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Business Review

Some Financial Guides
From 1970

-An Address by
Philip E. Coldwell

---_

February 1971

.............

This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org)

Some .Financial Guides from 1970
An Address by

Philip E. Coldwell
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
at the
Salesmanship Club of Dallas
February 4, 1971

At the begiIming of 1971, the
near-term economic prospects were
less promising than at the start of
any other recent year. The nation
appeared to be suffering from not
only a retrenchment in economic
~rowth measured by gross product,
lndustrial production, and unemployment but also a continuing
a.dyance in prices resulting from
nSlllg costs and a loss of profit
flexibility.
The past year was one of
consolidation and adjustment, with
th~ demand pressures subsiding
While wage-cost pressures increased. As monetary and fiscal
policies finally brought a general
slOwing of business and consumer
spending and as defense spending
~as curtailed, there was a sizable
lllcrease in unemployment. The
long uptrend in sales and profits
Was interrupted, with a conseqUent strong impact upon the
ability of many conglomerates and
~thers to sustain their positions in
/bt and equity markets. In addilon, the cumulative effects of
tight money, the higher costs of
Operation, and the shortfall of sales
and profits brought a near-crisis
of liquidity for a number of
corporations.
I,n. this atmosphere, Government
POhcles shifted toward stimulation
and at least moderate monetary
ease, and this trend accelerated
Business Review I February 1971

throughout the last half of 1970.
By the end of the year, the shortrun impact was already visible in
the sharp declines in interest rates
and the developing liquidity at
many financial institutions.
Nevertheless, several worrisome
matters continue to plague the
nation, including the rising level of
unemployment, the still-evident
price increases, and the enlarging
deficits in the domestic budget and
the nation's international balance
of payments. Bright spots in the
economic scene include a developing upswing in residential construction and a supporting advance
in state and local government
spending. The principal question
marks for the economic outlook
appear to be the trend of consumer
spending, the vigor of the housing
upswing, and the degree of curtailment in business capital outlays.
At this season of economic forecasting, there has developed a
standard forecast reflecting relatively slow growth in "real" output,
an advance of 6 to 8 percent in
nominal gross product, and a
continuing inflation of about 4 to
5 percent. Most forecasters are
predicting some further increase
in unemployment, a sharply rising
budget deficit, easier money, and
lower interest rates. Broadly
characterized, the economists are
saying 1971 will be a better year
than 1970, but without much
sparkle or zest.
As usual, however, the timing of
changes in the important economic
variables and the quarterly trends
of overall production vary greatly
among the forecasters. Some
believe in high-level stagnation for
the full year. Others forecast a
slow growth in the first half,
followed by a strong upswing in
the final six months. Still others
are predicting a dichotomy of
trends, with unemployment peak-

ing and interest rates bottoming
out by midsummer and then
economic stagnation.
In my opinion, there are many
elements of the standard forecast
which could easily come true, but
my reservations concern the possibilities of a much more rapid
recovery and one in which inflation
is reinforced rather than dampened. The prime key to a potentially stronger recovery lies with
the consumer. If he, after many
months of very heavy savings,
decides his job is more secure and
his income prospects are brighter,
he might just move toward a higher
purchasing level and thereby
restimulate many of the currently
lagging industries. At present,
most consumer surveys reflect a
bearish attitude, but such polls
have not always proved to be a
true guide to the future and may
not in 1971.
Other potentials for a stronger
economic outlook exist in the
pressure for inventory building as
a hedge against a steel strike, a
more rapid expansion of U.S.
Government spending-especially
in the welfare and public works
areas, sharper gains in housing,
and heavier business spending for
laborsaving equipment.
If one merely looks at the economic and financial stimulation
already undertaken, it must be
evident that powerful forces have
been unleashed to reinvigorate the
economy. The Government in late
1970 and early 1971 has expanded
its spending effort and enlarged its
budget deficit, has moved to soften
investment tax loads, and is proposing a number of new programs
in the welfare and revenue-sharing
fields which will sizably increase
total spending. In an immediate
sense, pay increases of about 6
percent were approved for many
federal employees and a further
1

boost in Social Security benefits
themselves or from the standpoint
is proposed.
of the regulatory or monetary
Congressional action to date has policy aspects of the nation's
provided only modest increases in control over banking. Foremost
spending, but the potentialities are among these has been the problem
almost endless. Moreover, conof liquidity. While defined a
gressional concern over the mount- variety of different ways, liquidity
ing unemployment and slowing
to me means an ability to meet
business of the nation argues
one's commitments, to pay the
strongly that future spending
bills required, and to have a
decisions are likely to be more
sufficient cushion for unforeseen
aggressive. Monetary policy, too,
developments.
has contributed a sizable measure
The liquidity of banks shifted
of stimulus to the future by exmarkedly during 1969 and 1970.
panding the money supply, reduc- Throughout the last l;lalf of 1969
ing discount rates, and providing
and early 1970, banks felt strong
commercial bank access to the CD
pressures from extensive loan
market without rate ceilings for
demands which steadily eroded
30- to 89-day maturities.
their margin, or cushion, of liquidOn balance, then, the chances of ity. With a very small growth in
a more rapid recovery than presdemand deposits and an actual
ently forecast by many economists decline in time deposits in 1969,
are within the realm of possibility.
many banks found themselves in
At least there is agreement that
an almost status quo position from
the chances of a cumulative down- the standpoint of total availability
turn are not likely, and, thus, the
of funds. Against this stability in
debate centers on the timing and
available funds was a rising
extent of the recovery. This dedemand from business, consumers,
bate is not meaningless because
and other users of credit.
too rapid a recovery will not
Many banks lacked short-term
permit time for dampening the
investments to liquidate to meet
inflationary cost pressures while,
this loan demand. Others had conon the other hand, a slow recentrated earlier efforts into
covery may prolong the economic
enlarging their long-term lending
and social costs of lost sales,
and, thus, lacked normal repayunemployment, and underutilizament flexibility. Still others, retion of capacity.
flecting decisions made in previous
Whatever the trend of the
years, were "locked in" to longeconomy in 1971, we should learn
term portfolio investments, both in
from our experiences. Thus, in the
Governments and in municipal
remainder of this speech, I will
securities. Not wanting to liquidate
discuss some of the lessons in
at a sizable loss, the banks' ability
banking and finance which seem to to meet enlarged credit demands
me to have been demonstrated by
was hampered.
the events, policies, and programs
For a few banks, this pressure
of 1970.
of liquidity reached near-crisis
The principal financial lessons
proportions in early 1970, and
to be reviewed are those concerned borrowings and nondeposit sources
with banking, monetary policy, and of funds were used to a great
fiscal policies of the Government.
extent to alleviate the pressures.
In the realm of banking, several
Borrowings from the Federal
trends-some not originating in
Reserve expanded sharply, and
1970 but evident in the handling
sizable borrowings in the Euroof various banking matters in that
dollar market became evident in
year-have been particularly
the Eleventh District for the first
troublesome, either to the banks
time. Net purchases of Federal
2

