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____________ Review____________ Vol. 67, No. 7 August/September 1985 5 The President’s Proposed Corporate Tctx Reform s: A Move Toward IcL\ Neutrality 18 Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of Farmland Prices: A Preliminary Assessment 25 Weekly M oney Announcem ents: N ew Information and Its Effects The Review is published 10 times p er year by the Research and Public In form ation D epartm ent o f the Federal Reserve Bank o f St. Louis. Single-copv subscriptions are available to the public fre e o f charge. Mail requests f o r subscriptions, back issues, o r address changes to: Research and Public In form ation Departm ent, Federal Reserve Bank o f St. Louis, P.O. Box 442, St. Louis, M issouri 63166. The views expressed are those o f the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions o f the Federal Reserve Bank o f St. Louis o r the Federal Reserve System. A rticles herein may be reprin ted provided the source is credited. Please provide the Bank's Research and Public Inform ation D epartm ent with a copy o f reprinted material. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review August/September 1985 In This Issue . . . Significant changes in the existing federal incom e tax laws have been proposed by the President. In the first article o f this Review, "The President’s Proposed Tax Reforms: A Move Toward Neutrality," authors Dallas S. Batten and Mack Ott argue that the suggested reforms would increase production and national welfare. Beginning with a simple illustration o f h ow taxes can alter the allocation o f econom ic resources, the authors demonstrate h ow the proposed reforms would reduce such allocative distortions. Batten and Ott argue that this aspect o f the proposed tax reform has been overlooked in most critiques o f the proposals, such critiques concentrating on macroeconom ic impacts or the possible loss o f subsi dies to particular interest groups. The authors note also that removing subsidies and making the tax code relatively more neutral w ould improve the productivity o f investment, measured by its before-tax rate o f return. In the second article o f this Review, Michael T. Belongia applies a basic m odel of asset pricing to farmland in an attempt to determine the major factors explaining the ups and downs o f land prices. In his "Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of Farmland Prices: A Preliminaiy Assessment,” Belongia shows that expected future inflation, expected future net returns to farming and the ex ante real interest rate explain much o f the variation in the growth o f farmland prices through their 1981 peak. To test the m odel’s validity in explaining the more recent behavior o f farmland prices, an out-of-sample simulation experiment was perform ed for the 1982-85 period. The result o f this exercise indicates that the m odel does poorly in explaining the recent decline in land prices, raising some doubt about the m odel’s validity in times o f sharp land price declines. The author argues that this poor performance in explaining recent land price movements is more likely related to difficulties in measuring unobservable expectations than to weaknesses in the econom ic model. The third article o f this Review examines the theoretical effects and reviews the empirical findings on the impact o f the weekly m oney announcement on finan cial markets. In "Weekly M oney Announcements: N ew Information and Its Ef fects,” Richard G. Sheehan presents three alternative hypotheses about w hy financial markets react to this announcement. T w o o f the hypotheses, the expected liquidity effect and the inflation premium effect, focus on expected changes in the m oney supply. The third hypotheses, in contrast, concerns the expected changes in money demand. These three hypotheses are generally assumed to be com peting explanations of w hy m oney announcements have an impact on financial markets. Sheehan demonstrates that, in fact, the three effects may be substitutes or complements. Only the expected liquidity effect by itself is consistent with till the empirical evidence. It is also possible, however, that all three effects have been present. 3 The President’s Proposed Corporate Tax Reforms: A Move Toward Tax Neutrality Dallas S. Batten and Mack Ott T J - HE President has proposed a significant change in the federal incom e tax law, The President's Tajc Proposals to the Congress f o r Fairness, Growth and Simplicity, (hereafter PTP). Included in PTP are pro posed corporate business tax reforms that, in general, w ould low er the marginal tax rate on business incom e w hile broadening the corporate tax base. Because, on net, these proposals w ould increase the average tax rate on business income, they have been w idely criti cized as having deleterious effects on U.S. investment, em ployment and econom ic growth.1 By focusing on the negative m acroeconom ic effects, however, these critics have overlooked some o f the proposed tax reform ’s positive allocative effects. The President's proposal w ould make tax rates across in dustries and activities m ore uniform and reduce the distorting influences o f inflation, thereby diminishing the role o f the tax structure in the allocation o f pro ductive resources. Dallas S. Batten, a research officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, is currently on leave as a senior staff economist at the Council of Economic Advisers. Views expressed are not necessarily those of the council. Mack Ott is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. James C. Poletd provided research assistance. 'See, for example, Rowen (1985), Stemgold (1985) and Yemma (1985). The purpose o f this article is to examine the alloca tive effects o f the President's proposal. W e begin by describing the concepts o f econom ic efficiency and tax neutrality, tw o important criteria for evaluating the reform. Then, the basic points contained in the Presi dent's proposal are outlined and evaluated against these criteria. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND TAX NEUTRALITY Fundamentally, econom ic efficiency means using resources in their highest valued activity. A simple example using the dem and for and the supply o f apples demonstrates the concept o f efficiency and shows h ow competitive markets result in efficient resource use.2The supply curve in figure 1 represents the minimum price that producers must receive if they are to supply a specific quantity o f apples. This price is determ ined by the "opportunity cost" (the highest valued alternative use) o f the resources used 'This example is simplified for illustrative purposes. It ignores the issues of externalities and imperfect competition. For a more com plete discussion, see Hirshleifer (1980). 5 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 F ig u r e 1 Efficient Production Q u a lity aid Price Determined by Market to produce apples. The dem and curve in figure 1 portrays the highest price consumers are w illing to pay for any specific quantity o f apples. The only price that is com m on to both the supply and dem and curves IP*) is called the "equilibrium ” price; it is the only price at which the quantity de m anded equals the quantity supplied IQ*). This sug gests that, at equilibrium, the value that people place on each apple equals the opportunity cost o f the resources used to produce it. This is w h y the com peti tive market equilibrium represents an econom ically efficient allocation o f resources. Producing m ore IQJ o r less IQ,( apples than Q* w ou ld be inefficient. Either too many or too few re sources w ou ld be allocated to apple production given the value people place on apples com pared with other products that those resources could produce. The market will induce producers to provide exactly Q*. If Q, apples w ere produced, consumers w ould be w ill ing to pay only P, per apple, w hich is less than the cost o f production, P,; producers then w ou ld decrease output, low ering costs and releasing resources to other higher-valued uses. If Q, w ere produced, the adjustment w ould proceed conversely, with output rising and resources for apple production being bid 6 F ig u re 2 Inefficient Production Qaaatity aad Price Distorted by Tai Sabsidy away from other activities w hose products w ere not as highly valued as apples. Taxes: The Wedge Effect and Reduced Efficiency Taxes and subsidies change the allocation o f re sources if they alter the incentives confronting pro ducers or consumers. In particular, some taxes or subsidies drive a w edge between the prices that con sumers pay and producers receive. A tax on apple production — or on the resources used to produce apples — raises firms’ costs o f production. This situa tion is depicted in figure 2 as the upward shift in the supply curve to STAXfrom its position w ithout taxes or subsidies, S. As a result o f the tax, the equilibrium price o f apples rises to P2 and the quantity produced (and sold) falls to Q,; the econom ically efficient quan tity o f apples, Q*, is no longer produced because the tax alters producer incentives. At Q „ the value that people place on apples IP,) exceeds the actual value of the resources used in apple production (P,). The wedge, the difference between these values (P2- P,), is the amount o f the tax. Likewise, subsidizing the production o f apples (per haps through use o f tax preferences such as special deductions, credits or abatements) shifts the supply FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS curve to S*,,, in figure 2, resulting in more apples being produced (QJ than is econom ically efficient. At Q*, the value o f resources used to produce apples (P2) exceeds the value that people place on apples (P,). The differ ence (P, — P,) is the amount o f the subsidy and a measure o f the econom ic inefficiency. T o summarize, taxes and subsidies cause econom ic inefficiency by affecting the quantity o f the good pro duced. A tax on production results in too few re sources em ployed in apple production, w hile subsi dies motivate too many resources devoted to apple production.3 In either case, resources are wasted, the value o f the econom y’s output is reduced and con sumers are correspondingly worse off than if there had been no tax or no subsidy. Nonneutral Taxes: A Cause o f Econom ic Inefficiency As w e have seen, some taxes and subsidies distort resource use, causing inefficiency and making people worse off. Thus, a useful benchmark against which to evaluate both the existing tax system and the potential benefits o f tax reform is an ideal, nondistorting "neu tral” tax system. A neutral tax is one that causes no change in production, consumption or investment. In the context o f figure 1, the im position o f a neutral tax w ould not alter the position o f the supply curve. Consequently, a neutral tax does not induce inef ficient resource use. O f course, many people feel that government should guide resource use in order to attain ends not necessarily reflected in market prices. For example, Sen. Russell Long, former chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, was characterized in a recent Wall Street Journal interview as being opposed to “[rjelinquishing tax law to the raw forces of the free market. . I do not regard this matter of collecting taxes as simply a matter of bringing in revenue to finance government," he says, “just as the appropriations process seeks to do more than pay tor national defense." To shy away from using the tax code to promote the general welfare, he says, is to be as callous as those who “don't want to be bothered doing anything that benefits anyone except their own greedy selves.” (Bimbaum. 1985) This view is widespread in both houses of Congress and on both sides of the aisle. For example, Senate Finance Committee Chair man Robert Packwood concurs in using the tax code for “legitimate social purposes.” (McGinley, 1985). Frequently, such social pur poses are identified with a particular industry as in Sen. Malcolm Wallop’s defense of tax preferences for the oil industry: “. . . These provisions are backed by sound tax policy and protect a higher public need, namely energy independence." (Wallop, 1985) Con versely, Sen. Bill Bradley, a proponent of tax reform, argues, The best allocator of capital is the free market, not the Senate Finance Com m ittee. . . as laudable as all these credits and deductions may be, when you put them in the tax code, rates are higher than they would otherwise be. (McGinley, 1985) AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 Obviously, any tax that can be reduced by a change o f activities is not neutral. For example, an incom e tax is not a neutral tax because it varies w ith income. Thus, for individuals, an incom e tax lowers the cost o f leisure (which is not taxed) and induces people to substitute more leisure in place o f income-generating (taxed) activities. The extent o f this substitution is small, o f course, w hen considering the im pact o f taxes on corporate incom e. A corporation’s shareholders are unlikely to place much value on the leisure time o f corporate assets — or that o f the corporation’s w ork ers. Consequently, the tax-free status o f leisure does not preclude neutral taxation o f business income. Although business incom e taxation could be set up in a nearly neutral fashion, in reality, it seldom is. Tax preferences exist explicitly to encourage specific activ ities that w ould not be undertaken otherwise. Capitalintensive industries benefit from certain investment tax credits and accelerated depreciation that are not as remunerative to less capital-intensive industries. Some capital expenditures are treated as a current expense (for example, intangible drilling costsl, and depreciation deductions based on historical costs are subject to distortions from inflation.4 Some business incom e is not taxed at all (for example, additions to bank reserves for loan defaults and the incom e o f limited liability partnerships), w hile other business incom e is taxed twice (corporate dividends). Finally, tax rates vaiy according to arbitraiy realization proce dures (capital gains vs. income). In each o f these in stances, taxes can be altered by changing the firm’s production activity — its input mix, legal structure, product m ix or timing o f sales. T o the extent that such tax-induced changes exist, the tax system is not neu tral; the result is a distortion o f resource use and econom ic inefficiency. Illustrations o f Nonneutral Tapes T o illustrate the potential allocative effects o f the current business tax structure, consider table 1, which contains effective tax rates fo r a sample o f large corpo rations in various industries over the past four years. This table presents average (not marginal) and actual (not expected) tax rates. It nonetheless provides an indication o f just h ow diverse tax rates have been across industries as w ell as h o w important tax prefer ences may have been in allocating resources among 4For a discussion of the distortions in depreciation accounting and the tax acts of 1981 and 1982, see Ott (1984). 