Full text of Speech of Mr. Huntington, of Connecticut, on the Subject of the Removal of the Deposites : Delivered in the House of Representatives, January 1834

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SPEECH

MR. HUNTINGTON,
OF CONNECTICUT,

O N T U E S U B J E C T OF

T H E REMOVAL OF T H E DEPOSITES;




DELIVERED

IN T H E HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

JASCAKT, 1834.

WASHINGTON:
P R I N T E D B V C A t C S ANI>^SKZ*fcTON\

1834.




SPEECH.
T h e H o u s e having r e s u m e d the consideration of the motion to refer t h e
report of the S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y on the subject of the removal of t h e
public deposites from the B a n k of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , to the C o m m i t t e e of
W a y s and M e a n s , with the instructions moved by M r . M C D U F F I E ,
•* To report a joint resolution, providing that the public revenue hereafter collected
** be deposited in the Bank of the United States, in conformity with the public faith
** pledged in the charter of the said Bank;**
A n d the a m e n d m e n t proposed by M r . J O N E S , substituting for the aforesaid"
instructions the following:
" T o inquire into the expediency of depositing- the revenue hereafter collected in
** :*U the State bunks in the different States where the same is collected, in proportion
** to their respective capitals p;&id in, and to prescribe the terms on which the same
*' shall be deposited"—
M r . H U N T I N G T O N addressed the C h a i r , in s u b s t a n c e , as follows:
M r . S F E A K E R : S i n c e the adoption of the constitution u n d e r which w e areh e r e a s s e m b l e d , t h e r e lias seldom arisen a subject of more d e e p and thrilling
interest to the p e o p l e of this country than that which is now submitted to
the consideration of their r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s in this Hall. T h i s is not a subject
of local c o n c e r n , of sectional interest, of the a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a few t h o u s a n d
dollars more or less, or one r e g a r d i n g wliich the injurious effects of h a s t y
legislation m a y be speedily corrected. I t is one in wliich e v e r y portion of
the c o m m u n i t y is d e e p l y interested, for it t a k e s hold of the value and s e c u rity of p r o p e r t y of all k i n d s , of the price of labor and its r e w a r d . I t is
most intimately c o n n e c t e d with the c u r r e n c y , the standard and m e a s u r e of
the value of all p r o p e r t y and all labor. T h e humblest individual who h a s
settled on vour public lands, the soldier who garrisons y o u r forts and d e f e n d s
y o u r frontiers, the sailor who carries y o u r flair over e v e r y o c e a n , the m e c h a n i c , the farmer, the m a n u f a c t u r e r , the day l a b o r e r — a l l — a l l of them h a v e
a direct interest in the p r o p e r disposition which we shall m a k e of this g r e a t
subject. *' T h e smallest of all politicians k n o w that the c u r r e n c y of a nation
44
is as delicate as a l a d y ' s honor; and those a r e the least of all, who s u p p o s e
" t h a t the hand of violence can he applied to it without doing mischief."
A n d I a m gratified that the subject is placed before us in a form which a d mits t h e fullest e x a m i n a t i o n and freest discussion. T h i s is due to the i m p o r t a n c e of t h e subject, to the c h a r a c t e r of this H o u s e , to t h e plighted faith of"
the nation; above all, it is d u e to the great interests of our citizens, which i t
is our d u t y to cherish and p r o t e c t , and p r o m o t e , by all t h e m e a n s which t h e
constitution of the c o u n t r y has placed within our r e a c h , and which are n o w
suffering, to an e x t e n t almost unparalleled in the history of the G o v e r n m e n t ,
and which are t h r e a t e n e d with s p e e d y and almost e n t i r e extinction.
Look
sir, at the two propositions submitted to us. O n e of t h e m has for its object
to place the public m o n e y s , the treasure of the p e o p l e , collected from t h e m ,







4
.and \^ be districted as the lezUlaticn of Congress may direct, in the B a n k
o f the United Starts; a corporation created by the authority of Congress, i n
which the United States are a lar^e stockholder; ;i Bank of a safe and solid
capita!, of great, and undoubted, and ample resources; which has always
redeemed ail i:s obligations to the. country, without expense and without loss
to the people of a single dollar, and which, by the admission of its opponents,
has kept the public moneys, safely, and pa: J them whenever required b y
proper authority: a Bank, also, winch U subject to a salutary control from
the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the Government—a
control, 1 had almost said, create r ti:an that which any monarch in Europe
can exercise over any moneyed institution within his dominions. W h a t , sir,
is that control? Examine the charier of this Bank, and you will find that
the President, whenever he shall have reason to believe that the charter has
beep, violated, may order a scire facias to be >i:ed out of the circuit court,
•that if, upon proper examination, such violation is made to appear, its charter
may be adjudged to be f -rfeited and annulled. T h e same power is vested
in Congress; and thus the judicial tribunals of the country may exercise a
proper control over the institution. This is not all: a committee of either
House of Congress appointed for that purpose are authorized to inspect the
books and examine into the proceedings of the corporation, and report
whether the provisions of the charter have been by the same violated or
not. T h e officer at the head of the Treasury Department is to be furnished,
once a week if he require i:, with a statement of the amount of the capital
stock, the debts due, the moneys depo>ited, the notes in circulation, the
specie on hand, with a rLht to inspect such general accounts in the books of
the Dank as relate to such statement: and, finally, K>r proper reasons, to
order and direct that the deposires of the money of the United States shall
not be made in the Bank or the branches thereof
I need not comment on
the extent of the power thus reserved, to make this institution a safe place
of custody for the public moneys; a faithful fiscal agent in the* disbursement
of tiiese moneys; and to subserve ail the great and important purposes for
which it was created. Such is the liank where, until lately, your treasure
has been placed, and where the instructions moved by the gentleman from
South Carolina propose that it shaii hereafter be placed. What is the substitute provided for it? Where are your moneys now deposited, and where
is it proposed that they shall continue to be deposited? In the local banks,
created by State authority, in winch the United States have no pecuniary
interest, over whom they have no control, into whose situation and affairs
they can make no examination, except by contract with those institutions,
and the performance of which is dependent upon their sense of propriety,
who have no unity of design or action, whose interests are Liton in opposition,
whose notes are limited in their circulation, " float in? around the points where
" t h e y are redeemable;** and of whose solvency and ability to discharge the
trust committed to them the Government have no peculiar means of knowing.
I submit to the House, whether any individual member of it, or any man
of ordinary prudence having moneys to deposito and to be disbursed, would,
if he had the conservative power possessed by the Government of the United
States over the Bank, select thai^ as the most suitable, proper, and safe institution to subserve his individual interests in the custody and transfer of
iiis private wealth? or would prefer the State banks, over whom he had not
even tha shadow of control? Would there be any hesitation or doubt in his
mind to which corporation to give the preference? And shall we* who are

5

the guardians of the public m o n e y s , whose d u t y to k e e p t h e m safely is a s
sacred as it is obvious, do with the t r e a s u r e of our constituents what we wouid
not do with our own u n d e r similar circumstances? Shall we be less prudent*
and discreet, and watchful in the selection of a d e p o s i t a r y , acting: as public
men, than when we are consulting our private
interests'? .Shall we give t h e
custody of the money of the people to institutions to whom we would not, in
similar cases, intrust our own? T h e s e are questions of grave import, and a r e
directly presented to us by the opposite instructions to the c o m m i t t e e , which
are proposed for our adoption: and I rejoice that they are put in a form and
in language so plain that the freemen of this country can understand t h e m T h e y have intelligence, und can c o m p r e h e n d their nature and import, and
wiil t a k e care that their rights shall be a c k n o w l e d g e d , and their interests
p r o m o t e d by those to w h o m they have been committed. T h i s great subject,
which now occupies almost the undivided attention of Congress, and which
engrosses the thoughts of almost e v e r y citizen n{ the c o u n t r y , should be e x amined and disposed of in that spirit which its importance d e m a n d s .
In
presenting the view cf it which I e n t e r t a i n , I have neither private interests
to p r o m o t e , nor political objects to attain. I n the stock of the B a n k of t h e
United S t a t e s I have n e v e r had the remotest interest. T h e subject rises infinitely
above all party considerations. It should have no connexion with the politics of
the times. It is one in which men of all parties have a common interest. I t
affects, more or less, all classes and all individuals
the m a n of wealth a n d
the man of m o d e r a t e p r o p e r t y ; him who is poor, and him who is rich; t h e
m a n who is in affluence, and him w h o , by his daily labor, e a r n s a comfortable subsistence for himself and his family. A n d X hope that in the discussions
to which the subiect has given rise, and in the results to which we m a y c o m e ,
we shall look a w a y from e v e r y thing which is not connected with its m e r i t s ,
and decide as our consciences shall dictate and our high responsibilities
require.
T h e honorable m e m b e r from T e n n e s s e e [Mr. P O L K ] stated, and more t h a n
once r e p e a t e d , that in regard to this subject the issue was formed b e t w e e n
the G o v e r n m e n t and the B a n k . I differ with him as to both the parties w h i c h
he has named. If he m e a n s by the term Cfoverument,
that which is so called hy the travelling aeent of the T r e a s u r y , one branch of it ordy, trie E x e cutive, or simply the T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t , lie has rightly n a m e d one of t h e
p a r t i e s ; but if he uses the term as freemen understand it, as including t h e
E x e c u t i v e , J u d i c i a l and Legislative D e p a r t m e n t s , then the G o v e r n m e n t is
no p a r t y to what he calls the issue which has b e e n closed. Congress h a s
d e c l a r e d the B a n k to be a necessary and useful corporation. T h e S u p r e m e
Court has decided that it is a corporation rightfully created under the constitution. T h e H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s , by a large majority at the last, session 9
d e c l a r e d it to be a safe place of deposite for the public m o n e y s ; and the E x ecutive only has b e e n found in opposition to it as unconstitutional and i n e x p e d i e n t . T h e G o v e r n m e n t proper, therefore, has not m a d e itself a p a r t y to
the removal of the deposites. T h e honorable m e m b e r is equally in an e r r o r
w h e n he affirms that the B a n k is a party. H o w e v e r great and u n w e a r i e d
the efforts have b e e n to destroy its credit and usefulness, both at h o m e a n d
a b r o i d ; h o w e v e r u n c e r e m o n i o u s l y the c h a r a c t e r s of the honorable and v i r t u ous men who m a n a g e its affairs have been traduced and slandered* h o w e v e r
w a n t o n have b e e n the a t t a c k s on the institution and its directors, t h e w h o l e
d w i n d l e s into insignificance c o m p a r e d with the results which have followed
to the country from the hostility of those who should h a v e b e e n its p r o t e c t -




6
ors and friends. T h e issue is closed between the T R E A S U R Y and the P E O P L E ,
and it lias been tendered by the former; and by tins House and the S e n a t e
is tliis issue to be tried, and judgment rendered; and in its determination the
Bank, as such, and in regard to its own rights, is comparatively a c i p h e r —
a matter of no moment. T h e question is, whether tiie Treasury shall govern*
or the people? T h e observations which I propose to submit to the H o u s e
will be comprised in answers to tiie following questions:
W h a t was the condition of the country previous to the contemplated
change in the place of deposite of the public moneys?
W h a t is that condition note?
W h a t is it to be. if the deposites are not restored?
W h a t causes have produced the present distressed condition of the country, and the alarming forebodings of calamities still greater to befall it?
What is the remedy for these evils?
Shall Congress apply it?
T h e r e is not one of these questions which is not full of meaning, and worthy our most serious consideration.
W h a t , then, icas the condition of every portion of this ere at nation while
the public moneys were in their legitimate place oi custody, and the power
o f the Treasury had not been applied to disturb and remove them?
11 was one of unparalleled quietness, ease, and prosperity. Every channel
of industry was filled. Full employment was yiven to the laborer, who earned
his daily bread by tiie sweat oi his brow—to the mechanic, who worked in
his shop, and furnished tiie necessaries and comforts of life for himself and all
in his employ—to the manufacturer, who rewarded the industry of thousands
connected with and dependent upon the successful pursuit of his business—to
the merchant, who was engaged in prosperous commercial enterprises—to the
farmer and planter, who found a ready and profitable market for the products of their labor. Payments were made for the productions of agricultural, mechanical, and manufacturing labor through the domestic exchanges o f
the country, at a trifling expense; and in like manner were payments made
for imported merchandise scattered over every portion of the Union. T h e
Bank of the United States, sustaining its amicable and confidential relations
with the Treasury, acted the part of a balance wheel, regulating all the m o v e ments of the whole machinervof currencv and exchange, keeping it in order,
EI^;if n Vi n8 t h c L 1 o v e r i s s u e s of the St»te banks, and vet befriending them; distrit ) U t i n £ r t r i o n u K l . o ».«

*

--

=*

Governlealth and
ing a curperiods
a scene
forth our
• --- ~
* ,w. ~
—anguished
mercies.
t h e r e was not a dark suade in the picture of our country's prospeiity; alt—all—was bright—delightful in fruition, cheering in prospect.
And y e t , it has been suggested as matter of congratulation, that the magic
wand had been applied to it, for ir evinced that our prosperity had been the
result of our own abject submission. T h e Bank, (tiie modern Circe,) it was
said, had transformed us into beasts of burden.
I do not envy the feelings of any one who could witness such a state o f
high prosperity as I have described, and rejoice that it had ceased, and b e e n
succeeded by one of deep depression; nor can I well conceive the nature or




