Full text of The Southwest Economy : September 1989
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IIII' II III R.\I RI'" RH H \ , ... 01' I)\I.I-\"i meriClns are incre'.lSin~ly conexmed alx>ul lhe size and per..lStence of the V.S. trade delicit. The Vnited StatL'S. which was Ihe world's largest creditor nine years ago, c. now the world's largeSl: del}(or, As 3 re.ull, proleclioni,s{ sentiment is on Ihe rise. Proponents of trade protL"CIion claim that Americans 3re exponing manufacluring jobs and 3rgue that Irade restraints bolster over.lll employment, panicul:trly in the protected induslry. The intent of trade restr:aints is to increase the competitiveness of thc proteeted domestic industries. By raising the price or limiting the supply of imponed goods, domestic proouccrs gain a greater market share. IkncfilS also now to industries that supply the proteeted seclor. Consequently, all these industries experience increased employment. Tr:ade protcetion, how. e\'er, imposes costs on the economy 3S well. Consumers face higher prices bec-Juse trade restraints increase Ihe domestic price of the ProleclL"d good and its impon subslilUles. Higher prices also afTe<1 ()(her linns that purchase the Prole<1ed good as an input. Again, consumers P3Y higher prices. Higher prices reduce sales and. Iherefore, employment. TIle key queslion is: Does trade proleclion increase or decrease overall employment? Because the industrial composition of the v3riOUS C.S. regions difTers. lhe regions may face unequal employment effects. \\nile one region ma)' g3in Trade A Protection: Its Effect on the Southwest " 1>1'1 \1HI'R t'lWI employment. anocher may lose. TIle question Ihis anicle addresses is: Whal are Ihe employment efTects in the SoUlhwest of protecth'e trade policies? I examine three cases of trade prolfflion. lextiles and apparel. steel, and 3ulorllobiles. These are among the largest industries in Ihe United St3tes and 3re well-known examples of prote(1ioniSl: policies. TextlJes and Apparel -111e history of pr()(ection in Ihe textiles and apparel industry is long and complicated. Chan I lists the trade agrt.'emenls negotiated over the past 32 yt:ars ;lnd ilJustr:ates how the level of protection has risen. ' In;1 1957 agreement. Japan vOlllntarChan 1 Textiles and Apparel: History of Trade Protection ~ '" ~ m - " " ,m .. '" 141111;211'.' VRA • vauw.y AIInoriII'V-..nI STA . Shot! T.-m ~ LTA 'lQngT.-m~ I.AFA_ .......... ~ This document was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org). ily agreed to restria its exports of fabrics to the United States. As a result, imports from other countries, including Hong Kong, Portugal, Egypt and India, qUickly replaced the Japanese g<xxls. In 1961, the United States reached a one-year agreement with other textile exporters, called the -Short Teml Arrangement on Cotton Textiles. - The succeeding, long Term Arrangement on Conon Textiles, broadened product coverage and extended from 1962 through 1973. Increased produdion of man-made fibers induced the United States to seek even wider product coverage. In 1974, the United States reached an expanded agreement with its trading partners, known as the "Multifiber Arrangement,which prOVided an international fmmework for negotiating bilateral agreements. The l\lultifiber Arrangement has since been renewed three times, each time covering a wider scope of prodUdS and countries. The current agreement, which will extend through 19')1, includes 54 developed and developing countries. The tariff or eqUivalent rate for imports of textiles and apparel rose from 20 percent in 1957 to 30 percent by 1982. As the level of protection increased. the costs and the benefits of these trAde agreements increased as well. These tariff or equivalent mtes caused the domestic price of textiles and apparel to increase by 16 percent in 1974 and 24 percent in 1984. An extensive stud~' by Gary Hufbauer. Di::tne Berlinger ,ltId Kimberly Elliott estimates that consumers paid from 59.4 billion in 1974 up to 527 billion in 1984 because of the higher import and domeslic prices of textiles and clothing. Domestic produccrs gained slightly less on average; estimates f'"Jnge