset

quality of these older banks was generally satisfactory.
Among the banks chartered since 1960, the asset quality is
generally not quite as satisfactory as that found in the older institutions
even of comparable size.


These newer banks have gone readily into areas

of unsecured loans and discounting of consumer installment contracts,
principally dealer generated automobile paper.

Because these fields were

generally unexplored by the banks, some of them have encountered a number
of difficulties.

Some of the newer banks have not been able to press

their collection policies as vigorously as they would have liked, and past
due loans have averaged somewhat higher than for other banks.

This may be

due in part to the fact that the newer banks have moved -- sometimes
aggresively -- to extend loans to lower income groups which find it very
difficult to make up payments on amortized loans once they become delinquent.
Probably the most serious problem faced by all of the Negro-owned
banks is that of obtaining, training —

and retaining personnel.

This seems

to be true of clerical personnel as well as of senior management and younger
individuals with management potential.

The older, well established banks

have managements which are genetally rated satisfactory, and most of them

- 14 have provided adequately for management succession.

However, they do

seem to encounter considerable difficulty in maintaining experienced
operating staffs.

Since these banks (like those newly-chartered) are

serving primarily a low-income community, they are faced with a heavy
volume of lobby traffic and an equally heavy volume of paper w o r k .


conditions are one of the causes of a high turnover rate of clerical staff
which compounds the training problem.
its effect —

Of course, this situation -- and

is common to all banks where it exists.

For some of the newly chartered institutions, the task of
obtaining and keeping a senior management cadre has been difficult.


some extent, this may have reflected the pressure of competition for bank
management personnel faced by all institutions —

especially by the smaller

Some of the banks have attempted to meet their difficulties by

employing white persons (particularly retirees) with bank management
owned banks.

Others have brought in officers from the established NegroNevertheless, some of these new banks are still facing an

uphill struggle.
B u t , taken as a whole —
them face —

and despite the problems which some of

the Negro-owned banks are filling a vital need in their

respective communities.

With few exceptions, each of these banks is located

in a part of an urban area which the large, white-owned banks have not
sought aggressively to serve ~
have permitted them to do so.

even when State branch banking laws would
In fact, it seems that several of the newly-

chartered national banks were able to obtain charters primarily because they

- 15 proposed to concentrate on the needs of communities where the number
of banking offices per capita was particularly low.

A few of the

State bank charters recently obtained by Negroes seem to have been
granted for similar reasons.

Although the community support for

some of the new institutions may not have developed as rapidly as
had been anticipated, the Negro-owned banks as a group do seem to
be meeting a definite need which has gone unmet for many years.
On the other hand, as mentioned above, the tasks of
mobilizing the financial resources necessary to rehabilitate the
urban ghetto will place a gigantic burden on all of our institutions.
This clearly calls for a genuinely cooperative effort in which
Negro-owned institutions can -- and should -- share.
Avenues of Cooperation
Let us look, then, at some of the specific ways in which
this needed cooperation can be facilitated.
return to the life insurance companies
in the urban ghetto.


Initially, let us

plan to invest $1 billion

At the outset, I want to make certain that

everyone understands my own attitude toward this proposal:

I applaud

it because it is a major step -- not simply in the right direction
but also because it represents a sizable amount which could increase
substantially the availability of funds for urban housing.

In saying

this, I am not unmindful of the magnitude of the tasks we face.


am I unaware of the enormous volume of resources under the command of

- 16 the life insurance companies.

A t the end of 1966, total assets of

these institutions amounted to $167 billion, having increased by
$8 billion during the year.

But during 1966, they acquired a total

of about $37 billion in new investments, an amount more than four
times as large as the net gain in total assets -- a fact reflecting
the reinvestment of loan repayments, exchanges, replacements and
short-term security purchases.
I , personally, do not interpret these large flows of life
insurance company funds to mean that the diversion of $1 billion
of investments to the urban ghetto (perhaps over a period of several
years) is of only minor importance.

To the contrary.

place, insurance companies are pinched for funds.

In the first

The cash flow

in a typical life insurance corporation is about as fully committed
as it has ever been.

In my judgment, these corporations would have

absolutely no trouble putting the money into investments elsewhere
with a higher rate of interest.

Of course, insurance companies

already have heavy commitments in the city -- investments in housing
and in industrial and commercial facilities.

Therefore, I can see

that they would want to share in underwriting the efforts of urban
recons truetion.
I think this decision of the life insurance companies is
significant in another w a y .

It is my impression, based on a number

of conversations with officials of Negro-owned life insurance companies,

that the large, nation-wide institutions are collecting substantially
more in net premiums in the Negro community than they are re-investing
in that community.

Of course, one cannot document this statistically,

but the indirect evidence seems to support the conclusion.


mentioned above, they have written a considerable amount of coverage
on Negro lines, and the total is growing rapidly.

At the same time,

because of the high risk inherent in investing in ghetto properties,
the flow pf investments to the Negro community, in the judgment of
Negro insurance officials, probably falls considerably short of the
In reporting these observations, let me say immediately
that I am not advocating that there should be a one-to-one ratio
between the flow of life insurance savings and the re-investment of
funds in a particular locality or community.

If such a rule were

applied across the board, the efficiency of our machinery for
mobilizing and channeling funds would be greatly damaged if not
essentially destroyed.

On the other hand, if extra risk in the

urban ghetto has induced life insurance companies, on balance, to
steer investments to other areas, there is much to be said in s.upport
of a conscious effort on their part to divert funds into the ghetto.
S o , in my judgment, this is a good decision.

B u t , how

can Negro-owned financial institutions help to translate these plans
into effective action.

The possibility of joining in local financing

- 18 of low-cost housing developments (perhaps through limited dividend
cooperations) is an obvious step.