7 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 Table 1 Comparison of Tax Rates on Large Corporations in Various U.S. Industries, 1980-83 Industry1 Aerospace Beverages Broadcasting Chemicals Computers and office equipment Construction Electronics and appliances Financial institutions Food processors Glass and concrete Instrument companies Insurance Investment companies Metal manufacturing Metal products Mining Motor vehicles Paper and wood products Petroleum* Pharmaceuticals Retailing Rubber Soaps and cosmetics Telecommunications Tobacco Transportation: Airlines Railroads Trucking Utilities5 Wholesalers 1980 1981 1982 1983 1980-83 average 16.4% 28.0 6.8% 28.8 (0.6)% 20.5 8.9 (17.7) 26.4 15.9 14.3 (3.8) 31.6 9.7% 23.2 21.9 (6.3) 21.3 14.0% 18.7 18.5 (1.0) 26.3 0.7 7.4 6.4 25.9 17.5 32.8 9.9 9.3 2 2 3 13.7 24.9 3 5.0 25.3 3 24.5 5.8 35.6 3 17.1 2.7 26.8 3 37.1 3 26.6 3 3 3 3 15.3 10.2 2 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 (1.4) 31.1 39.2 34.1 (14.2) 21.7 35.9 22.3 3 3 3 3 3 3 31.4 31.3 3.0 10.7 37.5 10.9 (7.5) 46.1 10.3 2 3 3 30.2 36.1 18.2 32.7 20.4 39.0 33.3 1.6 36.3 2 4.1 36.9 15.6 36.1 15.1 3 3.6 25.8 3 16.2 3.8 29.5 3 29.5 3 3 2 3 2 3 3.5 (0.5) 21.3 27.2 20.0 19.6 35.6 4.8 33.8 3 2 3.3 34.5 7.1 34.8 (2.9) 23.5 32.9 22.9 3 3 3 33.3 2 2.4 38.2 10.7 3 Source: Joint Committee on Taxation, November 30, 1984, as reported in Daily Report for Executives, December 3,1984 (DER No. 232), p. J-1. 'An industry is included in this table only if substantially the same companies are included in the sample each year. 2Rate not computed on book loss. 3The 1980 and 1981 rates are not available: the 1980-83 average is not computed. 4Some companies included in the 1982 and 1983 group were classified with crude oil production in 1980 and 1981. 5ln 1980 and 1981, the utilities group included AT&T and GTE. The 1980 and 1981 utilities rate is restated to include only electric and gas utilities. industries. For example, in 1983, these rates ranged from an effective tax rate o f —1.0 percent (that is, a subsidy) for the chemical industry to a 35.6 percent rate fo r the soaps and cosmetics industry. Further more, providers o f services faced substantially diverse rates: from financial institutions 16.4 percent) to Digitized for 8 FRASER wholesalers (34.8 percent). In large part, these variations are due to variations in the tax credits available to the corporations. This is made clear by an examination o f table 2, w hich dis plays the data for 1981, the most recent year available. Table 2 The Impact of Tax Credits on Tax Rates, 1981 (dollar amounts in millions) Tax Rates Income Subject to Tax Industry ALL INDUSTRIES Cor porate Tax $241,496.0 $102,258.0 Agriculture, Forest, Fishing Mining Construction Effective Net of Percent’ Credit2 Tax Credits Total3 Total Credit as a Percent of Cor porate Tax Invest ment Investment Credit as a Percent of Corporate Tax 42.3% 18.1% $58,444.0 57.2% $18,887.0 18.5% Foreign $21,829.0 Posses Foreign sions Credit Credit as a as a Percent Percent of Cor of Cor U.S. porate Posses porate Tax sions Tax 21.3% $1,946.0 1.9% 1,278.0 9,479.0 6,610.0 557.0 4,245.0 2,360.0 32.2 44.8 35.7 24.0 17.8 28.3 142.0 2,556.0 490.0 25.5 60.2 20.8 128.0 582.0 334.0 23.0 13.7 14.2 3.0 1,958.0 107.0 0.5 46.1 4.5 6.0 0.0 2.0 1.1 0.0 0.1 133,416.0 10,163.0 2,179.0 59,555.0 4,574.0 1,003.0 44.6 45.0 46.0 22.6 27.6 35.7 29,439.0 1,768.0 225.0 49.4 38.7 22.4 9,145.0 850.0 151.0 15.4 18.6 15.1 17,737.0 770.0 56.0 29.8 16.8 5.6 1,867.0 117.0 14.0 3.1 2.6 1.4 1,470.0 653.0 44.4 33.9 155.0 23.7 125.0 19.1 14.0 2.1 2.0 0.3 932.0 3,843.0 403.0 1,618.0 43.2 42.1 38.6 21.8 43.0 782.0 10.7 48.3 30.0 303.0 7.4 18.7 4.0 461.0 1.0 28.5 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 4,929.0 15,294.0 2,034.0 755.0 1,729.0 5,065.0 6,698.0 15,219.0 2,120.0 6,895.0 871.0 334.0 765.0 2,122.0 2,869.0 6,897.0 43.0 45.1 42.8 44.2 44.2 41.9 42.8 45.3 33.8 18.2 26.7 38.9 23.7 23.4 33.1 23.8 452.0 4,108.0 327.0 40.0 356.0 938.0 649.0 3,268.0 21.3 59.6 37.5 12.0 46.5 44.2 22.6 47.4 350.0 873.0 112.0 19.0 149.0 649.0 326.0 939.0 16.5 12.7 12.9 5.7 19.5 30.6 11.4 13.6 97.0 2,250.0 190.0 5.0 195.0 304.0 277.0 2,229.0 4.6 32.6 21.8 1.5 25.5 14.3 9.7 32.3 4.0 892.0 8.0 12.0 3.0 4.0 20.0 36.0 0.2 12.9 0.9 3.6 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.5 9,561.0 4,292.0 4,282.0 1,869.0 44.8 43.5 24.1 20.2 1,974.0 1,003.0 46.1 53.7 631.0 739.0 14.7 39.5 770.0 218.0 18.0 11.7 473.0 6.0 11.0 0.3 2,005.0 4,531.0 880.0 2,057.0 43.9 45.4 26.6 34.8 347.0 481.0 39.4 23.4 122.0 293.0 13.9 14.2 205.0 472.0 23.3 22.9 0.0 144.0 0.0 7.0 23,843.0 5,413.0 8,113.0 10,727.0 2,257.0 3,789.0 45.0 41.7 46.7 21.3 28.0 16.9 5,660.0 739.0 2,421.0 52.8 32.7 63.9 5,334.0 671.0 2,283.0 49.7 29.7 60.3 228.0 53.0 67.0 2.1 2.3 1.8 22.0 0.0 22.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 10,317.0 4,681.0 45.4 21.1 2,502.0 53.5 2,380.0 50.8 108.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 WHOLESALE AND RETAIL Wholesale 32,360.0 16,966.0 12,516.0 6,700.0 38.7 39.5 31.8 33.4 2,234.0 1,038.0 17.8 15.5 1,593.0 695.0 12.7 10.4 420.0 264.0 3.4 3.9 41.0 38.0 0.3 0.6 FINANCE, INSURANCE, REAL ESTATE Banking 21,903.0 7,664.0 8,159.0 2,803.0 37.3 36.6 27.6 19.6 2,121.0 1,301.0 26.0 46.4 888.0 351.0 10.9 12.5 1,190.0 936.0 14.6 33.4 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12,034.0 4,100.0 34.1 24.5 1,156.0 28.2 878.0 21.4 183.0 4.5 3.0 0.1 987.0 396.0 40.1 32.2 78.0 19.7 61.0 15.4 11.0 2.8 1.0 0.3 ALL MANUFACTURING Food Tobacco Textile and Mill Products Furniture and Fixtures Paper Products Printing and Publishing Chemicals Rubber and Plastic Leather Products Stone, Clay, Glass Primary Metals Fabricated Metals Machinery Electrical, Electronic Motor Vehicles Transportation Equipment Instruments UTILITIES Transportation Telecommunications Electric and Sanitary SERVICES Hotels and other lodging Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistics of Income 1981, Corporate Income Tax, Table 2. 'Corporate tax divided by income subject to tax. Corporate tax less total credits divided by income subject to tax. 3Sum of investment tax credits, foreign tax credits, U.S. possessions tax credits, work incentive tax credits, jobs tax credit, nonconventional fuels tax credit and research activities tax credit. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS In general, industries with proportionally high tax credits (table 2) correspond with the large corpora tions facing low tax rates (table 1) and vice versa. In particular, chemicals, banking and utilities each have high ratios o f credits to tax and low tax rates for 1981. Conversely, food, instruments and wholesalers have low ratios o f tax credits and high tax rates. These tax credit ratios differ within industrial groups as w ell as across them. Within the utilities group, for example, compare tax credit ratios for trans portation (32.7) and telecommunications (63.9) in table 2 with their corresponding tax rates in table 1, or compare the overall finance, insurance and real estate tax credit ratio (26.0) and that for banking (46.4) in table 2 with their corresponding tax rates in table 1. Profit-seeking investors typically w ill ensure that their expected after-tax rates o f return are the same across alternative investments, adjusting for risk dif ferences. If tax rates differ across industries, however, the expected before-tax rates o f return w ill vaiy with the tax rate. Consequently, some higher-earning in vestment opportunities, w hen com pared on a before tax basis, w ill be passed over in favor o f investments that have low er before-tax, but higher expected after tax, rates o f return. A neutral tax system w ould result in the same relative ranking o f investment opportuni ties before and after taxes. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the present tax structure does not have this character istic. A tax reform that produced more uniform tax rates across industries w ou ld generate m ore efficient allocation o f resources because investments w ould be chosen more in line with their socially relevant, before-tax yields. A MORE NEUTRAL TAX SYSTEM: THE PRESIDENT’S PROPOSAL The President’s proposed business tax reform con sists o f four primary adjustments. These adjustments w ould AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 While the focus o f our discussion is on the third general feature, the reduction o f nonneutralities, the analysis cannot be undertaken without considering the other three. The President’s tax proposal was set up to be "revenue-neutral.”3 Consequently, in order to low er the corporate tax rate yet shift the tax burden from the personal to the corporate tax, it was necessary to increase corporate tax revenues by broadening the tax base — that is, by removing subsidies, exemptions and credits. Their removal provides just about enough additional revenues to offset the impact o f the rate reductions, corporate and individual. This revenue enhancement also extends to the reduction o f in flation distortions. By indexing depreciation for in flation, much o f the rationale for the accelerated d e preciation system is removed. Thus, the protection of the depreciation deduction's real value compensates for the low er depreciation deductions. The impact o f these changes on total tax revenues can be seen at the bottom o f table 3. Corporate tax and other federal tax revenues over the five years 1986—90 w ould rise by about $120 billion, w hile personal tax revenues w ould fall by $132 billion. The result is that overall tax revenues over the five years w ould be ap proximately unchanged — less than a one-half per cent overall decrease — from what they w ou ld have been in the absence o f tax reform. Yet, there is m ore to the reform proposal. The Trea sury’s estimates o f tax revenues over the 1986—90 p e riod are based on an extrapolation o f current macroeconom ic output and grow th; this ignores the reallocative or m icroeconom ic effects o f the reforms. With the repeal o f various tax subsidies reducing profitability in some business sectors, and the net reduction in marginal tax rates increasing profitability in other sectors, there w ould be a reallocation of resources. A m ajor argument in favor o f this tax reform is that it results in a m ore efficient allocation o f pro ductive resources. That is, the decrease in output in sectors losing tax subsidies w ill be exceeded by the increase in output in sectors benefiting from net de clines in marginal tax rates. (1) Lower the corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 33 percent; 12) Shift the income tax burden proportionally— from personal taxes (down 6 percent) to corporate taxes (up 24 percent); (3) Reduce nonneutralities in the tax code by broaden ing the tax base and repealing tax subsidies; and (41 Reduce inflation distortions of resource allocation bv indexing inventory costs and depreciation de ductions to reflect price changes. Digitized for10 FRASER 5This is clearly stated in the summary of The President’s Tax Pro posals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (p. 7); Taken together, the President's proposals are “revenue neutral" (plusor-minus 1.5% of total revenues) — using conventional estimating procedures, without changing macro-economic assumptions. That is, under these assumptions, the proposals would, when fully effective, raise virtually the same amount of revenue as current law. AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Table 3 Major Proposed Corporate Business Tax Reforms (dollar amounts in billions) Anticipated Change in Corporate Tax Revenue3 Reform Principal Elements1 Reference2 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Reduce corporate tax rates Corporate tax rate reduced from 46 to 33 percent; revise graduated corporate rate structure; revise corporate minimum tax 6.01, 13.04 $ -1 0 .0 $ - 2 6 .9 $ -3 5 .9 $ -3 9 .0 $ -4 1 .8 Neutrality toward location of income Use per country limitation for foreign tax credit; allocation of deductions; replace possessions tax credit (Puerto Rico) with wage credit 15.00, 15.02, 12.05 1.3 3.4 4.1 4.6 5.1 Neutrality toward types of investment Adjust depreciation schedules and 7.01,7.02, index for inflation; repeal investment tax 7.04, 7.07 credit; allow inflation indexed FIFO inventory accounting recapture of rate differential on accelerated depreciation 21.9 41.9 47.8 46.9 48.7 Neutrality toward form of business organization Dividends paid 10 percent deductible from taxable income 6.02 0.0 - 3 .4 - 6 .2 - 7 .2 - 8 .0 Neutrality toward income measurement Match expense and income from multiperiod construction; treat pledges of installment obligations as payments; repeal structure rehabilitation tax credits 8.01,8.02, 12.01 3.3 6.9 10.3 13.6 15.0 Neutrality toward industries: repeal energy and natural resource subsidies Repeal business energy credits; repeal percentage depletion 9.01,9.02 0.24 0.44 0.54 0.84 1.14 Neutrality toward industries: repeal financial institution subsidies Repeal depository institutions’ bad debt reserve deduction; disallow interest incurred to carry tax-exempts; repeal tax exemption of large credit unions; limit life insurance reserve deductions; repeal special percentage of taxable income deduction for life insurance companies; limit property and casualty insurance reserves 10.01, 10.02, 12.08, 12.09, 12.10 2.1 4.2 4.9 5.7 6.9 $18.9 -1 7 .9 0.2 1.2 $26.1 -2 6 .0 0.3 0.4 $24.3 -3 2 .0 0.4 - 7 .3 $23.9 -2 9 .0 0.4 -4 .6 $25.2 -2 6 .9 0.4 - 1 .2 -1 .2 9 % -0 .7 4 % -0 .1 8 % Total Changes Change in corporate tax receipts5 Change in personal tax receipts5 Changes in other federal tax receipts6 Overall change in federal tax receipts Percentage change from baseline revenues7 0.25% 0.08% Source: PTP 'Not complete listing; reforms listed are those with cumulative revenue implications 1986-90 exceeding $1 billion. References are to subchapters in PTP. 3Static revenue estimates; for each reform group, the total change is reported including specific reforms not referenced in column 2. •■Includes change in excise taxes. 