Full text of Speech of the Hon. William C. Rives, on the Subject of the Removal of the Deposites : Delivered in the Senate of the United States, January 17, 1834

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S 1r E E C BE

or

THE

H O N . WIULIAJfT

C. R I V E S ,

ON T H E SUBJECT O*

THE REMOVAL, OF THE DEPOSITES;




DELIVERED

IN T H E SENATE OF T H E UNITED STATES,

JANUARY 17, 1834.

CITY OF W A S H I N G T O N :
raiirrBD BY TRAHCIS P R E S T O * BLAIR.

1834.




SPEECH
OF

XOIB»

raroBS» ®m

WM&WSUI*

T h e Senate having* r e s u m e d the consideration of t h e subject of t h e removal of the I>cposites from t h e B a n k of the United States—

M r . R I V E S r o s e a n d said:
Mr.

PRESIDENT:

I t is w i t h g r e a t r e l u c t a n c e , a t all t i m e s , sir, t h a t I o b t r u d e m y s e l f on t h e
a t t e n t i o n of t h e S e n a t e . I n so e n l i g h t e n e d a b o d y , I feel far m o r e d i s p o s e d
t o b e a l i s t e n e r t h a n a s p e a k e r — t o r e c e i v e i n s t r u c t i o n from t h e v i e w s a n d
a r g u m e n t s of o t h e r s , r a t h e r t h a n to a t t e m p t t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n of m y o w n .
B u t t h e r e are q u e s t i o n s a n d o c c a s i o n s w h i c h l e a v e n o o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e , t h a n a
d e p a r t u r e from tins r e s e r v e , or a s i l e n c e e x p o s e d t o misconstruction.
Such,
s i r , is t h e p r e s e n t q u e s t i o n , a n d such t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h I n o w
v e n t u r e t o a s k t h e i n d u l g e n c e of t h e S e n a t e .
T h e subject w e a r e c o n s i d e r i n g , M r . P r e s i d e n t , is a d m i t t e d , on all h a n d s ,
t o b e one of t h e h i g h e s t i m p o r t a n c e , d e r i v i n g a n especial i n t e r e s t from t h e
d i s t r e s s a n d e m b a r r a s s m e n t w h i c h a r e said at t h e p r e s e n t m o m e n t to p e r v a d e
t h e c o m m u n i t y . I n r e g a r d t o t h e e x t e n t of t h a t d i s t r e s s , it m a y , a n d p r o b a b l y
h a s b e e n e x a g g e r a t e d , a n d it is d e s t i n e d , I t r u s t , above a l l , to b e of t r a n s i t o r y
d u r a t i o n * B u t t h a t it has e x i s t e d , a n d still exists to a v e r y c o n s i d e r a b l e e x t e n t , t h e r e c a n be no d o u b t ; a n d w e a r e n o w c a l l e d u p o n to i n v e s t i g a t e t h e
c a u s e s of t h e evil, a n d t o a p p l y a s u i t a b l e a n d effectual r e m e d y . B u t , in t h e
p e r f o r m a n c e of t h i s office, l e t u s b e careful n o t to m i s t a k e a m e r e s y m p t o m
for t h e d i s e a s e itself, a n d b v a n e m p i r i c a l p r a c t i c e a d d r e s s e d t o t h e m o m e n t a r y p a l l i a t i o n or r e m o v a l of t h e o n e , to a d d t o a n d confirm t h e v i o l e n c e a n d
d a n g e r of t h e o t h e r .
F o r myself, sir, I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e disease is far m o r e d e e p l y s e a t e d t h a n
t h e h o n o r a b l e m o v e r of t h e r e s o l u t i o n s n o w u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u p p o s e s .
I t h a s its origin in t h e v i c e s of our o w n l e g i s l a t i o n , a n d will r e q u i r e t h e
c a u t e r y a n d t h e k n i f e for i t s e x t i r p a t i o n , I a m n o t l e s s s e n s i b l e , I t r u s t , s i r ,
t h a n o t h e r g e n t l e m e n , to t h e sufferings of a n y p o r t i o n of m y f o l l o w - c i t i z e n s *
b u t I m u s t s a y t h a t t h e p r e s e n t c r i s i s , w h a t e v e r b e its s e v e r i t y , c o m e s a l l e v i a t e d b y one high c o n s o l a t i o n . I t is c a l c u l a t e d t o a w a k e n , a n d I t r u s t it tvill
a w a k e n , all of u s to t h e t r u e n a t u r e a n d d a n g e r o u s c h a r a c t e r of t h a t f o r m i d a b l e m o n e y e d p o w e r w h i c h w e h a v e b u i l t u p b y our o w n l a w s , a n d w h i c h n o w
•sits e n t h r o n e d u p o n o u r s t a t u t e book in t h e p r i d e of c h a r t e r e d p r e r o g a t i v e .
S i r , w e h a v e h e r e t o f o r e b e e n s i n g u l a r l y d e a f t o t h e m o n i t o r y l e s s o n s deliver-*
•ed t o u s b y o u r f a t h e r s a n d p r e d e c e s s o r s - I n v a i n d i d t h e r e p u b l i c a n s t a t e s m e n
of ' 9 1 w a r n u s of t h e fatal c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h i s *< first t r a n s g r e s s i o n " of thrs
s a c r e d l i m i t s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n — i n v a i n d i d M r . Jefferson, i n t h a t p r o p h e t i c
p a s s a g e w h i c h w a s r e a d t o u s t h e o t h e r d a y b y t h e S e n a t o r from M i s s o u r i
[ M r . Benton,]] t e l l u s t h a t of all possible i n s t i t u t i o n s " t h i s w a s t h e o n e tot



4
€<

most deadly hostility against the principles and form of our constitution,'*
and that if permitted to exist, it would, one day, reduce the constituted
authorities of the nation themselves under vassalage to its will. In vain, sir,
did the eloquent voice of the Senator from Kentucky himself, [Mr. Clay,}
on another occasion, warn us that this corporation, though then wielding less
than one-third
of its present capital and resources, was fraught with the most
serious *c danger to our liberties**—liberties which the honorable Senator
seems now to think can be preserved only by upholding this same corporation
against the just animadversions of the public functionaries appointed to supervise it. Sir, all these warnings have been unheeded by us, till the distresses
which it has now wantonly inflicted upon the country, with the obvious design
of influencing and controlling our proceedings here, must have brought home
to all of us, I trust, a deep conviction of the danger and capacities of mischief inherent in this great monopolyI t will hardly now be contended, I presume, bv any gentleman who has
taken the trouble to examine tht* subject, that the present distress is the necessary consequence of the removal of the public deposites from the Bank of
the United States. It has been expressly admitted, in a quarter entitled to
the highest consideration, not only from the distinguished eminence of the
gentleman himself, but from the special relation in which he stands to the
B a n k , [ M r . R . here alluded to the speech of Mr. Binney in the House of Representatives,] that the removal of the deposites per sc is not a sufficient or justifiable cause for the present distress—that this removal is a thing which might
happen, and had happened before in the history of the Bank, without producing
any distress or inconvenience to the community. Sir, a removal of the public
deposites from the Bank happens, in effect, whenever an application of the
public moneys to the public debt, or to the current expenses of the Government, exhausts the amount which is to the credit of the United States in Bank*
If we are to credit the book which the Rank itself has laid on our desks, (the
report of its committee on the exposition of the President to his Cabinet,)
a removal ot the deposites, in this wav, has occurred at a very recent period,,
without leading to any pressure on the community. The Bank informs us, in
that document, that in the month of March last, when the protested bill on the
-French Government
returned upon it, there was, after deducting the advances
P *i ^ a d e ° n t h a t b i U * " l e s s t h a n two thousand dollars of the whole funds
ot the Government in the Bank!** And vet it appears from its monthly reTurns that, notwithstanding this exhaustion of the public deposites, it was at
™ . * ^ e actually enlarging, instead of curtailing its discounts.
^ R>ir, H the removal of the deposites has produced the late severe and grinding pressure upon the community, there is a singular disproportion, indeed,
between the cause and the effect. It appears from statements now before
me, that on the 1st day of August last, when the Rank commenced its curtailments, the amount ot public deposites in its vaults wa* S7,;>99,84t; on the
1st of December, that amount was still 85,162,239, making a diminution of
&S,437,582 only. By the returns of the Bank, it is shown that on the 1st of
August its discounts amounted to S64,lG0,f>49* On the 1st of December
they were 854,453,104, making a reduction of discounts, in four months, of
near ten millions, to meet a diminution of deposites of less than two and a
lialf millions; and this by an institution which, according to its own showing,
Had not only not reduced, hut actually enlarged its discounts, at a time when
the public deposites in
its vaults, had, by rapid and large diminutions,
1>een brought down to tc less than two thousand dollars!**
it is clear, then, that the removal of the deposites alone, has not produced
thr existing distress. But it was the removal of tlie deposites connected (as
vr* rue told, from the same authentic quarter already referred to,) with the
jL&ctrhir xhat the operations of the Government and the business of the commmnty
can henceforward be carried on without the Rank of the United



5
S t a t e s — i t was the intention manifested *« of s e p a r a t i n g t h e people from t h e
B a n k , and the B a n k from t h e people,'* as it is e x p r e s s e d , which p r o d u c e d t h e
^convulsion. W e are then to p r e s u m e , that it was to p u t d o w n this doctrine
t o d e m o n s t r a t e the dependence of the G o v e r n m e n t a n d nation on this ° r e a t
i n s t i t u t i o n — t o show t h a t t h e people cannot be " separated " from it without
r u i n a n d confusion—that all this d i s t r e s s has b e e n visited upon t h e c o u n t r y .
W i t h like views, d o u b d e s s , an exhibit w a s p r e s e n t e d of the a n n u a l opera*
t i o n s of the B a n k in the various forms of e x c h a n g e , domestic and foreign, d i s c o u n t s , circulation of n o t e s , & c ; showing the e x t e n t , t h e alarming e x t e n t , to
w h i c h this institution has m i x e d itself u p with, a n d a c q u i r e d a control over,
t h e o r d i n a r y business and i n t e r e s t s of the c o u n t r y . Sir, if there be g e n t l e m e n
h e r e w h o do not see in this exhibit a most fearful revelation of the power a n d
i n f l u e n c e of t h e B a n k , they have, I confess, m u c h firmer nerves than I c a n
p r e t e n d to. I t appears from this portentous paper, t h a t t h e operations of t h e
B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , in domestic exchanges alone, u n d e r one form o r
a n o t h e r , d u r i n g the y e a r 183£, a m o u n t e d to
£>241,717,910
I n foreign e x c h a n g e ,
13,456,737
T o t a l a m o u n t of e x c h a n g e s ,
8255,174,647
T w o h u n d r e d a n d fifty-five millions one h u n d r e d and seventy-four thousand
a n d six h u n d r e d a n d forty-seven dollars.
T o which m u s t be a d d e d t h e loans and discounts of the B a n k , which aver\,
, - r , 5&66,871,349
&ged> J" t h a t . y c ? r ! .
^ j y n d the circulation ot notes ot t h e B a n k , averaging
for
:
t h e same year,
"
,. , "
"
820,309,342
I awould
ask every
c a nof
d i dtheand
reflecting
n institution
e n i]SfoW,
o y i u g sir,
SMC/Imonopoly
as this,
general
c o m mm
e racne , a nifd acirculation
of
of
-the c o u n t r y , incorporating itself, as it has been its policy to d o , with the ordin a r y t r a n s a c t i o n s of the c o m m u n i t y to so fearful an amount, exercising, cona
control over the fortunes and i n t e r e s t s , the fears and hopes, of so
ften^ient^y'
m a n y persons-—if such an institution does not wield a power of the m o s t
t r e m e n d o u s and alarming c h a r a c t e r — a p o w e r altogether unchecked
by t h e
S t i i t e B a n k s , for the S e n a t e will recollect the significant s t a t e m e n t m a d e b y
t h ^ P r e s i d e n t of the B a n k io a commit tee of this H o u s e in 1830, t h a t " t h e r e
c< a r e very few B a n k s (State) which might not be destroyed by an exertion of
<< the po/rer of the B a n k (IT. S.)*? Sir, sooner or later," evil, dire evil, m u s t
h a v e come of so t r e m e n d o u s a power, unchecked and irresponsible,
concentrated
i n t h e h a n d s of a great moneyed corporation. I t is well that " by an exertion
of thai jjoiccrS'
so significantly v a u n t e d , and now so wantonly put in p r a c t i c e , ^ e have been aroused to a sense of our d a n g e r , before it is too late t o
p r o v i d e for our security.
T h e t r u e seat of the disease with which the body politic is afteeied, is here:
i t i s in the existence of this powerful, remorseless, and overshadowing m o n o p o l y * AY hat, t h e n , is the remedy? I s it by succumbing to its dictation, to
a d d to its p o w e r — b y r e s t o r i n g the depositee," (the grand panacea proposed to
u s , ) to increase its resources for future a n n o y a n c e , to enlarge its menus ot i n fluences a n d n u d t i p l v the chances of perpefuating its existence? Sir, if w e
h a v e not firmness to resist live panic which the B a n k has m a d e ii]yretext of t h e
r e m o v a l of the depositee for c r e a t i n g , how much less shall we be able to b e a r
t l i e more serious p r e s s u r e for w h i e h ' i t will find a real and operative cause i n
t h e expiration of its c h a r i e r , w h e n , to provide for its r e t u r n i n g circulation,
a n d the p a y m e n t of its stockholders and its depositors, it must call in, i n s t e a d
of ten millions, the whole sixty or seventy millions of debt due to it? S i r ,
so unreflecting as to suppose that we should ever b e
c a n any one have been
a b l e to"throw off the frightful incubus of this bloated monopoly, without a
b i t t e r and painful struggle? l i a s the experience of 1 8 1 1 , when the charter of
t h e first B a n k of the U n i t e d States expired, been entirely fin gotten?
Then,



6
MB now, t h e same scene of bringing forward the State Banks in Philadelphia*,
as advo'cates and petitioners on behalf of the United States B a n k was gotten
u p , with this honorable distinction in favor of the present times, that then all
of those banks came forward at the bidding of the United States B a n k , now,
some five or six of them have had the firmness to refuse. T h e n , there were
xiot only memorials from boards of trade, and public meetings, as now, b u t
t h e r e were formal deputations sent to this place, to lay their complaints b e fore Congress, and a committee of this body was appointed to hear and investigate thenu T h e n , too, there was a pause in the operations of trade; and t h e
products of agriculture sustained a depression, of which the fact then stated*
in Congress, that flour had fallen in a few day- from ten to seven dollars, m a y
serve as a set-off to all that we have heard on this floor, for some days past>
concerning the ominous decline in the price of cotton. But, sir, our p r e d e cessors had the firmness to stand up against all this terrorism, and to regard
t h e cause of the constitution »nd the public liberty as dearer to the American
people than the transitory state of the money market.
I hope, sir, we shall follow their example. If we yield to the panic with
which we are now assailed, and restore the deposites, which the Bank has, b y
its misconduct, justly forfeited, the triumph of this dangerous and unconstitutional institution is complete, and its re-charter virtually decided. Do we not
all here feel that these questions are one and the samer Does not the whole
course of the arguments we have heard on the modus operandi of the removal
of the deposites in producing the existing distress, and in what manner their
restoration wculd tend to relieve it, shew that neither the removal nor t h e
restoration are regarded, except as signs expressing the termination or renew*
al of the Bank charter; and that, in truth, it is the Bank itself, and not t h e
deposites, which is in issue. Restore the deposites, and what will happen?
Another sudden and great expansion of discounts by the Bank, bringing more
and more of the community within its power, and at the ^nd of two years,
w h e n its charter expires, if any resistance should then be offered to its r e newal, we shall find ourselves in the merciless gripe of another Bank contraction^ far more agonizing than the one we now endure—a crisis to which our
eourage and principles must certainly prove inadequate, if we have not the
firmness to meet the present trial. On the other hand, if the deposites, b e i n g
withdrawn, are permitted to remain so, the Bank will see in that resolution
its own fate finally determined—with such an admonition, it will go on g r a dually to prepare for the winding uy of its affairs, (for, happily, it will n o t
have it in its power to inflict further injury on the communitv, 'without doing
still greater injury to its own interests,) the State B a n k s , at*the same t i m e , ,
will be enabled progressively to extend their accommodations, and we shall
finally get rid oi this tyrannical and unconstitutional monopoly, at the e x pense of no other suffering than that to which we have already been subjected.
I t is in view of this great consummation, M r . President, tKe final extinction
of thia dangerous and unconstitutional moneyed corporation, overshadowing
alike the Government and the People, that i j for one, am willing to let t h e
measures which have been taken have their course. T h e honorable S e n a t o r
from South Carolina, [ M r . Calhoun/] tells u s , however, that the question is n o t
B a n k or no Bank, but whether we are to have a Bank organised and controlled by Congress, or a Bank created and governed by the P r e s i d e n t alone; for
the honorable Senator seems to consider the State Banks which may be selected as depositories of the federal revenue, as forming, in effect, a N a t i o n al B a n k , B u t , sir, if there were no other alternative to the agency of the pre*
sent Bank of the United States, than the employment, under the selection of the
Secretary of the Treasury^ of State Banks, (a supposition by no means necessary in my opinion,) is it possible that State Banks, deiriving; their existence
from the State Governments, subjected to the habitual control and supervision
of those Governments, in the appointment of whose directors, and the ma*



