Full text of Review (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) : April 1968
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business • revIew april 1968 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org) contents the ever-changing world of finance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 district highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11 THE EVER-CHANGING WORLD OF FINANCE An Address by Dr. Philip E. Coldwell President Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas at the Fifth District Meeting Texas Bankers Association Sheraton-Dallas Hotel Dallas, Texas Saturday, March 30, 1968 In view of the very rapid financial changes Under way, it seems appropriate at this meeting of the Fifth District of the Texas Bankers Association to review some of the broader trends of banking, finance, and central bank relationships Which appear important both to the District and to the Nation as a whole. The scope of the ad~ess will be quite broad, ranging from internatlonal and national problems in the world of ~nan~e down through developing changes in an king structure and practices and, finally, ~ the operational relationships of the Federal b eserv.e Bank of Dallas and the commercial anks In the Eleventh Federal Reserve District. Starting, then, at the broadest level of con- ~act, let us review a few of the developing trends In the international financial scene. As has been al11~ly demonstrated in the past month, there is ~n Inevitable link between the intetnational and omestic financial postures of a nation and even a causal relationship in the problems of both areas. In the post-World War II period, there has developed an important growth in international trade, financed to a considerable extent by the deliberately induced deficits in the U.S. balance-of-payments position in the early postwar years. It takes but little memory to recall the Marshall plan, the establishment of NATO, the Alliance for Progress program, and tlle resultant growth of U.S. worldwide commitments. Of special importance has been the extensive expansion in exports and imports. U.S. merchandise exports have tripled since 1950 and reached about $31 billion in 1967, while U.S. imports have multiplied nearly threefold to a 1967 level of $27 billion. The volume of world trade expanded from $117 billion in 1950 to $374 billion in 1966. To a considerable extent, the U.S. worldwide commitments and the growth of international trade are interlocked; the Nation's efforts to rebuild Western Europe bore fruit in a strong expansion of demand for U.S. commodities, and the stimulation to the country's domestic economy occasioned by both growing exports and internally developing expansion created new markets for European imports. Similar effects have grown out of our commitments in Japan, Latin America, and other important sectors of the world. Export markets now account for more than 25 percent of U.S. production of such diverse commodities as rice, wheat, commercial jet aircraft, and a wide range of highly technical machinery. Conversely, more than 25 percent of the U.S. requirements for many agricultUral specialty items, certain metals, and even residual fuel oil are met by imports. In addition, there has been a marked expansion in imports of business review/april 1968 3 steel, automobiles, and many other consumer goods. The United States has encouraged capital investment abroad, and the potential profits from this investment have spurred many companies to establish branches and to merge with or purchase foreign companies, especially in the more industrialized European areas. The success of the investment program is evident in the amount of capital investment abroad, now totaling nearly $55 billion, and in the steady return of earnings amounting to more than $5 billion per year. A concomitant development with this capital investment program has been the steadily closer ties between U.S. capital markets and capital flows and those of other nations throughout the free world. Undoubtedly, one of the principal causes of these closer ties was the developing use of the U.S. dollar as both a reserve and a vehicle currency. In fact, throughout the past 15 years, the U.S. dollar has been the principal medium of exchange and method of settlement for most international trade, and free world nations abroad now hold U.S. dollars as more than one-fourth of their total foreign official reserves. These changes - coupled with a mechanism to effect rapid transfers of funds, a network of almost instantaneous communications, and a broader understanding of world investment possibilities - created the climate for large . short-term investment flows between nations. In addition, in Europe now, there exist both Euro-dollar and Euro-bond markets, which are virtually free from any domestic government control. To the United States, these various developments have brought an acute awareness that foreign relationships affect the financial and economic trends of the Nation and, since approximately 1960, a distinct recognition of the impact which the relationships could have upon 4 the international financial position of the United States and the domestic monetary and fiscal policies of this country. The institutional controls and policies of the Nation have not kept pace with the new environment within which they must operate. At the same time, the current trend toward specific controls - such as the interest equalization tax, the mandatory restraint on investment, and the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program - has not represented either the U.S. policy toward free trade and free movements of currency and credit or a long-range solution for this country's balanceof-payments problems. The change in the Federal Government's budget position has been one of the important developments in the national financial situation which has impacted upon both domestic policy and the international area. In all but six of the postwar years, the Federal budget has been in deficit. Cumulatively, the deficits now total about $100 billion, and they find a concurrent relationship in the deficits abroad, which have reached more than $38 billion since 1947. It is well known that the costs of these deficits internationally have been an outflow of gold and a growth of foreign-held short-term claims against the dollar. Within the United States, the continued budget deficits over the postwar period, occasioned in part by the Federal Government's participation in broader areas of responsibilities, have brought steady pressure upon the value of the American dollar in terms of its domestic purchasing power and have denied the Nation one of its principal means of stabilization control. In this catalog of changing financial conditions, perhaps it would be well to give immediate recognition to both the private and the official tolerance