7

degree of that " abject submission" which avails itself of all honorable and
lawful means (even if they exist through the facilities furnished by the Bank
of the United States) to sustain and increase the industry and wealth of the
nation* And should it be true that this great moneyed aristocracy has converted
us into animals of the description which has been mentioned, it would be gratifying to know whether our cars would be less long if we should be in subjection to the State banks^ and derive that measure of prosperity which it is
supposed we should then enjoy under their kind and republican government* If the people of this country are to be the slaves of any banks, it
would be the part of wisdom to select those over whom they can exercise some power, rather than those whose conduct they cannot in any manlier control*
What is note the condition of the country?
Changed, greatly changed; almost wholly reversed. Every channel of industry is now partially choked. A paralysis has settled upon our principal
commercial cities, and is rapidly extending itself in every direction. Business is suspended; no new contracts are made; the arm of labor has become
nerveless; the currency is disordered, and money not to be obtained; a universal panic exists; fear and alarm are apparent in the countenances of all;
frequent bankruptcies occur; commercial credit is impaired; and the whole
country is in a state of agitation, excitement, alarm, and fearful apprehension. Is this statement true? Does not every day's post bring us confirmation of it? I am aware that the gentleman from New York, [Mr. BEAKD-SXEY,] after asserting in very unmeasured terms the hostility of the Bank of
the United States towards the local corporations, in its attempts to embarrass
and prostrate them; its utter recklessness of private credit, in its efforts to
destroy it, and with it all commercial transactions; its disregard of individual
prosperity, by meeting the removal of the public deposites in a spirit of anger and menace; all of which, he said, was palpably evident, but of which he
furnished no evidence, and did not profess that he possessed any, and which
he cannot tax our credulity to believe, as he does not know it by intuition,
nor by testimony to which he has referred us, concluded his denunciations
against the Bank with the declaration that, notwithstanding all the power of
the Bank, exerted for the purposes which he named, our cities were now
brought to a " tolerably healthy condition." Let us examine and see what
that healthy condition is.
T h e price of bills on England has fallen from 1\ per cent* premium
{last of September) to 1 ^ per cent*, which is lower than at any period within
fifteen or twenty years; the notes of merchants of undoubted solidity, with
the most ample security of endorsers, payable at ninety days to six months,
from 1£ to 2 and 2£ per cent, interest per month, and more offered than purchased; almost all kinds of agricultural productions and manufactures unsalea b l e for cash, and nearly so on credit; loans, on mortgage of the most desirable city property, solicited at from 12 to 18 per cent, per annum, and
refused; the auctioneers and commission merchants declining, except to a very
limited extent, to accept drafts or make advances against the consignments of
mechanics, manufacturers, and country merchants and dealers; the prices of
every article on sale fallen—indeed, almost nominal; a great reduction in
the price of all stocks of unquestionable solidity; private capital almost
entirely withdrawn from employment, investment, or loan; it is hoarded
up, not lent; orders for foreign goods countermanded; extensive failures almost daily occurring; the discount on country bank notes increased; the




8
notes and bills oiTered for discount greatly exceeding the ability of the b a n k s t o
purchase; the state and rates of exchange between the commercial cities a m i
the interior suspending all business dejwndent on them. 1 am informed that t h e
Bank of the United s f a t e s buys drafts to some extent on the Atlantic cities t o
the South, where it has branches. Beyond this, however, there are no sales u n *
less on terms extremely injurious to the holders- T h e brokers, w h o are w i l l ing to give their notes, may purchase, to a limited extent, at a considerable
discount, and these notes are endorsed by the sellers, and sold at the current
rate of interest, (2 to 2$ per cent, per month.) T h i s operation, however,,
is so severe, that, if it be not already, it must soon be discontinued.
T h i s , sir, is the tolerably "healthy condition" of our principal cities.
I
hope we shall not witness a great redundancy of such health. Cut this is a
condition, to speak of which with levity is inexcusable; it is one which calls
for the exercise of every feeling of sympathy, and the exertion of every l a w ful power to change it; it is one of imminent peril and danger.
T h i s , however, is but the commencement of evils still greater to follow^,
unless an immediate remedy be applied by the action of Congress. And t h i a
leads to the inquiry what is the prospect before us? W h a t is to be the c o n dition of the" country, if there be not a reaction, if business do not r e v i v e ,
confidence be not restored, the usual course of industry and enterprise be not
pursued, the currency be not restored to its former sound and healthful state*
and active employment be civen to the labor of our citizens, with a reasonable
prospect of a fair and certain remuneration?
T h a t condition, it is to be feared, will be one of general bankruptcy, axui
perhaps, a suspension of specie payments by most of the local banks; t h e
present state of things, gloomy and fearful as it is, cannot long continue; t h e
pressure will be more severely f<lt; the causes which have produced it w i l l
not cease to operate, but will accumulate strength, and produce still more d e leterious effects; the cord is fast drawing to its ultimate power of tension; i n
a few months it will part. And what will be the result? Will it not be o n e
which will jeopard the capital of the ^tate banks, or compel them to refuse
the redemption of their notes in coin? Can the local hanks redeem their c i r culation and pay their depositor without calling upon their debtors to m a k e
frequent and large payments? T h e y have not the power to coin m o n e y , n o r
can they raise it on their credit. And can these debtors pay without effecting
loans elsewhere, or obtaining money by the sale of their crops or their m a n u factures! And are these, resources which are at hand? T h e banks, instead
of loaning, are curtailing their accommodations; private capitalists will not
lend; sales of the products of labor cannot he made. In what manner, t h e n ,
is provision to be made for the payment of bank loans? And if none can b e
made, the local banks must resort to other means than collections from their
debtors to provide for the redemption of their own debts—and they will l o o k
in vain for any such means. It is also not to be forgotten that the whole s y s tem of banking operations in this country has its foundation in public confidence and credit. It is well known that the banks cannot redeem all their
issues in coin, if demanded at once; but the community feel a security in t b e
integrity, and intelligence, and prudence of those who have the m a n a g e m e n t
of these institutions, and a certainty that the notes will subserve all the p u r poses to which they wish to apply them, and thus he equivalent to coin*.
W h i l e these feelings of security and certainly continue—while all the b a n k *
are disposed to be liberal and friendly to each other—while the business o f
the country is carried on with its accustomed industry and prosperity, and t h e




9

r e v e n u e s of the G o v e r n m e n t a r c disbursed equally for the benefit of all, a n d
t h e d o m e s t i c e x c h a n g e s c o n t i n u e d with their usual frequency a n d r a p i d i t y
a n d without loss, a n d the c u r r e n c y is p r e s e r v e d p u r e — a l l will he well, as it
w a s before the T r e a s u r y o r d e r relating to the public deposites w a s issued.
B u t w h e n the time arrives that m o n e y cannot be o b t a i n e d in a n y form to m e e t
o u t s t a n d i n g e n g a g e m e n t s ; w h e n such a state of alarm shall exist as that t h e
vaults of the local b a n k s a r e to be o p e n e d to r e d e e m tiieir notes; w h e n s p e culators in B a n k n o t e s shall c o m m e n c e the p u r c h a s e of t h e m at a large d i s c o u n t , to d e m a n d their p a y m e n t in specie; w h e n this period a r r i v e s , t h e n will
m o s t of the S t a t e b a n k s be compelled to close the doors of tiieir vaults, a n d
t h e scenes of the y e a r s 1 8 1 4 a n d 1 8 1 5 again be witnessed. A n d though 1
believe the B a n k of the U n i t e d S t a t e s — t h a t m o n s t e r a n d t y r a n t , as it has b e e n
called, which w a s to crouch at the feet of the T r e a s u r y a h u m b l e s u p p l i a n t for
favor—will ride out the storm without the loss of a s p a r , or a sail, or a y a r d ,
it is greatly to be a p p r e h e n d e d that the b r o k e n fragments of most of t h e S t a t e
b a n k s , which will b e seen e v e r y w h e r e floating, will e v i n c e what desolation
and ruin h a v e befallen t h e m .
I would not be understood to e x p r e s s doubts as to t h e solvency of t h e g r e a t e r
portion, if not all, of the S t a t e B a n k s , nor of the p r u d e n c e a n d fidelity with
which t h e y a r e m a n a g e d ,
I believe them to be sound, and h o n o r a b l y and
honestly c o n d u c t e d . I am viewing their condition w h e n subjected to t h e action
of a strong p r e s s u r e upon the m o n e y m a r k e t , and a g e n e r a l w a n t of confidence
and a state of a l a r m and great e x c i t e m e n t in the c o m m u n i t y ; and n o n e c a n
fail to see t h a t the " s i g n s of the t i m e s " clearly indicate the rapid a p p r o a c h of
the period w h e n that p r e s s u r e will be too g r e a t to be a n y longer e n d u r e d , a n d
that w a n t of confidence a n d that a l a r m and e x c i t e m e n t be such, as that its
effects cannot be resisted nor obviated*
A n d n o w , sir, I will p r o c e e d to the inquiry what causes h a v e p r o d u c e d the
p r e s e n t distressed condition of the c o u n t r y , and the a p p r e h e n d e d c a l a m i t i e s ,
of still g r e a t e r m a g n i t u d e which i m p e n d o v e r it?
T h i s is a p a r t of the subject under consideration which d e m a n d s the closest
investigation and the most a t t e n t i v e e x a m i n a t i o n of the H o u s e . I f w e do not
a s c e r t a i n the true c a u s e s , it cannot be e x p e c t e d t h a t we should a p p l y the
m o s t s a l u t a r y and a p p r o p r i a t e r e m e d y .
I take leave to say w h a t a r e not the causes for which we a r e seeking*
T h e y h a v e not arisen, as has b e e n suggested, from t h e substitution of cask
duties on the importation of certain foreign m e r c h a n d i s e . I t is doubtless
t r u e that these have been c o n s i d e r a b l e , though I h a v e not the m e a n s of a s c e r t a i n i n g their precise a m o u n t ; and it is also t r u e t h a t , to the e x t e n t to
which t h e y h a v e been paid, it has c r e a t e d the necessity of the a p p l i c a t i o n of
m o n e y to that a m o u n t ; and this is one of the r e a s o n s w h y the period selected
for t h e c h a n g e of the place of deposite of the public m o n e y s w a s not the most
s u i t a b l e . B u t they a r e *4 as the small d u s t of the balance** w h e n c o m p a r e d
w i t h the m o n e y s r e q u i r e d for o t h e r p u r p o s e s ; and if the o r d i n a r y o p e r a t i o n s
of the B a n k of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , in distributing t h e m o n e y s of t h e G o v e r n jnent, not i m m e d i a t e l y w a n t e d , in loans and e x c h a n g e s , had b e e n suffered to
p r o c e e d , the cash duties would at once h a v e b e e n put into active e m p l o v m e n t , and therefore not w i t h d r a w n from circulation.
N o r h a v e these causes p r o c e e d e d from the m e r e w i t h d r a w a l of cit r ht m i l lions of the public t r e a s u r e from the B a n k of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ; for it is well
k n o w n that much larger sums have b e e n heretofore w i t h d r a w n from the B a n k ,
almost without t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e p e o p l e , and certainly without p r o d u c i n g