from 58.4 billion to 522 billion. l I-ligher import prices for textiles :md apparel enabled American producers to increa~ their domestic market share. In 1984, U.S. employment in the textile :mJ apparel industry was 640.000 jobs above its free tmde level. About 29,600 of those additional jobs were in the Southwest (Arizona. Louisiana. New t-Iexico, Oklahoma and Tex:ls). Protection also stimulated employment in industries that supply inputs 10 textiles and apparel production. I estimate that the Multifiber ArrAngement 111 increased employment in the Southwest by 40.800 jobs. TIlis figure includes Ihe increases in both the textiles and apparel industry and its Table 1 Net Changes In Southwest Employment Resulting from Trade Protection Protected Industry: Textiles and Apparel Steel Automobiles (Number of Jobs) Affected Industry: Food and Kindred Products Textiles and Apparel Products Other Nondurables Lumber and Wood Products Other Durables Transportation Communication and Utilities Wholesale Trade Retail Trade Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Services Total -54 -103 8,759 -85 -565 -88 -6 -3 4 -6 -9,345 -1,127 -511 -164 -858 -28 -52 11 54 -20 135 103 29 -461 -1 ,071 -3,258 -259 261 -39 -798 -3,060 -381 8,778 -20,358 -1,455 -50 suppliers. On the other hand, industries using textiles faced higher input prices. As increased costs were p:lsscd on to the conSllmer, sales declined and nnns reduced production. In the Southwest, the 24-percent increase in domestic textile prices occurring in 1984 caused a loss of 32,000 jobs. On net, therefore, protectiOn of textiles and ;Ipparel meant only 8.800 additional jobs in the Southwest. Chart 2 Nel Change in Employment Resulting from Protection in Textiles and Apparel NumDe' o! JoOs 5.029 Table 1 lists the net changes in employment in different sectors resulting from trade protection, The first column lists the effects of the Multifiber ArrJngement Ill. Some sedOrs gained in employment while olher SC(10rS lost jobs as a result of trade proledion. TIle textile and apparel industry alone had a net employment gain of 8.800 jorn>. The retail trade industry suffered the greatest loss in employment. Chart 2 shows the net gains in employment for each of the five stales. W1hile Texas gained the most in absolute employment, the number of jobs created in Oklahoma was a larger percentage of its total employment. Oklahoma's employment increased by 0.16 percent, while the other fOllr statcs' employment increased by around 0.1 percent. Steel In 1969, in:1O effon to forestall a bill limiting U.S. imports of stecl..Japan and This document was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org). members of the Europe:m Economic Community voluntarily agreed to restrict their exports to the United States. This agreement expired in 1974 and was not renewed (C!Jm13). In 1978. the United St;ltes imposed the Trigger Price Mechanism, which eSlablished import reference prices based on estimates of Japanese costs of production, profit margins and tr.msport:l.tion costs. Countries exporting steel below the reference price were subjected to expedited antidumping investigations. Countries found dumping steel on the intern:nional marketplace-seiling steel ;\broad at a price below their estimated costs of production-faced increased trade barriers. By January 1982. American steel companies had flied 110 antidumping petitions against II COllntries. In an effon to settle these petitions, the United States negotiated a voluntary restrnint agreement with Japan and imposed a quota :l.g:linst the Europe:ln Economic Community. In 1984 and 1985, other sK.oe1 exporters :Ilso negotiated voluntary restmint :lgreements with the United States. which were scheduled to e~pire september 1989. President Bush recently announced that the agreements will be extended into 1992. Like clolhing :md textiles. the level of protection for the U.S, st(.oel industry increased with every new agreement Chart 3 Carbon Steel: History of Protection TarillO/ EQUival8f1l Ral8 W8fcenl} ~r------------, ~I------- ~I------ VRA • Voluntary R&S1rlIlm Ag<88m&m TPM· Ttigg8f Pric8 MlK:/lanosm Chart 4 Net Change in Employment