funds by District member 'banks
mounted steadily to an average
exceeding three-quarters of a billion dollars per day in early 1970.
By the end of the year, many of
these special borrowings had been
markedly reduced or eliminated,
primarily because the Federal
Reserve permitted banks to participate in the 30- to 89-day CD
market without interest rate ceilings but also because, in easing
monetary policy, the Federal
Reserve provided an expansion in
the money supply and the reserve
base of the banks.
The lesson to be learned, I
think, is better forward planning
of liquidity and a scheduling of
short-term investments which will
provide a cushion to meet loan
demands during periods of monetary restraint. This may mean
some reduced commitments in the
long-term area or some decline in
the average maturity of investment
portfolios. In a sense, this lesson
reflects a basic lack of planning.
While most bankers are not
economists, there are enough published reports available for the
majority of bankers to have some
advance knowledge, or at least
premonition, of the developments
leading toward monetary restraint.
Preparing for such a period would,
I submit, be nothing but normal
planning, and yet there were too
few banks prepared to take
anticipatory actions in portfolio
management, interest rates, or
long-term commitments.
Similarly, it seems to me that
there has been a lack of planning in
the sense of a forward look toward
new business. This was especially
true in the handling of credit cards,
which became so prevalent in this
District during the past two years.
The impact of the credit-card
development was apparently
underestimated or planning was
inadequate, for a number of banks
found themselves without adequate
data-processing facilities and with
insufficient reserves to cover the

losses and slow payments from
their accounts.
There has been a rather evident
lack of planning on the part of
many banks in developing new
sources of lendable funds, and
some of those that have moved
to the new sources of funds have
done so in a "follow-the-leader"
fashion without recognition of
Some of the problems inherent in
th?se new sources. Especially
eVldent has been the expansion of
?ank purchases of Federal funds,
~n some few cases to levels exceedIng .40 percent of deposit totals.
While individual banks could argue
that this new source was an
almost-assured source of funds
because of commitments from their
subsidiary or correspondent banks,
others ventured far and wide,
.
paYlllg rates far in excess of the
average and tapping sources of
Such funds which were, at best,
questionable in their permanence.
Another planning failure, or
perhaps a "sublesson" to be
learned, regards the matter of
COnunitments by banks for lines of
~redit. Too often in the past, banks
liaVe been willing to commit for a
ne of credit to a corporation,
~hinking that such lines would not
e utilized or, if utilized, would
be drawn down only to a small
degree. As restraint grew during
late 1969 and early 1970, some of
these banks found to their sorrow
that their commitments were not
only firm but binding, and their
expense in meeting the commitments was higher than the rates
to be obtained. This may. have been
especially true of a bank which
Was forced to enter the Eurodollar
m~rket at its peak and make a
Prune rate loan to a national
CUstomer.
b Of course, for most of what has
een mentioned so far, the core
problem has been management
and there were other managem~nt
problems evident in 1970. First, it
~eems to me that the banking
lndustry has not done an adequate
BUSiness Review / February 1971

job in recruiting new employees or
in training them to such a degree
as to meet the demands for new
bank management. Part of this
has been because of inadequate
salary levels at many banks. At
others, there has been a continuous
loss of personnel or a threat of
unionization because of a lack of
attractive fringe benefits or other
compensation.
Some bank management also
failed to prepare itself for competition, both from other banks and
from other financial institutions or
newly devised direct-debt competition. It became evident some
years ago that banks were going
to be forced to pay for a larger
proportion of their deposits and
that, unless they did a good job
of servicing their communities,
there was a possibility for a new
bank to be chartered, especially
in the unit-banking states such as
Texas. It also has been abundantly
clear that banks were going to be
under heavy competition from savings and loan associations, finance
companies, credit unions, and farm
credit associations. Yet, banks in
some of the areas of greatest competition appeared to move ahead
with the same old policies and the
same old procedures, almost ignoring the development and growth of
their competitors.
Finally, from a regulatory and
monetary policy standpoint, there
was too little support from the
banking industry for sound stabilization policies. As in the previous
year, there were still banks ev:ading
some of the impact of regulatIOns
and seeking profit above' national
interest. We must recognize that
banks are profit-making organizations, but bankers are in a specialized public-interest industry, not
only in the use of funds owned by
the general public but also in the
participation in an industry which
has vital and important effects
upon the health of the national
economy. Thus, policies which are
adopted by the commercial

banking industry must be in keeping with the high purpose and
public responsibility of the industry, placing the public interest in
at least an equal position with the
profit of the organization. Unfortunately, too many of our banks
still see profit as their only goal
and primary indicator of success.
It is quite difficult, of course, to
ask individuals in a privateenterprise economy to take actions
or institute policies which might be
against their own short-run selfinterest, but the policies banks
were asked to adopt and those
which they should be supporting
are, in the long run, in the best
interests of both the economy and
the banks. Our banking industry
must move the focus of its attention from the short-range profit
motive to the combined long-range
profit and public-interest motive.
A failure to do this will only mean
that additional efforts must be
undertaken by national regulatory
agencies to compel the industry to
abide by those short-run policies
which lead to the long-run best
interests of the economy.
It is easy to stand on the
sidelines and be critical of an
industry, but I assure you that my
intention is not destructive criticism but constructive suggestion
so that our economic and financial
system will continue to provide the
environment and impetus for the
long-range, stable growth we all
seek.
One other policy of the banking
industry which I think provides a
lesson for us in the coming years is
that reflected in some of the problems evident in the current headlines on the SEC investigation. For
many years, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas has been raising a
warning flag about the abuses of
bank-stock loans and self-dealing
within the banking fraternity. We
have publicized the bank-stock
loan problems to a considerable
extent, and I will not recite all of
the details which bring me to a
3

position of opposition to many of
the practices in this field.
It will be sufficient to say that
the bank-stock loan procedures,
where they encompass heavy
compensating balances, create a
situation in which a bank's funds
are being used to support a loan to
one group of stockholders. Moreover, in many cases, such funds are
available only by withdrawing the
bank from membership in the
Federal Reserve System and
using the reserve requirement
as the compensating balance. In
addition, there are inequities
in rates charged, credit leverage
created, and long-term control
relationships established which
do not lend themselves to the
arm's-length dealing appropriate
to banking.
Some of this same type of
problem is evident in the internal
dealings of directors and officers in
developing loans from their own
banks to other industries or corporations in which the officers or
directors have substantial personal
financial interest. One wonders
how it is possible for some customers of a bank to borrow the full cost
of purchasing stocks with no other
collateral than the stocks themselves, especially when the banker
has a personal interest in the
corporation whose stock is being
financed. Responsible bankers
should not place themselves in
such an obviously compromising
position, at least from a publicappearance standpoint.
Perhaps the most serious longrun aspect of this affair is the
damage to public confidence in the
banking industry. The handling of
these loans does not reflect usual
practice in handling securities
loans, with perhaps the exception
of those secured by bank stocks.
Unfortunately, this bank-stock
loan procedure casts a sufficient
shadow of doubt to reflect on the
entire industry.
It seems absolutely necessary for
all banks to demonstrate their

