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U N IT E D ST A T E S D E P A R T M E N T OF L A B O R
Frances Perkins, Secretary
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
Isador Lubin, Com m issioner (on leave)
A . F. Hinrichs, A ctin g Com m issioner
+
Report on the W o rk
of the
National Defense Mediation Board
M arch 19, 1941-January 12, 1942
Bulletin 7\[o. 714
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1942
For sale by the Superintendent o f Documents, U . S. Governm ent Printing Office
Washington, D . C. - Price 35 cents
OFFICERS OF THE BOARD
Chairman
Clarence A. Dykstra, March 19, 1941-July 1, 1941
William H. Davis, July 2, 1941-January 12, 1942
Vice Chairman
William H. Davis, March 25, 1941-July 1, 1941
Frank P. Graham, August 7, 1941-January 12, 1942
Executive Secretary
E. P. Marsh, March 25, 1941-April 15, 1941
Ralph T. Seward, April 16, 1941-January 12, 1942
George G. Kirstein (acting), October 15, 1941-January 12, 1942
Director of Information
Osgood Nichols, March 27, 1941-January 12, 1942
II
CONTENTS
Introduction________________________________________________________
Pasre
1
Part I
General view of the Board's activities
Jurisdiction of the Board______________
Composition of the Board_____________
The count of cases__________________________________________________
The practice of voluntary settlement.___-------------------------------------------The critical situation of cases at certification_________________________
Methods of maintaining production pending final settlement____________
Duration of interruptions of production____________________________ __
Methods of final settlement__________________________________________
Compliance with recommendations of the Board_______________________
P
II
5
5
7
8
8
9
10
13
14
art
The process of mediation and recommendation
Powers, purposes, and procedures of the Board________________________
Principles and precedents as factors in decision-----------------------------------Union security_____________________________________________________
Wage rates________________________________________________________
Breach of collective contracts________________________________________
Questions involving the National Labor Relations Act_________________
P
III
19
23
24
29
33
34
art
Appendixes
A. General documents:
1. Executive orders—
No. 8716 of March 19, 1941.....................................................
No. 8731 of April 4, 1941______________________________
No. 9017 of January 12,1942___________________________
2. General resolutions of theBoard____________________________
B. Cases and interruptions of production before the Board:
Table 7. List of all cases, showing parties and stoppage situa
tion when case was taken by Board_______________
Table 8. Cases in which the Board upon taking case requested the
parties to continueor resume production----------------Table 9. Cases in which stoppages of production occurred after
certification_____________________________________
Table 10. Cases in which hearings were held, classified by stop
page situation and by method of final disposal_____
C. Personnel:
Membership of the National Defense MediationBoard______ _
Panel assistants, _________
Special agents, listed by cases in which they served------------------D. Maintenance of production pending settlement of controversy.______
E. Union security:
1. Coverage of this appendix and classifications____________ - ___
2. Recommendations________________________________________
3. Agreements_______
in
39
40
40
42
45
49
50
51
53
54
54
57
63
64
67
IV
CONTENTS
F. Wage rates:
1. Coverage of this appendix andclassifications_________________
2. Recommendations________________________________________
3. Agreements______________________________________________
G. Contract violation_______________________________________________
H. Relation with National LaborRelations Board______________________
P
IV
Case histories_______________________________________________________
P
V
Supplementary documents_____________________________________________
Index of cases---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
art
art
Page
73
74
80
83
87
91
265
277
FOREWORD
The National Defense Mediation Board was the ultimate authority
under the President of the United States, which dealt with labor
disputes that threatened to impede the defense effort in the period
immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. The Board was established
on March 19,1941, about 9 months after the beginning of the defense
program. It was superseded by the National War Labor Board on
January 12, 1942, about 1 month after the United States entered the
war. During the 10 months of its existence, the Board dealt with 114
disputes that had been certified to it by the Secretary of Labor, a
total of 118 cases.
The importance of this report on the work of the National Defense
Mediation Board is too obvious to require emphasis. It seems appro
priate that this report should be made available by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, the Bureau which published the analysis of the
activities of the first War Labor Board (1917-19), in its oulletin No.
287. However, a distinction should be made between the nature of
this bulletin and the earlier one. This bulletin consists, essentially,
of the report by the staff of an independent agency, rather than a
report by the Bureau’s own staff. It is not a record of the completed
history of the settlement of war-time disputes, a project which must
be deferred until the close of the war. Meanwhile, it is important to
preserve, for present-day administrators and future students, the
record of the methods used and the results attained in the handling
of the most difficult labor disputes which developed in the period of
active preparation for national defense. The fact that the original
Board has been superseded by another agency makes appropriate the
separate publication of the report. No other comprehensive report
was made by the National Defense Mediation Board.
To the manuscript as submitted for printing, the Bureau of Labor
Statistics has added part V, which contains certain documents that
may contribute to a more complete understanding of the disposition
of cases referred to the Board. The need for including those docu
ments arises because of the fact that action was taken by other agen
cies in four of the Board’s cases: No. 36, North American A viation;
No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding; No. 51, A ir Associates; and No. 20B,
Captive Mines. Part Y, supplied by the Bureau, consists of the
executive orders and other decisions reached after the work of the
National Defense Mediation Board on these cases was completed.
A. F. H
,
Acting Commissioner, Bureau of.Labor Statistics.
in r ic h s
v
PREFACE
The following study of the work of the National Defense Mediation
Board was prepared upon the Board’s request and with its coopera
tion by Louis L.Jaffe, professor of law, University of Buffalo Law
School, and William Gorham Rice, Jr., professor of law, University
of Wisconsin Law School.
The Board was created by Executive order on March 19, 1941, and
was dissolved by the Executive order of January 12, 1942, which
created the National War Labor Board. The study treats of the entire
work of the Board and, in addition to the body of the report and
appendices, there is a brief report of each of the cases handled, to
gether with the full text of all recommendations.
The study treats of the powers, organization, and practice of the
Board, and analyzes its efforts in shortening and preventing strikes;
the methods used in settling cases; and the substance of the settle
ments on some outstanding issues.
The Board was in certain respects a unique experiment. The use
of a tripartite body—public, employer, employee—in mediation was
novel, and many entertained doubts whether it could and would suc
ceed. The combination of mediatory and recommendatory power of
a vaguely compulsory nature in a body without specific statutory
authority raised practical problems of great moment to the public.
These problems are also of special interest to practitioners and
students of law and government. On the mediatory process, there is
very little literature. It is hoped that this study will be of value to
all who are concerned with the process of collective bargaining and
the relation of the Government thereto.
I take this opportunity to express to Messrs. Jaffe and Rice the
appreciation ana gratitude of the National Defense Mediation Board
for their unselfish and devoted work on this study.
W
H. D
,
Chairman, National Defense Mediation Board .
il l ia m
71
a v is
Bulletin T^o. 714 of the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics
R eport on the W o rk o f the National Defense
M ediation Board
Introduction
As the United States of America plunged deeper into the rearma
ment program in the winter of 1940-41, the upward swing of indus
trial activity brought with it rises in the cost of living and
emphasized maladjustments between labor and management
throughout the country. As is usual in such times, the number of
strikes increased from 147 in December 1940 to 316 in March 1941.
The number of man-days of idleness due to strikes rose rapidly from
458,314 in December 1940 to 1,543,803 in March 1941.
Defense production and transportation were being seriously crip
pled by these strikes, which became more and more difficult to handle
through the existing governmental machinery. This situation was
dramatized by rioting which occurred in connection with such stub
born strikes as that of 14,000 men in four plants of the International
Harvester Co., and 7,500 men at the Milwaukee plant of the AllisChalmers Manufacturing Co. The Lackawanna works of the Beth
lehem Steel Co. were closed for several days and similar consequences
threatened other plants of this company. The huge River Rouge
plant of the Ford Motor Co. was constantly in danger of being shut
down. By the middle of March it was apparent that additional
measures had to be taken to cope with the situation.
On March 19, 1941, the President created the National Defense
Mediation Board to adjust labor disputes in defense industries.
Three steps were set forth in the Executive order for the Board to
follow in settling these controversies: (1) Mediation in promoting
collective bargaining between the parties before the Board; (2) if
this fails, suggestion of voluntary arbitration; and (3) if both of
these fail, findings of fact and recommendations, which may bo
made puolic. Disputes were to reach the Board only through
certification by the Secretary of Labor after the United States
Conciliation Service had been unable to settle them.
The Board was originally composed of 11 members—4 manage
ment, 4 labor, and 3 public. Labor’s representation was equally
divided between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress
of Industrial Organizations. As the pressure of work increased,
alternates from all 3 groups were added, increasing the membership
to 41. The first chairman, Clarence A. Dykstra, was succeeded in July
by William H. Davis.
1
2
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Cases were heard by panels of the Board, representing the three
groups. These panels exercised all the powers of the Board in
settling disputes. Only three cases were brought before the full
Board.
At the time the Board was abolished, January 12, 1942, 118 cases
had come before it involving a total of 1,191,664 workers, and of
these 118 cases, 96 had been settled.
Only four times did Board cases reach the President for further
action.1 The first case was that of North American Aviation,, Inc.,
where the union called a strike during mediation in violation of an
agreement with the Board; the second and third, Federal Shipbuild
ing and D ry Dock Go., and A ir Associates, Inc., where the companies
refused Board recommendations; and the fourth, the Captive Mines
dispute, where the union rejected a Board recommendation, and
the C. I. O. members of the Board resigned. By Executive order
the President ordered the Army to take possession of the first and
the third plants, the Navy, the second. In the fourth case, the
President’s suggestion of arbitration was accepted. All plants had
Jieen returned to their owners by January 7, 1942. Other important
controversies tackled by the Board were those involving 7,500 em
ployees of the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., of Milwaukee,
160,000 employees of General Motors, 400,000 bituminous-coal miners,
and 225,000 trucking employees in 12 midwestern States.
Shortly after the United States declared war, a national confer
ence of labor and management, convened by the President, on De
cember 23 agreed to settle disputes for the duration without resort
to strikes or lock-outs and recommended the setting up of machinery
for peaceful settlement. On January 12, 1942, pursuant to this
agreement, the President set up the National War Labor Board, which
took over all unsettled controversies still on the Mediation Board’s
calendar.
1 The documents in these four cases concerning developments after the cases passed out
of the jurisdiction of the Board are given in pt. V.
Part I
General V iew o f the Board’s Activities
3
General V iew o f the Board’s Activities
Jurisdiction of the Board
The National Defense Mediation Board was established by Execu
tive order1on March 19,1941. The order gave the Board jurisdiction
over such controversies as the Secretary of Labor certified to the Board,
arising between any employer and any employees, which threatened to
burden or obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or
materials essential to national defense and which could not be ad
justed by the Commissioners of Conciliation of the Department of
Labor. The Board was thus restricted to such matters as the Secre
tary of Labor certified to it. It considered, however, that its jurisdic
tion embraced all parties necessary to the disposition of a certified
dispute. In a few matters, unions not named in the original certifica
tion, upon showing interest, were permitted to participate in the hear
ings and negotiations.
The Board treated as binding the determination of the Secretary
that the dispute threatened production. However, about the first of
June, the Secretary created an advisory committee on certification,
consisting of a representative of the Conciliation Service, a representa
tive of the Labor Disputes Division of the Office of Production Man
agement (later called the War Production Board), and the chairman
of the Mediation Board or his representative. Thereafter, the
Secretary was guided by the advice of this committee.
Before this the Board had rejected the certification of No. 24, BuschSulzer Bros. Diesel Engine Co., &case that involved a dispute between
two unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor that
threatened to hold up defense work. The reason for its refusal to
exercise jurisdiction was that the dispute was not one between em
ployer and employees. In this situation of intrafederation conflict
(but for other reasons) the National Labor Relations Board also had
refused to adjudicate representation controversies. Where the disput
ing unions were not members of one federation the Mediation Board
took jurisdiction, as in No. 61, Consolidated Edison Co. Usually these
disputes were over bargaining representation and they were handled
solely for the purpose of expediting a determination by the N. L. R. B.
as to which union should be the bargaining agent, and of maintaining,
or securing resumption of, production pending N. L. R. B. action.
Composition of the Board2
The Board was composed originally of 11 members designated by
the President, 3 representing tne public, 4 representing employees,*
1 Appendix A sets forth this order, the Board’s rules of procedure, etc. The National
Defense Mediation Board should not be confused with the statutory National Mediation
Board which is concerned with labor relations in rail and air transportation.
* Appendix C sets forth the complete personnel of the Board.
5
6
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
and 4 representing employers. Later many alternates were appointed;
some of these were designated as alternates to 1 of the 11 regular
members of the Board; others simply as public, employer, or employee
alternates. In a matter to be disposed of by the full Board where a
roll call was asked for, only the regular members or, in the absence
of a member, his alternate, or in the absence of his alternate, an alter
nate of the same class, could vote. By a rule of the Board the employee
alternates were subdivided into A. F. L. and C. I. O. groups. Alter
nates of one group could not vote as substitutes for members of the
other group unless all members and alternates of the latter group were
absent. Except in formal votes it was customary for alternates to take
full part in the discussions and proceedings of the Board in its execu
tive sessions. In these the Board concerned itself with matters of
policy and with the general conduct of its business.
In ordinary course a case was handled by a division or special panel
of the Board, one member (either regular or alternate) from each
class,34the labor man being of the group to which the union in the
case belonged (if any). Occasionally substitutions occurred when
hearings were prolonged or numerous. In cases where both the A. F. L.
and C. I. O. were concerned, there was one public member, two em
ployer members, one C. I. O. member, and one A. F. L. member. It is
believed that no employer member sat in a case involving himself or
a corporation of which he was an officer or director. On only two
panels were there labor members whose own union was a party: the
earlier case, No. 17, American Car and Foundry Co., involved merely a
reference to the N. L. R. B.; and in the later case, No. 92, Ingalls Ship
Budding Co., an international vice president of one of the party unions
sat with the consent of the employer. As regular members of the full
Board, two international officers of the United Mine Workers sat in
the last stage of No. 20B, Bituminous Coal Operators, Captive Mines.
Tb°v dissented from the decision and resigned from the Board.
In only two cases did the full Board bring to a conclusion a certi
fied matter. These were No. 20B, Bituminous Coal Operators, Cap
tive Mines, and No. 37 Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Division,
No. 20B, Captive Mines, had previously been heard by a panel, which
had rendered a two to one decision, and after refusal by the union
to accept the recommendations of the panel, the matter was referred
to the full Board pursuant to an agreement between the parties and
the President. In No. 37, Bethlehem Steel, because of the great im
portance and controversial nature of the issue, the panel referred the
case to the full Board.
A member of the panel could request the full Board to consider
the case in which he was sitting. This happened only in No. 37,
Bethlehem Steel Go., and No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding Corporation^
In the latter case the panel, by vote of two to one, was prepared to
recommend that the employer agree to a union maintenance clause.
The full Board discussed the issues but recommitted the case to the
panel for final disposition. It was hoped by some of the members
that the panel might find a way to bring the parties to agreement.
* A six-man panel heard No. 105, Central States Employers* Negotiating Committee . In
the early cases extra employer or worker members frequently participated, e. g., cases Nos.
10, 17, 31, and 34.
4 The panel-drawn recommendation in No. 31, E m ployers Negotiating Committee^ was
formally approved by the full Board when the union issued its blast of defiance.
7
GENERAL VIEW OF THE BOARD’S ACTIVITIES
The panel finally issued its recommendation, by vote of two to one.
Thus with the exception of No. 20B, Captive Mines, No. 37, Bethle
hem Steel, and to some degree, No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding, all of
the Board’s recommendations have been on the responsibility of a
panel. Cases No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding, No. 20B, Ca/ptive Mines,
No. 20C, Alabama Mines, and No. 65, Solvay Process Co., were the
only ones in which the panel recommendation was not unanimous.5
Initially the Board had difficulty in securing the constant and
faithful attendance of employer and employee members at hear
ings. In one early case as many as four different labor members
sat. It became a "question whether part-time members picked for
their great distinction and representative character could devote
the needed time and effort to mediation as well as to their own
important affairs. A great many alternates were added, enough, it
would appear, to eliminate the early difficulty. It was found also
that certain of the members could give more time than others and
were used more often. In this way the Board was able to carry on
its business with persons a part of whose usefulness was just the
fact that they had not severed their industrial or labor connection.
In several cases where no member was available, persons served on
panels who had not been appointed to the Board. Usually these
persons were about to be appointed as alternates.6
The Count of Cases
The Board received cases as follows:
T able
1.— Date of acquisition of cases by the 'National Defense Mediation Board,
by certification and by division
Date of acquisition
Mar. 19-Apr. 18____________________________________________
Apr. 19-May 18______ ______________________________________
May 19-June 18.............................................................................. -..........
June 19-July 18__________________________________ _____-____
July 19-Aug 18
_______ _______________ ___________
Aug. 19-Sept. 18.............................-.......................................................—
Total f«r first, fi months
_
Pept. 19-Ofit. 18
__
__
Oct. 19-Nov. 18...........................................................................................
Nov. 19-TTeA 7
__
Total to outbreak of war_ ____
_____________
TV», R, 104.1—.Tan. 12, 1942
_______________________
Total to supersession of the Board. __ ____
___
By certifi By divi
cation, case sion,^ case Total cases
numbers numbers
1-15
16-34
35-42
43-51
52-67
68-79
80-93
94-105
106-109
110-114
20A
20B, 20C
4A
15
19
9
9
16
14
82
14
134
1135
118
i Case No. 4, International Harvester, was subdivided by the Board into No. 4 (plants where the C. I. O.
was bargaining representative) and No. 4A (plants where the A. F. L. prevailed). Case No. 20, Bituminous
Coal, was subdivided into No. 20, Appalachian Mines (C. I. O.), No. 20A, Wisconsin Steel Coal Mines , an
Appalachian mine where the Progressive Mine Workers, A. F. L., had bargaining rights, No. 20B, Captive
Mines, certain Appalachian mines owned by steel companies, chemical companies, and the Carter Coal
Co., and No. 20C, Alabama Mines. Cases Nos. 4A, 20A, 20B, and 20C are counted as if certified on the date
the Board separated them from their parent.
On November 11 or soon after, the members and alternate members
of the Board who belonged to the unions comprising the Congress of
5 One member “reserved” a minor difference of opinion in an interim recommendation in
No. 4. International H arvester Co.
0 Labor men who were never named to the Board served on panels in cases Nos. 9, 17,
25, 32, 80. and 81.
8
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Industrial Organizations, in protest against the full Board’s decision
in the Captive Mines case, presented their resignations to the President.
After that date the Secretary of Labor certified no C. I. O. cases to the
Board. Regarding pending cases the Board took the position that
it could be discharged of responsibility only by a settlement of the con
troversy, and it tried to effect such settlements wherever that seemed
possible without action by the panels in the absence of C. I. O. rep
resentation.
The Practice of Voluntary Settlement
The principal purpose of the creation of the Board is expressed in
the last words of the Executive order of March 19: “to avoid strikes,
stoppages, and lock-outs.” This objective was pursued directly by
action directed to relieving the strike rash and indirectly by the pre
ventive medicine of furthering sound collective bargaining and arbi
tration of differences. The Board followed both these techniques,
mindful always that an agreement willingly reached is more enduring
than one arrived at under undue pressure of any sort; occasionally it
was thought that ultimate agreement was more likely to be reached
without first achieving a resumption of production.
In three cases the President concluded that situations had arisen
where production would be promoted by military occupation of a
plant. In each of these cases the Board had used in vain the resources
at its command of listening to the parties’ complaints, of fostering
direct dealing between them, and of mediation; and in two of the
cases it had made formal recommendations. This possibility of com
pulsion necessarily formed a background to all the Board’s work, but
every effort was made by the Board to promote arrangements between
the contending parties that satisfied them, in the belief that only such
arrangements fully released the productive powers of labor and man
agement in the Nation’s defense effort.
The Critical Situation of Cases at Certification
Since cases were to be certified to the Board only when they “cannot
be adjusted by the Commissioners of Conciliation of the Department of
Labor,” 7 it was the most stubborn disputes alone that reached the
Board; every case represented an actual or potential strike. Indeed,
in nearly every case certified during the first 3 months, a strike was in
progress or had been voted before certification was made.
Of the 118 cases, 64, or 54 percent, were strike cases.8 After the
Board took jurisdiction there were generated 24 more stoppages9 of
measurable duration, a few in cases that came to the Board as strikes
and more in nonstrike cases. Altogether, 75 cases at one time or
another confronted the Board with 88 distinct interruptions of pro
duction.
7 Rarely a case was certified in which the Conciliation Service had not intervened:
No. 61, Consolidated Edison, and No. 105, Central States E m ployers* Negotiating Committee
(parties agreed to arbitration by Board).
8 Appendix B, table 7, and appendix D.
• Appendix B, table 8.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE BOARD’S ACTIVITIES
9
Methods of Maintaining Production Pending Final Settlement10*
In several of these 64 strike cases settlement was effected before the
Board heard the case. The efforts of other Government agencies,
such as the Conciliation Service, paved the way for a steadily increas
ing proportion of settlements before hearing—occasionally settle
ments of the controversy, usually merely of the strike. Thus 9 strikes
were ended pursuant to an agreement of the parties with the President,
the 0. P. M., or some other Government agency, immediately prior to
certification—all late cases.
The whole controversy, including the strike, was settled after certi
fication and before hearing in eight cases, of which one was a post
certification strike. In two of these the settlement was to remove the
controversy to the N. L. R. B .; in the rest the parties reached a final
settlement by contract at this stage of proceedings. In four cases an
interim agreement ended strikes (one, a strike arising after certifica
tion) without a final settlement of the controversy. Even in those
cases, however, in which the strike was settled without a hearing, the
Board had a role: (1) In each it notified the parties that it would
hear the controversy; (2) in several it requested the parties to resume
production; (3) in one it requested the N. L. R. B. to act.
Without any formal agreement between the parties, strikes were
ended by request of the Board. It customarily requested continuation
of production in cases that reached it before interruption of produc
tion, and these requests almost always succeeded; likewise in many
instances the Board successfully requested resumption of production
before a hearing.11 It is particularly worthy of note that so often
unions were willing to abandon their strikes upon the mere promise of
a hearing. Though a certain number of such strikes may have been
partly motivated by a desire to get the controversy before the Board,
its request to keep working was a novelty that proved very valuable.
Its success soon made it the Board’s usual procedure in all cases where
it was likely to be conducive to maintenance of production, except in
the rare instances in which suspension of work appeared to be a factor
favorable to the effectuation of a lasting settlement.
Often these interim arrangements for ending or preventing an inter
ruption of production were accompanied by a pledge by the employer
that any wage agreement thereafter made should be retroactive to the
date of the abandonment of the strike or of the expiration of a col
lective contract. This understanding was usual where a strike had
occurred at the expiration of such a contract.
The Board’s usefulness in promoting production pending adjustment
of a controversy brought to hearing is noteworthy.
In the 28 cases that came up for hearing with a strike still in progress
and in others that generated a stoppage at some later time, there were
many instances of resumption of production before final settlement.
This was achieved by various means, such as the parties’ interim agree
ment or their compliance with a request or a formal recommendation
of the Board.12 Two strikes, arising after certification, in No. 36,
10 Further analysis w ill be found in appendix D.
51 Appendix B, table 8.
12 Details are presented in appendix D.
10
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
North American Aviation,, and No. 51, A ir Associates, were ended by
seizure of the plant by the Government, and the second of three strikes
in No. 20B, Captive Mines, by an agreement sponsored by the Presi
dent. Less than one-third of all the stoppages, including those that
occurred after certification, lasted till final settlement of the case.
Among these were the two other instances that evoked Presidential
intervention, No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding (plant seizure), and No.
20B, Captive Mines (agreement to arbitrate). At the outbreak of war
on December 7—and since the last week of November—no stoppage of
production existed in any of the 30-odd cases before the Board, and
none developed during the remaining weeks of the Board’s life.
The following table summarizes the Board’s record:
T a b l e 2 . — Strikes at time National Defense Mediation Board received cases cmd
,
those occurring thereafter by mode of ending stoppage
Mode of ending stoppage
Strikes
existing at Strikes
time Board occurring
received thereafter
Stoppages ended before hearing—
9 ...................
By reason of certification..........
5
1
By final contract of parties.......
3
1
By interim contract of parties..
2 ..................
By reference to N. L. R. B ----17
2
By request of Board..................
36
4
Total........................................
Stoppages ended during or after hearing but before final disposition
of case—
3
By interim contract of parties...........................................................
3
3
By request of Board................................................................................................
3
By formal recommendation of Board........................................... .
9
2
By plant seizure........................................................................................................
12
11
Total................................................................................
9
Stoppages ended by final disposition of cases after hearing.
16
64
24
Totals..
Total
40
23
26
88
Duration of Interruptions of Production13
A good test of the usefulness of the Mediation Board as a national
defense agency is afforded by its record of speed in terminating and
averting stoppages of production. The following tables show 110
eases (omitting 8 complicated or peculiar cases) divided into 8 cate
gories and the corresponding average periods of work stoppage.
“ Further analysis will be found in appendix D. For reasons indicated in connection
with table 13 therein, cases Nos. 4 and 20 and their offshoots and cases Nos. 19 and 24 are
not dealt with in the present section.
11
GENERAL VIEW OF THE BOARD’S ACTIVITIES
Table 3 .— Number of strike and nonstrike cases certified and average days of
interruption of production
Item
Strike cases........
Nonstrike cases..
Total.........
Number of cases certified—
IV
II
I
Mar. 19- III Sept. 19Mar. 19- Sept. 18, Sept. 19- Jan. 12,
Sept. 18, trans Jan. 12, trans Total
com ferred to com ferred to
pleted N. W. pleted N. W.
L. B.
L. B.
9
37
3
9
58
32
52
3
11
6
69
6
20
110
15
Average days of interruption of production
Strike cases
Average duration before certification of the interrup
tion existing at time of certification..........................
Average duration after certification of all interrup
tions ...........................................................................
21.9
11.9
42.3
24.7
15.1
3.4
23.7
3.0
22.2
9.9
2.2
8.3
.1
1.2
1.9
7.4
16.5
1.6
2.3
6.1
Nonstrike cases
Average duration after certification of all interrup
tions ....................... ..................................................
All cases
Average duration after certification of all interrup
tions. _...........................................................................
The duration after certification of all interruptions of production
in the 38 cases (open and closed) certified before June 19 is 325 days;
or 8.6 days per case. The duration after certification of all interrup
tions of production in the 37 cases (open and closed) certified between
June 19 and September 18, inclusive, is 285 days; or 7.7 days per case.
The duration after certification of all interruptions of production in
the 35 cases (open and closed) certified after September 18 is 66 days,
or 1.9 days per case.
The duration of all interruptions of production in cases before the
Board from date of certification through June 18 is 308 days. (If the
8 excluded cases were included, the duration might be reckoned 378
days.) The duration of all interruptions of production between June
19, or from the date of certification if thereafter, and September 18,
inclusive, is 226 days. (If the 8 excluded cases were included, the
duration might be reckoned 236 days.) The duration of all interrup
tions of productions from September 19, or from the date of certifica
tion if thereafter, to January 12,1942, is 142 days. (If the 8 excluded
cases were included, the duration might be reckoned 168 days.) In
all, interruption of production in the 110 cases while they were before
the Board amounted to 676 days, an average of 6.1 days per case, as
indicated above. Or, with the 8 excluded cases added, it might be
reckoned that there were 782 days of interruption in 118 cases, an
average interruption of 6.6 days per case.
The Board’s increasing success in dealing with interruptions of
production is further displayed by the following table and the accom
panying chart, which shows that the percentage of those at work in
cases rose from 0 percent in March to 100 percent in DecemSending
er. The high percentages during May, June, and July are due to the
fact that No. 20, Bituminous Goal Operators, involving 400,000 men,
was pending until the Appalachian contract was signed July 6, though
the strike had ended April 30, 6 days after the case was certified to
the Board.
469872°— 42-----2
12
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
,
T a b l e 4 . — Average number of workers on strike and at work by month
Workers on strike and at work
Month
March 1...................................... .......................................
April............................
....................................................
May..................................................................................
June............................................ .......................................
July....................................................................................
August................................................. ..........................
September............................................ ...........................
October...............................................................................
November................................................................... .
December*.......................................................................
* March 27-31.
Monthly
average
number of On strike At work Percentage
at work
workers in
pending cases
17,825
17,825
0
0
161,634
106.909
54,725
34
13,234
615,092
601,858
98
503,892
8,000
495,892
98
76,016
1,853
74,163
98
93,197
11,495
81,902
88
141,970
13,567
128,403
90
177,425
16,668
160,757
91
216,230
14,195
201,935
94
350,753
0
350,753
100
* December 1-7.
GENERAL VIEW OF THE BOARD’S ACTIVITIES
13
Methods of Final Settlement
Although the forms of settlement are various, if not infinite, a
rough classification is offered (based largely on the opinion of the
Board’s panel assistants) for the 96 cases that were concluded by the
Board. Of these 96, 75 were cases that came to the Board before
September 19. Of the 82 cases arising before September 19, 7 were
turned over to the War Labor Board, and of the 36 of later origin, 15
were so transferred and 21 were settled by the Mediation Board.14
The variety of settlements is scarcely indicated by the following
classification, for each panel chairman had his own methods, and each
case presented its own procedural problems. The tripartite consti
tution of the panels added to the variety of approach utilized to bring
the parties to a spontaneous or a recommended settlement.
When the Board made recommendations, they frequently referred
to only one or two of the many issues which divided the parties at
the time of certification. Moreover, in a few cases, what took the
form of a recommendation was, in fact, terms accepted by the parties
which one or both of the parties preferred to have appear to emanate
from the Government rather than from direct negotiation. The rec
ommendation usually proposed either a method oi settlement of pres
ent or prospective disagreements (e. g. arbitration) or else substantive
terms of settlement—m either case to be embodied in a contract;
sometimes, however, it set forth a course of action for one party only,
or a procedure of investigation and report by the Government.
In nearly every case, it need hardly be said, most issues were set
tled by direct negotiation. In the following table cases are listed as
settled simply by contract whenever the Board was not active in
framing any of the terms of settlement.
Where agreement was reached before the Board, it was not unusual
for panel members to sign or initial the contract. In No. 28, Bendix
Aviation Corporation , the union officers were unable to secure mem
bership acceptance of the agreement. The officers asked that the
matter be reopened. The panel took the position that the agreement
being initialed was akin to a recommendation and that it would be
bad practice to permit reopening; Judge Stacy, the panel chairman,
thought that nevertheless the Board’s responsibility in case of a strike
threat might compel its further effort. Indeed, in No. 43, Sealed
Power, where the workers struck against a recommendation, the Board
undertook further negotiations in the field resulting in better terms
for the workers.
Cases in which the contract or the recommendation principally
related to present or prospective proceedings before the N. L. R. B., as
well as cases in which the Board refused to take desired action because
it would encroach on the province of the N. L. R. B., are classed as
disposed of by reference to N. L. R. B. In case No. 53, Gulf States
14 The conclusion of a case by the Board is a somewhat arbitrary concept, for the con
troversies with which it dealt are never finally settled. In the Board’s records a case
was ordinarily “closed” (and the Secretary of Labor so notified) soon after the comple
tion of a collective agreement settling outstanding difficulties. But there were often
clerical delays. Moreover, not every case eventuated in such an agreement; in which
case the date of closure depended even more on clerical convenience. The date of conclu
sion used herein is usually earlier than the date appearing in the Board’s records; it is
the date when a settlement contract was completed, or, if the case did not lead to such
an agreement, it is the last date on which the Board took an active hand in the controversy
(as by referring it to the N. L. R. B. or by appointing an arbitrator).
14
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
U tilities, the Board was confronted with two distinct issues, one of
which it referred to the N. L. R. B.15 Cases settled without a hearing
are not included in the first of the two following tables:
T a b l e 5 . — Strike and nonstrike cases and method of disposal
Method of final disposal of cases settled after
hearing1
1. Bynfcontract
the parties
(sometimes with aid
aganeiesofftthor
than Board)
2. Bythecontract
of
the
parties
Board nr its agents with suggestions of
3. By contract of the parties pursuant to formal
recommendation of the Board____________
4. By acquiescence of dissatisfied party in formal
recommendation of the Board___________
5. By reference to N. L. R. B...............................
6. By intervention of the President__________
7. By nonaction of the Board________________
Sum nf eases
^
Cases arising before
Sept. 19
Cases arising after
Sept. 18
Strike
Nonstrike
Strike Nonstrike
11
6
6
8
10
3
4
1
3
1
1
29
2
5
2
2
8
11
12H
1
5H
1
1
38
Total
22
23
25^
3
8H
2
2
86
1 These cases are identified by number in appendix B, table 10.
T able 6 . — Method of
final disposal of all cases
Item
Settled before hearing: *
By contract of parties____
By reference to N. L. R. B
Settled after hearing:
By contract of parties. ............................................ ................
By contract of parties with N. D. M. B. aid........................
By contract of parties with N. D. M. B. recommendation.
By acquiescence in recommendation of N. D. M. B _____
By reference to N. L. R. B ....................................................
By intervention of the President_____________________
By nonaction of N. D. M. B________________________
Transferred to N. W. L. B.
Total...........................
Cases arising Cases arising
before Sept. 19 after Sept. 18
5
3
7
17
14
23H
2
7H
3
2 ......................
6
9
3
1
2
2
68
7
82
18
15
i These cases are named in appendix D, paragraph on final settlement before hearing.
Compliance w ith Recommendations of the Board
In the great majority of cases going to recommendation, the recom
mendation was accepted by all parties. There were important excep
tions, however.16
In No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding Corporation, the employer refused
to accept a recommendation for union maintenance. In No. 51, A ir
Associates, the employer refused to accept a recommendation that
employees be immediately returned to work. These refusals eventu
15 A similar dichotomy might be performed on several other cases that the Board did not
formally divide, e. g., No. 50, Tennessee Coal Co. (where both halves were settled in the
same way).
16 An interim contract made at the Board’s instigation was violated by a strike in No. 3C,
North American Aviation, Inc,
GENERAL VIEW OF THE BOARD’S ACTIVITIES
15
ated in Government seizure. In No. 83, Agar Packing & Provision
the employer rejected a recommendation that certain
strikers be reinstated, with no further action by this Board. In No.
57, Lincoln M ills, the employer refused at first to accept recommenda
tions for union maintenance and a voluntary check-off; but subse
quently accepted in order to end an interruption which might have
lost it Government orders. (Similar pressure was conducive to accept
ance after long delay in No. 58, Ohio Brass Co., and perhaps in
other cases.)
In No. 31, Employers Negotiating Committee, the Board recom
mended that, pending a study of conditions in the industry, the union
accept the employers’ offer of union maintenance and a certain wage
increase and end the strike, all else to remain in status quo. The
International Woodworkers of America rejected this recommenda
tion. On the same day the President proclaimed the existence of an
unlimited national emergency. The Board immediately wired the
president of the union calling attention to the fact that the President
had “called upon loyal workmen as well as employers to merge their
lesser differences in the larger effort to insure the survival of the
only kind of government which recognized the rights of labor or of
capital.” The Board called upon the union to reconsider its decision
and to bring the telegram to the personal attention of everyone with
power to vote. When this was not done, the Board recalled repre
sentatives of the union to Washington. After 2 days of meeting with
the chairman of the Board and the president of the C. I. O., the
international president of the union issued a statement defying the
Board. This was immediately answered by the president of the
C. I. O. who said: “It is the considered, calm judgment not only of
myself but of all C. I. O. representatives who are either members or
alternate members of the National Defense Mediation Board that the
interests of the I. W. A. will be better served by accepting the recom
mendations of the Board.” He urged that local unions on strike hold
meetings and consider these recommendations. Within a week local
unions started returning to work under the terms the Board had
recommended, which the international union through its officers
finally accepted.
Another dramatic case was No. 73, Kansas City Pow er & Light Co.
The controversy related to unfair labor practices and representation
matters already in litigation under the National Labor Relations
Act. The Board therefore recommended that the parties continue
production pending the litigation. But members of the dissatisfied
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers immediately struck and blacked
out Kansas City. Whereupon the chairman of the Board issued a
statement saying: “In this emergency the universal and ungrudging
acceptance of the letter and spirit of the [National Labor Relations J
Act by employers is a compelling obligation. It is an equally com
pelling obligation on the part of labor to seek and follow its legal
remedy in preference to direct action in such cases as this. All me
pressure of public opinion is called for to enforce these obligations.
The National Defense Mediation Board, therefore, today calls upon
the striking members of local No. B-412 to return immediately to
work, and it calls upon the national officers of the American Federa
tion of Labor and the international officers of the International
Corporation,
16
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers to exert all the influence they
possess to that end.” This appeal was successful forthwith.
In No. 3, CorneU-Dubilier, the union refused to call off a strike,
as recommended, but soon after reached a full settlement with the
employer. In No. 10, Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation,
the union twice rejected recommendations of the Board to resume
work on stated conditions. The Board was about to bring the case
to the attention of the President when the crucial terms of settlement
were agreed upon and production was renewed. In No. 20, Appala
chian Mines, and No. 20C, Alabama Mines, there was no verbal rejection
of what the Board urged, but the final terms of the contracts were
somewhat more favorable to the union; in the Appalachian case the
employers conceded certain demands which the panel had rejected.
In No. 43, Sealed Pow er, the union struck in protest against the
recommendations. The Board dispatched an agent to the scene.
Eventually the union and the employer agreed on terms slightly
more favorable to the workers than those recommended. In No. 77,
Duquesne Light, the independent union purported to reject a recom
mendation that the bargaining unit be settled by the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board, but the rival union obtained this redress from
that board. In No. 92, Ingalls Ship Building Corporation, the union
announced its refusal to accept the recommendations against union
maintenance, but production continued nevertheless. In No. 72,
Aluminum Co. (Vancouver), a recommendation that a master agree
ment be negotiated covering all Aluminum Co. plants in which the
A. F. L. was the bargaining agent was rejected by the union, but
the rejection involved no stoppage or disturbance of the status quo.
The recommendation was in fact no more than a suggestion looking
to the future solution of demands pressed before the Board.
Finally in No. 20B, Captive Mines, the United Mine Workers of
America rejected 2 recommendations of the Board. The second of
the 3 strikes in this case was the union’s reply to a recommendation of
the Board that the controversy over terms of employment (particu
larly union security) be settled by arbitral decision of the full 11-man
membership of the Mediation Board or of a special joint arbitration
board created by the parties, and that meanwhile mining be carried
on without interruption under the terms temporarily existing. This
second strike was terminated by an agreement engineered by the
President, whereby the matter was submitted to the full Board for
its arbitral recommendation. The union rejected this recommenda
tion also, because it did not include the union shop, and it ordered
a third strike. At the same time all C. I. O. members presented their
resignations from the Board, and the President again intervened to
restore coal production.
Part II
The Process o f Mediation and Recommendation
17
The Process o f Mediation and Recommendation
Powers, Purposes, and Procedures of the Board
The Board was authorized to make “every reasonable effort to
adjust and settle” the disputes certified to it by assisting the parties
thereto to negotiate agreements for that purpose. If the Board had
had no other authority than this it would have been simply a mediation
board. But the Board was authorized further to investigate, to con
duct hearings, to make findings of fact, and to formulate recom
mendations for the settlement of the disputes and make public its
findings and recommendations. The Executive order did not purport
to make the findings or recommendations binding upon the parties.
Nevertheless, a recommendation approached in force as well as in
form an arbitral award. This was emphasized by the fact that great
moral pressure was brought to bear upon the parties to embody its
terms in agreements. In two cases where management refused to
accept the recommendation, the President ordered the armed forces
to take possession of the plant and then put the Army and the Navy
in charge of the respective plants. The authority to recommend has
tended to obscure the fact that the primary object and the greatest
effort of the Board was directed to securing agreement of the parties
by purely mediatory action. Thus in only approximately 30, or a
little over one-third, of the 86 cases settled after hearing before the
Board was it necessary for the Board to resort to its authority to
recommend.1 Furthermore, the recommendation might cover only
part of the dispute and pave the way for agreement on the remainder
of it. Thus about 70 percent of the wage demands and 70 percent of
the union security demands were settled by agreement without the
need of recommendation.
In each case the parties were asked to send representatives to a
hearing. No party ever refused to attend. But when the C. I. O.
members attempted to resign, the C. I. O. “withdrew” its cases. The
Board, though postponing hearings indefinitely, stated that its re
sponsibility to effect settlement could not be affected by a party’s
attempted withdrawal. It took a similar position in No. 105, Central
States Employers' Negotiating Committee, when certain of the em
ployers covered by the certification indicated their intention to with
draw. The Board would demand that employer representatives have
authority to bind the employer and that the union or employee
representatives be prepared to recommend to their constituencies
whatever they agreed to before the Board. In only two cases, No. 77,
1In a number of cases there were interim recommendations arranging the terms for
calling off a strike or continuing production until a permanent agreement could be
reached. These included provisions concerning discrimination, retroactivity of the per
manent agreement, and occasionally even wage and union security terms which were
likely to become part of a final settlement. The figures in the text do not include interim
recommendations. Also excluded are recommendations that an issue be settled by the
N. Ii. R. B. pursuant to the N. L. R. A.
19
20
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
., and No. 91, John A . Roeblina's Sons Go. (at
hearing of December 16), did a party (an independent union) send
representatives avowedly not authorized to negotiate to the extent
customary. In only one case, No. 51, A ir Associates, did a party
(en employer) refuse to continue to attend a hearing when dissatisfied
with its course. All hearings were held in Washington except those
held by special investigators. Parties sometimes protested this—
employers complaining of the loss of time, unions of the expense.
Parties were free to employ lawyers in the hearing as they wished.
The employers used lawyers more frequently than the unions. Parties
were permitted to introduce into the hearing as many persons as
they saw fit. Anyone properly attending the hearing was permitted
to participate either to make argument or to assert facts. There
were no written statements of claim or denial. The Board had no
power to subpoena.
The extent to which the proceedings were reported verbatim de
pended on the panel chairman. In time it became customary to
record most of what was done in the presence of the full panel, but
nothing of the negotiations conducted by the panel or by members
of the panel with one or another of the parties. The transcripts of
the hearings wtere relatively confidential, but were available for
perusal by the parties in the office of the Board; parties were per
mitted to have copies of introductory statements made by themselves,
but of nothing which would reveal the course and progress of the
hearing. The transcripts, though often inaccurate, because of the
informality of the proceedings, and not revised by the participants,
are valuable at the least as showing the opposed positions, the argu
ments pro and con, and sometimes the reaction of the panel; and
from them the statement and narrowing of the issues and occasionally
the forming outlines of the agreement may be grasped. The further
and ultimate maturation ordinarily took place off the record.
At the beginning of the hearing the chairman of the panel called
upon each of the parties to present its claim. Thereafter, there was
no set order. The object of the panel at this point was to assist
the parties in finding mutually agreeable positions. At this stage
there was no attempt to distinguish sharply Between assertion of
facts and argument. No oath was taken by persons who asserted
facts. In the process of discussion the parties, unaided by the panel,
might find that differences between them were not great enough to
justify a deadlock. Certain parts of the discussion might involve
an examination of the reasons why a party demanded or refused a
particular solution. Participation of the Board in such a discussion
was extremely valuable. The parties might feel greater obligation
to make it appear to the Board that their conduct was rational than
they would to each other. Given a statement of the reasons for and
against a position it might be possible to find a formula which could
not, in good faith, be rejected. When it appeared that general dis
cussion was not bringing a solution it was customary for the employer
representatives and the employee representatives to retire to separate
rooms. The full panel or individual members of the panel would
then confer with the separate parties in an endeavor to break the
deadlock. The intent of the separate conferences was to promote the
immediate consideration of proposals and counterproposals in an
Duquesne Light Go
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
21
uncoerced atmosphere. It enabled the panel member presumably
most favorable to the party in question to secure a more exact idea
of the concessions which were possible and at the same time to make
available to the party the judgment of one who was both a nominee
of the President and an individual presumptively and legitimately
sympathetic to him. It would develop occasionally that the parties
came to see the advantage of further negotiation either at home or
in Washington without panel participation. The panel then with
drew, offering to hold itself in constant readiness to assist. The panel
members thus applied continuous and persistent effort to the bringing
about of agreement between the parties and in the majority of cases
this effort was successful.
The presence of avowedly employer and employee members in addi
tion to public members is novel in mediation. It might have been
surmised that the representative members would each support their
side and so stiffen the backs of the parties. The members were, how
ever, conscious that they were appointed as public officials and were
strongly moved by a sense of responsibility.
Team play, which characterized panel procedure, was due in part
to the members5 passion for settlement. This devotion kept tired
Board members working on cases until 3 and 4 o’clock in the morn
ing when they felt that by so doing they could cement an agree
ment. It was not intended that a member should give up his sym
pathy for and understanding of the point of view which he was
chosen to represent and it was for each member to affect a recon
ciliation between private sympathy and public duty. The member
with a known sympathy for a party and a sense of the public interest
was able to prevail upon that party to make concessions which might
not have been won by hostile threats or a supposedly disinterested
pressure. This fact was of consequence in the success of the Board’s
mediating effort.
Yet is cannot be denied that the power to recommend was one
of the circumstances conditioning the mediation process. The parties
understood that failure to agree involved a gamble as to what the
Board would recommend. The parties understood also that public
opinion and even governmental force might compel acceptance of
the recommendation. This meant, at least, that the parties would be
impressed with the futility and wastefulness of assuming intransigent
positions. It could be said to increase the likelihood of a serious
examination of all possibilities.
Despite the existence of this reserved power the Board in each case
indicated its extreme reluctance to use it and tried to convince the
parties that its efforts, at least during the initial stages, were not to
be interpreted as involving any judgment on the merits; that its sug
gestions did not carry the implication that its recommendations,
should any be necessary, would follow similar lines. The Board
particularly discouraged attempts by a party to draw from the Board
hints as to how much it would give or as to whether some conces
sion by the party would win some compensatory concession from the
Board in the form of a recommendation or a refusal to recommend.
Generally speaking, the Board was satisfied that it succeeded in con
vincing the parties that its intentions were mediatory. The positive
values which flow from consent were not seriously impaired despite
22
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
the fact that agreement was negotiated under the auspices of a Board
which might have exercised semicompulsory powers.
There came a time, however, in certain of the cases when the media
tory atmosphere began to yield to the sense that recommendations,
or something approaching them, would be necessary. The cases in
which this happened were not limited to those which issued in formal
recommendation. The panel, for example, might make it clear that
it would not recommend a union maintenance clause. Such an action
was nearly equivalent to a recommendation since it was likely to place
the demand in question beyond possibility of agreement. In an occa
sional case the Board let it be known that it would recommend a cer
tain provision. This might increase the bargaining power of one
party with respect to that specific demand or some other demand. At
the same time it left the favored party free to press in the most desir
able direction and the other party to choose the point at which it
would yield. More or less persistent suggestions from the panel, all
having a similar tendency, would make it clear that the panel was
insisting upon or was preparing to recommend an agreement in some
thing like the suggested terms. On the other hand, occasionally recom
mendations embodied the predetermined agreement of the parties,
one of whom perhaps wished to avoid responsibility to his constitu
ency for the bargain or to make it more persuasive and more likely
to gain acceptance.
The Board was most reluctant to make recommendations with re
spect to pay, insofar as such a recommendation must depend upon a
fact such as whether the employer in question was paying the pre
vailing wage. In a number of instances it was possible to arrive at
a wage decision without any intense development of the facts. But
the loose mixture of argument and fact customarily presented to the
Board, and adequate for the usual process of mediation, did not always
provide material sufficiently detailed or precise. In such cases, of
which there were 26, the Board appointed special representatives or
investigators, not members of its regular staff, who gathered informa
tion. The investigator sometimes, but not always, held a hearing.
Among the investigators2 were college professors, industrial engi
neers, lawyers, and a prominent industrialist. The investigator con
ferred with each party. He secured information from governmental
and private research organizations. The investigator usually was
asked to state his findings of fact and to suggest solutions. His report
on occasion served as a basis for further conective bargaining, elimi
nating the need for formal recommendations. These references vary
in importance. In one, No. 31, Employers Negotiating Committee, a
five-man board investigated the entire wage structure of the Douglas
fir lumber industry in the Pacific Northwest with a view to furnishing
a stable and permanent base for labor relations. Not all of these
references involved wage issues. In a few the Board’s agent was told
to promote further and continuous negotiation or simply to keep one
or the other party quiet until a solution was found. In No. 20, A p
palachian Mines, and in No. 20G, Alabama Mines, the Board itself
conducted an examination into the facts. Here the parties presented
upon their own motion and upon request detailed material. The*
*
Appendix C, list of Special Agents.
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
23
Board secured assistance also from the statistical and economic serv
ices of the Bituminous Coal Division, Department of the Interior.
In No. 105, Central Stales Employers'* Negotiating Committee, the
Board secured the assistance of the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Though the Board did not usually give interpretations of its recom
mendations (and of course did not undertake to interpret contracts
made under its auspices), an interpretation of a clause proposed by
the Board was sometimes given by the panel chairman, as in No. 39,
Marlin Rockwell, and No. 5, Weyerhamser Timber Co. (telegram to
Snoqualmie Falls Lumber Co. from executive secretary of the Board
after consulting panel). In No. 86, Cleveland Graphite, a further
hearing was held when a keen controversy arose concerning the mean
ing of a contract made under Board auspices.
Principles and Precedents as Factors in Decision
The point was often made both inside and outside of the Board
that unlike the National War Labor Board of 1917-18, this Board did
not operate under formulated principles and that its disposition of
one matter did not serve as a precedent in another; and there was
a resolution by the Board to that effect. The distinction between the
two Boards has been exaggerated since it is only with respect to the
demands for the union shop and union maintenance that the question
of formulating a policy was important or controversial. In a number
of respects the present Board proceeded upon the basis of well under
stood principles though they may not have been made explicit. One
of the principles of the War Labor Board was the recognition of
labor’s right to organize and to bargain collectively. Since this prin
ciple had been enacted into law, it was, of course, equally a principle
of the present Board. The Board accepted as binding the provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act together with the interpreta
tions of these provisions by the National Labor Relations Board.
Furthermore, the Board refused to permit one party to a collective
agreement to open up an existing contract during its life unless the
other party agreed. The principles of the War Labor Board provided
that, in fixing wages, hours, and conditions of labor, regard should
always be had to labor standards, wage scales, and other conditions
prevailing in the localities affected and that minimum rates of pay
should be established which would insure the subsistence of the worker
and his family in health and reasonable comfort. These are prin
ciples which have either been enacted into law or so thoroughly ac
cepted that inevitably they would be and were applied by this or any
similar board.
It was on the issue of union security that the War Labor Board
did formulate and the National Defense Mediation Board is believed
not to have formulated a principle or to have acknowledged earlier
decisions as precedent. In the case of the War Labor Board a con
ference of employer and employee representatives had agreed upon
a set of principles prior to the establishment of the Board. Among
these principles was one providing that strikes or lock-outs should not
be resorted to for turning an open into a closed shop, or the reverse;
that the union shop if established should continue; and that era
24
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
ployer refusal to grant a closed shop was not to be deemed a griev
ance. It was understood that this commitment was given in return
for the principle, which had not until then been accepted, that
employers should not in any way interfere with the right of the
workers to organize and to bargain collectively through chosen rep
resentatives. No such agreement preceded the formation of the
present Board. It was the opinion, at least of the majority of the
members, that the Board itself, being primarily a mediatory board,
could not consistently adopt a set policy upon a matter concerning
which there was basic • disagreement between employers and em
ployees. To some extent this attitude was a true reflection of the
mediatory nature of the Board. It was emphasized by the fact that
all recommendations of the Board, with the exception of those noted
under “Composition of the Board,” were made by panels. This per
mitted the equities of each case and the talents of particular Board
members to play a greater part in the decision than if it were con
trolled by generalities. It made it possible to secure agreements
based upon concessions which would not have been forthcoming if a
set policy had blocked the way. The mediatory nature, however, of
the Boards’ process did not fully explain the refusal to adopt an
explicit principle for union security claims, since the Board was
also semiarbitral in character. The tripartite composition of the
Board explained much. It had not only to solve the controversy
before it, but to do it without disaffecting the Board members. The
difficulty arose where it was called upon to take positions which seri
ously offended one or the other group and which could not be forti
fied by a reference to well-established governmental policy. A dis
cussion of union security may make the point clearer.
Union Security3
In approximately half of the cases heard by the Board there were
demands for some form of union security; these include the following
types:
( a) Closed shop.—All persons employed must be union members when hired
and must remain union members during employment.
(b) Union shop.—All persons employed must within a specified time after
hiring become and remain union members.
(c) Union maintenance.—All employees who at the time of the contract
were union members or thereafter become union members must maintain mem
bership as a condition of employment.4 (In one of the last cases the agreement
made the clause applicable only to those individuals who specifically accepted
it.)
(d) Check-off.—The employer must periodically deduct a stated portion of
an employee’s pay and transmit to the union the amount deducted as dues.
The check-off might not require the consent of the member or it might require
specific authorization; and in the latter case it might or might not permit
revocation of the authority. The check-offs introduced into agreements under
the auspices of the Board (none of them as a result of recommendation) were
of the voluntary type with limited power to revoke.
(e) Preferential hiring.—Union members were to be given preference in em
ployment. Such clauses varied in the extent to which preference must be
given.
8 Further analysis will be found in appendix E.
4 This is the only form of “union maintenance” recommended by the Board or contained
in agreements negotiated under its auspices. But note No. 57, Lincoln M ills , appendix E,
2 ( d ). Other forms require the employer to fill places vacated by union members with
union members or to maintain the same proportion of union membership which existed
at the time of the contract.
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
25
(f) Employer recognition or encouragement of union membership.—These
clauses were of great variety. In some of them the encouragement was con
fined to statements of good will or friendship contained in the agreement. In
others the employer must make known his approval of union membership to
each new employee. An occasional clause gave to the union exclusive privileges
to use bulletin boards and other plant facilities.
(g) Discipline of antiunion activity.—These clauses required the employer
to discipline by discharge, lay-off, or otherwise, persons whose activity imperiled
the position of the contracting union. The clauses varied primarily with respect
to enforcement procedures from a naked unimplemented promise of the employer
to impartial arbitration.
In the 56 or so cases in which union security was demanded some
33 were disposed of by agreement without recommendation and in
the other 14 that were closed, recommendations usually, but not in
every case, became the basis for agreement. An earlier portion of
this report has explained that the distinction between agreement
and recommendation is a rough one. To what extent the difference
of disposition is significant is to be considered in the light of those
observations and the comments on union security in relation to spe
cific cases noted here and in appendix E.
The Board made a recommendation in favor of the closed shop
in only 1 case, No. 37, Bethlehem Steel Go., Shipbuilding Division .
The closed or union shop was demanded in probably as many as
46 cases but in many of these cases it was not seriously presented
and the failure to make recommendation signifies simply that the
demand would be given serious consideration only in a very special
case. The Board made a recommendation against the nearly equiva
lent union shop in only 1 case, No. 20B, Bituminous Goal, Gaptwe
Mines. It is possible, however, to treat cases in which union main
tenance was explicitly denied, of which there are 4, as an implied
denial of the union or closed shop. Both Bethlehem and Captive
Mines were dealt with finally by the full Board.
The background of Bethlehem was this: The Navy Department,
the Maritime Commission, and the Office of Production Management
had established the need for some regional uniformity of labor
conditions in shipbuilding in each of the four zones: Pacific Coast,
Gulf Coast, Great Lakes, and Atlantic Coast. The Pacific Coast
stabilization conference was the first to be held. The Bethlehem
Steel Co. was invited but did not attend. The Government authori
ties brought strong pressure upon employers and employees for uni
form wage standards and abolition of strikes. It asked them to
embody these provisions in all collective contracts. The standards
having been accepted,5 negotiation of a so-called “master agreement”
followed. This agreement included not only the zone standards
but also many other terms to be incorporated into the contracts
between the unions and each employer. An overwhelming majority
of the employers employing approximately 80 percent of the work
ers agreed that the closed shop be one of the terms of this master
agreement. Bethlehem alone refused to participate in this negotia
tion, which was strongly supported by the Government. The Board,
therefore, considered its recommendation that Bethlehem become a
party to the master agreement as an appropriate measure to further
5 The legal significance of zone standards was in issue in several other cases, discussed
in appendix Q.
26
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
the interest of the Government in securing uniformity and stability
in the shipbuilding industry of the West. This reason, perhaps
more than any need of the union for protection, was determina
tive, but the Board’s action gave color to the union’s claim that
it was entitled to the closed shop in exchange for making wage
concessions practically forced by the Government and giving up the
right to strike. On the other hand, that employers employing 80
percent of the men had agreed to a closed shop went not so much
to the merit of the union’s demand as it did to the justice of asking
Bethlehem to accept a degree of uniformity that the Government
conceived to be important to defense.
In the Captive Mines case, it was the union rather than the Gov
ernment which was pursuing and had in very considerable degree
established uniformity in working conditions. Taking the bitumi
nous-coal industry as a whole, the union represented an overwhelm
ing proportion of the employees, and it had secured union-shop
agreements with nearly all of the commercial operators though with
few of the operators of the coal mines owned by steel producers.
The captive mine owners had never taken part in the industry
negotiations and had not, formally at least, been asked to take part
in negotiating the contract in question. Some of the Board mem
bers were influenced, too, by the fact that whereas in Bethlehem
the closed shop would not exclude nonunion members from many
other building-trade jobs, the union shop in the coal mines would
cover practically all the jobs available to the men in question and
so establish a union monopoly of all existing jobs. The Board had
already recognized, as appears below, that where employees were
asked voluntarily to forgo their right to strike as a contribution
to national defense and it seemed likely that by so doing they would
imperil their organization, the organization should be entitled to
protection of some sort. So much might be legitimately deduced
from the express Congressional encouragement given to organiza
tions for collective bargaining. The mine workers, however, did
not show the need for the union shop as a measure of present pro
tection. In the absence of such need and in the absence of any
Government policy requiring a union shop, the Board did not recom
mend the union shop.
The Board recommended the union maintenance clause in seven
cases and explicitly refused to recommend it in four cases. In an
early case, No. 5, Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. and Snoqualmie Lumber
Co., involving a group of lumbering companies on the Pacific Coast,
a panel of the Board was instrumental through its suggestions in
securing an agreement for union maintenance. There is no doubt
that the panel considered that the union maintenance clause would be
valuable in stabilizing employer-employee relations in a disturbed
industry, but there is nothing to show that in that case or in four
other cases in which the clause was agreed to without recommenda
tion the panel would have recommended the adoption of the clause
had it not been agreed to. The latest development of the clause
was that agreed to in No. Ill, Hammond & Irving , in which each
employee member could elect whether the maintenance clause should
be applicable to him. This compromise was suggested by the em
ployer’s claim that many of the present members were not satisfied
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
27
with the union or its leadership. The maintenance clause was first
recommended in No. 31, Employers Negotiating- Committee, and again
shortly thereafter in No. 34, Columbia Basin Area Loggers and
Sawmill Operators, both involving other sectors of the Pacific North
west lumber industry. In No. 31 the employers offered the clause,
and the Board in an interim recommendation urged the employees to
accept it, which they, having demanded the union shop, very reluct
antly agreed to do. In No. 34, the recommendation was based on a
predetermined agreement of the parties. Similarly in No. 43, Sealed
Power, and in No. 57, Lincoln M ills, the panel had some reason to
believe, thov 1
1
11
* from the employer’s
subsequent
seriously oppose the
demand. T
, .
^ i Aviation Co.,
Western Cartridge, and No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding Corporation,
in which it was clear that the employer was opposed to the demand
for union maintenance and in which the recommendation must be
considered as based squarely upon the merits.
In North American Aviation the officers of the national union had
not objected to the use of troops to break the strike. The indirect
effect had been greatly to weaken the local union. There was an
urgent need for reviving the union in order to assure stable labor
relations, and the quarrel between local and national leadership made
it doubtful whether the national leadership could restore it without
the assistance of the maintenance of membership clause. In Western
Cartridge it was clear to the panel that the employer had persistently
fought unionization even during the course of proceedings before the
Board so that the union, deprived of a strike weapon, would have
been disabled from protecting itself against the employer’s activities.