Resulting from Prolection in Steel Numt>&r of Jobs reached. [n 1974. lhe tariff or equivalent mte was llbout 13 percent. It reached 30 percent by 1984. These tariff or equiv:llent rates C'J.used the price of domestic steel to rise by 5 percent in 1974 and 12 percent in 1984. To Americl.O consumers, the estimated annu:Il cost of higher steel prices increa.sed from 52 billion in 1974 to 56.8 billion in 1984. G:lins to domestic steel producers increased from 51.3 billion to 53.8 billion over the same period. The gains in employment caused by steel protection are more limited than those caused by tmde restr.lints in textiles and a.pparel. The tl"Jde restraints in 1984 allowed steel produc~ ers to expand their domestic production and. as a result, to increase their employment natiOnally by 9,000 jobs above the frce-tl"Jde level. Because lhe Southwest produces very little steel relative to the rest of the coumry. imporl restrictions increased employment by only 400 jobs in the region, My input-outpllt analysis indicates th:\I protection created 1,300 jobs in steel and steel-supplying firms. On the negative side, the Southwest is :1 large steel user. As a result of [he 12-percent increase in domestic steel prices. 21.600 jobs were lost beouse st,--"Cl-using finns suddenly faced higher input costs. Consequently, net employmem in the Southwest decreased by 20.300 jobs..! The second column of Table 1 shows the employment effects of protection in steel. Because sK"C1 is :1.0 input in the production of so many goods, employment decreased in all of the industries listed. The largest loser was the geneT'"JI durable goods category, which includes heavy steel-using industries such as tmnsportation equipment, machinery, and other fabricated metal products. The retail tl"Jde and service industries incurred the se<:ond and third largest losses in employment. Ch:l11 4 shows the net losses in employment for each of the five states in the Southwest. Texas incurred the greatest losses in employment. The trade restraints in steel caused a loss of 10.900 jobs in Texas. New Mexico lost 3,500 jobs, while the other three states each lost about 2.000 jobs. New Mexico lost the gre:ltesl percentage of jobs-itS employment decreased by 1.06 percent. Employment in louisiana decreased by 0,16 percent, while each of the other three states suffered job reductions of around 0.2; percent. Automobiles Although steel import restrJ.ints in the mid·l980s hurt the automobile industry, car proou(.'tion was buoyed by its own protection. In April 1981, Americans negotiated a voluntary restraint agreement with Japan to limil Japanese exports to the United States. The restraints on Japanese car imports greatly increased the production of domestic cars, as well as prices and industry profits. From 1980 to 1985. the value of U.S. car production Chart 5 Automobile Production and Imports Million Dollars :o]~~!=t/I _. = i4::: :7' 1970 197~ 1980 ' - I19M ~ VflA_~ This document was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org). increased almost 200 percent (Chal1 5). Over the pre<:eeding five years, it increased only 43 percent. When the voluntary restraint agreement expired in April 1985, the United States did not ask Japan to extend it. Since then, however, Japan continues to voluntarily limit car exports to the United States, although at a less restridive level. The voluntary restr:J.int agreement with Japan cost American consumers much more in higher prices than domestic producers gained in increased production and profits. The agreement between Japan and the United States C"J.used the price of imported cars to increase by II percent. This led to a 4.4-percent increase in the price of domestic automobiles in the United St;ltes. Consumers paid 55.8 billion, and producers gained 52.6 billion in 1984 as a result of the higher price of cars. On a national level, the voluntary restr;tint agreement with Japan saved 55,000 jobs in the auto industry. This translates into 2,400 jobs in the Southwest. In 1984, the automobile and its supplying industries gained 4,700 jobs in the Southwest. Industries in the Southwest that purchase cars, however, los! about 