7
n a g e m e n t of w h o s e affairs, t h e G o v e r n m e n t h e r e w o u l d h a v e n o p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,
— w i t h o u t a c o m m o n h e a d , c h e c k e d a n d c o n t r o l l e d b y rival i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d
t h e s h a r e of t h e p u b l i c d e p o s i t e s falling t o each a boon h a r d l y w o r t h t h e t r o u b l e of its k e e p i n g ; is it possible t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n s t h u s c o n s t i t u t e d a n d t h u s s i t u a t e d , could b e m a d e t h e c h a n n e l s a n d instruments
of a formidable influence,
l i k e a g r e a t c e n t r a l c o r p o r a t i o n , *< p e n e t r a t i n g / ' a s M r , Jefferson says, c* b y
i t s b r a n c h e s , e v e r y p a r t of t h e U n i o n , a c t i n g b y c o m m a n d a n d in p h a l a n x / ' a n d
w e l d i n g a n e n o r m o u s a c c u m u l a t i o n of m o n e y e d power? Sir, t h e t h i n g is i m p o s s i b l e . T h e g e n e r a l e s t i m a t e i n t h e operations of t h e T r e a s u r y i s , t h a t
a b o u t one q u a r t e r ' s r e v e n u e r e m a i n s , at a n y g i v e n t i m e , on h a n d a n d u n e x p e n d e d . N o w , sir, w h e n t h e deposite of this one-fourth p a r t of t h e a n n u a l r e v e n u e , r e d u c e d , t o o , a s t h a t r e v e n u e will be 3 b y t h e effect of existing l a w s ,
s h a l l b e d i v i d e d b e t w e e n s o m e t h i r t y or forty S t a t e B a n k s , is t h e small s h a r e
w h i c h m a y fall t o t h e l o t of e a c h , s u c h a c o n s i d e r a t i o n as could t e m p t t h e m
from their natural allegiance to, and sympathies with, the Governments which
Tnade a n d c a n u n m a k e t h e m ? W h a t has j u s t o c c u r r e d in m y o w n S t a t e , is
sufficient t o s h e w t h e u t t e r i n c o m p e t e n c y of such a boon to affect t h e i n d e p e n d e n t e x e r c i s e e i t h e r of t h e feelings or the j u d g m e n t s of t h e S t a t e B a n k s ,
But,
t o obviate e v e r y a p p r e h e n s i o n , I t r u s t a s y s t e m will be d e v i s e d , a n d I d o n o t
h e s i t a t e to s a y , s u c h a n o n e o u g h t t o b e d e v i s e d , p r o v i d i n g for a d e s i g n a t i o n of
t h e depositories of t h e public m o n e y s b y fixed r u l e s , a n d u n d e r t h e control of
Congress.
g i r , t h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r from S o u t h C a r o l i n a h a s also t o l d u s t h a t so l o n g
a& t h e G o v e r n m e n t itselt r e c e i v e s a n d p a y s a w a y b a n k n o t e s , it is an i n s u l t t o
t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g to d i s c o u r s e of t h e p e r n i c i o u s t e n d e n c y a n d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of t h e B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ; t h a t w h i l e t h e G o v e r n m e n t , b y so d o i n g * t r e a t s b a n k n o t e s as m o n e y , it n o t only has t h e r i g h t , b u t it is i n d u t y
b o u n d , t o i n c o r p o r a t e a B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s ; a n d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of such a n i n s t i t u t i o n c a n fairly arise o n l y w h e n t h e G o v e r n m e n t shall refuse t o r e c e i v e a n y t h i n g b u t gold a n d silver i n p a y m e n t of
t h e p u b l i c d u e s . W i t h o u t s t o p p i n g a t p r e s e n t to e x a m i n e t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of
t h e r e a s o n i n g of t h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r , (reasoning, w h i c h t o m y m i n d is e n t i r e l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , i n a s m u c h as it m a k e s a g r e a t q u e s t i o n of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
p o w e r to d e p e n d , n o t on t h e fixed a n d i m m u t a b l e provisions of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n
itself, b u t , in effect, on t h e mere will of t h e G o v e r n m e n t , as it m a y h a p p e n t o
d o or n o t to do a p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g , ) w i t h o u t stopping, I s a y , sir, to e x a m i n e this
r e a s o n i n g , a t p r e s e n t , I will say t o t h e honorable S e n a t o r , t h a t , seeing so m a n y
a b l e r g e n t l e m e n , himself a m o n g t h e n u m b e r , while a d m i t t i n g the vital i m p o r t a n c e of t h e object, d e c l i n i n g t h e t a s k of its prosecution* I p l e d g e m y s e l f t o
p r e s e n t this g r e a t issue in t h e shape in which o n l y t h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r t h i n k s
i t can be legitimately presented.
S i r , of all t h e reforms, social, political, or e c o n o m i c a l , r e q u i r e d b y the g r e a t
i n t e r e s t s of t h e c o u n t r y , t h a t w h i c h is m o s t u r g e n t l y d e m a n d e d , a n d w h i c h
p r o m i s e s in i t s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t t h e l a r g e s t r e s u l t s of u t i l i t y , s e c u r i t y , a n d
p u b l i c benefit, i s , b e y o n d c o m p a r i s o n , t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e G o v e r n m e n t t o
w h a t it w a s intended* b y t h e f r a m e r s of t h e constitution t o b e , a hard
money
G o v e r n m e n t . W e a r e too m u c h in t h e habit, M r . P r e s i d e n t , of r e g a r d i n g t h e
e v i l s of t h e p a p e r s y s t e m as n e c e s s a r y a n d incurable, and ot b e i n g c o n t e n t
w i t h t h e delusive palliation
of those evils supposed t o be d e r i v e d from t h e
c o n t r o l l i n g s u p r e m a c y of a N a t i o n a l Bank* N o t h i n g , i n m y opinion, is m o r e
d e m o n s t r a b l e t h a n t h a t t h e g r e a t evil of t h a t s y s t e m , its r u i n o u s
fluctuations
a r i s i n g from a l t e r n a t e e x p a n s i o n s a n d c o n t r a c t i o n s of b a n k i s s u e s , m a k i n g a
l o t t e r y , in effect, of p r i v a t e fortunes, a n d c o n v e r t i n g all p r o s p e c t i v e c o n t r a c t s
a n d t r a n s a c t i o n s i n t o a species of g a m b l i n g — n o t h i n g c a n be m o r e c e r t a i n t h a n
t h a t t h e s e r u i n o u s fluctuations (and w e have a striking; proof of it in t h e p r e s e n t
d i s t r e s s e s of the c o u n t r y , ) a r e i n c r e a s e d , i n s t e a d of b e i n g d i m i n i s h e d , b y t h e
e x i s t e n c e of an i n s t i t u t i o n of such a b s o l u t e a s c e n d e n c y , t h a t w h e n i t e x p a n d s



3
the State Banks expand with it; when it contracts, those banks are forced in
self-defence to contract also. Whatever influence such an institution may be
supposed to exert, in preserving the soundness of the currency, that object
would be much more effectually promoted by a return, as far as practicable,
to a metallic circulation. T h e first step towards that return is to let the Bank
of the United States go down. Its notes being withdrawn, the convenience of
travelling alone would immediately create a demand for gold coins, as a substitute, and enforce the necessity of correcting that undervaluation of them at
the mint, which is said to have "contributed to their disappearance. In concurrence with this, let measures be taken, as it is believed effectual measures
may be taken, to discourage and suppress the circulation of bank notes under
a certain denomination, (teiror twenty dollars,) of which the effect would be,
to produce another accession to the metallic circulating medium. The ordinary channels of circulation being thus supplied with gold and silver, the Government would be prepared, without hardship to the public creditor, to r e quire payment of its dues in specie, and thus realise a reform, than which
none could be more deeply interesting, in every aspect, to the safety and prosperity of the country.
Sir, here is an object worthy to engage the most anxious labors of the
patriot and statesman, and I feel persuaded that, with a tithe of the effort and
talent daily expended in the ephemeral contests of partv, we should see it
happily accomplished. I conjure gentlemen, then, with abilities so eminently
fitted for this great work, to leave the Bank of the United States to its fate—
a fate already pronounced by the Toice of the nation, and called for by the
nighest considerations connected with the safety of our free institutions—and
to bring forward their powerful aid in an effort to restore the Government to
its true constitutional character and destination—that of a simple, solid, hard
money Government.
But, I shall doubtless be asked, M r . President, if, in this instance, the public faith has been broken, and the rights of the Bank violated, will I not
repair the breach, and redress the wrong? Sir, if such were the case, I would;
b u t in my humble judgment, and I hope to be able to >how it, the public faith
has sustained no violation—the Bank no w n m j : and tikis? brings us to the consideration of the rights of the Bank, as secured hv \\* charter. Gentlemen
have argued as if the Bank, by the bonus which it paid, of a million and a half

of the Union, and fur the expro-> .-Tipuhnnm* pl/d^ma the frith of the United
States that no other Bank should be eiiUibii^hed by Congress during the continuance of the said corporation.
Those evidently were the "exclusive
privileges and benefits conferred b y
the a c t f ' of incorporation, ** in consideration of which ** the bonus was to be
paid*—and were they not of \alue enough. Mr. President, of a character sufficiently important to merit and justify the } rice to be paid for them? W h y ,
sir, amon<$ them is :* urea; sovereign p^wer ;*ran:^d to thi> corporation—that
of establishing subordinate Bunks v. iihin the juri-uK ;;on of die Stales, independent of the- convonu and e x c e p t from th * le^i.-la;i-»ii of the Suites in which
they mav be established—a power which M r . M:;di.-on declared, in the debates
on^the creation of the iii>( Bunk hi 1701, " f u J i i not to be thfegfited to any



9
set of men under the sun," T h e deposite of the public moneys in the Bank
of the United States can with no propriety be considered " an exclusive privi" lege or benefit conferred on the Bank of the United States by the act of incor€t
poration;" inasmuch as that act expressly reserves to the Government, by its
financial officer, the power to deposite the public moneys in other Banks, if it
should thinkj>roper to do so.
Let, sir, the document I have already referred to, the report of the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting to Congress the plan of the Bank, be examined, and nothing can appear clearer than that the true and fundamental
contract between the Government and the Bank is that which I have stated the
grant of the important corporate faculties and privileges already mentioned
on the one side, and the payment of the bonus on the other. The provisions
in regard to the deposite of the public moneys by the Government, and the
transfer and distribution of them by the Bank, "were treated as being of an
*' incidental k i n d / ' and regarded in the light of "mutual equivalents," (the
one a compensation for the other) growing out of cc the fiscal connexion between the Bank and the public treasury.** So long as the public moneys
should be deposited in the Bank of the "United States, the Bank would be
bound to transfer and distribute them as the exigencies of the Government
should require. W h e n they ceased to be deposited there, the Bank would be
relieved from that obligation. The deposites being reserved unde* the discretionary control of the Government, which could continue or witlihold them at
its pleasure, could not rationally form a part of the consideration, for which a
Jixetl and unchangeable equivalent was to be paid in the form of a bonus
It is, moreover, to be remarked, as is shown likewise bv the important document to which I have referred, that at the time of the ^establishment of the
Bank, the deposites of the public moneys were not regarded solely as n privilege or advantage to the Bank, but also as a duty or charge.
It is evident
that they were not contemplated at the time, as a'source for'enlarging the discounts of the Bank, to the extent to which they have been actuedfylixcd
for
that purpose.
It had been stated by Mr. Gallatin, in a report
made
by
him
as
Secretary of the Treasury, on the 2d of March, 1809, that <g the Bank,-' (the
first Bank of the United States) " has not, in any considerable degree, used
the pxiblic deposites for the purpose of extending its discounts; '* and the same
course was, doubtless, expected of the new Bank, It certainly never could
have been supposed or intended, that the Bank, for its own advantage, should
lend out the moneys of the United States committed to its keeping, to such an
extent as to be unable, (as it will be hereafter shown to have been on several
occasions,) to meet the calls of the Government for its own funds, when
required to discharge the public engagement.-.
But, sir, even if ji could be shown, as is now contended by the Bank,
that the public deposites, and not the faculties and privileges conferred on it
as a banking corporation, Mere the consideration* for which it stipulated to pay,
and did pay, the bonus of a minion and a half dollars, it cannot, by virtue of
this alleged contract, claim the deposites further or otherwise than the terms
of the contract have given them. N o w , what are the terms of this alleged
contract? The 18th section of the Hank charier furnishes the answer: " T h e
«« deposites of the money of the United States, in places in which the said
**
Bank and branches thereof may be established, shall be made in said
c
« Bank, or branches, unless the * Secretary of the Treasury shallt at any
*« time, otherwise order a?id direct; in which c a s e / ' &c. &LC. AVhat ;irc
the true nature and extent of the riyjht given by this section? Ts it nn absolute and perfect right to the public deposites;or rather is it not a ri^ht to them,
(if right it may be called,) only so long rs the fc Government, by its financial
orsuif, the
Secretary of the Treasury, may not « otherwise order and direct! 95
kh
I f it be otherwise ordered and directed," the right, by the//rm& of the contract itself, ceases.



10
I admit that this discretionary authority in the Secretary of the T r e a s u r y is
not a mere capricious volition. I t is to*be exercised for reasons, which shall
appear to him to be sufficient, and to be reported to and judged of by Congress* B u t an extraordinary attempt is now made against the clear import ot
the language used, to limit* the poM er to the single case of the public funds
bein<* deemed unsafe in the keeping of the Bank. If such had been the intention, nothing could have been easier than to have adopted a form of expression
adapted to the object, and to have declared that " the deposites, & c , shall be
«« made in the B a n k of the United States, unless the Secretary of the
Treasury
*' shall, at any time, consider them unsafe there"
But, instead of this restricted phraseology, which would so naturally have occurred, if the intention had
been such as is now supposed—the discretionary power of the Secretary is
reserved in the broadest and most general terms which the language can supp l y — " unless the Secretary of the Treasury -shall, at any time, otherwise order
and direct."
B y what astringent process of interpretation, words of so large
a scope have been contracted into so narrow a meaning, I am at a loss to conceive.
T h e honorable Senator from South Carolina, [ M r . Calnoun,*] has contended
that a power over the deposites, even if it had been retained in the fullest manner b y Congress itself, " i s , from its very nature, limited solely to the safe
keeping of the public f u n d s / ' But, sir, if the public deposites*be so import a n t a benefit as they have been represented, to the B a n k , nothing seems to be
more natural than that the power of withdrawing this benefit, should be r e served by the Government, as a means of control over the conduct of the Sank,
as well as to provide for the safety of the public moneys. T h a t such was a
' p r o p e r and important end of the power, seems to have been clearly the opinion
of the honorable Senator himself on another occasion. "While a bank bill providing, among other things, for a subscription of twenty millions of its stock
bv the United States, was under consideration in the ftouse of Representatives, of which the honorable gentleman was then a member, a motion being
m a d e to strike out so much of the bill as provided for this subscription by the
U n i t e d States, it was objected to the motion that the Government ought to
hold a due proportion in the stock of the proposed B a n k , in order to guard
itself against the operation of an unfriendly influence. I n answer to this objection, and in support of the motion, the honorable Senator, as I find his speech
reported in the volume in mv hand, made the following just observation: " But
" there was another mean of protecting the Government against the Bank, more
potent and certain than any such provision. L e t the United States retain the
"power over UHthpotttes.aml
over the receipt i>f the Bank notes in pavment of
duties ami debts; to the Government, and it would possess a sufficient control
« over the Bank."
H e r e , it is evident, the honorable Senator considered t h e
power over the public deposites as an important means of control over the general conduct ot the Bank, as well as a necessary provision for the safetv of t h e
public funds; and in this opinion I entirely concur.* T h e power b e i n P r e s e r v ed in the. broadest terms by the charter of the existing B a n k , it is applicable
t o all the rightful purposes of such a power, and the !?ecretarv of the T r e a sury, in the exercise of it, may and ought to look to the general conduct of the
institution, as well as to the safety of the public funds.
T h a t such has been the uniform construction of the authority, both b y the
T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t and bv Congress, appears abundantly from the proceedings and correspondence of \ l r . Crawford and M r . Ingham on the one h a n d ,
a n d from the reports of the Committee of Investigation in 1819, and of the
Committee of W a v s and M e a n s in 1830, on the other. W e must, therefore*
#

A discussion subsequent!v took place between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Rives on this
topic, for which sec Uiobe of 24th January.