Finally in Federal Shipbuilding, the union, by agreeing to the At
lantic Coast Zone Standards of wages, hours, and working conditions,
was, in the interest of stabilization, limiting its importance to work
ers and giving up its right to strike at the very time that, due to the
rapid expansion of the shipbuilding industry, a great number of new
workers were being introduced without trade-union experience. It
was thought that in such a situation a maintenance of membership
clause was necessary to enable the union to protect its organization.
These cases are the only ones in which Board panels found adequate
reason for recommending the adoption of the union maintenance
clause.
In a number of cases the Board refused to recommend union
maintenance; it made no such recommendation after that in No. 57,
Lincoln Mills, on August 7. In No. 21, General M otors, the Board,
in refusing to recommend, pointed to the continuous and successful
growth of the union. In No. 85, Alabama D ry Dock, it pointed to
the existence of a contract which stated specifically that union mem
bership should not be a condition of employment. In No. 92, Ingalls
Ship Building, which bears some resemblance to Federal Shipbuild
ing , the Board was impressed with the fact that the employer had
made freely an offer which included preferential hiring, union mem
bership encouragement, shop discipline, and grievance procedure;
this offer led the Board to believe that the employer harbored no
antiunion motives but on the contrary was willing to cooperate with
the union. In other cases the panel let it be known informally, by
469872° -
28
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
express statement or by the tenor of its questions, that it would not
recommend union maintenance clauses. In all of these instances it
was obvious that the panel could find no special or distinguishing
circumstance which would support the claim for union maintenance.
It is probably correct to state that the Board did not adopt a fixed or
inflexible attitude toward demands for the union shop or union main
tenance. Any such attitude would have excluded from consideration
the intangibles which were important in a process in which mediation
played so large a part: the relative strength of the opposed parties,
the intensity of their attitude with respect to union security, the im
portance of the industry’s operations for national defense. Neverthe
less there does seem to have been a frame of reference which oriented
the thinking of the Board on the issue of union security. The Board
appealed to the unions in the interest of national defense to forgo, to
as great an extent as possible, the use of the strike. The strike is
an important instrument for maintaining the union’s power and hold
ing its membership. Where the special circumstances of the case indi
cated a threat to the union’s security, which the abandonment of the
strike instrument would have seriously increased, it was thought appro
priate and just to recommend to the employer that he grant in return
some protection in the way of a union maintenance or some related
clause. Thus the union made a prima facie case if it showed a substan
tial membership and a special threat to its position. In the absence
of such a showing, the cases required quite special circumstances to
entitle the claim to serious consideration.
The union shop and union maintenance clauses are not the only in
struments of security for a union that has statutory bargaining rights.
Others were recommended—preferential hiring, encouragement by the
employer of union membership, forbidding activity against the union
on company time. These recommendations usually reflected existing
practice in the shop or agreement achieved at the hearing and were
put in the form of recommendation to give them greater weight.
The variety of devices available where the parties have been in
duced to take up a cooperative attitude is indicated by the 33 cases in
which agreements were arrived at without the pressure of recom
mendation. Here it is appropriate to call attention to only one of
these, namely, No. 6, Allis-Chalmers (Milwaukee); this case is im
portant for a number of reasons. The Board succeeded in terminating
a controversy which 76 days of strike had not settled. During all
of this period the exact nature of the issue was never brought to a
focus. An obscure bitterness probably generated by employer en
couragement given earlier to a company union, later to a rival A. F. L.
union, seemed to block exploratory negotiation. The mediatory
processes of the Board were exactly suited to clarification. The com
pany had purported to agree to the principle that an activity which
^undermined” the C. I. O. union was a breach of shop discipline, but it
had refused to implement the principle so acknowledged by ade
quate procedure; in any case the parties had been unable or unwill
ing to come to an agreement on the details. The company claimed
to see in such procedure as the union demanded a sanction for com
pelling payment of union dues; it was unalterably opposed to be
coming a party to machinery having such objectives. Upon the
basis of general principles to which both parties acknowledged allegi
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
29
ance, the Board brought the parties to accept an agreement which
gave the union a favored status in the shop, which provided for an
impartial referee, but which explicitly stated that the mere failure
to pay dues should not be construed by the referee as an “undermining”
of the union.
Wage Rates 6
In the cases certified to and heard by the Board approximately
three-fourths of them involved, among other demands, a demand with
respect to wages. In the 66 or so wage cases which were completed,
the wage controversy was determined by agreement without any
recommendation in about 46 and with recommendation in about 20,
though in 2 of these the recommendation was only as to wages pending
mediation. Obviously there can be no very specific rules for the solu
tion of a wage demand, and 20 cases are too few from which to draw
conclusions as to general tendencies. Roughly speaking, it may be
stated that the recommendations, with a few exceptions, proceeded
along lines made familiar by arbitration practice. The Board was
reluctant to recommend rates of pay. Such recommendations ordi
narily would require a detailed examination of facts. As indicated
above, the Board’s regular procedure of developing facts was a loose
one, well fitted to mediation but often insufficient for the needs of arbi
tration. It thus had to appoint special investigators where the
mediatory process did not succeed, but more than this the Board under
stood that there were no firm principles to give a measure for a deci
sion with respect to wage demands and so preferred that the parties
find a solution by agreement.
In a few cases the Board has recommended no more than a procedure
by which a rate can be determined as, for example, arbitration, an
impartial grievance procedure, or study by efficiency engineers. In
a number of cases the recommendations follow very closely the rates
offered by the employer or fill in the wage scale more or less in accord
ance with the logic of the existing scale.
Where the Board itself has had to improvise the wage terms it has
usually instructed its investigators to pay special attention to prevail
ing wage scales. A representative case is No. 39, Marlin Rockwell.
The reasoning upon which the recommendation is based is the tradi
tional one of applying existing patterns. It is usually debatable as to
what industries, both in kind and location, are justly comparable. In
this case the Board extended the area from the small town in question to
a nearby metropolitan area which created a somewhat more favorable
basis for the treatment of the union claim. Also, it considered as rele
vant, practices in industries different from that in question. In a later
wartime case, No. 110, Anaconda Copper Mining Co., however, the
Board applied to electricians the industry rates in preference to the
higher rates of nearby nonrelated industries; the case dealt with a
skilled class already well paid; the Board recommended the increase
offered by the company. In other cases, particularly those settled by
agreement before the Board, the area of comparison is apt to be re
stricted to the industry, but the general lines of reasoning have been
the same. In a few cases where no investigation was had the recom
mendation was the result of compromise between the union’s demand
and the employer’s offer.
• Further detailed analysis will be found in appendix F.
30
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Five of the wage recommendation cases are distinctive. Two of
them, No. 20, Bituminous Goal Operators, Appalachian Mines, and
No. 20C, Bituminous Coal Operators, Alabama Mines, involved de
mands for the elimination of differentials in pay between different areas
of bituminous-coal production. In No. 20 the southern Appalachian
operators opposed the abolition of the differential of 40 cents in the day
wage rates in their favor and against the northern operators because
of allegedly higher cost of production, and less favorable freight rates.
An analysis of the facts presented by the Bituminous Coal Division
showed that the realizations of the southern operators (even after
absorption of the freight differential) were superior; that the elimi
nation of the differential would add 3% cents a ton to the cost; that
at least one-half of this additional cost would be neutralized by adjust
ments in the minimum price structure established by the Bituminous
Coal Act and the remaining V/2 cents was immaterial with reference
to competition between the northern and southern fields. In No. 20C,
involving the Alabama producers (traditionally a lower wage area
than either the northern or southern Appalachian fields) the union
demanded that 40 cents be added to the day wage rate so that the gap
between the southern Appalachian and the Alabama rates would not
be increased as a result of the elimination of the 40-cent differential
between southern and northern Appalachian fields. The issue was
framed entirely with reference to the claim of the Alabama operators
that realizations were not sufficient to cover the additional 40 cents.
The Board examined the current realizations and decided that they
were sufficient to cover an additional 25 cents a day. The Board rec
ommended further that should there be any increase in these realiza
tions one-half of the profit should accrue to the miners up to, but not
exceeding, an additional 15 cents per ton. In both of these cases the
Board resolved the issue by criteria substantially agreed to by the
parties. The difference was not as to the principles but as to the facts
and these were found by a process essentially judicial.
In No. 21, General M otors, the union asked and received from the
Board a recommendation for a general increase of 10 cents per hour.
The employer had offered up to 5 cents for all employees and 5 to 10
cents for skilled workmen. There was no question but that the em
ployer was paying the prevailing rate in the industry or that the hourly
wage rates were generally higher than those in other industries. The
union argued that there was a customary differential between the in
dustry and certain other related industries such as steel, and that
because steel had increased its rate 10 cents, General Motors should
increase by the same amount. The Board took note of this fact and the
fact that the seasonal nature of the industry tended to reduce the
annual earnings of the workers. The Board stated that it did not take
into consideration the possibility of increases in the cost of living or
the possible decrease in production and opportunities for employment
which might lower earmngs of both company and employees. These
contingencies might be taken care of when they arose by the clause in
the contract permitting termination on 60 days’ notice.
The Board recommended increased war-risk bonuses in No. 80,
American Merchant Marine Institute. The practice had grown up of
giving monthly bonuses to seamen who voyaged into dangerous bellig
erent areas and additional flat bonuses for duty into ports such as Suez
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
31
and Aden which were peculiarly hazardous. The monthly rate had,
by agreement, been stepped up to $60. West-coast seamen asked for
$90; east-coast seamen for $150. West coasters wanted the danger
zone shifted from 160 east to 160 west meridian; east coasters wanted
the Caribbean and the Canadian ports included. Suez had come to be
worth $75; the seamen asked for $300; a few other ports were worth
$45; they asked for $100, and $50 for certain ports not previously pay
able. There were other demands. These paint the picture. The
ship owners were most anxious for an arbitration procedure which
would cover future demands. The unions were set against this. The
panel gave an $80 monthly rate; $100 for Suez plus $5 for every day
laid over after the first 5 (lay-overs were usually 20 days or more).
It added a few ports to the bonus list and rejected claims on many
others. It set the one hundred and eightieth meridian as the danger
line; it ignored the Canadian and Caribbean ports. For future dis
putes it recommended an arbitration board of three to be appointed
by the President. The case is interesting because the situation was one
in which practice was new and the criteria for rate making completely *
nebulous, though, when the Board entered, a structure had been worked
out by contract. The Board gave what it considered a generous
increase in return for the stabilization which it hoped would come
from the arbitral board.
The last of the important wage determinations, decided after the
actual commencement of war, was No. 105, Central States Employers'*
Negotiating Committee. The Committee, representing about 800 com
mon and contract carriers engaged in motortrucking in the Central
States, had collective agreements since 1938 with the Teamsters
(I. B. T.) Union. The certification grew out of the negotiation of a
renewal contract. The parties agreed to seek the offices of the Board
and to abide by its determination. Thereupon the case was certified.
The principal demands were, for a raise in hourly rates from 80 cents
to $1, in mileage rates from 3 to 5 cents, and for vacations with pay.
The Board found that since 1937 truckers’ wages had risen much faster
than cost of living. However, “it seems unsound to take real wages
in 1937, the year before the first general contract was negotiated, as
necessarily the standard, or to assume that the lower standard of living
then existing among the drivers was proper and should now be re
established. We must differentiate between the standards reached by
workers through individual bargaining or through bargaining in local
and limited groups and those reached by industry-wide bargaining of
the type with which we are here dealing. Absolute standards of fair
real wages, of course, do not exist. But when dealing with organized
industry it seems to us fairer and more desirable to take as the standard
that balance between wages and living costs which has been reached
through industry-wide bargaining.
«* * * A sa general rule, it is only after some years of collective
bargaining that the proper competitive balance between a newly or
ganized industry and those longer organized is established. When
that balance is reached, of course, can only be judged by rule of thumb.
But it seems fair to assume from the evidence before us that if the
proper balance in labor costs between this industry and its chief com
petitor, the railroads, has in fact been reached, it was only when the
32
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
advances established by the recently expiring contract became effective
in 1940.”
In view of the recent 10-cent increase given to the railroad workers
by the President’s Emergency Board, the Board awarded 10 cents per
hour and 4 cents per mile more (roughly 12 percent in each class). It
will be noted that, despite their somewhat greater elaboration, both the
argument and the conclusion are strikingly similar to No. 21, General
M otors. The companies complained of inability to pay increases.
Here the Board replied that in setting a minimum it, like the last
War Labor Board, must ignore inability to pay, but that that factor
had led the Board “to restrict the increase * * * to the minimum
which * * * other factors have seemed to dictate.” “In dealing
with this question, however, we must of necessity consider the industry
in this case as a whole and not the individual carriers.”
The Board awarded 1 week’s vacation with pay to be taken, however,
only in the form of actual vacation and not as a bonus. The com
panies had urged that the emergency was a bad time to inaugurate
•vacations. The Board, on the contrary, found that the demand for
greater productivity, increasing strain and fatigue, would be well
served by vacations. It cited a similar conclusion as to railroad em
ployees by the President’s Emergency Board and remarks of Prime
Minister Winston Churchill with regard to holidays as an aid to
staying power.
The Board had little occasion to consider the relevancy of a living
wage as a criterion for fixing wage rates. This may have been due
to the minimums set by and under the Fair Labor Standards Act, or
to the fact that the unions did not rely upon the point. The Board
occasionally adverted, as in General Motors, to the fact that the
employer was able to pay the increase which it recommended. It
will be remembered that the War Labor Board of 1918 took the
position that an employer, regardless of its profit and loss account,
must pav a reasonable price for labor. It was in No. 105, Central
States Employers’ Negotiating Committee that the Board first ad
verted directly to the problem and endorsed the position of the War
Labor Board with the qualification, however, that profit and loss
might be taken into account should the wage demanded be more than
the reasonable minimum. The standard, however, of a reasonable
minimum is what the representative units of the industry should pay
in the light of the relation between its wage scale and wage scales of
comparable industries. The qualification may therefore be of little
comiort to marginal and submarginal operators, particularly where
industry-wide collective bargaining has developed. In No. 20C,
Alabama Mines, the Board made a recommendation which might in
cidentally threaten the profit margin of some producers, but it did
restrict the increase to a point which it hoped would enable all opera
tors to break even, and it counted upon changes in the legally fixed
minimum price structure eventually to protect marginal operators. A
number of cases settled by agreement seem to indicate that the poor
financial position of the employer might lessen the pressure exerted
by the Board for a solution which might otherwise seem appropriate.
It is even less possible to make generalizations concerning wage
settlements where there was no recommendation. These settlements
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
33
have followed the expected lines of compromise and comparison with
the practices prevailing in the industry. One agreement, however, is
sufficiently important and distinctive to justify mention. That is the
agreement which settled the controversy in No. 36, North American
Aviation. Here the Board was instrumental in raising the general
wage level in airplane manuf acture. The union demanded a 75-cent
minimum and 10-cent blanket increase. It argued the large profits
of the industry and pointed out that the present minimums were much
lower than in the body and motor plants of the automobile industry.
North American’s minimum was 50 cents, at which figure a great
majority were employed, a fact partly explained by the large per
centage of employment of workers new to the aircraft industry.
Other airplane plants ran from 50 cents for starters to 63 cents
after 6 months’ time. The Board was at one time prepared to recom
mend a 60-cent starting rate, a 75-cent regular minimum, and a 10cent blanket increase. The panel admitted that the wages at North
American were not substantially out of line with those of other West
coast plants, but it believed that in view of the enormous importance
of airplanes in national defense the wage levels in this comparatively
new industry should be brought to the level of wages in the more
highly paid industries with which airplanes were comparable, such
as steel and motors. The wages, the panel felt, should be of such
a nature as to attract and keep contented the finest workers in the
area. The parties agreed along these lines.
Breach of Collective Contracts 7
In many cases the controversy concerned legal rights as well as
economic interests. For issues of this sort, other forums are avail
able, The Board did not, even at the request of the parties, handle
controversies for which the law designated a specialized tribunal,
such as the National Labor Relations Board. But it did not refuse
to dispose of such matters as charges of breach of contract. In several
cases its recommendation was based in part on a finding of invasion
of legal rights or included a proposal to arbitrate such an issue.
While the Board sometimes ignored charges of breach of contract as
insignificant and devised no definite sanctions for strikes in violation
of contract, it repeatedly asserted the obligatory character of collec
tive agreements and sometimes phrased its recommendations ex
pressly to provide redress for breach. This attitude is most clearly
expressed in its handling of No. 2, Vanadium Steel Corporation; No.
78, Bendix Aviation Corporation; and No. 85, Alabama D ry Dock &
Shipbuilding Co. In the last-named case the Board rejected all
union demands because “this case is governed by the principle that
a collective bargaining agreement once made should be given effect
as long as it endures.”
In a few cases the Board exercised its mediatory function, as in
No. 101, Chris Craft Corporation, or recommended inquiries, as in
No. 40, Bohn Aluminum, and No. 78, Bendix Aviation Corporation,
with a view to voluntary modifications of contracts by the parties.
7 Further detailed analysis will be found in appendix G.
34
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Questions Involving the N. L. R. A .8
While the Board might encourage modification of existing con
tracts which it deemed unsuited to present circumstances, it wornd not
recommend violation of the statute law nor even pass judgment on
alleged violations where another agency had been created expressly
to perform this function. This policy was proved repeatedly in cases
where, the union claimed that the employer was committing unfair
labor practices under N. L. R. A., section 8, or where there was uncer
tainty about bargaining units or bargaining representatives under
N. L. R. A., section 9. However, in the very first case heard by the
Board, No. 3, Cornell-Dubilier, the Board did not respect an
N. L. R. B. order to an employer not to bargain with a particular
union. Here production had been interrupted and no other union
was on the scene. In these circumstances the Board, in the prime
interest of obtaining production, recommended bargaining pro
hibited by the N. L. R. B. order, which was under court review.
Though the recommendation was rejected by the union because it
involved ending the strike before terms of settlement were reached,
bargaining before the Board soon led to a contract. The Board—or
the employer—was more cautious in No. 6, Allis-Chalmers (Milwau
kee), where the possibility of conflict between terms of the contract
and the N. L. R. B. was expressly provided against in the collective
contract.
When a representation issue had to be decided, the Board referred
this issue—whether it was incidental or principal—to the N. L. R. B.
This reference was made sometimes by informal suggestion even be
fore a hearing, sometimes by request to the N. L. R. B. to expedite
a pending proceeding, sometimes by formal recommendations to the
parties. This procedure was expressly envisaged by the Executive
order of March 19.
The Board’s policy of self-limitation is further illustrated by No.
42, Duquesne L%ght, in which the Board recommended that the issue
of representation be decided by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board and that the parties forgo any right of judicial review.
Though the Board’s recommendation was not accepted by all parties,
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board’s actual decision was.
The Board’s relations to the N. L. R. B. extended also to the unfair
labor practice field. Cases No. 22, Minneapolis-Honeywell, No. 48,
Scullin Steel, No. 69, Pullman (Bessemer), No. 73, Kansas City Power
and Light, and No. 107, Burgess Battery , involved questions both of
representation and of unfair labor practices. Case No. 69 is partic
ularly interesting because, at the suggestion of the Board, the parties
agreed that they would accept the determination of the N. L. R. B.
trial examiner on reinstatement demands, and renounced any recourse
to the N. L. R. B. itself or to the courts. The refusal of the Board
to intervene in matters entrusted to the N. L. R. B. of course extended
to N. L. R. B. cases in the courts. Thus, in No. 73, the N. L. R. B.
had started a contempt proceeding against the employer for violating
an order of the N. L. R. B. affirmed on appeal. The Mediation Board,
holding that this proceeding was progressing in due course, succeeded
in persuading a union complaining of the employer’s conduct to call
off its strike and return to work pending the court’s decision.
8 Further detailed analysis will be found in appendix H.
PROCESS OF MEDIATION AND RECOMMENDATION
35
The Board repeatedly obtained from N. L. R. B. sources, inter
pretations of the N. L. R. B. In No. 18, John A . Roebling's Sons, the
Board asked the N. L. R. B. for an opinion on the propriety of allowing
the bargaining representative bulletin board privileges superior, to
those accorded a rival union. The general counsel of the N. L. R. B.
unofficially replied that no decisions forbade it. In connection with
No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding <&D ry Dock Co., the President suggested
that the Board consider “if necessary with the members of the Na
tional Labor Relations Board” whether the proposed maintenance
of membership were violative of the National Labor Relations Act.
The Board, supported by a formal opinion of the general counsel of
the N. L. R. B. that “an employer does not engage in unfair labor
practices * * * by including in a contract with a proper labor
organization a maintenance of membership clause,” agreed unani
mously that the proviso of section 8 (3) of the N. L. R. A. constituted
“an express statutory sanction of the maintenance of membership
clause,” and the chairman so reported to the President. The N. L. R. B.
general counsel again gave the Board a formal opinion—regarding
bargaining with unions in the absence of a majority representative of
the employees—in No. 108, Nevada Consolidated Copper (Santa Rita
and Hurley). In No. 54, Arm our, the Board obtained a statement of
the chairman of the N. L. R. B. that it would be proper for the em
ployer to negotiate a master agreement covering many plants when
the N. L. R. B. had certified the C. I. O. as representative in each of
these plants as separate bargaining units. In No. 65, Solvay Process,
the Board asked the N. L. R. B. to get from the Circuit Court of
Appeals clarification of its decree affirming a N. L. R. B. duty-tobargain order against the employer. The court, so requested, gave an
elucidation.
In No. 51, A ir Associates, the Board suggested that, instead of
leaving a claim of reinstatement and back-pay to the N. L. R. B., the
employer reinstate all employees and leave the question of pay to an
arbitrator. Thereafter the N. L. R. B. issued a complaint on this
matter. The employer agreed to take the men back, but wished the
N. L. R. B. to determine whether any pay was due. The Board
amended its recommendation accordingly and it was then accepted.
The relation between the two boards was altogether harmonious; the
Mediation Board did not invade the field of action of the N. L. R. B.
or of the courts in dealing with the N. L. R. A. The Board’s function
in situations where the N. L. R. A. provided the ultimate remedy
was to arrange a truce while the appointed agency proceeded to
adjudicate. The chairman of the Board expressed the Board’s atti
tude when he said in his public statement in response to the union’s
brief strike against the Board’s recommendation in No. 73, Kansas
City Power <&L ight:
“The National Labor Relations Act, which has been described as
the Magna Charta of trade unionism in the United States, gives to
this union an orderly method of obtaining the recognition for which
it is now striking; it is labor’s own act. In this emergency the uni
versal and ungrudging acceptance of the letter and spirit of the act
by employers is a compelling obligation. It is an equally compelling
obligation on the part of labor to seek and follow its legal remedy
in preference to direct action.”
Part m
Appendixes
37
Appendix A
General Documents
1. Executive Orders Relating to the National Defense Mediation
Board
E xecutive Order No. 8716
,
March 19 m i
W hereas it is essential in the present emergency that employers and em
ployees engaged in production or transportation of materials necessary to na
tional defense shall exert every possible effort to assure that all work necessary
for national defense shall proceed without interruption and with all possible
speed.
Now, therefore , by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution
and the statutes, and in order to define further certain functions and duties of
the Office of Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President
with respect to the national emergency as declared by the President to exist on
September 8,1939, it is hereby ordered as follows:
1. ( a) There is hereby created in the Office for Emergency Management, a
board to be known as the National Defense Mediation Board (hereinafter re
ferred to as the Board). The Board shall be composed of 11 members to be
appointed by the President, of whom 8 shall be disinterested persons represent
ing the public, 4 shall be representatives of employees, and 4 shall be repre
sentatives of employers. The President shall designate as chairman of the
Board one of the members representing the public.
(b) Each member of the Board shall receive necessary traveling expenses, and
each member who, during the period of his service on said Board, is not an
officer or employee of the United States shall receive in addition thereto $25
per diem for subsistence expense on such days as he is performing Board duties.
Within the limits of such funds as may be appropriated by Congress or allo
cated to it by the President, through the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of
Production Management shall furnish the Board with necessary experts, assist
ants, officers, and employees, and make provisions for the necessary supplies,
facilities, and services.
2. Whenever the Secretary of Labor certifies to the Board that any contro
versy or dispute has arisen between any employer (or group of employers) and
any employees (or organization of employees) which threatens to burden or
obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or materials essential
to national defense (excluding any dispute coming within the purview of the
Railway Labor Act as amended) and which cannot be adjusted by the Com
missioners of Conciliation of the Department of Labor, the Board is hereby
authorized—
(a) To make every reasonable effort to adjust and settle any such controversy
or dispute by assisting the parties thereto to negotiate agreements for that
purpose;
(b) To afford means for voluntary arbitration with an agreement by the
parties thereto to abide by the decision arrived at upon such arbitration, and,
when requested by both parties, to designate a person or persons to act as im
partial arbitrator or arbitrators of such controversy or dispute;
(c) To assist in establishing, when desired by the parties, methods for re
solving future controversies or disputes between the parties; and to deal with
matters of interest to both parties which may thereafter arise;
(d) To investigate issues between employers and employees, and practices
and activities thereof, with respect to such controversy or dispute; conduct
hearings, take testimony, make findings of fact, and formulate recommenda
tions for the settlement of any such controversy or dispute; and make public
39
40
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
such findings and recommendations whenever in the judgment of the Board the
interests of industrial peace so require;
( e ) To request the National Labor Relations Board, in any controversy or
dispute relating to the appropriate unit or appropriate representatives to be
designated for purposes of collective bargaining, to expedite as much as possible
the determination of the appropriate unit or appropriate representatives of the
workers.
3. Whenever a controversy or dispute is certified to the Board, in accordance
with section 2, the chairman, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Board, shall designate as a division of the Board such members as he deems
necessary to take action with respect to such controversy or dispute, and to
perform in connection therewith any of the duties enumerated in section 2;
provided (a) that no less than three members shall be assigned to any such
division, and (b) that each of the three groups represented on the Board shall
be represented on any such division.
4. Whenever a controversy or dispute which has not been certified to it in
accordance with section 2 is brought to the attention of the Board, it shall refer
the matter to the Department of Labor.
It is hereby declared to be the duty of employers and employees engaged in
production or transportation of materials essential to national defense to exert
every possible effort to settle all their disputes without any interruptions in
production or transportation. In the interest of national defense the parties
should give to the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor and to the
Office of Production Management (a) notice in writing of any desired change
in existing agreements, wages, or working conditions ; (b) full information as
to all developments in labor disputes; and (c) such sufficient advance notice of
any threatened interruptions to continuous production as will permit explora
tion of all avenues of possible settlement of such controversies so as to avoid
strikes, stoppages, or lock-outs.
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
E xecutive Order N o. 8731
April 4, 19U
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes and
in order further to assure that all work necessary for national defense shall
proceed without interruption and with all possible speed, it is hereby ordered as
follows:
Executive Order No. 8716 of March 19,1941, entitled “Establishment of National
Defense Mediation Board,” is hereby amended so as to provide for the appoint
ment of alternate members of the National Defense Mediation Board, each of
which alternate members shall be designated as alternate for a regular member of
the Board named in connection with his appointment. Any alternate member
shall be authorized to serve, when the regular member for whom he is designated
as alternate shall for any reason be unavailable for such service, upon any di
vision of the Board designated by the chairman of the Board under the pro
visions of section 3 of said Executive Order No. 8716, and to perform in
connection with such service the duties and functions of a member of the Board
with respect to any matter before such division. An alternate member shall
receive compensation and expenses during any period of such service in like
manner as regular members of the Board.
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
E xecutive Order N o. 9017
January 12, 191$
W hereas by reason of the state of war declared to exist by joint resolutions of
the Congress, approved December 8, 1941, and December 11, 1941, respectively
(Public Laws Nos. 328, 331, 332, 77th Congress), the national interest demands
that there shall be no interruption of any work which contributes to the effective
prosecution of the war; and
W hereas as a result of a conference of representatives of labor and industry
which met at the call of the President on December 17,1941, it has been agreed
that for the duration of the war there shall be no strikes or lock-outs, and that all
GENERAL DOCUMENTS
41
labor disputes shall be settled by peaceful means, and that a National War Labor
Board be established for the peaceful adjustment of such disputes:
Now, th er efo r e ], by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and
the statutes of the United States, it is hereby ordered:
1. There is hereby created in the Office for Emergency Management a National
War Labor Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board. The Board shall be com
posed of 12 special commissioners to be appointed by the President. Four of the
members shall be representative of the public; 4 shall be representative of
employees; and 4 shall be representative of employers. The President shall desig
nate the chairman and vice chairman of the Board from the members represent
ing the public. The President shall appoint 4 alternate members representative
of employees and 4 representative of employers, to serve as Board members in the
absence of regular members representative of their respective groups. Six mem
bers or alternate members of the Board, including not less than 2 members from
each of the groups represented on the Board, shall constitute a quorum. A
vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to
exercise all the powers of the Board.
2. This order does not apply to labor disputes for which procedures for adjust
ment or settlement are otherwise provided until those procedures have been
exhausted.
3. The procedures for adjusting and settling labor disputes which might inter
rupt work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war shall be as
follows: (a) The parties shall first resort to direct negotiations or to the proced
ures provided in a collective bargaining agreement, (b) If not settled in this
manner, the Commissioners of Conciliation of the Department of Labor shall be
notified if they have not already intervened in the dispute, (c) If not promptly
settled by conciliation, the Secretary of Labor shall certify the dispute to the
Board, provided, however, that the Board in its discretion after consultation with
the Secretary may take jurisdiction of the dispute on its own motion. After it
takes jurisdiction, the Board shall finally determine the dispute, and for this pur
pose may use mediation, voluntary arbitration, or arbitration under rules estab
lished by the Board.
4. The Board shall have power to promulgate rules and regulations appropriate
for the performance of its duties.
5. The members of the Board (including alternates) shall receive necessary
traveling expenses, and, unless their compensation is otherwise prescribed by the
President, shall receive in addition to traveling expenses $25 per diem for sub
sistence expense on such days as they are actually engaged in the performance of
duties pursuant to this order. The Board is authorized to appoint and fix the
compensation of its officers, examiners, mediators, umpires, and arbitrators; and
the chairman is authorized to appoint and fix the compensation of other necessary
employees of the Board. The Board shall avail itself, insofar as practicable, of
the services and facilities of the Office for Emergency Management and of other
departments and agencies of the Government.
6. Upon the appointment of the Board and the designation of its chairman, the
National Defense Mediation Board established by Executive Order No. 8716 of
March 19,1941, shall cease to exist. All employees of the National Defense Media
tion Board shall be transferred to the Board without acquiring by such transfer
any change in grade or civil service status. All records, papers, and property, and
all unexpended funds and appropriations for the use and maintenance of the
National Defense Mediation Board shall be transferred to the Board. All duties
with respect to cases certified to the National Defense Mediation Board shall be
assumed by the Board for discharge under the provisions of this order.
7. Nothing herein shall be construed as superseding or in conflict with the pro
visions of the Kailway Labor Act (act of May 20,1926, as amended, 44 Stat. 577;
48 Stat. 926,1185 ; 49 Stat. 1169; 45 U. S. Code 151), the National Labor Relations
Act (act of July 5, 1935, 49 Stat. 457; 29 U. S. Code 151 et seq.), the Fair Labor
Standards Act (act of June 25,1938; 52 Stat. 1060: 29 U. S. Code 201 et seq.), and
the act to provide conditions for the purchase of supplies, etc., approved June 30,
1936 (49 Stat. 2036; 41 U. S. Code, sections 35-45), or the act amending the act of
March 3,1931, relating to the rate of wages for laborers and mechanics, approved
August 30, 1935 (49 Stat. 1011; 40 U. S. Code, sec. 276 et seq.).
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
42
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
2. General Resolutions of the National Defense Mediation Board
Adopted April 10
That the Office of Production Management should continue to act as the fiscal
agent for the Board within the purview of section (b) of the Executive order of
March 19, 1941.
That the Board should appoint and maintain its own independent administra
tive staff.
That the chairman should appoint a committee to study the administrative
organization of the Board and submit recommendations to the Board at its
next meeting.
That the records of the Board with respect to hearings before a division of
its members are confidential and not for disclosure.
Adopted July 10
That the Board should not adopt any uniform policy with respect to union
security recommendations.
Adopted July 24, August 7, and August 21
Rules of Procedure.
1. [Rule 1, adopted July 24, providing for a rotating vice-chairmanship was
rescinded August 7, and the following resolution was adopted in its stead:]
In his absence and that of the vice-chairman, the chairman should designate an
acting chairman; and in the absence of such designation, the public representa
tive senior in appointment should serve as acting chairman.
2.1. At any meeting of the Board all regular or alternate members of the
Board present shall be empowered to vote unless a roll call is requested. A
roll call may be requested by any member of the Board present at the meeting.
2.2. In case of a roll call, all regular members of the Board present shall be
empowered to vote. Alternate members may then vote only in accordance with
the following section.
2.8 In the absence of any regular member of the Board his power to vote
shall pass to one of his designated alternate members in the order of their
appointment and, as among those appointed simultaneously, in alphabetical order.
2.4. In the absence of a regular member of the Board and of all of his desig
nated alternates, or in the absence of a regular member of the Board for whom
no alternates have been designated, his power to vote shall pass to an alternate
member present from the same group as the absentee. For the purpose of
this section, regular and alternate members shall be divided into four groups:
Public representatives, employee representatives affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations, employee representatives affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, and employer representatives. Power to vote shall pass
to alternate members within each group in the order of their appointment and,
as among those appointed simultaneously, in alphabetical order.
2.5. If less than two employee representatives affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations are present, the power to vote of the absentees shall
pass to alternate members affiliated with the American Federation of Labor
in the order of their appointment and, as among those appointed simultaneously,
in alphabetical order. If less than two employee representatives affiliated with
the American Federation of Labor are present, the power to vote of the absentees
shall pass to alternate members affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organi
zations in the order of their appointment and, as among those appointed
simultaneously, in alphabetical order.
3.1. At all Board meetings at which the chairman of the Board is present,
he shall preside. In his absence, the vice-chairman of the Board shall preside.
In the absence of both the chairman and the vice-chairman, the acting chairman
shall preside.
4.1. A quorum of the Board shall consist of seven Board members empowered
to vote in accordance with the provisions of section 2 provided that a quorum
must include at least two members representing the public, two members repre
senting the employers, and two members representing the employees.
5.1. Under paragraph 3 of the Executive order of March 19, 1941, a division
designated by the chairman is empowered to take action with respect to the
controversy or dispute and to perform, in connection therewith, any of the
GENERAL DOCUMENTS
43
duties of the Board. Action by the Board on a particular dispute may be
effected by such a division duly designated by the chairman. Upon the request
of any member of a division, the matter before the division may be referred to
the full Board for consideration and action.
Adopted August 21
That the chairman should instruct the assistants to the divisions that one
of their duties in each case is to keep alert to the question of whether or not
there is machinery for settling disputes over the interpretation of agreements
negotiated before the Board or recommendations issued by it, and, if not, to
bring it to the attention of the chairman of the division.
That the present policy of the Board of permitting the parties to disputes
to examine, in the Board’s offices, copies of the transcripts taken at hearings,
but not to take such transcripts from the Board’s offices or to copy from them,
should be continued.
469872°— 42--- 4
Appendix B
Cases and Interruptions of Production Before the Board
T able
7 .— List
,
of all cases showing parties and stoppage situation when case
was taken by Board
* Production substantially slowed or stopped when Board took jurisdiction (i.e. on date of certification
except in cases 4A, 20A, 20B, and 20C).
# Stoppage threatened when Board took jurisdiction.
X No critical situation when Board took jurisdiction.
Case
No.
*1
*2
*3
*4
X 4A
*5
*
6
*7
8
*9
10
*11
*12
#13
*
♦
*14
*15
#16
*17
*18
*19
*20
* 20A
* 20B
* 20C
Name and address of employer
Name of labor organization and affiliation
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and
Tin Workers of North America, Good Will
Lodge 178, C. I. O.
Vanadium Corporation of America, Bridge- United Vanadium Workers Local Industrial
ville, Pa.
Union No. 953, C. I. O. Later changed to
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Lo
cal 2480, C. I. O.
ComeU-Dubilier Electric Corporation (sub International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
sidiary of Condenser Corporation of America), ers, Local B-1041, A. F. L.
South Plainfield, N. J.
International Harvester Co., Chicago, 111. (3 Farm Equipment Workers Organizing Com
plants), East Moline, 111., Canton, 111., Rich mittee, C. I. O.
mond, Ind.
International Harvester Co., Chicago, 111., Federal Labor Unions, Locals 22631 and 22657,
A. F. L.
Milwaukee, Wis., and Rock Falls, 111,
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. (Snoqualmie Falls Puget Sound District Council Lumber and
Lumber Co.), Snoqualmie Falls, Wash.
Sawmill Workers, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local
2545, A. F. L.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., Milwaukee, United Automobile Workers of America,
Local 248, C. I. O.
Wis.
Seas Shipping Co., Inc., New York, N. Y......... National Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Associa
tion, Local 33, C. I. O.
Standard Tool Co., Cleveland, Ohio................... United Automobile Workers of America, Local
217, C. I. O.
Cowles Tool Co., Cleveland, Ohio....... ............. United Automobile Workers of America, Local
217, C. I. O.
Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
of America, Local 441, C. I. O.
Elizabeth, N. J.
J. Sklar Manufacturing Co., Long Island City, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Work
ers of America, Local 1225, C. I. O.
N. Y.
California Metal Trades Association, San Fran International Association of Machinists, Lodge
68, A. F. L.
cisco, Calif.
Minneapolis Moline Power Implement Co., United Electrical, Radio and Machine Work
Minneapolis, Minn., and Hopkins Moline ers of America, Locals 1138 and 1146, 0 .1.0.
Power Implement Co., Hopkins, Minn.
Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Machine Co., Birds- Steel Workers Organizing Committee, C. I. O.,
Birdsboro Steel Foundry & Machine Co. Em
boro, Pa.
ployee and Beneficial Association.
Federation
of Dyers, Finishers, Printers, and
Arcadia Emitting Mills, Inc., Allentown, Pa_~
Bleachers of America, C. I. O. (Branch of
Textile Workers Union of America).
Kellogg Switchboard & Supply Co., Chicago, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
ers, Local B-713, A. F. L., and International
HI.
Association of Machinists, District 8, A. F. L.
American Car & Foundry Co., Buffalo, N. Y— Federal Labor Union 22518, A. F, L., and Steel
Workers Organizing Committee, C. I. O.
John A. Roebling’s Sons Co., Trenton and Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
2111, C. I. O.
Roebling, N. J.
American Potash & Chemical Corporation, International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers, Local 414, C. I. O.
Trona, Cal.
Bituminous Coal Operators. (Appalachian United Mine Workers of America, C. I. O.
Mines were dealt with as No 20; special groups
of Appalachian Mines as No. 20A and No.
20B; and Alabama Mines as No. 20C.)
Wisconsin Steel Coal Mines (subsidiary of United Mine Workers of America, C. I. O.,
and International Union of Progressive Mine
International Harvester Co.), Benham, Ky.
Workers of America, Local 402, A. F. L.
Bituminous Coal Operators (Captive Mines).. United Mine Workers of America, C. I. O.,
Bituminous Coal Operators (Alabama Mines).. United Mine Workers of America, District 20,
Universal-Cyclops Steel Corporation, Bridgeville, Pa.
C. I. O.
45
46
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
T able 7 .— L ist of all casesy show ing p a rties and stoppage situ a tio n w h en ease
w a s taken by B oard —Continued
Case
No.
Name and address of employer
#21
General Motors Corporation, Detroit, Mich—
# 22 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., Min
neapolis, Minn.
* 23 Utica <fc Mohawk Cotton Mills, Inc., Utica,
XN• X•
#24 Busch-Sulzer Bros. Diesel Engine Co., St.
Louis, Mo.
* 25
# 26
* 27
#28
* 29
* 30
#31
* 32
* 33
#34
* 35
* 36
* 37
* 38
* 39
#40
#41
#42
Curtis Manufacturing Co., St. Louis, Mo.........
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., Pittsburgh,
Pa.
Continental Rubber Works, Erie, Pa.................
Bendix Aviation Corporation, South Bend,
Ind.
Ex-Cell-0 Corporation, Detroit, Mich................
United Engineering & Foundry Co., Pitts
burgh, Pa.
Employers Negotiating Committee (represent
ing employers in the logging and milling
industry in the Puget Sound area).
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., La Porte,
Ind.
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corporation, Washing
ton, D. C.
Columbia Basin Loggers, Portland, Oreg.,
(representing lumber operators).
E. W. Bliss Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.........................
North American Aviation, Inc., Inglewood,
Calif.
Bethlehem Steel Co. (Shipbuilding Division),
San Francisco, Calif.
Aluminum Co. of America, Cleveland, Ohio,.
Marlin Rockwell Corporation, Plainville, Conn..
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corporation, Detroit,
Mich.
Curtiss-Wright Corporation (Curtiss Propeller
Division), Neville Island, Pa.
Duquesne Light Co. (Colfax Power Station),
Pittsburgh, Pa.
#43 Sealed Power Corporation, Muskegon, M ich...
* 44 Western Cartridge Co. (East Alton Manufac
turing Co.), Alton, HI.
* 45 Western Pennsylvania Labor Relations As
sociation, Pittsburgh. Pa. (representing
truck owners).
X 46 Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. (sub
sidiary of U. S. Steel Corporation), Kearny,
N. J.
X 47 Cheney Brothers, South Manchester, Conn—
#48 Scullin Steel Co., St. Louis, M o.
#49 Breeze Corporations, Inc., Newark, N. J.........
# 50 Tennessee Coal, Iron, & Railroad Co. (sub
sidiary of U. S. Steel Corporation), Birming
ham, Ala.
* 51 Air Associates, Inc., Bendix, N. J._..................
* 52 Federal Mogul Corporation, Detroit, Mich........
* 53 Gulf States Utilities Co., Baton Rouge, La........
X 54 Armour & Co., Chicago, 111., and other plants..
Name of labor organization and affiliation
United Automobile Workers of America, G. L
O.
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Work
ers of America, Local 1145, C. I. O.
Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. O.
International Association of Machinists, Dis
trict Lodge 9, A. F. L., and United Brother
hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
1128, C. I. O.
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Work
ers of America, Local 613, C. I. O.
United Rubber Workers of America, Local 61,
C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
9, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America,
Local 157, C. I. O.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
1388, C. I. O.
International Woodworkers of America, C. I.
O.
Farm Equipment Workers Organizing Com
mittee, Local 119, C. I. O.
Sand and Gravel Workers' Union, Local 22075,
A. F. L.
International Woodworkers of America, Co
lumbia River District Council No. 5, C. I. O.
United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Work
ers of America, Local 475, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America,
Local 683, C. I. O.
Bay Cities Metal Trades Council, A. F. L.
National Association of Die Casting Workers
of America, Local 55, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
197, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
208, C. I. O.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
2170, C. I. O.
Utility Workers Organizing Committee, Local
117, C. I. O., and Independent Association of
Employees of Duquesne Light Co. and Asso
ciated Companies.
International Union United Automobile Work
ers of America, Local 637, A. F. L.
Chemical Workers Union, Local 22574, A .F. L.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
America, Local 249, A. F. L.
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America, Local 16, C. I. O.
Textile Workers Union of America, Local 63,
C. I. O.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
1062, C. I. O., and Scullin Steel Co. Employ
ees Mutual Aid Association, Inc.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
871, C. I. O.
Office and Technical Workers, Local 2210,
C. I. O., and International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local B-287, A. F. L.
United Automobile Workers of America,
C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
202, C. I. O.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
ers, Locals 1003,1238, and 1241, A. F. L., and
Gulf States Electrical Service Employees
Association.
Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee,
CASES AND INTERRUPTIONS OF PRODUCTION
47
T able 7.— L ist of all cases , show ing p a rties and stoppage situ a tio n w hen case
w a s taken by B oard —Continued
Case
No.
Name and address of employer
Borg-Warner Corporation (Mechanics Uni
versal Joint Division), Rockford, 111.
Aluminum Co. of America, Vernon, Calif-------Lincoln Mills of Alabama, Huntsville, Ala........
Ohio Brass Co., Mansfield and Barberton, Ohio.
Erwin Cotton Mills Co., Durham, N. C............
United States Gypsum Co., Chicago, 111., and
other plants.
61 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.,
New York, N. Y.
62 Todd Galveston Dry Docks, Inc. (subsidiary of
Todd Shipyards Corporation), Galveston,
Tex.
#63 Rockford Drop Forge Co., Rockford, 111.
#55
X 56
# 57
* 58
#59
60
*64 Curtiss-Wright Corporation (Curtiss Propeller
Division), Caldwell, N. J.
#65 Solvay Process Co., Inc. (subsidiary Allied
Chemical & Dye Corporation), Baton Rouge,
La.
X 66 Aluminum Co. of America, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
and other plants.
* 67 Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. (subsidiary of
McWane Cast Iron Pipe Co.), Provo, Utah.
• 68 American Car & Foundry Co., Chicago, HI----* 69 Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co.,
Bessemer, Ala.
Henry Vogt Machine Co., Louisville, Ky____
Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co.,
Michigan Citv, Ind.
Aluminum Co *of America, Vancouver, Wash..
Kansas City PoWer & Light Co., Kansas City,
Mo.
* 74 Pressed Steel Car Co., McKees Rocks, Pa-------
* 70
* 71
* 72
* 73
* 75 Lamson & Sessions Co., Cleveland, Ohio_____
* 76 American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co., Mahwah, N. J.
* 77 Duquesne Light Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., and
Curtiss-Wright Corporation (Curtiss Propel
ler Division), Beaver, Pa.
#78 Bendix Aviation Corporation (Bendix Prod
ucts Division), South Bend, Ind.
* 79 Hendey Machine Co., Torrington, Conn-------* 80 American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.,
New York, N. Y., Pacific American Ship
owners Association, San Francisco, Calif.,
Waterman Steamship Corporation, Mobile,
Ala.
Aircraft Corporation, San Diego,
#81 Consolidated
Calif.
* 82 Shaw-Box Crane & Hoist Division of Man
ning^ Maxwell, & Moore, Inc., Muskegon,
Agar Packing and Provision Corporation, P.
Brennan Co., Illinois Meat Packing Co.,
Chit ;o, 111.
* 84
'leable Iron C o., Inc., Worcester,
Mass.
#85 Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., Mo
bile, Ala.
*86 Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., Cleveland,
Ohio.
Name of labor organization and affiliation
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
225, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
808, C. I. O.
Textile Workers Union of America, C. I. O.
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Work
ers of America, Locals 747 and 758, C. I. O.
Textile Workers Union of America, Local 246,
C. I. O.
Gas, By-Products, Coke and Chemical Workers
Union, District 50, United Mine Workers
of America, C. I. O.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
ers, Local 3, A. F. L., and Brotherhood of
Consolidated Edison Employees.
Galveston Metal Trades Council, A. F. L., and
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Ship Builders and Helpers of America,
A. F. L.
International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths,
Drop Forgers, and Helpers, Local 614, A. F.
L., and International Association of Machin
ists, A. F. L.
International Association of Machinists, Local
703, A. F. L., and Propeller Craft, Inc.
Oil Workers International Union, Local 424,
C. I. O., and Chemical Workers Union Local
22609, A. F. L.
Aluminum Workers of America, Local 2,
C. I. O.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
1654, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
805, C. I. O.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
1466, C. I. O., International Association
of Machinists, Local 359, A. F. L., and Inter
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local B-287, A. F. L.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
1693, C. I. O.
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America,
Local 290, A. F. L.
Aluminum Trades Council, A. F. L.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
ers, Local B-412, A. F. L., and Independent
Union of Utility Employees.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local
1844, C. I. O., and Car and Foundry Workers,
Union, Local 1.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
217, C. I. O.
International Molders’ and Foundry Workers"
Union of North America, Local 315, A. F. L.
Independent Association of Employees of Du
quesne Light Co. and Associated Com
panies, and Building and Construction
Trades Council, A. F. L.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
9, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
398, C. I. O.
Seafarers International Union of North
America, A. F. L., and Sailors Union of the
Pacific, A. F. L.
International Association of Machinists, Air
craft Lodge 1125, A. F. L.
International Union United Automobile Work
ers of America, Local 644, A. F. L.
Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee,
C.I. O.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, C. I. O.
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America, Local 18, C. I. O.
Mechanics Educational Society of America,
Local 5.
48
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
T able 7 .— L ist of a ll cases , show ing parties and stoppage situ ation w hen case
w a s taken by B oard —Continued
Case
No.
Name and address of employer
#87 Fairmont Aluminum Co., Fairmont, W. Va ...
* 88 American Cyanamid Co. (Calco Chemical
Division). Bound Brook, N. J.
International Harvester Co., Springfield, Ohio. .
' 90 Hillsdale Steel Products (subsidiary of Spicer
Manufacturing Corporation), Hillsdale, Mich.,
and Spicer Manufacturing Corporation, To
ledo, Ohio.
#91 John A. Roebling’s Sons Co., Roebling, N. J___
* 92 Ingalls Ship Building Corporation, Pascagoula,
* 93 American Engineering Co., Philadelphia, P a...
#94 Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., Birmingham,
Ala.
#95 Alabama By-Products Corporation, Birming
ham, Ala.
#96 Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, N. Y...........
#97 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., New York,
N. Y.
#98 Union Electric Co., St. Louis, Mo.......................
* 99 York Corrugating Co., York, P a........................
100 Wolverine Tube Co., Detroit, Mich...................
101 Chris Craft Corporation, Algonac, Mich..........
102 American Can Co., Chicago, 111...........................
X 103 Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation
(Subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corpora
tion), Ely, Nev.
# 104 Waterfront Employers Association of Washing
ton, Seattle, Wash.
*
*
*
States Employers* Negotiating Com
# 105 Central
mittee, Chicago, HI. (operating truck own
ers).
X 106 American Shipbuilding Co., Cleveland, Ohio...
* 107 Burgess Battery Co., Freeport, 111....... ...............
Consolidated Copper Corporation (sub
# 108 Nevada
sidiary of Kennecott Copper Corporation),
Santa Rita and Hurley, N. Mex.
X 109 American Molasses Co., American Sugar Refin
ing Co., Refined Syrups Sales Corporation,
New York, N. Y.
Copper Mining Co., Butte, M ont...
# 110 Anaconda
111 Hammond & Irving, Inc., Auburn, N. Y_____
*
•
112 Johns-Manville Products Corporation, Watson,
Name of labor organization and affiliation
AluminumWorkers of America, Local 1, C. I. O.
Chemical Workers Union, Local 22051, A. F. L.,
and United Mine Workers of America,
C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
402, C. I. O.
International Union United Automobile
workers of America, Local 663, A. F. L., and
United Automobile Workers of America,
Local 701, C. I. O.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Lodge 867.
Pascagoula Metal Trades Council, A. F. L.
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America, Local 35, C. I. O.
United Mine Workers of America, District 50,
Local 12014, C. I. O.
United Mine Workers of America, District 50,
Local 12136, C. I. O.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
501, C. I. O.
Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America, Local 39, C. I. O.
Tri-State Utility Workers Union.
International Association of Machinists, Local
1462, A. F. L.
United Automobile Workers of America, Local
174, C. I. O.
Federal Labor Union 20783, A. F. L.
Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Locals
2041 and 1478, C. I. O.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, Divi
sion 596.
International Longshoremen’s Association, Lo
cals 38-83, 38-86, 38-97, A. F. L., and Inter
national Longshoremen’s Association, Check
ers and Supercargoes, Local 38-36, A. F. L.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, Central States Drivers’ Council,
A. F. L.
Metal Trades Department, A. F. L.
International Association of Machinists, Lodge
1096, A. F. L.
Chino Metal Trades Council of Santa Rita and
Hurley, N. Mex., A. F. L., Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen,
Lodge 492, and Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, Lodge 825.
International Longshoremen’s Association,
A. F. L.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
ers, Locals 65, 122, and 200, A. F. L.
International Association of Machinists, Local
153, A. F. L., and International Brotherhood
of Blacksmiths, Drop Forgers and Helpers,
Local 628, A. F. L.
Rock Products Workers Union, Local 21643,
A. F. L.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
America, Locals 430, 771, ana 776, A. F. L.
Calif.
Highway Transport Association of Pennsyl
vania, Inc., York, Pa., Harrisburg Truckowners Negotiating Committee, Harrisburg,
Pa., Lancaster Truckowners Negotiating
Committee, Lancaster, Pa.
Transportation Association, Inc., International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
# 114 Carolina
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, and Helpers of
Charlotte, N. C.
America, Local 71, A. F. L.
# 113
CASES AND INTEKRUPTIONS OF PRODUCTION
T able
49
8 .— Cases in which
the Board upon taking case requested the parties to
continue or resume production
S Stoppage.
T Threatened stoppage.
* Production resumed or stoppage prevented by Board’s request.
# Production resumed or stoppage prevented by truce or settlement before hearing.
X Occurrence or continuance of stoppage despite Board’s request.
Y Production resumed pursuant to agreement to end stoppage upon certification of case.
Action Case No.
SX
2
4
13
16
20B
20C
21
22
26
28
29
30
32
33
34
36
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
46
47
48
60
62
66
66
67
68
69
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
78
79
80
Title and location of company
Vanadium Corporation of America, Bridgeville, Conn.
International Harvester Co., strikes in two plants at Chicago, HI., and one each at
Rock Falls, 111., and Richmond, Ind.
T
Minneapolis Moline Power Implement Co., Minneapolis, Minn. Hopkins Moline
Power Implement Co., Hopkins, Minn.
T*
Kellog Switchboard & Supply Co., Chicago, HI
SX
Bituminous Coal Operators (captive mines)
Bituminous Coal Operators (Alabama mines)
8*
T*
General Motors Corporation, Detroit, Mich.
T*
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., Minneapolis, Minn.
T*
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.
T*
Bendix Aviation Corporation, South Bend, Ind.
Ex-Cell-0 Corporation, Detroit, Mich.
SX
s*
United Engineering & Foundry Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., Laporte, Ind.
SX
Smoot Sand & Gravel Corporation, Washington, D. C.
TX
T*
Columbia Basin Loggers, Portland, Oreg.
E. W. Bliss Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.
T*
T*
North American Aviation, Inc., Inglewood, Calif.
Bethlehem Steel Co., San Francisco, Calif.
1S *
Aluminum Co. of America, Cleveland, Ohio.
T*
Marlin Rockwell Corporation, Plainville, Conn.
S*
2t *
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corporation, Detroit, Mich.
Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Neville Island, Pa.
T*
Duquesne Light Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.
T*
Sealed Power Corporation, Muskegon, Mich.
T*
Western Cartridge Co., Alton, 111.
T*
Western Pennsylvania Labor Relations Association, Pittsburgh, Pa.
S*
Cheney Bros., South Manchester, Conn.
T*
Scullin Steel Co., St. Louis, Mo.
T*
Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., Birmingham, Ala.
T*
Federal Mogul Corporation, Detroit, Mich.
S*
Borg-Warner Corporation, Rockford, HI.
T*
Aluminum Co. of America, Vernon, Calif.
T*
Lincoln Mills of Alabama, Huntsville, Ala.
T*
Ohio Brass Co., Barberton and Mansfield, Ohio.
3S X
Erwin Cotton Mills Co., Durham, N. C.
T*
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., New York, N. Y.
SY
Todd Galveston Dry Docks, Inc., Galveston, Tex.
S*
Rockford Drop Forge Co., Rockford, HI.
T*
Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Caldwell, N. J.
SY
Solvay Process Co.. Inc., Baton Rouge, La.
T*
Aluminum Co. of America, Pittsburgh, Pa.
T*
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co., Provo, Utah.
S*
American Car & Foundry Co., Chicago, HI.
S*
Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co., Bessemer, Ala.
s*
Henry Vogt Machine Co., Louisville, Ky.
s
Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co., Michigan City, Ind.
SX
Aluminum Co. of America, Vancouver, Wash.
T*
Kansas City Power & Light Co., Kansas City, Mo.
T*
Pressed Steel Car Co., McKees Rocks, Pa.
s#
Lamson
& Sessions Co., Cleveland, Ohio.
T*
x*
Bendix Aviation Corporation, South Bend, Ind.
Hendey Machine Co., Torrington, Conn.
SY
American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc., New York, N. Y., Pacific American Ship
SY
owners Association, San Francisco, Calif.,and the Waterman Steamship Corporation,
Mobile, Ala.
Consolidated
Aircraft Corporation, San Diego, Calif.
T*
81
82 Shaw-Box Crane & Hoist Division of Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., Muskegon,
<sx#
Mich.
Malleable Iron Co., Inc., Worcester, Mass.
s # 8584 Arcade
Alabama Dry Dock <fc Shipbuilding Co., Mobile, Ala.
T*
86 Cleveland Graphite Bronze Co., Cleveland, Ohio.
s*
T*
87 Fairmont Aluminum Co., Fairmont, W. Va.
88 American Cyanamid Co., Bound Brook, N. J.
S*
SY
89 International Harvester Co., Springfield, Ohio.
SY
90 Hillsdale Steel Products, Hillsdale, Mich., Spicer Manufacturing Corporation, Toledo,
Ohio.
T*
91 John A. Roebling’s Sons Co., Trenton, N. J.
92 Ingalls Ship Building Corporation, Pascagoula, Miss.
SY
S*
93 American Engineering Co., Philadelphia, Pa.
94 Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., Birmingham, Ala.
*T X *
T*
95 Alabama By-Products Corporation, Birmingham, Ala.
T*
96 Bell Aircraft Corporation, Buffalo, N. Y.
See footnotes at end of table.
s*
50
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
T able 8 . — Cases
in which the Board upon taking case requested the parties to
continue or resume production
—Continued
Title and location of company
Action Case No.
*TX #
T"
«XS
SY
B*
S#
T«
T«
T"
T"
T<
T"
SY
8*
T*
T*
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., New York, N. Y.
Union Electric Co., St. Louis, Mo.
York Corrugating Co., York, Pa.
Wolverine Tube Co., Detroit, Mich.
Chris Craft Corporation, Algonac, Mich.
American Can Co., Chicago, 111.
Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation, Ely, Nev.
Waterfront Employers Association of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
Central States Employers* Negotiating Committee, Chicago, 111.
Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation, Santa Rita and Hurley, N. M.
American Molasses Co., American Sugar Refining Co., Refined Syrups Sales Cor*
poration, New York, N. Y.
Anaconda Copper Mining Co., Butte, Mont.
Hammond & Irving, Inc., Auburn, N. Y.
Johns-Manville Products Corporation, Watson. Calif.
Highway Transport Association of Pennsylvania, Inc., York, Pa.
Harrisburg Truckowners Negotiating Committee, Harrisburg, Pa.
Lancaster Truckowners Negotiating Committee, Lancaster, Pa.
Carolina Transportation Association, Charlotte, N. C.
i The certification expressly excluded revision of “Pacific Coast Zone Standards.’* The Board’s request
to resume production was heeded, except by the machinists* local which made a demand contrary to these
standards. The Board addressed its request to the employer and to the Bay Cities Metal Trades Council,
of which this local was a member. Upon the council’s voting for resumption of work, this local withdrew
from the council and, despite appeals from its international president and from the President of the United
States, remained on strike till the Board’s recommendations had been accepted by the parties. Though
its demand (being excluded by the certification) had not been dealt with, its members then resumed work.
* Board’s telegram requesting postponement of strike received too late to prevent stoppage.
* Controversy involved plants at Barberton and Mansfield, Ohio. Strikers did not return to work at
Barberton, but the threatened strike at Mansfield was called off.
<Union acceded to Board’s request to return to work, but company refused to reopen plant till union
agreed to abide by shop rules and regulations.
«Union acceded to Board’s request to return to work, but company refused to reopen plant until an agree
ment had been reached.
T able 9 . — List of cases in which stoppages of production occurred after certifica
tion to the National Defense Mediation Board
Case
No.
Title of company
Case
No.
18
i20B
200
21
22
31
33
36
38
139
John A. Roebling’s Sons Co.
Bituminous Coal Operators (captivemines).
Bituminous Coal Operators (Alabama
mines).
General Motors Corporation.
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.
Employers Negotiating Committee.
Smoot Sand & Gravel Co.
North American Aviation, Inc.
Aluminum Co. of America.
Marlin Rockwell Corporation.