"

utmost purity and arm's-length
dealing by restricting the amount
of loans granted directors or
officers or institutions in which
they have significant financial or
management positions. Moreover,
loans for security investment
should be limited to securities in
firms not represented by interests
of directors or officers. These
problems have been evident for
many years, but I submit that they
are growing. Since the banking
industry is apparently unable to
police itself, there may be need for
regulatory or legislative control
over the coming years.
Let me say that my resentment
and anguish over these matters
arose because, on the whole, we
have such a fine group of bankers
and banking institutions. It is
deplorable that a few can have
such a damaging effect upon public
confidence in the entire industry.
After spending so much time on
what I hope were constructive
suggestions regarding the banking
industry, I intend to spend some
time in self-analysis with regard to
the lessons of 1970 for monetary
policy.
In my opinion, there have been
several important lapses in Federal
Reserve monetary policy control
over the past two years. First and
foremost was the adoption of
gradualism as a policy approach in
early 1969, with the resulting
extension of time within which
corrective action could have been
expected from monetary policies of
restraint. By such a policy of
gradualism, credit restraint was
insufficient and banks and others
took evasive measures which
minimized the impact of the
restraining policies. Similarly, this
extended period of restraint, with
its high levels of interest rates and
almost imperceptible dampening
of the rate of inflation, allowed
cumulative price increases which
encouraged labor to demand compensation for the erosion of its real
purchasing power. This, too, has

accentuated the problem of bringing the nation out of its inflationary
cycle and has resulted in a situation in which unemployment has
risen rapidly while price increases
continue. Such changes are forming the impetus to cost-push
inflation, which may prove to be a
very difficult problem to minimize
over the coming months.
A second problem or lesson from
1970 for the Federal Reserve and
one which also carried over from
the previous year has been the
System's inadequate response
to changing conditions. Here I
would cite our procrastination in
placing in effect regulatory restrictions on Eurodollar borrowings
and commercial paper issues by
commercial banks. Both actions
were ultimately taken, but in our
slowness the volume of these
borrowings rose to record heights.
Thus, we are now faced with a
difficult problem in our balance of
payments with regard to the return
flow of Eurodollars.
In my opinion, we have also
provided inadequate controls over
our international balance of payments, for our deficits in this area
have continued and for 1970 were
very large. It is not within the
province of the Federal Reserve to
take the policy actions necessary
to correct our balance-of-payments
deficit, but I believe we suffer some
of the blame for continuing this
unsatisfactory situation, in part by
our ingenuity in creating short-run
regulatory correctives which may
have deferred or taken off the pressure for long-range answers.
Finally, particularly in 1970, it
is my opinion that the Federal
Reserve has both practically and
philosophically adopted a position
of overreliance on money supply as
the prime target for monetary
policy. It has been abundantly
clear over the past several months
that Federal Reserve actions were
not able to ensure a precise rate of
money supply growth and hold to
that rate despite the internal

changes in the economy. It has
also been abundantly clear that
Our present state of research, even
with the aid of very high-powered
computer equipment, is inadequate
to provide accurate predictions or
forecasts of the rate of money
Supply growth. This is especially
true when one looks at the week-toweek and month-to-month figures.
My unhappiness with this concentration upon money supply as
a guide to monetary policy stems
both from our inability to predict
and achieve the targets set out by
t~e System and from the impresSIOn which this may provide both
the marketplace and the national
economy of an overprecision in
monetary policy control. Stated
~other way, we are giving an
Impression of fine tuning in the
economy which the nation's monetary authorities cannot uphold.
In a sense, we have brought on
ourselves a public reliance upon
monetary policy as the corrective
source for all of the nation's ills.
~e in the Federal Reser.ve recognIze that monetary policy by itself
cannot do the whole job of economic stabilization, much less
provide the correctives in economic
and financial structure which may
be necessary before our economy
returns to a stable growth pattern.
~nd yet, we have permitted an
Impression of fine tuning to permeate the financial market, and I
believe we have aided and abetted
this impression by the adoption of
money supply as a prime target for
monetary policy.
Let me leave no mistaken impression, however. I believe we

Business Review I February 1971

should continue to pay close
attention to the money supply and
continue our research into the
linkages of monetary policy actions
to changes in money supply and
to changes in national economic
conditions. We should also study
carefully the lags in timing between a policy action and changes
in the short-run and intermediate
objectives, as well as the ultimate
effect on the real economy. These
lags apparently are highly variable.
Some of the impact of monetary
policy actions appears to be
almost immediate, but another
part seems to impact only after
six months or a year. Some
academic consultants and observers
seem to be saying that there is a
uniformity of lag and a precision to
the impact, which I believe
is incorrect.
A number of times in 1970, at
least in the short run, we had to
abandon our money supply targets
because of developments in the
economy, the prime case being the
bankruptcy of Penn Central. Here,
such a massive threat to the
nation's financial markets required
Federal Reserve action to reassure
the markets and forestall a financial crisis. Such actions were taken
and taken promptly, but for a
period of time this meant that the
money supply target had to be
pushed into the background.
In my opinion, the money
market variables, such as net
reserves, borrowings, and interest
rates deserve a continuing place in
both 'the targets and the objectives
of Federal Reserve policy. However, I would say the same thing

about the money market aggregates, including the money supply
bank credit, and bank reserves. I '
strongly resist the idea that a
single guideline or objective can
be adequate to measure the complex requirements of our nation's
economy.
I could go on, probably beyond
your endurance, in reviewing the
lessons which I believe should have
been learned by Congress and the
Administration, especially in the
handling of fiscal policies, but
suffice it to say that we still have
an overconcentration upon spending and an underconcentration
upon providing the needed revenues. Our Government leaders
could well have learned the lesson
of overreaction when in 1969 and
1970, defense spending was curtailed simultaneously with economic stabilization efforts.
Similarly, one could hope that our
leaders recognize their slow reaction to an apparent need for
wage-price restraint. Despite
repeated calls by many responsible
economists and business leaders
for some form of moral suasion or
incomes policy, no efforts appeared
until late in 1970 after rising wage
settlements had gained full
momentum.
Our lessons from 1970 may not
provide precise guides for solutions
in the future, and the problems
which they reflect will probably
plague us into the current year.
But we should learn from our
experiences, for the old adage is
still abundantly clear that "those
who refuse to learn from history
are doomed to repeat it."