11

l o o k i n t o t h e c o n d u c t of t h e B a n k , t o see h o w far t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y is justifiable for h a v i n g o r d e r e d t h e r e m o v a l of t h e p u b l i c d e p o s i t e s . T h e
S e n a t o r from S o u t h C a r o l i n a , QMr Calhoun,]] r e m a r k e d t h a t it was n o t t h e c o n d u c t of the B a n k , b u t t h e c o n d u c t of the S e c r e t a r y , w h i c h w a s u n d e r r e v i e w .
T h e honorable g e n t l e m a n , h o w e v e r , will p e r m i t m e to say t h a t , as the justification
of t h e S e c r e t a r y d e p e n d s on t h e reasons furnished b y t h e c o n d u c t of t h e B a n k
for t h e e x e r c i s e of his a u t h o r i t y , an i n q u i r y into t h e c o n d u c t of the one n e c e s s a r i l y involves a review of the c o n d u c t of the o t h e r .
[ T l e r e M r . C A L H O U N r o s e , a n d said he did n o t d e n y the r i g h t of t h e S e c r e t a r y to b r i n g t h e c o n d u c t of the B a n k u n d e r r e v i e w , so far as the safety of the
deposit es ivas concerned, but no
farther.^
I h o p e I have s h o w n , r e p l i e d M r . R . , t h a t from the n a t u r e a n d t e r m s of t h e
a u t h o r i t y r e s e r v e d to the S e c r e t a r y j f the T r e a s u r y , the whole c o n d u c t of t h e
B a n k , in t h e d i s c h a r g e of all its d u t i e s , is p r o p e r l y open to c o n s i d e r a t i o n ; a n d
I shall n o w p r o c e e d to i n q u i r e into its c o n d u c t in several i n s t a n c e s , w h i c h
a p p e a r to m e to furnish a m p l e justification for w i t h h o l d i n g from it the d c p o sites of t h e public m o n e y . I n confining m y s e l f to t h e s e i n s t a n c e s , J d o n o t
w i s h t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h i n k i n g t h e r e is n o t h i n g else in the c o n d u c t of t h e
B a n k w o r t h y of b l a m e , or j u s t l y i n c u r r i n g t h e a n i m a d v e r s i o n of the G o v e r n m e n t . O n the c o n t r a r y , I t h i n k t h e r e is m u c h m o r e ; b u t I confine m y s e l f t o
t h o s e i n s t a n c e s , b e c a u s e I believe t h a t t h e y alone a r e a b u n d a n t l y sufficient t o
j u s t i f y t h e w i t h d r a w i n g of t h e depositee; a n d b e c a u s e I a m u n w i l l i n g to o c c u p y t h e t i m e of t h e S e n a t e u n n e c e s s a r i l y w i t h d e t a i l s of this s o r t .
T h e c o n d u c t a n d d u t i e s of the B a n k , M r . P r e s i d e n t , m a y b e v i e w e d in t w o
g r e a t r e l a t i o n s : 1st to the G o v e r n m e n t ; 2 d , to the c o m m u n i t y a t lar«-e*
I n t h e first of t h e s e r e l a t i o n s , its d u t i e s a r e t w o - f o l d — a s fiscal a g e n t of t h e
G o v e r n m e n t , t o r e c e i v e a n d d i s t r i b u t e t h e p u b l i c m o n e y s , a n d to have t h e m
ready for the public s e r v i c e , w h e n e v e r a n d w h e r e v e r t h e y m a y b e c a l l e d for
b y the G o v e r n m e n t — a n d as a c o r p o r a t i o n d e r i v i n g its e x i s t e n c e from the l a w ,
t o observe a n d conform to all t h e c o n d i t i o n s a n d s e c u r i t i e s imposed b y t h e a c t
of its creation. N o w , sir, let us first i m p u r e h o w it has performed the first
n a m e d of these d u t i e s .
H a s it b e e n a l w a y s r e a d y a n d p r o m p t to r e n d e r u p
t h e public m o n e y s c o m m i t t e d to its k e e p i n g , w h e n t h e y h a v e b e e n r e q u i r e d t o
m e e t t h e public e n g a g e m e n t s ? T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n I hold to b e of t h e h i g h e s t
i m p o r t a n c e . I t is not sufficient that t h e public m o n e y s s h o u l d b e u l t i m a t e l y
safe in t h e h a n d s of the B a n k , or in o t h e r w o r d s , t h a t t h e B a n k be u l t i m a t e l y
solvent.
B u t it is n e c e s s a r y t h a t it should be r e a d y to m e e t promptly
and
faithfully
e v e r y call m a d e u p o n it b y t h e G o v e r n m e n t for the p u b l i c f u n d s ,
w h e n r e q u i r e d for t h e public s e r v i c e . T h i s is d a i l y exemplified in t h e affairs
of p r i v a t e life.
AY h e n a n i n d i v i d u a l h a s a c c u m u l a t e d a s u m of m o n e y w h i c h
h e wishes to p u t out at i n t e r e s t , to a w a i t an e x p e c t e d c a l l , or an o p p o r t u n i t y
of profitable i n v e s t m e n t , it is a l e a d i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h him to p u t his m o n e y
i n the h a n d s of some one w h o will n o t m e r e l y be able to p a y in the long
run,
b u t w h o will p a y promptly
and certainly, w h e n e v e r c a l l e d u p o n .
H a s t h e B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , sir, d i s p l a y e d t h e s e f u n d a m e n t a l q u a l i t i e s of promptitude
axiA fidelity
in r e n d e r i n g u p t h e public f u n d s , for t h e p u b lic u s e , w h e n called for bv the G o v e r n m e n t ? I c o n f i d e n t l y a p p e a l to t h e h i s t o r y of the p o s t p o n e m e n t s of the 3 p e r c e n t s , r e d e m p t i o n , to s u s t a i n m e in t h e
a s s e r t i o n t h a t it h a s n o t . I t is in the r e c o l l e c t i o n of t h e S e n a t e t h a t e a r l y in
t h e s p r i n g of 1 8 3 2 , it had b e e u £ d e t e r m i n e d to p a y off* six a n d a half m i l l i o n s of
t h e 3 p e r c e n t , s t o c k on t h e e n s u i n g 1st d a y of J u l y , a n d t h a t a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e took place in t h e m o n t h of M a r c h , b e t w e e n t h e T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t a n d
t h e B a n k , w i t h a view t o t h a t operation- I t soon b e c a m e e v i d e n t t h a t t h e B a n k
'was n o t in a situation to m e e t the o p e r a t i o n — s o l a r g e l y h a d it u s e d t h e p u b l i c
f u n d s in an u n p r e c e d e n t e d e x t e n s i o n of its d i s c o u n t s , (as will b e seen hereaft e r , ) t o p r o m o t e its own i n t e r e s t s a n d v i e w s . I n this s t a t e of t h i n g s , v a r i o u s
p r e t e x t s a n d suggestions w e r e u r g e d b y the B a n k to i n d u c e t h e G o v e r n m e n t



12
to postpone the contemplated payment; and a postponement to the month of
October, was finally yielded, the "Bank undertaking to pay the interest on t h e
debt in the mean time, and holding out expectations, ivhich it did not fulfil, of
accommodations to the importing merchants to enable them the better to pay
the accruing revenue to the Government. T h e Bank has resorted to a great
deal of special pleading to show that, notwithstanding the arguments it so z e a l ously urged on the Government, it neither " sought for " nor " requested " t h e
postponement.
B u t what said the Committee of Investigation of 1832, before
w h o m the matter w a s thoroughly .discussed and examined? " T h e committee
« artfully
of opinion that though the Bank neither ' sought for* nor < request" cd' the postponement,** (returning thus the language of the President of the
" Bank,) " y e t if such postponement had not been made, the Bank would not, on
" the 1st of July, have possessed the ability to have met the demand, without
** causing a scene of great distress in the commercittl
community.4**
N o w , M r . President, while the Bank was thus unable to meet the demand
of the U n i t e d States for their own money, what was the state of the account
b e t w e e n it and the public Treasury? AYhy, sir, on the 1st of April, 1 8 3 2 ,
w h e n the notice w a s proposed to be issued of the contemplated payment, there
w a s in the B a n k to the credit of the Treasury, for public monevs on deposite,
the sum of 8 9 , 5 1 3 , 0 0 0 , and on the 1st of July, when the payment was to have
been made, the s u m of 8 9 , 8 1 1 , 0 0 0 , more than three miliums of the public
money over and above the sum proposed to have been called for!
B u t , sir, this w a s not all. W h e n the month of July arrived, the Governm e n t determined, and issued notice of its intention to pay, on the first of
October following, two-thirds of the whole amount of the 3 per cent, stocks,
and the remaining third on the 1st of January thereafter. T h e Bank, feeling
that it could not, with any plausibility, appeal to the further indulgence of the
Government, but being still unprepared to meet its call for the public funds,
instituted a secret negotiation, and actually consummated an arrangement with
the foreign holders of the stock, not to come forward with their certificates at
t h e periods designated, to leave the amount due to them still in the Bank, on
an agreement that the Bank should pay them the interest, but the Govern*
m e n t continuing bound, in consequence of the detention of the certificates, for
the principal of the debt. Here the conduct of die Bank, from a negative,
became a positive delinquency. It was no longer a mere want < f readiness
and ability to pay up the public funds, when required for the public service,
but an active and unwarrantable interposition, cuutrarv 10 e.verv principle of
its duty as fiscal agent of the Government, to thwart "it in a great object of
public policy—the early and final e?;tiny^h.hment of the public debt.
YHion the existence and result of thi.4 i-ccm ne^:>tmtu>n became accidentall y k n o w n , the Bank endeavored to-undo what had been agreed to be d o n e ,
and io [jrocuro She surrender of the certificates, which it had previously made
an arrangement to have held up. B u t this in no manner lessens the impropriety and unwarrantable character of the original act, and leaves the B a n k
j u s t l y exposed to the full force wf the imputations of faithlessness and illegalit y , which its conduct, iu this transaction, has incurred. It avails as little t o
refer to the declaration of the Committee of W a y s and Means of the H o u s e
of Representatives, at the close of the last session of Congress, that as " t h e
€€
matter is now- substantially closed by the surrender of nearly the whole of
** the certificates, it no longer present* a practical object of inquiry, or to call
<c
for, or admit anv action of Conirrr*w upon i t / " T h e same committee e x plicitly pronounced the coudemnawon of the transaction, in declaring, as it d i d ,
" that the B a n k had exceeded its legitimate authority, and had no warrant for
c
* it in the correspondence of the Secretary of the T r e a s u r y / * In the state
of the question now presented to us, this transaction beinx referred to by the
Secretary of the Treasury as one of his reasons tor ordering a removal of the
public d'eposites, it necessarily becomes " a practiced object of i n q u i r y / ' d e 


13
x t i a n d i n g the serious consideration, if not " tlie action of Congress;" and
n o n e , in m y estimation, could more signally illustrate the delinquency of the
B a n k in its relations of fiscal agent to the Government, W h i l e these secret
n e g o t i a t i o n s were going on to withhold the public funds from their legitimate
d e s t i n a t i o n — t h e payment of the public debt—it appears that there was in the
S a n k on the 1st day" of October, 1832, after deducting the whole amount of
d e b t designated for payment on that dav, a clear surplus of the public revenue
o f £3,222,792.
U p o n a calm review of these transactions, M r . President, I think it must be
a d m i t t e d by all, that the Bank, by an improper use of the public money for
i t s o w n advantage, had disabled itself to meet, with promptitude and p u n c t u a l i t y , the calls of the Government for the public funds committed to its
k e e p i n g , that it had not only failed to have those funds forthcoming, when req u i r e d for the public service, but that by a secret and unwarrantable interv e n t i o n between the Government and the public creditor, it had sought to prev e n t the application of those funds to the extinguishment of the public debt,
a n d that, in both respects, it had violated its clearest duties as fiscal agent of
t h e Government.
l i e t us now see if it has not equally violated the other duty indicated as
appertaining to its relations to the GoVernment—that of fulfilling the condit i o n s and guarantees provided and imposed bv the charter itself, for its correct
administration. The charter provides that, for the management of the affairs
of the Bank, there shall be twenty-five Directors, of whom five are to be
chosen by the President of the United States, with the advice and consent of
t h e Senate; and it is farther provided, as a fundamental
article of the constitution of fkz Bank, that " not less than seven Directors shall constitute a Board
for the transaction of b u s i n e s s / ' T h e design of these provisions, undoubte d l y , was to secure, in all the operations of the Bank, an adequate and responsible representation of the interests both of the Government and of the
stockholders, and such a knowledge on the part of the Government, through
t h e Directors chosen by it, of the proceedings of the Bank, as would serve as
a check to malpractices and abuses, and as a security for the public interests,
of every kind, connected with the institution* But the actual management of
t h e B a n k has been so conducted as to evade and frustrate all these essential
g u a r a n t e e s provided by the charter for a correct administration. Instead of
t h e affairs of the Bank^being transacted by a Board of at least seven Directors,
a t which every Director might, and when occasion required, would be present,
t h e most important business of the institution is transacted by small committ e e s chosen by the President, and conducting their proceedings in secret; and
from these committee*, thus engrossing the active administration of ih^ B a n k ,
t h e Directors chosen by the Government have been systematically excluded.
I t is the remark, sir, of a most able and distinguished man, of one whose
knowledge both of banking and finance, is unsurpassed in this, as it probably
i s in any other country, (Mr. Gallatin,) that " the mystery with which it was
** formerly thought necessary to conceal the operations of B a n k s , has been one
**€ of the most prolific sources of erroneous opinions on that subject, and of
on their part*" This dangerous and exploded mystery,
* mismanagement
t h e Bank of the United States has sought to revive, and in doin^ so, has furjiished j u s t cause for the jealousy of the Government and the nation.
T h e President of the Bank, according to the by-laws of the corporation,
being, ex officio, a member of these committees, as well as having the sole a p p o i n t m e n t of them, he directs and controls their proceedings at will; and his
responsibility is reduced to less than a name, not only by the mystery which
envelops those proceedings, but by the fact that through the number of proxy
v o t e s which he gives, (in violation of the spirit of the charter at least, whi«H
r e s t r i c t s the highest number of votes of any individual stockholder to thirty )
h e chooses also what Directors he pleases. I n the actual administration of




14
the Bank, then, every guarantee provided by the charter is set at nought
T h e representation allowed to the Government in the affairs of the Bank, is
virtually nullified—instead of the open management of its concerns by a responsible Board of Directors, the most important business of the Bank is
transacted in the conclave of small committees controlled by the President
alone; and in him, in fact, has been realized that concentration of all power
in the hands of one man, (so far as the affairs of this great corporation are
concerned,) the apprehension of which, in regard to the constituted authorities
of the nation, has elicited so much patriotic oloquence in the progress of this
debate* In whatever aspect, then, I look at the conduct of the Bank in its
relations with the Government, whether as fiscal agent bound to administer the
public funds for the public convenience, or as a subordinate corporation created
by the Government, and bound to conform to the fundamental regulations imposed by the law of its creation, I think it has equally failed in its duties, and
forfeited its title to the confidence of the Government,
I will now, M r . President, briefly inquire what has been the conduct of the
Bank in its relation to the community at large. In this relation, its proper
functions and duties are to give safe and prudent aids to sound industry
and enterprise, to abstain from encouraging a spirit of wild speculation
and overtrading, and above all, to abstain from all interference with the
politics of the country. This last duty was on a former occasion recognised by the President of the Bank himself" as fundamental in the constitution of the B a n k . " The inquiry in what manner the Bank has discharged these
duties, imposed by its relations to the community, necessarily brings under
review that unprecedental extension of its accommodations "to individuals
from 842,402,304 to £70,428,070, in the short space of sixteen months, between 31st December, 1830, and 1st May, 1832. This extraordinary increase
of Bank facilities must inevitably have produced, and did produce, a most
pernicious spirit of overtrading in the country. I t was effected too, as we have
seen, by an unwarrantable use of the public funds in the keeping of the Bank,
to such an extent as utterly to disable it to meet the calls of the Government
for those funds, when they were required for the public engagements. But, in
addition to these j u s t and strong objections, it is alleged both by the Secretary
of the Treasury in his report to Congress, and by the President in the paper
read to his Cabinet, that there is every reason to believe this extraordinary
expansion of the business of the Bank was made with an express view to a*
political object—to bring more and more of the community under its power,
to be exerted at the critical moment of an election, in which it felt a deep
interest.
I must say, Mr, President, that this allegation is sustained by evidence of
thestrongest probability, while the attempts of the Bank to explain so extraordinary an expansion, on other principles, have been entirely unsatisfactory*
I t is true, that in this interval, the Bank received from the "Government reimbursement of a loan of about eight millions; but even if it had been proper,
at such a period, (little more than four years before the expiration of its
charter, and when it was aware of the intention of the Government to use the
public deposites as fast as they accrued, in the payment of the public debt,) to
re-invest this sum in the permanent form of accommodation, which, it is understood, much the greater part of this extraordinary extension of its business
assumed, it surely did not require an increase of private loans tq the amount
of twenty-eight millions, to invest eight millions. I t is also alleged by the
Bank that, during this interval, it had called in its funds from Europe to an
additional amount of about four millions; but it has failed to tell us, sir, why
rthad thus called in its foreign funds. T h e question would naturally occur,
W a s it to aid in the great political operation at home attributed to it, involving* as was supposed, the critical issue of the renewal of its charter or was it
 for other purposes?