of the erosion in the value of the dollar. With increasing frequency one hears the statement, "A 2- or 3-percent rate of inflation is necessary to the growth of the United States and to the feeling of well-being of be! citizens." Yet, it takes only an elementary education in mathematics to calculate the impact of such a rate of inflation upon the value of the currency, even over the short work span of a normal life. For those who entered the labor force in the immediate postwar period, there has developed a loss of purchasing power by each of the dollars earned in 1947, so that the dollar saved from the salary earned in that year will today buy only two-thirds of what it did 21 years ago. Clearly then, one of the principal and important financial trends of the postwar period has been the existence and public acceptance of infiation, along with official unwillingness to come to grips with this tax upon purchasing power. Too frequently in the postwar years, tlle burden of stabilization control has fallen directly upon the actions of the monetary autllOrities of the United States, rather than upon a properly balanced mix of monetary and fiscal policies sUpplemented by a rational and reasonable incomes policy. The monetary authorities have had to absorb most of the brunt of control, although they recognized that monetary policy could not do the job by itself and that such exclUSive reliance on monetary restraint might cause great inequities between companies and between various sectors of the market. It probably should be noted here that the ~tabilization efforts of the United States, worklUg largely through aggregate controls, have been unable to restrain effectively the pressures developing from an economy dedicated to full employment and from the very sizable flows of funds Which occur in an uncontrolled and unpredictable fashion in a world of uncertainty. Some of the difficulty is probably attributable to the. lack of recognition of the critical fiscal POlicy role and to the unwillingness to use tax and debt-management policy in the stabilization efforts. Perhaps tlle United States has overreacted to the urgent requirements of its world- wide commitments or to tlle demonstrated need of its citizens for a better way of life and a more equitable share in the fruits of progress. Whatever the reason for the difficulty, tlle fact remains that the interaction of international conflicts and unrest with domestic pressures has created a volatile force which threatens to get out of control. The United States is undoubtedly the world's richest nation. Its gross national product exceeds the combined output of the six Common Market countries, and its income per capita is more than 10 times the world average. Despite this strength, the capacity of the Nation is not infinite at anyone point in time. Stabilization control has been hampered by an unwillingness to establish priorities of spending. This Nation can no longer expect to maintain all of its national and international commitments within the framework of a stable economy. Priorities are urgently needed but, obviously, require careful development. Another facet of our less-tllan-satisfactory stabilization efforts in this country can probably be attributed to the changing mix of financial institutions and procedures. The composition of the private financial structure and its internal relationships have changed markedly. To a considerable extent, the personalized approach which was apparent in the prewar period has diminished in importance. Customers have been well educated to the value of their money in achieving a return for the use of the money, and they have sought the highest rates of return available at not only domestic but also international institutions. The nUlllber of financial institutions has grown, their powers have been enlarged, and the base of financial relationships has been broadened among a wide and diverse community of financial institutions, both private and public. Despite this change in structure, the monetary authority must work through only a business review/ april 1968 5 limited and steadily declining proportion of the total financial institutional group in this country - namely, the member commercial banks. If more equitable and more efficient monetary control is to be achieved in the future, the Federal Reserve fulcrum of operations may need to be broadened and enlarged. One can develop a logical position for central bank control over all financial institutions, whether they are depositaries or merely intermediaries. Even if we, as a Nation, develop an awareness of the need to use fiscal policy as a stabilization device and encourage a responsible attitude toward the determination of spending priorities, it would still be the monetary authority's job to make day-to-day and month-tomonth shifts in the credit base in order to insure that the total supply of credit is adequate to meet all legitimate demands which can be handled in a framework of sustainable economic growth. Full responsibility for economic and financial stabilization is not, of course, strictly a governmental function. It is everybody's business. Stable and healthy economic growth requires the efforts of all officials, businessmen, bankers, and individuals. Our ability and willingness to accept this responsibility have been influenced, to some extent, by the expectational framework within which day-to-day decisions are made and by the institutional structure through which we work. Most knowledgeable market observers consider the expectations of businessmen and investors to be prime influences accentuating a developing inflationary situation. If the corporate executive becomes convinced that price levels are moving up, that costs will rise materially, and that labor expenses and other pro·· duction costs will make serious inroads upon his profit picture, he then, in self-defense, contributes the second part of what we have come to call "the cost-price spiral." If, on the other hand, his expectations are for a stable cost 6 structure or one which advances only within the bounds of productivity, his pricing decisions can be settled on the basis of the demand, supply, and competition for his product. Today we are faced with the first of these conditions. To assess the blame between labor and management is hardly a useful exercise. Labor can say that it needs to be protected from the inflationary consequences of rising prices, while businessmen can say that, with rising costs, they must increase prices to protect their profit position and to meet their responsibilities to stockholders. In consequence, many persons believe that it is hopeless for them, as individuals, to make any contribution toward breaking this spiral. Yet, collectively and individually, the businessman and laborer have a responsibility to contribute to the stability of the national economy, especially in