5

New par banks
The Hodge Bank and Trust Company, Hodge, Louisiana, an insured nonmember
bank located in the territory served by the Head Office of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas, was added to the Par List on January 4, 1971. The officers are: L. C.
Ewing, Chairman of the Board; Robert L. Cone, President; Leon H. Whitten,
Vice President; and Terry O. Ewing, Assistant Cashier.
The Town and Country Bank, Houston, Texas, an insured nonmember bank
located in the territory served by the Houston Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas, was added to the Par List on its opening date, January 4, 1971. The
officers are: Dan M. Moody, Chairman of the Board; W. C. Frels, President; and
William A. McGinty, Executive Vice President.
The American Bank, Conroe, Texas, an insured nonmember bank located in the
territory served by the Houston Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas,
was added to the Par List on its opening date, January 7, 1971. The officers
are: Clayton G. Hester, President; Roy A. Pederson, Vice President (Inactive);
and William M. Sherman, Cashier.
The Arlington Bank of Commerce, Arlington, Texas, an insured nonmember bank
located in the territory served by the Head Office of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas, was added to the Par List on its opening date, January 8, 1971. The
officers are: H. Richard Poynter, President; Wayne Warren, Executive Vice
President; and Jo Bess Russell, Cashier.
The Community State Bank, Boling, Texas, an insured nonmember bank located
in the territory served by the Houston Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, was added to the Par List on its opening date, January 20, 1971. The
officers are: Sherman D. Tryon, President; Jimmie Marquart, Cashier; and Miss
Madeline Urbanovsky, Assistant Cashier.
The Security State Bank of Portland, Portland, Texas, an insured nonmember
bank located in the territory served by the San Antonio Branch of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas, was added to the Par List on its opening date, January 20,
1971. The officers are: L. M. Fischer, Chairman of the Board (Inactive); Edgar M.
Linkenhoger, President (Inactive); W. E. McKenzie, Executive Vice President;
Jim T. McKenzie, Vice President; and W. L. Powell, Cashier.
The Permian Bank and Trust, Odessa, Texas, an insured nonmember bank located
in the territory served by the EI Paso Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas, was added to the Par List on its opening date, January 29, 1971. The
officers are: Jesse 1. Combs, President; David 1. Mountain, Vice President; and
Donald O. Starr, Cashier.

6

New member bank

The Promenade National Bank, Richardson, Texas, a newly organized institution
located in the territory served by the Head Office of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas, opened for business January 20, 1971, as a member of the Federal
Reserve System. The new member bank has capital of $500,000, surplus of
$300,000, and undivided profits of $200,000. The officers are: Rodney D. Hargrave,
President; David L. Stone, Vice President; and Houston J. Sides, Vice President
and Cashier.

-

B .

usmess Review I February 1971

7

Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Station K, Dallas, Texas 75222

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
February 1971

Statistical Supplement to the Business Review

-

:rhe seasonally adjusted Texas
llldustrial production index in
~ecember continued the essentially
at movement that began in
8eptember. At 179.2 percent of its
1957 -59 base, the index was off 0.7
Percent from November and up only
1.2 percent from December 1969.
d The .month-to-month decline was
Ue Pl'lmarlly to a slowing in the
petroleum industry. Crude oil production was off 2.3 percent from the
previous month and petroleum
refining was off '2.7 percent. Utilities
wer~ unchanged. Manufacturing
dech.ned slightly. All of this decline
Was m nondurable goods, which
reflected the drop in petroleum
refining. Output of durables was
unchanged.
n The small increase in output over
f ecember 1969 resulted essentially
rom a 25-percent gain in crude oil
P~oduction. Much of this gain was
~h set, however, by a decline of more
f and 12 percent in the production
o ur~ble goods, especially transPortatIon equipment and electrical
tnachinery.
Toltal nonagricultural wage and

sa ary employment in the five

SouthWestern states advanced
llloderately in December but
~hach~d a level only slightly higher
t a:n In December 1969. ManufachurI:ng employment declined again,
avmg fallen in every month of 1970
~hcept June. This decline was more
i an offset, however, by an increase
~ employment outside manufacturg. In this sector, trade showed
Cfnsiderable weakness, reflecting
:tOwe~ Christmas selling, but conructIon was essentially strong.
e COlmpared with December 1969,
lOp oyment was up only 0.5 percent. The lack of strength was
attributed mostly to manufacturing

employment, which dropped more
than 6.0 percent. But with a gain of
only 2.0 percent, nonmanufacturing
employment was also up much less
than in other recent years.
Registrations of new passenger
automobiles in Dallas, Fort Worth,
Houston, and San Antonio totaled 9
percent higher in December than in
November. Changes ranged from an
increase of 22 percent in Houston
to a decrease of 10 percent in Dallas.
Overall, registrations in these four
metropolitan areas were 27 percent
lower than in December 1969.
Registrations for the year were 13
percent lower than in 1969.
Department store sales in the District were 9 percent higher in the four
weeks ended January 30 than in the
corresponding period a year before.
Sales for 1970 were 3 percent higher
than in 1969.
The Texas oil allowable was reduced
again in February. Although cut
for the third consecutive month, the
allowable still remains high. In
setting the new rate at 82.1 percent
of maximum efficient production, the
Texas Railroad Commission lowered
the allowable only one percentage
point from the rate for January.
This reduction is expected to slow
production in Texas only about
10000 barrels a day. Daily producti~n in January ran an estimated
3421000 barrels. The allowable
aiso ;emained high in Louisiana.
The regulatory agency in that state
left the rate unchanged for February
at 75 percent of maximum efficient
production.
Allowables have been high in
petroleum-producing states of the
Eleventh District since mid-1970.
They were raised to help meet

increased need for domestic crude
after a worldwide shortage of tanker
space developed early last summer.
Credit at weekly reporting banks in
the Eleventh District declined more
than usual in the five-week period
ended January 27. Reductions in
loans and bank holdings of U.S.
Government securities more than
offset a substantial increase in holdings of other securities. The decline
in total credit occurred in spite of
a contraseasonal rise in deposits.
Banks used a large part of the deposit inflow to reduce their net
borrowing in the Federal funds
market.
Loans declined more than in the
corresponding periods of most recent
years. This reduction followed a
sharp buildup in loans in late 1970
and may reflect partial repayment
of these earlier borrowings. Most of
the decline in recent weeks has been
in loans to nonbank financial institutions and to businesses, both of
which increased substantially in
the second part of 1970. Most other
types of loans also declined or
increased only nominally.
With slack loan demand and
ample inflows of funds, banks added
further to their holdings of securities. All these additions were
municipal issues, probably reflecting
the large volume of such issues
coming to market and the comparatively attractive yields available
on them.
Total bank deposits expanded
substantially, largely in response to
renewed inflows of large negotiable
CD's. Demand deposits declined
slightly, but less so than in comparable periods of recent years. Banks
also increased their borrowings from
nondeposit sources, particularly
in the Eurodollar market.