5Totals include some reforms not listed; source: PTP, Appendix B, p. 461. 6Estate, gift and excise taxes. 7As estimated by Treasury under current law. 11 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS An estimate o f the overall gain (a part o f which results from increased efficiency) due to the Presi dent’s proposed reforms has been com puted by the Treasury Department: For reasons suggested above, it is reasonable to expect improved economic performance as a result of the President’s tax proposals. The Treasury Department estimates that the effect of the proposals would be to cause real GNP to be at least 1.5 percent higher by 1995 than it would be under current law. Because of the inherent uncertainty in such forecasts, however, this additional growth has not been added to Administra tion forecasts and is not reflected in higher revenue estimates.6 The estimated 1.5 percent rise in the level o f output results from resource reallocations that w ould be in duced by the proposed tax reforms. In that sense, the proposed repeal o f many so-called tax expenditures — that is, tax subsidies, exemptions, credits and the like — are sources o f a rise in U.S. wealth. Repeal o f these tax expenditures, w hich are subsidies o f pro duction in the beneficiary industries, releases re sources to higher-valued uses. Thus, the value o f pro duction, in other words, income, and its capitalized value, wealth, w ill rise as a result o f the reforms. T o see more tangibly the source o f such tax reform benefits, consider the follow ing description o f specific tax re forms outlined in table 3. Neutrality Toward Location o f In com e U.S. corporate incom e is subject to the U.S. income tax regardless o f w here such incom e is generated. Corporations, however, receive credits against their U.S. tax liabilities for taxes paid to foreign govern ments. (See table 2 for the impact of foreign tax credits across industries.) Under current tax law, corpora tions may receive larger credits from overseas produc- 6See The President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity, p. 7. Estimates of the gain based on the predecessor to the President’s proposal, the U.S. Treasury's Tax Reform For Fairness, Simplicity and Economic Growth (1984), pro jected similar gains. Allison, Fullerton and Makin (1985) estimated that the Treasury's tax reform proposal would increase GNP by about 1.2 percent over what it would be under 1973 tax law. This corresponds to a rise in wealth of over $895.1 billion dollars at current prices. For the current U.S. population, this would amount to over $3,700 per person at current prices. See Allison, Fullerton, and Makin (1985), p. 12, table 3. Note that these estimated gains do not exhaust the potential efficiency gains from even more dramatic tax reform. Again, using the 1973 tax code as the base, Ballard, Shoven, and Whalley (1985) have estimated the efficiency gains from an alternative lump-sum tax system designed to avoid com pletely the resource misallocation that plagues the current system to be between $4.0 and $7.3 trillion in 1/1985 dollars. Digitized for12 FRASER AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 tion than from the equivalent domestic production.7 This amounts to a subsidy o f foreign production for U.S. corporations in high-tax foreign countries. The Treasury proposal w ould eliminate this subsidy by changing the foreign tax credit to a bilateral basis. U.S. corporations w ould be allowed to claim credit for taxes paid in each foreign country up to a limit o f the equivalent U.S. tax. Since the U.S. tax rate under the Treasury proposal w ould be low er than most indus trial nations, it is likely that some overseas production w ould be repatriated.8 In addition, the proposal w ould change some ac counting rules that allow firms to reduce tax liabilities by transshipping goods or changing title to them in offshore facilities. Also, the so-called possessions tax credit, which applies predom inantly to Puerto Rico, w ould be replaced with a wage credit. The result of this change w ould be to limit U.S. corporate tax credit to job-creating production in Puerto Rico. As shown in table 3, such reforms w ould result in an expected $18.5 billion increase in tax revenues during the 1986-90 period. Not shown in the table, but clearly important, w ould be any U.S. production increases induced by removal o f the tax subsidy. Neutrality Toward Capital Investment Currently, tax deductions for the cost o f deprecia tion o f capital equipment and structures are based on their historical cost. This creates a bias favoring invest ment in less durable over more durable equipment and structures when the expected inflation rate is moderate or high. The 1981 and 1982 tax acts revised depreciation methods — the Accelerated Cost Recov- This is because the current tax credit is computed on an overall or, equivalently, an average basis. For example, suppose a U.S. corpo ration has taxable income of $1,000 each in countries A and B, country A has a 60 percent tax rate and country B has a 20 percent tax rate. Under current law, the corporation has a U.S. tax liability of $920 on its foreign income — 46 percent of $2,000. It receives a foreign tax credit of $800— 60 percent of $1,000 in country A and 20 percent of $1,000 in country B — so that its net U.S. tax on foreign income is $120. Under the reform, the tax credit would be computed with regard to the tax paid in each individual country and limited to the equivalent U.S. tax. Thus, in this example, the foreign tax credit would fall to $533 — the maximum of 33 percent under the lower proposed U.S. corporate tax in country A and the actual 20 percent in country B. As a result, the profitability of foreign production would decline relative to domestic production. 8The corporate tax rates in most major industrial countries exceed the proposed 33 percent U.S. rate: France, 50 percent; Germany, 56 percent; The Netherlands, 43 percent; United Kingdom, 35 percent (as of 1986); Japan, 43.3 percent on retained earnings, 33.3 percent on distributed earnings; Canada, 46 percent. See U.S. Treasury (1984), vol. 1, p. 260. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 Table 4 Effective Corporate Tax Rates on Income from Equity-Financed Investments for 46 Percent Taxpayer under ACRS1__________ Asset class Type of asset Inflation rate (percent) (years) 0 5 10 Automobiles, light trucks 3 -7 5 % -9 % 18% Most other producers’ durable equipment 5 -4 7 -4 16 -6 Railroad equipment 10 19 31 Utilities' equipment and low-income housing 15 8 33 43 Structures 18 27 39 45 Source: PTP, p. 136. 'Assumptions: Real return after tax is 4 percent. The investment tax credit selected is the maximum allowable tor new equipment (6 percent on three-year equipment and 10 percent on five-, 10- and 15-year equipment). Effective tax rates are the difference between the real before-tax rate of return and the real after-tax rate of return divided by the real before-tax rate of return. e iy System (ACRS) — to counteract the effects o f in flation by a more rapid w rite-off o f assets, especially longer-lived assets, such as structures. As table 4 illus trates, however, the bias against more durable equip ment and structures rem ained a feature o f the tax code. W hile the bias narrows as the inflation rate rises, it remains heavily skewed in favor o f short-lived equip ment investment. paper products industry, w hich put 88.2 percent o f its investment into equipment, received an ITC covering 18.7 percent o f its tax liability and had a net negative tax rate ( —14.2 percent) in 1981. In contrast, the to bacco products industry put 68.8 percent o f its invest ment into equipment, resulting in an ITC covering 15.1 percent o f its tax liability and a 31.3 percent effective tax rate. This bias against investment in structures does not im pinge evenly on the earnings o f all industries. Some industries invest a larger proportion o f their capital in equipment than others. As table 5 shows, across all industries, equipment accounts for more than fourfifths o f investment, but the proportion varies widely: the tobacco products and pharmaceuticals industries are on the low side, w hile the m otor vehicle and paper industries are quite high. To reduce these biases and their nonneutral tax effects, the President’s tax proposal would revamp the depreciation accounting deduction and repeal ITC. ACRS w ould be replaced with the Capital Cost Recov ery System (CCRS). CCRS differs from ACRS in three important respects: The importance o f such investment patterns is their impact on tax rates, both from the bias in the deprecia tion system (table 4) and the investment tax credit (ITC). 1TC applies only to equipment; no credit is given for structures. Thus, industries with high proportional investment in equipment (table 5) tend to have high ratios o f ITC to tax liabilities (table 2) and, conse quently, low er tax rates (table 1) than firms w ith low er equipment-to-investment ratios. For example, the First, CCRS would allow cost recovery of the real or inflation-adjusted cost of depreciable assets, rather than only the original, nominal cost. Second, CCRS would assign property among new recovery classes based upon economic depreciation rates. Third, CCRS would prescribe depreciation schedules and recovery periods which produce systematic investment incen tives that are neutral across recovery classes. {PTP, p. 138) Along with this revamping o f depreciation accounting, ITC w ould be repealed. The result is to drastically reduce the biases against durable equipment and structures. As can be seen by comparing tables 4 and 13 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST LOUIS * AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 Table 5 Investment Expenditures and the Proportion Invested in Equipment by Selected Industries (dollar amounts in millions) Investment in Producers Durable Equipment Structures Industry Total Expenditures Aerospace Beverages Chemicals Computer and Office Equipment Electronics Food processors Glass and concrete Instruments Metal manufacturing Fabricated metal products Motor vehicles and equipment Paper and wood products Petroleum and coal products Pharmaceuticals Rubber Soap and other detergents Tobacco products All industries $ 672.5 993.9 5,812.7 826.1 2,866.5 4,214.9 1,050.4 938.9 4,496.8 2,606.1 3,636.1 3,887.0 2,261.3 578.5 1,645.3 334.0 181.5 47,459 Percent in Equipment 82.5% 80.2 85.8 79.9 81.9 78.5 83.1 74.9 85.4 81.5 87.5 88.2 72.7 73.2 81.4 80.3 68.7 82.1 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Manufacturers, 1977. 6, the effective tax rates on equipment are changed from subsidies for short-lived equipment to a level tax rate across all durabilities, and the bias against struc tures is reduced to a few percentage points from its current huge spread. Note also that the indexing for inflation removes that tax distortion as an influence on asset choice. Correspondingly, there w ould be a nar rowing o f the tax rate differentials across industries. It is important to em phasize that these reforms are not intended to be neutral in the sense o f removing incentives to invest. The new depreciation scheme (CCRS) retains w rite-off periods for capital recovery that are shorter than the anticipated econom ic lives of the assets. Rather, the neutrality sought is between investments o f varying durations: The proposed CCRS depreciation system, in conjunc tion with repeal of the investment tax credit and other capital and business taxation proposals, makes possi ble a substantial lowering of statutory tax rates for individuals and corporations. This reduction in statu 14 tory tax rates is accomplished without sacrificing in vestment incentives necessary to stimulate continued economic growth for the economy as a whole. The CCRS depreciation rates and recovery periods pro duce effective tax rates which would stimulate new investment in depreciable assets. The indexing of de preciation allowances for inflation and the classifica tion of assets on the basis of economic depreciation would ensure that the CCRS system provides neutral investment incentives. (FTP, p. 148I Another form o f investment w hose yields are dis torted by the current tax code is inventories. The costs o f maintaining inventories are a relatively more im por tant part o f business in the service sector, particularly wholesale and retail trade, than in manufacturing. Inflation reduces the real deductible expense in curred in inventory replacement. This tends to low er the profitability o f production in retail and wholesale trade relative to manufacturing both directly and indi rectly (by inducing a smaller inventory level than oth erwise w ould be held). The President’s proposal FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 income tax.!l In contrast, incom e from sole proprietor ships or partnerships is not taxed at the firm, only as the ow ner’s personal income. Table 6 Effective Tax Rates on Equity-Financed Investments in Equipment and Structures1_________________________ Asset Type (example) Paid2 Held3 Equipment: four-year depreciation (autos) 16%4 18% five-year depreciation (trucks, computers, office equipment) 16 18 six-year depreciation (construction, machinery, aircraft, instruments) 17 18 seven-year depreciation (furniture, industrial machinery, communications and railroad equipment) 17 18 10-year depreciation (ships, turbines, plant and equipment for electric utilities) 17 18 23 25 Structure: 28-year depreciation (industrial and commercial buildings, rental housing) Source: PTP, p. 147. 'Assumes 33 percent statutory tax rate and 4 percent required return after tax and inflation. The effective tax rate at the entity level may be lower than reported here on leveraged investments, depending on the degree of debt-finance and the relation between the interest rate on debt and the rate of return on the investment. Effective tax rates on different property within a recovery class may vary somewhat depending on experienced economic depreciation rates. 2Assumes application of a 10 percent dividend-paid deduction to a corporation which distributes 100 percent of its earnings derived from depreciable assets. 