15
W e have been further told by the Bank, that the years 1831 and 183S
-vrere years of extraordinary foreign importations, and that unusual facilities of
b a n k accommodation were required to diffuse these imports through the count r y • B u t the Bank ought to have recollected that these very importations h a d
t>een unduly stimulated by the improper and unprecedented extension of its
t l i s c o u n t s ; and that the distinguished authority, [ M r . R u s h , ] whose testimonial
i t h a d vauntingly cited in reference to another question, had, in the very r e p o r t from which that testimonial is extracted, declared that one of the most
i m p o r t a n t duties and functions of the Bank is, " b y confining its issues within
** p r u d e n t limits, to restrain excessive importations, and tokeep them within the
**true wants a?id capacities of the country**
B u t , sir, another most extraordinary explanation has been attempted by the
B a n k - I t says that while this expansion of its discounts was going on, and unt i l J u l y , 1832, when the President put his veto on the bill for re-chartering it,
** i t was unknown whether it £the B a n k ] would have the least reason to be opp o s e d to his election/' 1 W h y , sir, one could not but be amused at this dram a t i c exhibition of political simplicity, on the part of this veteran tactician in
t h e field of politics, if it were not for the reckless self-contradiction which a c companies it- W h e n , sir, in the very book in which it makes this declaration*
i t characterises the first message of the President in December, 1829, as an
assault upon the Bank—when it had adopted, in November 1830, and in
Itf arch 1831, resolutions for the distribution of tracts and pamphlets, " t o
c o u n t e r a c t , " as it says, " the schemes for the destruction of the B a n k , " orig i n a t i n g in that message—when in the same book it expressly justifies those
resolutions of 1830 and 1831, on the ground of self-defence against the hostile
a t t e m p t s of "politicians,"
(meaning of course the President and his friends,)
to destroy the institution—that it should after these things gravely tell us it
did not know, all this time, that it " would have the least reason to be opposed
t o the election" of the present Chief Magistrate, is certainly an extraordinary
e x p e r i m e n t upon our simplicity, it it be not an amusing display of its own.
Considering, then, M r . President, that the attempts of the Bank to explain
t h i s unprecedented increase of its discounts at the period referred to, have
failed to justify it by proper and sufficient reasons-—that it stands condemned,
o n the contrary, by sound maxims of banking, and of a safe, correct, and prud e n t management—but t h a t on the other hand, there were obvious political
m o t i v e s for it, notwithstanding the professed ignorance of such by the B a n k —
t h a t it was co-incident in point of time, with the application for a renewal of
i t s charter, and also rwith the pendency of a contested election, in the issue of
w h i c h its own fate w as supposed to be involved, and that the part of the Union
w h i c h was the principal scene of the Bank operation, was at the same time the
debatable ground of the political contest. W h e n all these circumstances are
c o n s i d e r e d , it does seem to me to be difficult to resist the impression that this
e x t r a o r d i n a r y operation of the B a n k was directed to a political object; an imp r e s s i o n strongly confirmed by the unequivocal manifestation of a political spirit
f>y t h e Bank in "other of its proceedings, I allude, of course, to the active d e v o t i o n of the funds of the Bank, under resolutions giving the President an u n l i m i 5t e d control over them for that purpose, to the " p r e p a r a t i o n and circulat i o n ' of pamphlets and other writings; which, whatever may be the disguise
i n which they are sent forth, have been, many of them, party publications of
t h e most acrimonious character.
T h e s e proceedings have been attempted to be justified on the ground of
self-defence. B u t there is a radical fallacy in the appropriation of this plea
bjr the B a n k . T h e Bank has no right to consider itself a party to the question
o f t h e renewal of its charter. I t is a great question of national policy, to be
d e c i d e d by high considerations of the public good, in which the interest of t h e
!j$ank, as such* cannot legitimately enter, in the slightest degree* L i k e every
>6ther public question, its discussion and its decision should be freely left to



16
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r g a n s of the p u b l i c w i l l , a n d to t h e o r d i n a r y and copious
c h a n n e l s of p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n ; t h a t public i n t e r e s t , which should alone g o v e r n
i t s d e c i s i o n , b e i n g a n a m p l e g u a r a n t e e t h a t e v e r y a r g u m e n t a n d consideration
i n favor of the B a n k , w h i c h e i t h e r j u s t i c e or policy c o u l d suggest, would b o
fully p r e s e n t e d to t h e public m i n d . O n t h a t g r o u n d the B a n k especially h a d
e v e r y reason to be c o n t e n t to s t a n d , A majority of both H o u s e s of C o n g r e s s
h a d d e c l a r e d t h e m s e l v e s in favor of a r e n e w a l of its c h a r t e r — t h e l a r g e r
p o r t i o n of t h e p r e s s w a s also favorable to t h e s a m e object. T h e r e w a s n o
d a n g e r , t h e n , t h a t its side of the q u e s t i o n w o u l d not be fullv presented to t h e
n a t i o n , t h r o u g h t h e u s u a l and l e g i t i m a t e m o d e s of e n l i g h t e n i n g public opinion,
w i t h o u t its c o m i n g f o r w a r d , w i t h its vast preponderance
of moneyed power, t o
o p e r a t e in t h e c a u s e .
B u t e v e n those w h o h a v e a t t e m p t e d a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of these proceedings of
t h e B a n k h a v e a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e p u b l i c a t i o n s '* p r e p a r e d and circulated,'*
u n d e r its p a t r o n a g e / s h o u l d be l i m i t e d to a defence of its conductWhat,
h o w e v e r , h a v e b e e n t h e c h a r a c t e r of m a n y of those publications? T h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r from M i s s o u r i , [ M r , Benton,H gave u s , a few d a v s a<*o, some i d e a
of t h e t o n e a n d spirit of one of t h e m , *< the a d d r e s s e s to m e m b e r s of the S t a t e
L e g i s l a t u r e s / ' of w h i c h some h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d s of copies, it seems, had b e e n
c i r c u l a t e d b y t h e B a n k , a p o r t i o n of w h i c h , u n d e r its a l l - p e r v a d i n g a g e n c y ,
h a d found t h e i r w a y into t h e r e t i r e d v a l l e y s a n d m o u n t a i n hollows of his o w n
S t a t e - T h e drift a n d object of t h e s e w e r e p l a i n l v to operate on p e n d i n g
e l e c t i o n s , b y QVCVV species of appeal which misrht be m a d e available for t h e
p u r p o s e . W e have been p r e s e n t e d , sir, in a n o t h e r q u a r t e r , [ M r . Polk, in t h e
H . of R e p s / ] w i t h s p e c i m e n s of o t h e r s of these p u b l i c a t i o n s , d i s s e m i n a t e d , i n
l i k e m a n n e r , far a n d w i d e , by the p o t e n t influence of the m o n e v of the B a n k —
j u d g i n g of w h i c h , b y the s p e c i m e n s g i v e n , w e m u s t all a c k n o w l e d g e t h e m t o
b e in t h e b i t t e r e s t a n d m o s t i n f l a m m a t o r y style of p a r t v d e n u n c i a t i o n a n d i n v e c t i v e ; s e e k i n g m u c h more to rouse a n d enlist the passions and prejudices of
t h e p e o p l e in the p a r t y c o n t e s t s of the d a v , t h a n to e n l i g h t e n and c o n v i n c e
t h e i r j u d g m e n t s as «< t o ' t h e n a t u r e a n d o p e r a t i o n s of t h e B a n k . "
B u t , sir, I will not p u r s u e t h e s e d e t a i l s . T h e fact, which they s e r v e t o
i l l u s t r a t e , is manifest, a n d k n o w n t o a l l . T h e B a n k has openly e n t e r e d t h e
political a r e n a as a p a r t i s a n — a g r e a t m o n e v e d c o r p o r a t i o n , c o n t r a r y t o t h e
e n d s of its i n s t i t u t i o n , a n d in violation of its c l e a r e s t d u t i e s , vests in t h e h a n d s
of its p r e s i d i n g officer, an itnlimited
and irresponsible
control over its v a s t
f u n d s , to e n l i s t t h e co-operation of t h e p r e s s , t h r o u g h it a n d b v other m e a n s ,
t o i n f l u e n c e t h e e l e c t i o n s , a n d t h u s if possible, to m o u l d the" action of t h e
g o v e r n m e n t to its i n t e r e s t e d a n d ambitious purposes- If an e x a m p l e of s u c h
** fearful o m e n " t o the m o r a l s a n d l i b e r t i e s of the c o u n t r v could have p a s s e d
w i t h o u t t h e s t e r n a n d i n d i g n a n t r e b u k e it has met from" the G o v e r n m e n t a n d
t h e P e o p l e , it w o u l d h a v e m a r k e d , i n d e e d , a fatal de***eneracv.
F r o m this g e n e r a l r e v i e w of the c o n d u c t of t h e B a n k , in its various r e l a t i o n s
t o t h e p u b l i c , I h o p e I h a v e s h o w n , M r . P r e s i d e n t , t h a t i7, at least, h a s n o
j u s t c a u s e to c o m p l a i n of t h e a n i m a d v e r s i o n w i t h which it has been v i s i t e d
i n t h e r e m o v a l of t h e p u b l i c d e p o s i t e e . I t r u s t also, sir, t h a t I h a v e s h e w n
t h a t in t h e a c t of t h e S e c r e t a r y of t h e T r e a s u r y , o r d e r i n g t h a t r e m o v a l , t h e r e
w a s n o w a n t of legal a u t h o r i t y . H e r e , t h e n , b e l i e v i n g as I d o , t h a t o u r h i g h e s t d u t i e s to t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a n d to t h e public l i b e r t i e s forbid o u r doing a n y
t h i n g , n o t r e q u i r e d by law a n d j u s t i c e , which w o u l d t e n d to s t r e n g t h e n t h i s
d a n g e r o u s a n d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n , (and s u c h , I t h i n k , w o u l d b e t h e
i n e v i t a b l e t e n d e n c y of a r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e deposites,) I m i g h t h a v e b e e n c o n t e n t t o t e r m i n a t e m y v i e w of t h e s u b j e c t . B u t ^ r a v e q u e s t i o n s of c o n s t i t u tional l a w have b e e n m a d e in r e g a r d to t h e r i g h t s a n d p o w e r s of t h e chief
e x e c u t i v e officer on this occasion, which ought n o t to b e s h u n n e d .
Questions
of this s o r t , w h e n e v e r t h e v a r i s e , should be firmly m e t , a n d f u l l y a n d f a i r l y
c a n v a s s e d a s n o t h i n g c a n "be of d e e p e r i n t e r e s t to t h e people a n d t o t h e S t a t e s



17
o f t h i s c o n f e d e r a c y , t h a n t h e a s c e r t a i n m e n t of t h e t r u e p r i n c i p l e s of t h a t C o n stitution which they have " ordained and established."
O n t h i s b r a n c h of t h e s u b j e c t , t h e r e is a d i s c r e p a n c y of opinion a m o n g t h o s e
Tflrho h a v e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , u n i t e d in c e n s u r i n g t h e c o n d u c t of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
1 u n d e r s t a n d t h e S e n a t o r from S o u t h C a r o l i n a , [ M r . C a l h o u n , ] d i s t i n c t l y t o
. a d m i t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p o w e r of t h e P r e s i d e n t to s u p e r i n t e n d a n d control, if
n e c e s s a r y , t h e a c t i o n of t h e T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t , in r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s q u e s t i o n ; w h i l e t h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r from K e n t u c k y QMr. C l a y ] u t t e r l y d e n i e s
t h i s p o w e r , a n d c o n s i d e r s t h e c o n d u c t of t h e P r e s i d e n t as a p a l p a b l e u s u r p a t i o n . [[Here M r , C a l h o u n rose a n d s a i d , t h a t t h o u g h he d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e c o n d u c t of t h e P r e s i d e n t a n u s u r p a t i o n , h e c o n s i d e r e d it a gross a b u s e of p o w e r / ]
S i r , (said M r . R-) t h e o n l y q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d b y t h e r e s o l u t i o n s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , is a q u e s t i o n of t h e existence, n o t of t h e abuse, of p o w e r . T h o s e r e s o l u t i o n s d i r e c t l y affirm, t h a t t h e P r e s i d e n t *' h a d assumed the e x e r c i s e of a
•power * 1Q t granted b y t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d l a w s , - W h e t h e r t h e c o n d u c t of
£ h e P r e s i d e n t w a s , u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e c a s e , an abuse, d e p e n d s
u p o n w h a t h a d b e e n t h e c o n d u c t of the i n s t i t u t i o n whose supervision w a s
i n t r u s t e d to a d e p a r t m e n t d e c l a r e d by t h e S e n a t o r from S o u t h C a r o l i n a to b e
u n d e r t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e a n d control of t h e P r e s i d e n t ; a n d if t h e v i e w s
w h i c h I h a v e a l r e a d y p r e s e n t e d , of t h e c o n d u c t of t h a t i n s t i t u t i o n , have a n y
f o u n d a t i o n , all will a g r e e t h a t if t h e P r e s i d e n t possessed the p o w e r , t h e o c c a s i o n h a d o c c u r r e d w h e n it ought to b e e x e r c i s e d .
I w i l l n o w , M r . P r e s i d e n t , e x a m i n e t h e s e v e r a l positions w h i c h have b e e n
t a k e n by t h e S e n a t o r from K e n t u c k y , QMr. C l a y , ] in relation to this q u e s t i o n
o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l power- T h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r first affirms t h a t , b y w h a t
h a s b e e n d o n e with r e g a r d to t h e r e m o v a l of t h e p u b l i c deposites from t h e
B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , t h e E x e c u t i v e h a s u s u r p e d t h e p o w e r o v e r t h e
Treasury
a n d t h e p u b l i c purse, w h i c h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n has e x c l u s i v e l y v e s t e d i n
t h e L e g i s l a t i v e D e p a r t m e n t . I n enforcing this position, sir, h e h a s p r e s e n t e d
t o u s , w i t h his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e l o q u e n c e , the a l a r m i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s of an u n i o n
o f t h e p o w e r of t h e s w o r d a n d of t h e p u r s e in t h e s a m e h a n d s . A s no t o p i c
i s b e t t e r c a l c u l a t e d to a r o u s e t h e j e a l o u s i e s of a free people t h a n t h i s , it b e c o m e s u s t o a n a l y s e a n d e x a m i n e i t , a n d to see h o w far it has a n y j u s t a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e s u b j e c t u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Sir, it is a g r e a t m a x i m of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i b e r t y , in t h a t c o u n t r y from w h i c h w e h a v e d e r i v e d so m a n y of o u r
i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h a t t h e p o w e r s of t h e s w o r d a n d t h e p u r s e should b e k e p t s e p a r a t e a n d d i s t i n c t ; a n d as t h e m a x i m c o m e s to u s from t h e n c e , w e c a n n o t b e t t e r
a s c e r t a i n i t s scope a n d m e a n i n g , t h a n b y s e e i n g h o w i t is u n d e r s t o o d a n d p r a c t i s e d t h e r e . I n E n g l a n d , the p o w e r of t h e s w o r d is in the h a n d s of t h e King*
H e c a n d e c l a r e w a r , m a k e p e a c e , raise a r m i e s , e q u i p fleets. H u t the supplies
for t h e p r o s e c u t i o n of t h e w a r , for t h e s u p p o r t of t h e a r m y a n d n a v y , can b e
o b t a i n e d o n l y b y a vote of P a r l i a m e n t ; a n d t h u s t h e p o w e r of t h e p u r s e i s
l o d g e d in t h e h a n d s of t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p e o p l e . T h i s is c o n s i d e r e d
t h e g r e a t s e c u r i t y of E n g l i s h l i b e r t y — t h a t t h e K i n g , w h o h o l d s t h e p o w e r of
t h e s w o r d , h a s n o p o w e r o v e r t h e p u b l i c p u r s e . B u t w h a t is this p o w e r of t h e
p u r s e , w h i c h is t h u s j e a l o u s l y a n d w i s e l y w i t h h e l d from t h e E x e c u t i v e M a g i s trate?
W h y , sir, e v i d e n t l y ' t h e p o w e r of d r a w i n g m o n e y from t h e p o c k e t s of
t h e p e o p l e , a n d of d e s i g n a t i n g t h e objects to w h i c h it shall b e a p p l i e d .
T h e p o w e r of t h e p u r s e , t h e n , of w h i c h w e h a v e h e a r d so m u c h in t h e
c o u r s e of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , a n d so m u c h , I m u s t be p e r m i t t e d t o s a y , t h a t is v a g u e
-.and i n d e t e r m i n a t e , i s , in t h e time c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s e n s e , t h e p o w e r of t a x a t i o n
a n d a p p r o p r i a t i o n — t h e p o w e r of r a i s i n g m o n e y b y t a x e s , of d e t e r m i n i n g in
w h a t m a n n e r a n d to w h a t a m o u n t t h e y shall be r a i s e d , a n d t o w h a t o b j e c t s t h e y
s h a l l be a p p l i e d . T h i s g r e a t p o w e r h e r e , as in E n g l a n d , is e x c l u s i v e l y v e s t e d ,
a s i t o u g h t t o b e , i n t h e i m m e d i a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p e o p l e - T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e s t h a t ct Con grew shall h a v e p o w e r to l a y a n d c o l l e c t t a x e s , d u t i e s , i m p o s t s / * & c . a n d t h a t u n o money s h a l l be d r a w n f r o m