10

a n y sensible effect u p o n the o p e r a t i o n s of the S t a t e b a n k s , or c r e a t i n g m u c h ^ if a n y , pressure upon the c o m m u n i t y .
You r e c o l l e c t , sir, t h a t M r . R u s h , m
his r e p o r t of D e c e m b e r , 1S2S, referring to the c o n d u c t of t h e B a n k in m a k i n g ;
t h e " h e a v y p a y m e n t s ' * of the public d e b t in the p r e c e d i n g y e a r , s a y s : ** S o
** p r u d e n t l y , in this and o t h e r r e s p e c t s , d o e s the B a n k aid t h e o p e r a t i o n o f
4t
p a y i n g off the d e b t , that the c o m m u n i t y has h a r d l y a c o n s c i o u s n e s s that it
" is iroing o n . "
M r . I n g h a m , too, in writing to the B a n k in J u l y , 1 8 2 $ ^
e x p r e s s e s his satisfaction at the course a d o p t e d by the B a n k , r e l a t i n g t o t h e
*' h e a v y p a y m e n t * ' of tiie public d e b t , ** at a t i m e of s e v e r e d e p r e s s i o n Ott
" all the p r o d u c t i v e e m p l o y m e n t s oi the c o u n t r y , without causing 1 a n y s e n s i b l e
44
addition to tiie p r e s s u r e , or e v e n visible effect upon the o r d i n a r y operation**
*4 of t h e .State b a n k s / '
T h e P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s also a d d s hn*
t e s t i m o n y , of a similar c h a r a c t e r , in his annual m e s s a g e in 18:29, in w h i c h h o
s t a t e s that " t h e p a y m e n t on a c c o u n t ol t h e public d e b t m a d e on t h e 1st o f
4t
J u l y last, was ehjht millions s e v e n h u n d r e d a n d h f t r e n t h o u s a n d four h u n ** d r e d and s i x t y - t w o doiiars and e i g h t y - s e v e n cents;*' a n d , a d v e r t i n g t o t h e
a p p r e h e n s i o n s e n t e r t a i n e d that it mi^ht injure the i n t e r e s t s d e p e n d e n t o n
b a n k a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , w h e n t h e r e was an unusual p r e s s u r e on the
money
m a r k e t , a d d - , that -4 this evi! was wholly a v e r t e d by an e a r l v a n t i c i p a t i o n o f
" it at the T r e a s u r y , aided by the judicious a r r a n g e m e n t s of the officers o f
4i
the B a n k of the t ' n i t e 1 S t a t e s . " D u r i n g the y e a r 1S;J^, including t h e l a s t
d a y of the y e a r 1 S J 1 and tiie 1st d a y of J a n u a r y , 1^3-5, t h e p a y m e n t s through
t h e B a n k , of p r i n c i p a l and in:*_-res: of the public d e b t , e x c e e d e d t w e n t y - f o d r
millions of dollars, of which b e t w e e n eitiht a n d nine millions w e r e o w n e d i n
E u r o p e ; and y e t , in c o n s e q u e n c e of the tfc judicious a r r a n g e m e n t s " of t h o
B a n k , t h e r e w a s n e i t h e r p r e s s u r e nor distress felt by a n y portion of o u r
citizens.
N o r has the p r e s e n t conditio]; of the c o u n t r y been c a u s e d by a n y s y s t e m a t i c ,
or u n u s u a l , or u n n e c e s s a r y c u r t a i l m e n t of the loans of the B a n k of the U n i t e d
S l a t e s . I k n o w that this has b e e n t h e reason assigned h e r e a n d e l s e w h e r e ,
I am a w a r e that e v e r y effort has been m a d e to p r o d u c e a conviction that m
this is to be found the true cau>e of aii the e m b a r r a s s m e n t s a n d distress w h i c h
exist; and I a m sensible that tho<e in " hiLTh p l a c e s " h a v e also set this forth
as tiie " root of all the e v i l . "
It is my intention to exhibit the e v i d e n c e
which exists, (and which I consider conclusive,) which clearly e v i n c e s that
no d e s i g n e d action of the B a n k , no throats of i n t e n d e d r e t a l i a t i o n , no course
e i t h e r p u r s u e d or p r o p o s e d to be pursued by the B a n k , at the t i m e of t h e
r e m o v a l of the d e p o s i t e s , different from that which h a d b e e n usual during
s u c c e s s i v e y e a r s of irs e x i s t e n c e , nov since pursued u n n e c e s s a r i l y o r o p p r e s sively, h a v e had the r e m o t e s t effect in p r o d u c i n g the p r e s e n t s t a t e of u n e x a m p l e d distress. A n d this e v i d e n c e is found in p r i n t e d d o c u m e n t s o n o u r
t a b l e s , a n d within the r e a c h of Qvery m e m b e r o( the H o u s e . A n d I shall
refer to tins t e s t i m o n y , not b e c a u s e the B a n k is i n t e r e s t e d in it, but that t h e
t r u t h m a y be k n o w n , a n d the public mind be d i s a b u s e d , in relation to a m a t t e r
on w h i c h the partisan p r e s s e s ot the c o u n t r y particularly h a v e b e e n v e r y
c l a m o r o u s ; a n d that we m a y be the b e t t e r e n a b l e d to a p p l y the appropriate
r e m e d y for existing evils* by a s c e r t a i n i n g the t r u e cause of t h e m , r a t h e r than.
assuming one w h i c h is false. T i n s is a p i e c e of base c o i n , w h i c h , t h o u g h i t
m a y not h a v e b e e n k n o w n by the S e c r e t a r y to be counterfeit, e v e r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n of public d u t v r e q u i r e s , since its d e t e c t i o n , should b e n a i l e d to t h o
counter.
T h e S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y , in r e p o r t i n g his r e a s o n s for t h e o r d e r i n




11

relation to the public dcposites, states that •* under other circumstances, he
** should have been disposed to direct the removal to t a k e effect at a d i s ** t a n t d a y , so as to give Congress an opportunity of prescribing, in the m e a n
" t i m e , the places of deposite, and of regulating the securities p r o p e r to be
4t
taken."
W h a t the existing circumstances w e r e , which m a d e an iminediate
removal in his opinion necessary, and which led him promptly to resort to
the power given him, are substantially these, as stated in the report: A b o u t
t h e 1st of August, 1 8 3 3 , the B a n k changed its course of policy in regard to
t h e a m o u n t of its discounts. F r o m D e c e m b e r , 1 8 3 2 , to this t i m e , they had
b e e n enlarged m o r e than two and a half millions; and at the latter d a t e ,
" t h e situation of the mercantile claims, 1 ' and other causes, " r e n d e r e d the
** usual aids of the B a n k more than ever necessary to sustain them in their
" business;" but in the months of August and S e p t e m b e r , 1 8 3 3 , its discounts
w e r e reduced more than four millions of dollars, while the deposites of public
m o n e y s had increased m o r e than two millions, and its specie more than six
h u n d r e d thousand dollars; and the balances from the S t a t e b a n k s increased,
from a little more than $ 3 6 0 , 0 0 0 , to upwards of two millions. T h e s e draughts
upon the community had required a probable curtailment of the State b a n k
accommodations, from two to t h r e e millions of dollars. T h e S e c r e t a r y then
adds, that ** we shall be at no loss to p e r c e i v e the cause of the p r e s s u r e
*c which existed in the commercial cities about the end of the month of S e p ** t e m b e r . I t was impossible that the commercial community could h a v e
*' sustained itself much longer under such a policy. A n d if the public m o n e y s
** received for r e v e n u e had continued to be deposited in the B a n k for two
** months longer, and it had adhered to the opj)ressive system which it pur" sued during the two preceding
months, a w i d e - s p r e a d scene of b a n k r u p t c y
** and ruin must have followed. 1 *
I shall not stop here to e x a m i n e what would seem to be a n obvious inconsistency b e t w e e n the complaint which the S e c r e t a r y m a k e s , that the B a n k
did not, about the 1st of D e c e m b e r , 1 8 3 2 , t a k e steps to p r e p a r e for its a p p r o a c h i n g e n d , by reducing its discounts and arranging its affairs, with a
view to wind up its business, and the complaint that it had reduced t h e m
* in the months of August and S e p t e m b e r , 1 8 3 3 . I f it was wrong in the B a n k
to h a v e enlarged its discounts when it should have curtailed them, it would
s e e m that it should have credit for a returning sense of duty when it did in
fact reduce t h e m . M y object now is to ascertain w h e t h e r the S e c r e t a r y is
not in error w h e n he says that the B a n k , about the 1st of August, " changed
*; its course,' 1 and " pursued an oppressive system of p o l i c y " during that
m o n t h and the month of S e p t e m b e r , and in which it was feared it would
persist, and which required his p r o m p t interference, by the removal of the
deposites.
Will it not surprise the H o u s e to learn that just this " oppressive system
of p o l i c y " was pursued in the months of August and S e p t e m b e r , 1 8 3 2 , and
y e t t h e r e was no pressure upon the commercial c o m m u n i t y , no d a n g e r a p p r e h e n d e d that it would not sustain itself, no wide-spread scene of b a n k r u p t c y
a n d ruin followed? It is very obvious, from an examination of the course
p u r s u e d by the B a n k in the months of 1832 corresponding with those in
. 1 8 3 3 mentioned by the S e c r e t a r y , that there was nothing unusual, nothing
d o n e by the B a n k different from what always existed at that season of the
^ y e a r , w h e n , by the regular course of business, its loans w e r e always diminished,
I will ask the attention of the H o u s e while I e x a m i n e the s t a t e m e n t s now on
o u r tables sent from the T r e a s u r y , of the operations of the B a n k during the
. m o n t h * of August and S e p t e m b e r , 1 8 3 3 and 1 8 3 2 .







12

I n Ausrust, 1 8 3 3 , its discounts were
I n October, 1 8 3 3 , they were
R e d u c t i o n in two month?,

-

-

$64,160,349 14
60,094,202 9 3

-

$4,066,146 2 1

I n August, 1 8 3 2 , its discounts were
I n October, 1 8 3 2 , they were
R e d u c t i o n in two months,

-

-

$68,008,988 81
63,693,310 50

*

$4,315,678 31

S o that there was collected from the community in August and S e p t e m b e r ,
1 8 3 2 , $ 2 4 9 , 5 3 2 10 moro than in the corresponding months of the y e a r 1 8 3 3 .
T h i s does not exhibit very striking evidence of a " c h a n g e of course'* on t h e
p a r t of the B a n k , or a design to pursue a JICW and i4 oppressive system o f
policy."
I n August, 1 8 3 3 , the deposites of public moneys in the
B a n k of the United States amounted to
- $7,599,931 4 7
I n O c t o b e r , 1 8 3 3 , to
9,868,435 5 8
I n c r e a s e in two months,

-

I n August, 1 8 3 2 . to
I n October, 1 8 3 2 , to

.

I n c r e a s e in two months,

-

£2,268,50411
.

.

.

$12,137,908 17
13,661,193 0 1
$3,523,284 84

T h e amounts collected from the public m the two months of 1833 e x c e e d e d
those of the corresponding months of 1832 only the sum of $ 4 9 5 , 6 S 7 1 7 ,
I n August, 1 8 3 3 , the B a n k had in specie, - $10,023,677 3 8
I n October 1 8 3 3 ,
10,663,441 5 1
I n c r e a s e in two months,

-

I n August, 1 8 3 2 ,
I n October, 1832,

,

Increase in two months,

-

$639,764 I S
-

.

_

$7,346,292 66
S,078,851 0 7
$732,o58 4 1

Increase in 1832, more than in 1 8 3 3 , $ 9 2 , 7 9 4 28I n August, 1 8 3 3 , the balances due from the State
banks were
I n October, 1S33, I n c r e a s e in two months,
I n August, 1 8 3 2 ,
I n October, 1 8 3 2 ,

-

-

$1,919,603 21

-

„
$
'2S! ?£
2,288,573 19
368

-

-

*
-

$

602,795 19
2,820,11456

$2,217,319 37
Exhibiting a n increase in 1832, more than in 1 8 3 3 , of $ 2 9 7 , 7 1 6 16,

13

I t is thus a p p a r e n t that no action of the B a n k in A u g u s t and S e p t e m b e r ,
1 8 3 3 , different from that in the s a m e months in 1 8 3 2 , took place.
There
w e r e about the s a m e reductions in both y e a r s , and these, with the c o m p a r a t i v e
a m o u n t of its specie and its balances against the S t a t e banks at both periods
w e r e the natural result of its usual and ordinary operations. I n 1 8 3 2 t h e y
produced no a l a r m , no p r e s s u r e , no change in the business of the S t a t e b a n k s ,
no fears of b a n k r u p t c y or ruin. T h e y could not, and did not p r o d u c e these
evils in 1 8 3 3 .
A n d now, sir, I put the question to the H o u s e : is it not a p p a r e n t that t h e
curtailment of the discounts of the B a n k in August and S e p t e m b e r , 1 S 3 3 , was
neither e x t r a o r d i n a r y nor unusual, and could not have had any operation in
causing a pressure in the m o n e y m a r k e t ?
H a d the T r e a s u r y , before the deposites were r e m o v e d , been informed that
t h e B a n k intended still further to reduce its loans? O r had the S e c r e t a r y a n y
reason to believe that an order to that effect would be made? T h e very r e verse of this is t r u e .
I n the letter of the G o v e r n m e n t directors to the P r e s i d e n t , dated
September 3d, 1 8 3 3 , t h e y state that " some time since, a resolution was a d o p t e d , inc
* s t r u c t m g " a committee ** to inquire into the e x p e d i e n c y of m a k i n g a gradual
** reduction in the a c c o m m o d a t i o n p a p e r of the B a n k , and to r e p o r t to the board
a s c a l e " of reductions; that 4,t7io report teas madr;** that on the 13th of A u gust resolutions were offered and passed, that ** the amount of bills discounte d " should 4t not be increased at the B a n k and the several offices,' 1 limiting
t h e time of bills purchased at the B a n k and all its offices, e x c e p t t h e five
W e s t e r n offices, to ninety d a y s , and prohibiting the latter offices from p u r chasing a n y bills, e x c e p t those p a y a b l e in the Atlantic cities, at ninety d a y s
or less, or those to be received in p a y m e n t for existing debts to the B a n k
a n d offices, a n d not having more than four months to run. T h e s e directors
44
concurred entirely in the propriety and e x p e d i e n c y of reducing the business of the institution," but disapproved of the mode suggested in the a b o v e
resolutions, a n d were of opinion " that a system of reduction should a n d
might be founded on a b r o a d e r and m o r e equal b a s i s ; " and on the 16th of
A u g u s t proposed a resolution, " t h a t the C o m m i t t e e on the state of the B a n k
4t
be instructed to report to the board, at as early a d a y as possible, a system
*c for the gradual reduction of the business of the institution throughout all
" sections of the c o u n t r y , having regard to the interests of the stockholders,
44
the debtors of the B a n k , and the community in g e n e r a l ; " which resolution
w a s at once refused to be considered, all the directors present, e x c e p t t h e
G o v e r n m e n t directors and one other voting against the consideration of t h e
p r o p o s e d resolution. A n d on the 1st and 8th of O c t o b e r , (after the removal
of the deposites^) resolutions w e r e passed authori'/ing the C o m m i t t e e on t h e
Offices *' to direct such measures for the reduction of the business of the i n stitution as they should d e e m b e s t . "
I t is thus manifest, that before the removal of the deposites, the B a n k h a d
m a d e no order for the reduction of its accommodation p a p e r , nor for r e d u c i n g
its bills discounted, nor for curtailing the a m o u n t of its domestic e x c h a n g e s ,
e x c e p t i n g in bills, (other than those received i?i payment
of debts due the
Bank*) offered at the five W e s t e r n offices, and not p a y a b l e in t h e A t l a n t i c
cities and that no authority was given for a general reduction of the business
o f t h e B a n k until after the order tor the removal of the deposites had issued.
A n d during the whole period, and u p to the p r e s e n t t i m e , unlimited a u t h o r i t y was given, and now exists, to p u r c h a s e bills o a the commercial cities on t h e