6,100 jobs. This means that the Southwest incurred a net loss in employment of 1,400 tabs as a result of the volumary restraint agreement with Japan. While there was a net loss in employment in the Southwest as a whole. Oklahoma :md Texas experienced a net gain in jobs as a result of the volumary restruint agreement with Japan. As Chart 6 shows, Arizona, louisiana and New Mexico lost employment. The third column of Table I lists the employment changes in different industries as a result of the voluntary restrJint agreement with Japan. Most of !he induslries listed incurred a dedine in employment, with the exception of the generul nondurable goods category. TIle dUr:J.blc goods industries lost about 500 jobs. The second and third highest losers in temlS of employment were the retail Chart 6 Net Change in Employment ReSUlting from Protection in Automobiles Numbllf 01 Jobs -0;,,- '" " of so many products, steel import restr"ints negatively affed employment in the region. The only industry in the Southwest gaining employment from trude proteclion is textiles and apparel. Duruble goods and retail trade industries consistently lost jobs. Contrary to the arguments advanced by proponents of trude protection, tr"de restraints do not increase overull employment-at least not in the Southwest. -linda Iiunter ·1.500 sales and service industries. The single protective phase temporarily improved the aUlOmobile industry's profitability. Production increast.'d substantially while the voluntary restruint agreement was in place. ;lnd domestic automobile producers st.'emcd to become more effident in the mid-l980s. In 1988, the three largest U.S. automobile companies markt.-'ci their highest profits ever. This year, however, sales of Japanese cars arc soaring once again, and domestic automobile sales arc dropping.' Conclusion Tmdc prOlt."<:tion produces both winners and losers. Consumers always pay for !rude protcction in the fonn of higher import and domestic prices. If the protected good is an input in the produdion of other goods, those related industries are hun by the higher cost and limited supply of their input. The protected industry and its suppliers are the only dear winners in the short 1 The tariff or equiv31ent rute refers to the 3ctual t:lriff rate, or if a quota was imposed, the eqUivalent tariff that would have led to the same level of imports as the quota. 1 Consumer cost and producer cost estimates are from Iiufbauer, Gary Clyde, Diane T. Berlinger, and Kimberly Ann Elliot. Trade Protection in/he United Slates: 31 CaseS/tidies, WashinglOn, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1986. .I Arthur Denzau also estimates the regional employment effects of protedion in the steel industry in his article, "liow Import RestrJims Reduce Employment,· Center for the Study of American Business, Formal Publication Number 80, June 1987. • WallStreetjoumal, May 23.1989. nln. In the three cases r examined, the net effects of trude protection are, overJIl, negative for the Southwest. Tmde protection in the textile and apparel, steel and automobile industries led to a net loss of 13,000 jobs in the Soulhwesl. The trade restraints in textiles and app3re1 alone. however, increased employment for the Southwest. J'rote<:tion in the steel industry is the most h3mlful to the region. Because steel is used in the production This document was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org). Extreme Weather Hurts Southwest Agriculture Crop Moisture Index July 15. 1989 Linf:wOl'3ble weather condilions ha\'c damaged crops across the Southwesl. Since January. soll'le areas ha\'c received ne:irl)' tv.'ice their normal rainfall. OI.her areas ha\'e recei\-l.'d only about half lheir normal amount. In some rt..-gions. rain ome h:H(J and faSi. ousing more hann DIhan good. Poor weather cominues 10 O hamper growing conditions in many areas. Drought remains a :loerious concern throughout Soulh Tex3s (sre Map) where farmers 3nd ranchers 3re experiencing lheir second ycar of ~'lh3n'l1OIlT\3l rJin~ fall. i'\on-irrigalC:.'<I crops ha\-e been dam~ agl.>d. and poor l'3nge condilions 3re forc· ing l'3nchers 10 cominue their sl3ughter of NOTE Tl'40gpMooslute livestock. mDISlIn~. New Mexico and Arizon.1 :lre 31.'