18
t h e T r e a s u r y b u t i n c o n s e q u e n c e of a p p r o p r i a t i o n s m a d e b j law?*
These
a r e t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n w h i c h confer a n d define t h e p o w e r of the
p u r s e . B u t while t h e g e n e r a l p o w e r s t o raise a n d appropriate m o n e y for the
p u b l i c s e r v i c e w e r e v e s t e d in C o n g r e s s , it c e r t a i n l y n e v e r could have been
i n t e n d e d that C o n g r e s s itself w a s to collect, to receive, to keep, to disburse, t h e
p u b l i c m o n e y , T l i e s e are s u b o r d i n a t e m i n i s t e r i a l functions which m u s t , of
n e c e s s i t y , b e p e r f o r m e d b y E x e c u t i v e a g e n t s , u n d e r the general provision of
t h e l a w . I n E n g l a n d , sir, w h e r e , as w e have s e e n , t h e power of the p u r s e is
fully a n d effectually v e s t e d in P a r l i a m e n t , it is, n e v e r t h e l e s s , the
Exchequer
a n d t h e Treasury,
E x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t s , which m a n a g e t h e collection a n d
e x p e n d i t u r e of the public r e v e n u e u n d e r a u t h o r i t y of law. So with u s , sir,
t h e m i n i s t e r i a l f u n c t i o n s of c o l l e c t i n g , r e c e i v i n g , keeping, disbursing, t h e
p u b l i c m o n e y , h a v e b e e n i n v a r i a b l y d e v o l v e d on the E x e c u t i v e officers of t h e
Government.
I t is t r u e , sir, t h a t C o n g r e s s , in the exercise of its legislative p o w e r s , m a y
a n d ought t o , (as far as is c o n s i s t e n t with t h e public i n t e r e s t s / w h i c h might in
c e r t a i n cases r e q u i r e a d i s c r e t i o n a r y p o w e r to be lodged with the E x e c u t i v e , )
p r e s c r i b e a p l a c e of d e p o s i t e for the public m o n e y s , w h e n collected; b u t if n o
s u c h p r e s c r i p t i o n be m a d e by t h e legislative a u t h o r i t y , it devolves n e c e s s a r i l y
on t h e E x e c u t i v e d e p a r t m e n t c h a r g e d with t h e collection a n d safe k e e p i n g of
t h e p u b l i c m o n e y s , to d e t e r m i n e w h e r e t h e y shall be d e p o s i t e d and k e p t .
Such
w a s t h e c a s e , in the most u n l i m i t e d s e n s e , p r e v i o u s to the passage of an a c t in
1801), which r e q u i r e d t h a t , a t c e r t a i n p l a c e s , t h e b o n d s t a k e n for the p a y m e n t
of d u t i e s should be d e p o s i t e d in the B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , or its b r a n c h e s ,
for c o l l e c t i o n .
Before that t i m e , the T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t caused the p u b l i c
m o n e y s to be d e p o s i t e d w h e r e s o e v e r it thought p r o p e r — i n some i n s t a n c e s in
t h e h a n d s of public officers; in o t h e r s , in t h e S t a t e B a n k s , and in o t h e r s again,
i n t h e B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d its b r a n c h e s . T h i s it did at its p e r f e c t
d i s c r e t i o n , w i t h o u t its e v e r b e i n g i m a g i n e d t h a t , in so doing, it e n c r o a c h e d on
t h a t p o w e r of t h e p u r s e , w h i c h the c o n s t i t u t i o n h a d l o d g e d "in other h a n d s .
W h e n the p r e s e n t B a n k of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s established, its c h a r t e r
c o n t i n u e d a provision t h a t the depositee of the public m o n e y should b e m a d e
i n it or its b r a n c h e s , unless the Secretary of the Treasury
should, at any
timet
otherwise order and direct.
I f the S e c r e t a r y of the T r e a s u r y , in t h e e x e r c i s e
of t h e d i s c r e t i o n t h u s r e s e r v e d to him b y tlie l a w , should order t h e p u b l i c
m o n e y s to be d e p o s i t e d e l s e w h e r e , he c e r t a i n l y usurps
no legislative p o w e r
over t h e p u b l i c p u r s e . H e m e r e l y e x e c u t e s a s u b s i d i a r v t r u s t in r e g a r d t o t h e
p l a c e of k e e p i n g t h e public m o n e y s , w h i c h h a s b e e n expressly confided to
him b y t h e legislative d e p a r t m e n t itself.
B u t , sir, it has b e e n a r g u e d t h a t b y t h e a c t i n c o r p o r a t i n g the B a n k of t h e
U n i t e d S t a t e s , w i t h the provision a b o v e m e n t i o n e d , the B a n k w a s , i n effect,
c o n s t i t u t e d t h e Treasury
of the United States, a n d that in r e m o v i n g t h e p u b l i c depositee from t h e B a n k , m o n e y h a d b e e n d r a w n from the Treasury,
in
violation of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e c l a r a t i o n on t h a t s u b j e c t . If t h e a c t incor*
p o r a t i n g t h e B a n k c o u l d , b y possibility, h a v e h a d t h e e fleet a t t r i b u t e d t o i t , of
c o n v e r t i n g t h e B a n k , b y some s t r a n g e m e t a m o r p h o s i s , i n t o the N a t i o n a l T r e a s u r y , still it b e c a m e t h e T r e a s u r y sub inodo o n l y — t h a t i s , only so l o n g a s the
S e c r e t a r y m i g h t n o t o r d e r t h e public m o n e y s to be d e p o s i t e d e l s e w h e r e .
W h e n t h e S e c r e t a r y should o r d e r the p u b l i c m o n e y s to be d e p o s i t e d e l s e w h e r e ,
t h e n , in v i r t u e of t h e v e r y provision r e f e r r e d t o , t h e B a n k ceased t o b e the
T r e a s u r y . B u t t h e r e is a t o t a l w a n t of logical p r e c i s i o n in this n o t i o n of the
T r e a s u r y . T h e e r r o r is in a n n e x i n g an idea of fixed locality t o it; whereas*
i n t h e t r u e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d financial s e n s e , it is not a place, b u t a state or
condition.
I t is t h e c o n d i t i o n of m o n e y s b e l o n g i n g to t h e G o v e r n m e n t , and
b e i n ^ in t h e c u s t o d y or legal possession'of t h e officer c h a r g e d w i t h t h e i r safe
k e e p i n g . W h e r e v e r m o n e y s a r e placed to the c r e d i t , a n d s u b j e c t e d t o the
c o n t r o l , of t h e p u b l i c T r e a s u r e r , t h e r e t h e y a r e , both in legal a n d c o m m o n
i n t e n d m e n t , in the p u b l i c T r e a s u r y .




19
I « a r e p o r t of the Secretary of the Treasury, made on the 9th day of J a n u a r y , 1 8 1 1 , I find the term used in such a way as to show conclusively the
s e n s e i n which it is habitually employed in the* finances of the Government.
A r e s o l u t i o n had been adopted by the House of Representatives, on the 19th
D e c e m b e r , 1810, requiring the Secretary of the Treasury, among other things,
t o r e p o r t '* what will be the probable amount of the depositee in favor of the
?* U n i t e d States in any of the said B a n k s / ' (U. S. and State,) " or their
«* b r a n c h e s , and which oV them, on the 1st of March, 1 8 1 1 . " T h e Secretary
o f t h e T r e a s u r y , in answer to this call, reported: " It is probable the amount
** o f s p e c i e in the 'Treasury will, on the 1st day of March next, exceed
<* 8 3 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 , and that the proportion deposited in the Banks, other than that
<* o f t h e United States and its branches, will not materially vary from what it
« i s a t p r e s e n t / ' Here we see, Mr* President, that the Secretary of the
T r e a s u r y speaks of the whole of this sum, though distributed in various Banks*
b o t h o f t h e United States and the States, as being in the Treasury* because,
w h e t h e r in one or the other, it was equally in the legal custody and under the
c o n t r o l of the Treasurer.
A. similar illustration is furnished by the very law establishing the Treasury
D e p a r t m e n t - T h e 4th msection of that act declares that " a l l receipts for mo*« n e y s received by him* (the Treasurer) " shall be endorsed upon warrants sign•« e c i b y the Secretary of the Treasury, without which warrant so signed no ac-9
** ItnowledgnuMit for money receivedI into the public Treasury shall be valid/
H e r e , it will be perceived that the receipt given by the Treasurer (endorsed
o n the warrant signed bv the Secretary ot the Treasury) is treated as synonym o u s with receipt into the public Treasury.
"When the Treasurer thus exec u t e s his receipt, the monev, wherever it may be, stands to his credit, and is
s u b j e c t to his control, and*is consequently in the public Treasury, I t contin u e s in the public Treasury so long as it stands in his name, though, in the
m e a n time, it may be repeatedly shifted from place to place; and it goes out
of the Treasury onlv when it passes from him to some creditor of the Governm e n t , to whom it is 'paid under a warrant of disbursement. Another illustrat i o n of the same kind is furnished by that clause of the act which makes it the
d u t y of the Treasurer, on the third d a y of every session of Congress, **to lay
b e f o r e them a true and perfect account of the'.state of the Treasury;" by which,
c e r t a i n l y , it is not meant that he should lay before Congress an account of the
s t a t e of
any Bank or other place where the public moneys may 5 be deposited,
c
b u t < the amount of the public moneys, wheresoever deposited/
I f e a r , M r . President, that I may have been a little minute in these explanat i o n s ; b u t , sir, the charge of violating the public Treasury, and of eloigning the
p u b l i c money, is a very grave one, and might well justify the tediousiieM
of a l i t t l e detail in developing a misconception and confusion of ideas, on which
a l o n e t h e charge rests. If these explanations have not been entirely fruitless,
I m a y now confidently appeal to gentlemen to say, where is there any thing
t o g i v e even a color of plausibility to the charge that the public moneys, in bei n g r e m o v e d from the Bank of the United States to other places of depoaite,
h a v e b e e n taken out of the public Treasury?
Are they not still (and equally
a s b e f o r e their removal) in that legal and responsible custody of the Treasurer,
w h i c h constitutes in fact, the public Treasury? Vo they not stand in his
n a m e a n d to his credit in the State Banks, as they did in the United State*
Bank?
A r e they any more accessible to misapplication, or unauthorized uses
novr, t h a n they were*then? Are they exempted, where they are, from any of
t h e safeguards and barriers which the law and the constitution have thrown
a r o u n d the public moneys? Can you reach them, in the State Bankn, any more
t h a n i u t h e United States Bank, without those precautionary forms which have
b e e n bestablished
for the protection of the public Treasury? Can a single shill i n g c disbursed now, any more than heretofore, without warrant drawn by
t h e S e c r e t a r y of the Treasury, countersigned by the Comptroller, and record


20
ed b y the Register? A n d y e t , sir, from the sweeping and v e h e m e n t d e n u n c i ations vre have h e a r d , one would suppose that the whole public t r e a s u r e was
now a t t h e unlimited disposition of the P r e s i d e n t , to be e x p e n d e d b y him in
a n y w a y a n d for a n y purpose he might choose, free from all r e s t r a i n t of l a w
a n d form of law.
T o what a d e g r e e , sir, mu»t the sagacious m i n d of the honorable Senator
from K e n t u c k y QMr. Clav^J have been inflamed by a gratuitous, however patriotic, indignation against the P r e s i d e n t , to have invoked, as applicable to this
occasion, the solemn w a r n i n g of P a t r i c k H e n r y , in the Virginia Convention,
against t h e union of the purse and the sword, which that gifted orator a n d p a t r i o t p r o n o u n c e d to be d e s t r u c t i v e of freedom. Glowing, sir, as was the imagination, a n d fervid as the oratory of that great m a n , he never could have s e e n
in t h e simple ministerial operation of transferring the public moneys from one
p l a c e of deposite to another, in p u r s u a n c e of an authoritv given by law, t h a t
formidable assumption of the power of the purse, which, u n i t e d with t h a t of t h e
s w o r d , he d e n o u n c e d as fatal to liberty. If the honorable Senator had r e a d a
few brief sentences i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g the passage lie quoted, he w o u l d
have seen in w h a t sense M r . H e n r y spoke of the power of the purse a n d t h e
s w o r d . H e would have seen that M r . H e n r y , uncompromising adversary a s
he was of the new constitution, was arguing against the powers proposed to b e
Tested in C o n g r e s s , of taxation, of raising armies, and of control over t h e
militia. W h a t said the orator, sir? «« Congress, bv the power of taxation, b y
** t h a t of raising an army, and by their control over the tnifitia9ha\e
the sword
" in one h a n d , a n d the purse in the other. Shall we be safe without either?
*' Congress have an unlimited power over b o t h — t h e v are entirely given u p b y
" u s . 5 ' T h e n followed, in immediate juxta-position, the passage quoted b y
t h e honorable Senator. *< L e t a n y one c a n d i d l y tell me when and w h e r e d i d
iC
freedom exist when the sword a n d the purse were given up from t h e
** p e o p l e , " &c.
I t is obvious,then, M r . P r e s i d e n t , that P a t r i c k H e n r v spoke of the power of
the p u r s e in the sense in which I have already explained it, as t h e g r e a t
p o w e r of taxation, and its incident, that of appropriation—and not the subord i n a t e ministerial functions of collecting, receiving, keeping, depositing-, the
public m o n e y s u n d e r authority of law. W e see, also, m what sense h e spoke
of the power of the sword, as t h a t of raising armies, and of general control
over t h e military force of the c o u n t r y . I t is in this sense, as w e have seen,
t h a t t h e K i n g of E n g l a n d is said to hold the w w e r of the sword. B u t there
is no color, n o t the slightest, for saying that the P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s
holds t h e power of the sword. H e cannot raise armies, equip fleets, d e c l a r e
w a r , o r g a n i s e , a r m , discipline, and call forth the militia. All these powers,
which constitute the power of the sword, are expresslv vested in C o n g r e s s .
H e is, by the constitution, it is t r u e , eommander-in-ehieY of the a r m y w h e n it
is raised, and of the militia when they are called forth bv Congress; b u t this
n o more gives him the power of the sword, in the t r u e political s e n s e , t h a n the
function devolved upon executive agents of collecting and receiving the public
t a x e s , after they have been imposed by Congress, gives him the p o w e r of the
purse*
T h i s ominous conjunction of the sword and the purse, t h e n , in the
h a n d s of the President,
is a creation of the imagination, which, like other
** raw heads a n d bloody b o n e s " of the d a y , can frighten only wlule it is unfcpproached and unexamined•
£ H e r e M r . C L A Y rose and said, if the Senator will inspect the p a s s a g e , the
expression will satisfy him, that it has some p e r t i n e n c y , P a t r i c k H e n r y was
against the union of the purse and the sword in the h a n d s of the G e n e r a l Gov e r n m e n t ; it was the whole power of the country; and u n d e r such a n union,
liberty was gone- M y argument was, that if, when the purse a n d s w o r d a r e in
the h a n d s of the entire G o v e r n m e n t , checked and balanced as it is, b y means
of its various d e p a r t m e n t s , there i- still danger, how much m o r e i m m e n s e




21
w h e n t h e y are in the h a n d s of one of t h e m , w h a n all did n o t furnish a c o m p e t e n t s e c u r i t y for liberty. M r . C- also said, t h a t in his r e m a r k s on the u n i o n
o f t h e p u r s e and sword in the h a n d s of the P r e s i d e n t , he did not allude solely
t o h i s seizure of the public money, b u t to the power which he had claimed a n d
e x e r c i s e d , of saying to one S e c r e t a r y , *' You must get out of office, if you will
n o t d o as I bid y o u , " and to another officer, " I dismiss you, u n l e s s you cons e n t to be governed and controlled b y me. ? ? 3
I t still seems to m e , continued M r . Rives, t h a t t h e honorable S e n a t o r has
f a i l e d to show the applicability of his quotation from P a t r i c k H e n r y to t h e
p o w e r exercised in the removal of the depositee. T h e honorable S e n a t o r n o w
r e c o g n i s e s the broad and only true sense in which M r . H e n r y spoke of t h e
p o w e r s of the purse and the sword, and argues if those powers, when poss e s s e d by the whole G o v e r n m e n t , were thus d a n g e r o u s to liberty, how m u c h
m o r e so m u s t they be when united in the h a n d s of a single b r a n c h of the G o v e r n m e n t . T o make this reasoning j u s t , then, and the quotation applicable, it
m u s t be shown that, in the same sense in which those powers are possessed b y
t h e whole G o v e r n m e n t , or rather by Congress, t h e y have been exercised or att e m p t e d to be exercised by the P r e s i d e n t . B u t , surely, sir, the honorable S e n a t o r will not contend that the P r e s i d e n t has exercised or a t t e m p t e d to exerc i s e the power of taxation, which M r . H e n r y spoke of as t h e power of t h e
p u r s e , or, on the other h a n d , that he has exercised, or a t t e m p t e d to exercise,
t h e power of raising armies and calling forth
the militia, which Mr- H e n r y
c o n s i d e r e d the power of the sword*
I n regard to the other portion of the honorable S e n a t o r ' s observations, touching
t h e abuses which the P r e s i d e n t might commit in s a y i n g first to o n e , a n d then
t o another S e c r e t a r y , that if you will not do so and so, I will t u r n you out of
office, I can only say that the" a r g u m e n t comes j u s t forty-five y e a r s too late.
I n t h e very first"Congress which met u n d e r the Constitution, it was d e c i d e d ,
u p o n the tullest consideration, that the P r e s i d e n t , according to t h e t r u e princ i p l e s of that i n s t r u m e n t , possessed the power of removal from office, and that
p o w e r was expressly recognised in the acts constituting the E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t s . T h e very a r g u m e n t which the honorable Senator now uses, and e v e r y
o t h e r which he has so earnestly pressed on this b r a n c h of the subject, derived from
p o s s i b l e abuses, w a s t h e n r e p e a t e d l y and strongly urged against the power of
r e m o v a l in the P r e s i d e n t - B u t they w e r e all over-ruled on the ground that
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , in " vesting the executive power in the P r e s i d e n t , " had m a d e
h i m responsible tor the c o n d u c t of the E x e c u t i v e officers employed u n d e r h i m ,
w h o m , therefore, he ought to have the power to control, and that this responsibility of the P r e s i d e n t , thus established, was, in fact, to use the language of
M r . M a d i s o n , the highest security «< fur liberty and the public g o o d . "
B u t , sir, this m a t t e r deserves a fuller examination, ami brings u n d e r review
s o m e opinions expressed by t h e honorable Senator a few days ago, which, as
t h e y involve the fundamental theory of the constitution in regard to the E x e c u t i v e b r a n c h of t h e G o v e r n m e n t , I will proceed to consider more in detail.
T h e honorable Senator took especial exception to the principle asserted b y t h e
p r e s i d e n t in the paper read by him to his C a b i n e t — " that the constitution
has
<< d e v o l v e d upon him the d u t y of superintending
the operation of the E x e c u t i v e
<* D e p a r t m e n t s . " H e c o n t e n d e d that the constitution
had given him no such
p o w e r — t h a t by lata those d e p a r t m e n t s m a y , and in certain cases have b e e n ,
p l a c e d u n d e r the s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e and direction of t h e P r e s i d e n t — t h a t so far,
a n d no farther, he h a s , by law, the superintendence of their operations; b u t t h a t
t h e constitution
has devolved on the P r e s i d e n t no right of s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e
over the Executive Departments.
N o w , sir, on this assertion, I m u s t respectfully j o i n issue with the honorable
S e n a t o r ; a n d I call to witness t h e fathers of t h e constitution, and those who
h a v e h a d the largest and most enlightened experience in the administration of its
h i g h e s t t r u s t s . T h e fundamental t h e o r y of t h e constitution in r e g a r d tu t h e



