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business
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revIew

april 1968

FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF DALLAS
This publication was digitized and made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas' Historical Library (FedHistory@dal.frb.org)

contents

the ever-changing world
of finance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

district highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11

THE EVER-CHANGING WORLD OF FINANCE
An Address by
Dr. Philip E. Coldwell
President
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
at the
Fifth District Meeting
Texas Bankers Association
Sheraton-Dallas Hotel
Dallas, Texas
Saturday, March 30, 1968

In view of the very rapid financial changes
Under way, it seems appropriate at this meeting
of the Fifth District of the Texas Bankers Association to review some of the broader trends of
banking, finance, and central bank relationships
Which appear important both to the District and
to the Nation as a whole. The scope of the
ad~ess will be quite broad, ranging from internatlonal and national problems in the world of
~nan~e down through developing changes in
an king structure and practices and, finally,
~ the operational relationships of the Federal
b eserv.e Bank of Dallas and the commercial
anks In the Eleventh Federal Reserve District.
Starting, then, at the broadest level of con-

~act, let us review a few of the developing trends

In the international financial scene. As has been
al11~ly demonstrated in the past month, there is
~n Inevitable link between the intetnational and
omestic financial postures of a nation and even

a causal relationship in the problems of both
areas. In the post-World War II period, there
has developed an important growth in international trade, financed to a considerable extent
by the deliberately induced deficits in the U.S.
balance-of-payments position in the early postwar years. It takes but little memory to recall
the Marshall plan, the establishment of NATO,
the Alliance for Progress program, and tlle resultant growth of U.S. worldwide commitments.
Of special importance has been the extensive
expansion in exports and imports. U.S. merchandise exports have tripled since 1950 and
reached about $31 billion in 1967, while U.S.
imports have multiplied nearly threefold to a
1967 level of $27 billion. The volume of world
trade expanded from $117 billion in 1950 to
$374 billion in 1966. To a considerable extent, the U.S. worldwide commitments and the
growth of international trade are interlocked;
the Nation's efforts to rebuild Western Europe
bore fruit in a strong expansion of demand for
U.S. commodities, and the stimulation to the
country's domestic economy occasioned by both
growing exports and internally developing expansion created new markets for European imports. Similar effects have grown out of our
commitments in Japan, Latin America, and
other important sectors of the world.
Export markets now account for more than
25 percent of U.S. production of such diverse
commodities as rice, wheat, commercial jet aircraft, and a wide range of highly technical machinery. Conversely, more than 25 percent of
the U.S. requirements for many agricultUral
specialty items, certain metals, and even residual
fuel oil are met by imports. In addition, there
has been a marked expansion in imports of

business review/april 1968

steel, automobiles, and many other consumer
goods.
The United States has encouraged capital
investment abroad, and the potential profits
from this investment have spurred many companies to establish branches and to merge with
or purchase foreign companies, especially in the
more industrialized European areas. The success of the investment program is evident in the
amount of capital investment abroad, now totaling nearly $55 billion, and in the steady return
of earnings amounting to more than $5 billion
per year.
A concomitant development with this capital
investment program has been the steadily closer
ties between U.S. capital markets and capital
flows and those of other nations throughout the
free world. Undoubtedly, one of the principal
causes of these closer ties was the developing
use of the U.S. dollar as both a reserve and a
vehicle currency. In fact, throughout the past 15
years, the U.S. dollar has been the principal
medium of exchange and method of settlement
for most international trade, and free world
nations abroad now hold U.S. dollars as more
than one-fourth of their total foreign official
reserves.
These changes - coupled with a mechanism
to effect rapid transfers of funds, a network of
almost instantaneous communications, and a
broader understanding of world investment
possibilities - created the climate for large
. short-term investment flows between nations.
In addition, in Europe now, there exist both
Euro-dollar and Euro-bond markets, which are
virtually free from any domestic government
control.
To the United States, these various developments have brought an acute awareness that
foreign relationships affect the financial and
economic trends of the Nation and, since approximately 1960, a distinct recognition of the
impact which the relationships could have upon

the international financial position of the United
States and the domestic monetary and fiscal
policies of this country. The institutional controls and policies of the Nation have not kept
pace with the new environment within which
they must operate. At the same time, the current trend toward specific controls - such as
the interest equalization tax, the mandatory restraint on investment, and the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program - has not represented either the U.S. policy toward free trade
and free movements of currency and credit or a
long-range solution for this country's balanceof-payments problems.
The change in the Federal Government's
budget position has been one of the important
developments in the national financial situation
which has impacted upon both domestic policy
and the international area. In all but six of the
postwar years, the Federal budget has been
in deficit. Cumulatively, the deficits now total
about $100 billion, and they find a concurrent
relationship in the deficits abroad, which have
reached more than $38 billion since 1947.
It is well known that the costs of these deficits internationally have been an outflow of gold
and a growth of foreign-held short-term claims
against the dollar. Within the United States, the
continued budget deficits over the postwar period, occasioned in part by the Federal Government's participation in broader areas of responsibilities, have brought steady pressure upon the
value of the American dollar in terms of its
domestic purchasing power and have denied the
Nation one of its principal means of stabilization control.

In this catalog of changing financial conditions, perhaps it would be well to give immediate recognition to both the private and the
official tolerance of the erosion in the value of
the dollar. With increasing frequency one hears
the statement, "A 2- or 3-percent rate of inflation is necessary to the growth of the United
States and to the feeling of well-being of be!

citizens." Yet, it takes only an elementary education in mathematics to calculate the impact of
such a rate of inflation upon the value of the
currency, even over the short work span of a
normal life. For those who entered the labor
force in the immediate postwar period, there
has developed a loss of purchasing power by
each of the dollars earned in 1947, so that the
dollar saved from the salary earned in that year
will today buy only two-thirds of what it did
21 years ago.
Clearly then, one of the principal and important financial trends of the postwar period
has been the existence and public acceptance of
infiation, along with official unwillingness to
come to grips with this tax upon purchasing
power.
Too frequently in the postwar years, tlle burden of stabilization control has fallen directly
upon the actions of the monetary autllOrities of
the United States, rather than upon a properly
balanced mix of monetary and fiscal policies
sUpplemented by a rational and reasonable incomes policy. The monetary authorities have
had to absorb most of the brunt of control, although they recognized that monetary policy
could not do the job by itself and that such exclUSive reliance on monetary restraint might
cause great inequities between companies and
between various sectors of the market.
It probably should be noted here that the
~tabilization efforts of the United States, worklUg largely through aggregate controls, have