CONDITION STATISTICS OF WEEKLY REPORTING COMMERCIAL BANKS

Eleventh Federal Reserve District
(Thousand dollars)
D.c. 23,
1970

Jan. 28,
1970

Other loans and discounts, gross .•.•. ...........

716,130
6,586,896

623,362
6,680,336

346,630
6,035,373

Total d.mand deposits •••••.••..•••.•••.•••

Commercial and industrial loans ... .. .... . ... .

3,171,189

3,202,424

3,029,871

Agricultural loans, excluding CCC
certiflcates of Interest ••....• .••...• .•• •..

Individuals, partnerships, and corporations •.••
States and political subdivisions •. ••. . .•...•
U.S. Government . .. ..•.•.....• .•• •..•...

115,689

108,809

109,915

L1A81L1T1ES

und er agr eements to resell . .....•.•• ••.• ....

loans to brokers and deal ers for
purcha sing or carryingl

509
52,313

507
56,986

555
41,3 16

1,606
433,81 1

1,270
420,441

861
397,505

182,578
447,980
652,044
16,448
9,572
736,322

U.S. Gove rnment securities . ....... . ..... . .
Other securities .. ...... ..... ..... ...... .

29 1,977
400,149
663,877
16,485
8,338
740,054

130,720
339,766
639,015
11,163
11,179
727,827

Oth er loans for purcha sing or carrying:

U.S. Gove rnm ent securities ... ............ .

Other securities . .....•......•...........
Loan s to nonbank flnancial institutionsl

Sales flncnce, personal flnance, factors,
and other busin ess credit companies • ...• ..

Oth.r ••.•.••.•••••.••••••••••• • •••.•••
Real estate loans.• ... .... .......••.....•.•
loans to domestic commercial banks ... ••••••..
loans to foreign banks ... . .... .....• •......
Consumer insta lment loan s•••. .••...•••••.•.•
loans to foreign governments, official
in stitutions, central banks, and international
institutions ••.. .... . ..•...•...•...•..••..
Other loans . •.....•••••.....•••.•.•••...•
Total investments . •..••.•.•...•.•.•...•••....

766,835
2,929,039

o

769,019
2,886,842

o

750
594,930
2,611,202

989,159
125,963

1,004,334
125,372

983,003
105,762

Total U.S. Governm ent securities . .. ..... .•....

Treasury bills ..•.•••••••.•.•••••••••••••

o

Treasury certificates of indebtedness • ... ...•
Treasury notos and U.S. Government
bonds maturing:

o

Within 1 y.ar ••• • ••....••••••.•••••.•

220,311
531,757
111,128

220,336
529,976
128,650
38,957
1,599,913

17,175
1,489,596

86,076
136,584
1,238,025
876,386
92,712
532,240
9,682

109,783
133,855
1,313,401
1,115,883
90,530
513,584
8,336

53,379
68,049
1,086,636
771,332
89,626
449,930
9,786

10,777,099

---6,252,558

8,864,611

4,240,778
236,484
253,4 11
1,393,350

5,620,150
3,977,637
282,017
139,99 1
1,112,593

3,871
26,003
112,579
4,548,552

3,426
27,121
97,988
4,452,729

2,933
25,252
79,727
3,244,46 1

948,906
2,509,390
966,198
18,481
86,692

943,090
2,504,167
913,850
26,755
46,482

921,265
1,604,884
688,831
2,104
18,527

17,785
1,100

17,285
1,100

7,500
1,350

1,012,322
73,802
397,006
139,403
20,418
1,028,863

1,353,620
84,775
380,179
128,822
16,750
1,029,318

1,248,762
333,033
335,136
136,503
13,255
974,207

TOTAL LIA81LITIES, RESERVES, AND
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS ••• • •• •• •••••••• •• 13,448,913

13,698,751

11,905,507

Banks in the United States ........... .. ....
Foreign:
Governments, official institutions, central
banks, and international institutions .. • . .
Commercial banks .•.. .•....•• .. .•. . ••.
Certified and ofAcers' checks, etc .••. • . . •. ..
Total time and savings deposits •• . .....••....
Individuals, partnerships, and corporations:
Savings deposits .•• ..••..... .. ...... ..
Other time deposits •. •.. .•••.......••..
States and politieial subdivisions • • ........ . .
U.S. Government (includ ing postal savings) .. .

Banks in the United Stat.s ......... ... . ... .
foreign:
Governments, official institutions, central
banks, and international institutions .. • ..
Commercial banks .. •.•..••..•••. ..•.• .
federal funds purchased and securities sold
under agreements to repurchase .•••. ••. •....
Other liabilities for borrowed money ••.. .••.....

Other liabiliti.s •••••• •••••.•• •••••••• • ••• •• •
Reserves on loans .•• ..•........•••..•••.•••.
Reserves on securities •• . . ....••.. . ... ..••.. .•
Total capital accounts •.... •....•••.••........

6,228,547
4, 171 ,008
290,716
204,393
1,419,977

---- ----

165,670
595,758
115,813

69,995
1,647,225

Dec. 23,
1970

10,705,287

Total deposits .. •• ...... . .....•...••.......•

Federal fund s sold and securities purchased

Jan. 28,
1970

Jan. 27,
1971

Jan. 27,
1971

ASSETS

1 year to 5 years .• . •••..•.. .•..•• .. ..
After 5 year, ••• •••.••.••.••••.•••••••
Obligations of states and political subdivisions!
Tax warrants and short-term notes and bills ••

All oth.r .............................. .
Other bonds, corporate stocks, and securities:
Certificates representing participations in
Federal agency loans . •••••• . ••• •••••..

All oth.r (including corporate stocks) ••• • ••••
Cash items in process of collection • •.•.•••••...•
Reserves with Federal Reserve Bank ••••• ••••..• •
Currency and coin . .. ...•. . . •.• ...•.. ••..•.••
Balances with banks in the United States • • •••.• ••
Balances with banks in foreign countries .• .• •••••
Other assets (Including investments in subsidiaries

o

CONDITION STATISTICS OF ALL MEMBER BANKS

Eleventh Federal Reserve District
(Million dollars)

504,992
11,905,507

Dec.31,
1969

13,211
2,268
3,742
1,400
296
1,457
10
1,405
956

12,528
2,186
3,648
1,499
257
1,342
11
1,341
940

24,745

23,752

22,862

1,861
9,792
8,895

1,720
9,162
8,730

1,919
9,926
7,246

20,548
1,229
1,126
1,842

19,612
1,189
1,120
1,831

19,091
1,159
901
1,711

ASSETS
Loans and discounts, gross . • •• .....• •• ••••
U.s. Government obligations •.•.. •••••••..
Other securities .. •• ..• . ••.• . ...•••...•.
Reserves with federal Reserve Bank ••••••..
Cash in vault •• , • •• .. • •• ••. .. •••• ..•••.