3Assumes no distribution of corporate earnings derived from depreciable assets. "The differences between the 16 percent effective tax rate for classes 1 and 2 and the 17 percent effective tax rate for equipment with six-year through 10-year depreciation write-off periods are due to rounding and are not significant. To reduce this distortion, the President's proposal w ould allow corporations to deduct from taxable in com e 10 percent o f their dividend payout. As shown in table 3, this w ould result in a decline in tax revenues during 1986-90 o f about $24.8 billion. Neutrality Toward In com e Measuremen t Analogous to the nonneutralities in the existing depreciation deduction system are distortions in d e termining taxable incom e from the production o f as sets covering more than one tax year. Examples are the construction o f large buildings or ships and the design and production o f aircraft. This raises the issue of how to treat the costs o f production incurred before the sale. Economic theory suggests these costs should be capitalized and deducted w hen the project is com pleted or sold; however, current tax law allows many such costs to be deducted currently, w hile receipts are not taxed until received, perhaps years later. Revis ing the tax code to require matching o f expenses and income from multiperiod production w ould raise cor porate tax receipts by $39.7 billion over 1986-90. The President’s proposed tax reform w ou ld repeal structural rehabilitation tax credits, yielding an in crease in corporate taxes o f about $1.5 billion in 1986-90.'" Also, the interest tax exem ption for privatepurpose state and municipal bonds — the so-called industrial developm ent bonds — w ou ld be repealed. W hile this repeal w ould not increase corporate tax revenues, it w ould significantly reduce the number of tax-exempt bond issues and increase individual tax revenues — by an estimated $15.9 billion over 1986-90. Neutrality Toward Industries w ould alleviate this bias by indexing for inflation the inventory replacement expense tax deduction. As shown in table 3, the result o f such changes in the tax code for investment w ould be an increase in corporate tax revenues during 1986-90 o f about $207 billion. Neutrality Toward Form o f Business Organization Income generated by corporations is subject to double taxation. It is subject to the corporate tax; then, dividends paid out from this after-tax incom e to the corporation’s shareholders are subject to the personal R epeal o f Energy and M ining Subsidies — An im portant tax subsidy to the oil- and gas-producing industry as well as other mining industries is percent age depletion. No longer available to large integrated 9Tax procedures that avoid double taxation of dividends are common among the principal industrial countries. For example, France has a 50 percent dividend tax credit, Germany effectively excludes 100 percent of dividends paid from double taxation and Japan excludes 38 percent. See U.S. Treasury (1984), vol. 1, p. 260. '“Individual tax revenues, including those from limited partnerships, which are very common in real estate investment, would rise over 1986-90 by about $5 billion as a result of this repeal. (The Presi dent's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity, p. 459) 15 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS petroleum producers, it primarily benefits small inde pendent producers. Percentage depletion allows these small producers to deduct from taxable incom e a fixed percentage o f the value o f production to com pensate for the reduction in the total amount remain ing." In practice, it results in a total deduction over the life o f the well or mine that exceeds the capitalized value o f the deposit. The proposed reform w ould phase out this subsidy o f oil and mineral production over the 1986-90 period, except for oil wells with small amounts o f production. Also to be repealed are the business energy tax credits. Originally, these credits w ere introduced to increase non-petroleum energy production, low er en ergy use and enhance petroleum production from technically difficult or deep deposits. In total, the repeal o f these energy and mineral industry deposits w ould yield an increase in corpo rate tax revenues over 1986-90 o f about $3 billion. R epeal o f Financial In s titu tio n Subsidies — As shown in table 1, the tax rate levied on the U.S. finan cial and insurance industries has been substantially low er than in other industries. Largely, this has been due to tax subsidies that the reform proposal w ould eliminate. Primarily, the form o f these subsidies has been to permit deductions from taxable incom e con tributions to reserves for various losses. Under the proposed reforms, only the actual losses w ould be deductible. Overall, the Treasury’s proposed reforms o f finan cial and insurance institution tax deductions would raise corporate tax revenues during 1986-90 by $23.8 billion. In particular, the principal reforms are the following (estimated tax revenue gains during 1986-90 in parentheses): • the repeal of the deduction for depository institu tions’ contribution to bad debt reserves ($5.1 billion); • the disallowance of the deduction of interest paid by financial institutions to finance purchase of taxexempt securities ($2.2 billion); and "The rationale is that production of the mineral essentially entails the removal of a quantity from a fixed inventory of mineral, the original deposit. The producer bought the mineral right, and it is being used up in the production process. Thus, for the same reason that a retail department store deducts the cost of goods sold out of inventory from its gross proceeds to compute taxable income, mineral pro ducers should deduct the proportion of the value of current period production that was capitalized in the mineral lease. The proposal does not dispute the propriety of an appropriately computed deduc tion for depletion. It does, however, dispute the fixed percentage form which is arbitrary in relation to the value of the deposit. Digitized for16 FRASER AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 • a limit on property and casualty insurance company tax-deductible additions to reserves equal to the capitalized value of expected claims ($5.6 billion). Impact o f Reform : Investment Yields Less Affected by Taxes The most important measures o f the overall impact of tax reform, in terms o f making the tax code more neutral, are the tax rates displayed in table 6. Compar ing these rates w ith those under current law in table 4, one can see two m ajor differences; no impact on investment due to inflation and nearly level tax rates on investments o f diverse durations. While tax rates are considerably less variable across types o f investments under the n ew tax plan, as levies against corporate income, they are somewhat higher on average. The net result may be a low er aggregate investment rate. A decline in investment, however, w ould not necessarily im ply a low er level o f output. The m ore uniform tax rates on investments ensure that investment w ill be induced by market demands — the valuations o f consumers — rather than tax subsidies. A resulting decline in investment w ould mean that some projects undertaken under the old tax code w ere inefficient. The release o f resources from such inefficient investment w ould im ply an im provement in welfare. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION The taxation o f business incom e in the United States has evolved into a com plex system o f distortions, subsidies and preferences, that has induced corpora tions to em ploy valuable resources inefficiently. Out put could be increased and people made better off if these tax-generated distortions w ere eliminated. If it becomes legislation, the President’s proposed busi ness tax reform w ould be a m ajor step in reducing the role that taxation plays in allocating our nation’s re sources. Those w h o concentrate on the m acroeco nomic impacts o f the proposal are overlooking some substantial efficien cy gains from the prop osed changes. REFERENCES Allison, Michael T., Don Fullerton, and John H. Makin. “Tax Reform: A Study of Some Major Proposals," AEI Working Paper No. 2 (February 1985). Ballard, Charles L., John B. Shoven, and John Whalley. “The Total Welfare Cost of the United States Tax System: A General Equilib rium Approach," National Tax Journal (June 1985), pp. 125-40. AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. “Sen. Long, An Architect of the Income-Tax Codes, Is Ready to Protect Handiwork From Reform’,” Wall Street Journal, May 7,1985. Hirshleifer, Jack. Price Theory and Applications (Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 440-45. Rowen, Hobart. “New Tax Rules, New Inequities,” Washington Post, June 6, 1985. Sterngold, James. “Forecasters and the Tax Plan,” New York Times, June 8,1985. McGinley, Laurie. “The Treasury’s Plan To Overhaul Tax Code Sparks Heated Debate,” Wall Street Journal, April 3,1985. U.S. Department of the Treasury. Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplic ity and Economic Growth, (U.S. Treasury Department, November 1984), vols. I and II. Ott, Mack. "Depreciation, Inflation and Investment Incentives: The Effects of the Tax Acts of 1981 and 1982,” this Review (November 1984), pp. 17-30. Wallop, Malcolm. 7,1985. The President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth and Simplicity (U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1985). Yemma, John. “Business View of Tax Plan,” Christian Science Monitor, June 10,1985. “Amplification,” letter to Wall Street Journal, May 17 Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of Farmland Prices: A Preliminary Assessment Michael T. Belongia T J L HE current debt problems facing many farmers can be attributed, in large measure, to the factors that produced the spectacular rise in farmland prices dur ing the 1970s and their precipitous decline since 1981. After increasing at a 5.6 percent average annual rate between 1951 and 1971, the growth in the price o f U.S. farmland accelerated dramatically: farmland prices rose at a 14.0 percent average annual rate from 1972 to 1981. Because land prices w ere rising faster than the rate of inflation at that time, the collateral base against which farmers could borrow increased significantly. Moreover, the availability o f subsidized credit for farm land purchases and certain tax advantages enhanced farmland ownership as an investment. Finally, re peated warnings about im pending w orld food short ages suggested that returns to farmland in production w ould rise, further increasing the demand for it.' Recently, however, the price o f farmland has been falling. Since its 1981 peak, the price o f farmland in the United States has declined at a 5.1 percent average annual rate, bringing farmland prices near their 1979 values. Of course, as land prices have fallen, the value Michael T. Belongia is a senior economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Jude L. Naes, Jr., provided research assistance. J. Bruce Bullock, James A. Chalfant, David Ervin, E. C. Pasour, Jr., Daniel A. Sumner and James Seagraves provided comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Any remaining errors or omissions are the responsi bility of the author. ’For example, as late as 1981, just two years prior to when the PIK program was implemented to reduce large and growing surplus grain stocks, the title of USDA's Yearbook of Agriculture was Will There Be Enough Food? Digitized for 18 FRASER o f farm equity has declined, and the ability o f farmers to secure additional credit has been diminished. Many studies o f the general movem ent in farmland prices have been conducted in the past.- Most o f these studies, however, predate the recent-period decline in land prices. The purpose o f this article is to examine the theoretical determinants o f farmland values and to determine w hether they can account for the rise and decline o f farmland prices in recent years. THE UPS AND DOWNS OF FARMLAND PRICES The data plotted in chart 1 show the behavior o f farmland prices in the postwar period.3The first point to note is that the price o f farmland generally has increased at a rate higher than the rate o f inflation, as measured by the GNP deflator. Moreover, the variabil 2Explanations for rising land prices include the accumulated savings from farm income and accumulated real estate debt, variations in farm income, increases in the general price level and increases in the provisions of commodity price support programs. See Shalit and Schmitz (1982), Herdt and Cochrane (1966) and Castle and Hoch (1982). Other studies of farmland prices include Tweeten and Martin (1966), Phipps (1984) and Reinsel and Reinsel (1979). A recent paper that provides a descriptive overview of the initial year of the recent land price decline is by Scott <1983). Doll, Widdows and Velde (1983) have surveyed the theoretical and empirical literature on land prices. 3The index is based on an average of farmland prices, per acre, in the 48 contiguous states. Until 1975, the prices were those existing on March 1. From 1976-81, February 1 prices were used. April 1 is the basis for 1982-84 prices. See Economic Report of the President (1985), p. 341. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 C h art 1 Farmland Prices and Inflation 1948 SO 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 1984 N O T E : D a t a a r e d e l t a lo g s. Q D a ta a re fro m the 198 5 E c o n o m ic R e p o r t o f the P resident. [2 D a ta a re c a lc u la t e d u s in g the G N P d e fla to r. ity in farmland price growth appears to be consider ably greater than the variability o f increases in the general price level.4Although the growth o f land prices and the rate o f inflation obviously are correlated, the chart suggests that land prices may be affected by additional factors. Chart 1, however, merely summa rizes what has occurred to land prices and does not tell us what has produced this result. For inferences concerning what these causal factors might be, w e turn to a simple m odel o f land prices. 4The standard deviations ot the growth rate of land prices and the rate of inflation are, respectively, 6.5 and 2.6. Average values for the annual growth rate of land prices and the rate of inflation over the 1948-85 (through 1984 for inflation) sample are 6.0 and 4.1 percent, respectively. THEORETICAL DETERMINANTS OF THE PRICE OF FARMLAND Although the supply o f land for use in farming has some price elasticity and w ill change in response to factors that affect its returns in other uses, it is conve nient for our purposes to examine primarily those factors that change the demand for farmland.5There fore, w e assume that the total amount of land available for farming is constant. Because w e have ruled out changes in the supply o f land, changes in the price o f 5Stigler (1966) notes the common fallacy, which argues that the supply of land is perfectly inelastic. While this is not even strictly true for the total supply of land, the important consideration is how easily land can be shifted from other uses to agricultural production. In this sense, the supply of land certainly is not perfectly inelastic. 