been unable to restrain effectively the pressures
developing from an economy dedicated to full
employment and from the very sizable flows of
funds Which occur in an uncontrolled and unpredictable fashion in a world of uncertainty.
Some of the difficulty is probably attributable to
the. lack of recognition of the critical fiscal
POlicy role and to the unwillingness to use tax
and debt-management policy in the stabilization
efforts. Perhaps tlle United States has overreacted to the urgent requirements of its world-

wide commitments or to tlle demonstrated need
of its citizens for a better way of life and a more
equitable share in the fruits of progress. Whatever the reason for the difficulty, tlle fact remains that the interaction of international conflicts and unrest with domestic pressures has
created a volatile force which threatens to get
out of control.
The United States is undoubtedly the world's
richest nation. Its gross national product exceeds the combined output of the six Common
Market countries, and its income per capita is
more than 10 times the world average. Despite
this strength, the capacity of the Nation is not
infinite at anyone point in time. Stabilization
control has been hampered by an unwillingness
to establish priorities of spending.
This Nation can no longer expect to maintain
all of its national and international commitments
within the framework of a stable economy. Priorities are urgently needed but, obviously, require careful development.
Another facet of our less-tllan-satisfactory
stabilization efforts in this country can probably
be attributed to the changing mix of financial
institutions and procedures. The composition of
the private financial structure and its internal
relationships have changed markedly. To a
considerable extent, the personalized approach
which was apparent in the prewar period has
diminished in importance. Customers have been
well educated to the value of their money in
achieving a return for the use of the money, and
they have sought the highest rates of return
available at not only domestic but also international institutions.
The nUlllber of financial institutions has
grown, their powers have been enlarged, and
the base of financial relationships has been
broadened among a wide and diverse community of financial institutions, both private and
public. Despite this change in structure, the
monetary authority must work through only a

business review/ april 1968

limited and steadily declining proportion of the
total financial institutional group in this country - namely, the member commercial banks.
If more equitable and more efficient monetary
control is to be achieved in the future, the Federal Reserve fulcrum of operations may need to
be broadened and enlarged. One can develop a
logical position for central bank control over
all financial institutions, whether they are depositaries or merely intermediaries.
Even if we, as a Nation, develop an awareness of the need to use fiscal policy as a stabilization device and encourage a responsible
attitude toward the determination of spending
priorities, it would still be the monetary authority's job to make day-to-day and month-tomonth shifts in the credit base in order to insure
that the total supply of credit is adequate to
meet all legitimate demands which can be handled in a framework of sustainable economic
growth.
Full responsibility for economic and financial
stabilization is not, of course, strictly a governmental function. It is everybody's business.
Stable and healthy economic growth requires
the efforts of all officials, businessmen, bankers,
and individuals. Our ability and willingness to
accept this responsibility have been influenced,
to some extent, by the expectational framework
within which day-to-day decisions are made and
by the institutional structure through which we
work.
Most knowledgeable market observers consider the expectations of businessmen and investors to be prime influences accentuating a
developing inflationary situation. If the corporate executive becomes convinced that price
levels are moving up, that costs will rise materially, and that labor expenses and other pro··
duction costs will make serious inroads upon
his profit picture, he then, in self-defense, contributes the second part of what we have come
to call "the cost-price spiral." If, on the other
hand, his expectations are for a stable cost

structure or one which advances only within the
bounds of productivity, his pricing decisions
can be settled on the basis of the demand, supply, and competition for his product.
Today we are faced with the first of these
conditions. To assess the blame between labor
and management is hardly a useful exercise.
Labor can say that it needs to be protected from
the inflationary consequences of rising prices,
while businessmen can say that, with rising
costs, they must increase prices to protect their
profit position and to meet their responsibilities
to stockholders. In consequence, many persons
believe that it is hopeless for them, as individuals, to make any contribution toward breaking
this spiral. Yet, collectively and individually,
the businessman and laborer have a responsibility to contribute to the stability of the national
economy, especially in periods of intense inflationary pressures. Industrial and business statesmanship may require some temporary foregoing
of profits or a temporary lag in the rate of wage
increases; but, in the end, either would be a
small sacrifice compared to the ravages of inflation upon the purchasing power of profits and
wages alike.
A second factor in the willingness and ability
of the individual to handle his responsibilities is,
of course, the institutional framework and operational procedures through which he must
work. In the postwar period, especially in
the past 10 years, there have been important
changes in both of these elements in the banking industry. It is no news to any of you tllat
bank management today probably pays as much
attention to the liability as to tlle asset side of
the balance sheet. Purchased deposits and borrowed money constitute significant proportions
of total available funds, and deposits upon
which interest is paid by the banks are noW
comprising nearly half of the entire deposits in
the banking system. Competition for such funds
has become nationwide, reflecting both an improved communications system and the more

widespread awareness on the part of the depositor of the returns available for the use of his
money.
An outgrowth of this trend has been the rapid
development of a new type of certificate of deposit. Certificates of deposit were originally a
convenience device, local in nature and tailored
to rather specific situations. Over the past decade, they have come to be viewed as a nationwide instrument with a secondary market and a
broad appeal to those who can schedule their
needs for funds.

The growth of certificates of deposit in their
new status has conflicting elements of strength
and weakness for the banking system. For the
large banks which maintain a careful watch over
their money position and have broad access to
national money market supplies, the large CD
instrument may be appropriate. Most smaller
banks without access to national sources of
funds use CD's primarily in a defensive manner
to protect against the loss of local deposits;
however, when such banks engage in the competition for large CD's, some serious questions
may be raised about the use of the device. At
member banks in the Eleventh Federal Reserve
District, large-denomination certificates now
~otal more than $1 .2 billion, while those issued
In smaller denominations exceed $1.5 billion .
Along with the change in the certificate market has come the widespread growth of the
~ederal funds market. Here again, there are
faVorable and unfavorable connotations. From
the central bank's viewpoint, the Federal funds
market means a more intensive utilization of
~redit already in the market as a short-term adJustment device. The Federal funds market as
an adjustment device in the short run seems
quite appropriate; but for longer-range usage
and, especially, for banks which do not maintain
iose supervision over their reserve position,
I ederal funds reliance may be unwise. More
~lan a few banks have had problems created
Y Utilizing short-term borrowed money as the