Balances with banks in the United &tat.s ••••

RESERVE POSITIONS OF MEMBER BANKS

LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Demand deposits of banks •• . .. • .•.. ••• ..

Oth.r demand d.posits ................. .

Eleventh Federal Reserve District

Time deposits ••.•.. ....••...•.• • ....•..

(Averag es of dally figures. Thousand dollars)

Item

Total d.posits •• •• ••..•••• •••• ••• .. ••

5 w•• ks end.d
Jan.6,1971

4 w •• ks end.d
D.c. 2, 1970

5 w•• ks .nd.d
Jan. 7, 1970

806,799
747,167
59,632
825,028
-IB,229
0
-18,229

775,369
720,34B
55,021
785,916
- 10,547
0
-10,547

749,724
692,994
56,730
764,358
-14,634
6,437
-21,071

With F.deral Res.rve Bank ••••
Currency and coin .... .••....
Required reserves ... . .•••• ...•
Excess rese rves •• .. .....•. . ..•
Borrowings . ....••.....• • •...•
Free reserves • .•...... .. ......

825,823
633,558
192,265
815,231
10,592
0
10,592

803,230
616,275
186,955
789,156
14,074
912
13,162

786,188
599,549
186,639
769,379
16,809
19,585
-2,776

1,632,622
1,380,725
251,897
1,640,259
-7,637
0
-7,637

1,578,599
1,336,623
241,976
1,575,072
3,527
912
2,615

1,535,912
1,292,543
243,369
1,533,737
2,175
26,022
-23,847

COUNTRY BANKS
Total rese rves held . •...... .•.•
With Federal Reserve Bank ••.•
Currency and coin . . .. ...... •
Required reserves • •.•.••.....•
Excess rese rves . •••.•.•...... •
Borrowings •.......... . •.. ...•
Free reserves • ........ .. . • ....

ALL MEMBER BANKS
Total reserves held • ••....•....
With Fe de ral Rese rve Bank .. . .
Currency and coin . ..........
Re quire d reserves .. .... •... ...
Excess reserves ..... .... •.. ...
Borrowings • ....... . ... . ......
Free reserves •. ........ . .....•

Borrowings • ..•... •... ...•...... • . •....
Other liabilities e •• .• ....... .. ..........
Total capital accounts e . . ......•...••...•

TOTAL LIA81L1T1ES AND CAPITAL
ACCOUNTS· .......... .. ......... .

RESERVE CITY BANKS
Total reserves held .... .. •.....

-

11,942
2,179
3,146
1,222
268
1,619
12
1,652
822

TOTAL ASSETS· .................... .

466,477
13,698,751

Nov. 25,
1970

Balances with banks in foreign countries e ....
Cash items in process of collection ••• • •.•• •
Other assets e • • •.••. ••.•••••• .•..••••..

467,803

TOTAL ASSETS ......................... 13,448,913

not consolldat.d) ......................... .

D.c. 30,
1970

It.m

e - Estimated

CONDITION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
(Thousand dollars)

it.m

-

Jan. 27,
1971

D.c. 23,
1970

Jan. 28,
1970

380,924
300

687,979

o

433,102
35,25~

2,802,860
2,803,160
1,460,824
1,902,027

2,791,830
2,791,830
1,668,608
1,945,227

2,390,301
2,425,551
1,309,025
1,695,814

----------------------------~--------Total gold certificate reserves • . ••.. .... .. ...
Discounts for member bonks • ...•.......••. .
Other discounts and advances .. .....••.... •
U.S. Government securities .•. ...........•..
Total ea rn ing assets •••• .. ....•.. .....• • ...
Member bank reserve deposits ••. .. . •. .....•
federal Reserve notes in actual circulation •.•.•

o

o

---------------------------------

BANK DEBITS, END.OF.MONTH DEPOSITS, AND DEPOSIT TURNOVER

Four Southwestern States

-

(Dollar amounts In thousands, seasonally adjusted)
DEBITS TO DEMAND DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS'

DEMAND DEPOSITS'

Percent change
Decem ber

1970
(Annual.rate

Standard metropolitan
statistical area

ba.ls)

~~I~I~~~~ucson.. . . . • . . . . • . . .... . . . ... . .... . . . .. . .
. Monroe. . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. .. • . . . .. . . . . . .
NE
Shreveport. . • . . • • • • • • • . . • • • • • • • . • • • • . • • •
TE W MEXICO, Roswell' . • • • • . . . . • • • • • • • . . . • • . • . . . . • •
XAS,

~:~~~~i~:':::::: : : : :::: :::::: :::: : ::: ::::

$

7,040,796
2,9BO,24B
9,445,680
92B,296

~:m:m

Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange. • • . . . . . . . . • . • . . . •
c'0wnsvllle-Harlingen-San Benito.. ..... . ........

6,546,732
2,07 1,272

H alveston-Texas City. • . .. . • .. . . • . . . . • . . . . . .. .