*40
43
46
149
51
55
57
65
73
*94
97
Title of company
Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corporation.
Sealed Power Corporation.
Federal Shibpuilding & Dry Dock Co.
Breeze Corporations, Inc.
Air Associates, Inc.
Borg-Warner Corporation.
Lincoln Mills of Alabama.
Solvay Process Co., Inc.
Kansas City Power & Light Co.
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co.
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
N ote.—Total: 21 cases; 24 stoppages.
12 stoppages.
* Board’s telegram requesting continuation of production was received too late to revoke strike order
before it became effective; but work was promptly resumed.
Of the foregoing cases a stoppage existed when the Board acquired
Nos. 18, 20B, 20C, 39, and 51. These five cases and No. 49 are the
only ones in which production was twice halted; and No. 20B, Captwe
Mines, and No. 39, Marlin Rockwell, are the only ones in which there
were three interruptions of work.
51
CASES AND INTERRUPTIONS OF PRODUCTION
T a b l e 1 0 . — Cases in which hearings were held, classified by stoppage situation
and by method of final disposal
Nonstrike cases 2
Strike cases1
Method of final disposal
1. By contract of the parties (some
times with aid of agencies other
than the Board).
2. By contract of the parties with
suggestions of the Board or its
agents.
3. By contract of the parties pur
suant to formal recommenda
tion of the Board.
4. By acquiescence of dissatisfied
party in recommendation of
the Board.
5. By reference to the N. L. R. B.
(usually on recommendation of
the Board).
6. By intervention of the President.
7. By nonaction of the Board..
Sum of cases______________
Original stop
page continued
till final
disposition
Original stop
page ceased
before final
disposition
7, 18, 29, 76, 86, 3,9,12,15,23,32, 28, 50, 56, 38,49,94.
90,93.
77.
63,96.
16, 26, 41, 40,55....
27, 30, 88, 101, 5,6,25,71 _
111, 112.
47,59,75,
81,87,95,
98,106.
2,10,20,20C, 37, 11,53 (half)......... 21, 34, 35, 36,43,57.
39, 45, 51, 62,
42,44,54,
78, 105,
68,79,80.
108.
72,85 ____
61 ____
22
17,52,64,69......... 53 (half), 20A__ 48................ 22,73....
8H
2ftB
31
10
15
i Cases in which there was a stoppage when certified.
3 Cases in which there was no stoppage when certified.
Num
None Stoppage ber of
occurred occurred cases
later
later in each
. class
46
24
an
10...........
23
25H
3
. 2
2
86
Appendix C
Personnel
Membership o f the National Defense M ediation Board
REGULAR MEMBERS
Representing the public.
Clarence A. D ykstra of Wisconsin, president, University of Wisconsin (chair
man from March 19 to July 1, 1941; alternate public member from July 2, 1941,
to January 12, 1942).
W illiam H ammatt D avis of New York, attorney (public member from March
19 to July 1, 1941; chairman from July 2, 1941, to January 12, 1942).
F rank P. Graham of North Carolina, president, University of North Carolina
(public member from March 19 to August 6, 1941; vice chairman from August 7,
1941, to January 12, 1942.)
Charles E. W yzanski, Jr., of Massachusetts, attorney (alternate public mem
ber from March 19 to July 17, 1941; public member from July 18, 1941, to Jan
uary 12, 1942).
Representing employers.
Cyrus S. Ching of New York, vice president, U. S. Rubber Corporation (March
19, 1941, to January 12, 1942).
R oger D. L apham of California, chairman of the board of directors, AmericanHawaiian Steamship Co. (March 19, 1941, to January 12, 1942).
E ugene Meyer of New York, publisher of the Washington Post (March 19,
1941, to January 12, 1942).
W alter C. T eagle of Connecticut, chairman, board of directors, Standard Oil
Co. of New jersey (March 19, 1941, to January 12, 1942).
Representing employees.
George M. H arrison of Ohio, grand president, Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks (March 19, 1941, to January 12, 1942).
T homas K ennedy of Pennsylvania, secretary-treasurer, United Mine Workers
of America (March 19 to November 11, 1941). (Resignation submitted Novem
ber 11, 1941.)
George Meany of New York, secretary-treasurer, American Federation of
Labor (March 19,1941, to January 12,1942).
P hilip Murray of Pennsylvania, president, Congress of Industrial Organiza
tions (March 19 to November 11, 1941). (Resignation submitted November 11,
1941.)
ALTERNATE MEMBERS
Representing the public.
F rancis W . H. A dam s of New York, attorney.
W alter T. F isher of Illinois, attorney.
W ayne L. Morse of Oregon, dean, University of Oregon School of Law.
W illiam Gorham R ice, Jr., of Wisconsin, professor of law, University of
Wisconsin Law School.
R alph T. Seward of New York, attorney.
W alter P. Stacy of North Carolina, chief justice, Supreme Court of North
Carolina.
George Stocking of Texas, professor of economics, University of Texas.
Representing employers.
Charles E. Adams of Pennsylvania, president, Air Reduction Corporation.
(Alternate for Eugene Meyer.)
J ohn E. Connelly of New York, attorney. (Alternate for Roger D. Lapham.)
53
64
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
F rederick S. F ales of New York, former vice president and director, SoconyVacuum Oil Co., Inc.
H o lla n d J. H a m il t o n of New York, secretary and treasurer, American Radiator
and Standard Sanitary Corporation. (Alternate for Eugene Meyer.)
F razier D. MacI ver of Wisconsin, vice president, Phoenix Hosiery Co.
George H. Mead of Ohio, president, The Mead Corporation. (Alternate for
Roger D. Lapham.)
Gerard S wope of New York, honorary president, General Electric Co. (Alter
nate for Walter C. Teagle.)
Representing employees.
J ohn B rophy of Pennsylvania, director of Industrial Union Councils, Congress
of Industrial Organizations. (Alternate for Philip Murray.)
E dward J. B rown of Wisconsin, president, International Brotherhood of Elec
trical Workers of America (A. F. L.). (Alternate for George M. Harrison.)
W illiam A. Calvin of Maryland, vice president, International Brotherhood of
Boiler Makers, Iron Shipbuilders, and Helpers of America (A. F. L.).
J ames B. Carey of Virginia, secretary, Congress of Industrial Organizations.
(Alternate for Thomas Kennedy.)
S. H. D alrymple of Ohio, president, United Rubber Workers of America
(C. I. O.).
Clinton Golden of Pennsylvania, regional director, Steel Workers Organizing
Committee (C. I. O.). (Alternate for Thomas Kennedy.)
George Googe of Georgia, southern representative, American Federation of
Labor.
George L ynch of Virginia, president, Pattern Makers League of North America
(A. F. L.). (Alternate for George M. Harrison.)
H ugh Lyons of Massachusetts, regional director, Congress of Industrial Organ
izations. (Alternate for Philip Murray.)
H erbert W. P ayne of New York, vice president, Textile Workers Union of
America (C. I. O.).
E mil R ieve of Pennsylvania, general president, Textile Workers Union of
America (C. I. O.).
R obert J. W att of Massachusetts, international representative, American Fed
eration of Labor. (Alternate for George M. Harrison.)
J ames W ilson of Ohio, labor advisor, International Labor Office, former presi
dent, Pattern Makers League of North America (A. F. L.). (Alternate for
George Meany.)
H erbert W oods of Connecticut, director of research, International Union of
Operating Engineers (A. F. L.). (Alternate for George Meany.)
Archibald Cox
Lewis M. Gill
F rederick H. H arbison
George K irstein
Panel Assistants
A very L eiserson
E. R iggs McConnell
T homas F. N eblett
J. C. T omey
Special A gents, Listed b y Cases in W hich T h e y Served
Case
No.
Name
2 Vanadium Corpora
tion of America.
4 International Harves
ter Co.
4-A International Harves
ter Co.
18 John A. Roebling’s
Sons Co.
Appointee and title
Msgr. Francis J. Haas,
special representative.
Don D. Lescohier, special
representative.
Stanley P. Farwell, spe
cial representative.
George T. Trundle, Jr.,
expert advisor.
Authorization
To investigate the issues in dispute.
To investigate the issues in dispute.
“* * * to investigate the wage issue in
dispute * * * and to report his findings
to the Board * * *”
“* * * to study the disputed operations
proposed for, but not yet actually put into
operation in, Department 76. * * * to
test the proposed new operations, to find
and evaluate the facts and on the basis of
his findings, to make recommendations to
theN. D. M. B. * * *”
Alfred Dangler, Jr., expert
adviser.
Donald Wright, expert | to assist Mr. Trundle in making his study.
adviser.
55
PERSONNEL
Special A gents, Listed b y Cases in W hich T h e y Served—C ontin ued
Case
No.
Name
22 Minneapolis- H oney- Edwin E. Witte, special
well Regulator Co.
27 Continental Rubber
Works.
31 Employers Negotiat
ing Committee.
35 E. W. Bliss Co.
Marlin Rockwell Cor
poration.
46 Federal Shipbuilding
& Dry Dock Co.
49 Breeze Corporations,
Inc.
51 Air Associates.
57 Lincoln Mills of Ala
bama.
Authorization
Appointee and title
* * to confer with the parties to aid
in reaching a settlement of pending unad
justed grievances and, if necessary, to
make recommendations for the adjustment
of such grievances * *
Nathan P. Feinsinger, Replaced Mr. Witte who was forced to dis
special agent.
continue his work for the Board due to
other commitments.
George T. Trundle, Jr., “* * * to make a survey of the engineering
special representative.
processes and the cost accounting system
* * * to find and evaluate the facts and,
on the basis of his findings, to make recom
mendations for the consideration of the
National Defense Mediation Board * * * ”
Carey O. Malpas, special
representative.
William E. Jones, special
representative.
Roy H. Dickson, special To assist Mr. Trundle in making his investi
gation.
representative.
Raymond P. Wright, spe
cial representative.
Edward Tegeler, special
representative.
Dexter M. Keezer, chair “ * * * to investigate issues in dispute
* * * to make findings of fact and, on
man of commission.
the basis of these findings, to make recom
mendations to this Board * * V ’
Wayne Morse, member of
commission.
Paul Eliel, member of Same as above.
commission.
Vernon H. Jensen, spe “* * * to assist the impartial commission
to investigate issues in dispute * *
cial representative.
George T. Trundle, Jr., “* * * to investigate the issues in dispute
* * * to find and evaluate the facts, and,
special representative.
on the basis of his findings, to make recom
mendations for the consideration of the
National Defense Mediation Board * *
Alfred Dangler, Jr., spe
cial representative.
Raymond Wright, special
To assist Mr. Trundle in making his in
representative.
vestigation.
Roy H. Dickson, special
representative.
Edward Tegeler, special
representative.
Paul R. Hays, arbitrator.. “* * * to arbitrate the basis for the estab
lishment of minimum rates, the setting of
minimum rates and the effective retro
active date * * *”.
Harry Shulman, special “* * * to investigate the matters in dis
pute, to report his findings of fact and
representative.
make recommendations to the Board with
regard to these issues * *
Burton A. Zorn, special To investigate the dispute.
representative
Harold B. Bergen, special ** * * to investigate entering rates, mini
agent.
mum wage rates, classifications, and ap
propriate blanket raises for employees in
jobs in each of the company’s plants
represented by the United Automobile
Workers * * * to receive evidence and
arguments from the parties; and * * *
to make a prompt report to the N. D. M.
B. * *
Phillip S. Babb, special
representative
Ewing W. Reilley, special To assist Mr. Bergen in his investigation.
representative
Harry Shulman, special “ * * * to serve as arbitrator with respect
to such issues * * * as the parties shall, by
representative.
mutual agreement, submit to arbitration;
and further, to investigate, make findings of
fact and recommendations to the Board
upon all other issues in dispute * * *.”
Francis Goodell, special “* * * to investigate the question of what
agent.
will be appropriate wages for the company
to pay * * * and shall report to the
Board within 3 weeks * *
agent.
“*
56
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Special A gents, Listed b y Cases in W hich T h e y Served— C ontinued
Case
No.
Name
Appointee and title
Authorization
58 Ohio Brass Co............... J. M. MacDonald, spe “* * * to investigate the issues in dis
pute * * * and report his findings to
cial representative.
the Board.”
E. F. Murdoch, special Same as above.
representative.
60 United States Gypsum Owen D. Young, special “ * * * to investigate general wage in
creases, vacation, arbitration of grievances,
representative.
Co.
and union security; to conduct hearings,
take testimony, and make findings of fact
for the information of the Board * *
61 Consolidated Edison Arthur S. Meyer, special “* * * to investigate the issues in dis
pute * * * and upon the basis of his
Co. of New York, agent.
findings to make recommendations to this
Inc.
Board * * *.”
Paul R. Hays, special “ * * * to assist Arthur S. Meyer, special
agent, in investigating the issues in dis
representative.
pute * * * and in making findings of
fact
* * and
# ff recommendations to this Board
66 Aluminum Co. of Paul R. Hays, special *** * * t0 investigate the issues in dispute
America.
between the employer and employees,
representative.
and practices and activities thereof with
respect to the controversy or dispute
certified; to conduct hearings, take testi
mony, and make findings of fact for the
information of the N. D. M. B. * *
McDonald K. Home, Jr., “* * * to assist Paul R. Hays, the Board’s
special assistant (repre special representative, in his investigation
of the issues in dispute * *
sentative).
67 Pacific States Cast James H. Wolfe, special a* * * investigate the question of wages
Iron Pipe Co.
and [the question of] overtime for truck
representative.
drivers and report his findings to the
Board * *
73 Kansas City Power & John A. Lapp, special “* * * to investigate the issues in dis
pute * *
Light Co.
representative.
84 Arcade Malleable Iron Charles G. Rugg, special “* * * to investigate the issues in dis
representative.
pute * * * to make findings of fact and
Co., Inc.
report such findings to the Board * *
90 Spicer Manufacturing A. C. Lappin, special rep “* * * to act as an impartial observer in
Co.
the dispute * *
resentative.
98 Union Electric Co___ Alex S. Langsdorf, special ]“* * * to investigate the issues in disrepresentative.
I pute * * * to conduct hearings beWade Childress, special 1 tween the parties, to make findings of fact
representative.
[ and report to the National Defense Media
Frank H. Wilson, special tion Board * *
representative.
103 Nevada Consolidated Frank M. Swacker, spe “* * * to investigate the issues in dis
Copper Corporation. cial representative.
pute * * * and report his findings to
the Board * *
104 Waterfront Employers Donald H. MacKenzie, “* * * to investigate the wage issue in dis
pute * * * and report his findings to
Association of W ash- special representative.
ington.
the Board * *
107 Burgess Battery Co__ Robert J. Meyers, special “* * * to make a thorough investigation
of the company’s wage rates at its Free
representative.
port, 111., plant and submit to the Board as
promptly as possible a written report con
taining ^his recommendations on wages
* * to investigate the wages of the
110 Anaconda Copper Isador Loeb, special rep “*electricians
at the Butte, Mont., mine of
Mining Co.
resentative.
the Anaconda Copper Mining Co.
* * * and report his findings to the
Board ♦ *
In several other cases the Board appointed persons pursuant to agreement be
tween the parties. These persons were not, however, representatives of the
Board in arbitrating or similar activity.
Appendix D
Maintenance o f Production Pending Settlement
The first list of cases in appendix B indicates the existence or the
imminence of interruption of production at the time of certification
and the second list shows how successfully the Board dealt with this
immediate situation. By dividing these lists into time segments, it
will be seen that the reference of a case to the Board came more and
more often to be substituted for a strike, and that the Board’s re
quests in strike cases were more and more usual and more and more
successful.
Table 1 1 . — Stoppage status of cases by time periods
Number of cases in each period of acquisition
Status of case when acquired
Mar. 19- June 19- Sept. 19- Total to Dec. 7June 18 Sept. 18 Dec. 7 Dec. 7 Jan. 12
Stoppage. _____ _____________________ _
Stoppage imminent___________________
No critical situation__________________
Total
__________ _
26
16
42
21
13
6
40
16
12
4.
31
62
41
10
113
Total
2
3
64
44
10
118
5
T able 1 2 . — Frequency and effect of Board's request to keep operating
Number of cases in each period of acquisition
Status of case when acquired
Stoppage:
fa) Production not asked _ _
(6) Production asked—
(1) With success
(2) Without, success
No stoppage:
(a) Production not asked
(b) Production asked—
(1) W ith success
__
(2) W ithout success .
Mar. 19- June 19- Sept. 19- Total to Dec. 7June 18 Sept. 18 Dec. 7 Dec. 7 Jan. 12
_.
19
4
3
-
2
12
2
6
12
3
3
16
0
2
11
2
2
12
2
27
27
8
7
40
14
0
2
0
0
3
0
Total
27
29
8
7
43
14
1In 3 of these cases the request to remain at work came too late; in all 4 the strike was settled before hearing.
In some cases the Board did not request production pending media
tion because there was no likelihood of a stoppage; in other cases, par
ticularly the earlier strike cases, because such a request apparently
would have been futile; in a few, perhaps, because, in the Board’s
opinion, it would have been a hindrance to the achievement of a lasting
settlement to ask that a stoppage be terminated before settlement o?
the controversy.
57
58
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Besides the 64 strikes which existed when the Board assumed juris
diction, 24 more stoppages of measurable duration and importance
developed at a later stage in these 118 cases, some in cases that came
to the Board as strikes and some in nonstrike cases. Altogether, 75
cases at one time or another confronted the Board with 88 distinct
interruptions of production. Besides these 24 stoppages, set forth in
appendix B, table 9, there were brief post certification stoppages of
small groups of workers in No. 7, Seas Shipping, No. 18, Roeblm g, No.
57, Lincoln M ills, No. 85, Alabama D ry Dock , and doubtless other
cases—slight stoppages that did not engage the attention of the Board.
In a few of these 64 strike cases, a final settlement of the controversy
was effected before the Board heard the case. Thus, one strike was
ended and the case closed (No. 74, Pressed Steel) by the promise to
consider at once the union’s petition for determination of representa
tion, and another (No. 14, Birdsboro Steel) by an agreement of the
parties to resume production pending such a determination. In 5
other strike cases (No. 1, Universal-Vyclops, No. 8, Standard Tool,
No. 70, Henry Vogt Machine, No. 82, Shaw-Box Crane <&H oist, and No.
99, York Corrugating), the parties reached a final settlement by con
tract before the Board held a hearing. Similarly, in 3 nonstrike cases,
No. 13, Minneapolis Moline, No. 33, Smoot Sand & Gravel (in which
there was a strike between certification and settlement), and No. 109,
American Sugar Refining, there was final settlement without hearing.
Thus, 7 strike cases, and 3 nonstrike cases ended in the first stage of
Board control.
Without a final settlement strikes were often averted or terminated
before cases came to hearing. Government agencies often made ar
rangements that production should be resumed or not interrupted if a
case was certified to the Board, as has been shown in table 2. Certifi
cation itself was the signal for calling off a strike in nine recent
cases, No. 6i, Consolidated Edison, No. 64, Curtiss-Wright, No. 79,
Hendey Machine, No. 80, American Merchant Marine, No. 89, Inter
national Harvester, No. 90, Spicer Manufacturing, No. 92, Ingalls
Ship Building, No. 100, W olverine Tube, and No. Ill, Hammond <&
Irving . Indeed in the last of these (though counted as a strike case),
the strikers had returned to work in response to a promise of certifica
tion forthwith, a few hours before the Board received the case.
Without such a stimulus strikes have occasionally been called off
before hearing as a part of some interim agreement of the parties, as
in No. 32, AlUs-Chalmers, La Porte, No. 97, Robins D ry Dock (a strike
that began after the date of certification but before the certification
had been received by the Board), No. 102, American Can, and No. 107,
Burgess Battery.
As indicated in appendix B, table 8, a request of the Board without
any form of agreement achieved resumption of work in 17 cases (while
with an interim or final agreement work was promptly resumed in
13 more) out of the 37 cases in which such a request was made, while
in nonstrike cases the Board kept the wheels of industry moving in all
of the 47 cases in which it so requested, except No. 33, Smoot Sand &
Gravel, No. 40, Bohn Aluminum. No. 94, Sloss-Sheffleld, and No. 97,
Robins D ry Dock , in the last 3 of which cases the certification was too
late to enable the Board to make its request in time. In Bohn and
Sloss-Shefield the strike was promptly called off: in the other 2 cases
MAINTENANCE OF PRODUCTION
59
it was soon settled by agreement, as has been noted. The total of 64
strikes in limine and 88 stoppages in all had thus been reduced to 28
and 48, respectively, before the cases were heard.
When a strike aid not end before the hearing, the Board, never
theless, often succeeded in achieving a resumption of production before
the completion of a collective agreement or some other form of final
settlement. In No. 2, Vanadium, No. 18, Roebling, and No. 93, Am eri
can Engineering , the parties as a result of the hearing made an interim
agreement to end a stoppage dating from before certification.
The brief second Roebling strike, culminating in several slight
stoppages, also was settled by the parties while the Board was
carrying on an investigation of wages and work load. The second
strike in No. 20B, Captive Mines, was ended by agreement, sponsored
by the President, which returned the case to the full Board. In No.
49, Breeze, a 2-day strike after hearing was ended by interim agree
ment. An earlier 1-day strike in this case and 2-day strikes in No.
65, Solvay Process, and No. 73, Kansas City Power, that occurred
during or after the hearing were stopped by request of the Board.
Interim recommendations made by the Board or its representatives
during or after hearing led to resumption of production in 11 cases;
i. e., No. 17, American Car & Foundry, No. 20, Appalachian Mines, No.
20B, Captive Mines (first strike), No. 22, Minneapolis-Honeywell* No.
27, Continental Rubber, No. 29, Ex-Cell-O, No. 31, Employers Nego
tiating Committee, No. 39, Marlin Rockwell (second strike), No. 51,
A ir Associates (first strike), No. 58, Ohio Brass, No. 60, U. S. Gypsum.
In 3 of these (Nos. 22, 31, and 39), the stoppage arose after certifica
tion; in the other 8, the strike began before the Board’s intervention.
The precertification strike in No. 10, Phelps Dodge Copper Products,
was ended upon the verbal acceptance of the Board’s final recom
mendation, though the collective agreement was not completed till a
week later. Two strikes, arising after certification, were ended by
seizure of the plant by the Government: No. 36, North American Avia
tion, and No. 1 , A ir Associates. Thus, in the hearing stage and before
final settlement, 23 stoppages were terminated of which 12 were origi
nal and ll.postcertificational stoppages; the toll of original strikes
that persisted beyond a hearing and to final settlement was 16; and
the toll of later stoppages that so persisted was 9.
Of these 25, one disappeared by attrition, No. 19, American Potash,
and 2 responded only to the intervention of the President, No. 46,
Federal Shipbuilding and No. 20B Captwe Mines (third strike).
The importance of the stoppages can be more clearly judged from
the following tables which show the number of cases in several cate
gories and the average period of stoppages before certification and
after certification for each of these categories. Cases Nos. 4, 4A, 20,
20A, 20B, and 20C are omitted, because they involve too many units
to be susceptible of anything approaching accurate mathematical treat
ment in this regard; and cases Nos. 19 and 24 also are omitted because
the Board did nothing effective in handling these controversies. There
were no stoppages in Nos. 4A and 24, but there were stoppages in Nos.
4,19,20,20A, 20B, and 20C.
469872° *
60
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
T able
13
. — C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f c a s e s in r e l a t i o n t o s t o p p a g e s
Item
Strike cases.................................................
Nonstrike cases_________ ____________
Total....................................................
I
Cases
certified
Mar. 19June 18,
closed
by N. D.
M. B.
II
Cases
certified
June 19Sept. 18,
closed
by N. D.
M. B.
III
Cases
certified
Mar. 19Sept. 18,
trans
ferred to
N. W.
L. B.
IV
Cases
certified
Sept. 19Jan. 12,
closed
byN .D .
M. B.
22
15
37
15
17
32
3
3
6
9
11
20
V
Cases
certified
Sept. 19Jan. 12, All cases
trans
ferred to
N. W.
L .B .
9
6
15
58
52
110
Average number of days of interruption of production in each
category
Strike cases
Average duration before certification of
the interruption existing at time of certi
fication_______ ______ ____________
Average duration after certification of the
interruption existing at time of certifica
tion____ ________________ ______
Average duration after certification of all
interruptions______________________
26.7
14.9
42.3
15.1
23.7
22.2
12.4
13.2
8.1
10.1
24.7
24.7
3.4
3.4
3.0
3.0
9.1
9.9
.8
3.4
8.3
.1
1.2
1.9
8.0
6.5 i
16.5
1.6
2.3
6.1
Nonstrike cases
Average durationtafter certification of all
interruptions_______________________
All cases
Average duration after certification of all
interruptions.........................................
The duration after certification of all interruptions of production
in the 38 cases (both open and closed) certified before June 19 is
325 days; or 8.6 days per case. The duration after certification of
all interruptions of production in the 37 cases (both open and closed)
certified between June 19 and September 18, inclusive, is 285 days;
or 7.7 days per case. The duration after certification of all inter
ruptions of production in the 35 cases (both open and closed) certified
after September 18 is 66 days; or 1.9 days per case. The over-all
stoppage after certification is therefore 676 days for the 110 cases, or
6.1 days per case, as indicated above.
If the eight excluded cases, all of which arose before September 19
(except No. 4A in which there was no strike), were included, the effect
would be to increase the number of days of interrupted production
markedly in the group of cases certified before June 19 and slightly in
the June-September group, thus steepening the diminution of produc
tion losses as time passed. By rough approximation the total of
interruptions would amount to 782 days and the average interruption
per case would be 6.6 days.
These same interruptions are classified by time periods in the next
to last paragraph of “Duration of Interruptions of Production”
(p. 11) of this report.
In terms of number of workers at work and number of workers not
at work the last paragraph of “Duration of Interruptions of Produc
tion” (p. 11) and the chart and table that accompany it show the
MAINTENANCE OF PRODUCTION
61
situation of all cases before the Board, month by month. After No
vember 24 there was no stoppage of production in any case pending
before the Board except that in No. 112, Jofons-ManvUle, a strike case
certified Saturday, December 20; work was resumed Monday, December
22. The method of calculation used in this report, of counting stop
pages from the day work ceased to the day it was resumed, makes this
a 2-day interruption.
Appendix E
Union Security
1. Coverage of This Appendix and Classifications
The number of docketed cases was in all 118. This includes Nos.
4A, 20A, 20B, and 20C. The cases, however, which were settled with
out hearings are here excluded. These are Nos. 1, 8, 18, 14, 88, 70,
74, 82, 99, and 109. In these cases it is not always possible to de
termine what the issues were nor in what way they were settled. They
have no ascertainable significance in assessing the trend of Board
activity. In sum, there are 108 cases which are here analyzed.
Of these 108 there were demands for some form of union security
in about 56. These included demands for closed shop, union shop,
union maintenance, check-off, preferential hiring, employer recom
mendation or encouragement of union membership, discipline of anti
union activity, and grievance procedure where demanded or granted
with the object of maintaining union membership. Mere demands
for union recognition have been excluded. Eight cases in which a
demand for union security was made were not disposed of and so are
not discussed. These are Nos. 4A, 60, 84, 89, 96, 97, 102, and 107.
Case No. 19, American Potash, though never settled, was closed.
A classification of the forms in which the demands for union secur
ity were first made must be very inexact and is of no great significance.
It is the usual self-respecting procedure of unions to make a demand
for the closed or union shop. The demand may be set high as a bar
gaining expedient and may cloak what is really a demand for union
maintenance, some form of shop discipline, or even something entirely
outside the union security field, such as wages. Thus, in approximately
46 cases a demand was made for the union shop. In the remaining
few cases the demand was more specific, as in No. 6, AlUs-Chalmers,
for shop discipline and grievance procedure clauses and in No. 92,
Ingalls Ship Building, for union maintenance.
Classification of solutions will be made from two points of view,
the method by which the solution was achieved (recommendation or
agreement), and the substance of the solution. The classification
according to method has obvious defects. The influence and participa
tion by the Board may range from a proffer of a well-heated office
to the Board’s ultimate power of recommendation. And, no doubt,
some recommendations imply the use of the Army and some do not.
Even the meaning of results which have the same formal descriptions
varies from case to case. Some recommendations are in the teeth of
at least one of the parties; others embody the agreement of the parties
which is thus given formal dress to protect the negotiators from the
displeasure of their constituencies. On the other hand, an agreement
may be the result of firm intimations from the Board of what it will
63
64
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
recommend, should it be forced to do so. Given these intimations the
parties may prefer a form of ostensible agreement to manifest in
transigence. A rough summary of results is as follows (cases may
appear in more than one subheading):
Cases disposed of by recommendation---------------------------For closed shop----------------------------------------------------Against closed or union shop(explicitly)____________
Preferential hiring________________________
For union maintenance____________________________
Against union maintenance (explicitly; it was denied in
many other cases informally orinferentially)______
Membership encouragement, shop discipline clauses,
etc., granted-----------------------------------------------------Cases disposed of by agreement_______________________
1
1
3
7
4
6
14
33
2. Recommendations
(a) Cases in which procedure alone was recommended.—It should
be noted that the Board through recommendation and suggestion has
substantially promoted the use of clauses and devices (short of the
more determinative union shop or union maintenance) to strengthen
the position of a union against the organizational effort of rival
unions. Examples of this are No. 6, Allis-Chalmers, and No. 10,
Phelps Dodge Copper. This course coincides with a similar course of
ruling by the N. L. R. B. which gives to unions attaining majority
status some power to suppress directly or through employer action the
activity of dissentient minority groups.
(b) Closed or union shop}—The Board has recommended the closed
shop in one case (No. 37, Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding D ivision).
The recommendation here was made in the face, apparently, of strong
employer opposition but the employer did indicate that it would accept
the recommendation. The union at one time was prepared to take in
compromise a preferential shop. The company stated that it would
prefer the recommendation of the Board to a voluntary concession by it
which might serve as a precedent in its plants in other parts of the
country. It could be stated that in the remaining 45 or so cases in
which the closed or union shop was demanded, the Board refused it.
That statement, however, would be misleading since in few of these
instances was the demand seriously maintained. In No. 20B, Captive
Mines (in which the demand was for a union shop or nothing), the
demand was refused by the Board (but granted by subsequent arbi
tration arranged by the President). In No. 31, Employers Negotiating
Committee, the union’s insistent demand for a union shop was at least
temporarily (and it would seem finally for the purposes of this case)
rejected; the union was advised to accept the employers’ offer of a union
maintenance clause. In No. 85, Alabama D ry D ock , the union shop
was explicitly denied. Bethlehem and Federal were said to be inap
plicable because in the case at hand a contract provided that member
ship should not be a condition of employment. Cases in which union
maintenance was explicitly denied may also, with some reason, be
treated as involving a denial of the union shop.1
1 As here used, the term “closed shop’' requires that the employer employ only persons
who are, prior to employment, members of the union; “union shop” requires that any
person employed become, within a stated time, a member of the union.
UNION SECURITY
65
(c)
Preferential hiring\—In three cases the Board has recommended
some form of preferential hiring. The recommendations involved
an expressed or implied refusal to recommend a formal union shop
clause. The first of these cases is No. 34, Columbia Basin Area Loggers
and Sawmill Operators, in which the Board recommended that, “the
employer give first consideration to local unemployed members of the
union, provided that they are qualified and readily available; when
satisfactory men cannot be obtained in the above manner, the hiring
of others shall not be deemed a breach of this agreement.” This clause,
embodying an existing practice, stated the wishes of both parties. The
second case is No. 62, Todd Galveston D ry Docks, Inc ., in which the
Board, taking account of the fact that substantially all employees were
members of the union and of the existing oral understanding which
in its opinion amounted to a preferential hiring arrangement, recommeded the following clause: “The company recognizes that a large
majority of its employees for years past have been members of the
unions with which it now has a labor agreement. Relations in general
have been mutually satisfactory. * * * The union and the com
pany agree that it is for their mutual interest to maintain existing
practices and agree to do so. The company looks with favor on its
employees becoming members of the unions, parties to this agreement.”
These clauses must be read in the light of a tacit practice of preferential
hiring. The third case is No. 92, Ingalls Ship Building Co., in which
the Board recommended that the union accept, among other things, a
clause, offered by the employer, stating, “All things being equal and
when practicable, members of the said union will be given preference
in the hiring of men when said members have registered with the em
ployer’s employment office and with the union and when they are
available within 24 hours.” In No. 19, American Potash and Chemical
Corporation , the Board during the hearing, suggested the appropri
ateness of a preferential hiring clause, but, although it does appear that
the panel would have been willing to recommend a union mainte
nance clause, it does not appear that it would have recommended a
preferential hiring clause. No formal recommendation was actually
made,
{d) Union membership maintenance.2—A union membership clause
has been recommended in 7 cases: No. 31, Employers Negotiating
Committee; No. 34, Columbia Basin Area Loggers and Sawmill Oper
ators; No. 36, North Am erican; No. 43, Sealed,"Power; No. 44, Western
Cartridge: No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding Corporation; and No. 57,
Lincoln Mills. In No. 34 the recommendations embodied the wishes
of the parties. In No. 43 the employer accepted the recommendations
when both the employer and the employee member of the panel indi
cated an attitude favorable to the claim. In No. 31, the employer
offered the clause in satisfaction of a union shop demand; the union
refused to accept it; the Board recommended that it do so. In No.
57, Lincoln Mills, the panel believed that the employer would accept
the recommendation, although it made no agreement to do so and
protested after its issue. The recommendation in that case con
tained a so-called “escape clause” providing that any employee might
2 “Union maintenance’* unless otherwise noted, provides simply that a person who at the
time of the contract is, or who thereafter becomes, a member of the union, shall as a
condition of employment remain a member in good standing.
66
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
withdraw from the union for legitimate reasons not related to wages,
hours, or conditions of employment; such reasons to be passed upon
by a board of review, the impartial member of which was to be
appointed by the United States Director of Conciliation. The recom
mendations also provided for a voluntary check-off, which at one
time the employer had granted to another union.
The other three cases, which show the strongest disposition to make
a recommendation contrary to the pleasure of at least one party, No.
36, No. 44, and No. 46, were decided, respectively, on June 28, July
24, and July 26. The recommendation in No. 57, Lincoln Mills, was
issued on August 7. There were no recommendations for union main
tenance after that date. In No. 19, American Potash, the Board stated
that if it became necessary to make a formal recommendation, “it
would not go beyond” recommending union maintenance.
In four cases, No. 21, General Motors, No. 85, Alabama D ry Dock,
No. 92, Ingalls Ship Building, and No. 94, Sloss-Sheffleld, the Board ex
plicitly refused to recommend a union maintenance clause. In two
of the cases, No. 92 and No. 94, the recommendations did contain
union security provisions falling short of union maintenance, in No.
92, preferential hiring, union membership encouragement, shop dis
cipline, and grievance procedure, and in No. 94, shop discipline. In
No. 92 these recommendations were endorsements of employer offers.
In No. 85 an existing contract provided that membership should not
be a condition of employment; the Board recommended adherence
to the contract. In three cases, No. 54, Armour <& Go., No. 55, Borg Warner Corporation, and No. 63, Rockford Drop Forge Co., the panel
let it be known informally that it would not grant a union mainte
nance clause. In a number of others, as for example No. 59, Erwin
Cotton Mills, and No. 71, Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co.,
the question by the panel chairman as to what special factors in the
case supported the claim for union maintenance indicated a panel
attitude negative to the claim.
(e) Membership encouragement, shop discipline, and related mat
ters.—In 4 cases, No. 34, Columbia Basin Area Loggers and Sawmill
Operators, No. 10, Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corporation, No.
62, Todd Galveston D ry Docks, and No. 92, Ingalls Ship Building Cor
poration, the Board recommended clauses obliging the employer to
encourage, in greater or less degree, membership in the union. The
Phelps Dodge clause is the weakest of these. The Board (not using
the word “recommend”) states that it is “of the opinion that the fol
lowing clause should be taken as a suitable basis for the immediate
resumption of production.” “The union and the employer agree that
at all times they will use their best efforts and endeavors to promote
and maintain harmonious, friendly, and cooperative relations between
the employee and union. * * * When a new employee is hired,
he will be informed of the existence of the union and of this agree
ment.” In No. 34, the employer was asked to agree to recommend that
all new employees join the union. The recommendations included
also union maintenance and preferential shop. In No. 62, the com
pany was asked to state in the agreement that it “looks with favor
upon its employees becoming members of the unions, parties to this
agreement” and in No. 92 the Board recommended that the union
accept clauses offered bv the employer whereby the company would
state that it “advocated” that those who are now members retain
UNION SECURITY
67
membership and that “the interests of the employees are best served
by being members of the union.” It should be understood that in all
of these cases the union encouragement clause was combined with
other clauses looking toward union security. In No. 10 the employer
agreed to “discipline without discrimination those who by their con
duct on the premises interfered with the production of the plant.”
In No. 62 the recommendation involved as well a practical recognition
of the preferential shop and in No. 92 the employer’s offer, acceptance
of which by the union was recommended, included also a form of
preferential hiring and discipline of any employee advocating a policy
contrary to that established by the agreement. Furthermore, the
Board recommended an additional paragraph whereunder the good
faith of a supervisory employee, in carrying out the policies of the
agreement, could be tried by a disinterested person designated by
the Board.
In No. 94, Sloss-Sheffield Steel <&Iron Co., the Board recommended
the following clauses: “The company will not tolerate any of its
agents engaging at any time in activities against the union signatory
to this contract.” “The company will not tolerate and will dis
cipline any employee who, on company time, carries on antiunion
activities or seeks to interfere with the membership or status of this
union. The company has good will toward membership in the cer
tified union as a basic part of our industry and a vital partner in de
fense production. The company and union agree to cooperate for
harmonious relations, orderly and efficient shop discipline, and maxi
mum defense production.”
In No. 11, Sklar Manufacturing Co., a recommendation for a better
definition of grievance procedure seems to have been directed in some
measure, at least, to the demand for union security.
In No. 72, Alumimmi Co. o f America, the Board recommended that
the demand for union shop in the Vancouver plant be postponed until
“such time as the parties might negotiate a new master agreement
covering all plants in which the union in question represented the
employees.”
In No. 20B, Captive Mines, the original panel was unwilling to issue
recommendations with respect to the demand for union shop. It
suggested instead further procedures involving a choice of methods of
arbitration.
3. Agreements
There is, of course, no clear-cut line between cases disposed of by
recommendation and those by agreement. Generally speaking, of
course, a case disposed of by recommendation is more likely to be
one in which the parties were unable to agree. The area of disagree
ment, however, may have been small and in some cases what was in
substance an agreement was embodied in a recommendation to make
it more persuasive with the constituencies of the negotiators. On the
other hand, agreements have been arrived at through varying degrees
of Board pressure and insistence.
Cases in which the parties have been told what the Board “would”
recommend have been noted in the preceding sections but a so-called
“suggestion” may make it clear to the parties that the Board is insist
ing upon its adoption. Suggestions thus range themselves in a series
68
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
from intense Board pressure for solution to simple stimulation of forces
making for agreement.
A rough attempt at such a classification of agreements has been
made in “Methods of Final Settlement” (p. 13) of the report. This
classification will not be repeated here but the amount of Board pres
sure will be indicated in connection with many of the cases.
(a) Union membership maintenance.—A union membership main
tenance clause was agreed to in five cases: No. 5, Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. and Snoquodmie Falls Lumber Co. (commonly called the Snoqualmie ca se) ; No. 23, Utica & Mohawk Go.; No. 88, American Cycmamid
Co. (union maintenance in a mild form ): No. 95, Alabama B yProducts C o.; and No. Ill, Hammond <& Irving (union maintenance
in a “voluntary” form).
Of these cases, No. 5, Snoqualmie, is the most important. In this
case the panel informally submitted the maintenance clause and a
clause obligating the company to recommend membership. Both were
accepted. The solution in this case was a dominant factor in bring
ing about the solution in No. 31 and No. 34 involving other sectors of
the Pacific Northwest lumber industry, in both of which cases the
Board recommended the union maintenance clause.
In No. 23, Utica <& Mohawk, the clause was agreed to without im
portant assistance from the Board. The employer had, prior to the
certification to the Board, proposed a clause requiring union mainte
nance but not obligating the company to discharge an employee not
remaining in good standing. The .clause finally agreed upon requires
the company to discipline union employees who do not remain in good
standing, but does not seem to require their absolute discharge. It
provides also for discipline of anyone “guilty of any activity in the
plant intending to undermine the union.”
In No. 88, American Cyanamid, the Board suggested, and the
parties agreed to, a clause falling somewhat short of union mainte
nance. It provides that the company “expects” that employees will
maintain union membership and that in the event of failure to do so,
the employee on request of the union will be called before a conference
of company and union officials, which will remind the employee of
the company’s expectation that he maintain his membership. A
similar agreement was secured in No. 106, American Shipbuilding.
The company in No. 106 agreed further to present new employees
with a copy of the agreement, to ask them to cooperate with the
union in fulfilling its obligations, and to “contact” union officers
before hiring.
In No. 95, Alabama By-Products, the clause requires not only union
maintenance, but that new employees become members of the union.
In a very late case, No. Ill, Hammond & Irving , the parties agreed
to an interesting variation, making the maintenance clause applicable
only to those members who agree that it shall be so applicable. The
idea seems first to have been given currency in the Board when such
an arrangement was offered by the employer in No. 106, American
Shipbuilding. (It was refused by the union.)
(b) Voluntary check-off.—In two cases No. 47, Cheney Silk , and
No. 59, Erwin Cotton Mills, the parties agreed to a voluntary check
off. The provision in No. 47 makes the authorization for check-off
irrevocable except for “legitimate reasons” which “shall not be related
UNIO N SECURITY
69
to wages, hours, and conditions of employment.” Furthermore, the
legitimacy of the reasons is subject to approval or disapproval by
a board consisting of equal representation from the union and the
company. In the event of the failure of the board to agree unani
mously, the matter is to be referred to an impartial person selected
by the board. Should the board be unable to agree, the impartial
party is to be selected by the Connecticut State Board of Mediation
and Arbitration. In No. 59 the substantive provisions of the clause
are the same as in No. 47, but the provisions for enforcement are
different. The company is not to be a party to the dispute, but the
employees affected in the union shall, if they are unable to agree on
a method of settling the issue, refer it to a person to be nominated
by Frank P. Graham, or, if he cannot make the nomination, by the
American Arbitration Association. This form of “escape clause” is
very much a Board invention. The check-off protects the union and
in so doing promotes stable labor relations. It may, however, bind
the employee to a union which in time is seen to be inefficient or
corrupt. The escape clause which permits withdrawal for reasons
other than the terms of the labor agreement may serve to keep union
officials faithful, and, if not, to lay the basis for justified revolt.
( c) Shop discipline.—There are approximately 11 cases in which
the parties agreed upon some form of shop discipline as a primary
or partial solution of the union security demand.
In the first, No. 6, AMis-Chalmers (Milwaukee), the controversy
was almost entirely over the form and implementation of a shop dis
cipline clause. The importance of the controversy and the obduracy
of the parties led the Board to exert very strong pressure for a solu
tion. The suggestions of the Board were nearly equivalent to recom
mendations. The employer seemed prepared, as a general proposi
tion, to treat its earlier statements and now-expired contractual
arrangements as involving a general principle committing it to the
treatment of activity against the union as a form of disruption of
shop discipline. The company also agreed to the principle of a
“referee clause,” providing for an arbitrator with jurisdiction to do
cide whether an activity constituted “undermining the union” or a
disruption of shop discipline. The company, however, was sharply
opposed to the clause becoming the vehicle of union maintenance or
union shop or a sanction for payment of dues, and the union, though
alleging a desire for one or the other of these things, did not insist
that the clause be the instrument of this desire. This controversy
narrowed down to the question of whether a failure to pay dues was
in itself an “undermining” of the union. The employer insisted that
the clause should explicitly state that it was not. The chairman of
the panel felt that the employer should not insist upon this position
but should trust to the referee to take a view consistent with the
meaning of the provision. He did not deny that a failure to pay
dues might, in some cases at least, be construed as “undermining,”
but he thought that the question should be left open for an arbitrator
since most cases would involve more than the mere payment of dues
and a good arbitrator should not be too closely controlled by an
excess of formula. The emplover persisted, however, in its position
and the panel suggested the following: “It is agreed that the fact
that an employee is not a member of the union or is not a member
70
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
in good standing, shall not alone and in itself be cause for discipline
in the absence of some other fact or facts showing that the status of
and conduct on the company premises of such employee is interfering
with shop discipline.” Apparently, as a concession in return for this
yielding to the employer, the Board suggested that these words be
followed by the words: “It is expected that by union members re
maining in good standing such interference with shop discipline will
be reduced.” These clauses were accepted. The employer at one
time had written a letter to the union stating: “The company will
maintain discipline on company premises, and to that end will strictly
enforce its rules and regulations; accordingly, no employee will be
permitted to engage in any activity in any way related to or con
nected with the work of a labor organization or of collective bar
gaining on company premises except as approved in the agreements
with labor organizations.” The employer later maintained that this
declaration was contrary to N. L. R. A., because by reference to the
agreement it permitted this union exclusively to engage in certain
organizational activities on the premises. The employer was induced
by the Board to accept the inclusion in the contract of the abovequoted words with the provision that if N. L. R. B. advises that the
provision is contrary to N. L. R. A., it shall be stricken. The union
demanded also that all shop rules hereafter adopted be subject to its
approval. The panel was able to bring the union to admit that its
interest was with respect to such rules as might discriminate against
it or undermine its organization. Both parties agreed finally to a
clause that no rule should be of a discriminatory character, and that
a dispute as to its character in this respect would constitute an adjudicable grievance.
In No. 26, ATlis-Chalmers (Pittsburgh), and No. 32, Allis-0halm ers
(La Porte, Ind.), the settlement followed the broad lines laid down
in No. 6.
No. 9, Cowles Tool Co., incorporated a shop discipline clause with
out important suggestion from the Board; also provisions for har
monious relations and use of bulletin board.
The agreement in No. 23, TJtica & Mohawk, also reached without
suggestion from the Board, incorporates shop discipline with the union
maintenance already mentioned.
In No. 30, United Engmeermg <& Foundry Co., in which the union
demanded the closed shop on the ground that the employer was
reversing its previously friendly attitude, the employer asked the
Board to make an informal compromise suggestion. Upon the basis
of the Board’s suggestions, the agreement provided that the employer
would not permit any conduct on company time or property opposed
to the interest of the union. In turn, the union was not to solicit
members on company time or property nor to exert coercion on any
employee to join the union.
In No. 47, Cheney Silk, plant discipline was a part of a clause
including voluntary check-off, as noted above, and employer en
couragement of union membership.
In No. 55, Borg-W arner Corporation, the employer indicated will
ingness to agree to a shop-discipline clause provided that it be made
clear that this did not require it to put the sanction of dismissal
behind the collection of dues. The Board let it be known that it
UNION SECURITY
71
would not recommend any union security clauses and the union agreed
to the company’s offer. '
In No. 75, Lamson & Sessions, on the basis of suggestions from the
Board, it was agreed that the company would take disciplinary action
against any of its employees whom it found guilty of “interfering
with the status and responsibility of the union as sole bargaining
agent certified by the N. L. R. B.”
In No. 76, American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co., the union de
manded a union shop and later expressed a willingness to accept a
clause to the effect that the employer approves of employees becoming
union members. Without important suggestions from the Board, the
parties finally agreed on a clause stating the company had no objection
to union membership and obligating the company’ to discipline any
employees who on company time engaged in antiunion activity. The
union in turn agreed to suppress union activities during working
hours.
In No. 88, American Cyanamid Co., the arrangements made upon
suggestions by the Bpard included the noncompulsory union main
tenance clause, discipline of activities in the plant “calculated to under
mine the status of the union as the bargaining agency,” union agree
ment not to engage in union activities during working hours, and
a commitment by the company to present new employees with a copy
of the agreement and to ask them to “cooperate with the union to
carry out the obligations of the contract.”
(d) Union membership encouragement and related matters.—
Clauses encouraging union membership or containing some form of
favorable reference to it have already been noted in cases Nos. 6, 9,
47,75,88, and 106. Other cases should be noted. In No. 29, E x-C ell-0
Corporation , the company agreed to a clause that “it was important
that employees who are or who become members of the union remain
in good standing.” The union agreed in turn that “neither the union
nor its members will intimidate or coerce any employee in respect to
his right to work or in respect to union activity, membership, or
nonmembership.”
In one case, No. 25, Curtis Manufacturing Go>., the only response
to the union-shop demand was a clause admitting the right of em
ployees to join the union.
In No. 76, American Brake Shoe <& Fomidry Co., the company
specifically refused to make any statement that it encouraged union
membership. Such a statement, it argued, was a covert form of
closed shop. It did agree to a shop discipline clause, as noted above.
In No. 16, K ellogg Switchboard Supply, and No. 71, Pullman
(Michigan City), the grant or improvement of grievance procedure
was considered as in some sense a response to claims for union
security.
(e) Agreements containing no reference to umion security .—In these
cases there was originally a demand for some form of union security
usually a pro forma demand for a union shop, but the demand was
not pressed or was swapped for some concession not related to union
security.
These include No. 18, John A . Roebling's Sons Co. (demands
waived for concessions); No. 27, Continental Rubber Works (claim
not pressed); No. 41, Curtiss-W right Corporation (where the claim
72
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
was abandoned but the employer informally agreed to arrange a
meeting between the union and some 24 employees who had refused
thus far to join the union, at which meeting the union representatives
would be given a full opportunity to present to the men the arguments
in favor of union membership; this agreement was not part of the
written contract); No. 49, Breeze Corporations (in which, however,
the union already had union maintenance under an earlier agree
ment) ; No. 63, Rockford Drop Forge Co. (in which the demand for
a union shop was dropped, apparently after the panel had indicated
its unwillingness to grant that demand); and No. 112, Johns-Manmile (in which the demand for union shop was dropped probably in
return for wage settlement; in any case union has 100 percent mem
bership) .
In No. 56, Aluminum Co. (Vernon), the Board suggested that the
issue of a union shop be postponed until the negotiation of a master
agreement for all the plants represented by the union in question.
The suggestion was acceded to. The fact was that the existing mas
ter agreement, which covered plants not here in question, had no
union shop provisions, and the company protested against exceptional
arrangements in the plant in question.
Appendix F
Wage Rates
1. Coverage of This Appendix and Classifications
The total number of cases docketed by the Board was 118. This
includes Nos. 4A, 20A, 2OB, and 20C which when certified to the
Board were included within Nos. 4 and 20, respectively, but were
split off when found to involve separate controversies.
Cases in which there was no hearing before the
Board__ 10
Cases in which there was no wage issue_________________
26
Cases in which the wage issue was not decided___________
16
Cases in which the wage issue was determined by recom
mendation in whole or in part_________________________ 120
Cases in which the wage issue was determined by agreement
in whole or in part____________________________________ 148
1 No. 44, W estern Cartridge, and No. 94, Sloss-Sheffield, were resolved in part by agree
ment. They have been included in both categories thus accounting for the two additional
numbers.
In some of the 26 cases in the second class, there may have been
wage issues at some time prior to submission or after disposition by
the Board, but there was none before the Board. The category in
cludes No. 51, A ir Associates, Inc., in which wage negotiations were
proceeding outside the Board at the same time that other issues were
before the Board. Here the Board’s special investigator made sug
gestions for minima based on his findings as to the wages prevailing
m the community for similar work, but the Board made no recom
mendation on this issue, and the case was closed upon seizure of the
plant by the President.
Of the 16 cases in which the wage issue was not decided the Board
closed No. 19, American Potash & Chemical Corporation, at the de
sire of the parties, without proceeding to any recommendation. The
strike ended with the employer raising wages without collective bar
gaining. In 8 of these cases the Board appointed an investigator.
In No. 4A, International Harvester, No. 58, Ohio Brass Co., No. 60,
United States Gypsum Co., No. 67, Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co.,
and No. 84, Arcade Malleable Iron W orks, the investigator’s report
either had not been received or had not been released owing to C. I. O.
withdrawal. In No. 49, Breeze Corporations, No. 66, Aluminum Co.
(regional differential), and No. 107, Burgess Battery Co., the in
vestigator’s report was released to enable the parties to resume col
lective bargaining. In the Burgess case the parties announced them
selves to be mutually satisfied with the investigator’s report and to
be willing to come to agreement on the basis of it. The remaining
cases, No. 4, International Harvester Co., No. 89, International Har
vester Co., No. 97, Robins D ry Dock, No. 100, Wolverine, and No.
102, American Can, hearings were, due to the withdrawal of the
C. I. O., either not scheduled or postponed. In No. 91, John A . R oe
73
74
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Fling's Sons Co., the hearing was postponed until the union would
send a representative with power to negotiate on all issues. The
last docketed case, No. 114, Carolina Transportation Association, was
not received until January 6, 1942. All of these 15 cases were trans
ferred to the docket of the National War Labor Board.
2. Recommendations
There were 20 cases in which the wage issue was treated in some
form or other through recommendation. As indicated elsewhere, a
classification which distinguishes between recommendations and agree
ments is somewhat arbitrary. Some of these recommendations, at
least, represented in very large part the already achieved agreement
of the parties. On the other hand, in many of the cases of so-called
agreement, the pressure brought to bear upon the parties by a de
termined panel was as great as that accompanying formal recom
mendations. The capitulation of the parties might indicate simply
less power of resistance or a preference for the form of agreement
to that of recommendation after it had become clear what the sub
stance of the recommendation would be.
(a) Cases in which procedure alone was recommended.—The rec
ommendations in No. 68, American Car and Foundry; No. 78. Bendix
A viation; No. 104, W aterfront Employers’ Association; and No. 118,
Highway Transport Association , do not deal with wage rates. In
No. 68, the Board believed that the dispute was essentially one over
the operation of a wage rate, and recommended an impartial griev
ance procedure as a means of settlement. In No. 78, the immediate
question was whether the employer had not refused to apply the
appropriate wage rate under the contract to some 12 female workers.
The Board recommended that a representative of the Board make
a binding disposition of the question. But this controversy was only
part of a larger one, increasingly acute, involved in transforming the
plant from a small-scale to a mass-production basis. For this trans
formation job, classification was an urgent necessity. The Board
recommended further negotiation between the parties with a Board
representative assisting. Case No. 104, W aterfront Em ployers1Asso
ciation , concerned the employees of Pacific Coast waterfront em
ployers represented by the A. F. L. The great majority were
represented by C. I. O. and an arbitration concerning similar wage
rates was proceeding contemporaneously. The Board considered that
it would be inadvisable to make recommendations which would place
one of the rival unions in a favorable position or otherwise embarrass
the arbitration. It recommended (orally) arbitration. The parties
accepted but insisted that the Board itself be arbitrator. The Board
arranged for an investigator who would make a study independent
of the other arbitration toward which the A. F. L. was hostile.
In No. 113, Highway Transport Association, the parties had agreed
on arbitration in principle but were unable to agree on the manner
of appointing arbitrators. It was with that problem that the recom
mendation dealt.
In one case, No. 98, Union Electric, the Board itself held no hear
ings. Due to special circumstance, it at once appointed three investi
gators who were to assist the parties to a conclusion. The investiga
WAGE RATES
75
tors made recommendations which became the basis of an agreement.
(b ) Oases in which the recommendations followed closely rates
offered by the employer, or the logic o f the existing wage scheme.—
In No. 11, J. Sklar Manufacturing Go., the company had already
made the following offer: To employees receiving 50 cents or less—
5 cents advance ; to those receiving 51 cents to 54 cents—advances
sufficient to bring the rate to 65 cents. The Board added to this
settlement a recommendation that those having more than 55 cents
receive an advance equivalent to 5 cents more than was being re
ceived at a certain date, thus following in a certain sense the em
ployers’ scheme of advance. It appears that this recommendation
embodied the substantial agreement of the patries. In No. 29, E xCell-O, the union asked a flat raise of 10 cents per hour. The employer
offered 5 cents to all not receiving increases through recent job classi
fication adjustments. The Board recommended a flat 5-cent raise. In
No. 31, Employers Negotiating Committee, the operators offered a
compromise of the wage demands which brought wages into line with
those generally agreed upon in No. 34, the related Colombia Basin
Area Loggers case. The Board recommended that the offer be ac
cepted on an interim basis until a committee appointed by the Board
might complete a comprehensive study on rates and methods of pay
in the Douglas fir industry of the Pacific Northwest. It should be
remarked that this is a progress rather than a final recommendation.
The distinction, however, is not important, since even a final recom
mendation may not be final for long. In No. 40, Bohn Aluminum,
the union asked a flat 10 cents per hour wage increase, though it had
agreed not to open wages until April 1, 1942. The company, never
theless, was prepared to grant 8 cents if allowed to experiment with
an incentive system. The Board adopted this offer as a recommenda
tion with the qualification that the introduction of the system should
be voluntary with each employee and its final adoption put to a vote
in 60 days. Similarly in No. 94, Sloss-Sheffield, where the union
demanded a 5-cent raise and the employer offered 2 cents, the Board
made an interim recommendation of 2 cents and suggested the ap
pointment of an investigator. The parties finally arrived at agree
ment without further Board participation.
In No. 44, W estern Cartridge, the permanent wage rates were a
result of agreement but there was an interim recommendation by the
Board that an advance of 5 percent granted to other employees and
departments be applied at once to the department before the Board.
In No. 110, Anaconda Copper Mining Co., the electrical workers asked
for an increase of $2.25 per day; the employer offered 75 cents. An
investigator found that Anaconda’s wage compared favorably with
other copper companies. He found no evidence to substantiate the
union’s charge that the companies held down rates collusively. He
found that the wages were much lower than those paid by neighbor
ing building contractors, but found that in the last 2 years, at least,
Anaconda’s men had had steadier employment. He found that wages
paid by neighboring utilities were 33 percent higher; this work may
have been more hazardous; its rate was traditionally higher. The in
vestigator was most troubled by the fact that 4 of the crafts in the
i. e., bricklayers, plumbers, molders, and lead burners, were much
Slant,
etter treated. Electricians were no worse treated than 13 other crafts
469872°
76
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
in which were the great majority of skilled craftsmen. Electricians
needed as much intelligence and education as any of the highest paid
crafts. Yet the differential had existed for a long time both here and
in the industry. The investigator was not unimpressed with the claim
that elimination of the differential might unsettle the company’s whole
wage structure and bring on unseen and overcostly consequences. He
asked whether, if the union had withdrawn the demand in 1939 (as it
had), it is justified in refusing to withdraw the demand in a period
of war and national peril ? He apparently thought it would not be;
he recommended, and in this the panel concurred, acceptance of the
employer’s offer. In these 6 cases, then, the recommendation was
either an adoption of the employers’ offer, or closely modeled upon
it, or a generalization of the employer’s existing wage structure.
(c)
Gases settled on traditional arbitration lines.—In No. 45, W estem Pennsylvania Labor Relations Association , the union asked a
general increase of 10 cents an hour. The employers’ association
raised its offer from 2 cents to 6 cents, at which point the men returned
to work. Both parties agreed at that time to be bound by any further
findings of the Board. An additional increase of 1y2 cents was
granted, making a total of 7% cents per hour. Whether this result
was based upon any special reasoning does not appear.
In No. 43, Sealed Power, the union eventually secured almost all of
what it had demanded before the Board. Its original demands before
certification are estimated to have involved a total increase in wages
of $210,000. The demand before the Board was scaled down to $150,000. The company offered approximately $100,000. The recommen
dation was for approximately $125,000. The union, however, struck
rather than accept the recommendation and eventually secured $145,000. The earnings in 1940, which were considerably above what they
had been in earlier years, were $293,000. It should be noted that in
this case the recommendation also provided for a union maintenance
clause. The more than usual rigor of the recommendations taken
together with the fact that the union struck against them and secured
an even superior settlement, suggests that the union was probably in
an unusually strong position. This as much as anything may account
for the recommendations.