19 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS farmland must arise from changes in the dem and for farmland. The section that follows explains the factors that, theoretically, should influence the dem and for farmland. Farmland as a Capital Asset The price o f land always w ill be determ ined by two factors: the net return to land em ployed in its “best” alternative use and the interest rate or rates that are used to discount these net returns to the present. For purposes o f illustration, consider an acre o f land best suited to corn production that will yield 100 bushels at a price of $3 per bushel; total receipts, then, are $300. If variable costs in producing corn each year — the costs o f fertilizer, seed, the use o f equipment and labor — were $200, the residual return to the land w ould be $100 each year. In the absence o f expected inflation, increased productivity and special knowledge about future econom ic shocks, $100 w ould be the net return expected in all future years as well. This net expected annual return to the ow ner o f an acre o f farmland used to produce corn w ill be evalu ated against the stream o f returns accruing to other investments. That is, the farmer w ill ask him self what amount, if invested elsewhere at the current interest rate, w ould yield an annual return o f $100. A rational farmer-investor, ceteris paribus, w ill not pay more for the acre o f farmland than the amount o f this alterna tive investment. This acre o f land w ill sell for its capitalized value, that is, the present discounted value o f all future earnings from the land. This relationship can be ex pressed as: AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 receipts from selling corn or the expected variable cost o f producing corn are altered. In assessing changes in real returns, w e are inter ested in changes in receipts or costs apart from those changes in nominal values associated with the general trend in inflation. Expected real receipts w ould rise, for example, if yields per acre w ere increased and the demand for corn w ere relatively elastic in the relevant range, or if government price supports w ere raised. The expected real cost o f producing corn is affected by changes in the relative prices o f fuel, fertilizer, crop insurance, water and a variety o f other factors em ployed as inputs in the production process. In either case, for a given rate o f interest, changes in expected real receipts or costs w ill produce changes in the expected net returns to investment in farmland rela tive to the returns available on other investments. When this occurs, land prices w ill change to bring the rate o f return for farmland back into line w ith other alternative rates. Changes in government farm programs have af fected land prices by raising the expected net incom e associated with farming. Direct incom e transfers based on target prices have increased the expected income from crop production by allowing farmers to sell eligible crops at the market price and then receive a direct payment equal to the quantity o f a crop sold m ultiplied by the difference between the market price and target price. Loan rates, w hich establish a price floor for crops, also increase expected incom e by elim inating the risk associated w ith market prices falling below the support level.7 Because these program benefits increase the expected incom e from farming, they are capitalized into land values. (1) land price = net returns -r- interest rate.1’ If the interest rate is currently 5 percent, the value o f the land w ould be $2,000 ($100 0.05); this is the maximum price that an investor w ould pay for the land. If the land price w ere higher, for example, $2,500, it w ould be irrational and unprofitable to purchase the land; investing the $2,500 in bonds or stocks yielding 5 percent w ould earn m ore ($125) than the $100 return to land em ployed in farming. It is clear from equation 1 that, for a given interest rate, the price o f farmland w ill change w henever there are changes in the expected real net returns to farm ing. Expected net returns w ill change if the expected This representation of an asset's capital value can be found in virtually all economics texts. Implicit assumptions are an infinite planning horizon and a constant real interest rate. 20FRASER Digitized for LAND PRICE DETERMINATION: SOME STATISTICAL EVIDENCE The M odel and Data The relative impacts on land prices from nomic relationships discussed above can be in a simple statistical model. Based on the discussion, the annual percentage change in of farmland can be estimated as: the eco assessed previous the price (2) %ALP, = a + p, ,_,£(%AP,I + p, ,_,E(%ANR,I + 03 %Ar + e,.“ This result has been demonstrated by Harris (1977), Boehlje and Griffin (1979), Gardner (1981), Pasour (1980) and Belongia (1983). 8Percentage changes (%A) are calculated as first differences of logarithms, multiplied by 100. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 are shown in table 1. The m odel explains 49 percent o f the variation in the growth o f land prices. Table 1 Assessing the Contribution of Alternative Factors to the Growth of Land Prices %ALP, = 2.981 + 1.398 x E(%APt) + 0.196 x E(%ANR,) (2.18) (4.54) (2.65) + 0.001 x %Ar (0.15) R2 = 0.49 SER = 3.48 DW = 1.80 NOTE: t-statistics in parentheses. Equation 2 states that the rate o f change in farmland prices (%ALP) w ill be determined by the expected future rate o f inflation [,_,E(% AP,)], expected growth in real net returns from farming [, ,E(%ANK,)], which in cludes cash receipts and government payments m i nus variable costs, and the percentage change in the real rate o f return on an alternative investment (%Ar). Note that, in contrast to many previous empirical studies, this equation is based on eji ante expectations rather than actual ept post data. Although using esti mated proxies for unobserved expectations variables introduces the problem o f measurement error, ex post data values have little to do with the eji ante decision to buy or sell farmland. Expectations for future inflation and real returns are assumed to be three-year moving averages o f past actual values. Exact variable definitions and data sources appear in the appendix to this article. Based on the earlier discussion o f h ow land prices are deter mined, expected inflation and the expected growth in real net returns to farm production should be posi tively related to land values. The expected sign on the percentage change in the real opportunity cost o f capital, %Ar, is negative.” The Results The results o f estimating equation 2 using annual data from 1955 through the 1981 peak in land prices 9Changes in expected inflation are linked, in theory, to transitory changes in the real rate of interest. This possibility introduces the potential for a collinearity problem in the estimating equation if E(%AP,) and %Ar are correlated. Their simple correlation coefficient (0.06), however, is not significantly different from zero. The results show, as expected, that increases in the growth of expected real net returns and an increase in expected future inflation tend to increase the rate at which farmland prices increase. The sizes o f these estimated coefficients and actual changes in expected inflation and returns offer m ore insight. W hile a 1 percentage-point increase in expected inflation has an effect on the rate o f land price appreciation about seven times larger than a similar increase in expected receipts, expected receipts exhibit considerably larger changes over time than expected inflation. For exam ple, expected inflation ranged between 1.4 and 8.1 percent over the 27-year sample, whereas expected growth in real net returns was as high as 24 percent in 1974 and as lo w as —25 percent in 1977. Considered together, these coefficients and the raw data suggest that expected inflation is a determinant o f the longrun trend growth o f nominal land prices and expected net returns, which are subject to considerable year-toyear variability, are a significant factor in producing short-run variations in the growth o f land prices. It also is interesting to note that the coefficient on expected inflation is not significantly different from one, im plying that expected inflation was com pletely reflected in land prices. From an econom ic viewpoint, this result indicates that farmland was a perfect hedge against inflation over the estimation period. Finally, the growth in land prices is not significantly related to the regression’s other variable, the real rate o f interest. Examining the in-sample fit o f the m odel can be used as a guide to the m odel’s likely usefulness in determining its ability to predict the future behavior o f land prices. For example, if the m odel’s errors are randomly distributed through time and are neither one-sided nor o f larger absolute value in recent peri ods, one might infer that it represents a reasonably accurate description o f the process through which changes in land prices are determined. Conversely, if recent errors are significantly larger or one-sided, this information may im ply that the m odel is misspecified. As chart 2 indicates, the in-sample errors o f equation 2 over the 1955-81 period appear to be random ly dis tributed, despite the volatile behavior o f land prices. Tw o o f the residuals are m ore than twice the size of the regression’s standard error (6.96). Out-of-Sample Simulation Errors The results in table 1 explain the behavior o f land prices through their 1981 peak. In view o f the variety o f 21 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS C h a rt 2 Residuals from Equation 2 1955 57 59 61 63 65 67 explanations that have been offered for the sharp drop in land prices, it is interesting to investigate w hether the m odel w ill reveal any one variable as a dominant factor in the recent land price decline. This experiment is conducted by using the esti mated coefficients in table 1 and actual values for the variables in equation 2 to project values for the per centage change in farmland prices for 1982-85. These projections and the out-of-sample errors are reported in table 2. The table clearly shows that the variables in equa tion 2 do a poor job o f explaining the sharp decline in farmland prices since 1981. W hile the m odel projects slower growth for land prices, it does not explain the actual reductions in the levels o f land prices that have occurred in each o f the last four years. A number o f possible explanations for this poor simulation performance can be offered. Equation 2 Digitized for22 FRASER 69 71 73 75 77 79 1981 could be m isspecified in a variety o f ways, including the omission o f variables important to the land price decline. A more likely explanation is that the variables included are subject to considerable measurement error. Since they are intended to reflect expectations, they are not observable directly and may not follow the assumed m oving average process. Moreover, ex pectations may be asymmetric: that is, expectations may be based on a long history o f past data while inflation and government payments are rising, but take on a short history w hen these variables are de clining. This effect may be particularly true since 1981, when proposals to cut government's support o f agri culture significantly began to emerge. The evidence presented in the bottom half o f table 2 lends some support to this conjecture by indicating that only expected returns from farming have moved in a direc tion and changed by a magnitude consistent with the land price decline, w hile expected inflation has ad- AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REFERENCES Table 2 Belongia, Michael T. “Agricultural Price Supports and Cost of Pro duction: Comment,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (August 1983), pp. 620-22. Simulation Results and Actual Data Values, 1982-85________________ Boehlje, Michael, and Steven Griffin. “Financial Impacts of Govern ment Support Price Programs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics (May 1979), pp. 285-96. Out-of-Sample Simulations Year Actual Simulated Error 1982 1983 1984 1985 -0 .6 3 -5 .9 0 -1 .3 6 -1 3 .1 6 14.34 10.05 8.73 8.32 14.97 15.96 10.09 21.48 Actual Values of Explanatory Variables in Equation 2 Year E(%AP) 1982 1983 1984 1985 8.77 7.95 6.26 4.43 E(%ANR) -5 .0 2 -2 0 .3 0 -1 5 .4 3 -4 .4 3 E(%Ar) 56.07 - 46.64 15.34 7.52 Castle, Emery N., and Irving Hoch. “Farm Real Estate Price Com ponents, 1920-78," American Journal of Agricultural Economics (February 1982), pp. 8-18. Doll, John P., Richard Widdows and Paul D. Velde. “A Critique of the Literature on U.S. Farmland Values," ERS Staff Report No. AGES830124 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, January 1983). Economic Report of the President. Office, February 1985). (U.S. Government Printing Gardner, Bruce L. The Governing of Agriculture (The Regents Press of Kansas, 1981). Harris, Duane G. “Inflation-Indexed Price Supports and Land Val ues,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (August 1977), pp. 489-95. Herdt, Robert W., and Willard W. Cochrane. “Farm Land Prices and Farm Technological Advance,” Journal of Farm Economics (May 1966), pp. 243-63. Holland, A. Steven. “Real Interest Rates: What Accounts for Their Recent Rise?” this Review (December 1984), pp. 18-29. justed slowly to low er actual inflation. Thus, while the drop in expected real returns is consistent with the land price decline, it is largely offset by movements in the other variables that are smaller or in the wrong direction. Pasour, E. C., Jr. “Cost of Production: A Defensible Basis for Agricultural Price Supports?” American Journal of Agricultural Eco nomics (May 1980), pp. 244-48. Phipps, Tim T. “Land Prices and Farm-Based Returns," American Journal of Agricultural Economics (November 1984), pp. 422-29. Reinsel, Robert D., and Edward I. Reinsel. “The Economics of Asset Values and Current Income in Farming,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (December 1979), pp. 1093-97. SUMMARY Scott, John T., Jr. “Factors Affecting Land Price Decline,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (November 1983), pp. 796-800. The price of farmland generally has followed