foundation for longer-term loan operations. Purchases of Federal funds to meet a consistent
deficit in position expose a bank not only to
higher costs of meeting shortfalls in reserve
positions but also, perhaps more importantly,
to the possibility that such funds might not be
available.
Nearly 5 percent of the District member
banks routinely purchase Federal funds in
amounts equal to more than half of tlleir reserve requirements, and a few purchase their
entire requirements. This is certainly stretching
the use of an adjustment device. In tlus day
and time of truly difficult financial problems for
our Nation, it would seem more appropriate for
banks to remain "close to shore," building or
at least maintaining adequate liquidity positions.
One of the important impacts of the increased
interest cost of both borrowed funds and interest-bearing deposits has been the pressure on
bank profits and the resultant efforts to enlarge
sizably the portion of bank assets placed in loan
accounts. Thus, loan-deposit ratios, advancing
sharply over the postwar period, now average in
excess of 55 percent for the District as a whole
and in excess of 65 percent for some of the
larger banks. The result of these changes in
policy has been increased pressures on liquidity,
a reduced margin of safety and flexibility,
and a steadily growing reliance upon external
sources of funds to meet unusual changes in deposit or loan accounts. Much of this reliance
has been placed upon tlle correspondents, but
the larger correspondent banks themselves perhaps to an even greater extent - have become reliant upon those farther up the ladder.
Many of these pressures eventually center upon
the large New York banks, and the safety valve
has been their ability to draw funds from the
Euro-dollar market.
Another of tlle important postwar changes in
banking has been the growth of financial institutions. In a broad sense, many financial institutions appear to be moving toward a common

business review/april 1968

format, with banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions taking on the loan and
deposit aspects of their competitors at a steadily
advancing pace. This trend has, of course, enlarged competition for the banks and has intensified efforts to achieve larger and, to some
extent, more efficient units.
Part of this pressure toward larger size originates in the developing trend toward automation. As competitors have become more effective and efficient in their handling of banking
routines, the advantages of size have become
even more apparent. Some banks have met the
problem of the high cost of original equipment
by spreading the cost through nonbank services
to customers and others. Still other banks are
seeking a solution by centralizing their accounting, transit, and proof operations in a common
clearinghouse or processing center. To the
majority, however, the profits and efficiencies
of automation are achieved only when the
growth in the size of the institution will justify
the costs. Not only is this growth important in
relation to automation; but, as businesses become larger, the size of the banking unit becomes critical in meeting the higher loan limits
sought by these businesses.
Some of this expansion in bank size has occurred through branching, mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions by holding companies. In
those states, such as Texas, which permit no
branch banking, the expansion routes are practically limited to internal growth or holding
company acquisitions. Branching has been intensified, and in a few states there have been
changes to relax limits upon branch expansion.
In some 16 states in the Nation, however,
branching is still prohibited. Whether it will be
possible for these states to maintain this position
will depend, in part, upon the ingenuity of the
banker in meeting the challenges of automation
and the ability of the industry as a whole to
provide the managerial talent needed to run the
many individual unit banks. These matters

should command your attention, for in the more
complex, highly competitive credit world of today, there is an urgent need for more efficient
operations and well-trained, quality management at all levels.
To those of us involved in the day-to-day
banking business of the Eleventh Federal Reserve District, the problems and challenges recited above are matters of daily concern. To a
large extent, your Federal Reserve System can
operate only because you are concerned and are
willing to give your complete cooperation. Before going further, let me express our great
appreciation for your help in moving toward
our common goals of better service to the public, more efficient credit mechanisms, and improved stabilization control.
In a sense, the work of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas is divided into three principal
sectors. A part of its job is obviously regulatory
- encouraging commercial bank management
to pursue sound banking practices and insuring,
to the extent possible, an equitable competitive
situation. In this role, the Reserve banks are expected to enforce regulations such as those pertaining to stock margin requirements, loans to
executive officers, and regulation Q.
At the same time, the Reserve bank is involved in administering certain requirements
which are fundamental to the execution of
monetary policy. One phase of this work is
overseeing the maintenance of reserve requirements. It is statutory that the member bankS
must maintain reserves at specified levels; and
while many have objected to this neutralization
of a sizable portion of their lendable funds, these
reserves are the fulcrum on which open market
operations and monetary policy must develop·
It is hoped that the requirements can be made
as convenient as possible, and, to this end, neW
procedures for maintaining required reserveS
have been suggested. But, despite all efforts
toward convenience, there must be a standard
of reserve requirements against which monetary

policy can operate; and in order to assure equitable treatment, all member banks will be required to meet this standard. Someday, perhaps
all financial institutions will be treated alike in
this and other respects, but such a possibility is
a longer-range problem.
Reliance upon narrowly timed transfers of
funds and the maintenance of reserve accounts
with only a thin or even nonexistent margin will
almost always create reserve requirement problems between the commercial bank and the
Reserve bank. The majority of the member
banks in the District ordinarily have no reserve
deficiencies and are to be congratulated. To
those of you who are consistently on the border
line and maintain such a thin margin that any
unforeseen shift will cause a deficiency, we hope
that you will pay closer attention to the maintenance of your required reserves. The Federal
Reserve does not ask that a surplus be maintained in the account; but, if you are unable to
Police your account thoroughly, then a small
margin of surplus is perhaps your only answer.
Another facet of Reserve bank operations
~hich is tied to monetary policy considerations
IS discounts and advances to member banks. A
sophisticated audience such as this one probably is thoroughly conversant with the underlYing policies of the Federal Reserve System regarding the handling of loans to member banks,
but, judging from the number of inquiries
and questions, it might be well to review them
quiCkly.
Federal Reserve credit is available for shortadjustments, longer-term seasonal require~ents, and, of course, emergency demands. It
IS not expected to be a permanent addition to
the lendable funds of an individual bank and
shoUld be used only intermittently. We disC~urage you from borrowing only when we fee l
~oat.Yo~ have overstayed your position and your
.rrowmgs have become continuous or you are
USing Our credit for a patently inappropriate
PUrpose.

run

Attempts have been made to make Reserve
bank loans more readily available and convenient. Telephone requests for loans and discounts
are accepted; and if paper is preplaced to be
held in abeyance, even loans secured by commercial paper can be handled by telephone, with
mail confirmation of the note. For the banks
which have "free" Government securities in our
safekeeping, a loan is readily available by telephone. There are, unfortunately, specific requirements of the law which limit the type of
paper that is eligible. The Federal Reserve System has had a bill before Congress for several
years to eliminate this eligibility requirement;
but, until the bill is enacted, the banks using
commercial paper as collateral for their borrowings will need to submit it for advance review.
Finally, tlle Federal Reserve banks, despite
our role as regulators and examiners of banks
and formulators of monetary policy, are essentially service institutions. We hope tllat we perform our services in an efficient and pleasant
manner. If we don't, we would like to hear
about it. To many of you, our principal contact
is through the check-clearing, fiscal agency, and
currency and coin services we render.
With regard to the first of these, the foremost
consideration is service to the general public,
though the Federal Reserve also clears checks
as a service to the commercial banks of the
District. You and we are charged with providing as efficient and effective a credit-transfer
mechanism as possible. Over the long range, of
course, we have hopes of developing a system
which will largely eliminate checks; but, in my
opinion, this happy Utopia may be several years
away. In the meantime, we have taken or are
contemplating a number of different steps to refine our present arrangements. All of you are
familiar with the changes made on September 1,
1967, in an attempt to eliminate nonencoded
checks. From our standpoint, this program, carried out with your cooperation, has been quite
successful, though we still must clean up the