2,774,256

~~~::'''' . .. ...• :.:.:: • :•.•..•••• :.... ,:;~!j.rn

ifb~~~:':': ::::::::::::::::::: 10tm:m
::::::: ::: :::::

.•:.:•.:· :·.:• ·: :·.· . . ,mml
tm:m

McAlien-Pharr-Edlnburg.. .. . • . • • . . • . • . • . • . • . • . .

1,756,704

Texarkana (Texas-Arkansas).... . . . • • • • • • • . • • • • •

1,415,628

r:~:~~E
tl~~~t~: ~~il;:

:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::

Total_28 centers... .. . . . . •• •••••• . . • • ••. • •• •••••• . •

Annual rate
of turnover

December 1970 from
12 months,
November

December

1970

1969

1970 from
1969

December 31,

December

1970

Novomber

1970

Decemb er

1970

1969

$355,091,328

21
9
14
4
6
9
1
1
13
14
8
9
9
10
II
10
12
4
6
2
3
8
12
8
-7
4
9
0

$ 232,199
B7,718
249,207
40,308
107,471
161,123
337,650
248,190
77,748
278,903
31,459
2,192,379
251,333
670,464
113,335
2,433,323
41,617
168,446
100,529
132,590
8B,859
74,951
657,017
62,9B2
72,890
101,852
126,B73
114,8B7

30.5
34.5
37.0
23.5
20.2
35.3
28.8
26.9
26.4
23.3
14.4
55.5
30.4
35.5
25.1
41.7
25.0
25.4
17.3
16.7
17.4
19.9
28.1
18.6
19.3
22.8
23.4
20.0

32.2
31.0
32.8
21.1
19.8
37.7
29.9
25.9
2B.6
23.3
14.3
55.2
30.6
36.7
24.9
40.8
22.5
26.0
17.2
14.7
lB.2
19.2
30.4
17.0
18.8
23.B
26.6
18.9

26.0
31.7
36.6
24.1
20.6
36.2
29.9
27.0
26.3
24.8
14.3
55.7
30.0
33.8
24.5
39.5
23.3
25.9
18.4
15.5
24.4
17.7
27.3
17.9
21.8
23.3
24.2
20.4

5

- 6
13
14
13
4
- 6
4
6
-9
-1
5
2
1
-1
2
1
12
-3
1
14
0
11
-5
9
4
-1
-8
5

17
13
2
-2
9
-4
12
1
10
2B
10
1
4
11
6
7
14
6
1
B
-10
13
10
11
-B
4
2
1

9

$9,256,303

38.1

38.1

37.7

--~------------------------------~~~----------------------------~ DepOSits of Individuals, partnerships, and corporations and of states and political subdivisions
County basis

VALUE OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
(Million dollars)
January .. Oecember

-

Decemb er

BUILDING PERMITS
VALUATION (Dollar amounts in thousands)
Percent change

Nonbuildlng construction • • •

Dec. t970
from

NUMBER

-

12 mos .
1970

Dec.

Nov.
1970

1969

66

FIVE SOUTHWESTERN
STATES' ............ ....
Re.ld ential building •••..••
Nonresidential building ••.•

12 months,
1970 from
1969

119

Dec.
1970

12 mas.
1970

616

6,B51

9,408

74
396

849
5,580

5,95B
3,528

19,464
33,194

640 1,134
19 -44

Wichita' F~il;: :

475
3,735
4,914
1,746
873
5,627
21,332
441
5,533
4,54B
777
34,373
542
2,320
617
833
B8B
608
15,171
796
358
2,345
853

4B2
4,759
18,668
564
I,B76
2,530
29,094
99
10,186
3,777
596
45,207
214
4,232
959
966
116
1,182
9,462
731
163
609
801

B,308
32,904
134,229
9,320
7,504
29,287
346,584
3,497
97,016
82,293
6,991
4BO,739
6,378
53,187
5,076
9,8B4
7,429
10,769
103,175
14,OB6
6,327
33,1010
12,605

201
41
125
385
98
130
-12 -3B
636
1,194
249
-32
99
15
30
-61
178
164
-9 -35
0
217
55
-16
- 1
185
139
13
749
275
220
148
-44 -31
141
809
23
16
173
0
16
-52
-70 - 11
111
- 17

-28
-23
-11
- 15
_ 6
25
13
26
13
8
-62
12
50
61
-15
29
-10
65
21
-22
_4
87
-27

TOl a l_26 cities •.

9,490

122,9B5 $ 156,167

Residential building ..... ..

Nonresidential building . . ..
Nonbullding construction •••

1970

October
t970

t970

553
290
173
90
4,974
2,045
1,693
1,235

553
227
199
128
5,145
1,947
1,701
1,497

597
270
201
127
5,453
2,302
1,863
1,289

7,709
3,074
2,542
2,093
67,097
24,428
24,IBO
18,489

1969
6,795r
2,793r
2,290
1,71 t
67,447r
25,261 r
25,641r
16,545r

56
-24

32
98
438
121
72
742
1,345
23
509
336
46
3,002
34
113
47
48
39
24
1,035
45
37
134
84

UNITED STATES ............

November

1970

Area and type

Area

Dec.

1970

ARIZONA
Tucson

lOUIS I A~~" '" •

$

64 ,606

Monroe·West

Sh Monroe ••• • .
TEXA~eveport ...•

~bllene .•••.••
Amarillo .•...•
BUslin .•......
aaument

~rOWnsYill~ : : : :

D~Ir.u, Christi ..
Do . ........
Ele;:lson •••••.•

F

aso . ... ...

rt
G Worth•.•..••
•.
H alvo.,on

l:r~~~n ••....

lUbbo ..•...•
Midi ck ......
Od and ••••. .
Por~~~th~~ •• . .
San Angel~: : :
SOn Antonio
Sherman
...

~xarka~~: : : :
aco.

-

---$1,617,992

22

72

, Arizona, louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas
r - Revised
NOTE . - Details may not add to totals because of rounding
SOURCE: F. W. Dodge, McGraw-Hili, Inc.

GROSS DEMAND AND TIME DEPOSITS OF MEMBER BANKS

Eleventh Federal Reserve District
(Averages of dally figures. Million dollars)
GROSS DEMAND DEPOSITS
Reserve

TIME DEPOSITS

Country

Date

Total

city banks

banks

Total

city bank.

Counlry
banks

1968, Decemb er..
1969, December ..
1970, July .......
August ••• •
September.
October .•.

10,6B2
10,692
10,412
10,530
10,65B
10,684
10,B43
11,271

5,007
4,947
4,7B2
4,B16
4,885
4,B60
4,B99
5,161

5,675
5,745
5,630
5,714
5,773
5,824
5,944
6,110

7,598
7,203
7,511
7,783
8,088
8,317
8,622
8,825

3,185
2,628
2,722
2,926
3,162
3,305
3,476
3,554

4,413
4,575
4,789
4,B57
4,926
5,012
5,146
5,271

November ..
December ..

Reserve

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION

NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT

Five Southwestern States

(Season a lly adjusted Indexes, 1957-59

l

December

Total nonagricultural
wage and salary workers ••
Manufacturing • ......••..
Nonmanufacturing •.••••.•
Mining .•• .•• ••. •• ....
Construction •.•.......•
Transportation and
public utilities ........

Trade •. ........ • .....
finance •••.•...•...•••
Service ...............
Government •.... .. ...•

December

1970p

Type of employment

November

1970

1969r