periods of intense inflationary pressures. Industrial and business statesmanship may require some temporary foregoing of profits or a temporary lag in the rate of wage increases; but, in the end, either would be a small sacrifice compared to the ravages of inflation upon the purchasing power of profits and wages alike. A second factor in the willingness and ability of the individual to handle his responsibilities is, of course, the institutional framework and operational procedures through which he must work. In the postwar period, especially in the past 10 years, there have been important changes in both of these elements in the banking industry. It is no news to any of you tllat bank management today probably pays as much attention to the liability as to tlle asset side of the balance sheet. Purchased deposits and borrowed money constitute significant proportions of total available funds, and deposits upon which interest is paid by the banks are noW comprising nearly half of the entire deposits in the banking system. Competition for such funds has become nationwide, reflecting both an improved communications system and the more widespread awareness on the part of the depositor of the returns available for the use of his money. An outgrowth of this trend has been the rapid development of a new type of certificate of deposit. Certificates of deposit were originally a convenience device, local in nature and tailored to rather specific situations. Over the past decade, they have come to be viewed as a nationwide instrument with a secondary market and a broad appeal to those who can schedule their needs for funds. The growth of certificates of deposit in their new status has conflicting elements of strength and weakness for the banking system. For the large banks which maintain a careful watch over their money position and have broad access to national money market supplies, the large CD instrument may be appropriate. Most smaller banks without access to national sources of funds use CD's primarily in a defensive manner to protect against the loss of local deposits; however, when such banks engage in the competition for large CD's, some serious questions may be raised about the use of the device. At member banks in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District, large-denomination certificates now ~otal more than $1 .2 billion, while those issued In smaller denominations exceed $1.5 billion . Along with the change in the certificate market has come the widespread growth of the ~ederal funds market. Here again, there are faVorable and unfavorable connotations. From the central bank's viewpoint, the Federal funds market means a more intensive utilization of ~redit already in the market as a short-term adJustment device. The Federal funds market as an adjustment device in the short run seems quite appropriate; but for longer-range usage and, especially, for banks which do not maintain iose supervision over their reserve position, I ederal funds reliance may be unwise. More ~lan a few banks have had problems created Y Utilizing short-term borrowed money as the foundation for longer-term loan operations. Purchases of Federal funds to meet a consistent deficit in position expose a bank not only to higher costs of meeting shortfalls in reserve positions but also, perhaps more importantly, to the possibility that such funds might not be available. Nearly 5 percent of the District member banks routinely purchase Federal funds in amounts equal to more than half of tlleir reserve requirements, and a few purchase their entire requirements. This is certainly stretching the use of an adjustment device. In tlus day and time of truly difficult financial problems for our Nation, it would seem more appropriate for banks to remain "close to shore," building or at least maintaining adequate liquidity positions. One of the important impacts of the increased interest cost of both borrowed funds and interest-bearing deposits has been the pressure on bank profits and the resultant efforts to enlarge sizably the portion of bank assets placed in loan accounts. Thus, loan-deposit ratios, advancing sharply over the postwar period, now average in excess of 55 percent for the District as a whole and in excess of 65 percent for some of the larger banks. The result of these changes in policy has been increased pressures on liquidity, a reduced margin of safety and flexibility, and a steadily growing reliance upon external sources of funds to meet unusual changes in deposit or loan accounts. Much of this reliance has been placed upon tlle correspondents, but the larger correspondent banks themselves perhaps to an even greater extent - have become reliant upon those farther up the ladder. Many of these pressures eventually center upon the large New York banks, and the safety valve has been their ability to draw funds from the Euro-dollar market. Another of tlle important postwar changes in banking has been the growth of financial institutions. In a broad sense, many financial institutions appear to be moving toward a common business review/april 1968 7 format, with banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions taking on the loan and deposit aspects of their competitors at a steadily advancing pace. This trend has, of course, enlarged competition for the banks and has intensified efforts to achieve larger and, to some extent, more efficient units. Part of this pressure toward larger size originates in the developing trend toward automation. As competitors have become more effective and efficient in their handling of banking routines, the advantages of size have become even more apparent. Some banks have met the problem of the high cost of original equipment by spreading the cost through nonbank services to customers and others. Still other banks are seeking a solution by centralizing their accounting, transit, and proof operations in a common clearinghouse or processing center. To the majority, however, the profits and efficiencies of automation are achieved only when the growth in the size of the institution will justify the costs. Not only is this growth important in relation to automation; but, as businesses become larger, the size of the banking unit becomes critical in meeting the higher loan limits sought by these businesses. Some of this expansion in bank size has occurred through branching, mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions by holding companies. In those states, such as Texas, which permit no branch banking, the expansion routes are practically limited to internal growth or holding company acquisitions. Branching has been intensified, and in a few states there have been changes to relax limits upon branch expansion. In some 16 states in the Nation, however, branching is still prohibited. Whether it will be possible for these states to maintain this position will depend, in