Case No. 39, Marlin Rockwell, follows somewhat the pattern of the
above cases and, in other respects, certain traditional patterns of wage
arbitration. Here the union wanted a 10-cent per hour general in
crease. The employer had already granted it to the men, but had
granted oiily 5 cents to the women. It justified the women’s rate on
the ground that it was that prevailing in the vicinity for comparable
work. The special investigator appointed by the Board came to the
conclusion that if the area of comparison were extended beyond the
town to adjoining towns and cities, the Marlin Kockwell rate was
below that prevailing; that the additional 5 cents would, therefore,
be fair. The Board recommended this increase. The union asked
2y2 percent of annual earnings as a vacation bonus. The employer
treated the request as a demand simply for more earnings. The in
vestigator was of the opinion that a vacation or an equivalent bonus
had a different psychological effect than the wage increase and was
justified by the custom prevailing in the adjoining city, Hartford.
He suggested a vacation bonus based on a rough median of those pre
WAGE RATES
77
vailing in Hartford. He advised against granting a demand for a
double-time Sunday, finding that to be unjustified in the defense situa
tion and finding further that time and a half was the prevailing
practice. He advised also that a demand for 4 hours call-in pay was
excessive but that 2 hours would not be unusual in the light of Hart
ford practice. All of his suggestions were adopted in the Board’s
recommendation. It will be noticed that the reasoning upon which
this recommendation is based is the traditional one of applying exist
ing industry patterns to the case in question. To be sure, it is usually
debatable what industries, both in kind and location, are justly com
parable. In this case, the Board extended the area from the small
town in question to a surrounding metropolitan area which would
create a somewhat more favorable basis for the treatment of the
union claims. It treated as relevant, also, practices in industries dif
ferent from that in question. In other cases, particularly in those
settled by agreement before the Board, the area for comparison was
somewhat narrower, but the general lines of reasoning have been the
same. Particularly to be noted is the much less favorable treatment
(from the union standpoint) of possibly relevant comparative mate
rial in the later wartime case No. 110, Anaconda Copper Mining Co.,
treated above.
(d)
The most strikmg o f the wage recommendations.—The five
remaining cases, No. 20, Bituminous Coal Operators (Appalachian
Mines), No. 20C, Bituminous Coed Operators (Alabama mines), No.
21, General M otors, No. 80, American Merchant Marine Institute, and
No. 105, Central States Employers5 Negotiating Committee, are the
most distinctive of the wage recommendation cases. However, No.
20, though dramatic, was solved in terms which, objectively consid
ered, were relatively uncontroversial. The differential for work done
on daily wage rates between the northern and the southern operators
within the Appalachian area had existed only since 1933. It was
justified on the basis of the difference in cost of production, particu
larly on the supposed unfavorable freight-rate differential. An
analysis of the facts presented by the Bituminous Coal Division
showed that, if anything, the realizations of the southern operators
(after absorption of freight differentials) were superior; that the
elimination of the wage differential was equivalent to an additional
cost burden of Sy2 cents per ton: that at least one-half of this addi
tional cost would be neutralized by adjustments in the minimum price
structure established by the Bituminous Coal Division, and that the
remaining iy2cents was immaterial in amount in the competitive price
structure.
The reasoning in No. 20C, Alabama mines, follow s somewhat simi
lar lines; but the effects are perhaps more drastic. Until the accept
ance of the decision of the Board in No. 20 there had existed
between the Alabama miners and the southern Appalachian miners a
wage differential of $1.10 a day. Upon the elimination of the Appa
lachian North-South differential of 40 cents, the question arose whether
40 cents should be added to the Alabama rate in order to maintain
the preexisting differential between the southern Appalachian and
the Alabama fields. The Alabama operators argued that their realiza
tions were not sufficient to cover the additional 40 cents. The issue
was framed entirely with reference to this claim. The Alabama
78
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
operators had experimented during and just prior to this period with
increased prices to the consuming public. They had established what
they believed to be the maximum limit of possible realization. Two
members of the Board recommended a wage increase of 25 cents per
day and certain adjustments on the theory that as much as, but no
more than, that was made possible by the increased realizations estab
lished in the period of operations just prior to the recommendation.
They recommended further that should there be any increase in these
realizations, one-half of the benefit should accrue to the miners up to
but not exceeding an additional 15 cents per ton.
The next recommendation for consideration is that in No. 21, General
M otors. Here the union was asking for a general increase of 10 cents
per hour and a union shop, among other things. The employer had
offered 3 to 5 cents before the case was certified. During negotiations
before the Board, it increased the offer to 5 cents for all employees and
5 to 10 cents for skilled employees. There was no question that the
employer was paying the prevailing rate in the industry or that the
hourly wage rates were generally higher than those in other industries.
The union argued that there was a customary differential between the
automobile industry and certain other related industries such as steel,
and that because steel had increased its rate 10 cents, General Motors
should increase by the sam,e amount in order to preserve the differen
tial. The Board took note of this fact and of the fact that the seasonal
nature of the industry tended to reduce the annual earnings of the
workers. The Board granted 10 cents as asked for. ^ The Board pur
ported not to consider, in arriving at this conclusion, the probable
increase in cost of living or the probable decrease in automobile work
due to defense readjustment. Adjustment for such changes could be
taken care of when the need arose by the provision that the contract
might be terminated by either side on 60 days’ notice. The Board did,
however, note that the profits were sufficiently substantial to enable the
employer to cover the increased wage. The Board refused to make any
recommendations for union security. This refusal may account for
the complete acceptance of the wage demand, though there was nothing
in the record which under criteria then or subsequently established
made out a special case for either the union shop or union maintenance.
The Board recommended increased war-risk bonuses in No. 80, Am er
ican Merchant Marine Institute. The practice had grown up of giving
monthly bonuses to seamen who voyaged into dangerous belligerent
areas and additional flat bonuses for duty into ports such as Suez and
Aden which were peculiarly hazardous. The monthly rate had by
agreement been stepped up to $60. West-coast seamen asked for $90;
east-coast seamen for $150. West coasters wanted the danger zone
shifted from 160 east to 160 west meridian; east coasters wanted the
Caribbean and the Canadian ports included. Suez had come to be
worth $75, the seamen asked for $300; a few other ports were worth
$45, they asked for $100, and $50 for certain ports not previously pay
able. The ship owners were most anxious for an arbitration procedure
which would cover future demands, but the unions were set against
this. The panel gave an $80 monthly rate; $100 for Suez plus $5 for
every day laid over after the first 5 (layovers were usually 20 days or
more). It added a few ports to the bonus list and rejected claims on
many others. It set the 180th meridian as the danger line; it ignored
WAGE RATES
79
the Canadian and Caribbean ports. For future disputes it recom
mended an arbitration board of 3 to be appointed by the President.
The case is interesting because the situation was one in which practice
was new and the criteria for rate making completely nebulous, though
when the Board received it a structure had been worked out by contract.
The Board gave what it considered a generous increase in return for
the stabilization which it hoped would come from, the arbitral board.
The last of the important wage determinations, decided since the
actual commencement of war, was No. 105, Central States Employers'*
Negotiating Committee. The committee, representing about 800 com
mon and contract carriers engaged in motortrucking in the Central
States, since 1938 had had collective agreements with the teamsters’
(I. B. T.) union. The certification grew out of the negotiation of a
renewal contract. The parties agreed to seek the offices of the Board
and to abide by its determination. Thereupon the case was certified.
The principal demands were for a raise in hourly rates from 80 cents
to $1, in mileage rates from 3 cents to 5 cents, and for vacations with
pay. The Board found that since 1937 truckers’ wages had risen much
faster than cost of living. However, “it seems unsound to take real
wages in 1937, the year before the first general contract was negotiated,
as necessarily the standard, or to assume that the lower standard of
living then existing among the drivers was proper and should now be
reestablished. We must differentiate between the standards reached
by workers through individual bargaining or through bargaining in
local and limited groups and those reached by industry-wide bargain
ing of the type with which we are here dealing. Absolute standards
of fair real wages, of course, do not exist. But when dealing with
organized industry it seems to us fairer and more desirable to take as
the standard that balance between wages and living costs which has
been reached through industry-wide bargaining.
“* * * As a general rule, it is only after some years of col
lective bargaining that the proper competitive balance between a
newly organized industry and those longer organized is established.
When that balance is reached, of course, can only be judged by rule
of thumb. But it seems fair to assume from the evidence before us
that if the proper balance in labor costs between this industry and
its chief competitor, the railroads, has in fact been reached, it was
only when the advances established by the recently expiring contract
became effective in 1940.”
In view of the recent 10-cent increase given to the railroad workers
by the President’s Emergency Board, the Board awarded 10 cents
per hour and 4 cents per mile more (roughly 12 percent in each
class). It will be noted that, despite their somewhat greater elabo
ration, both the argument and the conclusion are strikingly similar
to No. 21, General M otors. The companies complained of inability
to pay increases. Here the Board replied that in setting a minimum
it, like the last War Labor Board, must ignore inability to pay, but
that that factor had led the Board “to restrict the increase * * *
to the minimum which * * * other factors have seemed to dic
tate.” “In dealing with this question, however, we must of necessity
consider the industry in this case as a whole and not the individual
carriers.”
80
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The Board awarded 1 week’s vacation with pay to be taken, how
ever, only in the form of actual vacation and not as a bonus. The
companies had urged that the emergency was a bad time to inaug
urate vacations. The Board on the contrary, found that the de
mand for greater productivity, increasing strain and fatigue, would
be^ well served by vacations. It cited a similar conclusion as to
railroad employees by the President’s Emergency Board and remarks
of Prime Minister Winston Churchill with regard to holidays as an
aid to staying power.
3. Agreements
(a) Oases in which procedure (done was agreed upon.—In 3 of these
cases, No. 5, Snoqualmie, No. 6, Allis-Chalmers (Milwaukee), and
No. 64, Curtiss- W right, the parties agreed to bargain further con
cerning wages, the principal issue involving union security or rec
ognition having been disposed of.
Somewhat similar is No. 10, Phelps Dodge, in which the Board
made recommendations on the union security issue; then stated that
it was not prepared without further investigation to express any
opinion on wages and recommended that the parties proceed to further
bargaining with resort to the Board if no agreement were reached.
Similar in No. 50, Tennessee Coal', Iron & Railroad Co., a demand
for increased rates was sidetracked, at least temporarily, by an
agreement of the employer to institute an incentive system. ^ The
union accepted with permission to return later to the Board if no
satisfactory solution were reached.
In No. 79, Hendey Machine Co., where the claim for increased
wages was in the teeth of an existing contract, the Board suggested
and the parties accepted a scheme for an engineering survey of job
classifications and job efficiency.
In No. 59, Erwin Cotton Mills, it was apparent from the attitude
of the panel that it was not prepared to bring pressure for any
increase. Increases had recently been made, existing rates were in
line with prevailing rates, and the industry was highly competitive.
There was an agreement, however, which the union apparently con
sidered valuable, for arbitration on job classifications.
In No. 62, Todd Galveston D ry Docks, Inc., the union wanted
bonuses for a form of particularly disagreeable work. The panel
was troubled lest the bonuses create a departure from the Gulf Zone
Standards Agreement in the shipbuilding industry. The panel sug
gested that the claim be disposed or through the grievance procedure.
This suggestion was accepted.
In No. 35, E. W . Bliss Co., the controversy, involving classifica
tions and minimum rates therefor, was settled by agreeing to arbi
tration.
(&) Cases in which rales were agreed upon.—In No. 55, B org Warner Corporation , the agreement was based largely on a recom
mendation of a Department of Labor conciliation panel made prior
to the certification. In No. 93, American Engineering, and No. 96,
Bell A ircraft, being among those in which the C. I. O. “with
drew,” agreements were subsequently negotiated under the auspices
of the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor.
WAGE RATES
81
Of the remaining cases, a few things may be said in general and
then certain significant cases singled out for special notice. Some
14 seem to have been brought to agreement with relatively little
pressure from the Board—No. 3, Com ell-Dubilier Electric Cor
poration; No. 7, Seas Shipping Co., In c.; No. 9, Cowles Tool Go.;
No. 12, California Metal Trades Association; No. 23, TJtica <&Mohawk
Cotton M ills; No. 26, Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing C o.; No. 28,
Bendix Aviation Corporation; No. 30, United Engineering <&Foundry
C o.; No. 32, AUis-Chalmers Manufacturing C o.; No. 38, Aluminum
Go. o f Am erica; No. 44, Western Cartridge C o.; No. 47, Cheney
B ros.; No. 81, Consolidated A ircraft; No. 94, Sloss-Sheffield; No. 95,
Alabama By-Products Corporation.
In No. 81 for example, the agreement was based largely on the
Lockheed and North American contracts, the latter of which was
importantly influenced by the Board, as is discussed below. The
solutions follow the usual lines in wage disputes—either a compromise
of opposing positions by finding an arbitrary midway point or else
an adjustment to conform wages to some standard considered to be
of governing importance such as a prevailing wage or a wage paid
by the same employer at other plants.
The Board’s offices may be considered to have had varying effect
running from strong to medium in the remaining cases in which the
wage rate was negotiated by agreement. There are approximately
14 of these. Generally speaking, the Board’s suggestions were based
upon prevailing rates construed rather liberally in favor of labor and
in the light of a generally rising wage trend, with secondary attention
to ability to pay.
No. 15, Arcadia Knitting Mills, and No. 25, Curtis Manufacturing
Co., for example, reflect the fact of the employer’s obvious financial
stringency. In No. 15, the union demanded a 25-percent increase and
a 45-cent minimum wage, the existing minimum being 33% cents.
The agreement provided for a 5-percent increase and a 37%-cent
minimum. In No. 25, the the union demanded a 10-cent per hour
increase and a 50-cent minimum. The agreement provided for a 3-cent
per hour increase and 45- and 47%-cent minimums (the minimums had
been offered by the employer before the hearing).
In No. 101, Chris Craft, the union sought to open up the wage terms
of a contract. The company stated its willingness to give increases if
Government defense orders were received. It was agreed to continue
the status quo unless such contracts were received.
A few cases, particularly in fairly prosperous industries, reflect the
influence of the 10-cent per hour rise in steel which thereafter spread
to a number of related industries. In No. 54, Armour & Co., where
the union asked for a flat 20-cent increase, the agreement provided
roughly for 10 cents. A similar result was achieved in No. 75, Lamson <& Sessions Co. (automobile accessories). In No. 88, American
Cyanamid, where the union asked for a 10-cent hourly raise the com
pany agreed to give 7 cents at once and 3 cents at the end of 6 months.
The company at first was willing only to reopen if living costs rose 5
points.
The most unusual of the cases in this classification is No. 36, North
American Aviation , Inc. Here the Board was instrumental in rais
ing the general wage level. The Board prevailed upon the parties
82
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
to pioneer in establishing a new minimum level for the airplane indus
try. The union demanded a 75-cent minimum and a 10-cent blanket
increase. It showed the large profits of the industry and pointed out
that the minimums in it were much lower than those in the body and*
motor plants of the automobile industry. The employer’s minimum
was 50 cents. Rates in other plants ran from 50 cents for starters to
63 cents after 6 months’ time. A subsidiary question was how long
an employee should be held at the minimum starting rate before
being raised to the permanent minimum. The employer, apparently,
in the course of discussions with the union, had given an opening for
an upward wage course by attempting to answer this question on
the hypothesis that 50 cents was the starting rate and 75 cents the
permanent rate. It appears from a tentative draft that the Board
was a one time prepared to recommend 60 cents as the starting rate,
75 cents as the eventual minimum, and the general 10-cent increase.
The panel admitted that the wages at North American were not
substantially out of line with those of other West-coast airplane fac
tories, but it believed that in view of the enormous importance of
airplanes in national defense, the wage levels should be brought to the
level of wages in the more highly paid industries with which airplanes
are comparable, such as steel and motors. The wages, the panel felt,
should be of such a nature as to attract and keep contented the finest
workmen in the area. The parties finally agreed along these lines.
Appendix G
Contract Violation
In No. 2, Vanadium Corporation, the striking union asserted that
the employer had violated the collective contract by hiring cer
tain employees. The corporation, on the other hand, denied this
charge and alleged that the strike was in breach of the contract. The
Board appointed an investigator and adopted his finding that the
union was at fault. In its recommendations, clearing the employer
and rebuking the local union leaders, the Board said: “We are passing
only upon the legal question of whether or not the company adhered
to its contractual obligations * * * not discussing, the wisdom or
tact of the company officials * * *. The union had no right under
the contract to strike.” The Board’s “findings and recommendations”
read not unlike an opinion and judgment of a court.
In No. 35, E. W. Bliss Co., the employer alleged the union’s claim
for reclassifications of employees was violative of the contract which
fixed wages for a definite term, but did not insist on this contention
and eventually agreed to arbitrate not this question of legal right
but the question of reclassification itself.
In No. 36, North American Aviation Co., a strike of a local union
(disavowed by the national union) in breach of an interim promise
not to strike, in exchange for the employer’s promise to make the
wage settlement retroactive, was met with Board approval, by mili
tary dispersal of pickets so as to facilitate access of willing workers
to the plant. But it may be doubted whether this device to achieve
continuity of production was used to vindicate legal obligation as dis
tinguished from a national economic interest. In other words, the
same device might have been used whether or not there had been a
promise and whether or not the promise were legally binding.
In No. 40, Bohn Aluminum & Brass Corporation, the employer in
voked the terms of a collective agreement with a year to run as a bar
to the union demand for an increase of 10 cents an hour in wage rates.
But again the contract issue was avoided by a recommendation (de
sired by the employer) that a wage increase be given in consideration
of the union’s agreeing to allow the employer to try an “incentive
wage” plan.
A contention of the employer that the Gulf coast zone standards
(in the negotiation of which both parties had participated) them
selves constituted a complete contract precipitated a break-down of
negotiations for a collective contract and a strike in No. 62, Todd
Galveston D ry Docks, Inc. This contention was disregarded by the
Secretary of Labor in certifying the case and by the Board in rec
ommending terms for its settlement. But the same standards were
deemed by the Board to become part of an existing collective contract
in No. 85, Alabama D ry Dock <& Shipbuilding Co., without any
83
84
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
formal incorporation into the contract. This holding was contrary
to the contention of the union, which, in seeking a union security
clause, asserted that the introduction of zone standards required the
“opening up” of the contract for negotiation of other changes. The
latter case carefully distinguished two earlier cases. In No. 37, Beth
lehem Steel Go., Shipbuilding Division , the controversy and strike
concerned the formation of a contract. No question of breach of
contract was suggested, both because the employer had not partici
pated in the Pacific zone standards conference and because the stand
ards were avowedly effective only as embodied in collective agree
ments. Nor did the Board see any breach of contract in No. 46, F ed
eral Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Go., in which a strike had eventuated
from fruitless negotiation for a contract. Strikes were forbidden by
the Atlantic zone standards in the formulation of which the parties
had participated, but these zone standards, like those for the Pacific
Coast, had been adopted for incorporation into collective contracts.
The controversy arose over what terms other than the zone standards
such a contract should have. The Alabama D ry Dock case distin
guished Bethlehem and Federal because in these earlier cases no con
tract was in force. (The same fact accounts for the disregard in
No. 62, Todd, of the allegations of breach of contract.) So in Ala
bama the Board, rejecting the union contention and holding that the
contract continued in force as amended by the zone standards, said:
“This case is governed by the principle that a collective bargaining
agreement once made should be given effect so long as it endures.”
In No. 68, American Gar & Foundry Go., the wages based on output
were falling short of expectations, because, it was alleged, management
was inefficient. The workers struck without utilizing the grievance
procedure of the contract. Soon after the case was certified to the
Board, production was resumed by request of the Board. After hear
ing, the Board recommended observance of the contract and the addi
tion of a provision for arbitration if the grievance procedure did not
provide a solution. The Board did not discuss the lawfulness of the
strike, and proposed no remedies that would not have been equally
appropriate whether or not there had been a breach of contract.
In No. 78, Bendix Aviation Corporation, the union charged the em
ployer with paying certain women workers wages below the contract
scale. The employer alleged that the contract scale applied only to
men. The Board recommended arbitration. At the same time it rec
ommended continuous mediation in the settlement of new problems of
mass production that were arising owing to rapid expansion. The
recommendations were accepted and thus the Board appointed two
representatives, an arbiter of the legal issue and a mediator of the nonlegal difficulties.
In the recommendations in No. 79, Hendey Machine Go., the Board
recognized that the union had struck in violation of the contract, but,
work having been resumed as soon as the Board received the case, it
proposed as a solution of the wage dispute, “without modification of
the contractual rights and responsibilities of the parties, which are
clear,” a survey of the possibility of more efficient operation. In a
later recommendation the Board proposed a trial of the plan evolved
by its surveyor.
CONTRACT VIOLATION
85
The war zones bonus case, No. 80, American Merchant Marine In
raised some discussion about contract obligations. On the
East Coast four of the lines were parties to contracts with the Sea
farers International Union, which apparently were violated by the
union in refusing to arbitrate and resorting to strikes, and on the
West Coast there was a contract which expired after certification
and before hearing. The Board’s solution of the differences was all
coast-wide and took no account of these violations; moreover, it was a
solution by arbitration in substantial conformity with the contracts;
and the Board’s proposals, as it said, did not affect methods of nego
tiation “or any unexpired contracts.”
Another case in which contract questions were raised but not dealt
with by the Board is No. 83, Agar Packing & Provision Corporation.
Here the employers had refused to deduct from wage payments certain
fines assessed by the union against its members. Whether or not this
was a violation of the collective contract which provided for a “vol
untary check-off,” the local union, by calling a strike (not authorized
by the national organization) violated the contract’s directive that
“there should be no strike,” and disregarded its grievance procedure
culminating in arbitration. When appealed to by the employer, the
national officers of the union ordered resumption of work. But the
companies refused to take back certain employees said to have insti
gated the outlaw strike. The employers charged also (but vaguely as
to any particular persons) sabotage, violence, etc. They said the men
that they refused to rehire were persons they could not trust within
their plants. The national union officers insisted on reinstatement of
all, but agreed to arbitrate any charges against particular individuals.
The employers agreed to arbitrate but refused to reinstate these men
meanwhile. The national union then authorized a strike, maintain
ing that such discriminatory rehiring was an unfair labor practice
(which overbore any contract provisions). The employers next en
larged the list of employees that they would not take back (unless
required by an arbitration award), including therein leaders of the
renewed strike, some of whom had been on vacation when the first
strike occurred. They also suggested that the breaches of contract
by the union justified them in treating the contract as completely
broken. These interesting questions of contract law were extensively
debated, but the Board, without throwing light on them, attempted to
consign the controversy about reinstatement to arbitration by a special
board.
In No. 101, Chris Craft Corporation, the union demanded higher
wages and the employer contended that wages had been fixed by con
tract till January 1943. The strike was terminated by request of the
Board. Owing to shortage of materials, no further work was in pros
pect when the case came on for hearing. The term of the contract
being long and the wage scale low, the company was willing to raise
wages provided it obtained defense orders enabling it to get materials.
At the suggestion of the Board, the parties signed an agreement to
negotiate a new wage scale if the employer “receives an invitation to
bid on a defense contract,” and the Board used its good offices with
the O. P. M. to enable the corporation to obtain such opportunities.
stitute,
A ppendix H
Relation With the National Labor Relations Board
The interrelation of the National Labor Relations Board and the
Mediation Board was constant and active. Many cases before the
Mediation Board involved first bargaining negotiations between an
employer and a union newly certified by the Relations Board. Some
times the N. L. R. B.’s determination of bargaining representative
was made before, sometimes after, the Mediation Board received the
case. Also there were several cases which involved charges of unfair
labor practices, either not yet presented to the N. L. R. B. (as No. 48,
Scullin S teel), or pending before it (as No. 22, Minneapolis-Honeyw ell), or already decided by it but contested in the courts (as No. 73,
Kansas City P ow er). The issuance of a complaint by the N. L. R. B.
between the date of the Mediation Board’s first and second recom
mendations in No. 51, A ir Associates, led the Board to withdraw its
proposal of arbitration of the back-pay question. After recommend
ing maintenance of membership as a term of settlement in No. 46,
Federal Shipbuilding, the Board obtained an important opinion from
the N. L. R. B. supporting the lawfulness oi this term.
N. L. R. B. issues were sometimes incidental and did not prevent
the Mediation Board from proceeding with its work (as in No. 18,
Boebling, No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding, and No. 51, A ir Associates),
or again caused a suspension of its work until the N. L. R. B. had
made its decision (as in No. 4, International H arvester), or given its
interpretation (as in No. 54, Arm our). In many cases these were the
sole or the outstanding causes of controversy. Then the case was
disposed of either without any formal action by the Mediation Board
(as in No. 74, Pressed Steel Car), or by a recommendation that the
parties resort to the N. L. R. B. (as in No. 52, Federal M ogul), or by
a request to the N. L. R. B. that a case already before that Board be
expedited (as in No. 69, Pullman, Michigan City). Or again, in order
to be able to effectuate a settlement, the Board got from the N. L. R. B.
an interpretation of the act (as in No. 108, Nevada Consolidated Cop
per, Santa Rita), or of an order of the N. L. R. B. (as in No. 54,
A rm our), or even an order of a court (as in No. 65, Solvay Process).
Though the executive order creating the Mediation Board mentioned
the N. L. R. B. only in directing the Mediation Board “to request
the National Labor Relations Board, in any controversy or dispute
relating to the appropriate unit or appropriate representatives * * *
to expedite” its action, the Mediation Board kept its hand off both
representation and unfair labor practice matters and was equally
ready to request the N. L. R. B. to hasten its consideration of either
type of case.1 Cases in which the N. L. R. B. was an important factor
were:
^
'
1. As to representation questions: No. 14t, Birdsboro Steel Foumdry;
No. 17, American Car and Foumdry; No. 22, Mirmeapolis-Honeywell;
1 In No. 42, Duquesne Light, the Board applied its hands-off policy where it deemed a
State body (the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board) the appropriate agency to determine
a representation issue, and recommended resort to that agency.
87
88
No. 48,
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
No. 52,
No. 53 (half),
No. 69,
, Bessemer; No. 73,
No.
and No. 107,
.
2. As to unfair labor practice questions: No. 22,
No. 48,
No. 69,
Bessemer; No. 73,
No. 107,
No. 65,
and
No. 108,
, Santa Rita.
Case No. 69 was unusual in that the parties agreed that they would
accept the determination of the N. L. R. B. trial examiner on a
reinstatement demand as a final determination and not seek to have
it reviewed by the N. L. R. B. and the courts. The Board recom
mended in No. 42, Duquesne Light, that the parties should agree to
take a State labor board’s prospective decision on representation as
final. The independent union rejected the recommendation, but the
State board’s decision did in fact end the controversy.
Scullin Steel;
Federal M ogul;
Gulf
States U tilities;
Pullman
Kansas City
P ow er;
Im pressed Steel Car;
Burgess Battery
Minneapolis-Honey
w ell;
Scullin S teel;
Pullman,
Kansas
City P ow er;
Burgess B attery;
Solvay P rocess;
Nevada Consolidated Copper
Part IV
Case Histories
89
Case Histories
CASE No. 1
Univebsal-Cyclops S teel Corporation, Bridgeville, Pa.
A malgamated A ssociation of I ron,
Steel, and T in W orkers of N orth
A merica, Good W ill L odge N o.
178, C. I. O.
Certified March 27. Strike February 19-March 28. 1,400 workers involved.
Closed March 28
Immediately after the Secretary of Labor certified the case, the Board was
notified that the dispute had been settled by the parties with the aid of a con
ciliator from the Department of Labor. Consequently the Board canceled the
hearing noticed for March 29 and closed the case.
CASE No. 2
Vanadium Corporation of A merica,
U nited Vanadium W orkers L ocal
Bridgeville, Pa.
I ndustrial U nion No. 953, C. I. O.
Certified March 27. Strike February 10-March 31. Hearings March 29, 30,
April 30. 274 workers involved. Closed October 24
Panel: March 29: Graham, Lapham (Meyer), Kennedy (Murray).
April 30: Davis, Teagle, Carey.
The following opinion of the Board, signed by Messrs. Davis, Lapham, and
Kennedy was issued October 20 (though dated September 23) and was agreed
to by the parties.
Findings and Recommendations
October 20
PRELIMINARY RECITAL
On February 10, 1941, the members of the United Vanadium Workers, Local
Industrial Union No. 953, went on strike against the Vanadium Corporation of
America at its Bridgeville, Pa., plant.
On March 27, 1941, the Secretary of Labor certified to this Board that the
strike threatened to burden or obstruct the production of equipment or materials
essential to national defense and had not been adjusted by the Commissioners
of Conciliation of the Department of Labor. The Board thereupon assumed
jurisdiction of the dispute and immediately called the parties to a hearing
before it.
On March 30, 1941, at the instance of the Board, the parties agreed in sub
stance that the plant should be reopened upon the following day and that all of
the striking employees should be returned to work without discrimination,
without prejudice, however, to the rights and defenses of either party respecting
the points in issue. The Board, for its part, undertook to proceed at once under
section 2, paragraph (d) of the Executive order of March 19, 1941, to investigate
the issues in dispute.
Pursuant to this agreement, the striking employees returned to work on
March 31, 1941, and production was resumed. On April 2, 1941, the National
469872°—42----7
91
92
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Defense Mediation Board appointed Father Francis J. Haas its special repre
sentative to investigate the issues in dispute. On April BO, 1041, at reopened
hearings before the Board, Father Haas submitted an interim report containing
his findings and recommendations for the settlement of the matter. On the
same day, the company submitted to the Board a written request for the modifi
cation of these recommendations in certain respects.
The matter is now before the Board for the making of final findings and rec
ommendations upon all points in dispute.
THE ISSUES
The union stated before this Board and its special representative that the
strike was called because of the failure of the company to comply with the
terms of a contract entered into between the company and the union on June
17, 1940, in the hiring of six guards on November 7, 1940. The union con
tended that under the terms of this contract the company was obligated before
appointing such guards to post notices of the existence of the new positions
and to give preference among equally qualified applicants to company employees
having the greatest seniority. The union further claimed that its protest over
the company’s failure to comply with this requirement should have been treated
by the company as a grievance under the contract and been the subject of dis
cussion between the members of the union shop committee and the general
superintendent of the plant. The union claimed that instead of such discus
sion with the shop committee, the company had dealt throughout with one of
the union’s national officers. The union demanded the removal of the guards,
strike pay, the reemployment of strikers without discrimination, and the enforce
ment of the contract.
The company contended for its part that the guards hired were confidential
employees and as such expressly excluded from the contractual requirement
with regard to the filling of vacancies or new positions. It claimed further
more that it had discussed the matter with the shop committee, as well as with
the international representatives of the union. The company’s main conten
tion, however, was that the strike had been called in violation of the contract
and that the members of the shop committee responsible for this violation should
be discharged.
This dispute thus presents to the Board these issues: (1) Whether or not
the company violated the contract of June 17, 1940, by employing six guards
without posting notice of vacancies, giving preference to qualified employees
of greatest seniority, or adequately discussing the matter with the union shop
committee; (2) whether or not the six guards should, in the company’s
discretion, be retained in employment; (3) whether or not the union violated
the contract by calling the strike of February 10, 1941; (4) whether or not
the striking employees should receive strike pay; (5) assuming that the strike
was called in violation of the contract, what penalties, if any, should be im
posed upon the members of the shop committee responsible for the violation.
A further issue raised during the dispute as to whether or not the striking
employees who removed defense materials from the plant during the strike
should be paid for this work has been withdrawn from our consideration by
the statement of the union representatives before the Board that the men did
not desire such pay.
FINDINGS
1. Section 6 of the contract of June 17,1940, reads in part:
“Notice of any vacancy or new position as timekeeper, clerk, stenogranher,
office worker, or salaried employee not in a supervisory, technical, oi con
fidential capacity shall be posted by the company for a period of 1 week to allow
time for written application by any qualified employee interested. In filling the
position from among those applying or otherwise, the company shall give
preference among equally qualified employees to the employee having the longest
service with the company.”
From that language it is clear that if the six guards hired on November 7,
1940, were hired in a confidential capacity, the company was under no obliga
tion to post a notice of the vacancies or new positions or to give to its senior
employees the preference otherwise required by the contract.
The Board’s special representative has found that these guards were, in fact,
hired as confidential employees. Nothing in the records before this Board
CASE HISTORIES
93
casts doubt upon this finding. The guards were hired in compliance with sug
gestions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and as part of the protective
measures taken by the company to prevent sabotage to its defense production.
Because of the special nature of their work and as a precaution in their selec
tion, the men were taken from the reserve guard list of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, Pittsburgh branch. Their names were submitted to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and their fingerprints were checked. While
it is apparently true, as the union claimed, that the company’s watchmen were
chosen in compliance with the section of the contract above quoted, it is clear
that the principal duty of these watchmen was merely to guard against fire
hazards. The task of guarding the plant machinery and products against in
tentional damage or sabotage is of a different nature and clearly placed these
guards in the capacity of confidential employees.
The record indicates, likewise, that the company did not violate the pro
visions of the contract with regard to grievance procedure either by failing to
discuss the matter with the union shop committee, or otherwise. Section 8 of
the contract reads in part as follows:
“Should differences arise between the company and the union as to the mean
ing and application of the provisions of this agreement, or should any local
trouble of any kind arise in said plant, there shall be no suspension of work
on account of such differences, but an earnest effort made to settle them imme
diately in the following manner:
“First, between the employee and his foreman, or between the member of the
shop committee and the foreman of the department involved;
“Second, between a member or members of the shop committee and the gen
eral superintendent of the plant;
“Third, between the representatives of the national organization of the union
and representatives of the executives of the company; and
“Fourth, in the event the dispute shall not have been satisfactorily settled,
it shall be referred to arbitration. The company shall choose one representa
tive and the union shall choose one representative and these two shall jointly
select an impartial third person. A majority decision of the three persons so
named shall be final and binding upon both the company and the union. The
expense incident to the services of the impartial third person shall be paid
jointly by the company and the union.
“Regular monthly meetings shall be scheduled between the shop committee
and the general superintendent for presentation of grievances by either party.
All grievances shall be presented at this meeting, provided, however, that mat
ters pertaining to discharges or other matters that cannot be reasonably delayed
until the time of the next regular meeting may be presented by special appoint
ment in accordance with the foregoing provisions.”
It was admitted at hearings before the Board by the union representatives
that the matter of hiring guards had been discussed on November 7, 1940, at
the regular monthly meeting for the presentation of grievances, by the general
manager and the shop committee. The general manager took the position that
this matter should not be considered a grievance since the matter was out of
the hands both of the local union and the local management. The general
manager stated, however, that if the union considered the matter a grievance,
they should proceed with the next step called for in the contract and arrange
for a meeting between representatives of the national organization of the union
and of the company executives.
The members of the shop committee thereafter got in touch with Mr. Bransome, the president of the company. The record is not clear as to exactly
what communications passed between Mr. Bransome and the members of the
shop committee. It is established, however, that on January 21, Mr. Bransome
wired the general manager of the corporation as follows:
“Following telegram received today: ‘United Vanadium Workers wish to
know why the present guards cannot be replaced by our members as we have
men out of work at present. Reply by Western Union as soon as possible.
Signed, Shop Committee.* Please advise shop committe that in my opinion
protection against outside sabotage so important that no changes could be
•taken in rotation of men assigned to guard duty. Perfectly willing to discuss
this question provided that qpmmittee understands that nothing should be left
to chance that might occasion accidents that would cause cessation of their work
and interruption in production vital to national defense.”
' It appears to this Boards that this, telegram constituted an offer by Mr. Bran
some to discuss the entire matter with the members of the. shop committee., .The
94
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
union has furnished neither this Board nor its special representatives with any
evidence which contradicts this conclusion.
As to the union’s claim, finally, that the company should not have discussed this
matter with Mr. Federoff, the regional director of the Congress of Industrial Or
ganizations in Pittsburgh, it seems to us that such action, far from constituting a
violation of the contract, is expressly provided for as stage three of the grievance
procedure as above set forth. It should be noted, of course, that we are passing
only upon the legal question of whether or not the company adhered to its con
tractual obligations. We are not discussing the wisdom or tact shown by the
company officials in handling the dispute. The maintenance of industrial peace
and harmonious relations often requires more than the mere adherence to the
letter of a contract, and we were left with the impression that if the company’s
representatives had taken a less abstract and more realistic attitude with regard
to the union’s protest, the entire strike might have been avoided.
On the issue before us, however, we find and conclude that in hiring the six
guards in question and in dealing with the union’s protest concerning such hiring,
the company did not violate the provisions of the contract of June 17,1940.
2. As to the demands of the union that the six guards should be removed, it is
clear from the foregoing, and we find that the company was entirely within its
rights in hiring them. We shall recommend that, in the discretion of the com
pany, they be retained in employment.
3. The Board’s special representative found that the union violated its contract
with the company in calling a strike on February 10,1941, and recommends that
this Board should so declare. From the facts before us, this conclusion is ines
capable. Regardless of the merits of the union’s claim with respect to the manner
in which the guards should have been hired, regardless of the manner in which
the company dealt with their alleged grievance, the union had no right under the
contract to strike. Its remedy clearly set forth in the contract was a request for
arbitration. No such request was ever made. Instead, in the face of their writ
ten promise that “there shall be no suspension of work on account of such differ
ences,” the strike was called.
We find and declare that this strike of the United Vanadium Workers Local
Industrial Union 953 on February 10,1941, constituted a violation by the union of
the contract of June 17, 1940.
4. It follows from this finding, that as the strike was in violation of the con
tract, the union’s demand for strike pay should be denied. We shall so recom
mend.
5. The Board’s special representative recommended that the union officers who
called the strike should be appropriately reprimanded and that such reprimand
should be made a condition of their retention in employment by the company.
With this recommendation we agree. This Board must condemn without re
serve the action of the officers of the local in violating the contract. Labor and the
friends of labor have fought for years to achieve for unions contractual provisions
for the peaceful settlement of grievances and disputes such as those in the contract
before us. Adherence to procedures so established for the orderly settlement of
industrial disputes without strikes or lock-outs is fundamental to the whole process
of collective bargaining. It is peculiarly essential in this period of national emer
gency. To disregard such procedures once set up and to call a strike in a defense
industry in violation of them is to do a great disservice not only to labor, but to
the Nation as a whole.
The company, on the other hand, has demanded that these men should be
discharged. Involving as it would the very livelihood of these workers and the
welfare of their families and dependents, we feel that such action would be inap
propriate. It would be a punishment not well suited to the offense for which
it was imposed. In calling the strike, the members of the shop committee acted
not as company employees, but as union officials. Disciplinary action as to such
actions is primarily a matter of union responsibility. Adequate punishment
would seem to involve, therefore, not their separation from employment, but from
union office.
Since the last hearing, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee has taken over
Local 953 and assumed responsibility for the then existing contract. The local
is now affiliated with the Steel Workers Organizing Committee and is chartered
as Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Local Union No. 2480. The members
of the shop committee which called the strike have all been replaced and at the
present time hold no union office. So long as that condition exists, we think that
disciplinary action is appropriate and adequate and we are not prepared to
recommend the discharge of these men.
CASE HISTORIES
&5
RECOMMENDATIONS
Pursuant to section 2 (d) of the President’s Executive Order No. 8716, of
March 19, 1941, the National Defense Mediation Board recommends:
1. That Frank A. Pugne, John T. Fagan, Andrew Campanucci, Mimi Cherry,
John A. Hastings, and Richard Chappie, the members of the shop committee who
called the strike Of February 10,1941, who have been excluded from office by Local
Union No. 2480 of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, be reprimanded by
having read to them paragraph 5 of the foregoing findings and that they each
be given a copy of these findings and recommendations;
2. That the strikers receive no pay for the time they were on strike;
3. That in the discretion of the company the six guards hired on November 7,
1940, be retained in its employment.
CASE No. 3
Cornell-D ubilier E lectric Corpora- I nternational B rotherhood of E lec
tion, South Plainfield, N. J.
trical W orkers, L ocal B-1041,
A. F. L.
Certified March 27. Strike March 10-April 3. Hearings March 29, April 2.
2,400 workers involved. Closed April 3
Panel: Graham, Ching, Watt.
At the first hearing which was the first held by the Board, the union asked
a continuance because the responsible officers of the international union were out
of town. After some discussion the Board recommended:
Recommendation
March 29
The National Defense Mediation Board recommends, and this recommendation
is agreed to by the representatives of the company, and the union representatives
agree to submit it to their international president and general counsel for their
approval:
“That all employees of the company now on strike return to work as soon as
possible in accordance with the spirit and recommendation of the President of
the United States of America in his Executive order creating the National
Defense Mediation Board; the understanding being
1. That the employees who are now on strike will in no way have rights
jeopardized by the return to work. This assurance has been given them by the
Mediation Board;
2. That the company will immediately resume negotiaitons with the union
for a satisfactory agreement including wage schedules and in the event no
agre'ement is reached, the entire matter shall again be taken up with the
Mediation Board for such further action as is necessary to carry out the
purposes of the President’s order creating the Board.”
The international president refused approval and the strike continued. At
the April 2 hearing the parties notified the Board that they had reached an
unwritten agreement and that a contract would be signed later. The issues in
the case were never discussed before the Board. On April 14 a complete
agreement was signed.
CASES Nos. 4 ,4A, and 89
I nternational H arvester Co.
Farm E quipment W orkers Organizing
No. 4. Chicago, 111. (3 plants), Canton, Committee, C. I. O.
111., East Moline, 111., Rich F ederal Labor U nions 22631 and 22657,
A. F. L.
mond, Ind.
No. 4A. Rock Falls, 111., Milwaukee, U nited Automobile W orkers of A mer
ica, C. I. O.
Wis.
No. 89. Springfield, Ohio.
No. 4 certified March 27. No. 4A set off October 30. No. 89 certified October 13.
Strikes: Tractor Works, Chicago, January 30-March 31; McCormick Works,
96
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Chicago, February 28-March 31; Richmond, Ind., February 17-March 31; Rock
Falls, HI., January 21-March 31; Springfield, September 23-October 14. Hear
ings : No. 4: March 31, April 1, 2, July 8, 9. No. 89: October 22, 23. Nos. 4, 4A,
89: October 30, November 1, 3-6,10,11. No. 4A: November 12,13. 30,300 work
ers involved. Transferred to the National War Labor Board.
Panel: March-April: Dykstra, Teagle, Meyer, Watt, Haywood.
July: Dykstra, Teagle, Meyer, Watt, Brophy. Assistant, Harbison.
October-November (No. 4 and No. 89): Wyzanski, Mead, Carey. Assist
ant, Gill.
October-November (No. 4A) : Seward, Mead, Calvin. Assistant, Gill.
When No. 4 was certified to the Board, the Farm Equipment Workers were on
strike at a number of the company’s plants, and no collective contracts had yet
been made. The strikers returned to work at the Board’s request, pending con
sideration of the dispute by the Board. At the first hearing it developed that
the A. F. L. also contended for bargaining rights, and on April 2 an agreement
was reached between all parties. The following document, in view of its language,
of its signature by all the panel, and of the “dissent” that the C. I. O. member
appended to his signature, may be considered as an interim recommendation.
Contract Pursuant to Recommendation
April 2
In the dispute between the employees of the International Harvester Co. and
the company, certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Defense Media
tion Board, the Board finds and the parties to the dispute have agreed,
1. That all plants are to be kept open and production for defense maintained
pending a recommendation for settlement from the Board.
Meanwhile the Board will proceed under the authority of the President’s Execu
tive Order No. 8716 of March 19, “To investigate issues between employers and
employees, and practices and activities thereof, with respect to such controversy
or dispute; conduct hearings, take testimony, make findings of fact * * * and
make public such findings and recommendations whenever in the judgment of the
Board the interests of industrial peace so require.”
2. To ask the National Labor Relations Board for the earliest possible determi
nation of the appropriate bargaining agencies.
3. The company agrees that all employees reporting for work promptly after
call by the company will be returned to work without loss of seniority rights and
privileges.
4. In the company’s four plants which have been reopened, since after a strike
continuous operations at former levels cannot be resumed at once, the company
agrees to continue to pay to each employee reporting to work not less than his
average earnings during the 4-week period preceding the strike until such time as
his former regular work or its equivalent is available to him. It is understood
that employees who cannot be given former regular work at once will do such other
available work as the company may assign temporarily to them.
5. The employees agree that good order and proper shop discipline will be
maintained during the period of investigation and fact finding by the Board.
Mr. Haywood signed the above subject to the following reservation:
“I dissent on the words ‘or its equivalent’ in paragraph 4, holding that employees
should have the right to return to their former jobs when such jobs become
available.
“Furthermore, I have suggested that, pending the proposed investigation, means
be provided for employees to have grievances adjusted by representatives of their
own choosing, this to apply to all groups in order to guarantee against discrimi
nation.”
The Board appointed Professor Don Lescohier, of the University of Wisconsin,
to investigate wages and other issues in dispute. At the July hearing his report
was served on the parties. He made no recommendation on the question of a
general wage increase, which was the principal issue, and the hearing was
adjourned with the understanding that the company would proceed to bargain
with the certified unions at the various plants. Meanwhile the N. L. R. B. was
conducting elections, which resulted in the certification of the C. I. O. at six
plants and the A. F. L. at two.
CASE HISTORIES
97
Case No. 89, certified to the Board in October, concerned the Springfield, Ohio,
plant, where the U. A. W., C. I. O., had been chosen bargaining agent. Several
days were spent in mediation efforts concerning that plant only, but the
F. E. W. O. C. and the A. F. L., the bargaining agents at the plants in the original
case, bombarded the Board with demands for consideration of their problems
along with the Springfield negotiations. Negotiations at these plants had not
been concluded and the unions were worried lest the U. A. W. strike a bargain
for the Springfield plant which would set a precedent for the other plants.
The Board therefore summoned the other unions and separated No. 4A from
No. 4. The U. A. W. and F. E. W. O. C. organized a joint bargaining committee
to negotiate for all the C. I. O. plants. Several days of mediation efforts brought
the parties together on certain of the issues, but the greater part of the con
troversy was still unsettled when the C. I. O. members of the Board resigned in
connection with the captive mines dispute. The hearings in the C. I. O. Harvester
cases were then suspended indefinitely because of the lack of a C. I. O. member
on the panel.
In the A. F. L. case, No. 4A, after 2 days of further hearing, the Board issued
the following:
Interim Statement
November 18
The parties to this case, after several days of direct collective bargaining, have
requested the assistance of the National Defense Mediation Board in the settle
ment of the two most important issues still remaining in dispute between them,
i. e., wages and union security.
After consultation with the parties, the Board has concluded that further
direct collective bargaining between the parties upon these issues is desirable
and that the time has not yet been reached when the Board itself should make
recommendations. With regard to the issue of wages, moreover, the Board feels
that it has not at present sufficient information before it to permit it to make
a recommendation.
The Board is, therefore, adjourning the hearing until further notice with
the following understandings:
1. That the Board will at once appoint a special representative to investigate
the issues arising out of the union’s wage demands. Without restricting in any
sense the scope of his investigation, the Board will direct the attention of the
special representative, particularly to the cost of living in Milwaukee and Rock
Island and the changes in such cost of living, the comparative wage rates paid
by the International Harvester Co. and its competitors in other similar indus
tries in these localities, and the financial ability of the company to grant the
wage demands. The special representative will be asked to conduct his inves
tigation with all possible expedition and to make his findings available to the
parties and to the Board. The parties, if agreement upon these issues has not
already been reached by direct negotiations, are requested to negotiate further
in the light of the report of the special representative with the understanding
that either party may again bring the issue before the Board if such negotiations
are unsuccessful.
2. That the Board at this time is not prepared to make any recommendation
upon the issue of union security. The Board believes, however, that the incor
poration into the contract of the clause attached to this statement as exhibit “A”
or of some modification of this clause satisfactory to both parties, would pro
mote stability and harmony in the future relations between the two parties to
this case. Without making any recommendation upon the issue, therefore, or
in any way committing itself as to the nature of such recommendation, the Board
commends this clause to the serious attention of both parties.
The parties, finally, are requested to keep the Board informed from time to
time of the course and results of their further negotiations.
On November 24, the Board appointed Stanley P. Farwell, president of the
Business Research Corporation of Chicago, as its special representative to con
duct the wage investigation. This investigation was still in progress on January
12,1942, and all three cases remained open.
98
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 5
Weyerhaeuser T imber Co. ( S noqual- P uget Sound D istrict Council L umber
mie F alls Lumber Co. ), Snoqualmie
and S awmill W orkers, Local 2545,
Falls, Wash.
A. F. L.
Certified April 1. Strike October 2, 1940-April 21, 1941. Hearing April 9-14.
1,060 workers involved. Closed April 19
Panel: Graham, Teagle, Watt.
This controversy began early in 1939, when the companies terminated their
contract with the union because of a dispute over an issue not important here.
The N. L. R. B. shortly thereafter certified the union as exclusive bargaining
agent after an election, and late in February 1939 negotiations began for another
contract.
Negotiations from time to time until October 1940 yielded no agreement; the
major issue was the union’s demand for a union shop. A strike began on
October 28. Settlement efforts failed and in March 1941 the parties agreed
to recommend that the dispute be referred to the newly created National
Defense Mediation Board.
Upon certification, the Board requested the union, pending the Board proceed
ings, to furnish carpenters to resume work at the Snohomish airport, halted by a
sympathy strike since March 14. The union agreed to this request the fol
lowing day.
On April 14, after 5 days of hearings, the Board informallv submitted to
the parties a compromise proposal embodying a prompt return of all strikers
to work, a maintenance of membership clause, a further company under
taking to recommend membership in the union to new employees, and an
undertaking by the parties to negotiate the outstanding wage questions by
collective bargaining. An agreement on this basis was signed on the same
day, and was ratified by the union membership on April 19.
CASE No. 6
A llis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., U nited A utomobile W orkers of A merMilwaukee, Wis.
ica , Local 248, C. I. O.
Certified April 2. Strike January 22-April 7. Hearing April 5, 6. 7,800 workers
involved. Closed April 7
Panel: Davis, Ching, Meyer, Watt, Rieve.
The background of this case was an interunion dispute in which the undis
puted majority union, the U. A. W., C. I. O., had become extremely sensitive
over the activities on company property of six A. F. L. members. This feeling
culminated on December 28, 1940, in a street fight between C. I. O. and A. F. L.
employees of the company. The company discharged the two A. F. L. employees,
pending investigation, and the A. F. L. filed charges with the N. L. R, B. On
January 3, 1941, Local 248 broadened its demand from previous insistence upon
permanent discharge of the two A. F. L. members to negotiation of a new con
tract to include provisions for a union shop and a general wage increase. No
formal contract had been in force for several months. A strike broke out
January 22.
A provisional agrement to return to work and to establish an impartial
referee was negotiated on February 15 by Mr. Hillman, but a misunderstanding
over an interpretive clause of this agreement resulted in charges by the union
that the company was refusing to accept the agreement in good faith. Additional
efforts by the Concilation Service, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Office of
Production Management, did not result in termination of the strike, and on
April 2 the case was certified to the Board.
After 2 days of hearing, a settlement which included provisions concerning
union security, strongly suggested by the Board, was signed by the panel
members and the representatives of the union and the company.
CASE HISTORIES
99
Contract
April 6
The terms and conditions of the 1940 proposal to Local 248, U. A. W. A.,
placed in operation by the company on April 29, 1940, as a company policy
shall be and remain in full force and effect for the term of this agreement
with the following changes:
A. There shall be added to the agreement exhibit “G” as follows: No employee
will be permitted to engage in any activity in any way related to or connected
with the work of a labor organization or of collective bargaining on company
premises, except as provided in the agreements with labor organizations cer
tified as the exclusive bargaining agencies in the various bargaining units in
the plant. It is agreed that if or when the National Labor Relations Board
shall find that these provisions are contrary to the National Labor Relations Act,
then this provision shall be stricken from the agreement; and it is further mutually
agreed that the parties will jointly submit, upon the request of either party, this
question to the National Labor Relations Board.
B. The company will maintain discipline on company premises and to that
end will strictly enforce the rules and regulations.
(b) Shop discipline is necessary for the orderly and efficient operation of the
plant. An essential purpose of this agreement is to promote the maintenance
of such shop discipline. Any employee guilty of an act which interferes with
such shop discipline shall be subject to disciplinary action by the company, which
shall be applied to all employees.
(<?) The union may appeal to the impartial referee in all cases of such disci
plinary action or alleged failure of the company to take such disciplinary action.
When the appeal is from the taking of disciplinary action, the referee shall
specify what discipline the company shall impose, unless he makes one or more
of the following findings: 1. That the employee was not guilty of the act inter
fering with shop discipline for which such disciplinary action was taken, or,
2. That the result of such act, if established, was not interfering with shop dis
cipline, or, 3. That the taking of such disciplinary action constituted discrimina
tion against the union or against the employee involved with respect to his
membership or status in the union. If the referee makes one or more of the
foregoing findings, the company’s disciplinary action shall be set aside and the
employee reinstated with full compensation for any time lost.
(d) When the appeal is from the failure of the company to take adequate
disciplinary action as to any individual employee, the referee shall specify the
discipline which the company shall impose, if he makes one or more of the fol
lowing findings: 1. That the employee was guilty of the act of interfering with
shop discipline. 2. That the company’s failure to take disciplinary action as to
the employee complained of was a discrimination against the union or member
ship in the union. 3. That shop discipline has been interfered with by the com
pany’s failure to discipline an employee for interfering with the status of the
union. If the referee makes one or more of the foregoing findings, he shall
specify what discipline the company shall impose.
(e) It is agreed that the fact that an employee is not a member of the union,
or is not a member in good standing, shall not alone and in itself be cause for
discipline in the absence of some other fact or facts showing that the status of
and conduct on the company premises of such employee is interfering with shop
discipline. It is expected that by union members remaining in good standing,
such interference with shop discipline will be reduced.
C. In paragraph 14, on page 11 of the proposal in the fourth line, the word
“may” shall be changed to the word “shall.”
D. All employees on the pay rolls on January 22, 1941, are to be restored to
their jobs without discrimination. It is understood that any grievances that
had been filed prior to January 22, 1941, may be proceeded with under the pro
visions of exhibit “A,” but that no additional grievances will be filed with respect
to things that happened prior to the date of resumption of production.
E. In view of the provision for final arbitration of all disputes arising under
the contract, it is mutually agreed that there shall be no strike or lock-out or
interruption of production or interference with production during the term of
the agreement.
100
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
F. The choice of the referee shall be made as follows: The National Defense
Mediation Board will submit to both parties a list of names, and the parties
will endeavor by mutual agreement to settle upon one of those names. If this
fails, then the parties will accept a referee named by the National Defense Medi
ation Board. The submission of the list shall be made within 5 days, and if
the agreement is not reached within an additional 5 days, the appointment shall
be made by the Board. It is mutually understood and agreed that the decision
of the referee shall be final and binding upon both parties. The expense of the
referee shall be shared equally by the parties.
G. The company will submit to the union a full list of the rules and regula
tions relating to discipline, and these rules and regulations shall be incorporated
in the contract. Thereafter the company will make no rule or regulation incon
sistent with the terms of this agreement and no rule or regulation of a discrimi
natory character. It is understood and agreed that if any dispute arises as to
whether any rule or regulation in the submitted list or any proposed new rule
or regulation is inconsistent with the terms of the agreement or is of discrimi
natory character, that dispute shall be treated as a grievance under the contract.
H. Within 2 days after the signing of the agreement and the resumption of
production, negotiations will be entered upon between the parties for a blanket
increase in wages, and those negotiations will be carried forward to a comple
tion as promptly as possible; and it is understood and agreed that any wage
increase granted shall be retroactive to take effect as of the day of the resump
tion of production.
I. The agreement shall remain in force for 1 year from the date when it is
signed and thereafter from year to year, unless one party or the other gives
notice in writing to the opposite party at least 30 days prior to the expiration
of the agreement that it does not want to renew the agreement or that it pro
poses certain changes therein. If a new agreement cannot be reached within the
30 days, then the existing agreement shall be automatically extended for a
period of not more than an additional 30 days, during which the negotiations
shall be continued before the United States Conciliation Service.
The foregoing agreement was ratified by the membership of Local No. 248 on
April 7. Wage negotiations were completed April 26 in Milwaukee.
In accordance with the agreement, Lloyd Garrison, Dean of the University of
Wisconsin Law School, was appointed referee, and on July 13 he announced the
terms of a further agreement between the parties covering the disciplinary meth
ods to be followed in cases of antiunion activity of employees.
CASE No. 7
S eas S hipping Co., I nc., New York, N ational Marine E ngineers’ B eneN. Y.
ficial A ssociation, L ocal 33, C. I. O.
Certified April 5. Strike March 22-April 12. Hearing April 9-11. 26 workers
involved. Closed April 12
Panel: Davis, Lapham, Rieve.
On March 22, 1941, the S. S. Robin Locksley and S. S. Robin Hood were loaded
and ready to sail for African ports with mail and war materials. A dispute be
tween the unlicensed personnel including the “patagonians” and the company was
resolved by increasing the war bonus from $30 per month to $50 per month. At the
same time the contract between the company and the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial
Association, which had represented the licensed engineers for some time, was up
for renewal and upon hearing of the increased bonus to the “patagonians,” the
engineers refused to sail unless they were given a war bonus of 50 percent of the
new basic wage (that being equivalent to a 57%-percent increase in the war
bonus). The C. I. O. union also demanded that two additional junior engineers
be employed on the Robin Locksley.
Upon hearing, an agreement was reached granting the union a war bonus of
50 percent of the base pay and two junior engineers, though the union agreed to
allow the Robin Locksley to sail with only one.
CASE HISTORIES
101
CASK No. 8
Standard T oot, Co.. Cleveland, Ohio.
U nited A utomobile W orkers of
A merica, Local 217, C. I. O.
Certified April 5. Strike January 27-April 16. Hearing April 10-12. 6T>0 workers
involved. Closed April 16
Panel: Dykstra, Meyer, Kennedy.
After 3 days of hearing it. became evident that the opportunities for direct nego
tiations between the parties had not been exhausted. They, therefore, returned to
Cleveland and. with the aid of a Labor Department conciliator, completed a con
tract on April 16.
Cowles Tool Co., Cleveland, Ohio
CASE No. 9
U nited A utomobile W orkers of A mer
ica, Local 217, C. I. O.
Certified April 5. Strike February 27-April 28. Hearings April 11, 12, 21, 22.
80 workers involved. Closed April 26
Panel: Graham, Swope, Watt (Anthony W. Smith).
Break-down of negotiation for a first collective contract led to a strike. After
brief hearing, the parties were sent back to Cleveland to bargain on the basis of
pending negotiations in No. 8, Standard Tool Co.
When the Board was notified that the union had refused to accept for Cowles
Tool Co. a contract similar to the Standard Tool agreement, the parties were re
called to Washington, where the parties agreed on April 22 on a complete con
tract which was signed also by the panel members, and which was ratified by the
union April 24. The union had demanded a 10-cent an hour general increase,
and obtained a 7l/i-cent general increase. The union had demanded a closed shop
and obtained the company's agreement to discipline any employee of any other
union who engaged in union activity on company time and company premises.
CASE No. 10
P helps D odge Copper P roducts Cor- U nited E lectrical, R adio and Machine
i >oratiox , Elizabeth. N. J.
W orkers, C. I. O.
Certified April 8. Strike April 7-May 2. Hearings April 14, 18, 19, 23-25. 1,800
workers involved. Closed May 9
Panel: April 14: Davis. Ohing, Rieve (absent). Thereafter (enlarged panel):
Davis, Ching, Teaglc, Brophy, Golden.
Negotiations for a contract between the union and the company began shortly
after an N. L. R. B. election on March 7, won by the union. Negotiations and
efforts at conciliation failed and a strike began on April 7.
At the end of the first hearing the B >ard issued the following:
Interim Recommendation
April 14
The panel of the National Defense Mediation Board has reviewed the points in
controversy, and finds several as to which, if the parties cannot agree, considerably
prolonged investigation would be required before any findings or recommendations
could be made. In order to give the panel opportunity to consider these points in
an atmosphere free from the pressure of emergency, the panel proposes that pro
duction be resumed on the following basis:
1. That the protest stoppage be terminated and all employees returned to work
without discrimination.
2. The panel will resume the hearings beginning Friday, April 18, and attempt
to affect voluntary agreement on all points of controversy.
3. Any terms and conditions so voluntarily agreed upon will be retroactive to the
date of the resumption of work.
102
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
4. Failing agreement as above, the proceedings will be continued to the making
of findings and recommendations toward final settlement. Such findings and
recommendations will be made on or before the 1st day of May, unless the parties
mutually agree to an extension of this time.