Apparently, projects involving

properties backed by FHA and built to rent on the basis of Federallysubsidized rents, will be among those initially undertaken by the
participating insurance companies.
Opportunities for Mortgage Bankers
B u t , at some stage presumably, the companies would plan
to branch out into expanded financing of other projects in the
ghetto —

particularly sitigle-family homes, small apartment buildings,

and commercial properties.

H e r e , then, one can see even more promising

opportunities for the large national institutions to build not simply
physical structures but human bridges as well in the ghetto.
It is my impression, based on considerable checking with
industry officials, that so far no major life insurance company has
designated any of the Negro mortgage bankers as correspondents.
Of course, many of the companies have made a considerable number of
loans against Negro homes and business properties in urban areas.
However, these were effected primarily through white mortgage bankers,
through Negro mortgage brokers, or by the companies directly.


most insurance companies have long-established relationships with
one or two mortgage bankers in their principal lending areas. Nevertheless, there appear to be positive advantages which would probably result

- 19 from the development of correspondence relationships with some of
the Negro mortgage bankers -- who could not only originate loans
but service them as w e l l .
I am told that there are presently some 1,300 mortgage
bankers in the country.

Eight of these are Negroes who have met

the requirements of FHA approval -- e.g., that applicant:
- Must be a responsible person.
- Must have net worth of $100,000 for office in one
State, plus another $50,000 for office in noncontiguous
States, and $250,000 for offices in several States.
- Must have commercial bank lines of credit against
warehousing of mortgages.
- Must have outlets with institutional investors (such
as life insurance companies and mutual savings banks)
other than FNMA.
The typical mortgage banker has a net worth of something
over $100,000 and services about $50 million of loans in a year,
although the largest may do a volume of business in excess of
$1 billion.

The largest of the Negro mortgage bankers has a net

worth of $100,000 and originates and services roughly $12 million
of loans in a year.

One-third to two-fifths of this total amount

is on behalf of FNMA rather than for private lenders.

The other

Negro mortgage bankers are said to have a volume of business in
the neighborhood of $2 - $4 million.

- 20 In conversations with a number of officials in Negro-owned
institutions (particularly banks and insurance companies) a great
deal of stress was put on the need for Negro mortgage bankers to
obtain secure correspondent relationships with leading life insurance

They believe that such channels would greatly enhance

the flow of funds to the ghetto by making available to these lenders
a degree of knowledge about local conditions which they cannot
otherwise tap.

While no one would want to suggest that a particular

company should employ a particular person as a correspondent, it
does appear —

at least at a distance —

that there may be merit in


some company s pursuing the idea further.
The continuous access to local people with expertise in
ghetto housing problems does seem to be a necessary condition of
a successful program of the type which the life insurance companies
have undertaken.

This seems to be one of the over-riding conclusions

which has emerged from the experience of the Philadelphia savings
banks which launched a similar program in that city about 18 months

Four, of these institutions pledged to invest $20 million in

private homes to be insured by FHA and purchased by residents of
the ghetto.

The amount was to be distributed among the participating

banks on a pro-rata basis according to their assets, and they made
it clear that additional funds could be provided.

So far they have

- 21 been able to disburse or firmly commit about $1-1/2 million, although
they originally expected to be much farther along toward their goal
by the time 18 months had passed.

They have encountered a number of

obstacles which are only gradually being overcome.

It took quite

a bit of time to work out procedures with the regional office of
FHA, and it took even more time to devise a system for appraising
ghetto homes and establishing criteria of eligibility without compromising on income standards.

But above all, it took time to make

contact with ghetto residents and to instruct many of the potential
buyers about the process —

and responsibility -- of becoming

While they worked through a local information center

and even employed a young lawyer full-time to help expedite the
program, they rel. d mainly on their own personnel supplemented by
local mortgage brokers and others active in real estate.
From the experience of the Philadelphia institutions,
it seems clear that Negro bankers, insurance company officials,
and others with a specialized knowledge acquired through lending
funds against ghetto properties could make a major contribution
in helping to translate the recently announced $1 billion life
insurance company program into a significant effort of urban
recons true tion.
Opportunities in Job-Creating Enterprises
Beyond the housing field, opportunities will probably also
exist to join in the establishment of job-creating enterprises in

- 22 the ghetto —

although only limited planning in this direction has

been undertaken by the life insurance companies so far.


concrete example of how this might be done was called to m y
attention only a few days ago:

Just outside the boundary of one

of our large midwest cities is an all-Negro community with a
population of about 10,000, and a labor force of roughly 5,000 —
whom 20 per cent to 25 per cent are unemployed.


The reasons for the

high unemployment rate are the usual ones, of which a lack of skills
is the most important.

The municipal officials have drawn up a

development plan and are actively trying to attract industry.


moderate-size machinery manufacturing firm has responded with an
offer to establish a plant in the community which would have
approximately 300 employees when it reached full strength in about
two years.

The capital outlay would be about $300 thousand, and

the company is prepared to supply $150 thousand.
city to find the remaining $150 thousand.

It has asked the

It appears that about

$300 thousand would be required to underwrite the on-the-job
training program necessary to fit most of the local potential
employees for the semi-skilled assignments which the plant would

It also appears that training funds may be available

through existing Federal Government programs.
ment is for $150 thousand for plant facilities.

T h u s , the net requireH e r e , then, is a

- 23 natural opportunity for Negro businessmen and bankers in that midwest
community to join with a life insurance company participating in the
newly-announced investment program to translate a plan into a going
enterprise offering jobs to ghetto residents.

I am confident that

similar opportunities exist in every one of our major cities.
I urge the National Bankers Association to share in the
identification and development of these opportunities.
in the ghetto —

and particularly their children —

grateful to all of you.

Our citizens

will be eternally