6,426,800
1,117,500
5,309,300
229,200
397,000

6,390,600
1,123,800
5,266,800
228,500
402,500

469,900
1,550,600
325,100
1,037,300
1,300,200

469,400
1,509,500
324,800
1,035,300
1,296,800

6,396,300
1,191,600
5,204,700
232,000
410,000
460,100
1,516,600
315,200
1,003,700
1,267,100

Nov.
1970

Dec.
1969

0.6% 0.5%
-.6 -6.2
.8
2.0
.3 -1.2
-1.4 -3.2
.1
2.7
.1
.2
.3%

2.1
2.2
3.1
3.3
2.6%

Arizona, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas
p - Preliminary
r - Revised
SOURCE: State employment agencies

1

November
1970

October
1970

December

1970p
179.2
195.8
198.7
193.9
139.7
265.4

180.5
196.6
198.7
195.1
142.2
265.4

179.3r
194.3r
200.7
190.0r
142.6r
265.3r

177.1
207.3
227.8r
193.7
119.0
252.8

163.9
161.6
156.2
168.2
139.3
240.0

161.6
158.8
151.7
167.7
140.0
239.5

162.3r
159.4r
153.5
166.6r
139.9
244.8r

171.1
171.3r
171.1
171.5r
134.4r
227.9

December

Percent change

Area and type of index

Dec. 1970 from

Number of persons

= 100)

TEXAS
Total industrial production . • . •.•
Manufacturing •. . ..•.. .. •.. . ..•

Durab/ •• • ••• • , •••••• •• ••••••
Nondurable . . .. ..... . ........
Mining •••...•••.•• • .•. . •• . ...

Utilities ....... .. ..... . ..... ···
UNITED STATES
Total industrial production •••..•
Manufacturing •...• • •..••.•.. • •

Durablo ... . . ... ........ • . . ..
Nondurab/ ••••• ••••••• • ••• • . •
Mining ........... . ......•....
Utilities•. ..... • .•.....•..... • .

1969

p - Preliminary
r - Revised
SOURCES : Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Reserve Bank of Dalles

DAilY AVERAGE PRODUCTION OF CRUDE Oil

ANNUAL BANK DEBITS AND ANNUAL RATE
OF TURNOVER OF DEMAND DEPOSITS

(Thousand barrels)

(Dollar amounts In thousands)
Demand deposits'

Percent change from
December

1970

Area

FOUR SOUTHWESTERN
STATES ........ . .. .. . . . .
Louisiana •••.. • • • •.•....
New Mexico • • • •. . •......

Oklahoma ........... . ..
Texas ........•• . .... • . •

Gulf Coast ............
West Texas •... • ..• • .•

East Texas (proper) .....
Panhandle .•.•. • .• • .. •
Rest of state . .••.••....

UNITED STATES ............

November December November December
1970
1969r
1969
1970

Debits to demand deposit accounts'

Standard
metropolitan
statistical ar ea

7,265.5
2,758.0
339.0
610.5
3,558.0
733.6
1,685.8
235.2
79.1
824.3
10,008.3

7,285.9
2,756.0
343.5
60404
3,582.0
728.6
1,720.8
228.8
80.0
823.8
10,062.0

6,717.3
2,422.5
358.3
600.0
3,336.5
673.8
1,586.3
182.1
80.7
813.6
9,508.2

-0.3%
.1
-1.3
1.0
-.7
.7
-2 .0
2.8
-1.1
.1
- .5%

8.2%
13.8
-5.4
1.8
6.6
8.9
6.3
29.2
-2.0
1.3
5.3%

r - Revised
SOURCES: American Petroleum Institute
U.S . Bureau of Mines
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

ARIZONA

24.9%

2,754,087
9,225,961

2,539,346
8,155,265

8
13

31.9
37.9

29.3
33.7

899,773

867,813

4

23.7

23.8

2,10 1,203
5,855,156
8,814,316

1,995,194
5,394,756
8,798,416

5
9
0

20.8
36.3
28.5

20.0
34.7
31.3

6,153,732

6,115,356

25.7

25.7

1,817,627
5,428,013
444,731
12 1,094,7 12
7,172,600
22,432,699
2,830,580
100,885,209
933,777
4,453,076

1,609,944
4,779,765
4 13,982
111,721,182
6,582,438
20,382,808
2,567,365
91,791,897
833,366
4,265,858

13
14
7
8
9
10
10
10
12
4

24.3
23.4
14.4
55.8
30.4
34.5
25.4
40.6
23.5
27.0

22.6
23.1
13.7
51.4
29.1
32.8
24.2
37.6
21.5
27.3

1,639,544
1,978,387
1,609,977
1,246,123
17,772,815
1,093,564

1,557,683
1,947,546
1,570,617
1,162,398
15,872,168
1,013,617

5
2
3
7
12
8

16.6
14.8
18.9
18.1
27.9
17.2

17.2
14.6
21.2
17.3
26.2
16.6

1,433,315
2,237,859
3,025,356
2,261,369

1,539,172
2,158,034
2,780,553
2,276,781

-7
4
9
-1

20.2
23.7
25.6
19.5

21.8
22.9
24.0
19.5

Total-28 centers .• . ... $344,128,639

$316,142,659

37.8%

36.0%

Monroe •• o • • • • • • o • • •
Shreveport • . .... •. ..

NEW MEXICO
Roswell' ... • ....• • ••
TEXAS
Abilene .......... .. .
Amarillo ... •• .......
Austin .... .. .... . ..•
Beaumont- Port ArthurOrange . . . . . • .
Brownsville-HarlingenSan Benito . ..•....
Corpus Christi .. . •....
Corsicana 2 •••
•

0

••

••

Galveston-Texas City . .
Houston
0

Crop of
1971

Area
Arizona
Louisiana ..•.•••
New Mexico • •
0

PRODUCTION
(Thousand bushels)

••••••

•

0"

Oklahoma • .....
Texas .• • •..• . ..

Total .........

Crop of
1970

Crop of
1969

Crop of
1971'

Crop of
1970

Crop of
1969

173
70
312
4,875
3,512

166
78
297
4,875
3,547

81
82
288
5,299
4,124

11,418
980
5,304
92,625
45,656

10,350
957
5,520
98,202
54,408

4,526
874
4,293
118,275
68,856

155,983

169,437

196,824

8,942

8,963

9,874

'Indicated December 1, 1970
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agricu lture

1969

28.0%

0

ACREAGE SEEDED
(Thousand acres)

1970

20%

Dalla s .. .. ..... . ....
EI Pa so ... . .. • ••....
Fort Worth ..........

Five Southwestern States

Annual rote
af turnover

5,449,339

Tucson • •••..••... .. •

LOUISIANA

0"

WINTER WHEAT

1969

1970

Percent
change

-

•

•••••

0

•

•••

laredo .............
lubbock .•. • .... . ...
McAllen· Pharr·
Edinburg ....... . ..
Midland .. .• ........
Ode ssa ...... • ......

San Angelo ... • .. • ..
San Antonio .. .. .....
Sherman-D enison . • ...
Texarkana (Texas-

Arkansa s}. • • ...••.
Tyler .. .. .......... .
Waco • • ...••

0

••••

•

•

Wichita Falls ........

$

6,533,078

$

9%

-

' UnadJuste d deposits of Indlvlduels, partnerships, and corporations and of
states and political subdivisions
• County basis