business review/ april 1968

remnants of the unencoded items and improve
the quality of the encoding.
More recently, we have been devoting attention to developing improved procedures for the
transmittal of checks, to investigating later cutoff hours, and to a joint study of new methods
to help one another in the handling of this massive flow of paper. We also have under consideration some changes in remittance procedures,
for we believe that the automation which has
provided such marked improvement in transit,
accounting, and bookkeeping operations should
be fully utilized and its other advantages fully
explored. We can see possibilities of a vast improvement through the use of computer-created
cash letters with automatic charges to reserve
accounts without any change in the normal deferment procedure. Our most recent efforts have
been designed to insure that remittances are
timely, to discourage the kiting of checks, and
to reduce the rather sizable amount of floatthe subject of considerable congressional criticism. We think that a fully automatic charge
plan for all banks would make real progress
toward most of these objectives.
Although it is a minor problem in the State
of Texas, there are still elements of nonpar
banking in this District. I would hope that the
banking leaders and associations will strive toward the elimination of the nonpar elements, so
that each check a person writes can be collected
at face value and the rather large balances maintained for the absorption of exchange can be
reduced. Of course, this latter procedure is an
evasion prohibited by regulation, but we believe
that the best approach is to eliminate the nonpar
checks.
The Federal Reserve has been devoting considerable attention to the broader picture of
automation and what it can do for the banking
industry and services to the public. We see a
great potential in computer-to-computer wire

transfers of Federal funds, research data, and,
eventually, checks. In the coming months, we
hope to institute a series of meetings to discuss
with District bankers the potentialities of computer-to-computer ties for obtaining more rapid,
efficient transfers of money and making the collection of data less troublesome.
Most of you already know that we have converted a sizable portion of our safekeeping operations to book entry. This is another facet in
our continuing effort to capitalize upon the
availability of automation. We hope to have
your support and cooperation in this program,
for we can see in it the potentialities of sharply
reduced costs of doing business and, perhaps
more important, a more efficient and effective
means of accomplishing our responsibilities.
Let me close by saying that we in the Federal
Reserve are reviewing our services to the banks
and general public and are already considering
a number of new programs which we hope will
meet with your approval and participation.
Among these is a possible new informational
program for officers of member banks. We hope
to be more active in our public relations responsibilities, to be more helpful in explaining neW
regulations and changes in procedures, and to
improve personal communications with bankers
about their problems, outlook and expectations,
and reactions and impressions regarding the impact of stabilization policy. Our interest is, of
course, directed toward being as helpful as possible in stimulating a more efficient, progressive,
and dynamic banking system.
We are interested in you as banks and as the
individuals making up a part of the banking industry in this District. We value your opinionS
and suggestions and hope that you will let US
know the ways in which we can help you, new
services which you believe are appropriate to a
central bank, and, of course, the ways in which
we can improve our present services.

dist,·ict highlights
During February, the seasonally adjusted
Texas industrial production index, rising to a
level of 168.4 percent of its 1957-59 base,
posted a strong gain of nearly 3 percent. Moderate to strong gains predominated among the
various industrial categories. Compared with
the preceding month, only one industry- stone,
clay, and glass products - showed a noticeable
decline, probably due to labor-management difficulties in the glass products industry. In durable goods manufacturing, four of the nine
industries displayed moderate advances; there
was a sharp rise of 9 percent in the category
"other" dUl'ables, mainly ordnance. In the nondurable goods sector, every industry shared in
the expansion. Apparel and allied products,
Which had been relatively weak, registered a
strong output gain of nearly 7 percent. In the
mining sector, adjusted crude petroleum output
was nearly 5 percent over the prior month.

cent over the same month in 1967. The mon'thto-month increase in total employment was
m.ore buoyant than usual for tIus time of the
year. A stronger-than-seasonal pattern extended
throughout all employment sectors except transportation and public utilities. Employment in
construction was more vigorous than usual ,
while the trade, finance, and service sectors
each performed moderately better than would
be accounted for by seasonal changes only.
As compared with a year ago, the percentage gain in manufacturing, construction, service, and government employment each exceeded the rise in total employment. In the case
of the last two sectors, the amount of the lead
was especially significant. Mining employment
continued substantially below a year earlier.

. The industrial production index for the State
In February was about 10 percent over the same
lllonth in 1967. In manufacturing, 13 out of
t~e 18 industries posted increases, ranging from
Slightly more than 1 percent to 28 percent in the
case of transportation equipment. The output of
stone, clay, and glass products was 10 percent
Under a year ago, while output in the primary
lUetal products and apparel industries each was
o~ .slightly under 2 percent. Activity in the
lng industry was up nearly 14 percent,
.oOsted by a 17-percent increase in the produchon of crude petroleum. Utilities recorded an 8~erc~nt gain, buoyed by a strong year-to-year
rise In eIectnclty
"
.
generation.

The output of crude oil in the Eleventh District in February was second only to the record
established during August of last year at the
time of the Middle East oil crisis. Daily average
production of crude oil in February, at 3.8 million barrels, was 2 percent lugber than in the
previous month and 10 percent above a year
earlier. Nationally, the output of crude oil surpassed the level established last August to attain
a new record of about 9.5 million barrels per
day. Reasons for the surge in crude oil output
are (1) a continuing lag in imports as an aftereffect of tbe Middle East crisis, (2) a colder
winter than usual in the United States and
Europe, and (3) anticipatory purchases of distillate oils used in space beating.

. Nonagricultural wage and salary employment
In the five southwestern states in February, at
\lev el of 5,790,000 persons, was fractionally
a ead of the preceding month and was 4 per-

Because of the strong demand for oil, regulatory authorities in the producing southwestern
states raised oil allowables sharply in January
and increased tbem further in February; however, allow abIes have been decreased for April.

business review/april 1968

The Texas allowable will be 46.7 percent of the
Maximum Efficient Rate of production, down
from the level of 49.6 percent for both February
and March. The allowable for southeastern New
Mexico in April will be drastically reduced, although Louisiana's schedule will not be curtailed as sharply. The lower allow abies stem
from an expected easing in heating oil demand
and a possible increase in oil imports.