part, upon the ingenuity of the banker in meeting the challenges of automation and the ability of the industry as a whole to provide the managerial talent needed to run the many individual unit banks. These matters 8 should command your attention, for in the more complex, highly competitive credit world of today, there is an urgent need for more efficient operations and well-trained, quality management at all levels. To those of us involved in the day-to-day banking business of the Eleventh Federal Reserve District, the problems and challenges recited above are matters of daily concern. To a large extent, your Federal Reserve System can operate only because you are concerned and are willing to give your complete cooperation. Before going further, let me express our great appreciation for your help in moving toward our common goals of better service to the public, more efficient credit mechanisms, and improved stabilization control. In a sense, the work of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas is divided into three principal sectors. A part of its job is obviously regulatory - encouraging commercial bank management to pursue sound banking practices and insuring, to the extent possible, an equitable competitive situation. In this role, the Reserve banks are expected to enforce regulations such as those pertaining to stock margin requirements, loans to executive officers, and regulation Q. At the same time, the Reserve bank is involved in administering certain requirements which are fundamental to the execution of monetary policy. One phase of this work is overseeing the maintenance of reserve requirements. It is statutory that the member bankS must maintain reserves at specified levels; and while many have objected to this neutralization of a sizable portion of their lendable funds, these reserves are the fulcrum on which open market operations and monetary policy must develop· It is hoped that the requirements can be made as convenient as possible, and, to this end, neW procedures for maintaining required reserveS have been suggested. But, despite all efforts toward convenience, there must be a standard of reserve requirements against which monetary policy can operate; and in order to assure equitable treatment, all member banks will be required to meet this standard. Someday, perhaps all financial institutions will be treated alike in this and other respects, but such a possibility is a longer-range problem. Reliance upon narrowly timed transfers of funds and the maintenance of reserve accounts with only a thin or even nonexistent margin will almost always create reserve requirement problems between the commercial bank and the Reserve bank. The majority of the member banks in the District ordinarily have no reserve deficiencies and are to be congratulated. To those of you who are consistently on the border line and maintain such a thin margin that any unforeseen shift will cause a deficiency, we hope that you will pay closer attention to the maintenance of your required reserves. The Federal Reserve does not ask that a surplus be maintained in the account; but, if you are unable to Police your account thoroughly, then a small margin of surplus is perhaps your only answer. Another facet of Reserve bank operations ~hich is tied to monetary policy considerations IS discounts and advances to member banks. A sophisticated audience such as this one probably is thoroughly conversant with the underlYing policies of the Federal Reserve System regarding the handling of loans to member banks, but, judging from the number of inquiries and questions, it might be well to review them quiCkly. Federal Reserve credit is available for shortadjustments, longer-term seasonal require~ents, and, of course, emergency demands. It IS not expected to be a permanent addition to the lendable funds of an individual bank and shoUld be used only intermittently. We disC~urage you from borrowing only when we fee l ~oat.Yo~ have overstayed your position and your .rrowmgs have become continuous or you are USing Our credit for a patently inappropriate PUrpose. run Attempts have been made to make Reserve bank loans more readily available and convenient. Telephone requests for loans and discounts are accepted; and if paper is preplaced to be held in abeyance, even loans secured by commercial paper can be handled by telephone, with mail confirmation of the note. For the banks which have "free" Government securities in our safekeeping, a loan is readily available by telephone. There are, unfortunately, specific requirements of the law which limit the type of paper that is eligible. The Federal Reserve System has had a bill before Congress for several years to eliminate this eligibility requirement; but, until the bill is enacted, the banks using commercial paper as collateral for their borrowings will need to submit it for advance review. Finally, tlle Federal Reserve banks, despite our role as regulators and examiners of banks and formulators of monetary policy, are essentially service institutions. We hope tllat we perform our services in an efficient and pleasant manner. If we don't, we would like to hear about it. To many of you, our principal contact is through the check-clearing, fiscal agency, and currency and coin services we render. With regard to the first of these, the foremost consideration is service to the general public, though the Federal Reserve also clears checks as a service to the commercial banks of the District. You and we are charged with providing as efficient and effective a credit-transfer mechanism as possible. Over the long range, of course, we have hopes of developing a system which will largely eliminate checks; but, in my opinion, this happy Utopia may be several years away. In the meantime, we have taken or are contemplating a number of different steps to refine our present arrangements. All of you are familiar with the changes made on September 1, 1967, in an attempt to eliminate nonencoded checks. From our standpoint, this program, carried out with your cooperation, has been quite successful, though we still must clean up the business review/ april 1968 9 remnants of the unencoded items and improve the quality of the encoding. More recently, we have been devoting attention to developing improved procedures for the transmittal of checks, to investigating later cutoff hours, and to a joint study of new methods to help one another in the handling of this massive flow of paper. We also have under consideration some changes in remittance procedures, for we believe that the automation which has provided such marked improvement in transit, accounting, and bookkeeping operations should be fully utilized and its other advantages fully explored. We can see possibilities of a vast improvement through the use of computer-created cash letters with automatic charges to reserve accounts without any change in