the rollercoaster o f expectations about future inflation and income from farming. The influences o f these expectations were assessed in conjunction with other factors that affect the demand for farmland as an input to farm production. A simple model of land prices was constructed based on variables that were expected to influence the net returns to land used in farming and the returns and costs of holding land as an investment relative to the returns on other investments. The results of estimating a statistical model derived from these arguments showed that expected inflation and expected growth in real net returns to farm produc tion were significant factors in determining the rate of increase in land values during the 1970s. Even with the recent sharp reductions in expected returns, however, the m odel does not explain the rapid decline in farm land values since 1981. A likely reason for this failure, when contrasted with the m odel’s in-sample perfor mance, is error in the measurement o f expectations concerning the future paths o f inflation, returns and the real interest rate. Shalit, Haim, and Andrew Schmitz. “Farmland Accumulation and Prices,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics (November 1982), pp. 710-19. Stigler, George J. The Theory of Price, 3rd ed. (The Macmillan Company, 1966). Tweeten, Luther G., and James E. Martin. “A Methodology for Predicting U.S. Farm Real Estate Price Variation,” Journal of Farm Economics (May 1966), pp. 378-93. U.S. Department of Agriculture. Will There Be Enough Food? The 1981 Yearbook of Agriculture (GPO, 1981). APPENDIX Data Sources and Variable Descriptions Land prices w ere measured by an index of farmland values for the 48 states reported in the E conom ic Report o f the President (1985), p. 341. Inflationary expectations were represented by a three-year moving 23 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS average o f past actual inflation as measured by growth in the GNP deflator. Expected real net returns from farming w ere assumed to be a three-year moving average o f past grow th in actual returns; this assumption was based on the notion that, since random shocks to production are the largest source of price change but cannot be predicted in advance, expected returns follow a random walk around some trend. Net returns w ere defined to be receipts from farm marketings plus government payments minus Digitized for24 FRASER AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 variable costs and w ere obtained from the E conom ic Report o f the President, p. 338. Real returns are net returns deflated by the GNP deflator. The e* ante real rate o f interest was measured as the nominal interest rate on one-year Treasury securities in the fourth quarter o f yea r t-1 m inus the one-year-ahead expectation o f inflation as measured by the December, year t—1, Livingston survey; see Holland (1984) for further details. The data used to estimate equation 2 are annual series from 1955—81. Weekly Money Announcements: New Information and Its Effects Richard G. Sheehan T -M. HE consensus among economists is that m one tary policy has its primary effects over relatively long time intervals — that is, quarters or years rather than days or weeks. Financial market participants, how ever, devote considerable attention to the weekly m oney stock announcement, despite substantial “noise” in the series.1 Moreover, some economists recently have “discovered" that an announcement o f an unexpectedly large m oney stock increase causes interest rates and U.S. exchange rates to rise and stock prices to fall.2 At first glance, the weekly impacts on financial mar kets may seem to contradict the consensus that money has its primary effects over longer horizons. In this paper, w e show w hy m oney stock announce ments may have an impact on financial market vari ables on a daily or weekly basis even though the principal effects o f m onetary policy are felt over sub stantially longer periods. The explanation for this ap parent contradiction is the adjustment o f financial markets to new information. The focus is on financial markets since their adjustments to new information tend to be more rapid than the adjustments o f other markets.3The paper examines three hypotheses that relate m oney stock surprises to financial market prices, the relationships between these hypotheses and the existing empirical evidence that attempts to discriminate between the hypotheses. Richard G. Sheehan is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Larry J. DiMariano and Michael L. Durbin provided re search assistance. 'That is, much of the week-to-week movements in the money stock are unrelated to any economic phenomenon. See Pierce (1981). 2For a sample of these results, see Cornell (1983b), Hardouvelis (1984), and Urich and Wachtel (1984). 3The standard assumption is that financial market prices adjust rapidly to changes in their determinants, within a span of hours or at most days, while prices in other markets tend, for a variety of reasons, to adjust more slowly. See Fama (1982). MONEY ANNOUNCEMENTS AND MONEY EXPECTATIONS Before examining the effects o f m oney announce ments, one must begin with an obvious observation: the m oney stock announcement itself does not create money. It does, however, create new information about the m oney stock. At the time o f the announce ment, the level o f the m oney stock to be announced has already been determined. Thus, any response resulting from the announcement is due to new infor mation rather than new money. In the following analy sis, it w ill be important to distinguish between these two. Announcements about the weekly m oney stock typ ically are made on Thursday afternoons at 4:30 p.m. EST; at this time the Federal Reserve Board releases figures on the stock o f m oney (M l) for the statement week ending 10 days earlier.4 If changes in the money stock itself have an immediate impact on financial markets, that impact w ill begin to be felt almost two weeks before the announcement when the m oney stock itself changed.3 The evidence discussed below suggests that the m oney stock announcements themselves appear to "Information also is released on the monetary base for the week ending one day earlier, the components of the money stock and the monetary base, and the aggregate portfolio of weekly reporting banks. 5The hypothesized short-run impact on interest rates of changes in the money stock is termed the “liquidity effect." For example, the Federal Reserve may buy government securities and in so doing provide currency and reserves. To convince economic agents to part with the securities in exchange for money, the Federal Re serve’s purchase of securities will bid the price of securities up, thus bidding the yield down. This liquidity effect occurs as soon as the stock of money is increased. See Brown and Santoni (1983) for evidence about the existence, magnitude and duration of the liquid ity effect. 25 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS influence interest rates independent o f any effect that the actual m oney growth may have had. To explain w hy the m oney announcements — which carry only new information — may influence interest rates, one must distinguish between expected and unexpected money announcements. Theoretical Effects o f Expected and Unexpected M oney Announcements The m oney stock figures, w hen announced, are not reported in a vacuum. Financial market participants have substantial information on current and previous interest rates and previous m oney announcements, allowing them to form expectations about the likely amount o f the m oney stock to be announced. Current asset prices are based in part on expected future econom ic conditions, including future m oney stocks. Observers generally believe that if financial markets are efficient, only the unexpected com ponent o f the money stock announcement should influence finan cial variables. The expected com ponent conveys infor mation already digested by the markets and incorpo rated in the prices and yields o f financial assets. Consequently, only surprises matter, not because they provide new money, but because they provide new information that may be useful in predicting policy makers’ actions and the behavior o f both real and nominal variables. The m oney stock announcement, to the extent that it is expected, com m only is assumed to have no impact on econom ic activity.6 THE IMPACTS OF UNANTICIPATED MONEY ANNOUNCEMENTS There are a number o f hypotheses about w hy money surprises influence financial market variables. The following sections compare three hypotheses and their underlying assumptions. All three hypotheses are based on the assumption that financial markets efficiently use all available information. Thus, current interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices reflect the implications o f the expected future m oney stocks. AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 ment can affect market rates o f interest by altering perceptions o f the real rate o f interest, expected in flation or both. Expected Liquidity Effect Under this hypothesis, an unexpected change in the m oney stock that moves it away from its annual target w ill be follow ed by changes in the opposite direction to get m oney growth back on target.7 The expected liquidity effect, therefore, is based on the belief that the Federal Reserve has credibility in pursuing its objectives for the m oney stock. The expected liquidity effect is based on financial market participants believ ing (1) that Federal Reserve policy is, at least in part, adhering to a long-run m onetary aggregate target; (2) that it will take the necessary steps to achieve its target over a relatively short time period; and (3) that such actions w ill change interest rates.8 The impact o f an unexpectedly large m oney stock announcement based on the expected liquidity effect is illustrated in figure 1. The cone form ed by the solid lines in figure 1 represents the Federal Reserve’s target range for m oney growth.3At any point in time, market participants know past announced m oney stock levels and have form ed expectations about the future path of the m oney stock, given by the line m ” in figure 1. The slope o f this line represents financial markets’ expec tations o f the m oney growth rate based on available information, including some estimate o f the Fed’s desired short-run growth rate.10 Unexpected money deviations here refer exclusively to those as seen by financial market participants. The money announcement itself is assumed to reveal no information to the Federal Reserve. See Urich (1982). 8While there may be professional debate over the impact of monetary policy on the real interest rate, there is general agreement among economic textbooks that monetary policy does play a significant role. For example, see Dornbusch and Fischer (1984). 9Money growth in this and the following sections refers exclusively to M1 growth since data on the M2 and M3 monetary aggregates are released only monthly. The Federal Reserve is required by Con gress to state target ranges for all three monetary aggregates. The analysis o f the alternative hypotheses is based on the Fisher equation, which divides the current nominal interest rate into the expected real return over the holding period o f the asset and the relevant anticipated rate o f inflation. The m oney announce- 10To focus on the expected liquidity effect and the impact of an unexpected money shock, we temporarily abstract from the noise in the series. In fact, the actual money stock numbers on a week-toweek basis as initially released form a saw-toothed pattern with an upward trend. In a more realistic setting, expected money may also be expected to fluctuate substantially as market participants attempt to adjust their forecasts due to a host of changing economic and institutional factors. 6See Cornell (1983b) for an explicit statement of this assumption. It should be noted, however, that more general models can be devel oped in which expected and unexpected announcements are both important. For example, see Belongia and Sheehan (1985b). These more general models have not been widely applied. The most common measure of expected money is the median of a survey of market expectations of money growth conducted weekly by Money Market Services, Inc. A time series forecast is infrequently used instead. Regressions of actual money changes on expected money changes indicates that about 30 percent of all money changes are expected. Thus, money changes have a large random component, but are not entirely unpredictable. 