•OOS
major spring crops this year. If such intenti
. out, this
. acreage would b e only fra care carrled
tionally larger than the plantings of these croPs
in 1967. Sharply increased acreages of cotto~,
.
b t gralO
rice , barley , and flax are ill prospect, u ear's
sorghum plantings may be below last Y
large total.

d the
Reflecting normal seasonal factors an Ch
greater competition for time deposit funds, ea I
.
pt tota
of the major balance sheet ltems exce
\CTotal registratioas of new passenger automotime and savings deposits advanced at the wee Ul
biles in February in the major metropolitan
eo
ly reporting commercial banks in the Elev _
areas of Dallas, Fort Worth, Houston, and San
ow
District in the 4 weeks ended March 20.:a _
Antonio were 5 percent above those for J an111
ever the advances were less than in the c0 1
uary. A significant increase of 32 percent oc,
d' t d tota
parable period last year for loans a JUs. e 'while
curred in Fort Worth, while Dallas and Houston
investments and total demand depOSits,
reported small gains. Registrations in San An,
.
d OSI'tS
the decline in total time and Savl~gs ep 967
tonio declined 14 percent. Cumulative data for
contrasted with a slight increase m the 1
the first 2 months of 1968 show that registrations in the four markets combined were 26 perperiod.
d' sted
cent more than in the same period last year.
The $21 million advance in loans a JU '11
.
'rease I
Department store sales in the Eleventh Disprimarily reflected a $24 million mc
I aO
commercial and industrial loans. Other 0 fftrict for the 4 weeks ended March 16 were 5
changes were relatively small ~d mos~y v~st
percent ahead of the corresponding period last
setting. The nominal advance ill total In t1year. Thus far in 1968, sales have exceeded
ments was the result of a $16.5 million accUb~cl1
those during the comparable period in 1967 by
,. s W J
9 percent. Sales had shown sharp gains during
lation of non-U.S. Government secuntJe '.
of
offset a decline of $16.3 million in holdJOgs
the first 8 weeks of 1968. In early March, however, sales reflected more moderate increases
U.S. Government issues.
the
over a year ago, when sales were strongly inOn the liability side of the balance she~t, refluenced by the earlier date of Easter.
$41 million rise in to~a~ de~and deposl~ deflected gains of $94 rmlllOn ill the dem all poThe official arrival of spring found Eleventh
posits of individuals, partnerships, and cOfaod
District farmers well behind their usual schedule
rations and $29 million in interbank de~lllOI1
in the preparation of soils and planting of this
deposits, which more than offset a $73, rill 'file
year's spring crops. Late-March snows in many
fall in U.S. Government demand ~eposlt~ savof the northwestern sections and widespread
reduction of $15 million in total ume an f all
rains in eastern areas, with accompanying lower
ings deposits was primarily the result 0 sits
temperatures, delayed wide-scale farming ac$18 million decrease in "other" time dep~os,
tivities further.
of individuals, partnerships, and c,orpor~~arge
most of which occurred in the holdlUgs °d osit
According to the U.S. Department of AgriCD's. Negotiable time certificates of e~O!e
culture, farmers in the five southwestern states
issued in denominations of $100,000 or'lllo!l'
indicated at the beginning of March that they
fell $35 million to a level of $1,289 Jlll
intended to plant about 26.4 million acres to

51ATI511CAt 5U PPI!EMEN1
to the

BUSINESS REVIEW

April 1968

FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF DALLAS

RESERVE POSITIONS OF MEMBER BANKS

CONDITION STATISTICS OF WEEKLY REPORTING
COMMERCIAL BANKS

Eleventh Federa l Reserve District

Eleventh Federal Reserve District

It em

Mar. 27,
196B

Feb. 2B,
196B

__________~
IIe:m~____________M_a_r_._6~,_19_6_8_____Fe_b_._7_,_1_96_8__---~

Mar. 29,
1967

RESERVE CITY BANKS
Tota l reserves held .. .... ..... .
With Fed eral Re.erve Bank .. . .
Currency and coin .... ..... . .
Required reserves .... . ... .... .
Excess reserves . . . ........ . .. .
Borrowings ........ ..... . ... . .
Free reserves........ . ....... .
COUNTRY BANKS
Total reserves held . . .. . ...... .
With Federal Reser ve Bank ... .
Currency and coin . .. ... ... . .
Required reserves ..... ....... .
Excess reserves ....... .. . .. .. .
Borrowings . ............. .... .
Free reserves ... ......... . ... .
ALL MEMBER BANKS
Totol reserves held ........... .
With Federal Reserve Bonk ... .
Currency and coin ........ . . .
Required reserves ... . ...... . . .
Excess reserves ....... . ... ... .
Borrowing s .................. .
Free reserves . . . . ..... ... .... .

ASSETS
5,390,513
107,266
5,497,779

5,443,674
107,730
5,551,404

5,212,355
97,103
5,309,45B

2,700,011

2,652,22B

2,493,903

98,436

9B,422

91,097

16,774
25,890

B,406
27,OB6

56,502
32,173

431
337,203

454
337,350

1,09 1
302,265

and othe r business credit companies . ..... .
, Olher • . • •••...••••••...••..•. , ....... .
Rea l estate loans ......................... .
loans to domestic commercial banks ... . . . .... .
loons to forolgn banks .................... .
Consumer instalment loans .. . ............... .
loans to foroign governments, offlclal
institutions, central banks, int ernational

167,593
267,287
536,BOI
175,052
5,372
553,35B

162,304
265,073
512,036
302,978
5,702
551,099

171,389
266,405
463,B48
362,842
3,610
515,029

~Otl~;~ltl~~~~s••:::::::::::: : :::: :::: ::: ::: ::

0
613,571

0
62B,266

0
549,304

Tottal invostments . .......................... .

2,4B4,919

2,515,BB3

2,283,620

:rotal U.S. Government securities . . ... . .... ' " .
Treasury bills . . ... .... . . .. ...... . . .. . .. .
Treasury cortlflcatos of Indebtedness .. .. . .. .
Troasury notes and U.S. Government
bonds ma turlngl
Within 1 year . ...................... .
1 year to S years .. . .. .. ..... . . .. .. . . .
After 5 years ... . .................... .

1,194,441
100,664
0

1,232,540
123,256
0

1,123,923
72,904
15,115

213,494
616,3Bl
263,902

223,879
635,2B3
250,122

150,548
622,403
262,953

7,012
1,094,741

3,544
1,072,725

6,667
967,756

Net loons and discounts .... .. ... . . . . ....... . . .
Valuation reservos .......................... .