the normal deferment procedure. Our most recent efforts have been designed to insure that remittances are timely, to discourage the kiting of checks, and to reduce the rather sizable amount of floatthe subject of considerable congressional criticism. We think that a fully automatic charge plan for all banks would make real progress toward most of these objectives. Although it is a minor problem in the State of Texas, there are still elements of nonpar banking in this District. I would hope that the banking leaders and associations will strive toward the elimination of the nonpar elements, so that each check a person writes can be collected at face value and the rather large balances maintained for the absorption of exchange can be reduced. Of course, this latter procedure is an evasion prohibited by regulation, but we believe that the best approach is to eliminate the nonpar checks. The Federal Reserve has been devoting considerable attention to the broader picture of automation and what it can do for the banking industry and services to the public. We see a great potential in computer-to-computer wire 10 transfers of Federal funds, research data, and, eventually, checks. In the coming months, we hope to institute a series of meetings to discuss with District bankers the potentialities of computer-to-computer ties for obtaining more rapid, efficient transfers of money and making the collection of data less troublesome. Most of you already know that we have converted a sizable portion of our safekeeping operations to book entry. This is another facet in our continuing effort to capitalize upon the availability of automation. We hope to have your support and cooperation in this program, for we can see in it the potentialities of sharply reduced costs of doing business and, perhaps more important, a more efficient and effective means of accomplishing our responsibilities. Let me close by saying that we in the Federal Reserve are reviewing our services to the banks and general public and are already considering a number of new programs which we hope will meet with your approval and participation. Among these is a possible new informational program for officers of member banks. We hope to be more active in our public relations responsibilities, to be more helpful in explaining neW regulations and changes in procedures, and to improve personal communications with bankers about their problems, outlook and expectations, and reactions and impressions regarding the impact of stabilization policy. Our interest is, of course, directed toward being as helpful as possible in stimulating a more efficient, progressive, and dynamic banking system. We are interested in you as banks and as the individuals making up a part of the banking industry in this District. We value your opinionS and suggestions and hope that you will let US know the ways in which we can help you, new services which you believe are appropriate to a central bank, and, of course, the ways in which we can improve our present services. dist,·ict highlights During February, the seasonally adjusted Texas industrial production index, rising to a level of 168.4 percent of its 1957-59 base, posted a strong gain of nearly 3 percent. Moderate to strong gains predominated among the various industrial categories. Compared with the preceding month, only one industry- stone, clay, and glass products - showed a noticeable decline, probably due to labor-management difficulties in the glass products industry. In durable goods manufacturing, four of the nine industries displayed moderate advances; there was a sharp rise of 9 percent in the category "other" dUl'ables, mainly ordnance. In the nondurable goods sector, every industry shared in the expansion. Apparel and allied products, Which had been relatively weak, registered a strong output gain of nearly 7 percent. In the mining sector, adjusted crude petroleum output was nearly 5 percent over the prior month. cent over the same month in 1967. The mon'thto-month increase in total employment was m.ore buoyant than usual for tIus time of the year. A stronger-than-seasonal pattern extended throughout all employment sectors except transportation and public utilities. Employment in construction was more vigorous than usual , while the trade, finance, and service sectors each performed moderately better than would be accounted for by seasonal changes only. As compared with a year ago, the percentage gain in manufacturing, construction, service, and government employment each exceeded the rise in total employment. In the case of the last two sectors, the amount of the lead was especially significant. Mining employment continued substantially below a year earlier. . The industrial production index for the State In February was about 10 percent over the same lllonth in 1967. In manufacturing, 13 out of t~e 18 industries posted increases, ranging from Slightly more than 1 percent to 28 percent in the case of transportation equipment. The output of stone, clay, and glass products was 10 percent Under a year ago, while output in the primary lUetal products and apparel industries each was o~ .slightly under 2 percent. Activity in the lng industry was up nearly 14 percent, .oOsted by a 17-percent increase in the produchon of crude petroleum. Utilities recorded an 8~erc~nt gain, buoyed by a strong year-to-year rise In eIectnclty " . generation. The output of crude oil in the Eleventh District in February was second only to the record established during August of last year at the time of the Middle East oil crisis. Daily average production of crude oil in February, at 3.8 million barrels, was 2 percent lugber than in the previous month and 10 percent above a year earlier. Nationally, the output of crude oil surpassed the level established last August to attain a new record of about 9.5 million barrels per day. Reasons for the surge in crude oil output are (1) a continuing lag in imports as an aftereffect of tbe Middle East crisis, (2) a colder winter than usual in the United States and Europe, and (3) anticipatory purchases of distillate oils used in space beating. . Nonagricultural wage and salary employment In the five southwestern states in February, at \lev el of 5,790,000 persons, was fractionally a ead of the preceding month and was 4 per- Because of the strong demand for oil, regulatory authorities in the producing southwestern states raised oil allowables sharply in January and increased tbem further in February; however, allow abIes have been decreased for April. :m business review/april 1968 11 The Texas allowable will be 46.7 percent of the Maximum Efficient Rate of production, down from the level of 49.6 percent for both February and March. The allowable for southeastern New Mexico in April will be drastically reduced, although Louisiana's schedule will not be curtailed as sharply. The lower allow abies stem from an