Although this recommendation was accepted and signed by representatives of
both the company and the union, the union membership refused to ratify it and
remained on strike.
After further hearing before an enlarged panel, the Board, referring to the draft
of a detailed contract under discussion, issued the following
Recommendation
April 25
The panel is unanimously of the opinion that the attached contract clauses
should be taken as a suitable basis for the immediate resumption of production.
The panel is not prepared, without a more extended investigation of the factual
situation, to express any opinion on the matter of bonus for night shifts or on the
matter of a general increase in wages.
The panel recommends that production be resumed with the agreement that the
parties will immediately enter into negotiations on these two questions; if they
cannot reach an agreement on or before June 1,1941, then these two questions will
be referred back to the panel, with full factual data supplied by both parties. The
panel will then proceed promptly under section 2 (d) of the Executive order to
make findings and recommendations.
Although this recommendation also was at first rejected by the union, it was
later accepted and the men returned to work on May 2. On May 9 a complete
contract was signed between the company and the union.
CASE No. 11
J. S klar Manufacturing Co., Long Is- U nited E lectrical, R adio and Machine
land City, N. Y.
W orkers, Local 1225, C. I. O.
Certified April 9. Strike April 4-May 12. Hearings April 16, 17, 21, May 7.
495 workers involved. Closed May 12
Panel: Wyzanski, Connelly, Brophy.
On February 27, 1941, the company and the union had made an agreement
which lacked wage provisions, arbitration machinery, a no-strike clause, etc.
At the time the agreement was executed the union had stressed these deficiencies
but the company, on the advice of its labor relations counsel, had refused to
include these provisions in the contract. On April 4 a strike was called over the
discharge of two union members. After the strike became effective, the union
broadened its demand to include negotiations for a new contract.
After a month of hearings and negotiations the Board issued the following
opinion, which had verbally been accepted in advance by the parties, as it resulted
from their collective bargaining. It was at once accepted by the company and
by the union representatives “subject to ratification by the local union * * *
to which the same will be submitted with the recommendation of the undersigned
for its approval.” This ratification was given May 8.
Recommendation
A panel of the National Defense Mediation Board, consisting of Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., representing the public; John E. Connelly, representing employers;
and John Brophy, representing employees, having heard, on April 16, April 17,
April 21, and April 22, 1941, and May 7, 1941, representatives of J. Sklar Manu
facturing Co., and of Local 1225 of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, makes the following recommendations:
1. The strike and picket lines shall be called off forthwith.
2. The company shall reemploy without discrimination all persons employed
on April 3, 1941,
3. The parties shall supplement their contract of February 27, 1941, by incor
porating the next three paragraphs of these recommendations.
CASE
h is t o r ie s
103
4. As used in this paragraph, the term “grievance’’ shall include a failure of
either party to perform any provision of this agreement. It shall also include
a discharge or lay-off if, but only if, the employee affected either (a) was
employed before May 1, 1941, and has been employed by the company for a total
of 3 months or more, or (ft) was first employed after May 1, 1941, and has
been employed by the company for a total of 6 months or more. It shall not
include any proposed amendment of this contract nor any proposal for changes in
hours, wages, or type of shop. Either party to this agreement may present to
the other party a grievance as herein defined. Both parties agree to handle the
grievance promptly in good faith and consistent with the procedure heretofore
provided in this agreement. If within 10 days after the grievance is presented,
it is not satisfactorily settled, either party if, but only if, it has the approval
of its highest active officer (that is, the president of the company or the presi
dent or other high international officer of the United Electrical, Radio and Ma
chine Workers ,of America, C. I. O.) may submit the matter to arbitration as
herein provided. Each party shall forthwith name one arbitrator and the two so
chosen shall, within 1 week, name a neutral arbitrator. If the two cannot
within 1 week agree upon a neutral, the American Arbitration Society, upon
the application of either party, shall name a neutral. Each party agrees to
accept and abide by any award made by the majority of the arbitration board
and agrees to pay one-half the expenses of the neutral member.
5. The company will grant, as of May 7, 1941, wage increases as follows:
( a) To an employee receiving $0.50 or less an hour, a wage increase of $0.05
an hour;
(ft) To an employee receiving between $0.50 and $0.55 an hour an increase
sufficient to pay him $0.55 an hour;
( c) To an employee receiving more than $0.55 an hour, such increase as may
be necessary so that his rate as of May 7,1941, will be $0.05 higher than his rate
as of January 1, 1941.
6. Neither party shall engage in lock-outs, strikes, slowdowns, concerted stop
pages of work, picketing, or boycotts.
CASE No. 12
California Metal T rades A ssociation, I nternational A ssociation of Machin San Francisco, Calif.
ists , L odge 68, A. F. L.
Certified April 15. Strike April 7-28. Hearing April 22-26. 4,000 workers
involved. Closed April 28
Panel: Stocking, Ching, Meany (Wilson).
This case arose out of a break-down in negotiations between the I. A. M. and
the employers over the renewal of an agreement which had expired March 31.
The association represents approximately 75 out of about 150 machine repairshop operators in the Bay Cities area, a group known as the “uptown” manu
facturers.
The demand of the I. A. M. for $1.25 hourly rate for journeymen machinists was
countered by the association with a proposal that the rate should be $1.12%—the
same in the uptown repair shops as in the West Coast standards agreement
negotiated for the shipyards on April 2.
A strike was called on April 7 and the case was certified April 15. After 1
day’s hearing April 22, the union’s representatives agreed to transmit a proposal
of the association to a meeting of Lodge 68 for consideration that evening. The
proposal was sent to San Francisco by telegram without the recommendation of
the union’s representatives. The union’s reply the following morning stated that
not only was the offer rejected, but that an assessment was being made to prolong
the strike. The telegram further stated that over 90 other shops in the Bay
Cities area had signed separate contracts with the lodge.
Further conferences failed to result in an agreement. The employer repre
sentatives wished to end the strike but did not wish to assume responsibility for
doing so in Washington. They therefore asked the panel to direct the parties
alternatively (1) to go back to work under the terms of the West Coast agree
ment, (2) to go back to work under arbitration, (3) to go back to work under
any terms that the panel might direct. The panel advised them that it was not
prepared to make recommendations when there was any possibility of the parties
104
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
reaching an agreement through collective bargaining directly. The employer
representatives thereupon submitted a statement expressing their disappointment
that the panel would not order a settlement of the controversy, and advised that
they were left with no alternative but to meet the union’s demands.
Negotiations were immediately resumed in San Francisco, and an agreement
to be effective until March 31,1942, was promptly achieved.
CASE No. 13
Minneapolis Moline P ower I mplement U nited E lectrical, R adio and Machine
Co., H opkins Moline P ower I mple- W orkers, L ocals 1138 and 1146,
ment Co., Minneapolis and Hopkins,
C. I. O.
Minn.
Certified April 15. No strike. 2,100 workers involved. Closed April 20
The two locals started negotiations with the company on or about December
17, 1940. The negotiations continued without material progress until February
19, 1941, when strike notice was served on the State conciliator, and on February
27, the conciliator certified this dispute to the Governor of Minnesota, under the
provisions of the Minnesota Labor Relations Act. Subsequent to this certification,
a commission was appointed, which made a report on April 4, but its proposals
were rejected by the employer, and the union ordered a strike for April 16. Imme
diately upon receiving the case the Board successfully appealed for postponement.
The parties happened to take the same train to Washington and the discussion
of the issues while traveling and after reaching Washington resulted in a memo
randum of agreement, signed at the Board’s office on April 10. The case was
thus closed without having been heard.
CASE No. 14
B irdsboro Steel F oundry & Machine Steel W orkers Organizing Committee,
Co., Birdsboro, Pa.
C. I. O., and S teel F oundry & Ma
chine Co. E mployee and B eneficial
A ssociation of B irdsboro
Certified April 17. Strike April 15-22. 1,209 workers involved. Closed April 22
On April 15, the S. W. O. C. struck the plant over the question of whether it or
the independent union should be the bargaining agent. No hearing was held
because the parties agreed to submit the question to the N. L. R. B. Thus the
strike and the case ended.
CASE No. 15
Arcadia K nitting Mills, I no., Allen- F ederation of D yers, F inishers , P rinttown, Pa.
ers and B leachers of A merica,
C. I. O.
Certified April 16. Strike April 3-May 5. Hearing April 29. 210 workers involved.
Closed May 3
Panel: Graham, Lapham, Brophy. Assistant, Kirstein.
There had been no collective bargaining relations prior to the strike, which re
lated primarily to wages.
Negotiations at the plant had succeeded in securing the employer’s agreement
to recognize the union and grant a closed shop. At the hearing substantial agree
ment was obtained without any Board recommendations, on most of the points
at issue, which included wages, check-off, vacations, holidays, overtime, etc.
After the hearing the chairman of the panel engaged in telephonic negotiations
with representatives of the parties and arranged a meeting of the parties in New
York to draft the contract. This was signed on May 3 and ratified on May 4 by
the union.
CASE HISTORIES
105
CASE No. 16
K ellogg S witchboard & S upply Co., I nternational B rotherhood of E leoChicago, 111.
trical W orkers, L ocal B-713, A. F. L.,
and I nternational A ssociation of
Machinists , D istrict 8, A. F. L.
Certified April 21. No strike. Hearings April 28-May 1, September 4, 5. 1,000
workers involved. Closed September 8
Panel: Wyzanski, Connelly, Watt. Assistant (in September), Cox.
In April 1940 the two unions won an N. L. R. B. election by the company’s
production and maintenance employees. After 2 months’ negotiations, a strike
was called on June 26, ending September 30. On January 2,1941, the N. L. R. B.
ordered the company to bargain in good faith. Negotiations failed to terminate
in an agreement, and a strike vote was taken on April 18. The dispute was
then certified to the Board. At the spring hearing the parties agreed to the
terms of a contract except as to wage classification, which was to be the subject
of further negotiation. When the parties were unable to agree on this point a
new hearing was called. Actually the controversy was mediated without a panel
meeting, for the intervention of the panel assistant achieved on September 5
an agreement, ratified 3 days later, the execution of which it notes, “was recom
mended by the representative designated by the panel.”
CASE No. 17
A merican Car & F oundry Co., Buffalo, F ederal Labor U nion N o. 22518,
N. Y.
A. F. L., and Steel W orkers Organ
izing Committee, C. I. O.
Certified April 22. Strike April 15-29. Hearing April 25, 26. 1,500 workers
involved. Closed April 29
Panel: Wyzanski, E. Adams, Watt, Golden (Joseph Kovner).
Without prior action by the N. L. R. B. American Car & Foundry Co. executed
on January 20, 1941, a 1-year agreement with Federal Labor Union No. 22518,
A. F. L., covering many of the company’s 1,500 employees at the Buffalo plant.
Shortly after the S. W. O. C. began a concentrated drive to organize the same
plant. It petitioned for an election but under the practice of the N. L. R. B.
the petition could not be entertained until the A. F. L. agreement expired. April
15, the heating department, organized by S. W. O. C., demanded a 25-percent
wage increase to be granted in 2 hours. It was not granted. The men struck.
April 16 an S. W. O. C. picket line surrounded the plant; the A. F. L. men would
not cross it and the plant was shut down.
At the close of the hearing after the Board had been assured by the N. L. R. B.
that it would expedite the consideration of the representation petition before it,
the following document was signed by the five persons who had served as the
Board’s panel, which was abnormally constituted in that there were more worker
than employer members. Since, in fact, the Board’s recommendation embodied
an agreement of the three parties, it was at once accepted and promptly ratified.
Recommendation
April 26
The National Defense Mediation Board, acting through the undersigned panel,
having heard representatives of the American Car & Foundry Co., the American
Federation of Labor Local Union No. 22518, and the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee upon the issues involved in the present strike at the Buffalo plant
of the American Car & Foundry Co., make the following recommendations to the
three parties involved, with the understanding on the part of the panel that
these recommendations will be followed:
1. The strike and picket lines shall be called off forthwith.
106
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
2. The company shall reemploy all workers employed on April 15, 1941, at
its Buffalo plant, without discrimination, as soon as possible, insofar as work is
available for them.
3. The National Labor Relations Board, in accordance with the assurances
given to the National Defense Mediation Board, shall promptly investigate, and,
if appropriate, hear any petitions or charges presented in accordance with the
National Labor Relations Act. In such proceedings all parties shall cooperate
to expedite hearings, and to that end accept short notice of such hearings.
CASE No. 18
J ohn A. R oebling’s Sons Co., Roebling S teel W orkers Organizing Committee,
and Trenton, N. J.
Local 2111, C. I. O.
Certified April 22. Strike April 16-29. Hearing April 25-29, June 5, August
1-5,11-19. 6,500 workers involved. Closed September 19
Panel: April and June: Graham, Meyer, Brophy.
August: Graham, Hamilton, Brophy. Assistant, Kirstein.
Following requests by the union for recognition, a strike took place at both
the company’s plants. On April 22, the day the case was certified, the N. L. R. B.
ordered an election in order to determine the bargaining representative of the
employees, and on May 20 certified the union as such.
At the close of the Board’s hearings in April, the parties and the panel signed
the following:
Memorandum of agreement
April 29
In view of America’s need for maximum defense production and in order to
promote cooperation in the Roebling Co.’s plants for this purpose, the company
and the Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee, on behalf of its members, make
the following agreement:
I. The company agrees not to influence or to attempt to influence any employee
against joining the union, and agrees to cooperate fully for a fair, free, and
prompt election. The Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee, in the exercise
of their recognized rights of self-organization, agree not to coerce or to attempt
to coerce any employee to join the union against his or her will, and agree to
cooperate fully for a fair, free, and prompt election.
II. The Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee agrees to order all its members
who are employees of the company to return to work immediately and that all
picketing cease at once.
III. All employees are to return to work promptly without discrimination or
loss of seniority.
IV. It is agreed that Mr. J. D. Thompson, works manager, and such other
officials of the company who may be necessary shall immediately, upon "he
return of the men to work, take up in the order of their importance grievances
not already disposed of, and the Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee may pre
sent grievances to the company for such employees as it represents, submitted
in a written form, signed by one or more of the complainants, and the company
will endeavor to solve such grievances in a fair and just manner. All decisions
arrived at shall be made known to such representatives of the employees who
presented the grievances. There shall not be more than one meeting per week.
V. Any matters not covered in this agreement or which fail of settlement shall
be listed for consideration and disposition in the negotiations between the com
pany and the certified representatives of the employees following the election.
If such matters are not settled by negotiation they may be referred to the Na
tional Defense Mediation Board for consideration and recommendation.
VI. On account of its special and technical nature, the disputed operation
proposed for, but not yet actually put into operation in department 75, shall be
the subject of study by an expert adviser, to be appointed promptly by the
National Defense Mediation Board. He shall proceed immediately according to
his best judgment, to take the steps necessary to test the proposed new opera
CASE HISTORIES
107
tions, to find and evaluate the facts, on the basis of which he shall make his
recommendations for the consideration of the National Defense Mediation Board.
VII. The company and the Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee, on behalf of
its members, agree that no misrepresentation of the settlement shall be made by
either party and nothing will be done by either to cause a stoppage, lock-out,
or slowing down of the defense effort.
VIII. The company and the Steel Workers’ Organizing Committee agree to
cooperate promptly and fully for fair, orderly, and harmonious conduct and for
intelligent and efficient production in the Roebling Co.’s plants, which are large
producers of materials immediately necessary and vital to the defense of the
Nation.
IX. The above agreement is entered into by both parties as a temporary meas
ure in an honest endeavor to settle the present labor dispute, pending the elec
tion, as ordered by the National Labor Relations Board by its order of April 21,
1941.
The minutes of the hearing of June 5, signed by the panel members, state:
“The chairman and the panel met with the representatives of the company
and the representatives of the union and heard the report read and explained
by Mr. Trundle and Mr. Dangler. The representatives of the union and the
representatives of the company, respectively, then held private sessions studying
the report.
“The chairman then called all parties back together again for further consid
eration, discussion, and suggestions. It was then agreed that the operations
proposed for department 75 should be tried out and seven points agreed upon
for the trial period. The transcripts of the agreement on these seven points
were to be sent to the representatives of the company and the representatives
of the union; two copies to be sent to the company, two copies to be sent to the
union, and two copies to be sent to Mr. Trundle. Two copies are to be filed in
the Board’s offices.”
Negotiations for a contract proceeded between the parties in June and July,
using the Trundle report as a basis, but no final agreement was reached.
The issues still in dispute, mainly, union security, vacations with pay, griev
ance machinery, and arbitration, were settled before the Board in August and a
contract was completed soon after.
CASE No. 19
A merican P otash & Chemical Corpo- I nternational U nion of Mine , Mill,
ration, Trona, Calif.
and S melter W orkers, L ocal 414,
C. I. O.
Certified April 23. Strike March 15-July 2. Hearing April 29-May 2. 1,300
workers involved. Closed June 4
Panel: Davis, Teagle, Carey.
The company had committed unfair labor practices and had been in much
litigation with the union. Negotiations with the union, which had won a
N. L. R. B. election in December 1940 had broken down because of the company’s
unwillingness to agree to a union shop and union preference in hiring.
The hearing ended May 2 with suggestions by the panel concerning union
security. The parties returned to Trona and continued negotiations, with the
Board mediating by telegraph and finally on June 4 informing the parties “that
if the Board had to make a formal recommendation * * * it would not go
beyond the following:
“That the company agrees that any employee who is now a member of the
signatory union shall as a condition of continued employment maintain his
membership in good standing in accordance with the provisions of the union’s
constitution.”
With the acquiescence of the parties, the Board “withdrew” from the case on
June 4. The plant reopened July 2, the strike having failed.
469872°— 12------------- 8
108
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 20
B ituminous Coal Operators, Appa- U nited Mine W orkers
lachian Mines
C. I. O.
of
A merica,
Certified April 21. Strike April 2-30. Hearings April 25, 27, May 23-29, June
4-5. 400,000 workers involved. Closed July 6
Panel: Davis, Teagle, Golden. Assistant, Cox.
On April 2, when a contract had not been negotiated to replace the one that
expired March 31, all coal miners went on strike. Negotiations continued.
About 2 weeks later the operators of the mines in the southerly portion of the
Appalachian area withdrew from the conference. On April 21, U. M. W. A. and
the operators in the northern Appalachian area reached and initialed an agree
ment. The strike, however, continued, awaiting a settlement of terms for the
southern Appalachian field. On April 21 the President of the United States issued
a proposal for settling the strike, which was accepted by the northern operators
and by U. M. W. A. The operators in the southern portion reserved their
acceptance.
On April 24 the case was certified to the Board. Hearings were held con
tinuously until April 27, when the Board issued the following:
Recommendation
April 27
The panel of the National Defense Mediation Board, designated to act in the
dispute between the Bituminous Coal Operators and the United Mine Workers
of America, has explored at length the matters in controversy. The proceedings
have been conducted in the presence of the fact that the President of the United
States on April 21,1941, publicly recommended and urged that:
“1. The miners and operators already in agreement resume coal production
under the terms of that agreement.
“2. The operators and miners who have not yet reached an agreement, enter
into wage negotiations and at the same time reopen the mines, the agreement
ultimately reached to be made retroactive to the date of resuming work/’
Throughout the discussion the principal point in controversy, and the one which
in the judgment of the panel has prevented an agreement, was the matter of
a differential in the daily wage rate, between that portion of the Appalachian
coal region which lies principally in the western portion of Pennsylvania, eastern
Ohio, and the northern part of West Virginia, on the one hand, and that portion
of the Appalachian region which lies principally in the southern portion of West
Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and portions of northern Tennessee and western
Virginia, on the other hand. The United Mine Workers and the operators in
the northerly portion of the Appalachian region have accepted without reserva
tion the President’s proposal. The operators in the southerly portion of the
Appalachian region have not accepted it. They have not at any time been will
ing to agree that wages fixed by future negotiation be made retroactive to the
date of resuming work. Many formulas have been discussed. The last offer of
those who have not agreed to the President’s proposal was to fix their wage
scale now on the basis of an addition of $1 to the daily wage and a properly related
percentage increase in other wage rates; wages not to be subject to further nego
tiation, and the contract to run to March 31, 1943. This offer as made did not
directly mention the differential. The effect of it was that elimination of the
differential could be brought about only if the Mine Workers would surrender
40 cents of the $1 increase to which the operators in the northern portion of the
Appalachian region had agreed. This offer was rejected.
After the most careful consideration, the panel is unable to recommend this
offer as a substitute for the President’s proposal.
The panel, therefore, unanimously recommends that the President’s proposal,
as made on April 21, as quoted above, be accepted today by the miners and all
operators in order that production of coal essential to the national defense may
begin on Monday, April 28,1941.
These recomendations were accepted immediately by the northern operators
and the union. Late the following evening, after the hearing before the Special
Senate Committee Investigating National Defense, the southern operators ac
cepted. On April 30 work was resumed.
CASE HISTORIES
10$
Further negotiations between the parties proved unfruitful and the Board
recalled the parties to Washington on May 23. Joint and separate conferences
were held continuously until the Board issued further—
Findings and Recommendations
June 5
In the matter of the dispute between the Bituminous Coal Operators and
the United Mine Workers of America, the National Defense Mediation Board
on April 28, 1941, recommended the acceptance of the President’s proposal of
April 21, 1941, that—
“1. The miners and operators already in agreement resume coal production
under the terms of that agreement.
“2. The operators and miners who have not yet reached an agreement, enter
into wage negotiations and at the same time reopen the mines, the agreement
ultimately reached to be made retroactive to the date of resuming work.”
In our recommendation of April 27, we pointed out that the United Mine
Workers and the operators in the northerly section of the Appalachian area had
accepted the President’s proposal. On April 30, the operators in the southerly
section of the Appalachian area accepted the President’s proposal on the basis
of a temporary agreement entered into on that date with the United Mine
Workers, and the production of coal throughout the Appalachian region was
resumed and has continued since that time. The temporary agreement provided
for the continuation of negotiations as to all those provisions incorporated in the
new Appalachian agreement which the operators in the northerly section had
approved and which the operators in the southerly section had not approved.
Negotiations between the United Mine Workers and these operators were ac
cordingly resumed, but they did not lead to an agreement, and on Friday, May
23, the parties again came before the National Defense Mediation Board.
Throughout the discussion the principal point in controversy has been the
40-cent differential in the daily wage rate between that part of the Appalachian
coal region which lies principally in the western half of Pennsylvania, eastern
Ohio, and the northern part of West Virginia on the one hand, and that portion
of the Appalachian region which lies in the southern part of West Virginia,
eastern Kentucky, and portions of northern Tennessee and western Virginia on
the other hand.
In the N. R. A. Coal Code negotiations in 1933 and 1934, two differentials
in favor of the operators in the southern section were agreed upon:
“1. A 40-cent per day lower daily wage. This 40-cent differential in the daily
wage rates amounts on weighted average to something between 3 and 3 y2 cents
per ton.
“2. Lower tonnage rates, which on the weighted average amount to about 15
cents per ton.”
Under the new Appalachian agreement establishing wage rates up to and
including March 31, 1943, the tonnage differentials remain unchanged, so that
the operators in the southerly section retain in any event approximately fivesixths of the wage-cost differential in their favor. The sole question of differ
ential before the Board is as to the elimination of the 40-cent daily wage rate
differential which amounts to about one-sixth of the total differential.
To understand the problems presented by this principal point in the dispute,
it is necessary to know about the way in which wages for coal mining have
been established. The coal miner himself—the man who actually mines the coal
and loads it into coal cars in the mines—is paid for his work on a tonnage
basis. (To this general rule there are some exceptions, of which the principal
one is that some of the machine loading is done on a day-wage basis.) The
work that is done on a day-wage basis, and that is affected by the controversy
about the 40-cent differential, is the work incidental to the actual mining of the
coal by inside day workers, such as timbering, track laying, drainage, ventilation,
and hauling and hoisting, and the work done on the surface outside of the
mines.
Industry-wide collective bargaining in bituminous-coal mining had its begin
ning as far back as 1886 when a joint conference was initiated between the
operators and miners in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. The area
covered by the joint conference has varied from time to time through the years.
The tonnage represented has varied from about 40 percent to about 70 percent
of the total national production of bituminous coal. At all times the area cov
110
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
ered by the joint conferences has been referred to as the “central competitive
field,” and collective bargaining in the industry has been characterized by the
fact that the wage rates fixed by negotiations for the central competitive field
have, under the impact of existing competitive relations, determined the levels
of wage rates paid in all other bituminous-coal fields in the United States.
These other areas have been referred to as the outlying districts.
From the beginning the competitive difficulties of the operators have been
important causes of industrial strife. The United Mine Workers have con
sistently urged that wages and working conditions should be as uniform as possi
ble for their entire membership; but from the beginning the competitive rela
tion of the operators has had its effect. As early as the joint conference of
1902 this fact was emphasized in the statement “That this movement is founded
and * * * is to rest, upon correct business ideas, competitive equality, and
upon well-recognized principles of justice.” Although the mine workers have
recognized the pressure of competitive conditions and because of them have
accepted lower tonnage rates in districts where coal-mining conditions are diffi
cult and in districts which are unfavorably located with respect to the market,
nevertheless they have continuously insisted upon a uniform basic daily wage
rate and have attempted to confine the differentials to tonnage rates. Wherever
possible the United Mine Workers have pressed their case for uniformity of
wages and working conditions and in the joint agreement of 1898 uniform daily
wage rates for all inside labor were established, and after the acceptance in 1906
of the principle that the United Mine Workers had jurisdiction over all work
in and about the mines, much progress was made in establishing a uniform daily
wage rate for outside workers. In 1924 the joint conference broke up and the
industry fell into chaotic competitive and wage conditions which continued until
the establishment of the N. R. A. Code in 1933. By that time the production
of coal in what is now the lower Appalachian region had greatly increased and
the N. R. A. Code set up a new central competitive area including Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Maryland, eastern West Virginia, eastern Kentucky, and portions of north
ern Tennessee and western Virginia, and representing about 70 percent of the
total national production of bituminous coal.
Prior to 1933 there existed little or no unionization of the mines in the
southerly portion of this area. Wages throughout the industry had fallen to
very low levels, and were nonuniform but in general lower in the southerly
portion of the new central competitive area than in the northerly portion of
that area. This condition resulted in the negotiated agreement fixing the
differential in the daily wage rates at 40 cents per day, and also fixing the
differential in the average tonnage rates. Both groups of operators, because
of the competitive effect of any differential in wage rates, reserved the right
to renew at any time their respective contentions about the propriety and the
amount of these differentials.
Prior to the joint conference which began in March of this year, the two
groups of operators had agreed that the question of the differential would not
be raised as between them in the negotiations. At the beginning of the con
ference the United Mine Workers demanded a wiping out not only of the
differential of 40 cents in the daily wage rate but also of the differential in
the tonnage rates. As a result of collective bargaining the demand for wiping
out the differential in the tonnage rates was eliminated. In the meantime,
certain proceedings before the Ways and Means Committee of the House, in an
investigation preliminary to reenactment of the Guffey Act, seemed to point
to a division of existing price area No. 1 into two sections, putting Pennsylvania
in a separate price area. The operators in the northern section who were
apprehensive about the competitive threat contained in this suggestion and
attributed its instigation to operators of the southerly group, thereupon fell
into disagreement with the operators in the southerly section as to the question
of wiping out the 40-cent differential in the basic daily wage rate, and swung
over to the support of the United Mine Workers in this demand. Thereafter
the operators in the southerly section withdrew from the Appalachian confer
ence and organized the Southern Coal Operators Wage Conference.
As a result of this interruption of the unity of the operators there was in
cluded in the new Appalachian agreement the so-called “protective wage” or
“favored nation” clause in which the United Mine Workers bound themselves
to wipe out the daily wage differential—that is, they agreed that if any more
favorable terms as to the daily wage rate were granted to the operators in the
southerly section, the operators in the northern section would have the benefit.
CASE HISTORIES
111
Such a clause had been customary in the district wage agreements under the
old Appalachian agreement, to protect its operators against competitive wage
cutting. Its inclusion in the new Appalachian agreement meant that the 40cent differential was to be wiped out. Any reduction of the 40 cents demanded
from the operators in the southerly section would result in a corresponding
reduction of the wage increase agreed to by the operators in the northerly
section.
Confronted by this realistic result of collective bargaining the representatives
of the National Defense Mediation Board, inexpert in matters pertaining to
the production of bituminous coal and familiar with the foregoing facts only
as a result of this hearing, are called upon in this period of emergency to make
recommendations, with the expectation that the recommendations of the Board
will be accepted, as to whether or not the new Appalachian agreement hereto
fore approved by the United Mine Workers and the operators in the northern
section should be modified to restore the 40-cent daily wage-rate differential
in favor of the operators in the southerly section of the Appalachian area.
The position of the mine workers that the same wages should be paid for
equivalent labor throughout the Appalachian area has in itself considerable
weight in favor of wiping out the 40-cent differential in daily wage rates. It is
conceded that the mine worker in southern West Virginia and eastern Kentucky
lays just as much track, sets just as much timber, and mines just as much
coal per day as the mine worker in northern West Virginia and western
Pennsylvania. But putting this consideration aside we have examined the
problem in its competitive aspects, giving careful consideration to each of the
points and to all of the evidence brought to our attention.
The first point in the final memorandum submitted by the operators in the
southerly section is the suggestion that the 40-cent differential is justifiable on
the ground that necessity for a difference in wage rates between the northern
and southern industrial areas in the United States is generally recognized.
The official figures submitted by these operators to support that contention
are based on comparison of the entire northern and southern industrial areas.
So far as they relate to wages paid in the bituminous-coal industry, they
include the wages paid to the mine workers in Alabama. A substantially lower
wage level has always existed in bituminous-coal mining in Alabama. The
Alabama basic day wage under thie old Appalachian contract was $4.50 as
compared with the basic daily wage of $5.60 in the southerly section of the
Appalachian area and $6 in the northerly section. The United Mine Workers
have always recognized the existence of such a differential and still recognize
it. The Alabama wage scales are not included in the present discussion. The
operators in Alabama have made a temporary agreement with the United
Mine Workers which involves the addition of the $1 per day to the basic wage
rate but they have reserved for future negotiations all the other questions
raised by the new Appalachian agreement. These official figures which are in
general based upon comparison of the entire northern and southern industrial
areas, and in particular include the lower wage rates paid the bituminous-coal
miners in Alabama, are not at ali applicable to the present dispute which has
to do with the relative competitive position of bituminous-coal operators within
the limited geographical area covered by the Appalachian agreement. The
present discussion has nothing to do with the question of wage differential
between the northern and southern industrial areas of the United States as
a whole.
In the next point presented by the final memorandum of the operators in
the southerly section they say that the “principal reason for the original estab
lishment of the differential and its acceptance in 1933 and its subsequent
perpetuation” is the freight-rate differential against them in the competitive
markets to which approximately 80 percent of their production is shipped, and
they go on to compare the total labor costs at the commercial mines in the
northern districts (districts 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6) with the total labor costs in the
southern districts (districts 7 and 8) for the calendar year 1940.
This comparison between all the districts is not very helpful. The really sig
nificant comparison is between the northern low volatile district No. 1, and the
southern low volatile district No. 7, and between the northern high volatile
district No. 2, and the southern high volatile district No. 8, because it is these
districts that enter into direct competition. The Board has therefore directed
its attention particularly to the competitive relationships of the commercial
operators in districts 1, 2, 7, and 8. District No. 3 might perhaps be included
112
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
since its production enters into some substantial competition with districts 1,
2, 7, and 8, but its inclusion would not materially affect the conclusions to be
derived from the direct comparison of districts 1, 2, 7, and 8. Districts 4 and
6 should clearly be excluded from the comparison. We are fortunate in having
at our disposal the comprehensive figures of the Bituminous Coal Division based
upon actual experience over the years from 1936 to 1940, inclusive, and particu
larly the figures for 1940.
So far as the freight-rate differentials are concerned, we have the actual
figures of realization at the mines in the different districts. These realization
figures are arrived at by subtracting from the average minimum market price
the freight differentials applicable to the producing areas. They, therefore,
represent the actual net realization at the mines in the producing areas and
afford a basis of sound and direct comparison.
On the basis of the minimum prices fixed by the Bituminous Coal Division
effective October 1, 1940, these figures show (1) the realization based on mini
mum prices, (2) the total production costs, and (3) the difference between total
production costs and realization, for these districts as follows:
District
1...............................................................................................
2...............................................................................................
Total, 1 and 2.............................................................
»
8 ............................................................................................
Total, 7 and 8.............................................................
Realization
based on min
imum prices
effective
Oct. 1,1940
Total costs
during 1940
Amount that
realization is
above costs
Per ton
Per ton
Per ton
$2.1872
2.0488
2.0890
2.1931
2.0888
2.1280
$2.1343
1.9852
2.0374
2.0345
1.9026
1.9537
$0.0529
.0636
.0516
.1586
.1862
. 1743
The additional day labor, tonnage, yardage, and deadwork costs that would
result under the new Appalachian agreement, including the wiping out of the
40-cent differential in the basic daily wage rate for the southern districts, have
been estimated by the United Mine Workers on the basis of all the mines in dis
tricts 1, 2, 7, and 8, and by the operators in the northerly section and by the
operators in the southerly section on the basis of the commercial mines, excluding
the captive mines. The figures submitted by the United Mine Workers have taken
into account the actual experience in the last 9 months of 1937 under a wage
increase that had occurred at that time. They indicate a lower cost than the
estimate submitted by the mine operators. Their estimates are as follows:
Submitted by United Mine Workers
All mines
District
(1)
1...............................................................................................
2..............................................................................................
7................................................................................................
8................................................................................................
Estimated cost
increases on
Total costs, cal day and ton Projected costs
endar year 1940 nage rates,
(2 plus 3)
yardage, and
deadwork
(2)
(4)
(3)
$2.1343
1.9852
2.0343
1.9026
$0.1790
. 1779
.1849
.1980
$2.3133
2.1631
2.2192
2.1006
113
CASE HISTORIES
The estimates submitted by the two groups of operators of commercial mines
are very close together and are as follows:
Submitted by operators of commercial mines in the northerly section
Estimated cost
on
Total costs, increases
day and Projected costs
calendar year tonnage
rates, (2 plus 3)
1940
yardage, and
deadwork
(3)
(2)
(4)
District
0)
1............ ....................................................... .........................
2___________________ ___________________________
7_____________________ _________________________
8.................................... ...... ........ ..........................................
$2.1762
1.9269
2.0863
1.8999
$0.1941
.1744
.2441
. 2303
$2.3703
2.1013
2.3304
2.1302
Submitted by operators of commercial mines in the southerly section
Estimated cost
on
Total costs, increases
day and Projected costs
calendar year tonnage
rates,
(2 plus 3)
1940
yardage, and
deadwork
(3)
(4)
(2)
District
(1)
1
.................................................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................... ....
2 _ _ _ ...................................................................... ...................... ..................................................... .........................................................................................
7.......................................... ............................. ..................
8....................................
................................ ............
....
...............................
....
$2.1762
1.9269
2.0863
1.8999
$0.2015
.1919
.2455
.2286
$2.3777
2.1188
2.3318
2.1285
Comparison of the old and the new cost figures (taking the estimate of the
operators in the southerly section) shows that the old production costs in district
1 were about 10 cents per ton higher than in district 7, and the old production
costs in district 2 were about 8 cents higher than in district 8. With the added
costs the new production costs in district 1 will still be about 4 cents higher than
in district 7, and the production costs in district 2 will be about 1 cent less than
in district 8.
Under the Guffey Act there will be an adjustment of the total average minimum
prices and of the realization prices in the several districts taking into account
any increased costs that may be established by evidence given before the Bitumi
nous Coal Division, and by the terms of the act the adjustment of the realization
prices in the several districts will be made for the purpose of maintaining so
far as possible “existing fair competitive opportunities.” In this connection it
may be pointed out, that while the 3 cents to Sy2 cents is a real addition to the
total labor costs of the operators in the southerly section, they will be protected
by the provisions of the Guffey Act against competitive price cutting to the
extent of at least half of that added cost, and perhaps more.
It is clearly apparent that these figures which show the relative realization
before and after the proposed wage increases do not afford sufficient justification
for the maintenance of the 40-cent differential in the basic daily wage rate. The
3- to 3%-cent difference in labor costs that is involved in the 40 cents, although
it is a real item in the labor cost, is not sufficient in itself to have any controlling
effect on this competitive situation, or to justify a recommendation by the
Mediation Board that the differential should be maintained in order to preserve
existing fair competitive opportunities.
The final point advanced by the operators in the southerly section is the asser
tion that if their mines are to survive and furnish employment to their miners,
the 40-cent differential must be maintained. We do not find any evidence suffi
cient to support this assertion. We have already discussed the comparative wage
costs and the total realization in the two areas. Another approach is possible
by way of an examination of the actual distribution of production from the
114
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
northern and from the southern districts over the years since the adoption of
the N. R. A. Code. Exact figures have been submitted for the years 1936, 1938,
1939, and 1940. These figures show that, over these years, the two northern
districts, 1 and 2, have not quite held their own in the competitive battle; they
now produce a slightly lower percentage of the total national production than
they did in 1936. On the other hand, the two southern districts 7 and 8 have
slightly improved their position: they now produce a slightly greater percentage
of the total national production than they did in 1936. These figures hardly
support the contention of the operators in the southerly section that the addi
tion to their costs of the 3 cents to 3y2 cents represented by the 40-cent differential
will subject them to an unendurable competitive burden.
For the foregoing reasons we conclude that there is no ground upon which
the Board can recommend that the 40-cent differential in basic daily wage rates
should be retained, and the Board recommends that it be eliminated.
In approaching the remaining points in controversy it should be remembered
that the provisions of the new Appalachian contract have been accepted by the
operators in the northerly section who produce approximately 55 percent of the
total tonnage in the Appalachian area and that these provisions have also been
accepted by all outlying districts except Alabama. On the whole, therefore, the
provisions have been accepted by the producers of at least 70 percent of the total
national tonnage of bituminous coal.
The additional points in dispute are as follows:
1. Basic tonnage rates.—The controversy here is about the proposed addition to
the basic tonnage rate provisions of the words “The minimum rate for pick mining
shall not be less than the aggregate of short-wall machine cutting and loading
rates.”
Pick mining is defined in the contract as “The removal by the miner of coal that
has not been undercut, centercut, or overcut by a machine.” This definition in
cludes the so-called “squeeze coal” which in general requires neither cutting,
drilling, nor shooting.
The dispute has practical effect only upon operators in the Pocahontas district
and one mine in the Winding Gulf district. In other districts throughout the
southerly section the now established minimum rate for pick mining is the aggre
gate of short-wall machine cutting and loading rates; in the northerly section the
established minimum rate for pick mining is 11 cents higher than the aggregate
short-wall machine cutting and loading rates.
By local agreement written into the smokeless district agreement, the miner
in the Pocahontas district and in the one mine in the Winding Gulf district is paid
on “shovel coal” or “squeeze coal” a tonnage rate equal to the machine loading
rate alone, and which is substantially lower than the aggregate of short-wall
machine cutting and loading rates. This local agreement expressly provides that
the special tonnage rates shall not be extended to any mines where it is not now in
effect, unless by mutual consent of the operators and the district officials of the
United Mine Workers.
The operators in the northerly section regard this isolated and localized prac
tice as a special privilege, and demand either that the practice be extended to all
districts of the Appalachian area or that it be eliminated. The limited local agree
ment is the residue of a long battle in which the United Mine Workers have con
sistently fought for the position that the miner should be paid the pick-mining
tonnage rate for all coal not machine cut, as the existing Appalachian contract
requires. The United Mine Workers assert that the additional hazards, timbering
difficulties, etc., which accompany the mining of “squeeze coal” explain and justify
the fact that the minimum pick-mining rate has been and is now being paid for
mining “squeeze coal” in all other districts; and they contend that the locally
agreed-to practice covered by the smokeless district agreement is contrary to the
language and to the intent of the pick-mining clause of the old Appalachian agree
ment, and is not justified by any special or peculiar conditions in the Pocahontas
district. The operators in the southerly section, on the other hand, contend that
the physical conditions of the coal in the Pocahontas district do not prevail in
other sections, and that these special conditions were recognized and taken into
account by the United Mine Workers when the local provisions were written into
the smokeless district agreement.
Under these circumstances the Board cannot recommend that the local and
restricted practice should be extended to all districts of the Appalachian area.
On the factual controversy as to whether there are special and peculiar physical
conditions of the coal in the Pocahontas district not met with in any other dis
tricts in the Appalachian area, no evidence has been submitted to us by either
side. Reliable factual evidence on the subject could be assembled only by a care
CASE HISTORIES
115
ful field Investigation. The old Appalachian and the new Appalachian agreements
contain an identical clause relating to the settlement of disputes, and this clause
seems to us to afford adequate machinery for such investigation. The Board
accordingly recommends that the tonnage rates for “shovel coal” or “squeeze coal”
in the limited area where the special rate now prevails be redetermined by a board
set up in accordance with the “settlement of disputes” clause of the Appalachian
agreement, with the provision that if any deadlock arises in the setting up of the
board, or in the selection of an umpire, or in the prompt redetermination of the
tonnage rates, the matter shall be referred back to this Board for appropriate
action.
2. Reject clause.—The so-called “reject clause” which has been the subject of
protracted dispute before the Board and elsewhere, was introduced for the first
time in 1934. Briefly stated, the practice objected to is that the tonnage rate paid
to the miner is measured by the amount of clean and marketable coal delivered
at the output end of the coal-cleaning or coal-handling plant, rather than upon
the amount of coal delivered by the miner to the coal-cleaning or coal-handling
plant.
The industry has had long experience with, and years of disagreement about,
practices which measure the tonnage after it has passed over or through mechani
cal equipment, such as screening plants; and has substantially eliminated such
practices by establishing tonnage rates on the run-of-mine basis. The trouble
with such practices is that the miner’s wage is made to depend more or less upon
the perfection or imperfection of mechanical equipment installed by the operator.
This is not fair either to the miner or to the competitive producer.
Our examination of the situation leads us to the conclusion that the practice
now carried on under the so-called “reject clause” reintroduces into the industry
this same sort of disagreement and discrimination. It penalizes both the mine
worker and the competitive operator who has invested in a more efficient cleaning
plant. We think the practice should be eliminated.
The method of eliminating the practice proposed by the United Mine Workers
and supported by the operators in the northerly section is to eliminate the so-called
“reject clause” from all district agreements. We have considered the possibility
that the elimination of the practice may result in hardship on certain operators
who in reliance upon the reject clause have made substantial investment since that
clause was introduced, unless some provision is made for working out by agree
ment a substitute tonnage basis that will eliminate the objectionable practice but
still take into account any special position in which such operators have been
placed. To minimize that possibility we think it should be understood and agreed
that in any such cases the particular operators may take up with the district
representatives of the United Mine Workers their particular problems and en
deavor to dispose of them by local agreement, and failing such agreement the
case shall be disposed of by application of the provisions of the “settlement of
disputes” clause of the contract, with the proviso which we have set forth in
connection with the preceding discussion of basic tonnage rates.
With this limitation, the Board recommends the acceptance of that provision
of the new Appalachian agreement which eliminates the so-called “reject
clause” from all district agreements.
3. Vacations with pay.—The Board recommends the acceptance of the new
Appalachian contract provisions as to an annual vacation period. This vacation
period has been accepted not only by the bituminous-coal operators in the northerly
section but also by the anthracite industry.
Under normal conditions we would approve the fixing of a period including
July 4 as the vacation period. In this critical stage of the Nation’s affairs, and
with the greatly increased demand for coal to meet the defense program, the
Board recommends that there should be no cessation of production in the coming
Fourth of July period unless the industry by agreement can arrange to at least
make up the loss of an estimated 15,000,000 tons, the production of which
would be lost from such cessation.
4. Safety practices.—The casualty rate in the coal mines, which has always
been high, is a matter of grave and common concern shared and expressed by
each and all of the parties to this controversy. Its reduction is a matter of
careful planning and constant vigilance on the part of the operators and the
mine workers alike. All parties agree that an effective safety clause should
be included in the contract. The disagreement relates to the form rather than
t;o the substance of the clause.
The Board recommends that the “safety practice” clause of the agreement
be rewritten as follows:
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
“Reasonable rules and regulations of the operator for the protection of the per
sons of the mine workers and the preservation of property shall be complied with.
“At each mine there shall be a safety committee. This committee shall be
designated from the employees at each mine by the district president of the
United Mine Workers of America, who shall also have authority to change the
personnel of the mine employees designated. The committee shall consist of
not more than three mine workers, unless a greater number is established by
local agreement. No member of the mine committee shall be a member of the
safety committee. The safety committeemen shall serve without compensation.
“This committee shall have the right to inspect any mine development or
equipment used in producing coal, for the purpose of observing its safe or
unsafe condition when such questions are brought to its attention. If the com
mittee believes conditions found are dangerous to life or property, it shall
report its findings to management.”
The principal point of dispute in connection with this safety practice clause is
the sentence which reads “The International Union, United Mine Workers of
America, may designate memorial periods provided it shall give proper notice
to each district.”
The operators in the southerly district have expressed apprehension about
this clause, on the ground that it is so indefinite as to give to the United Mine
Workers the power to call unlimited memorial periods which would interfere
with production. We do not so interpret the clause. Rather, we interpret this
clause as being subject to the “settlement of disputes” clause of the contract,
so that the proposed memorial period provision in the new contract gives to the
mine workers no right to bring about a suspension of work in the mines, except
by local agreement.
Inasmuch as the mine workers have in any case the right to designate a
memorial period at any time which would not interfere with normal produc
tion, and since they have as a matter of course the right to negotiate locally
for memorial periods that might interrupt normal production, the Board recom
mends that the clause above quoted be excluded from the contract.
5. Seniority.—The only dispute here, we think, is whether the displaced em
ployees who are to have preference in rehiring shall or shall not be limited to
employees of the same mine, or employees of the same employer in the same
residential area. The Board suggests the following substitution for the last
sentence of paragraph 2 of the seniority clause:
“Employees displaced at a mine or in the same residential area by new mining
methods or installation of new mechanical equipment, so long as they remain
unemployed, shall constitute a panel from which their former employer shall
select new employees at that mine or in that residential area.”
6. Pay day.—The question here is whether the discounting of scrip shall be
prohibited without prohibiting the issuance of scrip.
It is recognized that the discounting of scrip lends itself to abuse against which
the employee should be protected, and in our opinion the discounting of scrip
should be prohibited. The Board, therefore, recommends that the clause as writ
ten in the new Appalachian contract be accepted.
7. Medical and hospitalization services.—The difference between the parties
here is that the mine workers, wherever the miner contributes out of his earnings
to medical and hospitalization services, are asking that they be given a voice in
the administration of such services by agreement arrived at in district confer
ences. The operators in the southerly section desire to continue the present sys
tem which provides that the contribution of the mine workers be deducted from
the pay roll and any dissatisfaction with the medical or hospital services becomes
a grievance under the contract.
It seems to us reasonable that when men contribute to the maintenance of these
services they should be given a voice in their administration; that this is a matter
of such intimate concern to the individuals involved that it should be administered
cooperatively rather than by the grievance and complaint procedure. The Board
therefore recommends that the clause as written in the new Appalachian agree
ment be accepted.
8. Physical examinations.—The dispute about this clause of the contract seems
to be one of definition rather than one of substance. The Board recommends that
the clause be rewritten to read as follows:
“Physical examinations required as a condition of or in employment, shall not
be used to discriminate against any employee or any prospective employee.”
9. House rents.—The provision in the proposed agreement as to house rents is
“Equitable adjustment of house rents shall be made in district conferences.” The
suggestion of the mine workers is that the increase in wages in some instances has
CASE HISTORIES
117
been, or may be, partially offset by increases in the rental of company-owned
houses.
The Board understands that there is no requirement on the part of the operator
that employees live in company-owned houses. Also that camps and company
towns are in the main, and increasingly, accessible by public highways. The
Board recommends that any increase in current rentals for company-owned
houses be taken up for adjustment locally and subject to the provisions of the
“settlement of disputes” clause of the contract.
10. Protective wage clause.—The operators in the southerly section have ex
pressed great apprehension about the probable effect of the last half of this clause,
which reserves to the United Mine Workers the right “to call and maintain strikes
throughout the entire Appalachian area when necessary to preserve and maintain
the integrity and competitive parity of this agreement.” This is a limitation of
the broad and sound provisions of the “settlement of disputes” paragraph of the
agreement which provides for no suspension of work during the term of the
agreement and also provides machinery for settling any disputes arising under the
agreement “or any local trouble of any kind.” The last half of the “protective
wage clause” was inserted in the Appalachian agreement primarily to implement
the so-called “most-favored-nation” provision of the first half of that clause.
If all the other recommendations of the Board are accepted, then the wages and
working conditions for the entire Appalachian area will have been agreed to for a
period up to March 31,1943, and this clause may well be omitted. The Board so
recommends.
11. Tonnage conveyor rate adjustments.—During the discussion a new point
has been raised by the operators in the southerly section which has to do with
the application of the new wage scale to tonnage conveyor rates. The suggestion
of these operators is that the tonnage conveyor rates be tied to the machine cutting
and loading rates by a formula which has been applied in some districts in the
North. This formula as applied in the North results in a tonnage conveyor rate
which yields to the worker a better income than he would earn on a day-rate basis.
If the day rate is increased in the southerly section by a greater percentage than
the day rate is increased in the northerly section, while the machine cutting and
loading rates are increased in the two sections in a lesser percentage ratio, then
the application of the same formula might result in a tonnage rate in mines in
the southerly section which would yield to the miner a less income than he would
earn on the new day-rate basis. This possibility is increased by the fact that the
machine cutting and loading rates vary in the different districts.
It is apparent that such a result would create an artificial incentive to switch
from a day-rate basis to a tonnage-rate basis depending upon the conditions in a
particular district or even in a particular mine; and would cause dissatisfaction
not only on the part of the miners but also on the part of competitive producers.
The Board cannot approve of the suggestion unless it is so limited as to pro
tect from loss any part of the increased daily wage above recommended. This
protection would be afforded by a provision, which now exists in the northern
West Virginia area, that the tonnage loading rate shall not yield to the worker a
less income than he would earn on a day-rate basis. The Board suggests and
recommends that the working out of conveyor tonnage rates be left to local
negotiations in the several districts.
On July 6 a contract more or less based on these recommendations was signed
but it contained the memorial and protective wage clauses, the union’s demand
for which had been refused by the Board. The northern operators had finally
agreed to them to get their mines open and, though the southern operators pro
tested (and were in some measure supported by the President and by the Board),
they finally capitulated.
CASE No. 20A
B ituminous Coal Operators: I nterna- U nited Mine W orkers of A merica,
tional H arvester Co., W isconsin
C. I. O., and I nternational U nion of
S teel Coal Mines , Benham, Ky.
P rogressive Mine W orkers, A. F. L.
Covered by certification of No. 20. Set off as No. 20A July 11. Strike April 2.
Hearing July 16, 17. 750 men involved. Closed July 17
Panel: Stacy, Mead, Connelly, Lynch, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
As the result of a victory in a consent election, the Progressive Mine Workers
of America signed an exclusive bargaining contract with Wisconsin Steel Coal
118
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Mines, which, with one renewal, was effective until June 1,1941. This mine had
long been the only mine in the area not organized by the United Mine Workers of
America.
On May 10, after the intervention by the Governor of Kentucky, a new consent
election was held, with the Progressive Mine Workers again successful.
On May 12 the company started to reopen the mine, which had been shut since
the beginning of the coal strike, April 2. About half the workers reported and
were greeted by about 1,000 shots from the surrounding hills. The United Mine
Workers informed the company they were dissatisfied with the election and
planned to protest. Later a protest was filed on the ground that there had been
misconduct by the representatives of the N. L. R. B., by the company, and by the
Progressive Mine Workers. The regional director who, under the consent elec
tion agreement, had sole authority to decide the question, ruled on July 7 that
the protest had no foundation. In the meanwhile, violence continued. One
person was killed and 28 houses destroyed. All efforts by the Governor of Ken
tucky, the Kentucky Commissioner of the Department of Industrial Relations,
and the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor, failed. The mine was
then operating at about 50 percent of capacity.
The Board, acting under certification No. 20, Bituminous Coal, called the parties
to be heard. After exploring in vain for 2 days the possibilities of settlement,
the panel and the parties signed the following:
Statement
July 17
It appearing upon the hearing that the dispute is one between two rival unions
which properly comes within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relatio'ns
Board, it is the thought of all concerned that it is not advisable for the National
Defense Mediation Board to proceed further with the case.
CASE No. 20B
B ituminous Coat, Operators, Captive
Mines
U nited Mine W orkers of A merica,
C. I. O.
Covered by certification of No. 20. Set off as No. 20B September 15. Strikes
September 15-22, October 27-November 3, November 17-24. Hearings Septem
ber 17-19, 24-25, October 7-9, October 31-November 10. 53,000 workers in
volved. Closed November 221
Panel: Davis, Teagle, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
On September 15, the United Mine Workers called a strike at the mines of all
companies which had not signed union-shop contracts. Hearings opened Sep
tember 17 and the strike continued until September 22, when it was terminated in
accordance with the Board’s
Interim Recommendation
September 19
1. That U. M. W. recommend the return to work of the strikers for 30 days
and thereafter until the expiration of a 3-day notice in writing given by either
party to the other;
2. That the parties accept during such period the Appalachian agreement;
3. That the union-shop provisions of the Appalachian agreement be inoperative
during such period ; and
4. That the Board retain jurisdiction.
The panel continued the hearing and a month later in the name of the Board
issued the following opinion, Mr. Lyons dissenting:
1 Documents in this case subsequent to the final recommendation of the Board on Novem
ber 10. 1941, which was not accepted by the union, are given in pt. V.
CASE HISTORIES
119
Recommendations
October 24
In this dispute the sole question is whether the United Mine Workers of
America shall be given a union-shop agreement in the noncommercial (captive)
mines operated by the companies represented in these negotiations.1 These
companies operate the mines for the production of coal for use in the manu
facture of steel only, but not for sale in the commercial market.
The strike which led to the certification of this dispute arose out of the
request of the United Mine Workers of America that these operators should
sign, and the refusal by these operators to sign, the Appalachian joint wage
agreement executed by the Appalachian conference of commercial operators
and the United Mine Workers in Washington on June 19, 1941. The operators
involved in the dispute now before us were prepared to accept the substance
of the Appalachian agreement with the exception of the union-shop provision.
At the request of the National Defense Mediation Board on September 19,
1941, the parties agreed to resume production for a period of at least 30 days
and thereafter until the expiration of a 3-day notice on the condition that both
parties agree with the Board to accept for that period the provisions of the
Appalachian agreement, and the United Mine Workers of America agree with
the Board that during that period the union-shop provisions of the Appalachian
agreement, which require membership in the United Mine Workers of America
as a condition of employment, should be inoperative.
The evidence presented during the conferences before us shows—
1. That on the one hand the mines involved in this dispute have been oper
ated under contracts with the United Mine Workers since 1933. which contracts
did not includ? the union-shop provision, and on the other hand that the unionshop provision has been accepted by substantially all of the commercial opera
tors and by some of the operators of captive mines, including some of the steel
companies, so that substantially 90 percent of the total annual production of
bituminous coal is under union-shop contracts.
2. That all of these mines have the voluntary check-off of union dues from
the wages of those workers who indicate their desire to have the company
make the deduction. The figures submitted to us by the companies on the basis
of these voluntary check-off cards show that a very large majority of the mine
workers, exceeding 95 percent in many of the mines, now belong to the union.
We put to the n^fe enc' before us the question—Why, under such circum
stances, the United Mine Workers press the demand for a union shop; and the
correlative question —Why, linger such circumstances, the operators are not
willing to accept the union-shop agreement?
Fundamentally the operators based their reply on the ground that every
worker has the right to choose for himself whether he will or will not join the
union, and his employment should not be made to depend upon union member
ship. To this the United Mine Workers opposed the right of union workers to
refuse to work with nonunion men.
The question of the union shop is one which has been very widely discussed,
and as to which there has been sharp conflict of opinion. This conflict appeared
in the Congressional discussions of the Wagner Act. The consensus of that dis
cussion is fairly summarized by the statement of Senator Walsh, chairman of
the committee that reported the bill, pointing out that the proposed act neither
prohibited nor required a closed or union ship.
Senator Walsh said:
“Nothing in this bill requires any employee to join any form of labor organi
zation.
“Nothing in this bill requires an employer to compel his employees to organize.
All employees are free to choose to organize or not to organize, to join any or
whatever labor organization or union they choose.”
and again—
“All this bill says is that no employer may discriminate in hiring a man,
whether he belongs to a union or not, and without regard to what union he
1 The Carter Coal Co., whose operations are involved in this dispute, is a commercial
operator and has not accepted the union-shop provision, nor has that company been a
member o f the Appalachian conference or taken part in the negotiations between the
Appalachian conference and the United Mine W orkers o f America.
120
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
belongs; but if an employer wishes to agree and to make a contract of his
own volition with his employees to hire only members of a company union or
of a trade-union, he can do so.”
Senator Wagner said—
“While outlawing the organization that is interfered with by the employer, this
bill does not establish the closed shop or even encourage it. The much dis
cussed closed-shop proviso merely states that nothing in any Federal law shall be
held to illegalize the confirmation of voluntary closed-shop agreements between
employers and workers.”
The Wagner Act provides that nothing in the act or in any other statute of
the United States shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action
defined in the act as an unfair labor practice) to require, as a condition of employ
ment, membership therein if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in section 9 (a) of the act, in the appropriate collective
bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made. And the act further pro
vides that nothing in it shall be so construed as to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike. By these provisions the Congress
included within the allowable scope of labor agreements a closed-shop or unionshop agreement arrived at by collective bargaining with full retention of the right
to strike.
In this national emergency the fullest production of coal is essential to the
national defense program. This dispute has arisen, mediation has not brought
about a meeting of minds, and the Mediation Board has been called upon to
make recommendations.
It became clear to the members of the Mediation Board that there could be no
meeting of minds in the conference before it with respect to the two conflicting
rights asserted in the present dispute, because of the possible repercussions of
any agreement here made on the steel and shipbuilding industries, in one or both
of which most of the interests involved in this dispute are engaged. There are
very real and important problems of union organization in those industries, and
in the opinion of the Board they should be disposed of, if and when they arise,
solely on their own merits unaffected by any recommendations made by the
National Defense Mediation Board in this case.
Under these circumstances we are unwilling to substitute our recommenda
tions for a voluntary agreement. We must find some way in which an agreement
between the parties can be arrived at without requiring either party to surrender
beforehand the right which it asserts. That result can be reached in either one
of the two ways which we now proceed to suggest
1. If the parties are willing to agree beforehand that the recommendations of
the National Defense Mediation Board will be accepted, the chairman of the
Board will refer the question for final decision to a full Board composed of 11
members, with the proviso that the parties shall agree to a continuation of
production at the mines, under the same conditions that resulted from our recom
mendations of September 19, 1941.
The conditions of the agreement which resulted from our recommendations of
September 19,1941, when applied to such an extension, would read as follows:
(a) That both parties agree with the Board to accept for such period the
provisions of the Appalachian agreement.
(b) That the United Mine Workers agree with the Board that during such
period the provisions of the Appalachian agreement which require membership
in the United Mine Workers as a condition of employment shall be inoperative.
2. If the parties are unable to agree on that procedure, then we are of the
opinion that, in this dispute in the coal industry, resort should be had to a proce
dure similar to that adopted under the National War Labor Board during the
emergency of 1917.
In line with that procedure, and in the event that the parties do not agree to
submit the controversy for final decision to a full membership of the National
Defense Mediation Board, we recommend:
(a) That the parties agree to a continuation of production at the mines under
the same conditions that resulted from our recommendations of September 19,
1941.
(b) That the parties agree upon a joint board made up of one or more repre
sentatives fully empowered to act for the companies which control the mining
operations here in controversy and an equal number of similarly empowere&repre*
CASE HISTORIES
121
sentatives of the United Mine Workers of America, the number of representatives
to be agreed to by the parties.
(c) If in any case an agreement cannot be reached by individual negotia
tions with any or all of the operators, then the dispute will be referred to a
joint board; and if this board cannot bring about an agreement, then the
members of the board shall thereupon jointly select an arbitrator who shall
have the power to make a final decision binding upon both parties.