Gross loans and discounts ...... . .. . . . ..... ... .
industrial loans • .•....•.••.. ,
Agricultural loans, excluding eec

Commercial and

certlflcates of intere st ......... . ..•...•...

loans to brokers and deal ers for
purchasing or carrying:

U.S. Government securities ............... .
Other securities ...... . ... ....... ... ... . .
Other loans for purcha sing or carrying:

U.S. Government securities ......... . . .. . . .
Other securities . . . . .. .... ...... .. .. .... .
loans to nonbank Anential institutions:
Salos Anance, personal finance, factors,

Obligalions of slales and political subdivisions:
Tax warrants and short-term notes and bills . .
All olhor ..... . ..... . ............... . .. .
Other bonds, corporate stocks, and securitiesl
Participation certlflcat es in Foderal
agency loans ........ . ......... . ..... .
All olher (Including corpora Ie slacks) ••••• •. •

69B,261
651,662
46,599
692,990
5,271
3,003
2,268

704,367
653,520
50,847
700,998
3,369
3,138
231

700,371
537,146
163,225
665,965
34,406
1,181
33,225

706,351
536,640
169,71 1
666,676
39,675
4, 165
35,5 10

1,39B,632
1, 188,808
209,824
1,358,955
39,677
4, 184
35,493

1,410,7 18
1,190,160
220,558
1,367,674
43,044
7,303
35,7 41

616,O~t
571'~85

44, ~

626,5~9

_ 10,5
1,6 96

_12,205

661,O~~

507,6
153,4 73
52
626,g2 1
35, 87
2,9
32,03 4

1,277,~~~

1,078'358
198, 6
1 252,6'
, 24,5 12
46 83

---------------------------------------------~

112,034
76,691

126,02B
Bl,046

118,649
66,625

8B4,739
776,791
Bl,336
446,677
4,354
360,210

B97,159
696,234
78,566
420,260
3,746
364,480

732,23B
634,752
76,355
443,199
4,845
329,9B4

TOT AL ASSETS. • • .. .. . . . .. . .. .. . • . .. ... 10,429,539

10,420,002

9,717,348

C~sh items in process of co llection .. . .....• . ....
Resorves with Federa l Resorve Bank . . . o • • • • • • • • •
Currency and coin .. . . . ..................... .
Balances with banks in Ihe Unlled Siale •••.••••••
Ba lances with banks in fareign countries ...•... . .
Other assets . .................... . ....... .. .

(Averag es of dally figure.s. In Ihousands of dollars)

========================~~==~~~~~
4 weeks e nded
5 week. ended
4 wee~s i967

(In Ihousands of dollars)

CONDITION OF THE FE DERAL RESE RVE BANK OF DALLAS

~
29
Md r• ,

(In Iho usands of do liars)

===================~~=
Mar. 27,
Feb. 28~
Ite m

1968

Tolal gold ce rlifical e re.erves .. .. . . • • • • • . . • •
D'
lib b k
O:~~~~~.c~~n~::nde~d~~n~~;: : : : :: ::::::::
U.S. Gov e rnm e nl .ecurities. . ... .. ..........
TOlal earning a ssets .... ..... ...... .. .... ••

365,7 47
34,499
855
2,1 13,5B2
2,148,936

1 96~
1968 ________ .• ,

-------------------=-=-:-:
38 1 ,50~
~~~~~r :e~~~v~e~~t:~ ~e~~t~~i ~i·;c~i~ti~n·.·.·. : : t~~~:r~g

7,3 1
0

2,021,4~~

2,028,7 65

l:~~5:~60

A57,~~~

2'580
71

1 ,77~~'156

I, '68S
i,0n'813

1,2 '

CONDITI ON STATI STI CS OF ALL MEMBER BANKS
Eleventh Federa l Reserve District

LIABI LITIES
Tola l deposits •••• .• •••.. • •. . •• . •••••.. •• .. .
Tolal demand deposits . . ...................
Individuals, partnerships, and corporations .. . .
States and political subdivisions .......... . .
U.S. Government ...................... . .
Banks in Ihe United Siales ............. .. ..
Foroignl
Governments, offlcial institutions, central
bonks, internationa l Institutions ....... . .
Commercial bonks . ................... .
Certlfiod and officers' checks, elc .. .. .......
Tolal time and savings deposlls •• . •. ••• •••••.
Individuals, partnerships, and corporations:
Savings deposits .. . . ............. . .. ..
Other time deposits . •. ... ......... . ... .
States and political subdivisions .... .. ......
U.S. Governmenl (Including posla l saving.) • •.
Banks in Ihe United Siale....... . ... . ..... .
Forelgnl
Governments, offlcial institutions, central
banks, Interna tional institutions . .. ......
Commercial banks . .... . .............. .
Bills payable, rediscounts, and olher
lIabililies for borrowed mon ey •. . ..... . ...•..
Olher liabilities .............................
CAPITAL ACCOUNTS ........................

(In millions of do llars)

8,893,608

8,B97,852

B,413,916

5,312,533
3,696,B66
304,544
120,188
1.Q94,387

5,334,325
3,622,357
306,133
210,131
I ,OB9,613

5,019,631
3,375,89B
312,B85
131,836
1,100,492

4.Q92
24,303
6B,153
3,5Bl,075

3,564
22,221
BO,306
3,563,527

3,256
21,537
73,727
3,394,2B5

1,092,905
1,796,344
660,602
B,688
19,036

1,086,010
1,7B5,674
658,417
11,70 1
18,725

1,115,808
1,593 ,689
652,474
10,8OB
19,976

3,300
200

2,800
200

BOO
730

406,333
22B,011

397,317
225,B98

27 1,314
173,859

901,587

B9B,935

85B,259

TOT AL LIAB ILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCO UNTS 10,429,539

10,420,002

9,717,34B

fe b . 2?2"
============:=:==~~~
F b 28
Jan. 3 1~
196~
Ile m

~968'

1968

-A-SS- E-TS- - - - - - - . : . - - - - -- -- - - - - - 9 523
Loans and di scounls . . . . • . • . . . • . • • . • . . . • . ,
U.S. Governmenl obllgalions........ .... ..
2,606
Olhersecuritles.. ......................
2,680

~';,'.':,'~~.v~~\~.~e.d.~r~~.R.e.s~:~~~.a.n.k::::........

1, ~~~

Balances wilh banks in the Uniled Siale. . • • •
Balances with bonks in for eign countriesc ....
Ca.h ilems in process 01 colleclion. • • . . . • • •
Olhe r ass el'e.... .. . . . . .. .. .. . . .. .. . . . .

1,090
6
1,008
456

TOTAL ASSETse ....... ....... .. , . . ..

18,7 41

LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL ACCOUNTS
Demand de posits of banks .... . ......... .
Other demand de posits ............. . . .. .
Time deposits .... ... ..... ........ . . .. . .

1,368
8,206
6,904

Total de posi ts . . . . .... . .. ... . . .. .... .
Borrowings ........................... .
Other liabiliti osc ................ ...... .
Total capital accountse ...... .. . . . . .... . .

16,478
412
309
1,542

9,428
2,552
2,698
1 149
'238

1 ,14~

8,6390~
2
2'293
'110
1'211

1 ,12~

923
997
503
460"--::-:

~
1,389
8,312
6,742

16,443
422
280
1,532

!Wb
~~
-----------------------------e - Estimated.
TOTAL LIABILITIES AN D CAPITAL
ACCOUN TSe .. .. .. •• .. • • •• . .• .•••.

BANK DEB ITS , END-OF-MONTH DEPOS ITS, AND DEPOS IT TURNOVER

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(~D~O~lIo~r~o~m~o~u~n=ts~in=t=h=o=US=o=n=d=s,=s=e=os=o=n=o=IIY~O=di=u=st=e=d'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~==
DE81TS TO DEMAND DEPOSIT ACCOUNTS'
DEMAND DEPOSITS'
Percent chang e

1968

Standard metropolitan

statistica l area
~RIZON
lOUI A, Tueson ...
SI"NA, Monroe" : : . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • • .
NEW
Shreveport . .. •. . . . .••.. ... .... .. ...• ...
lEX" MEXICO, Roswell;' . •....•. . . •... .•.. ••. .... ...

(Annual ~ rate

Januar y

February

basis,

1968

1967

4,495,008
2, 144,868
6,436,032
666,072
1,8 12,828
5,080,236
5,490,204
5,576,004
1,503,000
4,538,304
353,880
74,226,804
5,067,924
17,453,616
2,462,496
75,426,852
668,316
3,440,796
1,334,676
1,665,876
1,232,544
1,004,892
14,975,304
836,208
1,378,824
1,703, 136
2,32 1,868
2,020,836