expected easing in heating oil demand and a possible increase in oil imports. •OOS major spring crops this year. If such intenti . out, this . acreage would b e only fra care carrled tionally larger than the plantings of these croPs in 1967. Sharply increased acreages of cotto~, . b t gralO rice , barley , and flax are ill prospect, u ear's sorghum plantings may be below last Y large total. d the Reflecting normal seasonal factors an Ch greater competition for time deposit funds, ea I . pt tota of the major balance sheet ltems exce \CTotal registratioas of new passenger automotime and savings deposits advanced at the wee Ul biles in February in the major metropolitan eo ly reporting commercial banks in the Elev _ areas of Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and San ow District in the 4 weeks ended March 20.:a _ Antonio were 5 percent above those for J an111 ever the advances were less than in the c0 1 uary. A significant increase of 32 percent oc, d' t d tota parable period last year for loans a JUs. e 'while curred in Fort Worth, while Dallas and Houston investments and total demand depOSits, reported small gains. Registrations in San An, . d OSI'tS the decline in total time and Savl~gs ep 967 tonio declined 14 percent. Cumulative data for contrasted with a slight increase m the 1 the first 2 months of 1968 show that registrations in the four markets combined were 26 perperiod. d' sted cent more than in the same period last year. The $21 million advance in loans a JU '11 . 'rease I Department store sales in the Eleventh Disprimarily reflected a $24 million mc I aO commercial and industrial loans. Other 0 fftrict for the 4 weeks ended March 16 were 5 changes were relatively small ~d mos~y v~st percent ahead of the corresponding period last setting. The nominal advance ill total In t1year. Thus far in 1968, sales have exceeded ments was the result of a $16.5 million accUb~cl1 those during the comparable period in 1967 by ,. s W J 9 percent. Sales had shown sharp gains during lation of non-U.S. Government secuntJe '. of offset a decline of $16.3 million in holdJOgs the first 8 weeks of 1968. In early March, however, sales reflected more moderate increases U.S. Government issues. the over a year ago, when sales were strongly inOn the liability side of the balance she~t, refluenced by the earlier date of Easter. $41 million rise in to~a~ de~and deposl~ deflected gains of $94 rmlllOn ill the dem all poThe official arrival of spring found Eleventh posits of individuals, partnerships, and cOfaod District farmers well behind their usual schedule rations and $29 million in interbank de~lllOI1 in the preparation of soils and planting of this deposits, which more than offset a $73, rill 'file year's spring crops. Late-March snows in many fall in U.S. Government demand ~eposlt~ savof the northwestern sections and widespread reduction of $15 million in total ume an f all rains in eastern areas, with accompanying lower ings deposits was primarily the result 0 sits temperatures, delayed wide-scale farming ac$18 million decrease in "other" time dep~os, tivities further. of individuals, partnerships, and c,orpor~~arge most of which occurred in the holdlUgs °d osit According to the U.S. Department of AgriCD's. Negotiable time certificates of e~O!e culture, farmers in the five southwestern states issued in denominations of $100,000 or'lllo!l' indicated at the beginning of March that they fell $35 million to a level of $1,289 Jlll intended to plant about 26.4 million acres to 12 51ATI511CAt 5U PPI!EMEN1 to the BUSINESS REVIEW April 1968 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS RESERVE POSITIONS OF MEMBER BANKS CONDITION STATISTICS OF WEEKLY REPORTING COMMERCIAL BANKS Eleventh Federa l Reserve District Eleventh Federal Reserve District It em Mar. 27, 196B Feb. 2B, 196B __________~ IIe:m~____________M_a_r_._6~,_19_6_8_____Fe_b_._7_,_1_96_8__---~ Mar. 29, 1967 RESERVE CITY BANKS Tota l reserves held .. .... ..... . With Fed eral Re.erve Bank .. . . Currency and coin .... ..... . . Required reserves .... . ... .... . Excess reserves . . . ........ . .. . Borrowings ........ ..... . ... . . Free reserves........ . ....... . COUNTRY BANKS Total reserves held . . .. . ...... . With Federal Reser ve Bank ... . Currency and coin . .. ... ... . . Required reserves ..... ....... . Excess reserves ....... .. . .. .. . Borrowings . ............. .... . Free reserves ... ......... . ... . ALL MEMBER BANKS Totol reserves held ........... . With Federal Reserve Bonk ... . Currency and coin ........ . . . Required reserves ... . ...... . . . Excess reserves ....... . ... ... . Borrowing s .................. . Free reserves . . . . ..... ... .... . ASSETS 5,390,513 107,266 5,497,779 5,443,674 107,730 5,551,404 5,212,355 97,103 5,309,45B 2,700,011 2,652,22B 2,493,903 98,436 9B,422 91,097 16,774 25,890 B,406 27,OB6 56,502 32,173 431 337,203 454 337,350 1,09 1 302,265 and othe r business credit companies . ..... . , Olher • . • •••...••••••...••..•. , ....... . Rea l estate loans ......................... . loans to domestic commercial banks ... . . . .... . loons to forolgn banks .................... . Consumer instalment loans .. . ............... . loans to foroign governments, offlclal institutions, central banks, int ernational 167,593 267,287 536,BOI 175,052 5,372 553,35B 162,304 265,073 512,036 302,978 5,702 551,099 171,389 266,405 463,B48 362,842 3,610 515,029 ~Otl~;~ltl~~~~s••:::::::::::: : :::: :::: ::: ::: :: 0 613,571 0 62B,266 0 549,304 Tottal invostments . .......................... . 2,4B4,919 2,515,BB3 2,283,620 :rotal U.S. Government securities . . ... . .... ' " . Treasury bills . . ... .... . . .. ...... . . .. . .. . Treasury cortlflcatos of Indebtedness .. .. . .. . Troasury notes and U.S. Government bonds ma turlngl Within 1 year . ...................... . 1 year to S years .. . .. .. ..... . . .. .. . . . After 5 years ... . .................... . 1,194,441 100,664 0 1,232,540 123,256 0 1,123,923 72,904 15,115 213,494 616,3Bl 263,902 223,879 635,2B3 250,122 150,548 622,403 262,953 7,012 1,094,741 3,544 1,072,725 6,667 967,756 Net loons and discounts .... .. ... . . . . ....... . . . Valuation reservos .......................... . Gross loans and discounts ...... . .. . . . ..... ... . industrial loans • .•....•.••.. , Agricultural loans, excluding eec Commercial and certlflcates of intere st ......... . ..•...•... loans to brokers and deal ers for purchasing or carrying: U.S. Government securities ............... . Other securities ...... . ... ....... ... ... . . Other loans for purcha sing or carrying: U.S. Government securities ......... . . .. . . . Other securities . . . . .. .... ...... .. .. .... . loans to nonbank Anential institutions: Salos Anance, personal finance, factors, Obligalions of slales and political subdivisions: Tax warrants and short-term notes and bills . . All olhor ..... . ..... . ............... . .. . Other bonds, corporate stocks, and securitiesl Participation certlflcat es in Foderal agency loans ........ . ......... . ..... . All olher (Including corpora Ie slacks) ••••• •. • 69B,261 651,662 46,599 692,990 5,271 3,003 2,268 704,367 653,520 50,847 700,998 3,369 3,138 231 700,371 537,146 163,225 665,965 34,406 1,181 33,225 706,351 536,640 169,71 1 666,676 39,675 4, 165 35,5 10 1,39B,632 1, 188,808 209,824 1,358,955 39,677 4, 184 35,493 1,410,7 18 1,190,160 220,558 1,367,674 43,044 7,303 35,7 41 616,O~t 571'~85 44, ~ 626,5~9 _ 10,5 1,6 96 _12,205 661,O~~ 507,6 153,4 73 52 626,g2 1 35, 87 2,9 32,03 4 1,277,~~~ 1,078'358 198, 6 1 252,6' , 24,5 12 46 83 ---------------------------------------------~ 112,034 76,691 126,02B Bl,046 118,649 66,625 8B4,739 776,791 Bl,336 446,677 4,354 360,210 B97,159 696,234 78,566 420,260 3,746 364,480 732,23B 634,752 76,355 443,199 4,845 329,9B4 TOT AL ASSETS. • • .. .. . . . .. . .. .. . • . .. ... 10,429,539 10,420,002 9,717,348 C~sh items in process of co llection .. . .....• . .... Resorves with Federa l Resorve Bank . . . o • • • • • • • • • Currency and coin .. . . . ..................... . Balances with banks in Ihe Unlled Siale •••.•••••• Ba lances with banks in fareign countries ...•... . . Other assets . .................... . ....... .. . ~ (Averag es of dally figure.s. In Ihousands of dollars) ========================~~==~~~~~ 4 weeks e nded 5 week. ended 4 wee~s i967 (In Ihousands of dollars) CONDITION OF THE FE DERAL RESE RVE BANK OF DALLAS ~ 29 Md r• , (In Iho usands of do liars) ===================~~= Mar. 27, Feb. 28~ Ite m 1968 Tolal gold ce rlifical e re.erves .. .. . . • • • • • . . • • D' lib b k O:~~~~~.c~~n~::nde~d~~n~~;: : : : :: :::::::: U.S. Gov e rnm e nl .ecurities. . ... .. .......... TOlal earning a ssets .... ..... ...... .. .... •• 365,7 47 34,499 855 2,1 13,5B2 2,148,936 1 96~ 1968 ________ .• , -------------------=-=-:-: 38 1 ,50~ ~~~~~r :e~~~v~e~~t:~ ~e~~t~~i ~i·;c~i~ti~n·.·.·. : : t~~~:r~g 7,3 1 0 2,021,4~~ 2,028,7 65 l:~~5:~60 A57,~~~ 2'580 71 1 ,77~~'156 I, '68S i,0n'813 1,2 ' CONDITI ON STATI STI CS OF ALL MEMBER BANKS Eleventh Federa l Reserve District LIABI LITIES Tola l deposits •••• .• •••.. • •. . •• . •••••.. •• .. . Tolal demand deposits . . ................... Individuals, partnerships, and corporations .. . . States and political subdivisions .......... . . U.S. Government ...................... . . Banks in Ihe United Siales ............. .. .. Foroignl Governments, offlcial institutions, central bonks, internationa l Institutions ....... . . Commercial bonks . ................... . Certlfiod and officers' checks, elc .. .. ....... Tolal time and savings deposlls •• . •. ••• •••••. Individuals, partnerships, and corporations: Savings deposits .. . . ............. . .. .. Other time deposits . •. ... ......... . ... . States and political subdivisions .... .. ...... U.S. Governmenl (Including posla l saving.) • •. Banks in Ihe United Siale....... . ... . ..... . Forelgnl Governments, offlcial institutions, central banks, Interna tional institutions . .. ...... Commercial banks . .... . .............. . Bills payable, rediscounts, and olher lIabililies for borrowed mon ey •. . ..... . ...•.. Olher liabilities ............................. CAPITAL ACCOUNTS ........................ 2 ~ (In millions of do llars) 8,893,608 8,B97,852 B,413,916 5,312,533 3,696,B66 304,544 120,188 1.Q94,387 5,334,325 3,622,357 306,133 210,131 I ,OB9,613 5,019,631 3,375,89B 312,B85 131,836 1,100,492 4.Q92 24,303 6B,153 3,5Bl,075 3,564 22,221 BO,306 3,563,527 3,256 21,537 73,727 3,394,2B5 1,092,905 1,796,344 660,602 B,688 19,036 1,086,010 1,7B5,674 658,417 11,70 1 18,725 1,115,808 1,593 ,689 652,474 10,8OB 19,976 3,300 200 2,800 200 BOO 730 406,333 22B,011 397,317 225,B98 27 1,314 173,859 901,587 B9B,935 85B,259 TOT AL LIAB ILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCO UNTS 10,429,539 10,420,002 9,717,34B fe b . 2?2" ============:=:==~~~ F b 28 Jan. 3 1~ 196~ Ile m ~968' 1968 ~ -A-SS- E-TS- - - - - - - . : . - - - - -- -- - - - - - 9 523 Loans and di scounls . . . . • . • . . . • . • • . • . . . • . , U.S. Governmenl obllgalions........ .... .. 2,606 Olhersecuritles.. ...................... 2,680 ~';,'.':,'~~.v~~\~.~e.d.~r~~.R.e.s~:~~~.a.n.k::::........ 1, ~~~ Balances wilh banks in the Uniled Siale. . • • • Balances with bonks in for eign countriesc .... Ca.h ilems in process 01 colleclion. • • . . . • • • Olhe r ass el'e.... .. . . . . .. .. .. . . .. .. . . . . 1,090 6 1,008 456 TOTAL ASSETse ....... ....... .. , . . .. 18,7 41 LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS Demand de posits of banks .... . ......... . Other demand de posits ............. . . .. . Time deposits .... ... ..... ........ . . .. . . 1,368 8,206 6,904 Total de posi ts . . . . .... . .. ... . . .. .... . Borrowings ........................... . Other liabiliti osc ................ ...... . Total capital accountse ...... .. . . . . .... . . 16,478 412 309 1,542 9,428 2,552 2,698 1 149 '238 1 ,14~ 8,6390~ 2 2'293 '110 1'211 1 ,12~ 923 997 503 460"--::-: ~ _ ~ 1,389 8,312 6,742 - 16,443 422 280 1,532 !Wb ~~ -----------------------------e - Estimated. TOTAL LIABILITIES AN D CAPITAL ACCOUN TSe .. .. .. •• .. • • •• . .• .•••. BANK DEB ITS , END-OF-MONTH DEPOS ITS, AND DEPOS IT TURNOVER ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(~D~O~lIo~r~o~m~o~u~n=ts~in=t=h=o=US=o=n=d=s,=s=e=os=o=n=o=IIY~O=di=u=st=e=d'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~== DE81TS TO DEMAND DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS' DEMAND DEPOSITS' Percent chang e 1968 Standard metropolitan statistica l area ~RIZON lOUI A, Tueson ... SI"NA, Monroe" : : . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . NEW Shreveport . .. •. . . . .••.. ... .... .. ...• ... lEX" MEXICO, Roswell;' . •....•. . . •... .•.. ••. .... ... S, (Annual ~ rate Januar y February basis, 1968 1967 4,495,008 2, 144,868 6,436,032 666,072 1,8 12,828 5,080,236 5,490,204 5,576,004 1,503,000 4,538,304 353,880 74,226,804 5,067,924 17,453,616 2,462,496 75,426,852 668,316 3,440,796 1,334,676 1,665,876 1,232,544 1,004,892 14,975,304 836,208 1,378,824 1,703, 136 2,32 1,868 2,020,836 $ ~~~~~LL::~; l; ;; ;;~ ~ ;;;~ ~ ~ ;;;~; ~ ;;;;; ;; ; Cro'Wnsvill e' H~rli~t ~~:~rong e: ••..•..... . .. .... orpus Christ' 9 an Benito . . ••...•....•.•. r~~~~1I::: :':';;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;; ~Olveston_i~~~~ C'.;· · ··· · ··· ·· ········· · ·.· .. ~1~fr,"·L!i l"orko no (T on . . . .... .......... ........ .. . . l.t.1-2:~ii~: ~~il; .~~~~t~k:o:n:s7:·:· ~ ~ ~ ~ ~: ~::::: ~ ~ ~: :: centers 10 :I: c~eO'its of ...................... .. ........... individu I "'y basjs, a . 