22
Executive power, is, 1st, Its unity, 2dly* Its responsibility; to secure which
last, in an undivided and the most efficient manner, was the great argument in
favor of the first* In governments of the monarchal kind, the Executive head
is exempt from all responsibility. But in our republican constitution, the
chief Kxecutive Magistrate is under a triple responsibility, through the medium
of election, of impeachment, and of prosecution in the common course of law.
H e is not only responsible for his personal acts, but the " Executive power
being vested in h i m / 5 he is responsible for the whole Executive Department;
and this responsibility of the President was considered the threat security for
the proper anil safe administration of that Department. Mr* Madison, in the
debates which took place in *B9 on the President's power of removal, said,
" I t is evidently the intention of the constitution th;.t. the First Magistrate
* uld be responsible for the Executive Department/" A spun, in the course
of the same debate, he said, *« T h e principle of unity and responsibility in the
" Executive
Department, is intended for the security of liberty and the public
" good/ 3
T h e President being thus responsible by the constitution for the conduct of
the Executive officers, he has, from the constitution also, as a necessary consequence, the ri^ht to inspect, superintend, ami control their proceedings:
and this right of superintendence is expressly and repeatedly recognised, on
constitutional grounds, in the great debate in the first Congress, to which I have
already referred. I will give a few only, of many similar extracts, in which
it will be seen that this right of superintendence* as a constitutional right, is
distinctly
and unequivocally asserted. Mr. Madison >aid, " is there no dan*cRer that an officer, when he is appointed by the concurrence of the Senate, and
** has friends in that body, may choose to ri<k his establishment on the favor of
" t h a t b r a n c h , rather than rest it upon the discharge of his duties to the satisfact i o n of the Executive branch, winch is constitutionally authorized to inspect
" and control his conduct/*
M r . Lawrance: " I n the constitution, the heads of Departments are const« dered as the mere assistants of The President in the performance of his exec" utive duties. 7H e has the superintendence, the control, and the inspection, of
" their conduct/ &c. &c.
M r . Ames : " T h e Executive powers are delegated/* (of course, b y the
constitution) " to the President, with a view to have a res]>ousible officer to su'* perintend, control, inspect, and check, the officers necessarily employed in
" administering the laws."
W e see, then, M r . President, that throughout the.se debates, which, as a
contemporaneous exposition, as well as from the distinguished ability of the
men who participated in them, must be regarded as an authority of the highest
order, that the right of the President to superintend the Kxccutive Departments, wa* treated as a right flowing from 'the fountain of the constitution
itself, and existing anterior to, and independent of legislative provision- Sir,
that this is the true character of the right, nothing could more strikingly show
than theyW/w in which the rjue>tion of the Presidential power of removal was
finally settled by the Congress, whose debater are here referred to. I n the
original shape of the bills for the organization of the Kxecutive Departments,
it was provided that such and such Secretaries should be appointed, " to be
removable by the President."
It was suggested, however, that a clause of this
sort might be considered as implving that the power of removal was granted by
the taw. T o preclude such an influence, it was proposed to substitute a mere
incidental recognition of the power, serving to show that the power was considered a pre-existing one, derived from the constitution and not from the
Uuc$ and this was done in the section providing for cases of vacancy in the
head of the Department* DV a st(ir,:!e d ^ W a t i o n that •« whenever the vrincipal
** ffficer shall be removed from office by the President of the Cnitea States, or
" in any other case of vacancv," the chief clerk shall, during such vacancy,



S3
nave the charge and custody of the records, &e. &c. of the Department* T h e
original clause was stricken out, and this incidental recognition of the power
substituted, as will be seen by reference to the acts constituting the Kxecutive
Departments; and this was done expressly on the ground, which the language
sufficiently imports, that the power of removal from office by the President,
w a s a pre-existing power, flowing from the constitution, and not derived from
the law* The power of superintendence, involved in that of removal, stands,
as w e have seen, on the same ground.
Sir, I beg leave now to call the attention of the Senate to an authority
•which, as that of one of the earliest and most uncompromising foes of tyranny,
and the great champion of popular rights, as he is the acknowledged founder
of the democratic parry in this country, cannot fail, I trust, to command the
respect of those who, like the honorable Senator from Kentucky, profess to be
fighting the battles of liberty on tins floor. I allude, of course, to Mr. Jefferson. While no one more steadily opposed the undue accumulation of power
in the hands of the chief Kxecutive Magistrate, it will be seen that no one
more unequivocally maintained the constitutional right of the President to
superintend and control the action of the Kxecutive Departments. 1 will read,
sir, an extract from a letter addressed by him t o M . d e Tracy, the author of an
able and enlightened commeutarv on the great work of Montesquieu. H e is
expressing; his difference of opinion from M. de Tracy on the question of a
plural or single Kxecutive, declares a decided preference for the latter, and
after appealing to the history of the French Directory to show the evils and
disadvantages of the former, he proceeds to notice thc\>rgani?;ation of our sin
g l e Executive thus:
€
* The failure of the French Directory, and from the same cause, seems to
*' have authorized a belief that the form of a plurality, however promising in
*< theory, is impracticable, with men constituted with" the ordinary passions.
€
* W h i l e the tranquil and steady tenor of our single Kxecutive, during a course
«« of twenty-two years of the most tempestuous times the history of the world
*« has ever presented, gives a rational hope that this important problem is
« at length solved. Aided by the counsels of a cabinet of heads of Depart** menis, originally four, but now five, with whom the President consults, either
«« singly or all together, he has the benefit of their wisdom and information,
*' brings their views to one centre, and produces an unify of action and direction
** in all fhe branches of the Government.
The excellence of this construction
4
« of the Kxecutive power has alreadv manifested itself here under very oppo*< site ^circumstances. During the administration of our first President, his
«« Cabinet of four members was equally divided, by as marked an opposition
«« of principle as monarchism and republicanism could bring into conflict*
<* Had \hat Cabinet been a Directory, like positive and negative quantities in
« algebra, die opposmsr wills would fiave balanced each other, and produced a
«« state of absolute inaction. But the President heard with calmness the opinions
" and reasons of each, decided the course to be pursued, and kept the Govern** ment steadily in it, unaffected by the agitation. The public knew well the
*' dissensions in the Cabinet, but never had ati uneasy thought on their account;
«< because they knew also they had provided a regtdating power, which would
«« keep the machine in a steady movement."
This passage, sir, requires no comment. It is evident that Mr. Jefferson
consicl^r^.rl the power of the President to control, and ** decide the course to
b e pursued bv each" of the Departments, as the fundamental cprinciple of our
Executive organization—that it only can secure the necessary * unity of action
and direction in all the branches" of the Kxecutive administration—and that,
i n short, it is the " regulating power which keeps the whole machine in steady
movement." In a subsequent part of the same letter, he speaks of " this power
« *f decision in the President, as that which alike excludes internal dissen*< sions, and repels external intrigues."



24
£ M r , C l a y h e r e i n q u i r e d of M r - R i v e s , if this l e t t e r was w r i t t e n before on
after M r . Jefferson was P r e s i d e n t / ]
Mr* R i v e s a n s w e r e d that it was w r i t t e n in J a n u a r y , 1 8 1 1 , in the philosophical r e t i r e m e n t of M o n t i c e l l o , when he had w i t h d r a w n from all t h e d i s t u r b i n g
scenes of public life, a n d , as a patriot and sage, employed his leisure in m e d i t a t i n g t h e lessons of his long e x p e r i e n c e , and recording them for t h e i n s true*
tion of posterity- B u t lest the honorable Senator may suppose, (as his q u e s tion seems to imply,) that the possession of power had given an u n d u e bias t o
t h e mind of M r . Jefferson, (than whom there never lived a man more thoroughIn
l y imbued with an i n n a t e love of liberty,) he shall speak for himself.
t h e l e t t e r from which I have a l r e a d y q u o t e d , he uses the following language:
" I am not conscious that m y participations in Executive authority have*
** p r o d u c e d a n y bias in favor of a single E x e c u t i v e : because the parts I h a v e
" a c t e d have been in the subordinate, as well as superior stations, and b e c a u s e ,
" if I know myself, what I have felt and what I have wished, I know I have
** never been so well pleased as when I could shift power from m y own,
" on the shoulders of others; nor have I ever been able to conceive how a n y
** rational being could propose happiness to himself from the exercise of p o w e r
** over o t h e r s . ' '
I n t h e l e t t e r from which I have read, we have seen M r , Jefferson's theory-.
of t h e constitution with r e g a r d to the E x e c u t i v e , and the practice of W a s h i n g t o n . L e t us now see, sir, the principles upon which he conducted his own a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of this high office. I n a few months after his accession to t h e
P r e s i d e n c y , in N o v e m b e r , 1 8 0 1 , he addressed a circular to the H e a d s of D e p a r t m e n t s , the m e m b e r s of his Cabinet, for the purpose of laying d o w n the*
r u l e s which w e r e to govern the official relations between him and those D e p a r t m e n t s . H e begins with repeating what was the p r a c t i c e , in this respect, of
G e n e r a l W a s h i n g t o n ' s administration, of which he had himself been a m e m b e r
— t h a t the several H e a d s of D e p a r t m e n t s r e g u l a r l v t r a n s m i t t e d to the P r e s i d e n t the communications a d d r e s s e d to them in relation to the concerns of theirrespective offices, with the a n s w e r s proposed by them to be m a d e , and r e c e i v e d
from him in r e t u r n , the signification of his approbation, or else the suggestion
of such alterations as he might think n e c e s s a r y — a n d then proceeds: " B y t h i s
" m e a n s , he was a l w a y s in accurate possession of all tacts ami proceedings i n
" every p a r t of the U n i o n , and to whatsoever
Department
they r e l a t e d ; h e
4<
formed a central point for the different branches: preserved an unity"
(this
despotic unity again, sir,) " o f object and action among: them; exercised t h a t
*€ participation in the gestion of affairs which his office m a d e incumbent on h i m ;
€£
and m e t himself the due responsibility,**
(General W a s h i n g t o n a n d M r .
Jefferson too, it seems, wore so r e c k l e s s and d a r i n g as to meet the responsibility of their offices,) "for whatever was done.
During Mr. Adams's ad** ministration, his long and habitual absences from the Seat of G o v e r n m e n t
w
r e n d e r e d this kind of communication impracticable, removed him from any^
«( share in the transaction of affairs, and parcelled oat the Government,
in fact,
** a m o n g four i n d e p e n d e n t head.-, d r a w i n g sometimes in opposite directions-' 3 1
H e then expresses his intention to adhere to the system, in this respect, of
W a s h i n g t o n , a n d a d d s — " m y sole motives are those before expressed, as g o v " e r n i n g the first administration in chalking out the r u l e s of their p r o c e e d i n g s ;
€t
a d d i n g to them only a sense of the obligation imposed on me by t h e public
** will to meet personally
the thtties to ivhich they have appointed
me."
H e r e , sir, we have the interpretation of W a s h i n g t o n and Jefferson in the m o s t
authentic of all forms, (their own practice*) of the duties and p o w e r s of t h e
P r e s i d e n t i a l office, creating in the Chief M a g i s t r a t e himself a responsibility
**for whatever is done" in a n y of the E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t s , a n d giving h i m , b y
c o n s e q u e n c e , a power to s u p e r i n t e n d , c o n t r o l , a n d shape the action of those D e p a r t m e n t s . T o these high constitutional models, realizing t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d
u n i t y a n d responsibility of a single E x e c u t i v e , t h e p r e s e n t Chief M a g i s t r a t e h a s



25
s o u g h t to conform his a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , r a t h e r t h a n b y i n d o l e n c e , n e g l e c t , or
s h r i n k i n g from resporxsibility,
to parcel out the Government
among five or six
i n d e p e n d e n t H e a d s of D e p a r t m e n t s , t h u s c o n v e r t i n g i t i n t o a d i s c o r d a n t a n d
p r a c t i c a l l y irresponsible d i r e c t o r y .
T h e honorable S e n a t o r from K e n t u c k y has also t a k e n exception to the P r e s i d e n t ' s reference to the clause of t h e constitution which d e c l a r e s *< the P r e s i d e n t shall t a k e care t h a t the l a w s be faithfully e x e c u t e d ; ' ' t h e P r e s i d e n t
h a v i n g referred to it as giving him the power to superintend
a n d d i r e c t the
c o n d u c t a n d operations of the E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t s . T h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r c o n t e n d s that the t r u e and sole operation of this clause is to e m p o w e r t h e
P r e s i d e n t , when the laws are forcibly resisted, to overcome that r e s i s t a n c e b y
f o r c e . H o says that he has m a d e , a n d caused to be m a d e , n u m e r o u s r e s e a r c h e s
i n t o t h e contemporaneous c o n s t r u c t i o n s of the constitution, a n d t h a t he can
find nowhere a n y color for the P r e s i d e n t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . N o w , sir, I m u s t
b e p e r m i t t e d to say that the honorable S e n a t o r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of this c l a u s e is
f a r more l a t i t u d i n a r i a n than that, of the P r e s i d e n t , a n d ascribes to it an o p e r a t i o n infinitely more d a n g e r o u s a n d e x t e n s i v e . T h e P r e s i d e n t , sir, has no
p o w e r of himself, u n d e r the constitution, to e x e c u t e the laws b y force.
This
d e p e n d s upon C o n g r e s s , to whom t h e power is expressly given to " c a l l forth
t h e militia to e x e c u t e the l a w s / ' & c . I t is t r u e , the P r e s i d e n t , by the c o n s t i t u t i o n , is C o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f of t h e a r m y and n a v y , a n d of t h e militia, w h e n
c a l l e d into actual service; b u t , as such, he is a m e r e i n s t r u m e n t in the h a n d s
of C o n g r e s s , b y whom the objects a n d purposes for which he is to employ the
f o r c e s u n d e r his c o m m a n d m u s t first be d e s i g n a t e d .
T h e construction of the honorable S e n a t o r , t h e n , is one of far m o r e dangerous*
l a t i t u d e t h a n t h a t of the P r e s i d e n t . T h e clause in q u e s t i o n , sir, can have n o
r e f e r e n c c e to t h e execution of t h e l a w s by force, which is a m a t t e r e x c l u s i v e l y
u n d e r the control of C o n g r e s s . I t m u s t refer to t\\v. faithful
execution of t h e
l a w s by other m e a n s — b y t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n of officers a p p o i n t e d for t h e p u r p o s e ,
w h o s e fidelity in t h e discharge of their duties m a y be s e c u r e d b y t h e s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e of the chief E x e c u t i v e officer. T h e honorable S e n a t o r has said, t h a t
i n t h e various r e s e a r c h e s he lias m a d e , a n d caused to be m a d e , he has found n o
t r a c e of this c o n s t r u c t i o n . If he had t a k e n the trouble to t u r n to the most ob~
Tious source of information on the s u b j e c t — t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a n d d e b a t e s of t h e
first C o n g r e s s on t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t s — h e could n o t
h a v e failed to see t h a t tkis clause w a s appealed to in the sense and for t h e
p u r p o s e which the P r e s i d e n t has d o n e . I will not fatigue t h e S e n a t e by m u l t i p l y i n g citations from a portion of our legislative and constitutional history,
w h i c h is, d o u b t l e s s , familiar to t h e m i n d s of all, b u t will c o n t e n t m y s e l f with
o n e or two brief e x t r a c t s from a speech of M r - M a d i s o n on t h a t occasion, a n
a u t h o r i t y for which I k n o w t h e honorable S e n a t o r from K e n t u c k y e n t e r t a i n s ,
a s all m u s t , t h e highest r e s p e c t . W h i l e discussing t h e question of the P r e s i d e n t ' s p o w e r of removal from office, h e says: " B u t t h e r e is another p a r t of
<< t h e constitution which inclines, in m v j u d g m e n t , to favor the c o n s t r u c t i o n I
•* p u t upon it; the P r e s i d e n t is require*! to t a k e care that the lazvs he fait hfidly
*< executed.
I f the d u t y to see t h e l a w s faithfully e x e c u t e d be r e q u i r e d a t the
€
* h a n d s of the E x e c u t i v e M a g i s t r a t e , it would seem that it was g e n e r a l l y i n t e n d <( ed he should have t h a t species of p o w e r which is n e c e s s a r y to accomplish
44
t h a t e n d . N o w , if the officer, w h e n once appointed, is n o t to d e p e n d u p o n
*( t h e P r e s i d e n t for his official existence, b u t upon a d i s t i n c t b o d y , I confess I
** d o n o t see how t h e P r e s i d e n t can take care t h a t the l a w s be faithfully c x e " cuted."
A g a i n , in the same speech h e s a y s : " I conceive t h a t the P r e s i d e n t is suffix
<< c i e n t l y a c c o u n t a b l e to the c o m m u n i t y ; and if this p o w e r is vested in h i m , i t
** will b e v e s t e d w h e r e its n a t u r e r e q u i r e s it should b e vested; if a n y t h i n g in i t s
** n a t u r e is e x e c u t i v e , it m u s t be t h a t p o w e r w h i c h is e m p l o y e d in
superintend** trig and seeing that the laws are faithfully
executed; t h e lawn c a n n o t b e exe~