Mr. Lyons said in dissent:
“I think that under the circumstances recited the United Mine Workers
of America are entitled to demand and the operators should grant the signing
of the Appalachian agreement without change.”
These recommendations were accepted by the coal operators. On October
26 John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers, wrote President
Roosevelt a letter in which he refused to call off the strike set for the follow
ing day and said of the Board’s recommendations; “The Board now emerges
with a report devoid of conclusions as to merit, evasive as to the responsibili
ties of the Board, and dumps its own sorry mess into the already overburdened
lap of the Chief Executive.” To this, the President replied in part on the
same day; “I am, therefore, as President of the United States, asking you and
your associated officers of the United Mine Workers of America, as loyal
citizens, to come now to the aid of your country. I ask that work continue
at the captive coal mines pending the settlement of the dispute.”
On October 27 the strike was resumed. That day Mr. Lewis replied to
the President’s letter, saying in part: “If you would use the power of the
state to restrain me, as an agent of labor, then, sir, I submit that you should
use that same power to restrain my adversary in this issue, who is an ag^nt
of capital. My adversary is a rich man named Morgan, who lives in New
York. * * * In the interest of settlement, I would be glad, Mr. President,
if you concur, to meet with you and my adversary, Mr. J. P. Morgan, for a
forthright discussion of the equities of this problem.” To this the President
replied in part: “Whatever may be the issues between you and Mr. Taylor
or you and Mr. Morgan, the larger question of adequate fuel supply is of
greater interest and import to the national welfare. For the third time your
Government, through me, asks you and the officers of the United Mine Workers
to authorize an immediate resumption of mining.”
On October 29, following a conference with Mr. Davis, Myron C. Taylor,
former board chairman of United States Steel, and Mr. Lewis, the President
wrote the following letter to Mr. Davis:
“I have asked the United States Steel Corporation and the United Mine
Workers of America if they will immediately reopen the mines, on the under
standing that the National Defense Mediation Board will proceed in full
session to consider the merits of the dispute and make its final recommenda
tions. It is understood that neither party is committed in advance to the
acceptance of the final recommendations. You have informed me that the full
Board is meeting on Friday and will be prepared to consider the matter
continuously until it makes its final recommendations.”
On October 30 the district presidents of the union voted unanimously to
return to work. The following day, the full membership of the Board opened
consideration of the dispute and sat continuously until it decided November 10
by a vote of 9 to 2 against the union’s demand.
On November 11 Mr. Murray announced that the C. I. O. members of the
Board had resigned in protest against the decision. He and Mr. Kennedy
wrote the President:
“We hereby respectfully tender to you our resignations as members of the
National Defense Mediation Board.
“We accepted membership on this Board with a single purpose. We were
and still are in wholehearted support of the national defense program. The
call for maximum production under this program creates the need for every
sincere effort to assure continuity of production. In our judgment the Na
tional Defense Mediation Board offered an instrument to labor and manage
ment whereby our problems could be disposed of without the need of industrial
conflict or the relinquishment of any legitimate rights of either party.
“We have, therefore, consistently counseled the affiliated unions of the C. I. O.
to utilize in full all available machinery for mediation to* achieve the peaceful
solution of the problems arising between labor and management. We are still
of the opinion that such a policy is desirable.
122
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
“However, in the recent decision of the Board involving the captive coal
mines of the bituminous-coal industry the Board has made it impossible for
labor to retain any confidence in its future actions. The United Mine Workers
of America has a perfectly meritorious case. Our reasons are set forth in
the minority opinion. The uncompromising attitude of the majority opinion is
in itself a negation of the basic principles upon which the Board was estab
lished by you in the effort to promote mediation in lieu of industrial conflict.
This opinion discloses that regardless of the merits of any case, labor unions
shall be denied the right of normal growth and legitimate aspiration, such
as the union shop, and the traditional open-shop policy of the antilabor
employers shall prevail.
“For these reasons we do not feel that in good conscience we can continue
as members of this Board.”
The Board’s recommendation of November 10 and the several accompanying
opinions follow.
Recommendation of the Board and opinion of Chairman Davis
November 10
In the recommendations of the National Defense Mediation Board in this case
dated October 24,1941, the Board expressed its desire to find some way in which
an agreement between the parties might be arrived at without requiring either
party to surrender beforehand the right which it asserts—the right asserted by
the operators to refuse to make employment in their mines dependent upon union
membership, in order to preserve to every worker in their employ the right to
choose for himself whether he will or will not join the union; and the right,
asserted by the United Mine Workers, of union workers to refuse to work with
nonunion men.
To that end the Board proposed that the parties agree to submit the matter to
arbitration either by the National Defense Mediation Board or by an arbitration
board set up according to the procedure adopted under the National War Labor
Board during the emergency of 1917-18. The parties have now chosen to submit
the dispute to this Board, on the understanding that neither party is bound
in advance to accept the recommendations of the Board.
In the recommendations of October 24, the Board pointed out that substan
tially 90 percent of the total annual production of bituminous coal is under
union-shop contracts, and that in the open-shop captive mines involved in the
present dispute approximately 95 percent of the mine workers have voluntarily
become members of the United Mine Workers of America. There has been no
substantial alteration of that picture in this discussion before the full Board.
The figures have been brought more closely up to date, and reference has been
made to the anthracite industry in which the union-shop status has been in
effect since May 1939. The situation may be briefly stated by saying that all
but 10 percent of the annual production of coal in the United States is under
union-shop conditions, and 95 percent of the mine workers who produce coal
under open-shop conditions are members of the United Mine Workers of America.
In other words, for every 200 mine workers there is one individual who has not
joined the union.
The United Mine Workers stress the importance and the desirability of industry
wide collective bargaining resulting in a uniform contract for the whole industry.
When the War Labor Conference Board in April 1918 made a declaration of
principles and policies to govern relations between workers and employers in war
industries for the duration of the war, it included the declaration that “the
right of employers to organize in associations or groups and to bargain collec
tively through chosen representatives is recognized and affirmed” and there is a
great deal of other evidence in this country and abroad that such collective
bargaining leads to stable and mutually satisfactory industrial relations and to
continuity of production under a uniform written agreement.
Collective bargaining in the bituminous-coal industry has never attained this
level. The United Mine Workers of America have always pressed for an
industry-wide contract, and they did so in the negotiations in 1933 and 1934.
At that time the Appalachian conference was established in which the United
Mine Workers of America bargained with the commercial operators in the
Appalachian area as a unit, and the contract negotiated in the Appalachian
conference became the determining factor in fixing the terms and conditions of
CASE HISTORIES
123
contracts in the outlying districts. In 1933-34, however, the captive mine op
erators, whose coal production is usually consumed in the manufacture of steel
by the companies which produce it and not sold on the commercial market, did
not enter the Appalachian conference. As the Board pointed out in its recom
mendations of October 24, 1941, the mines involved in this dispute have been
operated under individual contracts with the United Mine Workers of America
since 1933 and those contracts have not included the union-shop provision. In
1939 the United Mine Workers of America proposed to the Appalachian con
ference and to the operators involved in this dispute a union-shop agreement.
The agreements in effect prior to 1939 provided for the settlement of disputes
arising under the contract without suspension of work, with grievance machinery
leading up to final decision by an umpire, and a clause reciting that a strike or
stoppage of work on the part of the United Mine Workers would be a violation
of the agreement. The union-shop provision proposed in 1939 provided, with
respect to ail workers in and about the mines eligible for membership in the
United Mine Workers of America, that “as a condition of employment all em
ployees shall be members of the United Mine Workers of America.” It was
further agreed that any expulsion or suspension from membership could be re
viewed by the executive board of the International Union, United Mine Workers
of America, and that the employer would be free to hire without regard to union
membership. Membership in the union as a condition of employment was to
become effective only within a reasonable time after the individual worker was
employed.
When this union-shop provision was proposed to the industry in 1939 the
United Mine Workers of America proposed also to fortify the no-strike provision
of the agreement by a penalty clause which provided that if any mine worker
violated the no-strike rule he would be subject to specified fines deducted from his
earnings, the proceeds of all fines to be paid to such charities as might be agreed
upon between the company and the United Mine Workers. In 1939 the com
mercial operators, parties to the Appalachian conference, chose to accept the
union shop with this penalty clause. The operators involved in the present contro
versy chose to reject it.
When we look at the resulting situation from the point of view of the 1 indi
vidual in 200 who has not chosen to join the union, in spite of the action of the
overwhelming majority of his fellow workers and the fact that he enjoys the
benefits of the contracts negotiated and administered by the United Mine Workers
of America at great expense, it is hard to think of a reason why the individual
should persist in refusing to join the union. In our opinion these individuals
could make a great contribution to untroubled labor relations in the coal industry
and to the national welfare in this period of crisis by voluntarily joining the
United Mine Workers of America, at least for the duration of this contract.
When we turn to look at the dispute from the opposing points of view of the
United Mine Workers and the captive operators, we are impressed at once with
the fact that the intensity of the dispute and the stubbornness with which the
parties stick to their positions, in spite of the great emergency that confronts the
country, seem put of all proportion to the minute fraction of the individual work
ers in and about the mines who have not joined the union. That intensity and
stubbornness which at first sight appears so unreasonable arises out of the in
herent nature of the question in dispute. It is important that the exact nature of
that question should be clearly understood.
In its investigation of the facts the Board has made every effort to find out
what, if any, effect the acceptance of the union-shop agreement has had or might
have on the physical operation of a coal mine where, as in the majority of the
present instances, there already exists a strong union with which the employers
have for years been in contractual relations and which has built up a substantially
complete membership among the workers. The operators concerned in the pres
ent dispute were unable to give any direct evidence on that point. They expressed,
however, the fear that the union-ship agreement would decrease the efficiency of
their operations because of resentment of some individuals who did not want to
join the union and because, as they thought, the conduct of the union officers
would tend to become arbitrary, since it would no longer be restrained by fear
of resignation of disgruntled members. It was apparent that there had been
actual experience on this subject in the mines of the commercial operators and of
many operators of captive mines, who have within recent years accepted and
operated under the union-shop agreement. Inquiry from these operators produced
evidence which can fairly be summarized by saying that while there have been
469872°—-42------------- 9
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
some protests from individuals, there has been no loss of employees and no per
ceptible detrimental effect upon the efficient operation of the mines, while the
penalty clause has to some extent, but not entirely, prevented the interruption of
production.
From this immediately practical point of view, and since the acceptance of the
union-shop provision in the coal mines is, in our opinion, divorced by the peculiar
and exceptional conditions of this case from effect as a precedent in other indus
tries, it would seem to be the part of wisdom for the operators involved in this
dispute to accept the offer of the United Mine Workers with its added assurance
of full and uninterrupted production at the mines throughout the period of the
contract.
The extended discussion before the Mediation Board has not however succeeded
in bringing about a voluntary acceptance of this provision. Both parties to the
controversy want the issue squarely decided by the National Defense Mediation
Board.
The only question in this dispute is the single question—whether the operators
here involved, who produce 10 percent of the coal in the United States, shall
join with the producers, who produce 90 percent of the coal, in making with the
United Mine Workers an agreement which requires as a condition of employment
membership in the United Mine Workers of America, when approximately 95
percent of the eligible workers in and about their mines are already members of
the United Mine Workers. The question at issue does not go beyond that. It is
definitely a different question from a provision for union security that requires
of an employee who has voluntarily joined the union that as a condition of his
employment he must maintain membership in that union. Nor do we think that
a forthright decision on the facts by the Board under the circumstances of sub
mission in this case would serve or could be urged as a precedent in any industry
in which these peculiar and exceptional conditions do not exist. If we were not
of this opinion we would not be able to make recommendations in this controversy
at all, because that proposition cuts both ways. If this decision cannot be isolated
by its peculiar circumstances from questions of union security that arise in other
industries then a recommendation by this Board in favor of the United Mine
Workers would mean that we are prepared to recommend the same contract in all
other industries, and on the other hand a decision in favor of the operators would
mean that we are not prepared to recommend the union shop under any circum
stances whatever. The Board is not prepared to take either of these positions.
The Board in the future may recommend as it has recommended in the past
various kinds of union security appropriate to the particular case.
This brings us down to the ultimate reasons advanced by the parties for and
against the recommendation that the operators involved in this controversy
sign the Appalachian agreement with the union-shop provision and the penalty
clause. The mine workers say that they want and are entitled to the union
shop in these mines because the organizational activities of the United Mine
Workers have in the past been opposed by these powerful interests, and the
mine workers want security against any such attacks in the future in case,
for instance, of a period of depression and unemployment. They point to the
ruthless disruption of the United Mine Workers, at the instigation of these
interests, in the years from 1920 to 1983. The operators in reply give us
assurance in most positive terms that they are not now opposed to and do not
intend to oppose the voluntary growth of union membership at their mines, and
they point out that the history of the growth of the United Mine Workers in
recent years, and the figures submitted to us showing substantially complete
union membership at some of the mines, show that the United Mine Workers
are in no need of any assurance of security. They take the position, in other
words, that the special and particular facts adduced in these proceedings show
that the union shop is not really needed by the United Mine Workers of America.
It is clear that the Wagner Act has something to do with these final points
of the argument. So long as that act remains in force many of the things
that were done in opposition to the United Mine Workers of America in 1920
cannot be done again. The forceful interference by employers with self
organization of the workers that occurred in those years cannot be repeated so
long as the Wagner Act remains in force. The possibility that these provisions
of the act will not remain in force in the United States is too remote, in our
opinion, to be given serious consideration. And if these provisions were to be
repealed it would only be by such a reversal of national policy that in any
event would surely sweep away the union shop.
CASE HISTORIES
125
But the Wagner Act, as the Board pointed out in its recommendations of
October 24, bears also in other ways on the present dispute. That act disposed
of many of the arguments that have been advanced, by one side or the other,
before us. It declared the national purpose to be to mitigate and eliminate
obstructions to production “by encouraging the practice and procedure of col
lective bargaining,” and to protect the exercise by workers of full freedom of
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing. It declared that an employer shall not be precluded from making
an agreement with a lawfully selected or designated labor organization “to
require as a condition of employment membership therein.” Thus the closed
or union shop in private industry is not precluded by the Wagner Act, and
closed- or union-shop agreements exist in great numbers in a great many indus
tries, in addition to the 90 percent of the bituminous-coal industry. But the
clear consensus of the discussion of the Wagner Act was that such labor agree
ments should be arrived at by collective bargaining with full retention of the
right to strike—not by governmental compulsion.
If we were convinced by the arguments presented on behalf of the United
Mine Workers that the further postponement, for the duration of the emer
gency, of their demand for the union shop in that 10 percent of the industry
involved in this dispute would seriously impair the security of the United Mine
Workers or threaten its existence, we would not be prepared to recommend
that the United Mine Workers should waive the union shop in these captive
mines at this time, because in our opinion the recommendations of the National
Defense Mediation Board should be made in the light of the principle that the
emergency should not be used either to tear down or to artifically stimulate the
normal growth of unionism in defense industries.
But we do not believe that the signing of the union-shop agreement by the
operators involved in this dispute is necessary to the security of the United
Mine Workers. The very reason given by the United Mine Workers for raising
the issue now, is, in our opinion, sufficient evidence to the contrary. That
reason is that in 1939 the United Mine Workers were not strong enough to raise
the issue, but they are strong enough now. That added strength has been built
up in the face of the very conditions which are now said to threaten the security
of the union.
But the final and determining consideration in our opinion, is that the past
performance of the United Mine Workers indicates very clearly that they are
well able by themselves to complete the full organization of the bituminous-coal
industry and the mature development of industrial relations in that industry,
if their efforts to do so are not interfered with by management. And we are
convinced that a 100-percent organization voluntarily arrived at through nego
tiations by the United Mine Workers themselves will be very much more able
to resist the stresses of any period of depression or any attack that may occur
in the future, than if the efforts of the United Mine Workers were now buttressed
by the aid of a Government agency, or if the goal were achieved by interrupting
defense production.
On the other hand, if the United Mine Workers are protected by adequate
assurance that the present attitude of the operators of no opposition to the
voluntary growth of union membership at the mines will not be departed from,
and if in support of the national defense which is essential to the preservation
of those fundamental rights without which the United Mine Workers could not
exist, they now decide to suspend for the duration of the national emergency
their unquestionable right to match their economic strength against that of
the operators of these mines by refusing to work with nonunion workers, then
it seems to us reasonably clear that their decision would greatly strengthen
their position before the people of the United States, that in this emergency
period they would be well able to continue as heretofore to extend the voluntary
membership of their organization, and that they would erect the most effective
protection against destructive forces of reaction that could be thought of.
It has been urged upon us that the United Mine Workers are legally and
morally bound by the “wage protective clause” of the Appalachian agreement
to surrender the union-shop provisions and withdraw the accompanying penalty
clause in their contracts with the 90 percent of the industry who now operate
under the union shop, if they do not secure the union shop in the 10 percent
of the industry here represented. It seems to us very difficult to so interpret
the “protective wage clause” as to give it any effect on the union-shop provision
of the Appalachian agreement, particularly when the United Mine Workers and
certainly many, if not all, of the operators under the union-shop agreement regard
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that agreement as more favorable from the point of view of practical operation
of the mines; but however this may be, we have no reason to suppose that the
operators who now have the union-shop agreement would take advantage of
our recommendation in this case to demand a return to the open-shop arrange
ment without the penalty clause. If they did, it would be a dispute within the
broad certification of the bituminous-coal industry to this Board, and we may
here point out that in such a case the interposition of the force of Government
to achieve something which could not be achieved by voluntary collective bar
gaining would not exist.
We. therefore, recommend:
That the United Mine Workers of America and the operators involved in this
dispute proceed immediately to sign the Appalachian agreement, with the res
ervation that the provision of the Appalachian agreement which requires mem
bership in the United Mine Workers of America as a condition of employment
shall be inoperative for the duration of the contract.
In presenting this recommendation the National Defense Mediation Board
has in mind that important purpose for which the Board was given power
to find the facts and make recommendations. That purpose was that the facts
might be widely known; that informed public opinion might pass upon the
justice and fairness of the recommendations, and that as a result uninterrupted
production of defense materials might be achieved without depriving labor or
management of the rights which they enjoy in a free and democratic society.
We express the hope that in considering this recommendation the parties to the
controversy will bear that purpose in mind, and that they will take sufficient
time, in deciding whether they will or will not accept the recommendation, to
permit sober and thoughtful consideration by everyone who may be affected
by their decision.
Concurring Opinion of Frank P. Graham,
November 17
In my support, in the main, of the able majority opinion of our chairman,
Mr. William H. Davis, I wish to summarize my own with the majority opinion
of the Board. Each member of this Board has tried to the best of his ability to
make his own decision in the case of the “captive coal mines.” The public
representatives, upon whom rested the special responsibility of hearing the
two sides to the end before reaching a conclusion, felt the impact of the facts
and arguments presented for the two sides by men who revealed both industrial
statesmanship and patriotic concern over the issue of union security in this case.
EXAMPLES OF MEDIATION REGARDING UNION STATUS
The public members of the Board, as chairmen of panels in many cases, have
attempted, by such lights as were available, to be open-minded and constructive
in the consideration of the basic issues of union security. They have refused
to accept the view that the matter of union security should be left in status quo
for the duration of the emergency. It would be unfair to industrial workers
in a period of expanding production to hold their organizational position rigidly
fixed and static in a dynamic industrial society.
To see this case and these recommendations in the context of other cases and
other recommendations it would be helpful to summarize some illustrations of
the content of mediation and recommendations involving union security. As
representative examples of mediation, Board panels have mediated in the settle
ment of disputes by mutual agreements which provided in one case for a closed
shop, in others for maintenance of membership clauses, in others for voluntary
check-offs, and in others for contractual assurances by the company not to
tolerate any antiunion activity by its agents against the certified or signatory
union, and for pledges by the union and the company against coercive tactics,
for orderly and responsible relations, and for creative cooperation for efficient
shop discipline and maximum production. It must be said in all fairness and
in grateful acknowledgement that in the negotiations of agreements before this
Board the representatives of business management and of labor have been for
the most part public-spirited, enlightened, and cooperative for the defense of
the Nation. These voluntary-agreements for union security have tended to pro
mote good faith and good will and have helped to make better unions, better
companies, more responsible relations, and more and better production.
CASE HISTORIES
127
examples op recommendations concerning union status
The mediating influence of the Board has been against a reluctant or merely
acquiescent recognition of the certified or signatory union and for a positive
recognition of and cooperation with the union as actually a basic part of the
economic and human structure of an industrial plant and potentially a con
structive partner in American industry. The Board has also in some cases
helped to restore or create, according to the facts, the union’s confidence in the
integrity and good faith of management. When mediation has failed and
voluntary arbitration has been rejected by either party, the Board has then
made recommendations. Sometimes such recommendations are made with the
knowledge that both parties will accept, though it has seldom been agreed in
advance that the recommendations are binding upon the parties. It has been
learned, through painful experience, that these formal recommendations carry
a public and moral sanction which, when persistently resisted, have resulted in
a few cases in the use of the authority and force of the Nation.
THE CASE OP AIR ASSOCIATES
In the recent case of Air Associates the executive branch of the Government
acted to prevent a company, which rejected the Board’s recommendations, from
nullifying the Wagner Act and causing industrial disorder in defense production
by its refusal to accept and cooperate with the union and by its maneuvers to
confuse and frighten the union which had won the plant election. The Board
held that the existence of this certified union, though only a struggling infant,
was the lawful responsibility of the Government and essential to the national
defense. The spokesmen for the corporation attacked the Board as being con
cerned not with production but with the security of the union. The Board held
that the defense of the union in its lawful rights was necessary to insure
harmonious relations and was an essential part of the defense of the Nation.
Defense production by Air Associates has since been greatly improved.
A CASE INVOLVING THE CLOSED SHOP
Early in its history the full Board supported a panel’s recommendation for
the acceptance by the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co. of a master agreement, made
between 38 companies and 20 constituent unions by collective bargaining, in
which was included a provision for the closed shop as part of the master agree
ment made for an emergency expanding defense situation. This provision did
not, however, result in a Nation-wide labor monopoly by the union involved.
The union was willing to accept less than the strictly union shop but the com
pany preferred to accept the formal recommendations at the hands of the
Board rather than to accept less by agreement with the union.
MAINTENANCE OF MEMBERSHIP CLAUSES
The Board has also, in very special circumstances, such as the Puget Sound,
the North American Aviation, Western Cartridge, Lincoln Mills, and Federal
Shipbuilding cases, made formal recommendations of maintenance-of-membership
clauses. The maintenance-of-membership clause does not require any old or
new employees to join the union but requires those who have voluntarily joined
or hereafter voluntarily join to maintain membership in good standing during
the term of the contract as part of their responsibility to maintain the contract
made in their name. In the Federal Shipbuilding case, to safeguard a union
in an emergency expanding defense industry against later disintegration, the
Board made a recommendation for a maintenance-of-membership clause which,
on account of the refusal of the company to accept, resulted in seizure by the
Nation of the property of the most powerful corporation in the world. All of
the public members supported this recommendation and would doubtless in such
special circumstances of a union endangered by the emergency defense program
do as much again.
THE CAPTIVE COAL MINES ISSUE
In the Bituminous Coal Operators case as the facts, issues, and their implica
tions emerged and developed, the Board faced the question as to whether it
would make a formal recommendation, which, though neither party was bound
to accept, might by a consequent train of events, potentially result in govern
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
mental compulsion upon workers to join the union against their wills. The
Question immediately arose as to the need of the union for such governmental
compulsion as a substitute for the use of compulsory economic power through
a strike.
THE PRESENT SECURITY OF THE UNION
The United Mine Workers of America, which in 1933 was but a depleted shell,
has, through the N. R. A., the consequent organization, strikes, and collective
bargaining, the Bituminous Coal Code, the Bituminous Coal Act, and the Ap
palachian agreement, grown to be one of the most powerful, disciplined, and
productive unions in the world. This union in those recovery years had able
and masterful leadership. Congressional legislation has, in the last 8 years,
thrown around unionization and collective bargaining in general and the
bituminous-coal industry in particular the protection of the laws of the Nation.
Labor’s magna charta, the Wagner Act, as a basis of union security, can be
preserved by the wisdom of a farseeing labor statesmanship. The membership
in this union has through all these factors grown to an overwhelming majority.
Public opinion, acts of Congress, political, industrial, and labor statesmanship,
and the strength of this union in collective bargaining in the most basic in
dustry of the Nation, which all combined helped to make all this growth and
strength possible, will not again tolerate the senseless destructive antagonisms
to labor unions on the part of the coal operators and the steel companies, and
the consequent destructive labor reprisals and ruthless strife. Tremendous
strides have been made by the United Mine Workers in 8 years and, if sustained
by public opinion, more progress will be made. An index of the security of this
union is revealed in the fact that, when a suggestion was made by a public
member and renewed by another public member the next day for the considera
tion of a maintenance-of-membership clause, it was pointed out by representa
tives of the C. I. O. that they did not desire such a clause, since, with the
already acquired check-off for the overwhelming majority of union members in
the captive mines, the union had protection as good as or better than the maintenance-of-membership provision. The security of this union can now be
threatened only by an abuse of its power and the loss of the public support
which plays a decisive part in both the development and restriction of our
human institutions.
PRIVATE MONOPOLY AND PUBLIC CONTROL
Public support is deeply involved in a public policy which, as most ably
pointed out in the opinion of Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., would, for all practical
purposes, require that no worker could work or ply his trade as a coal miner
in the United States except through membership in this union. To press for
this private monopoly, through private agreement between the parties or through
the use of economic power, raises questions not only of public regulation of
labor unions but also of hasty restrictions in an unpropitious hour. Analogously,
the public enforcement of a private Nation-wide monopoly requiring that a
citizen could invest his capital in the oil business, for all practical purposes,
for example, only through X company would be sure to lead to drastic govern
mental controls beyond the detailed restrictions already imposed in the public
interest by the Nation against private monopoly in business. Once a great oil
company which was tending to control so basic a natural resource as oil in one
vast monopoly raised this question for public concern and restrictions.
Time and calm intelligence were required to work out the evolving American
system of the public controls of private and monopolistic business in the United
States. Such grave issues of public policy need for decision more time and a
wider sanction than belong to an emergency administrativve agency set up for
the national defense. The best interests of labor unions, industry, national
defense, and wise democratic processes suggest that the question of a public
enforcement of a Nation-wide private monopoly should not be pressed and
fought out in the midst of a great crisis in the world involving the very ex
istence of free labor unions, the corporate and cooperative association of free
men, and all the basic charters and institutions of human freedom.
CONCLUSION
In the present state of the nations, in the world crisis of democracy in gen
eral and the associations of free men in particular, my position, reached after
CASE HISTORIES
129
giving due weight to the special facts in this case, after thinking through the
related experience of this Board and exploring, in lonely vigils, alternative
ways, is that, in the long run, the cause of labor unions and all free institutions
will best be served by a governmental agency refraining from making formal
recommendations, requiring workers against their will to join an organization
which, potentially by the sanction and force of Government, would become in a
basic industry a private monopoly unregulated by the Nation. This matter
becomes graver when we consider that this governmental compulsion may be
against the convictions of men regarding other than trade-union issues and
policies. It will take more than emergency time to work out the wise and fair
basis and structure of public responsibility for such a Nation-wide or industry
wide labor union. We need time, perspective, a national industrial conference
of the authoritative representatives of labor and management, suggestions on
both sides, and the reference frame of the public welfare, as conditions prece
dent to the public sanction of a private monopoly involving power over basic
industries and the strategic natural resources of the Nation.
As we look down the centuries and back to this the world’s darkest hour,
we see centuries-old charters of human liberty torn and trampled under the
ruthless heels of dictators. As we look around the earth today we see freedom
and democracy, lately the goal of modern nations, now renounced or crushed
in more than half the world. As we look inside the totalitarian nations we
see subjugated the most precious institutions of human freedom—the church,
parliament, the press, the radio, the university—and the labor union high on
the list in its once vital democratic meaning to the freedom and security of
the millions who now in servile subjection do the work of the totalitarian
states. This is part of the ground and background of our opposition to any
governmental sanction of an unregulated private monopoly and to any formal
recommendation which, through the logic and force of governmental sanction,
may likely lead to governmental limitation upon the rightful freedom and func
tion of the labor union as one of the most indispensable of the free institutions
now imperiled in the world.
For these reasons I concur in the majority opinion of the chairman.
Concurring Opinion of Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr.
November 12
The Board has before it two companion cases, one involving the captive mines
and the other involving the Carter Coal Co.
The first case involves, on the one side, about 50 coal mines, commonly called
captive mines, owned by subsidiaries of 7 different steel companies, and, on the
other side, the United Mine Workers which, for present purposes, we assume to
be the bargaining agent for the 53,000 miners employed there. The second case
involves an independent commercial operator, the Carter Coal Company, and the
same union which represents and has as members 100 percent of the eligible
employees.
The facts are simple. There are in this country independent commercial coal
mines, captive coal mines owned by steel companies, and captive coal mines
owned by railroads, utilities, and miscellaneous industrial companies. In ton
nage, number of workers employed, and similar bases of comparison, the inde
pendent commercial mines and captive mines owned by other than steel companies
are more than nine-tenths of the total.
The owners of all the commercial mines, except Carter, as a result of negotia
tions with the United Mine Workers, now operate under the Appalachian agree
ment which provides for the ‘‘union shop.” This makes membership in the United
Mine Workers a condition of employment; it does not require the company to
hire only persons who are already members of the union. This agreement also
has what is called a “wage protective clause” which provides that if, during
the period of that agreement, the union makes a wage agreement covering wages
or working conditions more favorable than in the Appalachian agreement then
the Appalachian agreement shall be modified so that all parties shall receive the
benefits of such more favorable wage agreement.
The Appalachian agreement has been accepted in full by substantially all the
captive coal mines owned by railroads, utilities, and miscellaneous industrial
companies. It has also been accepted in full by a few steel companies.
The subsidiaries of the seven steel companies here represented, as well as
Carter Coal Co., have accepted all the Appalachian agreement except the union
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
shop provision. In each subsidiary company and in Carter Coal Co., the United
Mine Workers affiliated with the C. I. O. claims a majority of the miners as
members; in the individual mines the percentage of miners whose dues are
checked off runs, on the average, close to 90 percent; in a few cases as high as
100 percent; in a few cases less than 50 percent. In a few individual mines
labor organizations affiliated with the A. F. L. and unaffiliated labor organiza
tions have members.
The sole issue is whether this Board shall now recommend that the mines
owned by Carter and by the subsidiaries of the seven steel companies and the
employees at these mines shall operate under the union-shop clause of the Ap
palachian agreement, which provides that a miner shall, as a condition of em
ployment, be a member of the United Mine Workers. Both parties to this case
want the issue squarely decided. They and a division of this Board have explored
and rejected compromises.
The union’s basic position is that the special facts in the coal industry support
the union-shop demand. They observe that the union shop is a nondiscriminatory
practice which has been adopted by the overwhelming majority of companies
through collective bargaining on an industry-wide basis. They see no reason
why it should not be adopted by the minority.
They say that the union shop is a normal demand by workers. It assures
the union member that he will not have to work beside a man who does not
belong to the union. It makes certain that all who share in the benefits of
collective bargaining will share in the burdens. It represents, as no other
symbol can, the fact that the employer accepts labor organization as a perma
nent characteristic of the enterprise.
The union urges that on the record of the parties before us a union shop has
special merit here. They observe that in the past some of the steel companies
destroyed unions, broke union contracts, and fought the development of collec
tive bargaining. The union suggests that after the emergency, if the union
shop has not been granted in the meantime, the conflict may be renewed and
that at that time there may be no National Labor Relations Act for protec
tion. They imply that if the operators actually operate under the union shop,
either the operators will come by experience to accept the union or the union will
be strong enough economically and politically to prevent disintegration.
The union also refers to its own record. It alleges that its constitution is
democratic, that admission is unrestricted, that disciplinary procedure is orderly,
that dues are moderate, and that contractual promises are kept.
The union notes that the union shop is lawful under State and national law.
The union shop has often been proposed as a desirable solution of a labor dispute
by Government mediators, including representatives of this Board. It exists,
if not by contract at least by informal understanding, in some Government
agencies and on some projects financed by the Government. In the union’s
opinion, it has been and will be a great aid to defense production wherever it
exists.
The union points out that if the Government had not intervened the union
would have been free to strike and, in their estimate, would have won the
strike and the union shop. The union says that if the Government asks the
union to withhold its power to strike, the Government should have an open mind
on the union-shop question and should recommend it if the special facts justify
that result. They say that any other course would not be fair. If this Board
will not in any case recommend the union shop, then the Board ought not to ask
a union to call off a strike on a union-shop demand and submit that demand to
this Board. To do so, they say, is to require a surrender—not an open and
fair arbitration.
The union also draws to our attention possible repercussions of our decision.
They point to the wage protective clause of the Appalachian agreement. They
say that if the union gives the captive mines or the Carter Coal Co. an open
shop, it has an obligation to offer the open shop to the commercial operators.
The union also points to more serious repercussions from a decision of this
Board against the union shop. The claim that, whatever may be our reasoning,
the Nation will interpret our decision as indicating a universal open-shop policy
by the Board. They say that this Board will lose the confidence that it has
enjoyed and that workers who heretofore have been willing to call off strikes
and to come voluntarily before our Board for a hearing will no longer do so
because they will not trust our impartiality. They say that a decision by us
against the union in this case will give the few undisciplined or malevolent
leaders of labor support for their charge that the many mature moderate leaders
CASE HISTORIES
131
of labor were wrong when they advised workers not to strike but to bring their
cases before governmental mediation boards and similar agencies.
They ask us to bear in mind that for almost all unions the union shop is an
aspiration, and that a decision against the union shop in all cases during the
emergency would gravely affect the morale of workers throughout the Nation.
The basic position of the employers is that the Government should never, and
particularly should not in this defense emergency, make union membership a
condition of employment. However, they also call attention to certain facts
peculiar to this case.
The first special fact is that all but one of the companies here involved own
open-shop steel mills. Having that in mind, in 1939 they made a trade whereby,
in their coal negotiations, they gave up the no-strike clause and the penalty
clause and the union gave up the union-shop-clause demand. They say that that
trade should stand for the period of the emergency.
They note that the labor organization which comes here with such claims to
virtue has defied the Government’s policy by calling strikes before this Board
could hear their case and also after the Board had heard their case and made
recommendations. They note also that this labor organization has been slow to
respond to the thrice repeated reasonable requests of the President of the United
States-made in the name of national defense.
They observe that although this union is before us in its capacity as a labor
organization it also performs other functions in other spheres. It has con
tributed on a grand scale to political parties. Its leadership takes an active
part in political affairs both domestic and foreign. And its manifold activities
have recently led to special assessments which have caused revolts among its
membership.
They urge that the record of success achieved by the union at the mines here
involved shows that there is no need for the union shop now. They disagree with
the union’s prophecy of future dangers, and they point to the National Labor
Relations Act. They say that even if there were a risk of repeal of that act
in the future, labor and business alike must, on account of this crisis, forego
some of the security which they would otherwise demand.
These employers say that the wage-protective clause of the Appalachian
agreement has no application to the union shop. They say that the history
of the negotiations of that agreement, and the prior usage of the parties to
that agreement, show that the phrase “working conditions” as used in that
agreement has no reference to the type of shop. If it did, they say that the
reference would not help the union since the clause applies only to differences
unfavorable to the commercial employers and the union has always, argued
that the union shop is more favorable than the open shop to the commercial
operators. They add that even if the union’s construction of the clause were
correct, many of the Appalachian operators have said they will not invoke the
clause in case we do not now recommend the union shop to the captive mines
and to the Carter Coal Co. Finally, on this point of the wage-protective clause,
they say that the union cannot make a side agreement which prevents our
doing justice in this case.
However, the chief points made by the operators cover less technical matters.
They urge that there is a fundamental American principle that a worker has
the right either to join or not to join a union. They say that employers should
not intermeddle in the membership campaigns of any labor organization. They
say that the National Labor Relations Act preserves that principle and that
viewpoint except where an employer voluntarily chooses to sign an agreement pro
viding for union membership as a condition of employment. The act, in their
opinion, permits an employer to deny a demand for a union shop if he believes
it restricts production, adversely affects managerial prerogatives, shifts the
balance of power previously existing in his enterprise, or makes it easier for
the union to fall into the grip of racketeers, or for any other reason.
The employers say that in this case we must not overlook the reality of the
issue we face. In their view the issue is whether a temporary governmental
agency shall virtually command that the small minority of coal miners who
have chosen not to join the United Mine Workers must become members of
that particular private organization or seek a different trade.
They ask us to remember that our recommendations in a case that vitally
affects national defense are not mere proposals which we suggest to the parties
as a sound basis for the voluntary composition of their differences. Our
recommendations, they say, become commands. They cite the Government’s
action in the North American Aviation, the Federal Shipbuilding, and the Air
132
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Associates cases and they conclude that in a vital defense industry the parties
are not free to ignore our recommendations. They add that the fact that
in this case the parties are not “committed in advance to the acceptance of
the final recommendations” of the Board does not give them a special immunity
which they would not otherwise enjoy.
On their view that the problem is not one of persuasion but of command, the
employers ask us to distinguish between a case where the union shop results
from collective bargaining or from private or public contract and a case where
the union seeks to attain the union shop by governmental compulsion.
In commenting on this issue, the employers and others have brought the case
to an even sharper focus. In their view the issue is not whether after a worker
has voluntarily joined an organization and authorized his agent to make a
contract requiring him to maintain membership, the Government shall enforce
the contract. The issue is not whether a particular shop shall be limited to
members of one union, leaving other shops open. The issue, in their judgment,
is whether membership in one private organization shall be a condition of fol
lowing the trade of a coal miner. They say this because there are almost no
coal mines left where the United Mine Workers are not in a majority. They
also observe that coal miners do not readily change their trade. Thus to them
the issue is in part an issue of monopoly.
Viewing, as they do, the issue as one of governmental command and private
monopoly, the employers suggest that we are not the appropriate agency of
Government to solve the issue. With all due respect, they observe that we are a
body of limited functions. This Board has no permanent relationship to labor
policy. It hears only those special cases which are referred to it during the
defense emergency. It has no power to exercise a continuous supervision
over the parties that appear before it. Its members were not selected by the
people and do not devote their full time to public service. It has no fixed
constitutional status.
In the employers view, the fundamental issues here should not be decided
by us at all. They want us to put the matter before the Congress. The Con
gress, they say, can determine whether a man ought to be required to join
a union, and if so what conditions if any should be imposed upon that union.
We are told that the Congress can decide whether reports should be filed, fees
fixed, methods of voting supervised, office holding regulated, activities confined
to labor questions, and like matters which the employers say are relevant if
the Government is to permit a monopoly and require workers to adhere to it.
The employers invite our attention to what they foresee as consequences of
a decisipn on our part favorable to the union’s demand. They predict that such
a decision, even if it purported to rest on special facts, would be everywhere
interpreted as a decision broadly upholding the union shop, or as they some
times inexactly call it the closed shop. They say that this would lead to
widespread demands for the union shop which would not otherwise be made
and that these demands will lead to strikes that would not otherwise be called.
It is pointed out that the records of this Board as well as the experience of
the country at large support that argument. After this Board, on what it
regarded as very special facts, recommended a maintenance-of-membership clause
in the North American Aviation, Western Cartridge, and Federal Shipbuilding
cases, the demand for that type of clause became more insistent in cases that
lacked the peculiar elements upon which the Board had there relied.
The employers also emphasize that if this Board yields to this union solely
because of the defiant attitude of its chieftain, the pattern of “strike first—
mediate later” will become universal. A dozen lesser union leaders, it is said,
will become imitators of the leader of this union, and the defense effort will
be irreparably handicapped.
I agree with all my associates that this case can be decided on its special
facts. It is not necessary for this Board to prescribe forever, or even for
all cases that arise during the emergency, a general rule on the issue of the
open shop versus the union shop.
The facts, in my opinion, represent a weak case for the union shop at the
present time.
This union seeks to occupy not in one plant, or in one area, or even in one
branch of industry, but in an entire calling a monopolistic position without
subjecting itself to any regulation. Coal miners follow a specialized craft
which they can pursue only in the coal industry. They do not change their
trade readily. If the union succeeds in securing a union shop throughout the
industry, the individual miner will have no economic choice except to join this
union. He cannot go to another shop and exercise his calling.
CASE HISTORIES
133
A monopoly on such a scale is not necessarily against the public interest. But
a monopoly on such a scale which remains unregulated is, in any opinion,
against the public interest whether achieved with or without governmental
imposition. This does not mean that I favor governmental regulation of unions.
It does not mean that I am opposed to the union shop. It does not mean that
I am opposed to any union shop until and unless the unions are regulated.
All that I find it necessary to say is that it is against the public interest to
require that a worker as a condition of following his calling anywhere in the
United States should be a member of a wholly private association. A wholly
private association retains the right to determine for itself entrance fees, dues,
proper objects for expenditure, participation in or withdrawal from political
activities, publication or concealment of records, methods of procedure, condi
tions of admission, and conditions of expulsion. Perhaps the association should
continue to retain such freedom; but, if so, then the worker should retain
a freedom to carry on his calling somewhere in the United States without
joining that association. Otherwise in the name of unionism the worker
will be forced either to quit his trade entirely or to join a group that may
have objectives beyond the purpose of improving working conditions.
I may add that I agree with the majority that the facts here show that there
is no immediate need for this union to achieve the security of the union shop.
The leader of the union himself testified at our hearings that the operators
are not “at this time” opposed to the voluntary growth of unions; that in some
mines this union has 100 percent of the miners; and that in others its mem
bership is extraordinarily high and growing rapidly without hindrance from any
source. Moreover, the labor members from the C. I. O. did not accept the
suggestion made by the public members of the Board that the Board consider,
as a possible solution of this case, a clause such as was used in the Federal
Shipbuilding and Dry Dock case which provides that an employee who has volun
tarily joined the union shall, as a condition of employment, continue to main
tain membership in the union. The C. I. O. members stated that they already
had greater protection than a maintenance of membership clause could give
them. The only danger which the union sees is a reactionary labor policy in
the future. I agree with the opinion of the majority of this Board that if the
union shop were to be recommended by us in a monopoly situation or achieved
by a strike in the present temper of the country the result would be not to
lessen but to increase that danger.
I, therefore, concur in the recommendation.
Minority Opinion of Philip Murray and Thomas Kermedy
November 10
The majority opinion of the Board establishes the following facts as con
ceded:
(a) The United Mine Workers of America has consummated industry-wide
collective bargaining for the anthracite and bituminous-coal industry resulting
in a uniform contract for such industry.
(b) Ninety percent of the annual production of coal, both bituminous and
anthracite, is under union-shop conditions. Only 10 percent of the annual coal
production, confined to the captive coal mines of the steel corporations in the
bituminous-coal fields, has refused to accept the Nation-wide collective bargain
ing agreement, including the union shop. Several steel corporations such as the
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation and The Inland Steel Co. have accepted
the uniform union-shop contract.
(c) In the captive coal mines 95 percent of the mine workers are members
of the United Mine Workers of America.
(d) The industry-wide collective bargaining agreement which has been ac
cepted by the entire coal industry, with the exception of the captive coal mines,
guarantees continuity of production by the mine workers without any stoppages
until May 1,1943.
The simple request of the United Mine Workers of America in this case is that
the steel corporations, owning and operating the captive coal mines, be re
quested to accept a collective bargaining agreement which has been accepted
by the overwhelming portion of the industry.
On June 18, 1941, the National Defense Mediation Board issued its recom
mendations in a case involving the shipbuilding industry on the West coast,
and the Bethlehem Steel Co. In this case the facts were as follows:
134
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
(a) A standard agreement had been negotiated providing for uniform wages
and working conditions in shipbuilding operations on the Pacific coast. One
of the provisions of this contract provided for a closed shop.
(b) The total number of employees in the shipbuilding industry on the West
coast was 30,000. Shipbuilding employers embracing some 24,000 employees,
accepted the agreement.
(c) The balance of 6,000 employees (20 percent of the industry) were those
of Bethlehem Steel Co. which refused to accept the master agreement.
The National Defense Mediation Board in that case decided the following:
“The master agreement is the product of industry-wide collective bargaining
on a regional basis. It has been approved as an instrument for stabilizing
working conditions and contributing to the uninterrupted production of ships
by all the shipbuilding employers on the Pacific coast employing 24,000 workers,
except the Bethlehem Steel Co., which employs 6,000, and by representatives of
the Bay City’s Metal Trades Council, certified by the National Labor Relations
Board as the bargaining agency for the employees of the Bethlehem Steel Co.
“Under these special circumstances, the Board recommends that the master
agreement be accepted and signed by the Bethlehem Steel Co.”
This recommendation by the National Defense Mediation Board in the Beth
lehem Steel case was approved by the entire Board, including the representatives
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations and those of the American Federation
of Labor whose affiliated unions were involved in the controversy.
The National Defense Mediation Board, including the representatives of the
employers, the public, and of the American Federation of Labor, have now re
jected the request of the United Mine Workers of America. On the merits there is
no basis for distinguishing the captive coal case from the Bethlehem Steel Co.
case. Representatives of the public and of the employers have offered no argu
ment in reason or logic to refute the merits of the request of the United Mine
Workers of America.
On the contrary, the representatives of the American Federation of Labor,
who made the motion in support of the position of the United Mine Workers of
America, stultified themselves to the extent of voting against their own motion.
The President of the United States, in submitting this controversy to the
National Defense Mediation Board, requested that—
“The National Defense Mediation Board * * * proceed in full session to
consider the merits of the dispute and make its final recommendations.”
This obligation has not been discharged by the National Defense Mediation
Board. The dispute in question has not been considered on its merits. To
the contrary, the National Defense Mediation Board has now decided that hence
forth, regardless of the merits of any case, labor unions must be denied the
right of normal growth and legitimate aspirations, such as the union shop, and
the traditional open-shop policy of the antilabor employers must prevail.
Such a decision as an expression of national policy endangers all labor unions
and threatens to rip asunder peaceful industrial relations established in other
industries where a union-shop relationship has already been established.
There can be no question as to the wholehearted support which the C. I. O.
unions have accorded the national defense program. We have appreciated that
the call for maximum production under this program created the need for every
sincere effort to assure continuity of production. In the judgment of the
C. I. O., the National Defense Mediation Board offered an instrument to labor
and management whereby our problems could be disposed of without the need
of industrial conflict or requiring the relinquishment of any legitimate rights
of either party. We have therefore consistently counseled the affiliated unions
of the C. I. O. to utilize in full all available machinery for mediation to achieve
the peaceful solution of the problems arising between labor and management.
We are still of the opinion that such a policy is desirable.
However, the decision of the majority of the Board makes it impossible for
labor to retain any confidence in its future actions. The United Mine Workers
of America has a perfectly meritorious case. The precedent had already been
established in the Bethlehem Steel Co. case. Without reason, without logic,
without argument, the claim of the United Mine Workers ,of America is denied.
The uncompromising attitude of the majority opinion is in itself a negation
of the basic principles upon which the Board was established in the effort to
promote mediation in lieu of industrial conflict.
For the foregoing reasons we submit that the merits of the controversy compel
the conclusion that the steel corporations should be requested to accept the
collective bargaining agreement, including the union-shop provision, covering
the overwhelming portion of the coal industry.
CASE HISTORIES
135
CASE No. 200
B ituminous Coal Operators, A labama U nited Mine W orkers op A merica,
Mines
District 20, C. I. O.
Covered by certification of case No. 20. Set off as No. 20C, September 3. Strike
September 3-6. Hearings September 10, 19-25, October 2, 3. 22,500 workers
involved. Closed October 24
Panel: Davis, Teagle, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
This dispute was heard under the general certification of the dispute between
employers and employees which arose in April 1941 in the bituminbus-coal indus
try. The employers in this dispute fall into two groups—commercial operators
who employ approximately 12,500 men; steel companies employing 10,000 men in
their coal mines. On September 3, 8,000 miners went out on an unauthorized
strike because the negotiations between the Alabama operators of both captive
and commercial mines and district 20 had reached an impasse. Work was imme
diately resumed at the request of the Board, pending hearing.
When these negotiations started there were 4 major and 14 minor points of
difference. After a general discussion of all the issues the Board suggested that
the minor issues be settled by direct collective bargaining between the parties
without further assistance from the Board. That was done. On the major
issues, the Board made formal recommendations, Mr. Lyons dissenting. These
were accepted October 24.
Findings and Recommendations
October 21
This dispute was heard by the National Defense Mediation Board under the
general certification by the Secretary of Labor of the dispute between employers
and employees, which arose in March 1941, in the bituminous coal producing
areas. Alabama is one of the outlying districts where the practice has been to
await the execution of the Appalachian agreement before negotiating a local
contract.
On April 1, 1941, the Alabama mines were shut down along with those in the
Appalachian area. Thereafter all of the mines were reopened on the basis of the
President’s proposal for the resumption of work pending further negotiations, the
final agreement to be retroactive. The final agreement between the northern
Appalachian operators and the United Mine Workers increased the basic daily
wage rate $1 and the basic tonnage rate 12 cents. During the protracted negotia
tions which led to the final settlement with the lower Appalachian operators,
these wage increases were made effective by a temporary agreement. The final
settlement in the lower Appalachian area included an additional increase in the
basic daily wage rate of 40 cents, making a total daily wage increase of $1.40, an
advance from $5.60 to $7.
Since May 8, 1941, under a temporary agreement between the Alabama Coal
Operators and the United Mine Workers of America the Alabama mines have been
operated with an increased basic daily wage rate of $1 and an increased tonnage
rate of 12 cents. No final agreement has been reached in Alabama. On Septem
ber 2,1941, an unauthorized strike broke out, but the miners promptly returned to
work at the request of the Board, pending this hearing.
When these negotiations started there were 4 major and 14 minor points of
difference. After a general discussion of all the issues the Board suggested that
the minor issues be settled by direct collective bargaining between the parties
without further assistance from the Board. That was done. The agreements
reached on these issues are expressed in the attached document marked exhibit A.
The four major points of difference are:
{a) Whether the Alabama miners shall receive a 40-cent increase of the basic
daily wage, in addition to the $1 increase now in effect under the temporary
agreement.
(b) Whether the mine workers of Alabama shall be paid the $20 vacation
payment for the year 1941, it having been agreed that they will be paid $20
for the vacation period in 1942.
( c ) Whether the deduction of washer losses from the check-weighed tonnage
weights, in calculating the payment to tonnage workers, shall be eliminated.
136
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
(d)
Whether the Alabama contract shall provide that tonnage rates on con
veyor loading shall not yield to the worker a less income than he would earn
on the day-rate basis.
1. The request of the mine workers that the contracts shall include a provi
sion that tonnage rates on conveyor loading shall not yield to the worker a
less income than he would earn on the day-rate basis, involves in Alabama the
same considerations as in the controversy which was before us in the lower
Appalachian area, and we notified the parties that we were disposed to make
the same recommendations here that we made there. Thereafter the parties
reached an agreement on this point.
We recommend, therefore, that in accordance with the agreement between the
parties the contract provide as follows:
The tonnage loading rates on conveyors shall be such as to yield to the worker
an opportunity to earn a net income equivalent to what he would earn on the
day-rate basis. Computations shall be made semimonthly.
At mines where hand loading and mechanical loading exists, the hand loaders
shall be given their share of mine orders and at least given the opportunity
to make earnings equal to “miner on company work.”
2. From the outset of the discussion before us great stress was put by both
sides on the question of washer-waste deductions. The insistence of the mine
workers was that in Alabama, as in the Appalachian area, the wages of a miner
on tonnage rates should be paid on the total checked tipple weights without
any deduction. They urged that the proper procedure to insure the mining of
clean and marketable coal is the dockage procedure which has been followed
in other areas, and that this procedure is sufficient to insure that the miners
will carry out their contract which is “to load the coal as free from impurities
as it is practical to do so.” The mine workers pointed to the uncertainties and
inequities of deducting from the tipple weights amounts which the mine workers
are not permitted to check, and which may vary with the efficiency of the wash
ing operation, and with the desire of the operator to produce a higher grade
of coal for a particular market.
The Alabama operators from the start recognized that any deduction from
the checked tonnage rates should not be arbitrarily made by the operators, but
should be made on a basis that would be agreed upon, and well understood,
and that was fairly and honestly applied. They gave us the assurance that
they desired and welcomed an entirely honest administration of the washer-loss
provisions, and saw no reason why those provisions could not be so administered.
They pointed out that in Alabama, 82 percent of the coal produced passes
through the washers, whereas in Kentucky only 8.3 percent is washed, in Ten
nessee 5.8 percent, and in the United States as a whole 18.2 percent, so that in
Alabama the passing of the coal through washers is not an exceptional condi
tion as in the lower Appalachian area, but is the usual and almost universal
procedure. They expressed great apprehension that any radical departure from
the established custom would create more problems than it solved.
In the Appalachian case we recognized the inequities and uncertainties in
volved in the method of calculating tonnage by deducting from the checked
tipple weights the unchecked amount of the cleaning losses, and for that reason
we recommended the elimination of the reject clause which had been intro
duced to a limited extent in the contracts in that area. On the other hand, we
there considered the possibility that the elimination of the reject clause in those
few mines of the whole Appalachian area where its use had been introduced,
might result in hardship on certain operators who in reliance upon the reject
clause had made substantial investments since that clause was introduced, and
we there recommended that in such cases these particular difficulties should be
worked out by negotiations under the “settlement of disputes” clause of the
Appalachian contract.
The extended discussion before the Board led to similar suggestions by the
Board on the subject of the washer-waste provision in Alabama, and these sug
gestions in turn led to further direct negotiations between the parties, in which,
by concessions on both sides, they were able to work out an agreement in
principle, which is expressed under the heading “Preparation of coal” on pages—
to — of the attached exhibit A. This agreement completely covers the matter
of washer-waste deductions except for one point. It includes in item H on
page — for the absorption by the operator of a portion of the washer loss
by the payment o f ------cents per ton in addition to the regular tonnage rate.
The parties have agreed that 1 cent per ton is equivalent to the absorption
of a washer loss of 1 percent of the total tipple tonnage, but they have not
been able to agree what portion of the washer loss the operators will absorb.
CASE HISTORIES
137
It is left to the Mediation Board to make findings and recommendations on that
one point.
While the parties thus by mutual agreement in collective bargaining covered
the greater part of the washer-waste problem, yet it is unfortunately true that
the part left for recommendation by this Board—the part which has to do with
money costs—is one of those things as to which it is particularly desirable that
conclusions should be reached by negotiations between the parties themselves,
rather than left to the relatively uninformed opinion of outsiders. Nevertheless,
the residue of the problem has been left to us, and we must try to arrive at a
just and fair recommendation. It is obvious that in such matters there is no
absolute and exact way of arriving at a precise result. We can only take into
account such considerations as might reasonably be advanced pro and con in
collective bargaining discussions. From that point of view we have carefully
considered all the arguments and all the relevant facts presented at the hearings
and obtainable, supplemented by the full data supplied by the Bituminous Coal
Division.
The real objective of the procedure which has been agreed to between the
parties, as to this washer waste deduction, is, as near as may be, to finally
arrive at an arrangement under which the miner will be paid, at a tonnage
rate which will give him a fair income relative to the day-wage workers, for
the full tonnage of coal which he loads “as free from impurities as it is prac
tical to do so” as provided in the contract, while the operators may retain the
full and fair use of their washers to eliminate any dirt in excess of what would
be loaded by a clean loader, and further to reduce the ash content of the coal
to the normal standard upon which he bases his market practice. It is, of
course, true that the conditions vary widely from mine to mine, and even from
time to time in the same mine, so that any figure agreed to for absorption by
the operator can only be an average figure.
Perhaps the best, although by no means perfect, single guide toward the
proper figure, presented in the proceedings before us is found in the following
considerations: A minimum estimate of the amount of dirt that a good clean
loader would on the average include in his loaded coal is from 5 to 8 percent.
The over-all average of dirt left in the marketed coal after it has passed through
the washer is, as an average estimate, from 2 to 3 percent. Averaging and sub
tracting these estimates gives 4 percent, as an approximation of the amount of
dirt removed in the washer that should be paid for by the operator. This
figure is fortified, on the whole, by all the other considerations which have been
presented to us.
It is true, and there has been much discussion of the fact, that a certain
amount of clean coal is eliminated as refuse and in the refuse water, by the
washers. The most careful estimate presented to us gives as a maximum an
elimination of clean coal in the refuse and in the refuse water of 2 y2 percent.
This is, however, more than offset by the fact that there is a considerable amount
of water, estimated to average about 4 percent, added to the washed coal in
the washer, and included in the tonnage reported to the State of Alabama.
This weight of water included in the total weight deducted from the tipple
tonnage reduces by that much the washer-waste deduction. We may in addi
tion point out that provision is made in the new agreement negotiated between
the parties for fixing upon the operator all losses of coal in transit, losses
due to the inefficiency of a washer and the losses caused by washing the coal
to a better analysis than the operator’s normal standard.
We recommend, therefore, that in item H of the agreement as to “Prepara
tion of coal” in the attached exhibit A, the operators shall agree to absorb
during the period of the contract up to March 31, 1943, a portion of washer
loss by the payment of 4 cents per ton, in addition to the regular tonnage rate,
to be divided appropriately between the machine men and the loaders. The
proportion to the loaders to apply alike to each bracket.
3. The next item as to which we have to make a recommendation is the matter
of paying to the mine workers in Alabama the $20 vacation payment for the
year 1941, it having already been agreed that they will be paid $20 for the
vacation period in 1942.
Here the position of the mine workers is that, the principle of a vacation
payment having been recognized and accepted as a part of the industry-wide
2-year agreement which is to become effective as of April 1, 1941, and to con
tinue in effect to March 31,1943, there is no ground upon which the mine workers
in Alabama can fairly be asked to forego the payment for the year 1941.
138
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
In reply to this the operators point out that at the time the vacation was
allowed this year (1941) they were operating under a temporary contract with
no vacation provision, and that while their coal has been sold this year at a
high price it has not produced funds to meet this expense, and finally, that
many commercial operators will not have the cash to meet the expense in 1941.
During the proceedings before us, and having particular regard to the last
item of the operator contentions, the mine workers agreed to adjust themselves
so far as possible to that difficulty by agreeing that the vacation payment may
be made half on the last regular pay day in November 1941, and half on the
last pay day immediately preceding Christmas 1941. This concession having
been made, we cannot find in the alleged inability of some of the commercial
operators to find the cash necessary, any reason for denying to all the miners
in the Alabama area this vacation payment for 1941. The operators’ first point,
that they have been operating this year under a temporary contract, applies to
the whole industry; it is nothing peculiar to Alabama. The operators’ second
point, that the prices of coal so far this year have not produced funds to meet
this expense, goes to the economic condition of the industry and its ability to pay
increased wages. We will consider that aspect of the matter more fully in our
discussion of the proposed additional daily wage increase of 40 cents per day.
We recommend as to the vacation payment for 1941 in the item identified as
“Vacations with pay” on page 18 of exhibit A, provision be made for the pay
ment of the sum of $20 to be paid half the regular pay day in November 1941
and half the last pay day immediately preceding Christmas 1941.
4. The next point presented to us for recommendation is whether the miners
in Alabama should get a further increase, above the temporary agreement, of
40 cents per day in the basic daily wage.
On this subject the operators took the position that the temporary wage in
crease had been assumed by them “with grave misgivings as to their ability to
operate under such increase” and that “experience under the present wages has
shown the misgivings to have been well founded.” Evidence was presented, on
behalf of the operators, to show that the commercial mines in Alabama have
been and are in a precarious economic position, a large proportion of the total
number of mining companies being referred to as marginal producers. It was
further said that the markets in which the Alabama operators have been able
to sell their coal in competition with coal from other districts have been shrink
ing, and that in that area of district 13 wherein the Alabama coal meets no
competition with other coal it has been and is meeting increasing competition
with other fuels—oil, natural gas, and electric power. And finally it was
pointed out, on behalf of the operators, that the production per man per day is
lower than in any area with which Alabama coal competes, and that the addition
of $1.40 to the 1940 basic daily wage of $4.50 in Alabama is a greater propor
tional increase than in the competing districts, and that this disproportion is
additionally burdensome because of the relatively low output per man per day
and the accompanying higher cost per ton.