14

A t l a n t i c , to any a m o u n t , so as to e n a b l e the whole W e s t e r n c o u n t r y t o o b t a i n
the facilities of this T to t h e m , i m p o r t a n t m e d i u m of e x c h a n g e . C a n it, t h e n *
b e affirmed with t r u t h , that it was n e c e s s a r y to w i t h d r a w t h e p u b l i c d e p o s i t e e
on the first of O c t o b e r , on a c c o u n t of the existing p r e s s u r e p r o d u c e d b y t h e
unusual policy of the B a n k in its c u r t a i l m e n t s , or from a n y w e l l - g r o u n d e d
fear, arising from the acts of the B a n k , that it would a d h e r e to s u c h a n ** o p *
p r e s s i v e " s y s t e m of reduction? S o far from a n y ** u n u s u a l " c u r t a i l m e n t h a v ing t a k e n p l a c e , so far from a n y o r d e r for u general r e d u c t i o n h a v i n g b e e n
g i v e n , which would c r e a t e pressure and e m b a r r a s s m e n t , a n d e x c i t e f e a r s o f
evils still g r e a t e r to e n s u e , it is a p p a r e n t that no such c o u r s e had b e e n a d o p t e d , n o r was it to be a p p r e h e n d e d from a n y act of t h e B a n k Wky^ t h e n , I
a s k , is this set up as the cause o{ the r e m o v a l on the 1st of O c t o b e r , e s p e cially when the a g e n t of the T r e a s u r y had c o m m u n i c a t e d to t h e S e c r e t a r y *
in his letter dated the 4th of September,
l b 3 3 ? that *4 if it b e d e t e r m i n e d not
to r e m o v e them,'* (the deposites) ** it is supposed the B a n k of t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s will r e s u m e it^ wonted course, and cease to distress the c o m m u n i t y ? 1 *
T h e S e c r e t a r y had only to d e c l a r e that the d e p o s i t e s should not b e w i t h d r a w n , and the m o n e y m a r k e t would be restored to its w o n t e d state of e a s e ,
and all a p p r e h e n s i o n and alarm would vanish.
A n d what has b e e n d o n e by the directors of the B a n k since the 1st o f O c t o b e r , which they ou<jht not to have d o n e , as faithful a g e n t s to the s t o c k h o l d e r s a n d the public? W h a t amount of reductions has b e e n m a d e , a n d w h y w a s
it n e c e s s a r y to m a k e them?
W h a t unnecessary c u r t a i l m e n t has b e e n o r d e r ed? T h e H o u s e will recollect that the B a n k , after the w i t h d r a w a l of t h e d e posites, was to m a k e provision for the p a y m e n t of the public m o n e y s t h e n
on d e p o s i t e , w h e n e v e r requested by the G o v e r n m e n t , a n d almost a l l of
which has been w i t h d r a w n . I t had also to p r o v i d e for t h e r e d u c t i o n o f its'
p r i v a t e d e p o s i t e s , a n d for the r e d e m p t i o n of its circulation of n i n e t e e n m i l lions. It had to do this while the T r e a s u r y was hostile to the i n s t i t u t i o n ;
while a t t e m p t s w e r e m a k i n g to impair its credit; while fears existed t h a t its
n o t e s mis"ht he c o n c e n t r a t e d at c e r t a i n points, ana1 h e a v y d e m a n d s b e m a d e
upon its specie. A n d what, e v e n in view of all these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , h a r
the B a n k done? It has r e d u c e d its business less bv n e a r l y t w o mill t o n s of
dollars than the sums which h a v e b e e n t a k e n from it* I t lias r e d u c e d its
specie more than six h u n d r e d thousand dollars, a n d increased its c i r c u l a t i o n
eighty thousand dollars. S o far from e x e r t i n g a p o w e r to injure and d i s t r e s s
t h e c o m m u n i t y , it has manifested a spirit of f o r b e a r a n c e h a r d l y c o m p a t i b l e
with the great duty of self-preservation; and its d i r e c t o r s , instead of b e i n g r e *
p r o a c h e d for t h e rieor and severity of their c u r t a i l m e n t s , a r e entitled t o t h e
t h a n k s of e v e r y class of our citizens for the modi-ration which t h e y h a v e e x ercised u n d e r such a combination of adverse and hostile m e a s u r e s with w h i c h
they have had to contend.
And it is well worthv our serious consideration:
w h e t h e r it is to be e x p e c t e d that the B a n k , consistently with the d u t i e s which*
it o w e s to its stockholders, can a n y longer continue to afford facilities t o the
e x t e n t in which they a r e now furnished.
I f a n y further proof were requisite to show that t h e B a n k , s i n c e t h e r e moval of the depositee, has not had an airency in continuine: a n d i n c r e a s i n g
the pressure upon the c o m m u n i t y , it is to be found in the implied a d m i s s i o n
of the S e c r e t a r y , and which is m o r e fully stated in the r e p o r t of his a g e n t ,
on file in his office, before they w e r e w i t h d r a w n .
In the l e t t e r of t h e agent*.
dated 4th S e p t e m b e r , 1 S 3 3 , he r e m a r k s . that T by an i m m e d i a t e t r a n s f e r of
the collections to the S t a t e b a n k s in the principal cities, a n d b y d e p o s i t i n g 4




15

in t h e m t h e p r o c e e d s of t h e cash d u t i e s , i m m e d i a t e relief would be afforded,
** T h e B a n k of the U n i t e d S t a t e s c a n then only press its o w n d e b t o r s , a n d
" the c o n s e q u e n c e of o p p r e s s i v e calls, which c a n n o t be m e t , will fall u p o n
** itself; s t r i p p e d of the p o w e r which the G o v e r n m e n t gives it, almost its
** whole s t r e n g t h would be lost. I f it shall be resolved to r e m o v e t h e m , " ( t h e
d e p o s i t e s , ) " and that resolution be followed by i m m e d i a t e a c t i o n , that B a n k
** will no longer h a v e t h e p o w e r to c r e a t e a n y g e n e r a l d i s t r e s s . " I f t h e s e
opinions be c o r r e c t , a n d it would s e e m t h a t tiie S e c r e t a r y c o n s i d e r e d t h e m s o
b y his almost " i m m e d i a t e a c t i o n , " how can it be said, with t r u t h , that t h e
evils t h e c o u n t r y now e x p e r i e n c e are j u s t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e to the exercise of t h e
p o w e r of the B a n k , e v e n h a d it manifested the disposition to e x e r c i s e it?
W a s it not ** s t r i p p e d of the p o w e r which t h e G o v e r n m e n t " g a v e ** i t , " a n d
t h u s " almost its whole s t r e n g t h losf?"
I h a v e t h u s , sir, e n d e a v o r e d to show to w h a t causes t h e p r e s e n t e m b a r rassed and distressed condition of the c o u n t r y is not to be a t t r i b u t e d ; a n d
this, I r e p e a t , I h a v e d o n e , not for the p u r p o s e of vindicating the B a n k , b u t
to a s c e r t a i n the true c a u s e s , t h a t w e m a y be e n a b l e d to a p p l y a p r o p e r
remedy.
W h a t , t h e n , a r e these causes? T h e y are to be found in the e n t i r e c h a n g e
of the relations of confidence a n d friendship which formerly existed b e t w e e n
t h e T r e a s u r y and the B a n k .
W h e r e were once harmony, and union, and
confidence, is n o w , on t h e one p a r t , hostility, not to say o p p r e s s i o n , and o n
the other, distrust, and c o n s e q u e n t prudential m e a s u r e s - You k n o w , s i r — w e
all k n o w — t h e s y s t e m a t i c a t t e m p t s which h a v e b e e n m a d e to d e s t r o y t h e c r e dit of the B a n k , to i m p a i r its usefulness, to c r e a t e groundless j e a l o u s i e s , a n d
excite groundless fears of its p o w e r and disposition to do evil, r a t h e r than to
s u b s e r v e the purposes of its c r e a t i o n ; to vilify and s l a n d e r the h o n o r a b l e m e n
w h o a r e intrusted with the m a n a g e m e n t of its affairs; to r e p r e s e n t it at h o m e
a n d abroad as u n d e r t h e control of political s w i n d l e r s , and to b r e a k it d o w n
a n d destroy it. I need not point out the m e a n s r e s o r t e d to by the public
p r e s s to further these views; t h e y are printed in c h a r a c t e r s which no r e a d e r
c a n m i s u n d e r s t a n d , a n d t h e y will be r e m e m b e r e d by those who h a v e fallen
victims to t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of this warfare, as long as p o v e r t y , a n d distress.
a n d ruin, shall be their portion. B u t it was t h e act of the T r e a s u r y in
r e m o v i n g the public d e p o s i t e s , c o n n e c t e d with the a v o w e d objects of the r e m o v a l , and the disruption of the a m i c a b l e relations o n c e subsisting b e t w e e n
t h e T r e a s u r y and t h e B a n k , which has brought the country to its p r e s e n t
s t a t e of gloom and d e s p o n d e n c y . T h e B a n k could p r o b a b l y h a v e withstood
t h e w a r of words which was w a g e d against it. N o expressions of doubt as to
its solvency from those in high places, or in the k e n n e l s , could have s h a k e n
t h e public confidence in its stability; no s l a n d e r s , written or s p o k e n , of t h e
m e n who conducted its affairs, could h a v e a r r e s t e d their course of usefulness.
O u r citizens had felt t h e beneficent results of their s e r v i c e s , a n d would h a v e
sustained t h e m , and the institution with which they w e r e c o n n e c t e d , while
faithfully discharging their duties to the stockholders and to the c o m m u n i t y .
A n d h o w has this r e m o v a l , c o n n e c t e d with the purposes and objects in
v i e w , **nd the d i s c o n t i n u a n c e of the amicable relations b e t w e e n t h e B a n k a n d
t h e T r e a s u r y , p r o d u c e d t h e p r e s e n t state of distress, and c o n s t e r n a t i o n , a n d
I h a v e before r e m a r k e d , that the time selected was not the most propitious
w h e n it is considered t h a t cash duties w e r e to be paid in considerable a m o u n t s '
t h a t c o m m e r c i a l operations w e r e m u c h e x t e n d e d , g r o w i n g out of several y e a r s




16

of successful operations; that there was to be a reimbursement of State and
United States* stocks; and that an unusually large amount of Southern and
Western stocks had been created and paid for in the commercial cities, par*
ticularlv in New York. AH these circumstances evinced that, though there
might not be a scarcity of money, there would be more than a usual demand
for it. This state of thines was succeeded by the withdrawal of the public
moneys from the Bank of the United States, and, with it, a partial derangement of the financial interchange connected with tb.c extensive commercial
operations of the country. T h e admirable system of checks and balances, o f
commercial exchanges, of a uniform and sustained currency, was broken
up. A curtailment of the loans of the Bank was indispensable to enable it
to redeem its notes, and make payment to the public and private depositors;
and it is matter of surprise that thU curtailment has been so small. T h i s
caused a partial disuse of the credit of the Bank, which had been employed
in the purchase of domestic bills, in the disbursement of the revenue by drafts
on the different branches, and on each other; and which, bein£ rapid and safe
in their transmission, and unattended with expense, had produced the most
beneficial results; and for them were substituted the notes of the local
banks, current only in the neighborhood of the places where they were issued,
and incapable of use as remittances to remote places. T h e most important
effect, however, of this measure, was the announcement of the fact, that h e r e after the country was t > suffer the evils of a State bank paper currency, a
circulating medium of local bank notes. Tins destroyed public confidence*
It suspended the performance of old contracts, and prevented the formation
of now ones; it alarmed capitalists; and money was hoarded up instead o f
beinsr lent. T h e State b m k s bejan to exhibit evidence of a state of feverish
excitement, and to curtail their loans. Tb.c confidence of the c o m m u nity in the ability of the banks to make any loans, or to redeem their notes
in specie, was shaken; and thus all the fearful consequences of a base and
vicious currency were apprehended. Can we be at a loss, in view of these
facts, to what causes to ascribe the sudden and rapid change from a state of
hi^h prosperity to one of devp despondency and distress? Do we not p e r ceive that had the Treasury permitted the Bank to pursue its usual course
in the distribution of the revenue in loans and domestic exchanges, in s u s taining and continuing a sound currency,
in co-operatine with the local banks
in all proper measures to meet tin1 wants of the community, in preventing
the awful catastrophe of a local bank paper system, in preserving its relations
of kindness, and confidence, and crood feelin^with the Treasury which it had
heretofore enjoyed, " all would have been well?*'
I have thus attempted to trace the causes of the evils which we now suffer, and the still creator ones which, it is to bo feared, are to befall us. I s
there any remedy for them? And if so, what is it?
Simply to remove the causes which have produced them:—by directing
the puhlic moneys hereafter collected, to be deposited in the* legitimate
place of custody, an 1 by restoring the former amicable relations subsisting
between
the Department of the Treasury and the Bank. *• T h e n there could
u
and
would
be an immediate prompt employment of the credit and capital
4t
of the Bank, at all points. This would exempt local banks from peril, sup-*
" ply all the necessary moans of remittance, inspire universal confidence in
" the value of property of every description, and in the soundness and suffi"<; ciency of the currency. T h e credit of the Bank, equal to, and indeed bet*
ter than specie everv "where, would restore, and continue to furnish all the
fci
needful facilities."*