26
•" c u t e d b u t by officers appointed for that purpose;
therefore, those w h o a r e
" over such officers n a t u r a l l y possess t h e e x e c u t i v e p o w e r . " I t is obvious
t h e n , t h a t M r - M a d i s o n v i e w e d t h a t c l a u s e in t h e lignt in which i t h a s b e e n
referred to b y the P r e s i d e n t ; t h a t the faithful e x e c u t i o n of t h e laws c o m m i t t e d
to h i m w a s t o be effected b y "officers a p p o i n t e d for t h a t p u r p o s e , " a n d t h a t
fidelity
i n the d i s c h a r g e of their d u t i e s w a s to be s e c u r e d b y a p o w e r of superintendence
a n d control over t h e m on t h e p a r t of the Chief M a g i s t r a t e , who
w a s m a d e responsible for t h e i r c o n d u c t , a n d specially charged w i t h t h e d u t y
of seeing t h a t the laws be faithfully e x e c u t e d .
I will n o w , Mr* P r e s i d e n t , a d v e r t t o an a r g u m e n t of the honorable S e n a t o r
from K e n t u c k y , which, I confess, s t r u c k me w h h considerable surprise.
In
o r d e r t o sustain His position t h a t the Constitution
had not given the P r e s i d e n t
a p o w e r of s u p e r i n t e n d e n c e a n d control over the E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t s , h e
c o n t e n d e d t h a t in c e r t a i n cases, the h e a d s of those D e p a r t m e n t s w e r e responsib l e t o , a n d c o m p e l l a b l e to a c t b y , the C o u r t s of J u s t i c e ; and in support of this
p r i n c i p l e , he relied on t h e decision of t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t in the case of M a r b u r y a n d M a d i s o n , an e x t r a c t of which he r e a d to t h e S e n a t e . I w a s t h e
m o r e s u r p r i s e d , sir, a t t h e d o c t r i n e a n d t h e a u t h o r i t y coining from t h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r of K e n t u c k y , b e c a u s e he professes an adhesion to the creed of
t h e r e p u b l i c a n p a r t y of that d a y ; and y e t it m a y be confidently affirmed t h a t
t h e r e n e v e r w a s a decision of that t r i b u n a l which gave more dissatisfaction to
t h e r e p u b l i c a n p a r t y t h a n t h a t d i d , and especiallv to t h e g r e a t chief a n d l e a d e r
of t h e p a r t y , who has r e c o r d e d , in various p a r t s of his w r i t i n g s , the m o s t e a r n e s t a n d energetic c o n d e m n a t i o n of it- W i t h all the d e f e r e n c e I e n t e r t a i n for
t h a t e x a l t e d t r i b u n a l , I m u s t say that t h e d o c t r i n e s of M a r b u r y a n d M a d i s o n
a p p e a r to m e u t t e r l y u n s u s t a i n a b l e , a n d such, I believe, woufd be t h e j u d g m e n t of all parties at the p r e s e n t d a y . T h e S e n a t e , sir, d o u b t l e s s r e c o l l e c t
t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e c a s e . M r . A d a m s , on t h e eve of q u i t t i n g t h e P r e s i d e n c y , had a p p o i n t e d , with t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of the S e n a t e , n u m e r o u s officers,
a n d , a m o n g o t h e r s , c e r t a i n J u s t i c e s of the P e a c e for this D i s t r i c t ,
Their
commissions h a d been signed by him, a n d t h e Seal of S t a t e , p e r h a p s , affixed
t o t h e m ; b u t t h e y h a d not b e e n d e l i v e r e d to t h e p a r l i e s , w h e n M r . Jefferson
c a m e i n t o office- M r . Jefferson finding t h e m still in the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e ,
w h e n he s u c c e e d e d to the P r e s i d e n c y , and c o n s i d e r i n g the a p p o i n t m e n t s e i t h e r
as i m p r o p e r in t h e m s e l v e s , or i m p r o p e r l y m a d e , a n d t h a t commissions, l i k e
d e e d s , w e r e i n c o m p l e t e a n d revocable till d e l i v e r y , d e t e r m i n e d to w i t h h o l d
t h e m . T h e p a r t i e s applied to t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t for a m a n d a m u s , d i r e c t e d t o
M r . M a d i s o n , t h e n S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , to compel t h e d e l i v e r y of the c o m m i s sions. The. C o u r t d e c i d e d t h a t , though t h e y had no j u r i s d i c t i o n to g r a n t a
m a n d a m u s in the case, (it not b e i n g e m b r a c e d nmonjjj tho^e cases of original
j u r i s d i c t i o n committed to them, 1 ) y e t t h a t the p a r t i e s had a c q u i r e d , b y t h e signi n g and sealing of the commissions, without d e l i v e r v , an absolute a n d legal
r i g h t to t h e offices in q u e s t i o n , which rnijjchtlie enforced against an i n d e p e n d e n t
d e p a r t m e n t of the G o v e r n m e n t by n j u d i c i a l t r i b u n a l .
I - m u s t leave it to M r - Jefterson, in his own s t r o n g l a n g u a g e , a n d w i t h a
r e a s o n i n g which a p p e a r s to me irresistible, to show the f u n d a m e n t a l a n d d a n g e r o u s e r r o r s of this decision, n o w relied on b y the honorable S e n a t o r from
Kentucky.
In a l e t t e r a d d r e s s e d to M r . H a y , A t t o r n e y of the U n i t e d S t a t e s
for t h e D i s t i i c t of V i r g i n i a , d u r i n g the progress of B u r r ' s t r i a l , a t R i c h m o n d ,
he writes thus:
*c I observe t h a t the case of M a r b u r y v s . M a d i s o n has been rritcl, a n d I
" t h i n k it material to ston at t*:e x!-tc-niioiu trie citing that case as a u t h o r i t y ,
** a n d to have it d e n i e d t o b e law* 1- B e c a u s e t h e j u d g e s , in t h e o u t s e t , d i s ** c l a i m e d all c o g n i z a n c e of t h e case; although t h e y t h e n w e n t on to say w h a t
4<
w o u l d h a v e b e e n t h e i r opinion had t h e y had c o g n i z a n c e of it. T h i s , t h e n ,
" w a s confessedly a n e x t r a - j u d i c i a l opinion, a n d a s s u c h , of n o a u t h o r i t y *
*4 2 . B e c a u s e , h a d it b e e n j u d i c i a l l y p r o n o u n c e d , it w o u l d h a v e b e e n a g a i n s t



27
«
**
«*
*«
««
«
**

l a w ; for t o a commission, a d e e d , a b o n d , delivery is e s s e n t i a l t o g i v e v a l i d i ty.
U n t i l , therefore, the commission is d e l i v e r e d o u t of t h e h a n d s of t h e
E x e c u t i v e a n d his agents, it is not his d e e d . H e m a y w i t h h o l d or c a n c e l it
a t p l e a s u r e , as he might hi* private d e e d in t h e s a m e s i t u a t i o n . T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n i n t e n d e d that the t h r e e great b r a n c h e s of t h e G o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d
t>e c o - o r d i n a t e , and i n d e p e n d e n t of each o t h e r . A s t o a c t s , therefore,
w h i c h a r e b e to d o n e by either, it has given no control to a n o t h e r b r a n c h .
*« T h e E x e c u t i v e and Senate act on the c o n s t r u c t i o n that u n t i l d e l i v e r y from
" t h e E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t , a commission is in t h e i r possession a n d w i t h i n
** t h e i r rightful p o w e r ; and in cases of c o m m i s s i o n s n o t r e v o c a b l e a t w i l l ,
** w h e r e , after t h e S e n a t e ' s approbation, a n d the P r e s i d e n t ' s s i g n i n g a n d s e a l *' i n g , n e w information of the unfitness of t h e p e r s o n h a s c o m e to h a n d before
«* t h e delivery
of the commission, n e w n o m i n a t i o n s h a v e b e e n m a d e a n d
-•* a p p r o v e d , a n d n e w commissions have i s s u e d .
** O n t h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n , I have hitherto a c t e d ; on tins I shall e v e r a c t , a n d *
** m a i n t a i n it w i t h t h e p o w e r s of the G o v e r n m e n t a g a i n s t a n y control w h i c h
*' m a y be a t t e m p t e d by the j u d g e s in subversion of t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e
«* E x e c u t i v e a n d S e n a t e within their p e c u l i a r department.**
T h i s a n s w e r of M r . Jefferson, sir, to the S u p r e m e C o u r t , a p p e a r s to m e t o
b e c o n c l u s i v e a n d irrefragable* I t shows t h a t the d o c t r i n e of M a r b u r y v s .
M a d i s o n was w r o n g , not m e r e l y with r e g a r d to t h e m e r i t s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r
c a s e , b u t d a n g e r o u s l y w r o n g in a n o t h e r a s p e c t , in a s s e r t i n g a c l a i m of t h e
j u d i c i a r y , (which is now r e i t e r a t e d by t h e h o n o r a b l e S e n a t o r from K e n t u c k y , )
t o c o n t r o l an i n d e p e n d e n t b r a n c h of the G o v e r n m e n t , in m a t t e r s confided b y
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n to its s e p a r a t e a n d r e s p o n s i b l e a c t i o n . A s this last a s p e c t
o f t h e decision involves a question of the g r a v e s t i m p o r t — o n e affecting t h a t
f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e , n o t m e r e l y of o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n , b u t of free g o v e r n m e n t
i n g e n e r a l , w h i c h p r e s c r i b e s the separation and m u t u a l i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e
t h r e e great departments, Legislative, Executive, a n d Judicial—a question too,
i n r e g a r d t o which t h e imputeel opinions of t h e p r e s e n t C h i e f M a g i s t r a t e h a v e
b e e n freely c o m m e n t e d upon in t h e course of t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , 1 b e g p e r m i s s i o n
o f t h e S e n a t e , w h i l e I have the w r i t i n g s of M r . Jefferson in m y h a n d , t o r e a d
w h a t * w a s u t t e r e d b y this g r e a t R e p u b l i c a n o r a c l e on this i m p o r t a n t s u b j e c t .
I n a l e t t e r a d d r e s s e d by him. in 1 8 1 9 to J u d g e R o a n e , h i m s e l f o n e of t h e m o s t
p r o f o u n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r i s t s of our c o u n t r y , he e x p r e s s e d h i m s e l f t h u s : —
** M y c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e constitution is v e r y different from t h a t you q u o t e .
** I t is* t h a t each d e p a r t m e n t is t r u l y i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e o t h e r s , a n d h a s a n
«« e q u a l r i g h t to d e c i d e for itself w h a t is t h e m e a n i n g of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n in t h e
" c a s e s s u b m i t t e d t o its action; a n d e s p e c i a l l y w h e r e it is t o a c t u l t i m a t e l y
** a n d w i t h o u t a p p e a l . I will e x p l a i n m y s e l f b y e x a m p l e s w h i c h , h a v i n g o c ** c t i r r e d w h i l e I w a s in office, are b e t t e r k n o w n to m e , a n d the p r i n c i p l e s
<< w h i c h g o v e r n e d t h e m . A l e g i s l a t u r e h a d p a s s e d t h e sedition ' a w #
*"e
«* f e d e r a l c o u r t s had s u b j e c t e d c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s to its p e n a l t i e s , of fine a n d
«* i m p r i s o n m e n t . O n c o m i n g i n t o office, I r e l e a s e d the i n d i v i d u a l s b y the
«* p o w e r of p a r d o n , c o m m i t t e d to E x e c u t i v e d i s c r e t i o n , which could n e v e r b e
«« m o r e p r o p e r l y e x e r c i s e d t h a n w h e r e c i t i z e n s w e r e suffering w i t h o u t t h e a u *
** t h o r i t y of l a w , or, which w a s e q u i v a l e n t , u n d e r a law u n a u t h o r i s e d b y t h e
<* c o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d therefore n u l l . I n t h e c a s e of M a r b u r v a n d M a d i s o n , t h e
*< f e d e r a l j u d g e s d e c l a r e d t h a t commissions signed a n d sealed b y t h e P r e s i d e n t ,
<< W e r e v a l i d a l t h o u g h n o t delivered* I d e e m e d d e l i v e r y essential to c o m p l e t e
<< a d e e d , w h i c h , as long as it r e m a i n s in t h e Viands of the p a r t y , is as y e t n o
<* d e e d ; it is i n jwsse o n l y , b u t n o t in esse, a n d I withheld
dvlhrrjf
of the
*< commissions."
( Y e s sir, / , t h e P r e s i d e n t , n o t t h e S e c r e t a r y , w i t h h e l d t h e
commissions.)
" T h e y c a n n o t issue a m a n d a m u s to t h e P r e s c i e n t o r i>egisla*< t a r e , o r t o a n y of t h e i r officers—(the c o n s t i t u t i o n c o n t r o l l i n g t h e c o m m o n
« l a w in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r l y . ) " W h e n t h e B r i t i s h t r e a t y of 1 8 0 7 a r r i v e d , w i t h o u t
** a n y p r o v i s i o n a g a i n s t i m p r e s s m e n t 0 f o u r s e a m c n , I d e t e r m i n e d n o t t o ratify




28
" i t . T h e S e n a t e t h o u g h t I should ask t h e i r a d v i c e . I thought t h a t w o u l d
•' b e a m o c k e r y of t h e m , w h e n I w a s p r e d e t e r m i n e d against following it,
" should t h e y advise its ratification. T h e constitution had m a d e t h e i r a d v i c e
** n e c e s s a r y t o confirm a t r e a t y , b u t not to reject it. T h i s has been b l a m e d
" by s o m e ; b u t I have n e v e r doubted its s o u n d n e s s . I n the cases of t w o per" s o n s , anlcnatt, u n d e r e x a c t l y similar c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the tederal c o u r t had
" d e t e r m i n e d t h a t one of t h e m ( D u a i i c ) was not a e i t i / e n ; the H o u s e of R e «* p r e s e n t a t i v c s , n e v e r t h e l e s s d e t e r m i n e d that the other, (Smith, of South
** C a r o l i n a , ) w a s a citi'/.en, and a d m i t t e d him to a seat in their body* D u a n e
*' was a r e p u b l i c a n , a n d Smith a federalist, and these decisions were d u r i n g
'* the federal a s c e n d e n c y . T h e s e are e x a m p l e s of my position, that each of
*< the t h r e e d e p a r t m e n t s has e q u a l l y tlie ri^ht to d e c i d e for itself what is its
t(
d u t y u n d e r the c o n s t i t u t i o n , without a n y r e g a r d to what the others m a y
** h a v e d e c i d e d for t h e m s e l v e s u n d e r a similar q u e s t i o n / *
W i t h o u t e n t e r i n g at this t i m e , sir, into a n v discussion of those i m p o r t a n t
p r i n c i p l e s , 1 will only say, t h a t if the p r e s e n t Chief M a g i s t r a t e h a s s i n n e d
a g a i n s t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n by a n y d o c t r i n e * which he has a d v a n c e d , or is s u p p o s ed to e n t e r t a i n , on this subject, he l*as sinned in c o m p a n y with the g r e a t
a p o s t l e of A m e r i c a n l i b e r t y a n d of the rights of m a n .
T o s u m , up t h e n , in a few w o r d s , the results of what lias been said, I t h i n k
it has b e e n s h o w n t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to the t r u e theory of the constitution, t h e
P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , in whom the *•= executive power is v e s t e d , " is
m a d e responsible for the c o n d u c t and proceedings of all the Executive D e p a r t m e n t s — t h a t , as a n e c e s s a r y c o n s e q u e n c e of that responsibility, he has a constitutional right to inspect, s u p e r i n t e n d , and control, the operation* of t h o s e
D e p a r t m e n t s — a n d that at the v e r y o r g a n i s a t i o n of the G o v e r n m e n t , i m m e d i a t e l y s u c c e e d i n g the adoption of tlie c o n s t i t u t i o n , the correctness of t h e s e
p r i n c i p l e s w a s a c k n o w l e d g e d in the most formal m a n n e r , a n d after the fullest
discussion, b y an explicit legislative recognition of the p o w e r of the P r e s i d e n t
t o r e m o v e from office a n y of t h e functionaries of the E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t s
a p o w e r which has n e v e r since been q u e s t i o n e d .
B u t to avoid t h e application of these principles to t h e subject u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the e x t r a o r d i n a r y novelty has been a d v a n c e d t h a t tlie S e c r e t a r y of
t h e T r e a s u r y is not an executive officer. H o w then has it h a p p e n e d , M r - P r e s i d e n t , t h a t from the origin of tlie G o v e r n m e n t to the p r e s e n t d a v , he h a s b e e a
associated with the H e a d s of the other D e p a r t m e n t s in the C a b i n e t of t h e
P r e s i d e n t ? B y w h a t title could the P r e s i d e n t of the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e q u i r e of
h i m , as w e k n o w has b e e n often d o n e , w his opinion in w r i t i n g upon s u b j e c t s
r e l a t i n g to the d u t i e s of his office," which the constitution authorizes him to d o
o n l y " o f t h e principal officer in each of the Executive
Departments?"
Do
g e n t l e m e n e x p e c t us to forget the most familiar facts which have been p a s s i n g
u n d e r our e y e s , for n e a r l y half a c e n t u r y , in o r d e r to sustain their novel t h e o ries? O n w h a t , t h e n , sir, is this n e w d o c t r i n e founded, that the S e c r e t a r y of
t h e T r e a s u r y is not an e x e c u t i v e officer?
Is it that in the m e r e title of t h e
a c t for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t , it does not h a p p e n t o
b e s t y l e d an E x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t ? T h e a c t s for the establishment of t h e
o t h e r D e p a r t m e n t s a r e s t y l e d , it seems, in the title» (forming no part of t h e
l a w itself) ' " A n a c t to establish an K x e c u t i v e D e p a r t m e n t , to be d e n o m i n a t e d
t h e D e p a r t m e n t of W a r / * and so likewise of the S t a t e a n d N a v y D e p a r t m e n t s ,
w h i l e t h e a c t for the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the T r e a s u r y , is s i m p l y s t y l e d i a i t s
title ** A n a c t to establish t h e T r e a s u r y D e p a r t m e n t / *
" N o w , sir, if this difference in the title w a s not the r e s u l t of m e r e a c c i d e n t ,
as I a m inclined to think it w a s , for I find that t h e title w a s the s a m e as of t h e
other a c t s , in all t h e p r e l i m i n a r y and i n t e r m e d i a t e p r o c e e d i n g s , d o w n t o t h e
ver
y passage of t h e a c t , (after w h i c h , a c c o r d i n g to the p a r l i a m e n t a r y c u s t o m ,
a formal e n t r y is m a d e on t h e j o u r n a l TO this efteet: " O r d e r e d t h a t t h e t i t l e
of t h e a c t " b e so a n d so;) if, sir, I s a v , this difference w a s n o t m e r e l y a c c i d e n 