26 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 Long-term rates w ill rise to the extent that they are an average o f the current short-term rate and expected future rates. F ig u re 1 Expected Liguidity Effect The strength o f the expected liquidity effect may vary over time.'2 A deviation o f announced from ex pected M l w ill typically have a larger effect on interest rates when market participants think the Fed is plac ing greater emphasis on controlling M l. Thus, the expected liquidity effect should have been stronger from October 1979 to September 1982 w hen the Fed eral Reserve targeted on nonborrowed reserves as an intermediate target. ( ii weeks) To focus on the expected liquidity effect, assume that the m oney stock for the week announced previ ously was Ma. Just before the m oney announcement, interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices reflect the assumption that Mb is the m oney stock to be announced. Further assume that the announcement o f the m oney stock during week t is then made and reveals that the m oney stock was, in fact, M,, rather than M b. The expected liquidity effect assumes that financial markets believe the Fed w ill adhere to its previous policy and w ill take action to return the m oney stock to its expected path." This temporary tightening may begin even before the m oney announcement, since the Fed develops estimates o f the m oney stock before its announcement. During this period, higher nominal interest rates w ill be expected. If the long-run growth rate in the m oney stock is assumed to remain un changed, the rate o f expected inflation should also remain unchanged. Thus, short-term real interest rates should rise as short-term nominal rates rise. "The analysis in figure 1 is presented in terms of money growth vis-avis its expected growth rate. Alternately, it is possible that no reaction (or a smaller reaction) would be expected until the money stock went outside of the Fed’s stated target range. For example, see Roley (1983). It is not w idely recognized that the expected liquid ity effect also makes an assumption about the perma nence o f the shock underlying the unexpected change in money, assuming the Fed is not the cause o f the shock. If the cause is tem poraiy — for example, a w inter snowstorm delaying check clearance — no Fed intervention is required. When the disturbance is re moved, the stock o f m oney w ill return to its expected growth path even without Federal Reserve interven tion. A movement from Mato M tl during week t w ill still be expected to yield money stock Mc in week t + k even without Fed intervention. Thus, a positive shock per ceived as temporary w ill not result in expected m one tary tightening or higher interest rates. In contrast, if the shock is perceived to be permanent, then discre tionary policy action w ill be required to return to the expected path as discussed above. If the change is temporary but the adjustment back to the expected path is slow, policy action may be expected. For example, if delays in processing tax refunds were an important but temporary factor in lowering m oney growth, the Fed might act to offset factors that w ould otherwise result in a temporary '2For example, see Roley and Walsh (1984) and Gavin and Karamouzis (1984). The most important institutional change was the switch in the Federal Reserve’s operating procedures for conduct ing monetary policy. Before October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve primarily focused on interest rates in the short run, although there were explicit monetary aggregate targets since 1975; see Wallich and Keir (1979). From October 1979 through September 1982, to improve monetary control, the Federal Reserve adopted a policy of targeting on nonborrowed reserves in the short run. Since then, the Federal Reserve has pursued a more flexible policy, paying some what more attention to interest rate fluctuations than it had in the previous period, although not reverting to the pre-October 1979 regime. See Wallich (1984) and Gilbert (1985). Institutional changes since 1977 also include changes in the money stock announcement date (switched from Thursday to Friday and back to Thursday), a change from lagged to contemporaneous reserve requirements (in February 1984), and the changes associ ated with financial deregulation. Any of these, in theory, could alter the informational content of the money stock announcement. 27 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS decline in the money stock. Thus, the expected liquid ity effect is also predicated on the assumption that the cause o f an unexpected m oney change is permanent (or o f long enough duration to prom pt an expectation o f Federal Reserve intervention). AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 F ig u re 2 Inflation Premium Effect Inflation Prem ium Effect The inflation premium hypothesis, like the ex pected liquidity hypothesis, focuses on market per ceptions o f Federal Reserve behavior in response to money surprises. In sharp contrast to the expected liquidity effect, this hypothesis assumes that the Fed eral Reserve will not react to offset unexpected m oney fluctuations. Again assume the Federal Reserve has a target range for m oney growth given by the cone in figure 2, and the dashed line represents expected m oney growth. The last announced value o f the m oney stock was M „ and Mb is the level expected to be announced in the cur rent week. Also assume the actual announced value is Md, yielding a positive m oney surprise o f M d- M b. The inflation premium effect assumes that the sur prise w ill not be offset but that the m oney surprise will induce (or is the result of) changes in the Federal Reserve strategy toward less restrictive m onetary pol icy. Thus, the money stock is not expected to return to its form er target path but is expected to move along a new path as indicated by m ' in figure 2. The slope o f this new path generally will be greater than that o f the previous expected path, w hich indicates higher ex pected m oney growth and thus higher expected in flation.13The inflation premium effect predicts that the increase in expected inflation w ill lead to higher nom i nal interest rates for as long as this inflationary policy is expected to last. A crucial assumption underlying the inflation pre mium effect is that an increase in the m oney stock, at least in part, signals an easier m onetary policy stance.'4 An unexpected increase in the m oney stock announcement leads financial market participants to revise upward their perceptions o f expected future money growth and expected inflation. What does this assumption im ply about financial market partici pants’ view o f Federal Reserve policy? T o the extent that the Fed has stated monetary aggregate targets, market participants must believe that those aggre gates may not be the sole target o f policy. The inflation premium effect, like the expected li quidity effect, also assumes that unexpected shocks are perceived as permanent or only slowly selfcorrecting. If the shock w ere perceived as temporary, Fed intervention w ould be unnecessary, and money growth w ould return to its original expected path without Fed intervention.15 13lf the slope along rh® is less than that along me, the two paths will ultimately converge, as they are assumed to do in the analysis of the expected liquidity effect. Alternately, the growth path could have exactly the same slope, m' = me, before and after an unexpected increase in the money stock. In this case, money growth before and after the one-week shock would be expected to be the same. The long-run money growth rate would increase only by the amount that the one-week increase had an impact on the average. Since money growth influences inflation only with a substantial lag and since a one-shot level change in the money stock is generally small in relation to, say, the year-to-year change in the money supply, a simple step up in the level of the money stock would usually have little effect on the actual or the expected inflation rate. M oney Dem and Effect ’4Again, this discussion assumes financial markets believe the Fed is using a single target within the cone. "This effect has also been titled the real economic activity effect. See Cornell (1983b). Digitized for 28 FRASER A third hypothesis suggested as an explanation of positive m oney surprises leading to interest rate in creases focuses on m oney dem and effects.16 Suppose 15This statement also abstracts from considerations such as interest rate smoothing. For example, a temporary shock may lead to Fed intervention to smooth the adjustment to equilibrium. In addition, if the shock were temporary but led to a permanent shift in Fed policy, it could also have the effect shown in figure 2. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 tual shift in the dem and curve, subject to the limita tions noted above, w ou ld already have had its impact felt before the announcement.17 F ig u re 3 Money Dem id Effect hi.™ • '* * '• • • * Distinguishing Between the Alternative Effects Th e three effects described above all predict that an unexpected m oney stock increase w ill lead to higher nominal short-term interest rates. In an effort to differ entiate the impacts o f the expected liquidity effect, the inflation prem ium effect and m oney dem and effect, some studies have exam ined the implications o f the alternative effects on stock prices and exchange rates.'* stack m oney dem and depends in part on expected future output, a situation considered by Fama 11982). Since expectations about future output tire unobservable, financial market participants cannot determine aggre gate m oney demand. The money announcement then conveys information not only about m oney demand but also about expected future output. An increase in m oney dem and due to an increase in expected future output is expected to persist and cause interest rates to be bid up. This effect is illustrated in figure 3, which focuses direcdy on market perceptions o f m oney sup ply and demand. W hile an increase in m oney dem and may lead market participants to also expect an in crease in m oney supply, it is assumed in this section that only the m oney dem and curve has shifted. The case o f m oney dem and and supply both changing is discussed below. Before the m oney stock announcement, the ex pected future m oney supply and dem and curves are given by S and D, respectively. After an unexpectedly large m oney announcement, the future m oney de mand curve is perceived to have shifted (permanently) from D to D ’. Interest rates in the future are expected to rise to equilibrate the m oney market, and the expec tations o f higher future rates lead current rates to rise in anticipation. Note that it is the n ew information about the location o f the present and expected future dem and curves that influences interest rates. Any ac Based on the expected liquidity effect, som e have argued that, because the m oney surprise leads to higher expected interest rates, it depresses the present discounted value o f future dividends, thus lowering stock prices. In addition, the expected li quidity effect predicts that, after taking into account exchange rate risk, higher expected real returns in the United States relative to, say, Germany should induce a capital inflow that w ill be accom panied by a rising value o f the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies. The inflation premium effect predicts that an unex pected m oney stock increase w ill low er exchange rates, as U.S. inflation increases relative to inflation in other countries. Th e inflation premium effect makes no prediction about the effect o f an unexpected money stock increase on stock prices.” "A shift in money demand that is not due to a shift in expected future output is not necessarily associated with any change in stock prices. One particular money demand effect that is sometimes consid ered separately is the reserve settlement effect This effect existed only under lagged reserve requirements when the timing of the money announcement was such that it revealed information about current reserve demand. Consider a money stock announcement say, on August 26, 1982. Data on the money stock was released then for the week ending August 18,1982. But deposits for the week ending August 26,1982, determined required reserves for the week ending September 2,1 982 . When the money stock numbers were released, they may have contained incremental information on the demand for reserves. An individual bank may know its own reserve requirements prior to the money announcement, but it has only limited information on aggregate reserves and thus on the federal funds rate expected to prevail for the remainder of the reserve settlement period. An unexpected money increase generally implies that deposits, as wed as the demand for required and total reserves, are all greater than expected. The reserve settlement effect demonstrates how institu tional characteristics can influence the relationship, say, between money announcements and interest rates. “ For example, see Cornell (1983b). ,9See Cornell (1983b) for a more detailed explanation. 29 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS In contrast, the m oney dem and effect im plies that an unexpectedly large m oney announcement w ill in crease stock prices due to the underlying increase in expected future output. Th e international value o f the U.S. dollar may increase due to the direct impact o f an increased m oney dem and as w ell as the indirect effect o f greater m oney dem and leading to higher real inter est rates and resulting capital inflows.3" COMPARING THE HYPOTHESES: SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS? Previous studies have advanced the three hypothe ses presented above as com peting theories to explain w h y unanticipated m oney announcem ents alter financial market variables.21In fact, the three effects do not necessarily com pete and m ay be either substitutes or complements. Consider a sim ple exam ple in which they are complements. As in figures 1 and 2, the expected m oney stock prior to the announcement at tim e t was M(l. w hile the announced value was Md. The expected liquidity effect again predicts a slowing o f m oney growth from time t to t + k . Assume that this tightening is expected to be only partially successful. In terms o f figure 2, the m oney grow th rate w ill be between m ' and m'. In this scenario, nominal interest rates w ill be expected to rise due to both the expected restrictive policy and higher expected inflation. Sim ply stated, m onetary policy is expected to be tighter after the unexpected increase, but not tight enough to restore the form er growth rate. Figures 1 to 3 each focus on one m onetary distur bance. There is, however, substantial noise in the w eekly M l series. Tim s, tem porary shifts cannot read ily be distinguished from permanent shifts. Further more, in light o f this uncertainty w hich all financial market participants face, the Federal Reserve may be expected to hedge its response to fluctuations.21Thus, it is plausible that market participants may expect monetary policy to be tighter after an unexpected increase, but not tight enough to restore the form er growth rate. Both the expected liquidity and the inflation pre “ tt should be noted that the relationship between real interest rates and capital inflows has only recently been emphasized. See Batten and OH (1983). Previously the emphasis would have been placed on relationships like an expected expansion leading to a rise in imports and a drop in the U.S. exchange rate. 21In fact. Come* (1983b) introduces an additional theory, the risk premium hypothesis, based on increased monetary variability re quiring larger risk premiums. Since neither he nor Belongia and Kolb (1984) found any evidence of its existence, it is omitted here. ®See Brainard (1967) for a formal model making this point. 