>0 suf~ fering from eXlrcmely dry condilioru;. Ranchbnd remains \'ery dry and crops :Ire rt.'quiring in=sed irrigation. Despile spring h3i1 and flooding. soil conditions are dry in p3rts of Oklahom:1 :md the Texas Panhandle. E:lrly in the year, Okl:ihom:1 :md nonhern 1'eX31> suffered drought damage to wheat and colton. When rains fin:IIl)' did arrive. heavy thunderstorms C'Juscd loc:II flooding and hail d:lmage 10 crops. Some cOllon and soybeans were replanted. hut wei soils delayed crop developml'nl. Now Northeast Oklahoma and much of the Texas P:lnh:mdle are once aRain in need of rain. Louisi:m:l experienced o o • • _.. --.. ANNOUNCEMENT The ] 990s--A Different Decade A Conference 011 tbe SOlltbwest Economy Sponsored by tbe federal ResenY! &lIIk ofDallas October 2rr21 /989 [Xillas. Te.xns For ,nformatio" call SUSl'm Brou·Il. Public Affairs Federal Resen'(! Btmk of Dallas ~ _ _ toOI _ _ Ill .... '- bIIow Iht surtIcI Ill..--.... toOl he:lvy rJinfall as Ihunden-loons and TropiC'JI Stonn Allison movl.'<i through Ihc 'talc E.xCC1>-,ive I""Jin C'JUsed disaPJX>inting whcal :Lnd oat h:l1'Vc.,ts and COl:lon and soybeans :lre now :;ho\\'ing ,i~ru. of dllnage. urge tl""JCI5 of prime f:lnnl:lnd remain flooded :lncl more I""Jln is l'xpo..'Clcd. In the Hlackl:lncb between Dall:ls and Austin, however. Rrowing condition... :lrc now f:l\'or-Jhle. Whe:ll :lnd 0:11 crops were d:ml:lRL'C1 by hail and frosl earlier this year. hlll prospects are now ~ood for C:ltlk:. COllon. corn :md milo. We:lther d:llll:lge throughout lhe SOlllhwest will n:.-'ducc 1989 agricultur:d prodllction. Although prices remain strong, :lgricllhul""JI income, will nOI met:l lasl year's levels. less than 45 percent of all crop acreage is insured in Tex:ls; 3nd. while disa:;ter assislance may slill he forthcoming. it i1> likely 10 be less generous Ihan 1:11>1 year. -Fiona Sigall:1 71x.· Southwest £COIlOIllY is published SL\( times annuall)' b)' the Fl.'<Ieral R~r"-e Uank of D:l.lla1>. The views expn..~>d arl.' 1001><.' of the aUlhon- and 1>hould nOl: be 3UribUIl.'d to the Feder-JI Reser\'(' Bank of Dall:ls or me Feder:lI Rl.~r\"e ~y'>!em_ Articles ma}' he reprint<.-d on the condition Ihat lhe source 11> Cn.'<IlIl.'d and a copy is PfO\1ded 10 Ihe Rese:uch Departnknl of the FederJI Reserve Bank of Dallas. 7be Solllhuy.'S/ Economy is a\"3ilable wilhout charge b)' wnlmg lhe i>Uhlic AlTaln- Department. Federal Reserw Rank of D31131>. '>tation K. D-Jllas. Texa:> -5222 or by telephoning (21 .. ) 651-6289, (214) 698-4405 This document was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org). Economic Conunentary by \l'l. Micbael Cox Vice Presidellt lIIul Ecollom;c AdL'isor Federal Reseroe Balik of Dal/as Education and the Reindustrialization of the Texas Economy Unlike much of the res( of the nation. Tex:lS is histone-.llly an eanh-derh':ltlve economy Our well·being has been derived largely from the ground; from oil. from :Jgrieulture. from cmle. and from the sale oflile land Il.self i'D"~ suppose llul we 1<X>k the state ofTexa~ and dried up all the oil. rem(l\'e<! pennanent]y :111 of the (";Iule. desHoyed most of the crops. and reduced the amount of mhabitable b.od by 90 jX'rcem 1hen suppose we built a large fence or dug :I deep ITlO3t around the state. so lhal no one could le:wc (at I~JSt not e'J.sily), ~ 61'SI question is, ~\l'h:1I would we h;l\'c?" The answer is ... Japall J3pan is an economy WIth no c.mlc. virtually no agriculture. relati\-dy little us:Jblc land. and wilh 311 its oil Imported: yet. il is one of the mOSl ~uccessful t.'COnomies In me world loday The second question is. "110\\ do Ihe Japanese do il?" 11lt: answer is ... ('(II/e(lf/ol' The realJty of JUSt how valuable t.'ducation is in today's world economy has ne\'~r b~~n made more de:lr to me than it was :1 couple of months ago whil~ talking with a young economiSl from japan. I asked him, "What m:lkes japan so successful?~ I-lis reply (in English) \vas, "In japan, you net.