17
Such would be the results, merely by restoring every thing to the condition
in which it w a s previous to the removal of the deposites. W i l l the s a m e
results follow through the agency of the State banks? W i l l the plan o f t h e
Secretary ensure confidence, resuscitate business almost annihilated, and fur—
nish a sound currency, and a well arranged and well balanced system o f d o mestic exchanges? I f this plan can be made effective, it must be by t h e
agency of the State banks, through the medium of their notes or their credit,
or by both united. I call the attention of the H o u s e to a brief examination,
of this new " s y s t e m , " that we may see whether it will probably " work
well."
Will the bank notes of the State institutions be current at all points?
A n d here it is to be remembered that the deposite banks decline entering
into a guarantee for each other, and have not y e t stipulated to honor eaci*
other's notes in all transactions of business- W h a t is the voice of all p a s t
and present experience on this subject? A r e the notes of sound banks i n
the interior, current at their par value in our commercial cities?
Examine
the bank note table which is almost daily furnished us in the public prints,
and you will s e e at what an enormous discount many of them are r e c e i v e d ,
and all of them at some rate of discount. Can the local banks make their
notes current, by issuing them payable in the comm«rcial cities? T h i s e x periment has been tried, and failed: and the reason is that all of them will
not ado^it this course, and those who refuse will have the benefit of c i r culation, and those who adopt it will furnish, at their own e x p e n s e , all
the remittances.
S u c h a system cannot continue long.
I t has heretofore b e e n pursued by some of the local banks, and has b e e n abandoned*.
If, then, the State institutions cannot make their notes current every where;,
if their circulation will, of necessity, be limited; if they will accumulate in*
their immediate vicinity, is it not obvious that those banks who receive t h e
public deposites will be weakened instead of strengthened by them, i n a s much as when required to disburse the funds thus received they will be c o m pelled to furnish s p e c i e at the remote points? A n d is it not equally
obvious, that these notes will not answer the purposes of remittance, o r
be advantageously substituted for the notes of the Bank of the U n i t e d
States?
Can the State banks furnish the necessary facilities, by means of t h e i r
credit?
I cannot well conceive how this is to be effected in the w a y s u g gested. T h e local banks, having no interest in common with each o t h e i v
have no c o m m o n fund on which to draw, as e x i g e n c i e s may require.
Their
credit is not expansive like that of the Bank of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , having a
board at one place to supervise the whole institution, and branches e s t a b l i s h ed throughout the country to aid the different interests which are to be pro*
moted by bank facilities. A s their circulation is limited, and returns to t h e m
to be r e d e e m e d , t h e y must reduce it. T h i s will rapidly, and to a vast e x tent, diminish business and labor, and then will follow all the deplorable c o n sequences which never fail to ensue from a great and sudden reduction of t h e
circulation.
I have n o w , sir, finished m y remarks on that part o f this great subject*,
which relates to the existence of the present and apprehended distress in t h e
country, the causes of it, and the remedy for it. It has b e e n m y object to*
present, faithfully, and as an honest inquirer after truth, and to enable us todecide correctly, the questions now presented to us, and upon which w e shall
b e called to record our v o t e s , the prosperous condition of this nation befor*2




18

the public deposites were withdrawn from the Bank, the distressed and alarming condition in which it now is, the still greater distress we have reason t o
apprehend, the causes of it, as arising f roni the removal of the public m o n e y s
from the Bank, connected with the open and undisguised objects of it, and
the loss of public confidence necessarily resulting from the cessation of the
friendly relations between the Treasury and the Bank, and the r e m e d y suit*
able and proper to be adopted, by putting an end to these causes.
Congress possess the power to make an application of this remedy; shall
it be exercised? I do not doubt an affirmative answer will be given to this
inquiry, unless imperious reasons exist which render its exercise unwise and
inexpedient. I f any such reasons do exist, they are to be found in the report
of the Secretary of the Treasury, and a brief examination of them will
conclude all which I have to say on the whole matter before us* T h i s
paper contains official notice to Congress, that the Secretary of the T r e a sury, in pursuance of the power said to be reserved to him, by the act incorporating the Bank of the United States, has directed that the deposites of
the money of the U nited States shall not be made in the Bank or its branches^
and the reasons for that order. In the examination which I have made o f
this document, I have been equally surprised at the extravagance of the
power which is claimed, the bold manner in which it is set forth, and the insufficiency and unsatisfactory nature of the reasons which have led to its exercise. Let us, sir, look at the principles assumed, and the reasons which are
set forth,
A portion (not a small one) of the report of the Secretary consists of certain principles advauced and assumed to be correct, which are made the
basis of an application of assumed facts, and which are set forth as well to
explain the nature and extent of the power which is granted to him, as to
justify its actual exercise in the removal of the deposites.
T h e s e principles are now to be considered.
T h e first to which I shall call the attention of the House, is that which
asserts the Treasury Department to be an Executive Department, and therefore subject to the supervision of the President, who is required to take care
that the laws he faithfully executed. Whether this is advanced with a view
to sustain the authority exercised by the Chief Magistrate in his indirect
control over the public treasure, by means of the power which he possesses
over the Secretary of the Treasury, by removing him if he does not perform
what is commanded, it is not material to inquire. It is now not denied that the
predecessor of the present Secretary was removed from ofhee^ because he
would not give the order for the removal of the deposites in pursuance of
the advice and direction of the President. A n d in this report, this advice
and direction are not only justified as lawful, but required bv the constitution as one of the duties to be performed by the Executive- * It is true that
the President, in wordsy claims no authority to direct or control the S e c r e tary in the discharge of the high trust committed to him relative to the withdrawal of the public moneys from the Bank. In practice* however, he asserts it; tor when the refractory Secretary insists on exercising his o w n
discretion, instead of following that of the President, he is informed that his
official services are no longer required. Advocates of this controlling power
in the Executive are not wanting here, or elsewhere; and most, if not ail, of
those who have addressed the House and approved the reasons of the Secre^
tary for the withdrawal of the deposites from the Bank of the United States,
have asserted, in unqualified terms, the right and duty of the President to




19

direct the head of any Department in the performance of any and every
executive duty, or in the exercise of any authority given him by law.
The
member from New York [Mr. BEARDSLEY] asserted that it was the duty
of the Secretary to give effect to the will and judgment of the President^ not
to his own. T h e member from Georgia [Mr. J O N E S ] said that the President, being responsible to the people for the execution of every law, has the
right to exercise a control over the Secretary, who is bound to comply with
his wishes. T h e very statement of such a doctrine, as applicable to the
power granted to the Secretary of the Treasury over the public moneys,
and especially when taken in connexion with the reasons urged in support
of it, is sufficient to startle any citizen of this republic who has hitherto supposed he was the subject of a Government having free institutions, and a
written constitution establishing different departments of that Government,
Let me briefly examine this, to my mind, most extraordinary proposition*
I will not stop to inquire whether the Treasury be an Executive Department, though the act organizing it, in its title, in the duties required of him
who presides over it, in the provision that his reports are to be made to
Congress, in the very nature of the trust committed to him, all prove that it
was not intended to be made subject to the action of the President in every
form. T o this might be added the distinction which, I think, has always
existed between the Treasury and the other Departments, in this particular.
Whenever an act is to be done under the authority either of the State, War,
or Navy Department, the official communication states it to be by order of the
President. No such language is ever found in any act emanating from the
Treasury Department, unless in a case where the law, in terms, makes the
consent or order of the President necessary. As in the tariff act of 1832,
where certain rules and regulations are required to be made by the Secretary
of the Treasury under the direction of the President, and such as he shall
approve—a very unnecessary provision, it would seem, if the President possessed a general supervisory power over the official acts of the Secretary.
Let it be admitted that the Secretary of the Treasury is strictly an executive
officer- Why may the President direct him in the discharge of his official
duties? Because, it is said, the President must appoint, and may remove him
from office, and is bound to sec that the laws are faithfully executed. If this
reasoning be sound, there is but a single Department in our Government, and
that is the Executive* We live under the forms of a republican Government, without a vestige of it in fact.
T h e constitution provides that there shall be a Judicial Department? How
are its orders and decrees to be executed? By one whom the President must
appoint, and whom he can remove. Can he control the official acts of the
marshal, because of his power over him in regard to the tenure of his office?
T h e territorial judges are appointed by the President, and, holding their
offices for four year3 only, are, as some suppose, removable, or if not, the
President is not bound to re-appoint them. Are they subject to the direction of the President?
T h e librarian of Congress is appointed and removable by the President.
Who controls his official acts? T h e President, or the Joint Committee of both
Houses of Congress?
In all the cases stated, it is very clear that the President can exercise no
authority, though the power of appointment and removal is in his hands, and
though he is bound to see that the laws are faithfully executed. And'wAv




20
c a n n o t he interfere in these cases? M e r e l y b e c a u s e the r e s p c n s i b i l i t y in all o€
t h e m devolves u p o n o t h e r s , a n d not u p o n h i m .
A n d in relation to the p o w e r of r e m o v a l of the public d e p o s i t e s * t o w h o m
is the discretion confided, a n d on w h o m is the responsibility c a s t b y t h e a c t
o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n ? I s it n o t , in t e r m s , the S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y ? A n d is
it not h i m a l o n e , w h e n t h e spirit and r e a s o n of the a c t , as well a s its l e t t e r *
a r e consulted?
C a n individual discretion e v e r be e x e r c i s e d , w h e n it is c o n *
trolled b y others? C a n a l a w , which d e p e n d s for its e x e c u t i o n u p o n t h e d i s c r e t i o n of one p e r s o n , be *4 faithfully e x e c u t e d " w h e n the d i s c r e t i o n of another
is substituted?
B e s i d e s , t h e provision w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h e r e a s o n s of t h e
S e c r e t a r y to b e given to C o n g r e s s , is v e r y conclusive to show t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t c a n n o t interfere with him in the d i s c h a r g e of this d u t y d e p e n d i n g o a
discretion.
Whose r e a s o n s axe to be given? T h o s e of the P r e s i d e n t or t h e
S e c r e t a r y ? W h a t should we h a v e thought if the p r e s e n t S e c r e t a r y had a n n o u n c e d to us t h a t he had o r d e r e d t h e d e p o s i t e s to be r e m o v e d , a n d that h i s
r e a s o n s wore to be found in an a c c o m p a n y i n g o r d e r of t h e P r e s i d e n t d i r e c t ing it to b e done? W o u l d that h a v e b e e n a c o m p l i a n c e with t h e law? I t
w o u l d h a v e b e e n if t h e S e c r e t a r y is b o u n d to consult the o p i n i o n s of t h e
P r e s i d e n t , to s p e a k his l a n g u a g e , to e x e c u t e his m a n d a t e , to o b e y his o r d e r *
t o b e g o v e r n e d by his d i s c r e t i o n .
T h e S e c r e t a r y c o m m e n c e s Ins r e p o r t , with d e c l a r i n g t h a t he h a s w i t h d r a w n t h e m o n e y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s from the B a n k , in p u r s u a n c e of a
p o w e r reserved to him in the act of i n c o r p o r a t i o n .
A n d h e afterwards e x plains h o w this is a p o w e r r e s e r v e d , not g r a n t e d to h i m . H e affirms t h a t
w h e n e v e r t h e r e is no e x p r e s s i o n of the legislative will in r e g a r d t o t h e
p l a c e of d e p o s i t e of the public t r e a s u r e , the S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y is
t h e k e e p e r , a n d h a s the c u s t o d y of it, a n d that t h e law i n c o r p o r a t i n g the B a n t
h a s r e s e r v e d to h i m , in its full e x t e n t , t h e p o w e r lie before possessed.
It
will b e p e r c e i v e d t h a t this a s s u m p t i o n as to the r e s e r v e d p o w e r of the S e c r e t a r y is i n t e n d e d to fortify tind s t r e n g t h e n a n o t h e r position w h i c h he h a s
a d v a n c e d , which is his u n c o n t r o l l e d p o w e r o v e r the d e p o s i t e s , so far as t h e
i n t e r e s t s of t h e B a n k a r e involved in t h e i r r e m o v a l . T h i s I shall notice
hereafterMy object at p r e s e n t is, to show t h a t the p o w t r in question,
w h a t e v e r m a y be its e x t e n t , is o n e granted to t h e S e c r e t a r y , not o n e p r e viously e x i s t i n g . T o w h a t officer of the G o v e r n m e n t , p r e v i o u s to t h e B a n k
c h a r t e r , w a s t h e custody of t h e public m o n e y s c o m m i t t e d — t o the T r e a s u r e r of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , or to the S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y ? O r h a d
C o n g r e s s o m i t t e d to legislate o\\ this subject?
N o t h i n g is m o r e clear t h a n
t h a t t h e p o w e r of C o n g r e s s e x t e n d s to t h e p l a c e w h e r e , a n d t h e p e r s o n b y
w h o m , t h e m o n e y s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s shall be k e p t . I n t h e y e a r 1 7 8 9 *
t h e y p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e T r e a s u r e r should keep t h e i r m o n e y s a n d p a y t h e m
only w h e n r e q u i r e d b y l a w — a n d a bond was to b e given for t h e faithful
p e r f o r m a n c e of his d u t i e s , a n d for the fidelity of the p e r s o n s b y h i m e m ployed.
H e r e w a s the first legislative provision on this s u b j e c t , a n d i t v e s t e d
t h e T r e a s u r e r with the p o w e r to select the place of d e p o s i t e , a n d m a d e hhtt
r e s p o n s i b l e for it. W h e n t h e B a n k of the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s i n c o r p o r a t e d *
both the d i s c r e t i o n a n d responsibility of t h e T r e a s u r e r , a s to t h e c u s t o d y o f
the public m o n e y , ceased d u r i n g t h e whole period in w h i c h the m o n e y s h o u l d
r e m a i n in t h e B a n k , w h e r e , b y t h e act of i n c o r p o r a t i o n , it w a s d i r e c t e d t o
b e deposited* T h e legislation of C o n g r e s s v a r i e d both t h e d u t i e s a n d r e sponsibilities c f t h e T r e a s u r e r ; for it had t a k e n from h i m the p o w e r , and
c o n s e q u e n t l y r e l i e v e d h i m from t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , of s e l e c t i n g a safe p l a c e