30 AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 mium effects are based on the assumption o f a perma nent m oney market shock that m ay prom pt Federal Reserve response. W hile such a shock need not origi nate in m oney demand, clearly it could. I f it does, then the expected liquidity and inflation premium effects cannot be distinguished from the m oney dem and effect. Further com plicating the analysis o f the m oney dem and effect is that it presumes a shift in m oney demand, but market participants are unlikely to be lieve m oney dem and can shift w ithout some Fed re sponse based on its presum ed targets. Thus, the m oney dem and effect m ay imply, say, an expected liquidity effect in response. For example, assume m oney dem and increases and the Federal Reserve is believed to be focusing exclusively on a m onetary aggregate target. The increase in m oney demand, ce teris paribus, w ill lead to increases in both the m oney stock and interest rates as figure 3 demonstrates. Fur thermore, the announcement o f a m oney stock in crease could lead financial market participants to ex pect the Fed to reduce the m oney supply in order to maintain its m onetary aggregate target. This tighten ing, however, is the expected liquidity effect. Alternately, if financial market participants believe the Federal Reserve is tiyin g to peg nominal interest rates, the expected Fed response to a m oney dem and increase w ou ld be very different. An increase in m oney dem and w ould prom pt the Fed to increase the m oney supply to prevent interest rates from increasing. In this scenario, the unexpected m oney announcements should have no effect on interest rates. Between the extremes o f focusing exclusively on interest rates and focusing exclusively on a monetary aggregate, both the expected liquidity and inflation premium effects may be present. EVALUATING THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS The findings o f previous em pirical analyses o f the impact o f anticipated and unanticipated m oney an nouncements are summarized in table 1. The results presented indicate considerable disagreement among previous studies. Short-Term Interest Rates Unexpected Changes — Most studies conclude that short-term interest rates are significantly and positively influenced by unantici pated m oney announcements. W hile this is true in both the pre- and post-October 1979 periods, the ef- Table 1 Summary of Empirical Results Pre-October 1979 Unexpected Money Changes Post-October 1979 Expected Money Changes Expected Money Changes Unexpected Money Changes NOMINAL INTEREST RATES Short-Run + Grossman (1981) Urich and Wachtel (1981) Roley (1982) Urich (1982) Cornell (1983a) Roley (1983) Roley and Troll (1983) Loeys (1984) Urich and Wachtel (1984) Judd (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) 0 Cornell (1983b) Roley and Walsh (1984) 0 Grossman (1981) Urich and Wachtel (1981) Urich (1982) Cornell (1983b) Roley (1983) Urich and Wachtel (1984) Roley and Walsh (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) Long-Run + Roley (1982) Cornell (1982) Cornell (1983a) Cornell (1983b) Shiller, et. al. (1983) Roley (1983) Roley and Troll (1983) Loeys (1984) Belongia and Kolb (1984) Urich and Wachtel (1984) Roley and Walsh (1984) Hardouvelis (1984) Judd (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) Hein (1985) Belongia and Sheehan (1985) - Belongia and Kolb (1984) Urich and Wachtel (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) Hein (1985) Belongia and Sheehan (1985) 0 Roley and Troll (1983) 0 Cornell (1983b) Roley (1983) Roley and Walsh (1984) + Cornell (1983a) - Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) Cornell (1983b) Loeys (1984) Rotey and Walsh (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) 0 Cornell (1983a) Cornell (1983b) Loeys (1984) Roley and Walsh (1984) Judd (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) STOCK PRICES - 0 Cornell (1983b) Roley and Walsh (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) Pearce and Roley (1983) Pearce and Roley (1985) 0 Cornell (1983b) 0 Shiller, et. al. (1983) Hardouvelis (1984) Judd (1984) - Cornell (1983b) Pearce and Roley (1983) Pearce and Roley (1985) 0 Cornell (1983b) Pearce and Rotey (1983) Pearce and Roley (1985) EXCHANGE RATES 0 Cornell (1983b) Pearce and Roley (1983) Pearce and Roley (1985) + Cornell (1982) Cornell (1983b) Engel and Frankel (1984) Hardouvelis (1984) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) 0 Cornell (1983b) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) + indicates a significant positive effect was found. - indicates a significant negative effect was found. 0 indicates an insignificant effect. 0 Cornell (1983b) Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) 0 Cornell (1983b) Roley and Walsh (1984) - Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) 0 Cornell (1983b) AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS fects are substantially larger in the latter period.21For example, Judd (1984) finds that a 1 percent positive m oney surprise w ou ld increase the three-month Treasu iy bill rate by only 6 basis points before October 1979, but by 36 basis points after September 1979.14 That this is true is consistent w ith financial markets believing that after September 1979 the Fed placed substantially m ore w eight on short-term m oney stock movements in their efforts to achieve monetary aggre gate targets Apparently, the market believed the Fed's statements that its procedures w ere being changed. The v e iy small estimated coefficients before October 1979 indicate that financial markets believed the Fed was less interested in short-term movements in the m oney stock before then. That an unexpectedly large m oney announcement increases short-term nominal interest rates cannot be used as evidence to distinguish between the expected liquidity, inflation premium and m oney dem and ef fects, however. All three predict a positive relationship between the two.25 Thus, previous research also has aThete is also substantially greater interest rate volatility in the latter period. In addition, studies that have attempted to assess the impact of money surprises have been faced with the task of sorting out the influences of other factors such as a change in the day of the mooey announcement, a discount rate surcharge, credit controls, etc. See also the institutional changes mentioned in footnote 12. Most stud ies have simply chosen a period (or periods) for analysis and assumed that non-money-announcement effects were unchanging over that period. Whether this approach is valid is debatable. It should be noted, however, that most estimated equations can explain only 30 percent or less of the fluctuation in interest rates around the time of the money announcement. **ln general, no attempt is made here to present the magnitude of estimated coefficients since the studies differ with respect to time periods, definitions of the dependent variable (e.g., federal funds rate vs. three-month Treasury bill as the short-term interest rate) and equation specification. In addition, all the studies except Judd (1984), Loeys (1984) and Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) make no systematic study of differential effects occurring after October 1982 when the Federal Reserve deemphasized the M1 monetary aggre gate. “ Cornell (1983b) states: The dramatic shift in the market response to money supply an nouncements after October 6 is difficult to reconcile with the expected inflation hypothesis. If the money supply announcements are providing information about future money growth, there is no obvious reason why the Fed’s stated intention to control monetary aggregates should induce a positive correlation between announced innovations in money and changes in interest rates. In fa c t it is more reasonable to conclude that the correlation would decline because week-to-week variation in the agcpegates would no longer provide information about long-run policy. Cornell's argument is that the expected liquidity effect predicts a greater response to money surprises pre- vs. post-October 1979, while the inflation premium effect predicts no change in response. This lack of change with the inflation premium hypothesis, however, is based on the assumption that the change in operating procedures dkl not alter market participants’ view of the money supply process. The inflation premium effect could also be associated with a greater response to a money surprise after October 1979 if, for example, an unexpected increase in the money stock after that date is viewed as having a greater probability of signaling monetary ease than under the previous operating procedures. 32 focused on financial market variables for w hich the responses to m oney surprises might differ. These vari ables include long-term interest rates, stock prices and exchange rates. Long-Term Interest Rates Studies that have considered the impact o f m oney announcements on long-term interest rates have been unanimous in concluding that neither announcement surprises nor anticipations influenced long-term rates prior to October 1979. This is again consistent with financial markets believing that the Federal Reserve was pegging interest rates before October 1979. After September 1979, w ith lim ited analysis there is some evidence that expected announcements have no im pact on long-term rates. Expected increases in the m oney stock m ay lead to higher inflation and higher long-term interest rates, but d o not necessarily lead to h i^ ie r inflation and interest rates im m ediately after the m oney announcement. The results concerning announcement surprises are mixed. Studies that have used long-term forward rates such as Shiller, et. al. (1983), Hardouvelis (1984) and Judd (19841 generally have found no significant response.® These findings are not consistent w ith the inflation premium effect. A m oney surprise is appar ently expected to be quickly offset by the Fed and thus has no effect on long-run inflation expectations. Alter nately, financial market participants could sim ply be lieve that weekly m oney announcements, from a longrun perspective, convey little o r no information useful in forecasting long-term interest rates. Studies such as Cornell (1983a) that have used changes in actual long-term rates, w hich include the effects o f short-term rates, have found significant ef fects. W hether these effects are the result o f market participants’ short-run expectations about current or prospective short-term interest rates or w hether they truly convey information about inflation expectations has not been determined. Stock Prices Relatively few studies have considered the im plica tions o f m oney announcements on stock prices. Stock prices apparently decreased in response to positive m oney surprises in the post-September 1979 period. In the pre-October 1979 period, there is no consensus ^■Gavin and Karamouzis (1984) find the four-year forward rate three years ahead is significantly influenced by money surprises, while the 23-year forward rate seven years ahead is not. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS on w hether m oney surprises influenced stock prices (table 1). Expected changes had no effect on stock prices in either period. These results are inconsistent with the m oney de mand effect. If the m oney announcement reveals an increase in m oney dem and due to an increase in expected output, stock prices should increase.27 Exchange Rates The exchange rate results presented in table 1 indi cate that neither anticipated announcements nor sur prises significantly influenced exchange rates before October 1979. After September 1979, m oney surprises have resulted in significant appreciation o f the dollar relative to some currencies, in particular the German mark and the Swiss franc. Other exchange rates, such as those relative to the British pound and the Cana dian dollar, have not appreciated significantly. To date, there apparently have been no joint tests o f the significance o f m oney surprises on all exchange rates. The evidence that exchange rates generally did not depreciate is also inconsistent with the inflation pre mium effect. The inflation premium effect predicts that an unexpectedly large m oney announcement, associated with higher expected inflation, should lead instead to low er exchange rates.28 Short-Term Interest Rates Expected Changes — Most studies also indicate that expected m oney announcements had no impact on short-term interest rates before October 1979. After then, table 1 indicates a consensus that expected m oney announcements had significant negative effects on short-term interest rates. This result is inconsistent with any o f the com peting theories and the efficient markets hypothesis.29 Thus, either the efficient markets hypothesis is incor rect, the theories as they are currently formulated or tested are insufficiently detailed, or other factors are changing that are correlated with expected money. 27This conclusion implies only that the money demand effect by itself cannot explain all of the impacts of the money announcements. 28The exchange rate results imply only that the inflation premium effect by itself is not capable of explaining all the impacts of money announcements. ^After October 1979, an expected increase in the money supply would cause movement down the money demand cun/e with a resulting decrease in interest rates. Market efficiency implies that this decrease in interest rates would occur immediately upon the change in expectations. Thus, if the money supply is expected to increase prior to the money announcement, interest rates would already have adjusted to this expectation prior to that an nouncement. AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 1985 It is difficult to argue that the efficient markets hypothesis is incorrect. If it were, it w ou ld im ply that profitable trading opportunities exist based only on knowledge o f expected money.30Given that the money announcement is w id ely forecasted and both the fore casted and announced values are w idely dissemi nated, it seems unreasonable to expect profitable trad ing opportunities to remain for long. It seems more plausible to attribute the significance o f expected m oney either to correlation between expected money and om itted variables or to limitations in the underly ing theory.31 CONCLUSIONS While a number o f theories have been advanced to explain w hy m oney stock announcements, particu larly the com ponent that is unexpected, influence financial market variables, this paper shows that these theories are not generally competing. For example, the expected liquidity and inflation premium effects may be com plem entaiy depending on financial market participants’ perceptions o f Federal Reserve goals. Some empirical results are inconsistent with either the inflation premium effect or the m oney demand effect alone. The expected liquidity effect, by itself, can explain the responses o f interest rates, exchange rates and stock prices to unexpected m oney announce ments. 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