5, GROSS DEMAN D Annual rate of turnover February 1968 from February -6 2 7 6 9 7 7 -6 -8 6 8 25 -4 16 16 I 11 - 18 -8 20 9 20 14 6 16 13 15 13 4 o - 11 8 2 5 -2 6 5 -3 -1 13 5 o 5 6 8 3 2 3 6 II 28 4 19 -8 9 9 7 -2 7 9 2 12 8 -3 -2 -I 0 14 13 2 february 1967 February 29, February Januar y 1968 1968 1968 26.9 26.8 28.9 20.2 19.1 37.5 24.0 25.0 20.1 23.5 12.5 40.7 25.5 31.9 24.9 35.9 20.2 24.4 15.9 13.6 18 .9 16.5 27.4 15.4 22.2 20.2 20.3 18.0 26.0 26.2 26.6 20.2 17.4 34.4 25.9 24.4 20.7 22.5 15.3 43.3 27.6 29.0 23.4 16.0 24.8 17.0 22.0 19.9 19.9 18.7 26.7 27.8 27.4 19.0 20.5 34.5 23.6 25.1 2 1.2 21.8 12 .3 39.7 24 .1 28.9 23 .4 32.6 17.8 23.5 17.4 12.6 17.7 16.9 23.3 15.8 22.2 19.2 19.3 18.3 31.7 31.2 29.8 $ 167,5 14 75,439 219,042 32,19 1 93,153 132,698 226,973 22 1,090 74,267 194,688 28,482 1,836,278 202,4 12 544,7 13 97,607 2,087,977 33,707 145,158 84,214 122,577 66,154 61,453 553,406 53,728 64,232 85,18 1 112,028 114,218 8 II 25 I 14 12 12 14 o 2 -3 3 $245,3 17,404 2 months, 1968 from 1967 $7,730,580 33.7 20.5 22.9 15.2 13.5 19.7 . partn ers hips, and corporations and of st ates a nd political subdivisions . AND TIME DEPOSITS OF MEMBER BANKS Elevenlh Federa l Reserve Dislrict (Ave rag es of doily figures. In millions of dollars, TIME DEPOS ITS Rese rve Reserve Country city bonks banks Date 1966. F 19 67' ebruary ... : FebrUor Sept ern y... OC'obe~er. . No vernb '" 196 oe'ernb:;" 80Januar .. Februo~' .. BUILDING PERM ITS ~ROSS DEMAND DEPOS ITS Total ci ty bonks Country bonks Tota l VALU ATION (Dollar amounts in thousands, Percent cha nge Feb. 1968 8,827 8,902 9,426 9,5 11 9,582 9,84 1 9,923 4,027 4,020 4,408 4,448 4,4 17 4,589 4,560 4,391 ~6 1 4,800 4,882 5,0 18 5,063 5,165 5,252 5,363 5,170 5,612 6,091 6,398 6,457 6,509 6,571 6,698 6,863 2,675 2,721 2,743 2,753 2,744 2,762 2,815 2,851 2,937 3,370 3,655 3,704 3,765 3,809 3,883 4,012 382 876 70 3 19 123 579 811 1,928 Wichita Falls •• 29 120 380 141 110 430 1,548 422 54 1 69 2,686 24 107 57 48 62 63 1, 137 43 237 55 53 226 704 252 246 786 2,768 847 902 126 4,422 57 223 105 100 109 122 2,040 74 422 115 166 2,131 12,894 1,416 601 2,162 18,349 5,855 8,873 693 4 1,037 198 1,197 849 349 294 877 14,478 696 1,184 631 Totol-24 cities •• 9,080 16,277 $ 119,694 Area ARIZO NA Tuc son . •• • • .•• Amarillo ..•. . . Austin . . . . . . .. Beaumont ••. . . Brownsville •... State and era ARIZONA grange. Indicated _ p_ _ _ _ _19 :..:..::6:.. 7 _ _ _ _~1:..:9.:.6:6_ _ _.....:1:.9:61~-:65::..-._ IE~:~pefr~ii::::::::::: : ::: : Granoes Average ~r~ii::::::::::: : :::: 3,700 3,000 k~~g 3,9 10 1,680 2,008 2,720 2,800 952 5,600 1,814 SOUR~ .S . Doport .:::::-::-: - - : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - rnent of Agr iculture. 1968 $ 2,025 $ 2 months, 1968 from 1967 2 mos. Jan . 1968 1968 Feb. 1967 3,719 20 80 38 2,614 3,628 -55 13 -73 54 -43 63 646 -65 12 4,030 73 20,356 2 2,799 127 866 9,227 -69 17 34,094 15,73 9 -41 150 12,427 57 1,135 12 77,544 92 301 3,646 -51 24 1,532 900 -37 43 500 94 1,329 32,009 - 17 96 1,051 3,318 -45 15 1,179 -93 106 5 -24 317 -25 30 72 2 40 45 -48 -16 - 15 -35 -6 82 -2 138 128 -1 -84 64 17 14 118 75 19 56 -11 4 71 -69 38 -5 -13 -47 32 53 129 216 12 LOUISIANA TEXAS Abilene •• • • ••• ~~~~===(I~n~t=h=o=us=o~n=ds~o=f=b=o=xe=s=)~~~~~~~~~~== Feb. 1968 2 mos. Monroe-West Monroe • • o • • Shreve port •... CITR US FR UIT PRODUCTI ON from NUM8ER Fe b. 1968 Corpus Christi .. Dallas ... ... .. EI Paso • •• • •• • Fort Worth . •.. Galveston .. .. . Houston ••• ••. lare do .. ... . . Lubbock ••.••• Midland • • •• .. Odessa . ..... . Port Arthur •••. Son Ange lo •• • Son Antonio ••• Tex arkana ... . Waco . ... ... . $234,589 18 ~6 3 VALUE OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS DAILY AVERAGE PRODU CTION OF CRUDE O )L (In millions of dolla rs ) (In thousands of barrels) Januar y-Fe bruary Area and type FIVE SOUTHWESTERN STATES' . . . . . .. . .. ... . .. Res id enti al building .. . ... . Nonresid ential building ... . No nbuil dlng co nstruction . .. UNIT ED STATES ...... ...... Resid ential buil ding . ..... . Nonr esid ential building .. .. Nonbullding construction ... Februa ry January Decemb e r 1968 1968 1967 390 190 92 108 3,704 1,495 1,251 958 1968 398 154 156 88 4,108r 1,516r 1,550 1,042 453 199 177 77 3,714 1,462 1,347 905 841 388 268 185 7,395 2,949 2,593 1,853 773 273 272 228 6,2 83 2,148 2,603 1,53 2 ] Arizona , loui siana, New Mex ico , Oklahoma, and Texas. r - Percent 1967r Rev ised . NOTE. - De tail s ma y not odd to total s because of rounding . SOURC E, F. W . Dodge, McGra w-Hili, Inc. Fe bruary January February January Ar ea 1968p 1968p 1967 1968 ElEVENTH DISTRICT. . . . .... Texa s ... .. ..... . ....... Gulf Coast • . .• •...... • W est Texa s ........... Ea st Texas (prope r) .... . Panhandl e • ... ••..•.• . Rest of State ...... .. •. Southe a ste rn New Mex ico . . Northe rn loui siana .. . . . . .. OUTSIDE ELEVENTH DISTRICT UN ITED STATES .. . ... ... . .. 3,8 13.1 3,321.1 668 .9 1,550.3 154.1 95.0 852.8 320.0 172 .0 5,638.0 9,451.1 3,743 .3 3,252 .2 648.9 1,528 .3 150.2 95.8 829.0 321.7 169.5 5,488.1 9,236.3 3,454 .9 2,976.8 553 .9 1,390.0 139.2 95.3 798 .4 323 .1 155.0 5,169.1 8,624.5 1.9 2. 1 3.1 1.4 2.6 - .8 2.9 - .5 1.5 2.7 2.3 p- change~ FebruorY 1967 ---- 10.4 11.6 20.8 11.5 10.7 _.3 6.8 _1.0 11.0 9. 1 9.6 ----- Preliminary, SOURCES, American Petrole um In stitute . U.S. Burea u of Mines . Federal Re serve Bank of Dallas. NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT IND UST RI AL PRODU CTIO N Five Southwestern Stotes ' (Seasonally adju sted indoxes, 1957-59 Perc ent chang e Number of p ersons Type of e mployment Fe b. 1968 from Februa ry Januar y February 1968p 1968 Jon. 1967r 1968 5,790,000 1,068,000 4,722,000 220,100 370,900 5,770,200 1,066,800 4,703,400 220,500 364,000 5,556,400 1,021 ,900 4,534,500 229,200 354,400 0.3 .1 .4 - .2 1.9 4 .2 4.5 4.1 -4 .0 4.7 433,200 1,307,800 280,700 883,900 1,225,400 429,600 1,314,200 279,800 879,900 1,215,400 423,200 1,262,000 270,900 828,500 1,166,300 .8 - .5 .3 .5 .8 2.4 3.6 3.6 6.7 5.1 Fe b. 1967 = 100) =====================================~ Fobru arY ~ --------~------------------------------153.0r 173.6r Total nonagricultural wag e and sa lary workers •• Manufacturing . ........ . . Nonmanufacturing .. ••. . •• Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Construction . ..• .• • ••• • Transportation and public utiliti es• . . .. ..• Trad e • ..• .. . . .• . .•• .• Finance • • • • ...• • ..... • Ser vice . . . ... . .... .. .. Governm ent ... .. .... .. 1 Ari zono , loui siano, New Mex ico, O klahoma, and Te xas. Pre liminary. Revi sed . SOURCE, Stat e e mplo yment ag e ncies. p r - 192. 2r 161. lr 11 4.9r 196. 8r 157.0r I 59. 0r 163.0 153. 0r 122.0r 181 .0r -------------------------------------~ p Pre liminary. r- Fedoral Rese rve Bank of Da ll as. ELEVENTH FE DERAL RESE RVE DISTR ICT ~ Dalla . Head Office Territor), IIIIID HOU l ton Branch Territory ·li:;:\:!:·:1 Son An lonlo Branch Terrllor), E§J EI Palo Branch Ter ritory 4 Revi sed . SOURCES, Boord of Governors of the Fede ral Reserve System .