21

of deposite, by making the Bank the depositary, *< unless the Secretary of
the Treasury" should afterwards " otherwise order and direct;*' or in other
words, until the Secretary, for proper reasons, should declare the right of
the Bank to continue to be the depositary at an end. T h e Secretary, by
virtue of the authority given him, might " order and direct" that the deposites should no longer be made in the Bank or its branches; and this is the
extent of his authority, under the Bank charter. It vests him with no power
to designate any new place of custody, but simply to order that the Bank
shall no longer be that place. And this is impliedly admitted by the Secretary,
for he asserts his right to select a new depositary, not on the authority to
order and direct the deposites to be removed, but on the broad ground of a
pre-existing authority, not conferred on him by the act of incorporation, but
reserved to him in that act, without any new limitation. It results, then, as
a necessary consequence, that if previous to "the creation of the Bank he
had no such authority, and his power under the act was simply to discharge
the Bank from its duties as depositary, the custody of the public money
again reverted to the Treasurer, by virtue of the act of 1789. T h e argument may be stated in this form: Before the incorporation of the Bank, the
safe keeping of the money of the United States was intrusted to the T r e a surer. This duty continued to devolve upon him until it was required to
be performed by the Bank; and when that institution ceased to be the depository, by virtue of the order of the Secretary, the right and the duty of
the Treasurer to become such immediately revived. T h e only inquiry then
is, on tvhom had the law, previous to the existence of the Bank, cast the
duty, and the responsibility of providing a safe place of deposito for the
public moneys—on the Secretary, or the Treasurer? T h e former claims
it by virtue of his office, as the head of the Department, intrusted* with the
administration of rhe finances, and required to superintend the collection of
the revenue. T h e latter possesses it, by the express words of the law,
which makes it his duty to receive and keep these moneys, and to disburse
them in the manner provided by law, and not otherwise. T h e power claimed by the Secretary, arises by mere implication from his office; that of the
Treasurer, from a plain, unequivocal legislative enactment; and no rule of
construction of statute law is more fully established, no rule of interpretation more sound in itself, and more universally acknowledged, than that an
authority which might be supposed to exist in one person, arising from
inference or implication, is not conferred on him when it is expressly
delegated to another. When the intention of those who alone can give the
authority, is clearly expressed, the doctrine of presumption, or inference, or
implication, has no application. Is it not clear, then, that the Secretary has
asserted a power in himself to select places of deposite, which is not warranted by law? And were not all the contracts which he has made with the
local banks, entered into by him on behalf of the United States, without
authority? And if it be true, that the practice of the Treasury sanctions
the view which he has, in this particular, taken of the subject, it is a practice not warranted by the existing laws, which is dangerous in its tendency,
and which it is both proper and necessary should be corrected.
T h e Secretary then proceeds to assert that Congress, in no event, and
under no possible state of things, however imperious may be the necessity,
can withdraw the public moneys from the custody of the Bank, without
violating the national faith. T h a t I may not mistake on this point, I quote
his words: " Although Congress should be satisfied, that the public money




22
** was not safe in the care of the B a n k , or should be convinced that the inte*
** rests of the people of the U n i t e d S t a t e s imperiously d e m a n d e d the rem oval >
" y e t the passage of a law directing it to be d o n e would b e a b r e a c h of the
11
a g r e e m e n t into which they have e n t e r e d . "
It r e q u i r e s n e i t h e r argument
n o r illustration, to confute this d a n g e r o u s a n d , I think, unfounded doctrine*.
I believe no one has a t t e m p t e d to sustain it. F o r the first time in t h e history
of this G o v e r n m e n t has it b e e n asserted, that the legislative p o w e r of C o n gress does not extend to the removal of a depositary of t h e m o n e y s of thep e o p l e , who cannot k e e p it safely, or will not disburse it in p u r s u a n c e oC
t h e i r lawTful directions.
I have lately, sir, had my a t t e n t i o n called, b y
r e a d i n g it in a public print, to a portion of English history, which m a y n o t
b e i n a p p r o p r i a t e to this part of the subject, and which m a y claim t h e notice
of the historian should he be fond of drawing parallels b e t w e e n present
and former times.
M y honorable friend from P e n n s y l v a n i a [Mr. B I . W E Y ] gave the House a
faithful historical account of the first a t t e m p t ever m a d e , and the results o f
it, to t a k e a w a y the chartered rights of a corporation, for alleged sedition,*
and an a t t e m p t to obtain political power. H e told us it was "in the worst
d a y s of the worst prince that ever sat on the English t h r o n e , Charles I I . .
T h e incident to which I a m about to refer occurred in the reign of the
s a m e m o n a r c h , when A s h l e y , (better known by the title of E a r l of S h a f t e s b u r y , ) who was one of the C a b a l , was treasurer of all the m o n e y raised upon
prizes, and C l a r e n d o n was one of the ministers.
I t was proposed in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that a bill should b e p r e p a r e d , .
a n d b e c o m e an act of P a r l i a m e n t , providing, in effect, for a n inquiry into
t h e security and disbursement of the public t r e a s u r e . W h i l e this was pending, it was discussed in the councils of the K i n g , or r a t h e r in that portion o f
it with which the K i n e was accustomed to advise, and H a l l n m , in his C o n stitutional History of E n g l a n d , thus refers to these deliberations:
" T h e immediate object of this inquiry was r a t h e r to discover whether the
4t
t r e a s u r e r had not issued money without legral warrant, t h a n to e n t e r upon
" the details of its expenditure.
B u t L o r d C l a r e n d o n , bigoted to his tory
" creed of p r e r o g a t i v e , thought it the highest p r e s u m p t i o n for a Parliament
** to intermeddle with the course of the G o v e r n m e n t . H e ] s p o k e of this bill as^
** e n c r o a c h m e n t and usurpation that had no limits, and "pressed t h e King to
" be firm in his resolution n e v e r to consent to it."
I n the Life of C l a r e n d o n , the proceedings in the Council are thus stated::
" H i s Majesty w a s no less troubled, and called that c o m m i t t e e of the P r i v y
" Council with which he used to advise, and complained of this unusual w a y
*4 of proceeding in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , which would terrify all m e n from
" serving His Majesty in all receipts; to which e m p l o y m e n t men submitted,
" because they k n e w what they were to d o , and what they w e r e to suffer, &,c,
" But to account by such orders as the P a r l i a m e n t should p r e s c r i b e , a n d to be
" liable to such punishment as the P a r l i a m e n t would inflict, was such a n u a ** certainty as would d e p r i v e them of all rest and quiet of m i n d , and w a s in
*fc itself so unjust that his Majesty declared * thai he n e v e r would suffer it..
** H e hoped it would never find a consent in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s ; if it
" should, that the H o u s e of P e e r s would reject it; but if it should be brought
** to him, h e was resolved never to cive his R o y a l assent.* T h e r e w a s n o
" m a n present who did not seem fully to concert with his M a j e s t y that he
** should n e v e r assent to it. * H o w e v e r , that the best care and diligence should
44
b e used that it might never be presented to him, but stopped in the H o u s e s ;




23

" and to that purpose, that the members should be prepared by giving them
** notice of his pleasure.* T h e Chancellor, upon this argument, in which he dis" cerned no opposition, enlarged himself upon what he had often before put his
** Majesty in mind of, that he could not be too indulgent in the defence of the
** privileges of Parliament; that he hoped he would never violate any of them;
14
but he desired him to be equally solicitous to prevent the excesses in JPar** liament^ and not to suffer them to extend their jurisdiction
to cases they
** have nothing to do with; and thaty to restrain them within their proper
'* bounds and limits is as necessary as it is to preserve them from being in** vaded; that this was such a new encroachment as had no bottom; and
** therefore he desired his Majesty to be firm in the resolution he had taken,
4t
and not to depart from it; and if such a bill should be brought up to the
ft
House of P e e r s , he would not fail in doing his duty, and speaking freely
" his opinions against such innovations, how many soever it might offend."
T h e bill passed the Commons, and provided for the appointment of c o m missioners to perform the duties specified in it by both Houses* In the House
of Lords it was proposed to have the duties performed by commission from
the King. His Majesty, however, prorogued Parliament while the measure
was pending, and made a speech, a part of which I will read.
44
I thank you for this other bill of supply, 1 hope we shall live to have
" bills of this nature in the old styley with fewer provisoes*
I looked to have
'* had somewhat'offered to me concerning the accounts of the money that have
** been already raised since the war; which, since you have not done, I will
** take care (after so much noise) that the same be not stifled, but will issue
** out my commission in the manner I formerly promised the House of P e e r s .
" I shall now prorogue you, that you may, in your several places, intend the
** peace and security of your several counties, where there are unquiet spirits
*' enough working: and I hope we shall meet again, of one mind, for my ho** nor, and the good of the kingdom."
T h e historian adds: " It does not appear that this royal commission, though
*4 actually prepared and sealed, was ever carried into effect;" for though it
was promised the Commons in hopes to pacify them, it was ** an expedient
" which was not likely to bring more to light than suited his purpose." A n d
he subjoins, that ** now the King had very much to do; more than he had
" time or tools to despatch."
T h e Secretary then proceeds to declare that his reserved power over the
deposites is absolute and unconditional, so far as the interests of the Bank
are concerned. I f this be so, it follows that this corporation has no right to
inquire into the causes of removal, if the Secretary thinks proper to order it;
and that, however injurious to the B a n k such removal may be, or however
unsatisfactory or insufficient the causes may be which led to it, it cannot rightfully complain. I do not concur with the Secretary in these views; I consider them opposed to the spirit of the act, and utterly inconsistent with the
vested rights of the institution.
It is admitted that if the Secretary issue the order of removal he is bound
to lay before Congress the reasons which led to it. And who are interested in
these reasons; Congress alone or the B a n k also? I f the latter, then it is
apparent the power to remove is not unconditional; for if this corporation have
any interest in the causes which led to its discharge as a depositary, those
causes must be such as will justify the revocation of the trust committed to
it; and has it no such interest'? Is it indifferent to the Bank whether it be unceremoniously and without cause deprived of the custody of the public trea-