-d eduction." Our imllledi:lle respon~ is prob:lbly 10 agr<.'C. 13ll\ as to eX:ldly how educalion has enabled ):Ipan to he beuer off-to have one of lhe f:lstest growing economies and largesl trade surpluses in lhe world lQ{by-\\'e may Ik less sure. So the first pOint lhat I w:ml 10 make is that educalio1/ is embodi£'tI ill pn:xll/cls. Educ:Ilion is contained in products ... and in different amounts. Although, to my knowledge, no measure exists of the amount of educalion embodied in different lypes of prodUdS, I think we C"an all dearly S<.'C thaI different products embody eduction in different amounts. Consider. for eX:lmple. the avcr:age amO\lnt of human knowledge. education, infomlation. and rescarch--or whatever you'd like 10 call il-thal is implicitly contained in lhe anti-ulcer drug cimetidine as romp:lred to masht.'d potalocos; in microcomputers as compared 10 h:lnd-cr:mk adding machines; in nuclear power plants as compared 10 coal-burning facilities; or in microwave ovens as compar<.'d to conventional ooes. Educalion is embodied in different product.':> in different amounts. So when my friend told~, "Inj3pan, you need education,W he W3S re311y telling ~ that jap3n is producing goods which brgely embody education. Call1hem high-tech productS, or whatC\·t.."f, but jap:mcse goods are relath'ely imeoslve in knowledge 3nd eduction 3nd rel3tJ\'ely SClrce III ocher factors, such :IS naturJI n.·sources or e\'en 13bor. J3pan no longer has ch<.'3P bbor, so thil> is n<X the resource th3t the j3panese are no\\ 'ClllOg. They 3re selling eduction. Indeed, 00\\ thaI j3pan has made the tr:aru.ition from selling goods which emhody C~'3p !:thor to those which emlxxly education, their bhor IS no longer cheap. (In other words. lheir \\~Jges 3nd st3ndard of Ihm8 3re higher.) And th3t is an impcxtanl cOfllpan~ lx.'C3u:-c the \\-Jge difference ~3SUres the payoff to educ.uion japan:,> c:<pcl"iencc dearly hel~ u:'> undersl3nd the importance of t..'duCJtion m toWY':,> world economy. InslC3d of s\\m8mg a hoc, we are no\\ :,>phdng genes to develop a ne\\ :.tr:am of com cpable of wo\\ mg m ne:lr..<Jesen climates; illSl:c3d of 3~mblmg an :lulomobile, we 3rt" now Cft"3tinl"\ deSign o;oftw:lrc 10 produce a roboI: \\ hich will 3ssemble the :lutO; and inslc3d of building d:lms 10 harness the power of falling water or extrJcting oil from the ,lo:round to bum in power pbn!.:'>, \\e may be.'>OOn ,lo:enerJting power vi3 nuclear fusion in cold \\NJh:r_po\\Cr which would flow through :,>uperconduCli\c matcrial:,> TI1C world b in a period of unprecedentL>d technologic.i1 progreS:'>o BUI unlike prc\'iou:,> periods of technological change, science and t."(lucalion are havinfl, a tlirect effect on technological changc th~ linw (as compared to their effect in the P;ISI which wa:; i:trgdy oblique). This is clearly the mCSoSagc of to..'Chnological :ldvance:,> in such areas as biochemlc;Ll and biogenetic engint."'Cring. supercomputers, microproce:,>sors, computer :.oftwarc, :tero:;p:lc\:', medical t,--'Chnology. food tcchnology. rohotics, ceramics, so.::miconductors, fiber optics, composites, tclL'Comnmnicltions, consumer de'-1ronics, and even, arguably. fadory ;nllom:Llion. In :.hon, too:lY':'> technologicll revolulion is t.-duCltion-led. And lx..'C"Ju'C of thb, eduCltion has become much more v;llu:lble for thc aver:agc person. Clearly. eduC"Jtion has 3lso 1x.'Come more critic,,1 for the futurt" of the Texas economy. ,'lore :lnd more tllL."><ie day:'>. cente!":'> of prosperit)' are centers 1101 of n3tur:a1 resources or simply providence bUI of knowledge and education Education b a country's ~ticket out"penn3nenlly oul--of 3 depressed 3nd underdeveloped economic condition Eduction IS 31sa Te:<:IS' ticket OUI. In cr:I.fting the much,oc..etk-d reinduStri31ization of our economy, prim:u)' fOC\!:'> :,>hould be pl3red on d~'e1oping an economic h3"e supponed by 3nd centrJlly linked to education. The bOllam line b th3t T\:'xas needs 10 invl:.'Sl more in edUClUon Do we \\:lnt to be a stat\:, Uul suys on the leading edge of tL'Chnology, thereby commanding the higher-paying jobs and m:lLnt:unlOg the hig~"-'I" standard of li\'ing? If so, then eduC"JtlOn I:'> thc answer document was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org). This This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org)