~~~~~LL::~; l; ;; ;;~ ~ ;;;~ ~ ~ ;;;~; ~ ;;;;; ;; ;

Cro'Wnsvill e' H~rli~t ~~:~rong e: ••..•..... . .. ....
orpus Christ'

an Benito . . ••...•....•.•.

r~~~~1I::: :':';;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;

~Olveston_i~~~~ C'.;· · ··· · ··· ·· ········· · ·.· ..

~1~fr,"·L!i

l"orko no (T on . . . .... .......... ........ .. . .

l.t.1-2:~ii~: ~~il; .~~~~t~k:o:n:s7:·:· ~ ~ ~ ~ ~: ~::::: ~ ~ ~:
::

centers

10
:I:

c~eO'its of

...................... .. ...........

individu I

"'y basjs,

GROSS DEMAN D

Annual rate
of turnover

February 1968 from

February

-6

2
7
6

9
7

-6

-8

8
25

-4

16
16
I
11

- 18

-8

20
9
20
14
6

16
13
15
13
4

- 11

8
2
5

-2
6

-3

-1

13
5

6
8
3

28
4

-8

9
9
7

-2

7
9

-3

-2

-I

february
1967

February 29,

February

Januar y

1968

26.9
26.8
28.9
20.2
19.1
37.5
24.0
25.0
20.1
23.5
12.5
40.7
25.5
31.9
24.9
35.9
20.2
24.4
15.9
13.6
18 .9
16.5
27.4
15.4
22.2
20.2
20.3
18.0

26.0
26.2
26.6
20.2
17.4
34.4
25.9
24.4
20.7
22.5
15.3
43.3
27.6
29.0
23.4

16.0
24.8
17.0
22.0
19.9
19.9
18.7

26.7
27.8
27.4
19.0
20.5
34.5
23.6
25.1
2 1.2
21.8
12 .3
39.7
24 .1
28.9
23 .4
32.6
17.8
23.5
17.4
12.6
17.7
16.9
23.3
15.8
22.2
19.2
19.3
18.3

31.7

31.2

29.8

$ 167,5 14
75,439
219,042
32,19 1
93,153
132,698
226,973
22 1,090
74,267
194,688
28,482
1,836,278
202,4 12
544,7 13
97,607
2,087,977
33,707
145,158
84,214
122,577
66,154
61,453
553,406
53,728
64,232
85,18 1
112,028
114,218

II
25
I
14
12
12
14

-3
3

$245,3 17,404

2 months,
1968 from
1967

$7,730,580

33.7
20.5
22.9
15.2
13.5

19.7

partn ers hips, and corporations and of st ates a nd political subdivisions .

AND TIME DEPOSITS OF MEMBER BANKS

Elevenlh Federa l Reserve Dislrict
(Ave rag es of doily figures. In millions of dollars,
TIME DEPOS ITS

Rese rve

Reserve

Country

city bonks

banks

Date
1966. F
19 67' ebruary ...
: FebrUor

Sept ern y...

OC'obe~er. .

No vernb '"
196 oe'ernb:;"
80Januar
..
Februo~' ..

BUILDING PERM ITS

~ROSS DEMAND DEPOS ITS
Total

ci ty bonks

Country

bonks

Tota l

VALU ATION (Dollar amounts in thousands,
Percent cha nge

Feb. 1968

8,827
8,902
9,426
9,5 11
9,582
9,84 1
9,923

4,027
4,020
4,408
4,448
4,4 17
4,589
4,560
4,391

~6 1

4,800
4,882
5,0 18
5,063
5,165
5,252
5,363
5,170

5,612
6,091
6,398
6,457
6,509
6,571
6,698
6,863

2,675
2,721
2,743
2,753
2,744
2,762
2,815
2,851

2,937
3,370
3,655
3,704
3,765
3,809
3,883
4,012

382

876

70
3 19

123
579

811
1,928

Wichita Falls ••

29
120
380
141
110
430
1,548
422
54 1
69
2,686
24
107
57
48
62
63
1, 137
43
237
55

53
226
704
252
246
786
2,768
847
902
126
4,422
57
223
105
100
109
122
2,040
74
422
115

166
2,131
12,894
1,416
601
2,162
18,349
5,855
8,873
693
4 1,037
198
1,197
849
349
294
877
14,478
696
1,184
631

Totol-24 cities ••

9,080

16,277

$ 119,694

Area

ARIZO NA
Tuc son . •• • • .••

Amarillo ..•. . .

Austin . . . . . . ..
Beaumont ••. . .

Brownsville •...

State and era

ARIZONA
grange.