24
sure and the incidental benefits resulting from it? Has it no voice which has
a. right to be heard when its interests are assailed? Is it condemned to perpetual silence? Are not the -easons for the withdrawal to be given to C o n gress, that, if unsatisfactory, the deposites may be restored to the Bank, and
thus the public faith preserved? And is not the Bank directly interested in
the proper disposition of the question arising upon the communication o f
those reasons? Obviously it has; and, if so, it has a right to demand that
they be such as to justify the removal; and therefore the power claimed canc o t , as to them, be absolute and unconditional.
If the doctrine of the Secretary be correct, it follows as an inevitable con*
sequence that Congress cannot effectually order them to bo restored to the
Bank. This is a result to which we must come, in view of the principles ass u m e d — a result which will not receive the approbation or support of any
representative of the people. T h e Secretary asserts an unqualified power of
removal, so far as the Bank is concerned. If, then, Congress should adjudge
his reasons insufficient, and direct a restoration of the deposites, might he not
at any time, immediately if he pleased, after they should be restored, issue an
order for their withdrawal a second time, and so on, indefinitely? And as Con*
grcr»s have not the power of removing him, might he not set at defiance their
expressed will, and impair the rights of the Bank? And, upon his construction
o f the act of incorporation, would the institution have any remedy even for a
wanton injury to its interests?
I will appeal, however, on this topic, to the admissions of the Secretary
himself. H e , at legist, will consider this as good authority; and in his
own report is this doctrine condemned. He admits that the power given
him over the deposites by the act incorporating the Bank, is the same power*
no other nor greater, than that which he before possessed. T h e act conferred on him •* no new power, but reserved to him, in its fullest extent, the
power he before possessed—his former authority, without any new limitation/* And what was this authority which he always possessed? I read his
own words:—an authority or duty " to take care that the public money was
4i
deposited in safe-keeping in the hands of faithful agents, and inconvenient
-" places, ready to be applied according to the wants of the Government."
H e r e we have, in his own words, the extent of his former and his reserved
power. And is this unqualified and unconditional? Is it not, by his own admission, confined in its exercise to the emergencies which he has stated? Has he,
in his own view, any other duty to perform, since the act, besides that which
existed before in relation to the place of deposite? And if the Bank keep the
public moneys safely; if it be a faithful fiscal agent—for that is the nature of
\is agency, as he admits in a subsequent part of his report—and if, at all times,
it keep them in convenient places, ready to be applied according to the wants
o f the Government, ha* lie the power, granted or reserved, to remove theml
f.u such case, is not his duty completely discharged by permitting them to remain in the Bank? And doe? lie not exceed his authority, or rather usurp one,
when, under such cirsum&tanc***. he directs a removal? Is that an unlimited
and unconditional power which, by his own admissions, exists only to be used
for particular purpose*, and to effect certain specified objects?
T h e Secretary, however, after thus stating the source and extent of his
authority, and confining its exercise to the events which he mentions, proceeds
t o assert that he has alright to remove the deposites, and it is his duty to re*
move them, whenever the public interest or convenience will, in any d e gree, be promoted by the change. I do not give my assent to this dan-

25
gerous doctrine- W i t h o u t adverting particularly to what has b e e n suggested
b y others, in the course of this debate, that it would often be e x t r e m e l y
difficult to ascertain what the slightest degree of public interest and c o n v e n i e n c e might be; and, from this, justly inferring that Congress could
n e v e r have intended to vest in one individual the power of declaring what
•would, in the most limited extent, promote the c o n v e n i e n c e and interest o f the
c o m m u n i t y , and thus justify a r e m o v a l o f the deposites to the possible injury
o f the public, and to the detriment o f the Bank, I submit to the H o u s e that,
by the fair and obvious construction of the act o f incorporation, the B a n k has
the legal and equitable right to the custody o f the public m o n e y s , if they are
k e p t safely, and it discharges its duties faithfully, as the fiscal agent of the
Treasury.
T h e S e c r e t a r y s e e m s to regard the extent of his p o w e r as he
would were there no other provisions in the act which confers it; he looks
alone to the words ** unless he shall, at any time, otherwise order and direct;**
v i e w s them as unqualified, and asserts the same authority which he would have
possessed, had a law existed directing the public m o n e y s to be deposited in
o n e of the vaults of ti>e capital, unless the Secretary should, at a n y t i m e , direct their removal. N o w , e v e r y man of ordinary understanding, though he
b e not a lawyer, k n o w s that general expressions in a statute are and ought to be
construed with reference to the whole act, and to be limited and restrained b y
the obvious m e a n i n g and clear intent of the Legislature in the use o f such
words. T h e design of all rules of construction is to ascertain the intent
o f the law maker, and, when understood, it is to be carried into effect. W h e n
w e examine the act incorporating the Bank, w e find in it a great variety o f
provisions, securing to it important privileges, and exacting of it the performa n c e of m a n y and onerous duties, with ample provisions to secure the faithful
discharge of those duties. A m o n g the rights secured to the B a n k is that o f
having the custody of the public moneys: this was given partly as a consideration for the bonus to be paid and the services it was to render the G o v e r n ment. I k n o w that the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. J O N E S ] denied that this
formed a n y part o f the motive which induced Congress to g i v e the B a n k the
incidental benefit of the public deposites, and he attempted to sustain h i m s e l f
b y referring to the original draught o f an act of incorporation by Mr, D a l l a s ,
in which there was a provision for the p a y m e n t of a bonus and for the p e r formance of the services n o w required of it, without any claim to the d e p o sites. T h i s , h o w e v e r , only proves that Mr. Dallas and Congress did not a g r e e
in this respect. T h e authority which created the corporation did declare
that, in consideration o f the e x c h i s i v e privileges and benefits conferred u p o n
the B a n k — o n e of which was the custody o f the public m o n e y s — i t should p a y
to the U n i t e d States one million five hundred thousand dollars; and the s a m e
authority, therefore, did expressly require o f the B a n k the p a y m e n t of this
bonus, in part consideration o f the benefit arising from these deposites.
The
inquiry, t h e n , is, looking through the whole charter, under what circumstances
m a y the deposites be withdrawn? F o r what causes m a y the S e c r e t a r y r e m o v e
them? T h e nature of the r e m e d y points with unerring certainty to the evils
w h i c h might exist, and of course, to the causes which would justify such removal- F o r what possible evils is the withdrawal an appropriate remedy?
I n s e c u r i t y and unfaithfulness as a fiscal agent; and for no other is it at all suitable- I f *h e deposites are insecure, take them a w a y ; if they are not disbursed
according to legal requisitions, r e m o v e them; for e v e r y other supposable
misconduct on the part o f the B a n k , a different and appropriate provision is
m a d e by w a y of remedy.
Is it feared that the B a n k m a y conceal its o p e r a -




26

tions from the Treasury? H e is authorized to require weekJy statements o f
its affairs. Is his power, in this respect, inadequate to a full and necessary
knowledge of its situation? An adequate remedy is provided in the authority
given to a committee of either House of Congress to inspect its books su%d
to examine into its proceedings.
Is it believed that it has violated its charter by enlarging or curtailing i t s
discounts; in refusing to give the Government directors information which
they request, or to appoint them on particular committees created by t h e
order of the directors; in causing to be printed and circulated pamphlets
designed to operate on political elections, in regulating its business with a v i e w
to political objects? T h e act has provided a very suitable remedy for these
derelictions—it has authorized a judicial inquiry to be made, and its charter
is to be annulled, if it has been violated. It is manifest, then, that in all
supposed contingencies requiring the exercise of control over the institution,
every such contingency is provided for, and in a way the best calculated t o
insure a beneficial result to the public- If a general knowledge of its transactions be necessary, the Secretary of the Treasury can obtain it. If more
particular information be necessary, a committee of either House of Congress
can procure it. If it has violated, in any way, its charter, it can be declared
forfeited in due course of law. If the public moneys deposited in it are unsafe,
or not paid at the t imes and places required, thev can be withdrawn by t h e
order and direction of the Secretary of the Treasury *
Having examined the principles assumed by the Secretary, on which h i s
authority to remove the deposites is justified, I proceed now to consider the
reasons which he lias stated for the exercise of that authority.
T h e first sreneral reason may be briefly summed up in the following sen*
tence: It was the duty of the Department to regulate its conduct upon the
principle that the corporation would cease to exist on the 3d of March, 1 8 3 6 ,
If this were all which had been said on this point, I should have passed it
without comment; but the Secretary has thought proper to go much further,
and to furnish Congress with his speculations on the subject. He says that
justice to the Bank did not require a renewal of the charter, because it
was a monopoly enjoyed at the expense of the rest of the community. I agree, sir, that the Bank has no claim for a renewal; but does the
act of incorporation create any monopolists bv name? W e r e not the books
for subscriptions open to all? And was it not difficult to procure subscribers
for the whole stock? Did not a wealthy banker, now deceased, subscribe for
the balance, because all others had declined taking it? And what have the
public lost by the Bank? Any facility which it before enjoyed—any ad van*
tage which it before possessed? Is not the inquiry much more suitable, what
have not the public gained by this monopoly? I turn to the prosperous state
of the business of the country, and the soundness of its currency, before the
deposites were removed, for an answer to this question.
But the public interest did not require a recharter; for the law creating it
was unconstitutional! In juxtaposition with this opinion, I would place the
opinions of different Presidents—of the Legislatures of the States—M>f distinguished public and professional men—of that Congress which created the
Bank—of that which renewed its charter but a short time since—and of the
Supreme Court—all concurring in the constitutionality of the act—and then
s q u i r e , whether it savors more of modesty or assurance* at this period of our
country^ existence, to affirm as a reason for the withdrawal of the public de*
poshes from the Bank, that the law which gave it being was unconstitutional*




27

T h e Secretary adds, the existence of such a powerful moneyed monopoly
is dangerous to the liberties of the people, and to the purity of our political
institutions. This idea is not original with the honorable Secretary, His
agent had before advanced it, in nearly the same words, in his letter of the
4 t h of September, 1833; wherein he says, in concluding his report, that it is
" an institution dangerous to the purity of our Government, and the liberties
•* of our people. 11
And who constituted the Secretary of the T r e a s u r y a judge to determine
that corporations, created by lawful authority, endangered our free institutions? W h o gave him power to declare that the public interest would be
injured by the recharter of the Bank? And, more especially, what section
of what law provides that his discretionary power over the public deposites is
to be regulated by his opinion of the good or evil tendency of a National
Bank?
Besides: have our liberties as yet suffered? H a s our Government become
less pure in consequence of the existence of the Bank? Does the Secretary
mean to be understood to assert, that our public men have been corrupted,
or the rights of our citizens invaded, by this corporation? And if not in times
which are past, is there any reason to fear such consequences in time to
come? Sir, there is another creed than that which prevails in some parts of
the country, that all men have their price, and are purchased and sold. T h e r e
is a creed of an honest people, who believe that there exist virtuous and honorable men, who are not venal and corrupt, and who cannot be bought with
the tempting offers of money or power.
T h e Secretary, in commenting upon the subject of a recharter of the
Bank, concludes his observations by stating that public opinion has manifested
itself in opposition to the renewal, by the election of the present Chief Magistrate. It is only necessary to observe, that this assertion is, I think, without
support from facts. And on this point I might appeal, with confidence, to
many gentlemen in this House, representing States which gave their electoral
vote to the President, that the question of the recharter of the Bank was not
considered in reference to that election- I will name but one, and that is
Pennsylvania,
T h e report then proceeds to state that the public interest required t h e
removal of the deposites, prior to the expiration of its charter- Admitting,
what is by no means true, that the Secretary is made the sole judge of the
public interest in this respect, what reasons existed connected with tills interest, that influenced his judgment?
T h e deposites would probably amount to several millions of dollars, in
1836, T h i s opinion is advanced in the report, dated December 3 , 1833; and
on the 17th of the same month, in his annual report on the state of the
finances, he says, " if the appropriations should be kept up to the amount
** authorized for the present y e a r , the charge upon the T r e a s u r y , in 1835,.
" would be more than it could probably m e e t / ' *fc If an amount of expendi" ture equal to the appropriations at the last session of Congress should be
** authorized at the present session, it might be necessary to provide addi*• tional revenue earlier than is now contemplated." If the present state of
things does not soon improve, there is reason to fear that there will not only
fce no money in the T r e a s u r y at the close of the year 1835, but that we shall
b e obliged before that period to increase the revenue. L e t m e , however
suppose that the revenue of the Government, in 1836, will be equal to what
it has been at any time within the past year. W h a t results, in the opinio*







28

of the S e c r e t a r y , are to take place deleterious to the public interests, if it b e
deposited in the B a n k of the United States?
T h e notes of the B a n k , payable at distant places, will b e c o m e d e p r e c i a t e d !
W h y ? W h a t cause wiH produce it? Because they will not then be receivable i n
p a y m e n t s to the United S t a t e s , and thus the peculiar credit given to t h e m ,
and which has arisen from this cause alone, will be lost* I do not k n o w
that the S e c r e t a r y is indebted to his agent for this novel idea; but it i s \ o
be found in his letter to which I have before referred, in somewhat similar
language. I do not agree with the Secretary or the agent, that it is the G o v e r n m e n t only which gives credit and currency to the notes of the B a n k of the
U n i t e d States. T h e y have obtained it from causes much more enduring than
this- T h e public have a higher confidence in them than in notes of the local
b a n k s , arising from the organization of the B a n k , its capital, its mode and
means of operation, its almost complete ubiquity.
If, however, the superior
credit of these notes grows out of the cause suggested in the r e p o r t , it by n o
means follows that they would depreciate at the expiration of the charter; for
the same cause would continue to operate in their favor- T h e y would still
b e receivable for debts due the G o v e r n m e n t . T h e y do not cease to be obligatory on the corporation at the termination of its charter, nor does the obligation of the United States to receive them in discharge of debts cease at that
period as a matter of course. L e t m e , however, appeal to former experience
on this subject. T h i s will prove that, so far from depreciating, the very
reverse of this will happen. It will be exceedingly difficult for the Bank t o
call them in, in consequence of their continued universal circulation a n d
superior credit, arising from the undoubted confidence of the public in them*
Such was the operation of these causes after the charter of the former B a a k
of the United States expired, and such will it always be when applied to t h e
notes of such an institution.
T h e S e c r e t a r y says^ if the deposites are left with the B a n k until the last
moment of its existence, and then be suddenly withdrawn, the ability of t h e
Bank to be prompt in its payments to the G o v e r n m e n t may well be doubted,
even if the ultimate safety of the deposites could be relied upon!
Can a n y probable events which will occur in 1836 have a more powerful
effect upon the ability and credit of the Bank than those which have occurred
within the last three months, consequent upon the removal of the deposites?
Will any greater inducements be held out to the public then than have been
for the last ninety days, to injure the credit of the institution, to force back
its circulation for redemption, to rapidly withdraw its public deposites, o r
cause its private depositors to be alarmed for the safety of their moneys?
A n d yet we know, notwithstanding all these adverse circumstances, the Bank
has been prompt in its payments to the public and private creditors; has paid
all the G o v e r n m e n t deposites which have been called for, and nearly all have
been demanded by checks and transfers both regular and irregular; has s u s tained its credit unimpaired not only, but increased, and assisted those who,
without its timely aid, would have been ruined and destroyed.
T h i s is not the only view which may be taken of this part of the subject,
A bank which is constantly receiving and making no issues, is always ifl the
best condition to meet the lawful demands which may be m a d e upon it* I t
would be an anomaly in the history of banking institutions, that o n e in,good
credit, and possessing the public confidence, should be less able t o m e e t it*
engagements when employed only in collecting its resources, thaa w h e n
actively engaged in business, and extending its usual accommodations t o its
customers.