*9
tal, it is sufficiently explained by the different organization X>f the Treasury
Department, compared with the other Departments. T h e organization of the
other Departments is simple and homogeneous, consisting, in e a c h / of one
principal officer, the head of the Department, and of clerks employed under
him, to perform, as he shall direct and arrange it, the business of the Departm e n t . But, on the other hand, the organization of the T r e a s u r y Department
is complex and diversified. It consists not only of one principal officer, the
head of the Department and his clerks, but of various other officers, of a hi«*h
and important grade, whose respective functions are classified and arranged by
the law itself—such as the Comptroller, the Auditor, the Register, the T r e a surer. T h e functions of some of these officers, of the Comptroller and of the
Auditor for example, seem to partake somewhat of the judicial character; and
it will be seen in the debates on the organization of the Treasury Department
that this idea was suggested in relation to the Comptroller particularly,
by M r . Madison, who, for that reason, proposed to modify differently the
tenure of his office. T h e same idea, we have seen it stated in the newspapers, in regard to the character of the Auditor's functions, has recently furnished, in my own State, the ground of an able and ingenious argument against
Ihe constitutionality of a particular act of Congress. In the organization of the
t r e a s u r y Department then, embracing officers of this description, whose
functions appeared to partake, in a considerable degree, of the judicial character, doubts might have arisen as to the propriety of denominating the whole
Department an Executive Department; though certainly, in regard, to the head
fcf the Department himself, his functions are obviously and exclusively executive.
I W h a t , sir, are those functions as prescribed by the act for the establishment
l>£ the Treasury Department? T o report and prepare plans for the improvement and management of the revenue, & c ; to prepare and report estimates of
the public expenditure, & c ; to superintend the collection of the revenue; to
pecide on the forms of keeping and stating accounts, & c ; and to grant warrants for money to be issued from the Treasury, in pursuance of appropriations
by law; and to execute services relative to the sales of public lands, &x. All
these functions, I think, sir, must be allowed to be Executive.
T h e only other
duty prescribed by the act is to make report and give information to either
branch of the Legislature, & c , respecting all matters referred to him by them,
or which shall appertain to his office, &c. I t is this circumstance, it seems, of re*
l^prting to Congress which is considered as divesting the Secretary of the Treasure of the character of an Executive officer. But, sir, does not the President him"•4fs the chief Executive officer, report to Congress? Is he not required by the
constitution to " give, from time to time, to Congress, information of the state
V of the Union, and to recommend to them such measures as he shall judge
** necessary and expedient;" in other words, to report to Congress both facts
fend opinions, just as the Secretary of the Treasury does? Do not the other
H e a d s of Departments, also, report, whenever required, to Congress? A r e
not resolutions adopted almost every day in the one house or the other, directing them to report on some matter or other?
T h e circumstance of reporting to Congress, then, surely, cannot divest the Secretary of the Treasury of the character of an Executive officer; which character
he has borne in the practice of the Government, and in the understandingof tho
community, as well as in the view of the law, from the adoption of the constitution to the present day. As little, sir, can the omission to denominate him
an Executive officer, in the mere title of the act establishing the Department
of which he forms a part, have that effect, (explained too, as that omission i»
bv the circumstances to which I have adverted,) if ihe functions
assigned to
him by the act itself be, as T think all must admit them to be, Executive
iu
their nature. But there is still another criterion, if another were necessary
for ascertaining the character of his office. 1 mean its tenure. T h e Secrcta*



30
ry of the Treasury holds his office by precise! v the same tenure as e v e r y other
H e a d of a Department. He is removable bv the President, p r e c i s e l y i s the
same way as other Secretaries are: and th:tt removability is d e c l a r e d i * the
act creating the Trea-ury Department, in identically the same t e r m s and
maimer that the removability of the other Secietarier i- declared i a t h e acts
constituting their respective department-.
Hv reference to the d e b a t e s «f
Congress in "89, on the power of removal bv the President, it will be s e e n that
the removability of public otlicers by the P r e - d e n t . w;is consitlered a s dependi n g solely on the circumstance of their h e m - K.n>-uttvt officers or otherwise.
All JKxecutivt officer* were regarded a* mere a-.i-tai.t-. and substitutes o f the
President, in the exercise of that /*./> f//"o }• >w- r -whku the constitution had
vested wholly in him, and a- such, oueht to' bi'. and were removable by him
at pleasure. T h e act eMabli-hins: the Tiva^nrv Department, therefore, in
expressly recognising, as it <!.*•>. the remo\ abillrv o\ the Secretary o f the
Treasury, by the President, virtually declares him" to he an JJufCittive officer.
T h e power of removal, t-xi-tin^ alike in re^artl to the Secretary o f the
Treasury and the other heads u f Departmentf. mav be rinhtfullv e x e r c i s e d for
reasons so various, that it is impossible TO reduce ih = -m to"*auv general classing
cation.
The President, who pos-.e*se> the power, i- to p u l s e , in the firtl
instance at least, of the reason- for its exerci-e. In the dehate of ' 8 9 , a*
frequently appealed to on this subject. Mr. Madison -aid. " If a head of a^
" Department shall not conform to the ;>>,.is>.it„? of thr President,
in doing
" the executive tluties of hi- office. !„• 'mav be displaced ** T h e honorabB
Senator irom New Jersey. M i . Southard.'' w ho -poke a few davs a g o , cite*
the. opinion expressed by Mr. Madison in the -ame debate, that the P r e s i d e n t
might be impeached for a wanton removal . T a public othcer. Sir. I d o n <*
tloubt it: but I beg l e a \ e t o remind the honorable Senator of ft c o r r e l a t » #
opinion delivered bv Mr. Madison on the same occasion that the P r e s i d e n t
might be properly impeached also for nezltctiirr
i„ remove a public o f i l c e *
w h e n the public interest demanded i». And this. Mr. >„.«,est* the true mod*
ot testing the question which has been raised of the Pre-Ident'* constitutional
power to remove the late Secretary of the Treasurv, for his refusal, ( i n thi
language ot Mr. Madison just cited. 1 •• to conform' to the judgment o r t | #
President on ihe subject of the public depo-ite-. I . c t u s reverse t h e caat
which actually occurred, and suppose tha* the Secretary of the T r e a i w * .
instead oi the President, had desired a transf..,- u f the public depositee—thnf*
he did so without any sufficient reason, and was about to commit them to Bank*
ot questionable solvency or ot notorious ins .Uencv. If the President, e n t e r !
taming a different opinion of the expediency and propriety of the measu*«i
had stood by and renouncing the suhirarv control which the constitution had
placed in his hands by the power of removal, had permitted his S e c r e t a r y
quietly to consummate his purpose, on the ground that the P r e s i d e n t had
no 11 ^ it to i n t c 1 ^ i e w 11 Vi a uiscretionarv power entrusted bv C o n g r e s s to A
head of a Department, what then would" have been said? \ V e should h m »
heard, sir, denunciation? not less loud and vehement than those w h i c h h«v*
been uttered on the present occasion, thundered against him, but upon ft
different principle. A\> should then have been told, sir, that the P r e s i d e n t
had been recreant to his high trust—that he had been armed with the p o w e r *f
removal expressly to protect the public interests from the faithlessness qr
incapacity of public officers, and that in fail ins: to exercise it, he had we*kW
and w i c k e d l y betrayed his duty to the constitution and to the country*
Having thus reviewed, Mr."President, the doctrines, to me, I m u s t s a y ,
novel doctrines, of constitutional law which have been advanced bv the h o n o r able Senator from K e n t u c k y . rMr. Clay." I will detain the Senate but w i t h %
few words more. T h e honorable Senator told us. with a deep and m o u r n f u l
patho* t that we are in the midst of a revolution.
1 a^ree with him, sir; w e
ARE in the midst of a revolution—a happv and auspicious revolution, like t}*e



31
fi

civil revolution of 1800,*' which, according to M r . Jefferson, was " as real a
•• revolution in the principles, as that of *?6 was in the form, of our Govern*« inent.** A like salutary revolution " in the principles of the Government,"
w e have seen accomplished during the last five years of its administration^
I n that time, sir, we have seen the Government brought back to its « republic a n t a c k / 7 from the deviations of latitudinous power into which it had fatally
fallen* W e have seen an unconstitutional and corrupting system of internal
improvements, under the patronage of the federal authority, arrested, and
those great local interests remitted to their natural and safe guardians, the
Governments of the States* W e have seen the Bank, the " first-born*' of
federal usurpations, foiled in its efforts to perpetuate its existence, and to confirm its triumph over the sanctity of the constitution. W e have seen, finally,
i\\e American System of the honorable Senator himself—a system which we of
chi* South have felt to be one, not of protection* but oppression—-we have seen
t h a t , too, partially overthrown and abandoned. H e r e , indeed, is a happy and
glorious revolution for those who have cherished the cardinal principles of
limited constitutional construction, of freedom of industry, of equality of
public burthens* And for these great results, we are indebted to the firmness,
t h e vigor, the patriotism, of the individual who now presides over the administration of the Government, sustained by the virtuous confidence of a free
people*
W e have, sir, the authentic and positive declarations of the honorable
Senator from Kentucky himself, made on this floor during the last session,
t h a t it was owing to tlie known and determined opposition of the Chief M a gistrate to the protective system, sustained as it was foreseen he would be by
a n increased popular support in the present Congress, that the honorable
Senator consented to yield what he did of that system in the compromise of
last winter. T h e other great reforms of national policy have been accomplished by the direct agency of that higher power which the constitution has placed
in the hands of the President, as a shield, among other purposes, for the protection of the just rights of the States, and which he has faithfully and firmly
w e l d e d for that object. Used, sir, as that power has been, 1 cannot sympathise in the sentiments of indignant reprobation with which its exercise has
b«*cn denounced by the honorable Senator of Kentucky. It is a power, sir,
which has been exerted in the best constitutional t i m e s o f England, and of our
o w n country. I n England, William the T h i r d , a veneration for whose memory
is pronounced by a late writer on the constitutional history of England to be
tht- true test of JSngiish whiggism, exercised it—an exercise rendered necessar y , and justified, we are told by one of the historians of the times, by the
existence of " a strong party in the House of I^ords9 who entertained deep designs*"
Our own Maoisou, sir, than whom there never lived a man more
virtuous, more conscientious, more scrupulous in the use of power, nor yet one
firmer in the discharge of duty, did not hesitate to exercise it. T h e limited opportunities of research I have'had, have disclosed no less than half a dozen i n stances in which he resorted to the veto; four of those during the first term of his.
presidency—and one of them, (the veto of the " Bonus bill for Internal Improvem e a t , " ) the very last act of his public lifr; thus rendering an appropriate and
impressive homage to the constitution, on retiring from its highest trust. I
cannot see, then, in the use of the veto by the present Chief Magistrate, a n r
cause of alarm for the liberties of the country.
1 confess,^ sir, I consider those liberties far more seriously threatened b r
the unconstitutional institution with whose grasping ambition we are m m
struggling. If, sir, it shall triumph in this vital struggle, then, indeed, a fatal
revolution will have been accomplished. T h e time will have arrived, which
was foretold by the great republican statesman,, [Mr. Jefferson/] whose prophetic and instructive warnings wTere read to us by the Senator from Missouri
when a moneyed power, self-constituted
and irresponsible, will have supersed


32
e d t h e delegated
a n d responsible
G o v e r n m e n t of t h e P e o p l e i n i t s actiMiV
G e n t l e m e n i n t h e c o u r s e of t h i s d e b a t e h a v e d e c l a i m e d m u c h o n t h e d a n g e r *
o u s i n f l u e n c e of m o n e y .
B u t t h e o n l y m o n e y w h o s e i n f l u e n c e t h e y s e e m tt>
r e g a r d a s d a n g e r o u s , is t h e m o n e y of t h e P e o p l e — m o n e y r a i s e d a n d a p p r o p r i a t e d b y t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e P e o p l e — d i s b u r s e d b y r e s p o n s i b l e officers—
Bfct
l o c k e d u p b y t h e i€ s t r o n g b o l t s a n d b a r s of t h e law** f r o m c o r r u p t u s e l
t h e y s e e m t o b e w h o l l y i n s e n s i b l e to t h e d a n g e r of m o n e y in t h e h a n d s o£ *
g r e a t c o r p o r a t i o n , w i e l d i n g a n i m m e n s e c a p i t a l at w i l l , w i t h o u t c o n t r o l , W**hf
out responsibility.
.*; .
L e t C o n g r e s s , s i r , a b s t a i n f r o m u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a p p r o p r i a t i o n s ; l e t tfcfe
m b l i c e x p e n d i t u r e b e r e s t r a i n e d t o t h e s i m p l e a n d e c o n o m i c a l w a n t s of r e p u b *
i c a n g o v e r n m e n t ; l e t t h e a c c o u n t a b i l i t y of p u b l i c d i s b u r s e m e n t s b e e n f o r c e d ;
a n d w e s h a l l h a v e b u t l i t t l e d a n g e r t o a p p r e h e n d f r o m t h e m o n e y of t h e p e o p l e .
B u t , sir, w e shall b y those m e a n s h a v e p r o v i d e d but a poor security against the
d a n g e r o f m o n e y , if, a t t h e s a m e t i m e , w e i n v i t e i t s c o n c e n t r a t i o n i n t h e h a n d *
o f a n o r g a n i z e d a s s o c i a t i o n , a n d g i v e it t h u s a r t i f i c i a l f a c u l t i e s of u n i t e d a o d b t t
and accumulated power,
A profound t h i n k e r , M I \ with w h o m I have had the good fortune to serve in
t h e p u b l i c c o u n c i l s , b u t w h o i s n o w in p r i v a t e l i f e , a n d t o w h o m it affords n e
s i n c e r e g r a t i f i c a t i o n t o h a v e t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y of p a y i n g t h e t r i b u t e of a c o r d i s
a n d r e s p e c t f u l r e m e m b r a n c e , [ M r . S . ( \ A l k n , t,f M a s s a c h u s e t t s , ] h a s betfu- *
t i f u l l y a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s a i d , t h a t " a s s o c i a t e d w e a l t h i s t h e dynasty
<£:^
S i r , it is so* T h i > m o d e r n d y n a s t v is n o w s e e k i n g t o e s u 3 > V
modern States/5
l i s h i t s s w a y o \ e r u s in t h e w o i > t of a l l f o r m s — t h a t of a g r e a t l e g a l c o r p o r a t i o n ,
ramified a n d e x t e n d e d through the U n i o n , d i r e c t e d by irresponsible authority,,
c o n t r o l l i n g t h e f o r t u n e s a n d t h e h o p e s of i n d i v i d u a l s a n d c o m m u n i t i e s . , nift*-^
e n e i n g t h e p u b l i c p r e - s , d u ^ a t i n ^ ;,> t h e o r g a n s of t h e p u b l i c w i l l ¥ •;;
I m a y b e p e r m i t t e d , M r . P r e s i d e n t , t o r e c a l l to t h e r e c o l l e c t i o n of t h e senflfce. r
t h e s o l e m n l a n g u a g e of a g r e a t p a t r i o t a m ' s t a t e s m a n of a n o t h e r c o u m r y , « n ,
a n occasion not u n l i k e the presentI t w a s on t h e m e m o r a b l e i m p e a c h m e n t - ^ f ^
W a r r e n H a s t i n g s , s i r , t h a t E d m u n d B u r k e , w i t h t h e p r o f o u n d s a g a c i t y vrhtfJh^
b e l o n g e d t o h i s g e n i u s , h e l d t h e f o l l o w i n g i m p r e c i s e l a n g u a g e t o t h e bigh*«S<
j u d i c i a l a m i . l e g i s l a t i v e b o d y of hi* c o u u i r v :
^
7
" T o - d a y t h e C o m m o n s of ( J r e a i B r i t a i n p r o s e c u t e t h e d e l i n q u e n t s of India*A
" * ? " m o r n i w t h e d e l i n q u e n t s of I n d i a m a v b e t h e C o m m o n s of G r e a t B n t a m ,
** YV e a l l k n o w a n d feel t h e t h r e e of m o n e y , a n d w e n o w c a l l u p o n y o u for
Jt^fmt$
« 1 U t l ^ l s c a u * e o l i n o ^ e y . W e c a l l u p o n v o u for t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f o u r w w / w j
" —t>f o u r virtues.
W e c a l l u p o n v o u V o r o u r national
character,
We
4t
u p o n y o u for o u r Jlhir'ir.- **
S i r . an .Vmericau Senator, a g p l v m g to his o w n times and c o u n t s
m**
s o l e m n a p p e a l of t h e B r i t i s h p a t r i o t ) m i g h t w e l l s a v : T o - d a v t h e C o n g r e s s ^
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s s i t s in j u d g m e n t o n t h e m o n o p o l i s t s of t h e B a n k .
T
irJ
r o w t h e m o n o p o l i s t s of t h e B a n k m a y b e t h e C o n g r e s s of t h e U n i t e d * t a t
A i l h i s t o r y h a t h 1 a u g h t u s tlie d a n g e r o u s p o w e r of n m n e v e d c o r p o r a t i o n s , «
w e n o w s e e a n d feel t h a t p o w e r e x e r t e d i n t h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s ot a l l f o r m a l
a s s a i l i n g t h e p u r i t y of o u r r e p u b l i c a n m a n n e r s , u n d e r m i n i n g t h e s t a b i l i t y of (
i n s t i t u t i o n s , a n d a w i n g t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of o u r p u b l i c c o u n c i l s .
ftir|?
A m e r i c a n P e o p l e — y e s , s i r , t h e People—when
their t r u e voice shall be
c a l l u p o n u s for Justice
i n t h i s g r e a t c a u s e of m o n e y v i o l a t i n g a n d t r a m pi i
u p o n t h e g u a r a n t e e s of f r e e d o m .
T h e y c a l l u p o n u s for t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f j
public morals,
exposed to a n e w and d a r i n g corruption.
T h e y call upon u$.
f o r t h e v i n d i c a t i o n of o u r national
character
f r o m t h e s c a n d a l of p r a c t i c e s bft^C
fore u n k n o w n in o u r history.
T h e y c a l l u p o n u s for t h e r e s c u e of t h e i r libi
Hes f r o m t h e g r a s p of a selfish a n d u n r e l e n t i n g m o n e y e d d e s p o t i s m .
TT
c a l l u p o n u s , s i r , for t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e s e hi-^h d u t i e s , a n d w o r t h i l y
t r u s t , will the call b e a n s w e r e d b y the
firmness,
the c o n s t a n c y , and
fl»,
p a t r i o t i s m of t h e i r R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
V,

f