The United Mine Workers took the position that the miners of Alabama should
not be asked to accept a less wage increase than was given to the miners in the
lower Appalachian area, not only for the reason that the miners all belong to
the same union and naturally strive for equalization of wages, but also because
the current rate of wages in Alabama is not a fair living wage. It was pointed
out that past experience shows that a mine worker cannot expect to get work
more than 200 days a year, and is lucky if he gets that many; that 200 days
multiplied by the 1940 daily wage of $4.50 per day is an annual wage of only
$900, and that even the $5.50 rate prevailing under the temporary agreements gives
an annual rate of only $1,100, and even with the proposed increase to a basic
wage of $5.90 the annual wage on the basis of 200 days per year would be only
$1,180. The old wage differential between the $4.50 rate in Alabama and the $5.60
rate that prevailed in the lower Appalachian area was $1.10 per day. The mine
workers do not seek to wipe out that $1.10 difference, but they do insist that it
shall not be increased. They further point out that the 12-cent increase in tonnage
rate which has been agreed to by the Alabama operators is the same tonnage rate
increase that has been applied in the lower Appalachian area, and they urge
that the same treatment should be accorded to the daily-wage increase.
The considerations advanced by the operators with respect to the economic
condition of the commercial mines in Alabama are, of course, of critical im
portance to the Alabama commercial operators, and even to the miners if added
wage increases should in fact lead to the shutting down of Alabama mines.
The economic conditions referred to by the Alabama operators are not, however,
peculiar to the Alabama district. We are, after all, in this discussion consider
139
CASE HISTORIES
ing only a fractional part of a substantial wage increase which has been agreed
to by the whole industry for the period from April 1941 to April 1943. The
basic problems which confront the Alabama operators with respect to competi
tion with other fuels, and the diminishing consumption of coal in the United
States, confront the whole industry. The Mediation Board is not asked to solve
that problem, and no evidence has been submitted to it in that connection.
What we are concerned with here is the relative competitive parity among the
competing districts, particularly with respect to railroad coal for which special
minimum prices are fixed by the Bituminous Coal Division and which amounts
to about 45 percent of the total production of the Alabama commercial mines,
and the commercial coal that enters into direct competition with the coal from
competing areas, which is approximately 10 percent of the total production.
Under the old wage scales the daily wage in Alabama was 80.3 percent of the
daily wage in the lower Appalachian area. With the $1 increase of the tempo
rary agreement in Alabama and the $1.40 increase in the lower Appalachian area,
the Alabama wage is only 78.5 percent of the lower Appalachian wage. It
would require an addition of approximately 12% cents to restore the percentage
relationship to 80.3 percent. But the United Mine Workers urge that it is
customary and desirable, when general wage increases are made, to prefer flat
dollar-and-cent increases to percentage increases, thereby tending to reduce the
un-uniformity of existing wage rates.
In our discussion of the 40-cent increase in the lower Appalachian area, where
like competitive relations were involved, we directed our attention to the com
parison on the basis of the minimum prices fixed by the Bituminous Coal Divi
sion effective October 1, 1941, in relation to the costs of mining in those several
districts during the year 1940, and we further directed our attention to an exami
nation of the actual distribution of production, in the past, from the several
competitive areas. We will make like comparisons here, selecting districts 8
and 9 as the dominant competitive areas with district 13.
The realization of the Alabama commercial mines on the basis of 1937 dis
tribution, the minimum prices effective October 1, 1940, and the reported costs
for the year 1940, compared with the like figures in districts 8 and 9 are as
follows:
District
R .....
13
fl
......................................................................
___
_____
Total costs
1940
Per ton
$1.9082
1.4272
2.3391
Realization
based on mini Amount that
mum price realization is
effective Oct. above cost
1,1940
Per ton
$2.0888
1.5889
2.4635
Per ton
$0.1806
.1617
.1244
Supplementing this comparison, we have figures on the actual net realization
in the Alabama mines under the wage increases which have been put into effect
by the temporary agreement and with the increased prices which have been
made effective in Alabama.
We are now primarily concerned with the possible realization in the years
covered by the contract, that is from April 1, 1941, to March 30, 1943. In the
year 1941 no useful information as to possible net realization is to be derived
from the months of January, February, March, April, and May, although it is
a fact that during those months, because of the strike from April 2 through
May 8, when the new wage scales and the new prices were put into effect, the
operations were conducted at a loss. We have, however, the figures on the net
actual realization of the Alabama commercial mines for the months of June,
July, and August during which the wage increases of the temporary agreement
were effective and the operators have made increases in their prices to consumers.
These figures of actual net realization for those months are as follows:
Months
June___________________________________________
. ....
^
A11prist ...
___ _
July
469872°—42 ------------- 10
Actual realiza Actual costs
tion
Per ton
$2.7267
2.7741
2.8284
Per ton
$2.5912
2.6674
2.7255
Net realiza
tion
Per ton
$0.1355
.1067
.1029
140
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The average net realization for these 3 months was 11.5 cents per ton.
When we turn to the reported figures of distribution, we find that under the
competitive conditions which have existed throughout the years 1337 through 1940,
the competitive position of the Alabama commercial producers in the total national
production has remained practically stationary. This was admitted by the
Alabama operators who said, “During these years the competitive position of
Alabama rail commercial production in the national production picture has
remained practically stationary.”
Further supplementing these comparisons of net realization and of distribution
records, we turn to what seems to us the most important one—the fact the same
daily wage increase applied in Alabama as in the lower Appalachian area would
exaggerate the existing cost differential, thereby tending to upset the competitive
parity as it has heretofore existed.
Figures based upon reports filed with the Bituminous Coal Division gave the
following comparison:
_. . . .
Estimated cost of increasing
the daily wage by $1.40,
together with 12 cents on
tonnage rates and 15 per- Percent that wage incent on yardage and dead crease is to total
work
1940 costs
District:
8________________________$0. 2269
12
13_______________________ . 3440
15
It will be seen from these figures that the $1.40 increase in Alabama would tend
to upset the competitive parity with district 8. There would be the same tend
ency, although perhaps not exactly the same percentage figures, with respect to
the effect in Alabama of the $20 vacation cost, and in addition there would be an
increased cost in Alabama of the absorption of washer loss which we have recom
mended. The total cost of that can be closely estimated. The evidence presented
to us shows that 40 percent of the commercial mines in Alabama are operated
wholly on a day-wage basis and 60 percent of the operators pay tonnage rates
to the miners, but in these mines approximately 50 percent of the total wage cost
is in day wages to others than the miners. Thus, 30 percent of the wage bill of
the Alabama operators is paid to tonnage miners. The increase of 4 cents in the
tonnage rate will add 4 percent to the wages paid the tonnage miners, thus increas
ing the total wage bill on the average of 1.2 percent. In Alabama labor cost per
ton in 1940 was $1.44. The recommended absorption of a portion of the washer
losses will therefore amount to an added cost per ton of approximately 1.728 cents.
Offset against all these unfavorable cost factors, and affording an explanation
of the fact that notwithstanding them the Alabama miners have been able to
operate, is the fact that a ton of coal in Alabama yields a greater return in dollars
than in the competing areas. This is due to several factors, among which are the
local consuming market in the Alabama area, in which there is no competition
with other coal, but only with other forms of fuel, and the suitability of the Ala
bama coal for special uses.
It is the purpose of the Guffey Act to maintain so far as possible existing distri
bution of coal from the several producing areas to the several market areas set up
under that act, and presumably new minimum prices will be established on the
basis of the increased costs in the several districts, perhaps with adjustment of
minimum market prices to maintain so far as possible the existing distribution.
The equalization in this manner of the different cost increases in the different
markets, including the railway fuel markets, by minimum price fixing under the
Guffey Act admittedly presents many difficulties, and while it is fair to assume
that some of the competitive disadvantage imposed on Alabama by the greater
relative increase in the cost of mining per ton will be equalized in time, it is not
possible to say that all of it will be.
Taking into account this uncertainty as to whether any action by the Bituminous
Coal Division under the Guffey Act will be able to fully restore the competitive
parity which would be upset by the additional cost in Alabama of the absorption
of washer loss and the 1941 vacation payment, plus the total increase of 40 cents
in the basic daily wage, it seems to us that the full 40-cent increase should not
be made at the present time.
We therefore recommend that the Alabama daily wage rate be increased, effec
tive as of April 1,1941, above the wages paid under the temporary agreement, by
25 cents per day.
This recommendation, made for the reasons above indicated, carries with
it the suggestion that if experience proves, during the term of the present
CASE HISTORIES
141
contract, that the Alabama miners and operators are jointly able to reduce
the cost of production, or if the Alabama operators are able to effect a greater
realization under new price adjustments than they have been able to realize
in the months of June, July, and August of this year, then the additional
15 cents should be awarded to the Alabama miners.
We, therefore, further recommend—
1. That there be no further liability on the operators for any daily wage
increase beyond the 25 cents per day for any part of the year from April 1,
1941, to March 31, 1942, but if a new cost determination is made by the
Bituminous Coal Division at any time prior to April 1, 1943, and that deter
mination shows a reduction in cost below the estimated total cost of pro
duction, including the added cost of the adjustment which we have here
recommended, then the miners shall be given the benefit of one-half that
reduction in cost up to but not exceeding an additional 15 cents per ton.
For the purpose of this determination we recommend that the estimated
total labor cost per ton for the commercial mines be taken as $2.70. We
arrive at that figure by adding together the following items:
(а) Reported total cost per ton in 1940_______________ $2.3391
(б ) Reported cost of the wage increase under the tem
porary agreement_______________________________ . 2745
(c) Estimated cost of an additional increase of 25 cents
in the daily wage rate________________________ .0434
(d) Estimated cost of the $20 1941 vacation payment_
.0282
(e) The estimated cost of the recommended absorption
of washer waste---------------------------------------------- .01728
Making a total of_______________________________ 2.70180 [sic]
2. A determination shall be made, as soon after April 1, 1942, as possible,
by the. Bituminous Coal Division, of the net realization of the Alabama
operators during the period from June 1, 1941, to March 31, 1942, and if
the net realization so determined exceeds the average realization for June,
July, and August 1941, taking seasonal factors into account, then the basic
daily wage for the period from April 1, 1942, to March 31, 1943, shall be
increased by an amount that reflects one-half of the additional realization,
but not to exceed 15 cents a day.
It is to be understood that the two foregoing recommendations are not to
be retroactive but are to be applied if and when they appear after April 1,
1942, until the daily wage rate has been increased an additional 15 cents
per day, but not beyond that.
We earnestly believe that the modifications of the existing temporary agree
ment which we have here recommended will result in a fair and equitable
contract for the Alabama miners and the Alabama operators alike, and we
recommend that these provisions be incorporated forthwith in a final contract
to be immediately signed, with the recommended wage changes and the im
mediate payment under the retroactive provision of the temporary agreement.
Minority Opinion of Hugh Lyons
October 21
I dissent from the recommendations of the Board upon two points—first,
the washer-loss clause and, second, the increase in the daily wage rates. In
all other respects I concur with the Board’s recommendations.
For many years it has been the practice in Alabama to pay tonnage men
not on the basis of tipple weights, but on the basis of tipple weights less
a deduction for losses in washing coal to remove impurities. Investments
may have been made and the Alabama tonnage rates may have developed
upon the assumption that these washer-loss deductions would be made. Tlie
recommendations quite properly take this into account.
The practice of making washer-loss deductions, however, is contrary to the
fundamental principle that tonnage miners should be paid on the basis of
tipple weights—a principle long^ fought for and now recognized in all other
districts. Any other basis of payment permits the uncertainties and inequities
mentioned in the Board’s recommendations and which arise from forcing
a tonnage miner to bear losses from causes beyond his control.
142
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The conclusion reached on this point seems to me unsound because it tem
porizes with an admitted evil. Tonnage miners in Alabama should be paid
on the basis of tipple weights just as miners in other districts are paid. I
recognize that the sudden elimination of all washer-loss deductions would
cause an overpowering burden upon the Alabama operators which might
seriously endanger the industry. However, a formula for reaching that goal
over a period of time could and should be established now. Such a formula
might well provide for the Alabama operators to assume an increasing pro
portion of the washer losses with each decrease in costs or increase in their
earnings so that after a fair period of time the operators would be bearing
all washer losses and the tonnage miners be paid on the basis of tipple
weights.
As for the daily-wage rate, I hold that the Board should recommend that
the full additional increase of 40 cents a day be granted immediately.
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, the relationships
between the various districts should not be upset. The only reason that has
been advanced is that the Alabama operators cannot fairly be expected to
carry the burden of the added costs. I am not persuaded that any substantial
part of them are unable to do so. The difficulties that the Alabama operators
have labored under in the past 3 years are no worse than in the Appalachian
districts. Moreover, the increased demand for coal holds out a prospect of
increased production and higher prices followed by increased earnings.
I conclude, therefore, that there is no compelling reason to upset the rela
tionships between the districts and that the full increase should now be granted
in Alabama as elsewhere.
CASE No. 21
General Motors Corporation,
Detroit, Mich.
U nited A utomobile W orkers op
A merica, C. I. O.
Certified April 25. Strike May 16-17. Hearing May 1-10, 13, 14. 160,000
workers involved. Closed June 3
Panel: Davis, Swope, Meyer, Brophy, Carey.
Negotiations for a renewal contract having come to a deadlock, the union
on April 10 served the notice required by Michigan law of intention to strike.
On April 20 it postponed the strike deadline and set no future date for a strike.
The union asked for a 10 cents per hour increase and the union shop. The
company had slowly in course of negotiations before the Board raised their offer to
8y2 cents. At that point the Board suggested a possible agreement of 8% cents
and the union shop. The company expressed its unwillingness to accept that
arrangement.
On the evening of May 14, the Board told the parties what it was going to
recommend. It offered voluntary arbitration, which was accepted by the com
pany and rejected by the union. The Board then formally made its recom
mendations at 4:30 a. m., May 15. These were accepted by the union. The
corporation asked 24 hours to accept or reject. At the request of the Board,
the union also postponed its strike deadline 24 hours, until 7 a. m., May 16.
Word of this postponement, however, apparently did not reach some of the
locals at Flint, Mich., in time and they went on strike. At about 12:30 a. m.
May 16 the corporation notified the Board of its acceptance, at which time
the terms were made public. The unauthorized strike at Flint was ended
very quickly. A contract was signed June 3. The recommendations follow:
Recommendations
May 15
Since April 28 the dispute between the General Motors Corporation and the
International Union United Automobile Workers of America, C. I. O., the
lawfully designated bargaining agents for General Motors employees in over 60
of its plants, has been before the National Defense Mediation Board on a cer
tification from the Secretary of Labor that the dispute threatens to burden or
obstruct the production of materials essential to national defense, and that the
Commissioners of Conciliation of tiie Department of Labor have been unable to
CASE HISTORIES
143
adjust it. During this time production has been maintained on an agreement
that any settlement finally arrived at will be retroactive to April 28, 1941.
For 4 years collective bargaining relations between General Motors Cor
poration and the United Automobile Workers of America, C. I. O., have been
in the process of development. In their growth they have passed through many
troubles. The protracted negotiations before the National Defense Mediation
Board have given us the distinct feeling that very real progress has been made
away from the relatively chaotic condition which existed 4 years ago, and in
which these collective bargaining relations were initiated to that stable and
peaceable relationship which emerges when parties have been accustomed to deal
with one another on the basis of equality, and have built up mutual confidence
and respect.
In the negotiations before the Board a number of points were disposed of by
continued collective bargaining. Certain other points, as to which the recom
mendations of the Board are set forth below, could not be agreed upon. As
to each of them the parties were given an opportunity to adopt the process of
voluntary arbitration, if they felt that the whole or any part of the unsettled por
tion of the dispute could be disposed of in that way.
Voluntary arbitration not being acceptable to the parties as to any of these
remaining points, the Board has proceeded, under the Executive order of
March 19, 1941, to make findings and to formulate recommendations for the
settlement of the dispute. The facts as to the background against which the
controversy is projected are substantially stated above. The facts as to the
particular points in controversy are stated in connection with the following
recommendations:
1. A main point of the union’s demands is the so-called “union shop”—that there
be included in the contract a provision that “A condition of employment in the
corporation shall be membership in the United Automobile Workers of America,
C. I. O., after 30 days of employment.” Under the circumstances, and in the
light of the fact that very real progress has been made in the growth of the
union and in its accompanying power to discharge the responsibilties which it
has undertaken in the contract, the Board has not felt prepared to recommend
the adoption by the company of this demand. Modifications, down to the limited
proviso that any employee who has voluntarily joined the union shall, as a con
dition of continued employment, remain a member of the union throughout
the term of the contract, have been suggested and extensively discussed. The
Board is not prepared at this time and under these particular circumstances to
recommend any of these proposals.
2. The second principal point of dispute is the amount of the general wage
increase which the corporation is prepared to give to all its employees. The
union asks for a flat increase of 10 cents per hour. Before the case was certified
the company had offered from 3 cents per hour to 5 cents per hour. During the
negotiations the company increased this offer to 5 cents per hour for all produc
tion and nonproduction employees not classed as skilled, with a proviso that the
skilled classifications would have the minimum raise of 5 cents per hour and a
maximum raise of 10 cents per hour. This offer was made on the basis of the
present 60-day termination clause in the contract. We have made the most
painstaking and extended examination of every point that has been brought
to our attention in this connection.
The position of the union is that General Motors employees are entitled to a
general wage increase comparable to the increase that has been given in the
more closely related of the larger production industries. The company points
out that the hourly wage rates in the automotive industry are already higher
that in these other industries. Investigation shows that such a differential does
exist and that it has exised over the past years. There are, of course, economic
reasons for its existence, including among other things the effect of the seasonal
nature of the automotive industry which tends to reduce the annual earnings of
the workers. The Board has directed its attention to every point of fact or argu
ment brought forward in this connection. The only considerable point that
could be developed was that, to a substantial extent, the automotive business
of General Motors is going to be subject to a percentage restriction after August
1, 1941, with possible further restriction later on. It is possible to estimate
the immediate extent of this reduction in the automobile business of the com
pany ; it is not possible to look very far ahead. There is no doubt that General
Motors, even with the now agreed to percentage reduction is amply able to pay
the increased wages this year. The union, on the other hand, stresses the in
security of the future of the workers in the light of a possible increase in the
144
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
cost of living and the fact that this cutting down of automobile production by
the company will tend to reduce the workers’ opportunity to get overtime, and
thereby accentuate the perennial problem of the industry, arising from its seasonal
nature and reflected in the relatively low annual earnings of the workers. The
present contract may be terminated by either side on 60 days’ notice. This affords
a mechanism for adjustment to wide changes in the economic situation, but at the
same time it introduces uncertainty as to the continuation of the contractual
relation and consequently of defense production.
Taking all these matters into account the Board recommends a flat wage in
crease of 10 cents per hour, and that the contract be made for the definite term
of 1 year from April 28,1941.
The Board is not prepared to recommend at this time either the increase in
night shift premium, or the additional 40 hours vacation pay or any provision
for increase in wages in proportion to further increases in the cost of living, or
the demand for time and one-half for all work on the sixth day of the employee’s
workweek.
3. The existing contract entered into June 24, 1940, has a no-strike clause
and a provision for an impartial umpire empowered to make final decision on
grievances arising under specified sections of the agreement, but without power
to modify any penalty imposed by the management in disciplinary lay-off and
discharge cases. The umpire has only the power in such cases to adjudge the
employee innocent or guilty of the offense charged. It has been learned by
experience and the parties agree, that there should be some enlargement of the
discretion of the umpire in such cases, but the parties have not been able to
agree as to the extent of this enlargement.
The Board recommends that the umpire be given full discretion in cases of
violation of shop rules, and that in cases of violation of the strike, stoppage,
and lock-out section of the agreement the umpire should have no power to
order back pay, but if the penalty imposed by the company is 2 week’s lay-off
or more, the grievance machinery must be expedited so that the umpire’s decision
will come within 2 weeks.
4. It became quite clear during the discussions that the paragraph of the
agreement (par. 8, p. 22) dealing with the consideration that will be given to
seniority in transferring employees has been given by the management a very
restricted interpretation which has led to dispute and dissatisfaction. The umpire
seems at least in one instance to have given the clause a broader interpretation.
The Board recommends that to eliminate this cause of misunderstanding and
friction the paragraph be rewritten as follows:
“8. The transferring of employees is the sole responsibility of the management.
In the advancement of employees to higher-paid jobs, when ability, merit, and
capacity are equal, employees with the longest seniority will be given preference.
“Any claims of personal prejudice or any claims of discrimination for union
activity in connection with transfers may be taken up as grievances. Such
claims must be supported by written evidence at the time the grievance is
filed.”
5. For the purpose of giving some security to temporary employees during the
6-month trial period provided for in the existing contract, the union has asked for
a subseniority list for such employees. The Board is not prepared to recommend
the setting up of such a list at this time but it does recommend that paragraph
1 of the seniority provisions on page 20 of the existing contract be supplemented
by adding thereto the following: “or on the grounds of personal prejudice.”
6. The union has demanded a modification of the present provisions as to how
seniority shall be broken. Under the present agreement a lay-off for 24 consecu
tive months breaks seniority. The union asks to eliminate this provision entirely.
The Board recommends that it be replaced by the following:
“If he is laid off for 24 consecutive months, except that if his seniority exceeds
24 months, he shall not lose seniority until he has been laid off for a period
of time equal to his seniority.”
7. The umpire has requested a better definition of the term “local wage agree
ments” in the contract, and the union has additionally asked for a better defini
tion of the limits within which local negotiations are to be conducted.
The Board recommends that there be added to tlie contract the following
clause:
“It is understood that local wage agreements consist of the present local
wage scale by job classification plus any future negotiated adjustments thereof,
together with any rules regarding the application of such wage scale that are in
effect locally.
CASE HISTORIES
145
“With"respect to any matter that is to be negotiated locally, the company will
fully inform the union as to the limits, if any, set by higher authority upon the
scope of the local negotiations.”
To bring paragraph 19 of the “grievance procedure” on page 18 of the existing
contract into accord with this reconynendation, the words “that may be herein
after executed by the parties” should be deleted from lines 19 and 20 of para
graph 19.
8. Under the heading of “Exceptions to above overtime payments” on page 28
of the existing agreement, the company has taken the position that under
“Working hours,” paragraph 6, page 28 of the agreement, it is entitled to set
up a four group, swing shift system to operate its machines 160 hours a week,
but it has proposed a more specific agreement. The union is unwilling to accept
that plan and takes the position that it prefers to negotiate the plan after a
national policy has been adopted by the Labor Policy Board of the Office of
Production Management, on the ground that this policy will affect industry in
general. The Board is unwilling to attempt to resolve this point*
9. The union has requested that the existing “strikes and stoppages” clause
be modified to include a reciprocal agreement on the part of the company that
it will not lock out its employees. This seems to the Board a reasonable request
and the Board recommends that the heading which appears on page 36, be
changed to “Strikes, stoppages, and lock-outs,” and that the first line of paragraph
2 of this section be rewritten to read: “2. During the life of this agreement,
the company will not lock out its employees and the” and that on page 18 of
the contract, subparagraphs 19, line 17, the words “strikes and stoppages” be
changed to “strikes, stoppages, and lock-outs.”
10. There was prolonged discussion of the wording of subparagraph (b) in
paragraph 21 proposed to be added to the “Grievance procedure.” Subparagraphs
(a), (c), and (d) had been agreed upon and the principle involved in subpara
graph (b) had also been agreed upon. In the end, however, the parties
were unable to agree on the details of fording. To resolve this last point of
dispute the Board recommends the following language:
“(b) In claims arising out of the failure of the corporation to give the employee
work to which he was entitled, the corporation before the next seniority lay-off
and within 6 months, shall give him extra work for a number of hours equal
to the number of hours that he had lost prior to the written filing of his claim,
and this work shall be paid for at the hourly rate he would have received had
he worked, or if paid for at a less rate the company will make up the difference
in cash. By extra work is meant work to which no other employee is entitled
on a seniority basis. Failing to give the employee work within 6 months, the
company will pay the back wages.”
Mineapolis-H oneywell
CASE No. 22
R egulator
U nited E lectrical, R adio and Machine
Co., Minneapolis, Minn
W orkers, L ocal 1145, C. I. O.
Certified April 28. Strike May 22-24. Hearing May 5, 6. 2,000 workers involved.
Closed October 6
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapham, Rieve.
No exclusive bargaining agency had been established and charges of unfair
labor practices had been filed by the union with the N. L. R. B. A threatened
strike was called off at the Board’s request following certification. After the
Board hearing, a 2-day strike occurred, but was promptly called off upon the
Board’s informal intervention. The hearing resulted in the following plan, which
was accepted by the parties.
Recommendation
May 6
In the above entitled matter, a panel of the National Defense Mediation Board
having heard on Monday, May 5, 1941, and on Tuesday, May 6, 1941, representa
tives of Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. and representatives of local 1145
of the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America recommend*
the following five points:
146
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
1. The National Defense Mediation Board will request the National Labor
Relations Board to determine as rapidly as possible case No. 18-C-377 involving
review of the trial examiner’s report dated December 26, 1940. Both parties will
agree to comply with the Board’s determination without seeking further judicial
review.
2. The National Defense Mediation Board will request the National Labor Rela
tions Board immediately to investigate and, if appropriate, hear the charges filed
against the company with the regional director for the eighteenth region of the
National Labor Relations Board on March 7, 1941.
3. The parties will within 60 days of the date of the execution of this agreement
jointly apply to the National Labor Relations Board, pursuant to section 9 of the
National Labor Relations Act, and in accordance with the National Labor Rela
tions Board certification procedure, for an election to be conducted by the Board
(after or simultaneously with the disposition of the matter referred to in par. 2),
to determine what, if any, labor organization has been selected as the collective
bargaining representative by the production employees in the company’s Minne
apolis plant. All parties will cooperate in that election and execute a consent
election agreement substantially in the National Labor Relations Board’s usual
form; by accepting short notice of hearings; by furnishing pay rolls to the
National Labor Relations Board; and by acknowledging the jurisdiction of the
Board under the “commerce clause.” It is understood that if the parties do not
agree, the Board shall fix the exact appropriate unit.
4. Until the results of the election are certified to the company, the company
will, upon request, discuss in good faith any grievances which may arise with
its employees or the labor organization, if any, representing them. It is under
stood that, as here used, the term “grievances” includes individual or group wages
but does not include negotiations for changes in general wages, hours, or general
working conditions. If, when a grievance is presented, the matter is not satis
factorily adjusted, either the company or the labof organization if it presents
the grievance, may request the National Defense Mediation Board to appoint, and
the National Defense Mediation Board shall appoint, a special agent to confer
with the parties to aid in reaching a settlement.
5. It is agreed that there shall be no lock-outs, strikes, slowdowns, boycotts,
or picketing during the proceedings conducted by the National Labor Relations
Board in accordance with the first three paragraphs of this agreement. If the
recommendations of the National Defense Mediation Board’s special agent are
disregarded, parties will retain liberty of action.
On May 23, the Board appointed Prof. Edwin E. Witte, succeeded on June 16
by Prof. Nathan P. Feinsinger, both of the University of Wisconsin, as its special
representative to aid the parties in settling grievances pending the determination
of a bargaining agency by the N. L. R. B. Both complaint and representation
proceedings continued before the N. L. R. B. Many ballots in the election, held
by the N. L. R. B. on September 11 between the C. I. O. and the A. F. L., by now
also in the picture, were challenged, and the result remained undecided in January
1942. Meanwhile, Mr. Feinsinger continued to act in a mediatory capacity and
succeeded in warding off several threatened stoppages of production. (Though
the Board formally closed the case, it was, in substance, transferred to the Na
tional War Labor Board, which at once appointed Mr. Feinsinger as its repre
sentative in the case.)
CASE No. 23
U tica & Mohawk Cotton Mills, I nc.
T extile W orkers U nion of A merica,
Utica, N. Y.
C. I. O.
Certified April 30. Strike April 24-May 19. Hearing May 6, 7, 12, 13. 2,000
workers involved. Closed May 16
Panel: Stocking, Adams, Haywood.
The Utica & Mohawk Cotton Mills had never been under contractual relations
with the union although there had been several attempts at organization in the
past 20 years. In January 1941 the T. W. U. A. began its present organizing
campaign. About the beginning of April, the union requested a conference with
CASE HISTORIES
147
the management to discuss union recognition and a collective bargaining agree
ment. The company replied with a letter saying that it would be glad to deal
with the union members as individuals but that, in the absence of evidence that
the union represented a majority, the company could not recognize the union for
purposes of collective bargaining.
On April 10, the company granted a 7 percent wage increase, and a week later,
an additional 3 percent. Three conferences having resulted in no progress toward
union recognition and a collective bargaining agreement the union went on strike
on April 24.
The Labor Department conciliator and representatives of the O. P. M. entered
the situation immediately and persuaded the company to agree to a consent
election to be held by the National Labor Relations Board, which the T. W. U. A.
won. Two further mediation conferences indicated that a deadlock had been
reached and on April 30 the Secretary of Labor certified the dispute to the Board.
It transpired on May 7 that the company’s representatives did not have author
ity to negotiate a settlement on the basis of any form of union shop. The chair
man of the panel therefore adjourned the hearings and asked the company’s
representatives to secure the necessary authority from the board of directors,
which they did.
The principal problem was as to union security. The company was transport
ing loom-fixers from the South who, it was alleged, preferred their friends in
allocation of work and showed bias against union members. The union demanded
a union maintenance clause. The company agreed to a clause saying it was
the “purpose” of the agreement that members maintain membership and calling
upon the company to “discipline” those who did not. An agreement on all
matters was reached on May 13, ratified May 16, and production was resumed
May 19.
CASE No. 24
B usch -Sulzer B ros. D iesel E ngine Co., I nternational A ssociation of Machin St. Louis, Mo.
ists , D istrict Lodge 9, A. F. L., and
U nited B rotherhood of Carpenters
and J oiners of A merica, A. F. L.
Certified May 2. No strike. 500 workers involved. Closed for want of
jurisdiction May 8
A strike was threatened by each of the unions if members of the other union
were employed in installing machinery on a construction job in St. Louis. The
Board in its next executive session discussed its authority to handle a dispute
primarily between unions and decided to refuse to act.
CASE No. 25
Curtis Manufacturing Co., St. Louis, Steel W orkers Organizing Committee,
Mo.
Local 1128, C. I. O.
Certified May 2. Strike April 7-June 2. Hearing May 26-28. 300 workers
involved. Closed June 1
Panel: Stacy, Connelly, John C. Lewis.
After negotiations for a renewal of a contract broke down, the union struck
on April 7. The issues were wages and union security. At the hearings, a
settlement was reached by mediation providing 3 cents per hour increase, an
increase in the minimum from 45 cents to 47% cents (previously offered by the
company), and confirmation by the company of the employee’s right to join the
union without company interference. On June 1 the employees ratified the
settlement and returned to work the following day.
148
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 26
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., U nited E lectrical, R adio and Machine
Pittsburgh, Pa.
W orkers, L ocal 613, C. I. O.
Certified May 3. No strike. Hearings May 7-9. 1,252 workers involved.
Closed May 9
Panel: Dykstra, Ching, Golden.
Negotiations for a renewal of a contract broke down over wages and union
security and the union voted a strike for May 5. Upon certification the strike
was called off at the Board’s request and a settlement was reached by mediation
at the hearing.
The union demanded a 10-cent hourly wage increase to parallel the similar
increase in steel. The wage issue was disposed of as follows:
1. The union accepted a proposal to call in the bargaining committee not later
than October 25 to discuss the question whether third-quarter earnings would
justify further general increases.
2. The company agreed to consider through grievance procedure all cases in
which a man working on a higher-paid job than his normal classification felt
himself qualified for the higher rate.
3. The company agreed that any general wage increases above the agreedupon current 5-cent increase granted in other company plants would automati
cally apply to the Pittsburgh plant.
The union, having an approximate membership of 95 percent of the employees,
claimed the need of an all-union shop or some device to discipline its member
ship. It was agreed that:
1. The company would make an express statement that only the union may
bargain for the group it represents.
2. No employee or group would be permitted to engage in any activity con
nected with the work of a labor organization except as provided in the union’s
agreement.
3. The union would assist the company in the enforcement of the company’s
disciplinary rules.
This solution was roughly similar to that in the company’s West Allis plant.
See No. 6, Allis-Chalmers.
CASE No. 27
Continental R ubber W orks, Erie, Pa. U nited R ubber W orkers of A merica,
L ocal 61, C. I. O.
Certified May 5. Strike April 2-May 15. Hearings, May 9, 10, July 16, 17.
840 workers involved. Closed September 11
Panel: Graham, Lapham, Payne. Assistant, Leiserson.
The union’s contract expired on March 31. It demanded an increase of 10
cents per hour for all day workers and 10 percent for all piece workers and
a 60 cents per hour minimum. The company offered 5 cents per hour; 5
percent to piece workers. The matters of union shop and vacations with pay
were also in controversy. A number of conferences brought no agreement. The
Board did not ask the union to resume production. On May 10 on the basis
of the Board’s suggestions, the parties arrived at agreement. The agreement
was ratified by the union members on May 13. The contract provided for a
7-cent increase for day workers. It provided no increase for piece workers but
it was agreed that Trundle Co. would make a study of the rate structure. In
the meantime the company agreed to make up the difference if a piece worker
fell below a certain minimum due to causes controllable by management. The
company agreed to train two union representatives to consult on methods of
settling and applying piece rates. On the coming in of the Trundle report a
further hearing was held. Further negotiations were had and a supplementary
agreement entered into and ratified on September 11 relating to guaranteed
piece-work earnings, a time study, and training program.
CASE HISTORIES
149
CASE No. 28
U nited A utomobile W orkers op
B en d ix A viatio n C orporation ,
A merica, L ocal 9, C. I. O.
South Bend, Ind.
Certified May 7. No strike. Hearing May 12-16. 8,100 workers involved.
Closed May 26
Panel: Stacy, Teagle, Rieve.
Negotiations were in progress to revise an agreement dated November 15,
1940, with respect to job promotion, a student program, working conditions, and
wages. The Conciliation Service was able to effect an agreement on all issues
except the wage question.
At the hearings, representatives of both parties agreed to a 7%-cent increase,
but this increase was rejected by the union membership. A strike deadline
was set for May 29. The union officers attempted to have the case reopened.
The panel members, as was not unusual, had signed the agreement. They felt
that by reason of this their action was nearly the equivalent of a recommenda
tion and believed it contrary to good practice to permit the agreement to be
reopened, though Judge Stacy stated that if a strike threatened it was the
duty of the panel to do what it could to settle it. On May 26 a Commissioner of
Conciliation visited the plant and was able to effect ratification of substantially
the original agreement with the addition of a clause which reopened the wage
question if the Bureau of Labor Statistics cost of living index rose above
5 points.
E x -C e l l - 0 C o rpo ratio n
CASE No. 29
, Detroit, Mich.
U
n it e d
A u to m o b ile W o r k e r s of A m e r
ic a , L o c a l 157, C . I . O .
Certified May 8. Strike May 5-16. Hearing May 12-14. 8,500 workers involved.
Closed June 18
Panel: Wyzanski, Ching, Lewis.
The issues in this case were primarily wages and union shop.
When the case was certified, the strikers were asked to return to work but
voted to continue the strike. The union demanded a 10-cent per hour increase.
The company offered 5 cents to all who had not received increases through recent
job classification adjustments. After hearing the Board proposed—
Interim Recommendation
May 14
1. The strike shall be called off forthwith.
2. The company shall reemploy without discrimination all persons employed
on May 5, 1941.
3. The company shall give to every employee an increase of 5 cents an hour above
his rate on April 28, 1941. . This wage increase shall be effective as of April 28,
1941.
4. After the strike is called off and the men have returned to work, the company
and the union shall bargain collectively further with respect to (a) the elimination
of the first three sentences of article I, section 2, of their proposed new contract;
(6) the vacation clause of that proposed new contract; ( c ) the classifications of
that proposed new contract and general wages. Any wage changes shall be retro
active until April 28,1941. If, after 30 days from the date bargaining is resumed,
the parties have not reached an agreement, either of them may request the Na
tional Defense Mediation Board to hold further hearings.
This recommendation resulted in resumption of production, renewal of bargain
ing, and a full contract on June 18.
150
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 30
U nited E ngineering & F oundry Co.,
Steel W orkers Organizing Committee,
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Local 1388, C. I. O.
Certified May 9. Strike May 7-10. Hearing May 14, 16. 900 workers involved.
Closed May 19
Panel: Graham, Connelly, Payne.
Since May 13, 1937, the company and the union had operated under a membersonly contract and an extension thereof dated April 14, 1938. The union on April
16, 1941, formally served notice terminating the contract under a proviso therein,
and demanding inter alia the union shop. Negotiations failed, the existing con
tract expired May 6, and the union struck. Upon receiving the case the Board
requested the men to return to work pending the Board’s consideration of the
dispute, which they did. The Board at the company’s request, informally made a
recommendation on union security. The proposal, providing in substance that the
company insert a provision approving the right of the employees to join the union
and agreeing to discipline antiunion conduct in the plant, was accepted by both
sides. The balance of the contract was bargained out without suggestions by the
Board. On May 16 an agreement was consummated settling all issues, and was
ratified by the union membership on May 19.
CASE No. 31
E mployers N egotiating Committee, I nternational W oodworkers of A merPuget Sound, Wash.
ica , C. I. O.
Certified May 9, Strike May 9-June 16. Hearings May 19-23, June 3-4. 12,000
workers involved. Referred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Dykstra, Lapham, Ching, Golden, Brophy.
This dispute arose out of an attempt to negotiate a general contract for the
Puget Sound area logging and saw-mill operations. The union demanded wage
increases, union shop, vacations with pay, and elimination of busheling (a form
of piece-work compensation).
No agreement was effected and as a result of strike threats the operators
offered a union maintenance clause (similar to that agreed upon in case No. 5,
Weyerhaeuser Timber Co.) conditioned upon the union’s withdrawal of certain of
its demands. However, the parties could not reach an agreement on any of these
proposed bases and the case was certified to the Board May 9, a few hours after a
strike had begun.
The May hearing resulted in a recommendation (signed by Messrs. Dykstra,
Ching, and Golden).
Recommendation
May 23
Fifty-two lumbering operations in the Puget Sound area are involved in this
case and some 12,000 men have been on strike for more than 2 weeks. In
brief, the issues are—the closed shop, a wage increase, vacations with pay,
and the abolition of piece work. The men demand a full union shop, includ
ing “the hiring hall,” a flat wage increase of TV2 cents “for every worker,” a
week’s vacation with pay for all who have been employed for 1 year prior to
January 10 of the current year, and the doing away with piece work in the
industry. The employers have offered in response to these demands:
1. A union maintenance of membership agreement for all employees now
members of I. W. A. and an agreement to recommend membership to all new
employees.
2. A wage increase of 7% cents on the basic wage with certain variations
in the brackets which had a 5-percent increase in wage last fall. Such an
adjustment would amount to 12y2 cents increase for everyone as of last Sep
tember. This is in addition to any individual wage adjustments which have
been made since September 1940.
CASE HISTORIES
151
3. Continuation of piece work with the suggestion that insofar as accident
hazards are concerned, committees of employers and employees shall under
take to study the relation between safety and piece work.
4. One week’s vacation with pay in sawmills for all who have been employed
during the period May 1, 1941, to May 1, 1942, and who have worked 1,400
hours of straight time; a vacation allowance of 2 cents per hour worked for
those in logging camps to be paid at the time or times agreed upon between
the employers and employees.
Several days of negotiation before a panel of the N. D. M. B. have failed to
bring the parties together in an agreement. Meanwhile there are rumors of
new difficulties in the lumber areas of the Pacific Northwest, and one other
logging case has been certified to this Board from the Columbia River area.
The fir industry is of great importance to our national defense and any
stoppage of work will have an effect upon other defense industries within a
few weeks. This appears to be a time when every effort should be made to
unite the forces which operate the industry. Interrelationships between the
various operations are so close, the competitive nature of work so keen, the
division between employing groups so marked, and the disunity among various
elements in the different labor organizations and locals so intense, that nothing
short of an attempt to deal with a whole situation can bring order and
stability into the Douglas Fir Belt lumbering area.
There are so many uncertainties in the various operations, so much division
of testimony as to the facts and such an apparent lack of uniformity in the
conditions of work and pay schedules that only a careful survey of all the
facts by impartial investigators can furnish the basis for a final recommenda
tion from the Board in cases that may come before it from this area.
This Board therefore proposes that it make provision for such an impartial
study by a competent commission immediately. This commission shall be
authorized to report on such matters as the following: (1) Union and man
agement relationships in the Douglas Fir Belt; (2) Wage practices in the
area; (3) The general condition of the industry; (4) The influence of seasonal
and climatic conditions as they affect the industry; (5) The problems of haz
ard; (6) The piece-work practices now in effect; (7) Vacation practices and
policies; (8) The possibilities for the stabilization of the entire industry for
the period of emergency; (9) Other relevant facts and situations which may
be deemed important as the study progresses.
This commission shall be charged with establishing any conclusions which
develop from the study and it shall report to the Mediation Board at the
earliest possible moment. The Board will then be in a position to make posi
tive and intelligent recommendations to the industry in the interest of national
defense.
Pending the finding of facts as indicated above the Board proposes in the
case now before it—
A. That the representatives of the I. W. A. unions accept: (1) The union
maintenance agreement here offered and the proffer of the employers repre
sentatives to recommend union membership to all new employees pending any
further recommendations of the Board; (2) the basic wage increase amount
ing to 7% cents together with the schedule which gives a 12%-cent increase
“across the board” as of last September; (3) the revised vacation suggestion
which reduces the 1,600-hour proposal for the mills to 1,400 hours and the
2-cent suggestion for logging camps; (4) the proposal for a study by joint
committees of the relation of piece work to hazard.
B. That work be resumed pending the findings of the investigating commis
sion and the final recommendation of the Board with the understanding that
any final proposal on wage rates or increases shall be retroactive to the time
of resumption of work and any findings on vacation which affect payments of
any kind shall also be retroactive as of the same time.
If this proposal is accepted by the parties now in dispute, the Board is
hopeful that within a comparatively short time a recommendation from this
Board will be found useful to the whole Fir Belt in establishing a pattern
which will bring stability and unity to an industry of unique importance to
our national defense. The time is here wfcen the maximum of intelligence
and good will must be applied in an industry which has lacked cohesion and
unity and which is perhaps ready just now for a constructive plan of organiza
tion and operation. This undertaking cannot be piecemeal and sporadic in a
time of emergency. It must be as inclusive and comprehensive as joint effort
can make it.
152
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The union rejected the Board’s proposal and voted to continue the strike.
Meanwhile, the President on May 27 proclaimed the existence of an unlimited
national emergency and the Board wired O. M. Orton, international president
of the I. W. A., calling his attention to the appeal of the President in his proclama
tion to all loyal workmen to “merge their lesser differences in the larger effort
to insure the survival of the only kind of Government which recognizes the rights
of labor or of capital.” The Board’s telegram called upon “all the striking em
ployees, as patriotic citizens, to reconsider their decision and to accept the
Board’s recommendation. The Board requests that you bring this telegram to
the personal attention of everyone with power to vote upon the acceptance or
rejection of the Board’s recommendation.” An exchange of telegrams which
followed failed to clarify the situation and on May 31 the Board called Mr.
Orton, in a telegram signed not only by the chairman of the Board but also by
the president of the C. I. O., to a hearing on June 3.
Following the hearing of June 3 and 4, in which not only the Chairman of the
Board but also the president of the C. I. O. urged acceptance of the Board’s
recommendation, Mr. Orton issued a statement in which he accused the Board
of offering a recommendation which was in no way different from that offered
by the employers. “This is a very peculiar situation,” the statement said. “Here
a Government agency takes a proposition from employers as its own; then, by
cajolery, threats, and tricky propaganda, advises the workers to take it or leave
it, saying, ‘If you don’t take it, you’re not patriotic.’ * * * This effort to
deprive us of our bargaining strength destroys every pretense of collective bar
gaining and reveals Mr. Dykstra’s action in this case as an all-out labor-busting
and strike-breaking device.” He announced that the strike would last until
the workers obtained a decent living.
The full Board considered the situation at its regular meeting the following
day. At the end of the session, which lasted until 11: 00 p. m., the Board issued
a formal statement outlining its position. This statement was signed unani
mously by all 19 members of the Board present at the meeting.
Statement
June 5
The National Defense Mediation Board today unanimously approved the
findings and recommendations of the panel of the Board which heard the dispute
between the Employers Negotiating Committee representing 52 employers in the
Puget Sound lumber industry and the International Woodworkers of America,
representing about 12,000 Puget Sound workers.
The recommendations are designed to do three things; First, to secure the
immediate resumption of production upon the basis of an equitable temporary
settlement; second, to institute at once thereafter a study of the entire ques
tion by an impartial commission whose report will furnish the basis for further
negotiations and a permanent settlement; and third, to protect the interest of
the employees during the period of this study by providing that any benefits
granted in the permanent settlement shall be retroactive to the date work is
resumed.
When the employers and the union came before the Board they were in disa
greement principally on four points: Union protection, wages, vacations, and
piece work. On these four points the following were the original views of the
parties and the recommendations made by the panel and endorsed by the full
board.
On union protection, the union wanted a closed shop with a union hiring hall.
The employers at first opposed anything beyond the requirements of the National
Labor Relations Act, but later offered to accept the terms of the Snoqualmie
Falls settlement applying to another group of workers in the same industry in
the Northwest. The Board, taking into account settlements in the same area
recommended that first, every present employee who belongs to the union and
every future employee who joins the union shall, as a condition of employment,
maintain union membership in good standing and, second, the employers shall
recommend that new employees shall join the union within 40 days after being
employed. This is substantially the same provision that has been accepted by
representatives of the parties in the Columbia River Basin case, and that has
been overwhelmingly ratified by the workers in the Snoqualmie case in April
1941.
CASE HISTORIES
153
As to wages* the union asked 7% cents an hour increase for every employee.
The employers were willing to raise wages, but not to the extent that the union
asked. The Board found that in October 1940 the employers had raised wages
4 percent in some classifications and 5 percent in others, and in December 1940
had further raised wages 2% cents per hour per man. The Board recommended
that the wages should be again increased so that every class of workers should
receive 12% cents an hour above the rate prevailing in September 1940. This
brings the wages into line with those agreed upon in the Columbia River Basin
case on June 5,1941.
As to vacations, the union asked for a retroactive vacation-with-pay clause.
The employers were reluctant to grant any vacation with pay in view of the
wage increases. The Board recommended that provision should be made for
vacations with pay to be effective in 1942 and to be included in the contract now
to be negotiated.
The question of piece-rate compensation presented complicated issues which
cannot be briefly summarized and which could not be promptly solved by the
Board. The Board, therefore, recommended that it should at once appoint a
commission to study that problem together with the three other problems as to
which temporary solutions had been recommended and also numerous related
labor and industrial problems in the Douglas Fir Belt. The recommendations of
the commission are to be the basis for a report to the Board and for collective
bargaining between the parties. The final settlement is to be retroactive to the
date work is resumed. When work is resumed the Board will direct the com
mission to report within 60 days.
The recommendations of the Board members who heard the case were sub
mitted at the regular meeting of the Board and were unanimously approved.
The recommendations providing for higher wages and improved working condi
tions were made to bring about immediate resumption of production upon a fair
and equitable basis pending a full investigation of the facts by an impartial
commission. The emergency declared by the President demands that prompt
action be taken. No injustice can result to anyone from the suggested pro
cedure. It is expected that upon a proper understanding of the situation the
workers will accept those impartial recommendations which involve substantial
immediate benefits to them.
At the same time the president of the C. I. O. issued a statement in which he
announced that he had personally recommended acceptance of the Board’s pro
posal to the officers of the I. W. A. and that in refusing them these officers “have
indulged in a campaign of misrepresentation, slander, and abuse, contrary to all
the well-defined policies of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.”
“In a statement released to the newspapers yesterday,” the statement con
tinued, “Mr. Orton, president of the I. W. A. accused the National Defense Media
tion Board, if not directly, then by implication, of being a labor-busting organiza
tion. This is, of course, a most reprehensible, lying defamation for the very
simple reason that the statement implies that Thomas Kennedy, secretary-treas
urer of the United Mine Workers of America, and Philip Murray, president of
the Congress of Industrial Organizations, are engaging in this kind of activity.
“It is the considered, calm judgment, not only of myself but of all other C. I. O.
representatives who are either members or alternate members of the National
Defense Mediation Board, that the interests of the I. W. A. will be better served
by accepting the recommendations of the Board.
“A continuation of the strike, under existing circumstances, is no longer
regarded as being directed against the employers, but rather against the National
Defense Mediation Board.
“The position of the president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations
should not be misunderstood. I want it to be definitely known that I am opposed
to a grant of arbitrary powers to any Government tribunal which would seek to
deprive workers of the right to exercise their economic power for the purpose of
seeking redress of wrongs.
“The president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations is wholeheartedly
in sympathy with all of the legitimate aspirations of all the members of the
I. W. A., and with his associates will strive consistently not only to maintain but
to improve conditions for workers employed in American industry.
“I, therefore, strongly urge the need of meetings to be held at the earliest possi
ble date for the purpose of giving consideration to the recommendations made
by the president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations to return to work.
164
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
“The recommendations of the Board consolidate the gains which the Inter
national Woodworkers of America have already secured. It is a reasonable ex
pectation that the report of the special commission, which the panel has proposed,
will make recommendations for a permanent agreement which will be mutually
satisfactory to everyone.
“I express the confident hope that, in your own best interests and in the spirit
of real unionism, you will accept the recommendations which have been made
to you by the Board.”
Ten days later, June 16, after several of the locals had taken Mr. Murray’s
advice and voted to return to work, Mr. Orton issued a statement announcing
that the delegates from striking locals had voted 30 to 1 to accept the Board’s
recommendation and call off their strike.
On July 22 the Board, pursuant to the terms of its recommendation, appointed
a 3-man commission to study the issues in the dispute and make recommendations
to the Board. After several weeks of investigation the commission, composed
of Dexter Keezer of Reed College, chairman, Wayne Morse of the University of
Oregon, and Paul Eliel of Stanford University, was asked by the unions and
employers to extend its study to include the entire Douglas fir industry in the
States of Washington and Oregon. Since the commission was unable to complete
its study by January 12, the case was referred to the National War Labor
Board.
CASE No. 32
Aix is -Chalmers Manufactuking Co., F akm E quipment W orkers Organizing
La Porte, Ind.
Committee, Local 119, C. I. O.
Certified May 9. Strike May 7-15. Hearing May 16, 17. 1,150 workers
involved. Closed May 20
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapham, Golden (Henry Adams). Assistant, Leiserson.
Disagreement in negotiation for the renewal of a collective agreement led to a
strike. The major points in difference were wages and union security. Though
the Board’s request to resume production was not promptly heeded by the union,
the parties were able to reach an agreement after 2 days before the Board without
any formal recommendation. The settlement was similar to that agreed to in
case No. 26, involving the same company’s Pittsburgh plant. The resulting con
tract was ratified by the union on May 20.
CASE No. 33
S moot Sand & Gravel Corporation,
Washington, D. C.
Sand
and Gravel W orkers’
L ocal 22075, A. F. L.
U nion ,
Certified May 10. Strike May 12-15. 300 workers involved. Closed May 15
Before a hearing could be held, a strike occurred on May 12, primarily over the
issue of wages. On May 15, the parties, without the intervention of the Board,
came to an agreement on the points that were in dispute.
CASE No. 34
Columbia B asin Area L oggers & Saw - Columbia R iver D istrict Council N o.
mill Operators
5, I nternational W oodworkers of
C. I. O.
Certified May 12. No strike. Hearing May 28. 4,000 workers involved. Closed
June 5
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapham, Ching, Golden, Brophy.
While negotiations for the renewal of an agreement were still proceeding, this
case was certified to the Board. It was understood by the parties that negotia
A m erica ,
CASE HISTORIES
155
tions would continue and they were to appear before the Board only In case the
major issues could not be settled directly. These issues were mainly wages, union
security, abolition of piece work, and certain shop practices. All of the issues
were disposed of except union security. As this case was closely allied with No.
31, Employers Negotiating Committee, which was settled by the recommendation
of maintenance of membership, the parties in this dispute informed the Board
that they would accept a similar recommendation, which was thereupon made and
accepted.
Recommendation
June 5
The Secretary of Labor certified this dispute to the National Defense Mediation
Board May 12, 1941. A panel of the Board, consisting of Charles E. Wyzanski,
Jr., representing the public, Roger D. Lapham and Cyrus Ching, representing
employers, and Clinton S. Golden and John Brophy, representing employees,
heard the case beginning May 28,1941.
The parties had operated under a working agreement between them which
expired April 1, 1941. Previous to the hearings in Washington, they had been
engaged in negotiations among themselves and with the cooperation of United
States Commissioner of Conciliation, Charles A. Wheeler, looking toward a new
contract. Much progress had been made. However, there remained unsettled a
number of questions including abolition of piece work, hours of work, board charges
and cook-house hours, wage scales, and union protection.
In accordance with section 2 (a) of Executive Order No. 8716 creating the Na
tional Defense Mediation Board, the panel suggested to the parties that they
should settle between themselves so much of their controversy as they could by
collective bargaining. Both parties carried out this suggestion in a patriotic
and friendly spirit. Within a relatively short time, the representatives of the
parties reported to the panel that they had reached complete agreement on every
point but one of those which had previously separated them. That point was
the degree of so-called “union protection.” On that point they inquired whether
the panel had any recommendations to make in accordance with section 2 (<D
of the Executive order.
The panel then discussed with the parties and considered among themselves
this point and gave particular attention to these among other factors: First,
the commendable attitude shown by the parties in subordinating their own indi
vidual interests to the larger interests of the Nation by continuing production
while negotiating among themselves in good faith; second, the views and offers
of each of the parties as expressed at various stages of the negotiations in the
West and in Washington; third, the provisions of the working agreement which
had expired April 1, 1941, and which in article XIY had included a modified
type of preferential hiring clause; and fourth, the suggestions, findings, and
recommendations of the Board in other cases involving the same type of work
in the same industry and the same area.
On the basis of these considerations, the panel makes the following recom
mendations and findings which the panel has been assured by the representatives
present in Washington they will, consistently with the President’s proclama
tion of May 27, 1941, recommend to their principals for prompt acceptance, rati
fication, and incorporation (together with points upon which they have reached
an agreement by themselves) in a new collective bargaining contract.
The parties shall include in their new contract these three provisions:
1. The employer agrees that any present regular employee who is now a mem
ber of the union recognized as the sole collective bargaining agency or who after
this date becomes a member, or is reinstated as a member of the union shall,
as a condition of continued employment, maintain membership in good standing.
2. The employer approves of its employees who are employed in the classes
of work covered by this contract becoming members of the union which is a party
to this contract. So far as is consistent with law, the employer agrees to recom
mend that all new employees in the classes above described who are found satis
factory to the employer after a probationary period of 40 days’ work join the
union recognized as the sole collective bargaining agency.
3. The employer shall have the right to hire directly at his office or place of
operation. In so doing, he will give first consideration to local unemployed
members of the union, provided they are qualified and readily available. When
satisfactory men cannot be obtained in the above manner, the hiring of othjers
shall not be deemed a breach of this agreement.
469872°— 42--------------11
156
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 35
E. W. Buss Co., Brooklyn, N. Y.
U nited E lectrical, R adio and Machine
W orkers, C. I. O.
Certified May 22. No strike. Hearings May 27, 28, 29, June 19, 20. 1,500
workers involved. Closed June 20
Panel: Graham, Meyer, Rieve.
The union demanded the establishment of classifications and minimum wages.
A strike for May 20 was called but did not take place. The Board requested that
production be continued. After mediation failed the Board appointed George T.
Trundle, Jr., of Cleveland, to investigate and requested the union to continue
production pending his report. At the hearing to consider the investigator’s
report the parties agreed to submit the issues to arbitration. The Board appointed
Paul R. Hays, of New York, as arbitrator. His decision was rendered on
October 2.
CASE No. 36
N orth A merican Aviation, I nc., U nited A utomobile W orkers of A merInglewood, Calif.
ica , L ocal 683, C. I. O.
Certified May 22. Strike June 5-9. Hearing May 27, June 2-4, 17-20, 25-28.
11,300 workers involved. Closed July 1
Panel: June 2-4: Dykstra, Adams, Kennedy.
June 17-20, 25-28; Davis, Swope, Kennedy. Assistant, Kirstein.
Negotiations between the union and the company followed a closely contested
N. L. R. B. election. Although there were several conferences, virtually no agree
ment was reached on any issues and the wage matter seemed particularly difficult.
No panel members were available to hear the case when the parties arrived
in Washington May 27. The Board assigned its executive secretary, Ralph T.
Seward, to help the parties negotiate an agreement which would postpone the
strike threatened for midnight that night. The union negotiators said that they
were empowered to accept only one of two alternatives. Either the company
must agree that day to a 10-cent blanket increase in wages and an increase in the
minimum wage from 50 cents to 75 cents per hour or it must agree to make any
wage increases later negotiated retroactive to April 16. the day that negotiations
were first entered into by the company and the union. The union said the only
alternative to acceptance of either of these demands was a strike that midnight.
About 9 p. m., with the aid of Judge Stacy, who was called in from another case,
Mr. Seward worked out the following agreement:
Memorandum of Agreement
May 27
1. Agreements when and if reached to be retroactive to May 1.
2. No stoppage of work or interference in any way with production will be
permitted during the pendency of this case before the National Defense Mediation
Board and for 3 days after the Board’s recommendations are made.
3. The issue of retroactive benefits is hereby removed from the list of items
to be considered during negotiations, it being understood that this issue has
not been settled finally.
4. Failure in any respect to abide by the terms of paragraph 2 hereof auto
matically invalidates the company’s obligations expressed in paragraph 1 hereof.
5. It is hereby agreed that neither the union nor the company will make any
statement to the press.
After a 45-minute telephone conference with the strike committee in Cali
fornia, the union negotiators succeeded in postponing the strike. While this
telephone conference was in progress, President Roosevelt told the nation by
radio that he was declaring an unlimited national emergency.
Panel hearings opened June 2. After 3 days and in violation of the interim
agreement, a strike was called at 3 a. m. June 5 at the huge aircraft plant. The
CASE HISTORIES
157
negotiating committee at first disclaimed responsibility for the strike, bat later
it appeared that they were instrumental in arranging it. Hearings, of course*
were recessed.
On June 6, the local leadership of the union was informed that neither the
national leadership of the U. A. W. nor the national leadership of the C. I. O.
would authorize the strike under the circumstances. On Saturday, June 7, the
White House announced that if the strike were not ended by Monday, the United
States Army would be ordered to occupy the plant. That night Richard T.
Frankensteen, director of aircraft for the U. A. W., in a Nation-wide broadcast
said in part:
“This is a wildcat strike. * * * The irresponsible, inexperienced, and
impulsive action of local leaders in violation of their own agreement will find
no support from myself or our organization. * * *
“Yesterday I notified the chairman of the National Defense Mediation Board,
Dr. Dykstra, of our official attitude. I told him that the record of the Board
in situations involving our organization had been outstandingly fair. Its actions
had been speedy, just, and decisive. * * * Any imputation to the contrary
by local spokesmen purporting to represent the policy of the C. I. O. is incorrect,
unfair, and only plays into the hands of those forces on the right and left which
are anxious to scrap the democratic methods of negotiation, conciliation, and
mediation and to substitute repressive antilabor legislation. * * *
“Into the inexperienced ears of local union leaders and to a rank and file
whose patience had been strained by the lethargy of the company negotiators,
came propaganda spread by enemies of responsible unions, enemies of the demo
cratic way of negotiation, conciliation, and mediation.
“I am speaking with the full knowledge and complete accord of President
Philip Murray of the C. I. O. and President R. J. Thomas of the U. A. W.C. I. O., when I say that the C. I. O. does not intend to allow the interests of a
majority of the North American workers, or the interests of 5 million members
of the C. I. O., to be endangered by the irresponsible action of a minority group
in the local union * * *.