29

Again: let me ask the House to listen to the voice of experience* L e t it
look to the events which followed the expiration of the charter of the old
Bank, and there see the ease, and rapidity, and promptness with which that
institution, having no time given it to close its concerns, paid its debts, without loss to itself, or injury to the public; and from that part of its history
learn a useful lesson on this subject of depreciation and ultimate safety of the
public depositee, even should they be continued in the Bank of the United
States.
T h e Secretary, on this topic of public interest, concludes by asserting that
the removal was necessary for the purpose of gradually introducing the sound
and convenient currency of local bank notes—a circulating medium which can
be furnished by the State banks quite as uniform in value as that afforded by
the Bank of the United States- This is substantially a repetition of the
opinion advanced by the agent of the Treasury, with somewhat of a qualification. T h e agent believes that a general currency of more uniform value
than that now furnished by the Bank of the United States would be provided
by the State banks; while the Secretary is content to say that it would be
quite as uniform, not more so, I will not here repeat what, when discussing
another branch of this subject, I particularly stated. I will merely remark,
that this project of a paper currency, through the local banks, of a uniform
value, has done as much to destroy public confidence, and to produce the
present embarrassments, as any other cause* It is a project which never has
succeeded—which never will succeed; and we have one melancholy evidence
of its unfitness, when we look at the fourteen hundred thousand dollars of
unavailable funds, consisting of broken bank notes, now in the Treasury.
T h e Secretary proceeds next to consider the conduct of the Bank, and
from that to obtain reasons to justify the removal. He says, *4 the condition
of the mercantile community, produced by the conduct of the Bank, rendered the removal indispensable at the time it was begun, and it could not have
been postponed to a later day without injury to the country,"
And what was that condition as described by him? One of great pressure
and distress, caused by the unprecedented and unnecessary curtailment of the
loans of the Bank of the United States, and the consequent curtailment by
the State banks, which, if it had not been relieved by the prompt interference of the Treasury, would have resulted in a wide-spread scene of bankruptcy and ruin.
T h e course of argument which I have adopted has led me, in another
part of it, to speak with much particularity on this prominent reason advanced by the Secretary. I shall not trouble the House with a repetition of
it. I shall content myself with remarking that I have pointed to the evidence from official documents, which shows, (and I think conclusively,) that
when the Bank extended i u loans, it was censured, because it did not take
steps to close its concerns; when it curtailed them, it was censured, because
it did not come to the relief of a suffering community; that it had not, previous to the removal of the deposites, refused its aid in loans at all, but they
had become contracted at that time merely in the usual and regular course
of its business-—an event which happened at the same time, and nearly to the
same extent, in the preceding year; that the Bank had done no act from
which the Secretary had a right to infer it intended to diminish its loans, hut
the reverse; that the agent of the Treasury had advised the Department, if
the depositeg were not to be withdrawn, there would be no more pressure by
the Bank, and if they were removed, its power to oppress would cease; and




so
that, since the removal, the Bank, instead of oppressively and rigorously cur—
tailing its discounts, had continued them to an amount, exceeding, b y m o r e
than seventeen hundred thousand dollars, the sums which it had paid to t h ^
public and its private creditors. In view of these facts, can it be c o n t e n d e d
that the conduct of the Bank towards the mercantile community had b e e n
such, or would be such, as to justify a removal of the deposites?
T h e Secretary says, the Bank is the Jiscal agent of the Government; a n d
if it conducts towards its principal in such a manner as would justify a p r u dent man in private life in dismissing his agent, it would equally justify hixn.
in removing the public moneys from its custody.
If it be but a Jiscal agent, its duties to the Treasury are merely fiscal: a n d
what are the duties of this character which attach to the Bankl T o k e e p
the moneys of the public safely, and disburse them when and where they a r e
needed. And has not the Bank done all this? W h e n did it occasion the l o s s
of a shilling to the public, or even endanger it? And when did it refuse t o
disburse the funds in pursuance of a legal requisition? Let the Secretary b o
tried by his own rule. Has not the Bank been a faithful fiscal agent'? And h a s
the principal any cause of complaint, if the agent perforin all which he h a s
promised?
It is said the Bank has violated its charter in the formation of its committees, and in the assignment of duties to them.
If this be so, let the question of violation be submitted to the proper tribunal, where the Bank may exercise the right given to it by its charter—of a
trial by jury. But in what does this violation consist? D o e s the act require
seven directors to discount notes? Can nothing be done by the corporation
without the attendance of seven of the board?
T h e Government directors, however—those public sentinels*—have n o t
been appointed on the important committees of the Bank.
I f the public have not suffered from this cause, it would not seem to furnish
a very satisfactory reason for the removal of the deposites. T h a t they h a v e
not sustained any injury, unless it be that these directors have not been a b l e
to discharge all the ** political" duties incident to the trust conferred on them %
though they evinced no want of disposition or zeal to discharge them, i s
abundantly manifestIt might not be difficult to conjecture why they have not been placed Oik
what they term the most important committees of the board. It is to be p«s*
sumed a due regard has been paid to their merits, and such places have' been,
assigned them as they could fill with the most advantage to the institution**
T h e Speaker of this House exercises the same discretion in the selection
of its committees, and with similar views; and it would be a novelty to m a k e
it a cause of complaint against him that he had misjudged in his opinions o f
the qualifications of members for the various committees, which it is made
his duty to appoint. It is not less singular that these Government directors
should suppose they are invested with " attributes" peculiar to themselves, o r
are appointed to discharge duties which do not equally attach to all the di~
rectors. T h e charter of the Bank provides that there shall be twenty-frr*
directors, five to be appointed by tbe President, and twenty to be chosen b y *
the qualified stockholders: and these directors so appointed and chosen a r e
to manage the affairs of the corporation. Does the act confer powers on a n y
of these directors, which it does not confer on all? W h y , sir, e v e r y m e m b e r
of the board is a ** public sentinel," no matter from whence his appointment
comes. All are required, by a sense of their own honor, by a regard to their*




31

o w n character, by assuming the trust reposed in them, b y every moral obligat i o n , to see that the great objects of the institution are attained, that the
public and private stockholders, the public and private depositors, those for
w h o m and with whom they transact any matter o f business connected with
t h e B a n k , are treated with becoming liberality, their rights regarded, their
m o n e y s safely kept, and honestly and promptly paid when demanded. A n d
w h e t h e r it partakes more of arrogance or diffidence in the Government directors to assume to themselves, exclusively, " national trusts and responsibilit i e s , " to claim for themselves " attributes" which they deny to their codirectors, and to intimate that the property and interests of the public
w h i c h are connected with the Bank are peculiarly and specially intrusted to
t h e m , it would not, perhaps, be difficult to determine.
I must hasten on* T h e old matter of the three per cents is once more raised
from the tomb, and spread before us in the report. I had thought that the v e r y
e l e m e n t s of this deceased subject had long since been decomposed- For
m a n y months it was under the dissecting knife of the E x e c u t i v e , the T r e a sury, the public press, and members of Congress. T h e r e was but little left
o f it when it was buried; but it has been again dug up by the newly appointe d Secretary of the T r e a s u r y , acting in the character of (if I m a y be allowe d the expression) a financial resurrectionist, and placed before our e y e s .
It
n e e d s no other remark, now that it is here, than this: It was fully examined
b y the standing Committee of W a y s and M e a n s , who, after a careful view o f
it, reported that the action of the Bank had probably caused the payment o f
the stock, so far as it respected the Government, at an earlier period than it
would otherwise have been paid, and that it neither called for nor admitted
a n y action of Congress upon it. It w a s , therefore, decently and honorably
interred, and is now exhumated, to be presented to us as a living memorial
o f the unfaithfulness o f the Bank, to justify the removal of the deposites.
I pass over the matter of the F r e n c h bill. It has been the subject of a p propriate remark by others who have preceded me* It is enough to s a y , that
e v e n wore the claim for damages less just and equitable than it seems to be,
it is, on the part of the Bank, but a claitn^ which it has not in any manner
attempted to enforce. Would any discreet principal violate his contract with
his agent, because the latter had made a demand upon him, growing out of
their transactions of business, which he thought unjust and unfounded?
T h e last reason suggested by the Secretary is, that the Bank has used its
m e a n s with a view to obtain political power, act on popular elections, and
influence the measures of the Government; and the evidence of this improper
application of its m o n e y arises from its loans to printers, and its expenditures
for printing books and pamphlets relating to its operations. A s to its loans
to printers, the whole subject, as to some of them, had been considered by a
committee of this House, and no interposition on its part was d e e m e d
necessary. A n d , in regard to those to G a l e s & Seaton, (whose private
transactions have been brought into this debate,) while it is known they were
m a d e to enable them to carry on and complete the publication of an important and extensive work, ordered by Congress, it is due to these gentlemen to
aay, what I believe to be true, that no men are more elevated above the imputation of being in the market, none whom it would be more difficult to
purchase, none who sustain more unblemished characters for integrity, none
w h o are less obnoxious to the charge o f impure motives in asking or receivi n g bank accommodations, and none more above the reach of the libels of
the press. It was intimated that the Bank had had an agency in the publi-







32

cation of libellous electioneering pamphlets and handbills. If any honorably
member who has alluded to this subject will vouch for the truth of this i n timation, I will join him in the most full condemnation of such an act, a n d ^
he may use the most unmeasured terms of reproof, and they will be j u s t * /
Until then, however, js it not due to the Bank to look into the publication*^
which it is admitted or proved they have caused to be printed and circulated,
and not assume for them an agency in the distribution of others? I will n o t
stop to inquire whether the just principles of seli-defence and self-preseryb*tion did not justity these publications* I will not, when discussing a qttestiox^
involving the dearest interests of every portion of our citizens, ask whetf^*-^
an injudicious or even improper application of sixty or eighty thousand do&—~
lars of the money of the corporation has or has not been made by tbe Bank^
I will call the attention of the House to but one consideration collected w i t h
this matter of printing:* It is this: if it be claimed that thei *••?-* ^»*>n ^
useless expenditure of money by the Bank, let the question be trv
V
termined by the tribunal selected by both parties—the courts of
States, on a scire facias sued out for that purpose. As, howcv* . ' *,<*-*
ecutive and the Treasury have deemed it suitable to appeal U- 'A*s pG&ple*
instead of the judicial tribunals; as they have preferred tendering an iissue
directly to the public, in the form of papers read to the cabinet, communictt*
tions from the public directors, reports to Congress, and removal of the d e poshes, can it be thought either unfair or illegal for the Bank to appeal t o
the same tribunal? If it be proper for one party to prepare or circulate
documents or pamphlets showing the danger of this moneyed monopoly to*
the liberties of the people and the purity of the elective franchise, can it bfe
improper for the other party to adopt a similar course to show that it po&»
sesses no powers, nor has any disposition to assume any, of such dangerous
tendency? T h e honest people of this country will judge.
I have now, sir, disposed of this report of the Secretary, in reference both
to the principles advanced in it and the reasons which induced him to t a k e
that important step which resulted in the removal of the public depositee
I
have made this examination, I hope, with a spirit and feeling which become
the subject, and with a sincere desire that the truth might be ascertained a w l
its influence might be felt. I cannot take leave of it without once more i n voking this House to call to its aid, in the final disposition to be made of it*
every principle connected with devotion to our common country, and a fixed
determination to protect the rights and promote the interests of our common
constituents* Sir, we are rapidly approaching an eventful crisis in thewhek*
business concerns and currency of the country. W e are almost upon tbe
outer edge of a precipice; we can look over it and see the abyss below**
Let us take all our prejudices, our preconceived opinions, our political p r e ferences or antipathies, and gather around the altar of our country and offar
them all up as a sacrifice to promote the welfare and prosperity of our citi«i
zens. L e t us open again the channels of business, revive expiring industry*
restore public confidence, and enable this free and great nation once more to
assume its wonted cheerfulness, industry, enterprise, and prosperity.