Indicated

_ p_ _ _ _ _19
:..:..::6:..
7 _ _ _ _~1:..:9.:.6:6_ _ _.....:1:.9:61~-:65::..-._

IE~:~pefr~ii::::::::::: : ::: :
Granoes

Average

~r~ii::::::::::: : ::::

3,700
3,000

k~~g

3,9 10
1,680

2,008
2,720

2,800
952
5,600
1,814
SOUR~
.S . Doport .:::::-::-: - - : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - rnent of Agr iculture.

1968

2,025

2 months,
1968 from
1967

2 mos.

Jan .

1968

Feb.
1967

3,719

2,614
3,628

-55
13

-73
54

-43
63

646 -65
12
4,030
73
20,356
2
2,799
127
866
9,227 -69
17
34,094
15,73 9 -41
150
12,427
57
1,135
12
77,544
92
301
3,646 -51
24
1,532
900 -37
43
500
94
1,329
32,009 - 17
96
1,051
3,318 -45
15
1,179

-93
106
5
-24
317
-25
30
72
2
40
45
-48
-16
- 15
-35
-6
82
-2
138
128
-1

-84
64
17
14
118
75
19
56
-11
4
71
-69
38
-5
-13
-47
32
53
129
216
12

LOUISIANA

TEXAS
Abilene •• • • •••

~~~~===(I~n~t=h=o=us=o~n=ds~o=f=b=o=xe=s=)~~~~~~~~~~==

Feb.
1968

2 mos.

Monroe-West
Monroe • • o • •
Shreve port •...

CITR US FR UIT PRODUCTI ON

from

NUM8ER
Fe b.
1968

Corpus Christi ..
Dallas ... ... ..
EI Paso • •• • •• •
Fort Worth . •..
Galveston .. .. .
Houston ••• ••.

lare do .. ... . .
Lubbock ••.•••
Midland • • •• ..

Odessa . ..... .
Port Arthur •••.
Son Ange lo •• •
Son Antonio •••
Tex arkana ... .
Waco . ... ... .

$234,589

VALUE OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS

DAILY AVERAGE PRODU CTION OF CRUDE O )L

(In millions of dolla rs )

(In thousands of barrels)
Januar y-Fe bruary

Area and type

FIVE SOUTHWESTERN
STATES' . . . . . .. . .. ... . ..
Res id enti al building .. . ... .
Nonresid ential building ... .
No nbuil dlng co nstruction . ..

UNIT ED STATES ...... ......
Resid ential buil ding . ..... .
Nonr esid ential building .. ..
Nonbullding construction ...

Februa ry

January

Decemb e r

1968

1967

390
190
92
108
3,704
1,495
1,251
958

1968

398
154
156
88
4,108r
1,516r
1,550
1,042

453
199
177
77
3,714
1,462
1,347
905

841
388
268
185
7,395
2,949
2,593
1,853

773
273
272
228
6,2 83
2,148
2,603
1,53 2

] Arizona , loui siana, New Mex ico , Oklahoma, and Texas.
r -

Percent

1967r

Rev ised .

NOTE. - De tail s ma y not odd to total s because of rounding .
SOURC E, F. W . Dodge, McGra w-Hili, Inc.

Fe bruary

January

February

January

Ar ea

1968p

1967

1968

ElEVENTH DISTRICT. . . . ....
Texa s ... .. ..... . .......
Gulf Coast • . .• •...... •
W est Texa s ...........
Ea st Texas (prope r) .... .
Panhandl e • ... ••..•.• .
Rest of State ...... .. •.
Southe a ste rn New Mex ico . .
Northe rn loui siana .. . . . . ..
OUTSIDE ELEVENTH DISTRICT
UN ITED STATES .. . ... ... . ..

3,8 13.1
3,321.1
668 .9
1,550.3
154.1
95.0
852.8
320.0
172 .0
5,638.0
9,451.1

3,743 .3
3,252 .2
648.9
1,528 .3
150.2
95.8
829.0
321.7
169.5
5,488.1
9,236.3

3,454 .9
2,976.8
553 .9
1,390.0
139.2
95.3
798 .4
323 .1
155.0
5,169.1
8,624.5

1.9
2. 1
3.1
1.4
2.6
- .8
2.9
- .5
1.5
2.7
2.3

change~
FebruorY

1967

----

10.4
11.6

20.8
11.5
10.7
_.3
6.8
_1.0
11.0
9. 1
9.6

-----

Preliminary,

SOURCES, American Petrole um In stitute .
U.S. Burea u of Mines .
Federal Re serve Bank of Dallas.

NONAGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT
IND UST RI AL PRODU CTIO N

Five Southwestern Stotes '

(Seasonally adju sted indoxes, 1957-59
Perc ent chang e
Number of p ersons

Type of e mployment

Fe b. 1968 from

Februa ry

Januar y

February

1968p

1968

Jon.

1967r

1968

5,790,000
1,068,000
4,722,000
220,100
370,900

5,770,200
1,066,800
4,703,400
220,500
364,000

5,556,400
1,021 ,900
4,534,500
229,200
354,400

0.3
.1
.4
- .2
1.9

4 .2
4.5
4.1
-4 .0
4.7

433,200
1,307,800
280,700
883,900
1,225,400

429,600
1,314,200
279,800
879,900
1,215,400

423,200
1,262,000
270,900
828,500
1,166,300

.8
- .5
.3
.5
.8

2.4
3.6
3.6
6.7
5.1

Fe b.
1967

= 100)

=====================================~
Fobru arY
~
--------~------------------------------153.0r
173.6r

Total nonagricultural

wag e and sa lary workers ••

Manufacturing . ........ . .
Nonmanufacturing .. ••. . ••
Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Construction . ..• .• • ••• •
Transportation and
public utiliti es• . . .. ..•

Trad e • ..• .. . . .• . .•• .•
Finance • • • • ...• • ..... •

Ser vice . . . ... . .... .. ..
Governm ent ... .. .... ..
1

Ari zono , loui siano, New Mex ico, O klahoma, and Te xas.

Pre liminary.
Revi sed .
SOURCE, Stat e e mplo yment ag e ncies.

p r -

192. 2r

161. lr
11 4.9r
196. 8r

157.0r
I 59. 0r
163.0
153. 0r
122.0r
181 .0r

-------------------------------------~
p Pre liminary.
r-

Fedoral Rese rve Bank of Da ll as.

ELEVENTH FE DERAL RESE RVE DISTR ICT
~ Dalla . Head Office Territor),

IIIIID HOU l ton

Branch Territory

·li:;:\:!:·:1 Son An lonlo Branch Terrllor),
E§J EI Palo Branch Ter ritory

Revi sed .

SOURCES, Boord of Governors of the Fede ral Reserve System .

Full text of Review (Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas) : April 1968

FRASER