“To all North American workers, I say this simply and soberly:
“You are on strike without the authorization of your international union or
the 0. I. O. You are out on a strike in violation of a sincere agreement which
your leaders made to exhaust the facilities of the Government’s Defense Medi
ation Board * * *. You have allowed yourselves to be jockeyed and stam
peded into the position of striking against the recommendations of the C. I. O.,
and against an agency of the Federal Government which has given our organi
zation every cooperation and consideration.
“You have allowed yourselves to be put in the position of complicating and
endangering those procedures through which you had every chance of obtaining
your wage demands, which are fair and consistent with the financial condition
of the company and long overdue.
“I may state also that although the overwhelming majority of the North
American workers have approached this economic problem of theirs with a true
perspective of their position as patriotic American workers, the infamous agi
tation and vicious underhanded maneuvering of the Communist Party is ap
parent.”
The following day when Mr. Frankensteen attempted to address a mass meet
ing of North American workers to plead with them to return to work, he was
greeted with such a chorus of boos, hisses, and catcalls that he was unable to
deliver his speech.
At 7 a. m. the following morning, June 9, the company opened its gates, but
not more than a dozen men were able to work their way through the mass picket
line thrown about the plant. Forty minutes later, President Roosevelt issued
an Executive order directing the Army to take possession and operate the plant.
Within an hour after the issuance of the Executive order, troops with fixed
bayonets cleared the entrances to the plant and men started returning to work.
There was no resistance to the troops. The texts of the President’s order and
accompanying press statement are as follows:
Statement of the President
June 9
Continuous production in the Los Angeles plant of North American Aviation,
Inc., is essential to national defense. It is engaged in the production of air
158
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
planes vital to our defense and much of the property in the plant is owned, di
rectly or indirectly, by the United States. Production in this plant has ceased
because of a labor dispute.
Conciliation was resorted to and efforts at conciliation failed. The dispute
was then certified by the Secretary of Labor to the National Defense Mediation
Board.
The course of mediation has now been interrupted in violation of an agree
ment entered into by the bargaining representatives of the workers to continue
production during the course of the mediation. Full stoppage of production has
resulted. This has created a situation seriously detrimental to the defense of
the United States.
Because of this situation, as President and Commander in Chief of the armed
forces of the United States, I have determined that this plant must be reopened
at once. I have therefore directed that the Secretary of War shall immediately
take charge of the plant and remain in charge and operate the plant until normal
production shall be resumed.
Our country is in danger and the men and women who are now making air
planes play an indispensable part in its defense. I call upon the workers to
return to their jobs, with full confidence in the desire and ability of this Admin
istration to protect their persons and their interests. I have an abiding confi
dence in the loyalty and patriotism of the American workers and I am sure
that they will seize this opportunity to cooperate in the national interest. Their
fundamental rights as free citizens will be protected by the Government and
negotiations will be conducted through the process of collective bargaining to
reach a settlement fair and reasonable to the workers and to the company.
The company already has stated that any such settlement will be retroactive
to May 1.
The Army has been directed to afford protection to all workers entering or
leaving the plant, and in their own homes.
Executive Order
June 9
W hereas on the twenty-seventh day of May 1941 a Presidential proclamation
was issued, declaring an unlimited national emergency and calling upon all loyal
citizens in production for defense to give precedence to the needs of the Nation
to the end that a system of government which makes private enterprise possible
may survive; and calling upon all our loyal workmen as well as employers to
merge their lesser differences in the larger effort to insure the survival of the
only kind of government which recognizes the rights of labor or of capital, and
calling upon all loyal citizens to place the Nation’s needs first in mind and in
action to the end that we may mobilize and have ready for instant defensive
use, all of the physical powers, all of the moral strength, and all of the material
resources of the Nation; and
W hereas North American Aviation, Inc., at its Inglewood plant in the City
of Los Angeles, State of California, has contracts with the United States for the
manufacture of military aircraft and other material and articles vital to the
defense of the United States; and the United States owns aircraft in the course
of production, raw material, machinery, and other property situated in the said
company’s plant, and
W hereas a controversy arose at said plant over terms and conditions of
employment between the company and the workers which they have been unable
to adjust by collective bargaining; and whereas the controversy was duly cer
tified to the National Defense Mediation Board, established by the Executive
order of March 19, 1941; and whereas before the negotiations had been con
cluded before the said Board, and in violation of an agreement between the bar
gaining representatives of the company and the workers authorized to appear
before the Board and conduct the negotiations, production at said plant of said
aircraft and other articles and materials vital to the defense of the United
States was interrupted by a strike which still continues, and
W hereas the objectives of said proclamation of May 27, 1941, are jeopard
ized and the ability of the United States to obtain aircraft essential to its
armed forces and to the national defense is seriously impaired by said cessa
tion of production, and
CASE HISTORIES
159
W hereas for the time being and under the circumstances hereinabove set
forth it is essential in order that such operations be assured and safeguarded
that the plant be operated by the United States:
Now, therefore, I, F ranklin D. R oosevelt, pursuant to the powers vested
in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, as President of the
United States of America and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, hereby authorize and direct that the Secretary of War immediately
take possession of and operate the said plant of North American Aviation, Inc.,
through such person or persons as he may designate, to produce the aircraft and
other articles and material called for by its contracts with the United States or
otherwise, and to do all things necessary or incidental thereto. Such necessary
or appropriate adjustments shall be made with respect to existing and future
contracts and with respect to compensation to the company, as further orders
hereafter issued by the Secretary of War shall provide. The Secretary of War
shall employ or authorize the employment of such employees, including a com
petent civilian advisor on industrial relations, as are necessary to carry out the
provisions of this order. And I hereby direct the Secretary of War to take such
measures as may be necessary to protect workers returning to the plant.
Possession and operation hereunder shall be terminated by the President as
soon as he determines that the plant will be privately operated in a manner
consistent with the needs of the national defense.
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
The following day, Lt. Col. Charles E. Branshaw, United States Army Air Corps,
who was put in charge of the plant, wired all employees as follows:
“I invite and request that all employees of the company return to their jobs
at once. I guarantee to them absolute safety and protection while they are on
the job, while they are proceeding to and from work and while they are in their
homes. Report for your regular shift.”
The same day Colonel Branshaw issued the following press release:
“Lt. Col. Charles E. Branshaw said this morning that the policy with regard
to labor relations was stated by President Roosevelt in the following words: ‘The
fundamental rights (of American workers) as free citizens will be protected by
the Government and negotiations will be conducted through the process of collec
tive bargaining to reach a settlement fair and reasonable to the workers and
to the company. The company already has stated that any such settlement will
be retroactive to May 1/
“Colonel Branshaw said further that workers at the North American Aviation
plant can be assured that the action taken yesterday in opening the plant under
Government control in no way impairs their right to bargain collectively. The
action of the Government has a twofold purpose: To prevent interference with
the program of national defense and to safeguard the fundamental rights of
labor. Nothing has been done or will be done to interfere with the right of
labor to bargain collectively or otherwise take lawful action. These rights cannot
be further interfered with by irresponsible individuals. Labor will be fully pro
tected in continuing lawful negotiations through accredited representatives.”
That afternoon, after a majority of the men had returned to their jobs, the local
leaders of the union, who had been suspended by Colonel Branshaw, called a mass
meeting, which voted to return to work. They termed this “a strategic retreat.”
By the next day employment and production were back to normal.
Mr. Frankensteen returned to Washington with a new set of negotiators June
17 as the Board reopened hearings on the case with a different public and em
ployer member on the panel. After 11 days of negotiations, an agreement was
reached on all the issues except union security. The agreement called mainly for
a 10 cents an hour wage increase and a graduated scale for trainees, starting at
60 cents and increasing 5 cents automatically every 4 weeks until 75 cents is
reached. It called for immediate classification of all jobs at the plant, the classi
fication not to increase wages more than an average of 2 cents an hour per
employee. No one’s wage was to be reduced by the classification.
On the union security question the Board made the following—
Recommendation
June 28
Since May 27, 1941, the dispute between North American Aviation, Inc., and
Local No. 683, United Automobile Workers of America, C. I. O., has been before
the National Defense Mediation Board on a certification from the Secretary of
160
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Labor. During this time the parties by collective bargaining have reached an
agreement on all clauses of a proposed contract, to become effective as of May 1,
1941, except as to union security.
After full consideration the Board recommends the acceptance by the parties
of the following provision as to union security:
“The company agrees that any present employee who on May 1, 1941, was a
member of the union or who has become a member of the union since May 1,
1941, shall as a condition of continued employment maintain membership in good
standing; and any employee who hereafter, during the life of this agreement,
becomes a member or is reinstated as a member of the union shall as a condition
of continued employment maintain membership in good standing.”
On July 1 the company accepted the Board’s recommendation, and the same
day the membership of the union also voted acceptance.
(For text of Executive order restoring plant to management, see pt. V.)
CASE No. 37
B ethlehem Steel Co., S hipbuilding
D ivision, San Francisco, Calif.
B ay Cities Metal T rades Council,
A. F. L.
Certified June 2. Strike May 12-June 3. Hearing June 12. 5,000 workers involved.
Closed June 23
Panel: Stocking, Meany, Swope.
Under the leadership of O. P. M., a stabilization agreement was ratified by all
the shipyards on the west coast except three, which were dealing with C. I. O.
unions and Bethlehem Steel. This agreement covered basic wage rates, overtime,
etc. Bethlehem Steel had been invited to participate, but had declined. On
May 2 Local 68 of the machinists union notified the company that its members
would not work at the zone rates. On May 10 they struck and on May 12 set up
pickets. The other craft members refused to cross the picket line. The Metal
Trades Council, having been designated by N. L. R. B. on May 14 as bargaining
agent for Bethlehem employees, began negotiations with the company on the
master agreement on May 20. Agreement was reached on all points except a
closed shop, to which all other signatory shipbuilding companies had agreed. On
June 3, when the council voted to resume work pursuant to the Board’s request,
the machinists union withdrew from the council and continued their strike against
the provisions of the Zone Standards Agreement. When requested by the Presi
dent of the United States to return to work they refused by a vote of 385 to 370.
In their telegram to the President they stated that to comply would be “a sacrifice
of every principle and ideal long cherished by Lodge No. 68 and leave our members
completely at the mercy of the Bethlehem Shipbuilding Co. and any discrimination
they might choose to invoke.”
The certification was restricted to the closed-shop issue, which made mediation
difficult. The union offered to accept as a substitute a preferential hiring clause,
but the company was unwilling to agree to anything which would set a precedent
for its dealings with its employees elsewhere, particularly in its steel plants. The
matter was considered in executive session by the full Board, which recommended
on June 18 that the company accept the closed-shop clause. The machinists still
refused to return to work despite the plea of the president of their international.
The company accepted the recommendations June 23. Shortly thereafter the
strike was called off. The text of the recommendations follows:
Recommendations
June 18
On June 2,1941, the Secretary of Labor certified to this Board that the dispute
between the Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Division, Union Iron Works, San
Francisco, Calif., and the Bay Cities Metal Trades Council, threatened to burden
or obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or materials essential
to national defense and had not been adjusted by the Commissioners of Concilia
tion of the Department of Labor. The Board thereupon invited both parties to
appear at a hearing before a division of its members on June 12, 1941, in Wash
ington, D. C. The hearing was continued through June 13,1941. It having become
clear that the parties could not agree on the issues in dispute, it has become
incumbent upon this Board, pursuant to the terms of the Executive order of
March 19,1941, to make its findings of fact and its recommendations in the matter.
CASE HISTORIES
161
The dispute involved certain provisions of a so-called master agreement which
had been submitted to the Bethlehem Steel Co. by the Bay Cities Metal Trades
Council on behalf of the company’s employees. Under the leadership of repre
sentatives of the Office of Production Management a shipbuilding stabilization
conference had been conducted on the Pacific coast at various dates between Feb
ruary 3 and April 2, 1941. Out of this conference had come an agreement,
approved by the Office of Production Management, the Maritime Commission, and
representatives of the Navy Department, providing for uniform wages and work
ing conditions in shipbuilding operations on the Pacific coast. Specifically it
included provisions for a basic wage rate for skilled mechanics of $1.12 per hour,
for time and one-half for hours worked in excess of 8 in 1 day and 40 in 1 week
and for all work done on Saturdays, and for double time for work performed on
Sundays and holidays. It likewise provided for a 10-percent premium over the
hourly wage rate for employees working on the second shift and a 15-percent
premium for employees working on the third shift. Equally important, it con
tained a prohibition against strikes on the part of the employees and lock-outs on
the part of employers. All disputes arising out of the agreement which could not
be settled by conciliation were to be submitted to arbitration. These provisions
were approved not only by the representatives of the shipbuilders and of labor,
who had participated in the conference, but by representatives of the Office of
Production Management, the Maritime Commission, and the Navy Department
under whose auspices the conference had been conducted.
Subsequent to the negotiation of the above provisions, they were incorporated
into the so-called master agreement in negotiations conducted between the ship
building employers and representatives of the unions whose members were em
ployed in shipbuilding operations. Included in the master agreement, in addi
tion to the zone standards, were provisions covering a closed shop, vacations
with pay, the details of machinery for the arbitration of disputes growing out
of the agreement, and other matters which had not been negotiated at the
stabilization conference.
The Bethlehem Steel Co. was invited to participate in the stabilization confer
ence but did not choose to do so, and, therefore, was not a party to the negotiations
in which the master agreement was worked out.
Subsequent to the negotiation of the master agreement by the shipbuilders
and representatives of labor, it was submitted to the rank and file of the several
craft unions whose representatives had participated in the shipbuilding confer
ences. Although a few locals of the unions voted not to approve the master
agreement, the great majority accepted it, and contracts incorporating the master
agreement were thereafter entered into between the several shipbuilding em
ployers and their respective employees. As of the week ending June 15, 1941,
all shipbuilding employers on the Pacific coast, with the exception of the Bethle
hem Steel Co., had accepted the master agreement, and some 24,000 out of a
total of 30,000 employees of the shipbuilding industry on the west coast were
working under the agreement. The balance of 6,000 employees are those of the
Bethlehem Steel Co.
The failure of the Bethlehem Steel Co. to accept the master agreement is the
basis of the dispute before the Board.
The master agreement is the product of industry-wide collective bargaining on
a regional basis. It has been approved as an instrument for stabilizing working
conditions and contributing to the uninterrupted production of ships by all the
shipbuilding employers on the Pacific coast employing 24,000 workmen, except
the Bethlehem Steel Co., which employs 6,000, and by representatives of the Bay
Cities Metal Trades Council, certified by the National Labor Relations Board as
the bargaining agency for the employees of the Bethlehem Steel Co.
Under these special circumstances, the Board recommends that the master
agreement be accepted and signed by the Bethlehem Steel Co.
CASE No. 38
Aluminum Co. of A merica, Cleve- N ational A ssociation of D ie Casting
land, Ohio
W orkers of A merica, L ocal 55,
C. I. O.
Certified June 4. Strike June 9-11. Hearing June 9-10. 4,500 workers
involved. Closed June 11
Panel: Stacy, Ching, Rieve. Assistant, Kirstein.
In April the N. L. R. B. certified the union as the bargaining agent for the
Cleveland works. Negotiations became deadlocked over wages, grievance ma*
162
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
chinery, vacations, and night-shift bonus. A strike was set for June 4, but
was postponed at the request of the Board. During the hearing the works were
struck. The following day agreement on all points was reached and was em
bodied in a memorandum signed by the parties and initialed by the members of the
panel. The wage demands were for a 75-cent minimum rate per hour and a
4%-cent per hour raise. There had been a raise of 8 cents in April. The settle
ment added 1 cent to the wage of all hourly workers and an additional 3 cents and
5 cents to that of certain night workers.
CASE No. 39
Mablin R ockwell Corporation, Plain-
U nited Automobile W orkers of A mer-
ville, Conn.
ica , L ocal 197, C. I. O.
Certified May 18,1941. Strikes May 27-June 9; August 21-25; September 19-30.
Hearings June 16, 17, 18; September 22, 23. 1,225 workers involved. Closed
September 30
Panel: Graham, Ching, Lyons. Assistant, Gill.
Negotiations for a first collective bargaining contract broke down resulting
in a strike on May 27, 1941. At the request of the Board, work was resumed
pending hearing. The Board proposed these terms of settlement:
Interim Recommendation
June 18
The National Defense Mediation Board, having held sessions for 2 days In
connection with the dispute between the Marlin-Rockwell Corporation, Standard
Division Unit, Plainville, Conn., and the United Automobile Workers of America,
C. I. O., Local No. 197, and having been unable to effect a settlement through
mediation, makes the following recommendations:
1. That all matters in dispute involving money contained in the union’s pro
posal, as submitted to the Board, be referred to a board of arbitration, the findings
of such board to be binding on both parties. The parties to this dispute are to
have 5 days to select the arbitrators or arbitrator. If they are unable to agree,
the National Defense Mediation Board will select the arbitrators or arbitrator.
2. That the other matters in dispute are to be negotiated as promptly as pos
sible between the parties. In the event of disagreement, a report is to be made
to the National Defense Mediation Board.
This recommendation was accepted by the union but partially rejected by the
employer. The Board then appointed Prof. Harry Shulman, of Yale Law School,
as its special representative to investigate and report concerning wage rates.
Upon receiving this report the Board made its second recommendation.
Recommendation
July 24
The Marlin-Rockwell Corporation is engaged in manufacturing steel balls and
bearings for aircraft, automotive, and machine use. It has two plants, one at
Plainville, Conn., known as the Standard Division, and the other, somewhat
smaller, at Jamestown, N. Y. The Plainville plant has a forge shop and a ball
plant which make bearings for both divisions of the corporation. The present
controversy involves only the Plainville plant, which employs now about 1,100
persons of whom about 155 are women. The plant operates two shifts—the
night shift on which only male help is employed, working 60 hours a week, 12
hours a night for 5 nights, and the day shift working 58 hours a week.
The union involved in the controversy is Local 197, United Automobile Workers
of America, C. I. O.
A United Automobile Workers union was first organized in Plainville in 1937.
After an unsuccessful strike for recognition and other demands, the union dis
integrated. The present union began organization in November 1940. In the
latter part of April 1941, a consent election was conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board at Plainville and the union was chosen as representative of the
CASE HISTORIES
163
employees by a vote of about 840 to 46. Early in May, the parties began negotia
tions for a collective agreement. The union presented a proposed contract, the
employer subsequently made a counterproposal of a contract, and the negotia
tions stalled. Mediators from the Connecticut Board of Mediation and Arbitra
tion, the United States Conciliation Service, and the Office of Production
Management were called in and endeavored to procure a settlement but without
success. Several representatives of the C. I. O. also tried, but unsuccessfully.
On May 27, the employees at Plainville went on strike. At the request of the
National Defense Mediation Board, the employees returned to work on June 9.
On June 16,17, and 18, a panel of the Board in Washington heard the parties, and
on June 18 made its recommendation as quoted above.
The union accepted the recommendations of the panel at once. The employer,
after taking a few days for consideration, accepted the recommendations in part
and qualifiedly, which qualification was unacceptable to the union and to the
Board.
Thereupon, the Board appointed Harry Shulman, Sterling Professor of Law,
Yale University, its special representative, “to investigate the matters in dispute,
to report his findings of fact, and make recommendations to the Board with
regard to these issues.”
Professor Shulman has made a thorough investigation and has filed with the
Board his findings of fact and recommendations. On the basis of the evidence
disclosed by the investigation, Professor Shulman made the following recom
mendations :
1. The company should grant an additional increase of 5 cents an hour to its
female employees, retroactive to June 9, 1941.
2. The company should grant a vacation bonus to its employees. If the parties
cannot agree upon the details for the bonus, Professor Shulman recommends:
(a) That the vacation bonus be paid to all employees who, on July 1, 1941, were
in the service of the company for 6 months or more; (ft) that the bonus of each
employee having 1 year or more of service on that day be 40 times his average
hourly earnings, exclusive of overtime extras in the month of June 1941; and
(c) that the bonus of each employee having 6 months or more, but less than
1 year of service on that date, be 20 times his average hourly earnings, exclusive
of overtime extras, in the month of June 1941.
3. No special bonus should be paid for work on Saturdays, that is work on
Saturdays shall be compensated in the same way as work on other week days.
But the union shall be permitted to take up through the grievance machinery
any cases, if such should occur, in which employees are laid off on week days and
asked to work on Saturday in order to avoid overtime payments.
4. Work on Sundays and holidays should be compensated at one and one-half
the regular rates.
5. Good Friday should be recognized as a holiday for the purpose of holiday
compensation as recommended in paragraph 4 above. Armistice Day should not
now be recognized as such a holiday.
6. The company should guarantee at least 2 hours’ work, or 2 hours’ compen
sation, at regular rates, to employees who are called to work, or who report for
work in regular course, without being properly notified that there will be no work
for them on the day in question.
7. The company should pay a minimum of 5 cents an hour bonus to employees
on the night shift. Employees who now receive more than this minimum under
an existing different personal bonus should continue to receive it without reduc
tion.
Professor Shulman also recommends that union representation be permitted
in the first stage of the grievance procedure, that is, the attempt at adjustment
with the proper foreman. This can be accomplished by providing that: (a)
An individual grievance may be taken to the proper foreman by the employee
involved, or if the employee so wishes, by a shop steward or other union repre
sentative performing a similar function, or (b) that an individual grievance
should first be taken to the foreman by the employee himself and if no adjust
ment results, then it may be taken up with the foreman by the shop steward,
or (c) that the grievance be taken up with the foreman by the involved em
ployee himself, or if he so wishes, along with the shop steward.
After considering the record in the case and all the evidence, the Board
concurs in the recommendations numbered 1 to 7, inclusive, made by Professor
Shulman and adopts them as its recommendations. The Board also suggests
to the parties that they consider his recommendation with respect to the
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
different grievance machinery as a guide for their negotiations.
As to the other matters in dispute between the parties, the Board recom
mends that they be the subject of direct negotiations between the parties and
that such negotiations should begin as promptly as possible.
This proposal also was accepted by the union and partially rejected by the
employer, and the employees again struck. The employer thereupon signed
an agreement with the union, embodying some of the recommendations, and
promised to negotiate concerning the others. Work was resumed. During
the negotiations the union made further demands. The Board thereupon called
another hearing. The employees again went on strike and remained out until
a complete collective contract was made at Washington on September 24 and
ratified by the union membership on September 29.
CASE No. 40
B ohn A luminum & B rass Corporation, Detroit, Mich.
U nited Automobile W orkers of
A merica, Local 208, C. I. O.
Certified June 9. Strike June 19-11. Hearing June 16-20. 4,600 workers involved.
Closed June 24
Panel: Wyzanski, Hamilton, Brophy. Assistant, Kirstein.
An agreement existed between the company and the union which dictated wages
until April 1942. The union demanded a wage increase of 10 cents per hour and
struck for it on June 10. The strike was terminated on June 11 at the request
of the Board. Developments at the hearing are set forth in the Board’s subjoined
Findings and Recommendations
June 20
This case was certified to the Board by the Secretary of Labor, June 9, 1941.
Hearings were held June 16,17,18,19, and 20 by a panel of the Board, consisting
of Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., representing the public; Holland J. Hamilton, repre
senting employers; and John Brophy, representing employees.
The parties had executed on December 11,1940, a collective bargaining contract
which does not expire until April 1,1942. That contract incorporates by reference
a wage schedule. Both parties assumed that under ordinary circumstances the
contract bound the company to pay not less than those wage rates and bound the
union to work at those wage rates.
The union, however, asked that the company should, as of June 9, 1941, raise
wages 10 cents an hour for each hourly worker covered by the contract. This
request was based principally upon the ground that the union said the cost of
living in Detroit had risen sharply since December 1940, and upon the ground
that other companies in allied industries had recently given substantial wage
increases, sometimes in cases where they had unexpired labor contracts setting
lower rates.
The company stated that it had a binding contract with this union, that the
practice of other employees in other industries was not relevant, and that the cost
of living had not risen so sharply as the union contended. Supporting this last
statement, the Cost of Living Division of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
United States Department of Labor informed the panel that in Detroit from
December 1940 to May 1941 the cost of living rose according to their indexes
2.5 percent. This figure was higher than shown by other authoritative indexes—
the rise in Detroit from December 1940 to April 1941 was 1.9 percent according to
the Michigan State Department of Labor and was 1.5 percent according to the
National Industrial Conference Board. However, these figures may not take
account of certain changes in purchasing habits and rentals, upon which the union
relied particularly.
However, the company informed the panel that it was not seeking a purely
legalistic vindication of its position. The company stated that it was concerned
with the best possible standards of production and with that end in view the
company was prepared to grant a wage increase on condition that the union
would not oppose the introduction of an incentive system.
CASE HISTORIES
165
The parties then discussed the question of the incentive system. Everyone
agreed that there were injustices in the incentive system as it had operated at
this company at some times in the past. On the other hand, everyone agreed that
the incentive system as it now operated in plant 2 and part of plant 3 worked
fairly and would be approved by employees in those plants if the matter were
voted upon.
At this point, the panel strongly recommended that, in view of the defense
emergency, the incentive system should be tried out, provided that there were fair
guarantees against abuses. The reason the panel took this view was that the
plants of this company are engaged in defense work of the greatest importance.
In this work there is a shortage of plants and a shortage of manpower. These
plants must not be allowed to become a critical bottleneck. The management
and each worker owes it to the country to put forth their best efforts. In return
for this best effort the worker ought to be fairly paid. The company ought not to
derive any undue advantage from this program. To make sure of these prin
ciples* each worker’s participation in the incentive system should be voluntary,
and each worker should receive at least the present rate of pay for the present
standards of work (unless these standards are modified by the union and the
company in accordance with their contract).
After several days’ discussion, the parties finally agreed that the company shall
be free to introduce in one or more plants an incentive system for production
workers on the following understanding:
1. If the company introduces an incentive system in any plant, the company will
guarantee the present rate of pay for the present standards of work, subject to
the provisions of the present contract.
2. The company shall select the time when the system will be introduced in each
plant.
3. The company shall be free by written and oral statements to explain the
system in each plant before it is introduced. In such explanations the company
shall not coerce any employees.
4. The international officers of the union and the negotiating committeemen shall
not discourage the employees from accepting or cooperating in an incentive system.
5. The company in introducing an incentive system shall consult with the stew
ards and the plant bargaining committees and shall discuss with them the proposed
system of compensation.
6. Every employee subject to the incentive system shall get at least as much per
hour as he did before the introduction of the system. If the employees cooperate,
it will be expected that the average weekly earnings of those persons affected by
the system will be materially higher than they were before the system was
introduced.
7. In each plant where the incentive system is introduced there shall be a trial
period of 60 working days (unless the company and the union mutually agree in
a particular case on a different period of time). After that trial period, the
production employees in that plant affected by the system shall have a right to
vote by secret ballot on the continuance of the system as applied to them. The
vote shall be conducted by a National or State agency agreed upon by the parties.
If the parties cannot agree on the agency, the National Defense Mediation Board
shall name the agency. The company and the union agree to abide by the results
of that vote until April 1,1942.
8. During the trial period the individual employee can work under the incentive
system or not, as he chooses.
Following agreement on those eight points, the parties discussed a general wage
increase (in addition to such increased earnings as may be involved on introduction
of the incentive system).
The parties negotiated by collective bargaining a wage increase of 8 cents an
hour for each hourly worker in the plants covered by the Secretary of Labor’s
certification in this case. This wage increase, by agreement of the parties, will
be retroactive to June 9, 1941. Moreover, the union agreed with the company
and the Board that it would not seek to reopen the wage question during the
period of the present contract, which expires April 1,1942. This corresponds with
the recommendations of the Board in case No. 21, General Motors. There it was
agreed that the wage rates should, regardless of changes in living costs, be “for
the definite term of 1 year from April 28,1941.”
On the basis of the foregoing, the panel recommends that the parties supplement
their existing contract by including the wage increase just referred to, the union’s
covenant not to seek further wage increases before April 1,1942, and the incentive
system subject to the 8 conditions set forth, and a no-strike, no-lock-out clause.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The panel understands that the representatives of the parties who appeared
before the Board will use their best efforts to have these recommendations ratified.
The panel further understands that the company will post or distribute to its
employees this statement of the National Defense Mediation Board without change
or explanation.
This proposal was ratified by the respective parties. After a 60-day trial in
two. plants, the employees in these plants, pursuant to condition 7, voted on
permanent adoption of the plan. The balloting was conducted jointly by the
company and the union on October 8 and resulted in rejection. The company
claimed that the union had violated condition 4 during the trial period, but there
was no further action requested of, or taken by, the Board.
CASE No. 41
Curtis s-Wright Corporation (Curtiss Steel W orkers Organizing Committee,
P ropeller D ivision ), Neville Island,
L ocal 2170, C. I. O.
Pa.
Certified June 12. No strike. Hearing June 18-20. 960 workers involved.
Closed June 22
Panel: Stacy, Meyer, Kennedy.
Negotiations for a renewal contract broke down. On certification, the Board
requested the postponement of a strike set for June 12. A contract was negotiated
before the Board and ratified on June 22. The union asked for and received a
10 cents per hour increase. It asked for a 75 cents per hour minimum and re
ceived 72^ cents, except for general labor, which would get 70 cents. A closedshop demand was dropped. The company informally agreed to arrange a meeting
between the union and some 24 employees who had thus far refused to join the
union. The union desired that the contract be open to further negotiation on 10
days’ notice. The company wanted the contract firm for 1 year. On the Board’s
suggestion the union acceded.
CASE No. 42
D uquesnb Light Co. (Colfax P ower U tility W orkers Organizing CommitS tation ), Pittsburgh, Pa.
tee, L ocal 117, C. I. O., and I ndepend
ent A ssociation of E mployees of D u quesne L ight Co. and A ssociated
Companies
Certified June 18. No strike. Hearing June 25, 27. 312 workers involved.
Closed June 27
Panel: Wyzanski, Hamilton, and Lyons. Assistant, Gill.
The facts in the controversy are fully set forth in the Board’s opinion which is
noteworthy because of its citation of precedents.
The Board’s proposal was rejected by the independent union, which refused
to waive its right of litigating a decision of the State labor board. Nevertheless,
the State board held hearings, ordered an election, and certified the C. I. O.,
which won the election, as the exclusive bargaining agent. None of the parties
contested this certification in the courts. The text of the recommendations
follows:
Findings and Recommendations
June 27
1. The Secretary of Labor certified the case to the Board June 18, 1941, and
amended the certification June 26, 1941.
2. The parties are Duquesne Light Co., Utility Workers Organizing Committee,
Local 117 (C. I. O.), and Independent Association of Employees of Duquesne
Light Co. and Associated Companies.
CASE HISTORIES
167
3. The panel designated to hear this case was composed of Charles E. Wyzanski,
Jr., representing the public; Holland J. Hamilton, representing employers; and
Hugh Lyons, representing employees. Since the independent union was not
affiliated with any labor organization from which employee members of panels
have been drawn, the Board at the outset asked the independent union whether
it wished to suggest some additional employee member of the panel; but the
independent representatives expressed themselves as satisfied with the panel.
4. Hearings were held in Washington June 25 and 27.
5. The principal controversy relates to questions of representation of employees.
6. The company is a subsidiary of the Philadelphia company. It operates a
light, heat, and power public utility system which need not be described in detail.
The system includes, among other enterprises, a power plant at Colfax, two power
plants about 15 miles distant located on Brunot Island (these plants being called
the Brunot Island plant and the James H. Reed plant), and clerical, accounting,
and general offices.
7. The number of hourly rated employees in this system is about 3,000.
Of these, about 250 are employed at the Colfax plant, and a somewhat smaller
number at the 2 plants on Brunot Island.
8. During 1937, organizing campaigns in the Colfax plant were conducted by
an unaffiliated labor organization and by the United Electrical and Radio
Workers of America (C. I. O.). Neither of these organizations is a party to
the proceedings before this Board. The company, in 1937, dealt with and
entered into contracts with each of these organizations on behalf of its members.
9. Subsequently, organizational activities were carried on by the independent
association and the U. W. O. C., both of which are parties before this Board.
10. In 1937 two proceedings involving this company were begun before the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board. Without attempting to state those pro
ceedings in detail, it wil be sufficient here to say that the Pennsylvania board
considered and dismissed charges that the independent association was domi
nated by the company in violation of section 6 (b) of the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Act. The Pennsylvania board determined that the appropriate units
for collective bargaining were: (1) All hourly rated or outside employees in the
company’s entire system (including the Colfax station) ; and (2) all monthly
rated or inside employees.
11. After an election, the Pennsylvania board certified, on May 15, 1940, the
independent association as the representative of the company’s employees in
those units.
12. After this certification, the association and the company negotiated a
collective bargaining contract which was executed August 14, 1940. Section 9
of that contract provided in its first paragraph:
“This agreement shall remain in effect for 1 year from the date hereof and
thereafter from year to year until canceled or otherwise terminated, as herein
provided. Either party may cancel the agreement at the expiration of 1 year
from the date hereof, or at the end of any subsequent yearly period, by giving
to the other written notice thereof at least 60 days in advance of such anni
versary date.”
13. The U. W. O. C. continued its organizational activities among the hourly
rated employees in the Colfax plant, and claims that those employees now con
stitute an appropriate unit and that the TJ. W. O. C. represents a majority of
those employees. On June 2, 1941, the U. W. O. C. requested the company
to recognize it as the exclusive bargaining agency for the hourly rated em
ployees at the Colfax station. On the same date, the company replied that in
view of its contract with the independent association it could not grant the
U. W. O. C.’s request. The U. W. O. C. then threatened to strike to enforce
its demand.
14. The U. W. O. C. thereupon requested the Conciliation Service of the
United States Department of Labor to assign to the dispute a Commissioner
of Conciliation. Commissioner Michael J. Crosetto held conferences with the
parties in Pittsburgh. Subsequently the Director of the Conciliation Service.
Hon. John R. Steelman, and some of his staff held further conferences with
the same parties in Washington. The Conciliation Service then made pro
posals dated June 15, 1941.
15. These proposals may be summarized as follows: (1) The parties shall
cooperate in securing a prompt and final determination by the Pennsylvania
State Labor Relations Board of whether the hourly rated employees at the
Colfax plant are an appropriate unit; (2) if the Pennsylvania board determines
it is an appropriate unit and the U. W. O. C. is the representative, then after
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
August 15, 1941, the unit shall not be covered by the August 14, 1940, contract
between the company and the independent; (3) pending the Pennsylvania
board’s determination, employees may present grievances through any repre
sentative; and (4) as an aid to the Pennsylvania board’s ruling there should
be an immediate method of determining the desires of the employees in the
Colfax station.
16. The representatives of all the parties signed (subject to ratification
in the case of the unions) these proposals. They also agreed to recommend
those proposals to their principals. The U. W. O. C. then ratified. However,
the independent did not. The three men who negotiated on their behalf took
the proposal back to a so-called general committee of 42, one of the members
of which was one of the Washington negotiators. That committee unanimously
rejected the proposal. Thereafter, the matter was drawn to the attention of
some, but not all, of the divisions into which the membership of the association
falls. It has not yet been put to a vote of those members who are employed
at the Colfax plant.
17. In the hearings before the panel of the National Defense Mediation Board,
the parties took these positions:
(a) The company acquiesced in the Conciliation Service’s proposals. It, there
fore, was willing to have the Pennsylvania Board determine what was the appro
priate unit; to have an election among the Colfax plant employees prior to the
Pennsylvania board’s ruling on what was the appropriate unit; and to abandon
any right of judicial review. The company saw nothing in its contract with the
independent association which prevented the Pennsylvania board from deter
mining at once, effective August 15, 1941, the unit and certification issues.
(b) The U. W. O. C. also accepted the Conciliation Service’s proposals.
(c) Those who came as negotiators for the independent asserted that the
Pennsylvania board was the proper tribunal for this case; that no one had asked
that Board to act; that the independent would not in advance agree to an election
or to waive any right of judicial review; and that the dispute did not affect
national defense.
18. The panel, in the course of drawing out the views of the negotiators, asked
what authority they possessed. The company executives stated that they had
authority to make an agreement. The U. W. O. C. negotiators said they had au
thority to negotiate subject to ratification by their membership; and that as indi
viduals they would pledge themselves to vote and support in Pittsburgh anything
to which they agreed in Washington. The independent negotiators made, but
subsequently withdrew, such a pledge. They stated that although they could, as
messengers, carry proposals back to the general committee of 42, it was only that
general committee which under their organizational set-up could recommend or
disapprove of ratification. This statement was supported by their recital of what
had happened in the case of the proposals of the Conciliation Service dated June
15, 1941.
19. The panel, in accordance with its procedure in the case of Case No. 23, Utica
& Mohawk Cotton Mills, Inc., and in accordance with the Board’s policy of
requesting parties to send only persons who have authority to negotiate and who
will support at home whatever they agree to before the Board, then by telegram
requested the members of the independent’s general committee of 42 to attend the
hearings of the Board. The committee of 42, through the vice president of the
independent union, replied that it would not attend the hearing because “we will
not agree to the separation of our bargaining unit,” and stating that the Pennsyl
vania board was available to anyone who wanted to raise the question of repre
sentation. This answer, in effect, was a refusal on the part of the committee of
42 to follow the procedure for settling disputes affecting national defense as out
lined in the President’s Executive order creating this Board.
20. The panel concluded that it could not allow its duty under the Executive
order to be frustrated either by the failure of parties to appear or by the parties’
preference for another tribunal, or by the unwillingness of negotiators to give
their personal word of honor that they would vote for and support at home any
thing to which they had agreed in Washington. Accordingly, the panel proceeded
with the case and now makes (pursuant to section 2 (d) of the Executive order
under which it functions) “recommendations * * * in * * * the inter
ests of industrial peace.”
21. Before coming to the recommendations, some procedural determinations
(not strictly findings) should be stated. It was contended by the representatives
of the independent (a) that there was not, as required by the Executive order, a
CASE HISTORIES
169
controversy or dispute “which threatens to burden or obstruct the production or
transportation of equipment or materials essential to national defense,” and (&)
that if there was such a controversy or dispute, the independent was not causing
it and therefore was no party to the case. The panel ruled that under the Execu
tive order the Secretary of Labor was given the duty of determining whether a
controversy or dispute obstructed national defense. The Secretary’s certificate
that a controversy obstructing national defense is involved is conclusive, at least
on the parties. The Board will not, at the request of any party, take evidence on
a question determined in accordance with the President’s direction by a member of
his cabinet. Moreover, the Secretary’s determination of who are the parties is
likewise conclusive upon them. And in this case the amended certificate clearly
names the independent association. Finally, the fact that there is not a strike,
or that the independent has not threatened a strike is clearly irrelevant. Re
peated interpretations of the phrase “labor dispute” as used in labor legislation
(such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the Wagner Act) leave no doubt that
there may be a labor dispute although there is no strike or even threatened strike.
22. All the parties have said, and the panel agrees, that the proper agency
to determine the appropriate unit for collective bargaining in this company is
the Pennsylvania State Labor Relations Board.
23. All the parties have said that they were willing to have the Pennsylvania
board act promptly. Moreover, the Pennsylvania board has informed the Na
tional Defense Mediation Board that it is willing to entertain a case and dis
pose of it promptly upon our Board’s request. This cooperative action is in
general conformity with section 2 (e) of the Executive order which authorizes
this Board to request certain agencies “to expedite as much as possible the
determination of the appropriate unit or appropriate representative of workers.”
24. While the National Defense Mediation Board does not purport to rule
on any question of State law, it is informed by sources in which it has con
fidence {a) that under Pennsylvania law the certificate issued to the independ
ent association will expire August 14, 1941 (and that the automatic renewal
clause does not alter this conclusion); (b) that the Pennsylvania State Labor
Relations Board is free to entertain new representation or certification proceed
ings at once and hold an election prior to August 14, 1941, although the new
certificate, if any, would not go into effect until that date; and (c) that the
Pennsylvania State Labor Relations Board in determining what is an appro
priate unit is free, as a preliminary step, to put to the employees in the Colfax
plant the question whether they want to be a separate unit.
25. The Board believes that it would be in the national interest for all the
parties to agree that they would accept as final, for the next year, the antici
pated determination of the Pennsylvania board as to what the appropriate unit
or units are among this company’s employees and that they would not exercise
their right of judicial review. In recommending this the panel has in mind two
points. First, if the Pennsylvania board determines the Colfax plant is a unit
or that the units are the same as last year, there is no substantial probability
that any court would overturn this administrative conclusion on this particular
type of issue. (In this connection see the opinion of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Go. and Crystal City Glass Work
ers’ Union v. National Labor Relations Board (April 28, 1941) and the unani
mous current of cases in the Circuit Courts of Appeal.) Second, the National
Defense Mediation Board has always attempted to persuade parties to agree
upon some mechanism for swift and final determination of questions which
might otherwise impede national defense. (See, for example, the first point
in the settlement of case No. 22, Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.)
26. In the light of the foregoing, we summarize our recommendations as
follows:
(a) The National Defense Mediation Board will request the Pennsylvania
State Labor Relations Board to entertain and to expedite as much as possible
a proceeding for the determination of whether or not the hourly rated em
ployees (excluding supervisory and clerical employees) at the Colfax plant of
this company constitute an appropriate collective bargaining unit.
(b) The parties shall execute an agreement that they will accept as final for
the ensuing year and without judicial review the determination of the Penn
sylvania State Labor Relations Board.
(c) The parties shall cooperate in any election which may be held by the
Pennsylvania State Labor Relations Board to determine the wishes of em
ployees as to appropriate units or representatives.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 43
Sealed P ower Corporation, Muskegon, I nternational U nion U nited AutoMich.
mobile W orkers of A merica, Local
637, A. F. L.
Certified June 21. Strike July 8-21. Hearings June 30, July 10. 1,163 workers
involved. Closed July 19
Panel: Stacy, Mead, Brown. Assistant, Harbison.
Negotiations for a renewal contract had proceeded for 3 months when on
May 5 the union took a vote to strike on June 9. The strike was postponed
for 2 weeks and again on the request of the Board. The issues were closed
shop and wages. The union presented no particular case for closed shop, but
when the employer member of the panel stated at the hearing that he could
see no objection to a union maintenance clause and the labor member agreed,
the panel felt itself thereby committed to a recommendation of union main
tenance. The original wage-increase demand had totaled about $210,000; before
the Board it was scaled down to $150,000. The company offered $100,000.
The earnings in 1940 had been about $293,000. The Board’s recommendation
totaled about $125,000.
The company announced its willingness to accept the recommendations. The
union officers put it to the membership without urging its acceptance. Ac
ceptance was refused and a strike authorized for July 8, the following morning.
The plant was shut down July 8. The panel reconvened July 10-11 and sent
telegrams urging resumption. On July 11 the panel assistant went to Muskegon
and found new evidence sufficient to warrant rehearing. He then conducted
mediation on the spot. The company made a further offer bringing the wage
to about $145,000, which the union accepted on July 19.
CASE No. 44
W estern Cartridge Co. (E ast A lton
Manufacturing Co.), Alton, 111.
Chemical W orkers U nion , L ocal
22574, A. F. L.
Certified June 24. No strike. Hearings June 28, July 11,12,14, 15. 500 workers
involved. Closed September 29
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapham, Brown. Assistant, Gill.
In this case a threatened strike was called off at the Board’s request. The
facts in the case are fully set forth in the three following recommendations,
dated June 28, July 24, and September 15. All of these were eventually accepted
by the parties, the union membership ratifying the agreement, pursuant to the
Board’s September 15 recommendations, on September 23. The final contract
between the parties was signed on September 29.
Findings and Recommendations
June 28
1. The Secretary of Labor certified this case to the Board June 24, 1941.
2. A panel of the Board composed of Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., representing
the public, Roger D. Lapham, representing employers, and Edward J. Brown,
representing employees, heard this case June 28, 1941.
3. The principal issue raised was whether the Western Cartridge Co. would
now recognize Chemical Workers Union, Local 22574 (A. F. L.), as the exclusive
representative of the hourly paid production and maintenance employees of the
company’s smokeless-powder division at East Alton, 111.
4. The company operates a plant at East Alton where it manufactures smallarms ammunition, explosives, brass, brass specialties, traps, and targets. It
employs a total of about 6,500 employees in the plant as a whole and about 550
in the smokeless-powder division.
5. The company has had individual contracts with employees at various times
Since 1914, and continuously since 1933, and has had so-called basic and working
CASE HISTORIES
171
agreement since 1937 with the Western Cartridge Employees Independent Union
covering production, maintenance, and other employees throughout the com
pany.
6. In January 1941 the Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 22574, began
organisational activities among the employees of the smokeless-powder division
of the company. The Chemical Workers claimed a majority in that division of
the company, and asked for exclusive bargaining rights for the production and
maintenance workers in that division. The company refused to grant such
recognition on the ground that the employees of the smokeless-powder division
do not constitute a proper unit and on the ground of an outstanding contract with
the independent union.
7. March 28, 1941, the Chemical Workers filed with the National Labor
Relations Board a petition asking to be certified as the exclusive representative
of the production and maintenance employees of the smokeless-powder division
of the company. The National Labor Relations Board held hearings. At the
company’s request the National Labor Relations Board subpoenaed officers of
the independent to appear. They did so. In writing they had previously stated
that they did not object to the unit claimed by the Chemical Workers and that
they waived any bargaining rights they might have for the employees in the
smokeless-powder division. The National Labor Relations Board on May 15,
1941, issued a decision ruling that the smokeless-powder division was an appro
priate unit and directing an election therein.
8. May 26, 1941, the National Labor Relations Board conducted an election
in that unit. In that election 527 were eligible to vote, 459 voted, 377 voted
for the Chemical Workers and 82 voted against them. Thereupon the National
Labor Relations Board on June 10, 1941, certified that the Chemical Workers
are the exclusive representatives of the production and maintenance employees
in the company’s smokeless-powder division.
9. June 10 the Chemical Workers asked the company to enter collective bargain
ing negotiations. In reply the company, after repeating that the unit was in
appropriate and that other contracts were obstacles, wrote “that the company
does not recognize Chemical Workers, Local Union No. 22574, affiliated with the
American Federation of Labor, as the representative for the purpose of collective
bargaining under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act of any of
its employees within said proposed bargaining unit.”
10. Commissioners of Conciliation conferred with the parties in Washington
June 23. The company’s lawyers drafted or participated in the drafting of a
proposal to be submitted to their clients which provided for the company recogniz
ing the Chemical Workers as the exclusive representative in the smokeless-powder
division. The union negotiators, duly empowered for that purpose, executed the
draft. The company’s executive officers refused to execute. They stated that
unless the directors and perhaps the stockholders of the company acquiesced they
would not abandon the company’s right to a review in the court of what was the
appropriate unit.
11. In the hearings before the National Defense Mediation Board, it at once
became apparent that the principal issue which was dividing the parties was
whether the company would now recognize the Chemical Workers as the exclu
sive representative in the unit found by the National Labor Relations Board to
be appropriate, or whether the company would insist on proceeding to seek court
review of that determination.
12. That this was the principal issue became undeniable when the panel asked
the vice president of the company whether the company would execute a contract
with the Chemical Workers which had in it only two clauses, the first providing
that wages, hours, and working conditions shall be the same as those now
prevailing under the company’s contract with the independent union, and the
second providing that the Chemical Workers shall be the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees in the unit certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as being appropriate. To this inquiry the company answered
that it would not agree to the second clause.
13. In trying to persuade the company to change its position the panel presented
various considerations. The panel pointed out that the Supreme Court of the
United States in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. and Crystal City Glass Workers’
Union v. National Labor Relations Board, decided April 28, 1941, and the Circuit
Court of Appeals in a uniform series of cases had indicated that a ruling of the
National Labor Relations Board on what is an appropriate unit is virtually conclu
sive unless there has been a lack of procedural due process of law. Hence there
is no substantial probability that an appeal to the courts on this issue would
469872°—-42------------- 1%
172
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
accomplish any purpose except delay. The panel also point out that only yester
day this Board had, in a similar case, recommended that a labor organization
should not seek a judicial review of a determination by a State labor relations
board. (See Case No. 42, Duquesne Light Co. See also the first point in the settle
ment of Case No. 22, Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.)
14. Not having been able to secure any agreement from the parties we are
authorized by the Executive order to make recommendations in this case.
15. In making recommendations it should be clearly understood that our purpose
is not to pass upon the correctness of any decision of the National Labor Relations
Board. It is not our function to determine appropriate units. But it is our duty
under the Executive order to aid in the establishment of industrial peace in
defense industries. In accordance with that duty we recommend that the company
should now bargain in good faith with the Chemical Workers as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the unit certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as appropriate.
Findings and Recommendations
July 24
PRELIMINARY RECITALS
1. This is the same case which was the subject of hearings, findings, and recom
mendations on June 28, 1941.
2. At that previous hearing the Board, acting through the same panel as is
now sitting in this case (that is, Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., representing the public;
Roger D. Lapham, representing employers: and Edward J. Brown, representing
employees) recommended that Western Cartridge Co. should bargain in good
faith with Chemical Workers’ Union, Local No. 22574 (A. F. L.) as the exclusive
representative of the employees in the unit certified by the National Labor Rela
tions Board as appropriate. That unit included “all hourly paid production and
maintenance employees of the smokeless-powder division of the company, including
hourly paid foremen, technical employees, and maintenance clerks, but excluding
superintendents, general foremen, watchmen, and office employees.”
3. The Western Cartridge Co., under date of July 2, wrote the Board a letter in
which it took exception to these recommendations but stated that “If it is neces
sary for the company to bargain separately for this unit, then we are prepared to
explore the possibilities of reorganizing the operations of the company’s plant
and business and of taking the necessary steps to create a separate integrated
economic unit for the so-called smokeless-powder division.”
4. The Board, insisting that its recommendations should be complied with, on
July 3 telegraphed the Western Cartridge Co. that it recommended that its repre
sentatives should meet in East Alton with the union’s representatives July 5;
that if no progress was made, the parties should be free to return before the Board
in Washington and that production should be continued throughout the negotia
tions and proceedings before the Board. The Board also relayed to the union
the Western Cartridge Co.’s proposal to organize a new corporation to carry on
the work of the smokeless-powder division.
5. July 5, the Western Cartridge Co. telegraphed that its representatives would
on that day meet the union representatives. The telegram further stated that
“Negotiations contemplated on our part shall be for and on behalf of contem
plated corporation to be formed representing reorganization of operations of
company’s plant and business comprising a separate integrated economic unit for
the so-called smokeless-powder division.”
6. At about the same time, persons associated with the Western Cartridge Co.
formed a wholly owned subsidiary, East Alton Manufacturing Co. The principal
officers of the two companies are expected to be substantially identical. Western
Cartridge has not yet transferred, but plans to transfer, to East Alton the jobs
which were performed by the hourly paid production employees of the smokelesspowder division except magazine storekeepers and probably junior physicists and
junior chemists. It also plans to have East Alton assume (so far as may be
practically and lawfully done) obligations and contracts affecting production,
sales, and employment in the smokeless-powder division. Furthermore, it plans
to transfer to East Alton the smokeless-powder plant and such other assets as
will enable East Alton in good faith to carry out the obligations it assumes and
incurs.
CASE HISTORIES
173
7. On July 5 the parties met for collective bargaining in East Alton. Some
progress was made. The union, however, regarding as improbable any further
accomplishments through negotiations in Illinois, asked the Board to take the
case back to Washington, in accordance with the Board’s telegram of July 3.
8. July 7, the counsel for the two companies stated to the Board that he was
surprised at the sudden interruption in the Illinois negotiations, as at the con
clusion of the July 5 session all parties had joined in making to the press a
statement of progress and a date had been set for a further hearing. He sug
gested that the Board encourage further negotiations in Illinois.
9. The Board, by telegram dated July 7, urged the parties further to negotiate
in Illinois and if they could not agree, to return to Washington for a hearing
July 11.
10. Further negotiations in Illinois proved fruitless. The companies charge
the union with being responsible by insisting on disposing first of a union-shop
demand made by the union. The union charges the companies with being respon
sible by refusing to bargain in good faith regarding the more critical questions
which divided them, including not only the type of shop, but also wages and the
so-called “individual contracts” later to be discussed. The union also complained
that shortly after the opening of the conference on July 5, the companies were
represented only by a plant superintendent and by lawyers and that John Olin
and Spencer Olin withdrew. In this connection the union pointed out that the
direction of the two companies rested primarily with these two men and their
father, F. W. Olin, who are the principal officers and the principal common stock
holders as well as a majority of the board of directors. As a rejoinder to this
contention, the Messrs. Olin emphasized the extent to which all of them were
engaged in other corporate affairs affecting not only their own but also the
national interest. Moreover, they stressed the fact that they had given broad
powers to those who were engaged in the actual negotiations.
11. The Board reopened hearings in Washington July 11. The three members
of the original panel were present. The union sent its local committee and also
its regional officers who were given by the membership the power to make a final
commitment without the necessity of returning for ratification. The companies
sent a plant superintendent and three lawyers (two of whom were connected with
different private firms, and one of whom was a corporate secretary who in prior
negotiations at the Department of Labor did not have the power to commit the
company). The three Olins informed the panel that these persons were at this
time adequately empowered to act. However, the panel, in line with the discus
sions at recent Board meetings, in accordance with the precedent in case No. 23,
Utica & Mohawk Cotton Mills, and in the light of its own best judgment as to how
a settlement in the instant case could most fairly and rapidly be achieved, re
quested that one or more of the Olins participate in the proceedings and further
requested that in the meantime those who had assembled should continue (in the
absence of the panel but in the presence of the panel’s secretary) to carry on nego
tiations with the hope of narrowing the area of controversy.
12. These requests were honored. The parties negotiated some relatively minor
matters Friday afternoon, July 11, and Saturday, July 12. The three Olins and
a labor relations counsellor arrived on Monday, July 14. Thereupon the panel
reconvened the hearings and extended discussions occurred on that day and the
day following.
13. At the outset of the session of July 11, the union agreed that it would be
prepared to negotiate its labor contract exclusively with East Alton on the under
standings (a) that all the jobs included by the National Labor Relations Board
in its finding of an appropriate unit at Western Cartridge should be transferred
to East Alton, (b) Western Cartridge should furnish East Alton with adequate
assets to fulfill appropriate labor obligations, (c) neither the N. L. R. B. nor
this Board lost such jurisdiction and power as either tribunal might have with
respect to matters in controversy affecting the parties, and (d) East Alton would
recognize the union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the jobs
embraced in the National Labor Relations Board’s certificate. The company
agreed to (b) and (d). The panel informed the union that no steps here taken
could prejudice any jurisdiction and power the National Labor Relations Board
might have, particularly in view of the second sentence of section 10 (a) of the
National Labor Relations Act; and that the National Defense Mediation Board
would not release such jurisdiction as it might have over Western Cartridge but
would merely add to the already included parties the name of the East Alton
Manufacturing Co. As to condition (a), the transfer to East Alton of all hourly
paid production jobs in the smokeless-powder division, more is said below.
174
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOAED
14. At the outset of the July 14 session, the parties agreed that the principal
issues which still divided them were: (a) The individual contracts, (&) the type
of shop (sometimes called the “union security issue”), (c) wage rates, (d) vaca
tions, (e) the extent to which Western Cartridge would be relieved of a duty to
bargain for such employees of the smokeless-powder division as were not trans
ferred to East Alton, and ( f ) seniority. (It should be added that at this stage
there also was some difference of opinion as to whether an employee should be
given a copy of any medical report on his health. That issue, however, was subse
quently negotiated to a mutually satisfactory conclusion and requires no further
statement here.)
15. The session on July 14 brought none of these six issues to a conclusion.
Much time was spent on general discussions of wages and an attempt to inform
the panel of the practices on wages presently prevailing in the smokeless-powder
division.
16. In that division, all of the 550 employees within the coverage of the National
Labor Relations Board’s certificate are hourly paid. That is, there is no bonus,
piece, or incentive system.
17. Most of these employees have been taken on within the last year to meet
the sudden expansion principally consequent upon orders placed with Western
Cartridge by Great Britain. Thus the number on the division’s pay roll has risen
in 1 year from 110 to 550.
18. The minimum rate among these 550 employees is 52 cents an hour. The
average rate is 71.8 cents an hour.
19. These employees fall roughly into three main divisions—330 in production,
125 in laboratories, and 95 in maintenance. Production subdivides itself into
7 classifications, laboratories into 4 classifications, and maintenance into 20
classifications.
20. The4company’s practice as to wages is illustrated in the following rough
break-down of the production division. In this break-down the figures were
derived from the companies’ oral testimony. An accurate, detailed statement
of the wages is set forth in the companies’ exhibit *0,”' but these details are too
complicated to be repeated here. An employee is hired at a learner’s rate, 58 cents
an hour. All learners (of whom there are now about 20 in production) are paid
that rate. It is expected that after about 3 months a learner will step up another
grade, and that in due time, if he has ability and efficiency and if there is an
opening, he may be given a personal increase or upgraded, as the case may be.
The grades and pay scales above learners in the production division are: Truck
drivers’ helpers, 58 to 62 cents an hour; truck drivers (who together with helpers
are about 30 in number), 63 to 75 cents an hour; helpers (about 75 in number),
who are paid 60 to 66 cents an hour; powder operators B (about 75 in number),
69 to 72 cents an hour; powder operators A (about 75 in number), 75 to 79 cents
an hour; and hourly paid foremen (about 12 in number), 83 to 91 cents an hour.
21. After the general exploration of the wage issue, the panel and the parties
on July 14 discussed principally the individual contracts and the type of shop.
After formal adjournment that day, there were further informal discussions
between the parties on these and other subjects.
22. On July 15 the parties appeared as requested at the Board’s offices again.
In the hope of securing greater progress, the panel conferred with each group
separately in the morning. These conferences plainly disclosed that further
collective bargaining would not be successful unless the issue of the individual
contracts were first resolved. In view of this impasse and in view of the impor
tance of continued production at this plant to effectuate the national policy of
supplying Great Britain with the arms and ammunition necessary for its and our
national defense, the panel is of the opinion that this case is appropriate for
findings and recommendations pursuant to section 2 (d) of the Executive order
creating the Board.
A. INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTS
23. Issue.—The first issue on which the panel makes findings and recommenda
tions relates to individual contracts.
24. Faets.—Beginning in 1914 and continuing to date, with the exception of an
intervening period from 1920 to 1923, Western Cartridge Co. has offered each of
its employees, after he has served a probationary period, an individual contract.
The full text of that contract in its present form (exhibit “A”) is attached hereto.
Approximately 5,100 employees of Western Cartridge have executed contracts
of this type. These contracts were executed at different times, but in each case
CASE HISTORIES
175
the contract expires 1 year after execution. Included in these 5,100 are 428,
or all but 2, of the employees here involved for whom this union is the certified
collective bargaining agent.
25. Union's contentions.—The union claims that these individual contracts are
invalid as a matter of law, particularly in view of the National Labor Relations
Act and the decisions thereunder, and in view of the certificate issued by the
National Labor Relations Board. The union points to paragraphs 8, 4, 6, 8, and
9 which it interprets as permitting the company to discharge an employee who
goes out on strike and as permitting the company to withhold a promised 6
percent annual bonus if, during the year, he strikes. The union also places some
reliance on the point that these contracts were not signed voluntarily since
they were presented to employees for signature by the company, and the union
asserts that the mere employment relationship puts the employee in such a posi
tion that on matters of this sort an employee does not act with; complete free
will which the union says the law guarantees him. Some reference is also made
to the fact that some of the terms included in the contract so plainly relate
to general wages, hours, and working conditions as not to be appropriate for
individual negotiation once a collective bargaining representative has been
certified. Furthermore, legal arguments aside, the union asserts that these
individual contracts are in their spirit contrary to and hence subversive of
sound collective bargaining relationships. For these reasons the union seeks to
have this type of contract, so far as it affects employees in the smokeless-powder
division, terminated by Western Cartridge, not assumed by East Alton, and not
hereafter offered by East Alton.
26. Companies' contentions.—The companies* contention is that these indi
vidual contracts are lawful and are conducive to a sound employment policy.
The companies stress the thrift features of the contracts, the interest the em
ployees have in the past shown in these contracts, and the concern of the com
panies in protecting their patents and trade secrets. The companies assert that
the contracts were executed voluntarily, that an employee who does not want
such a contract can (like the two present nonsignatories) decline to execute such
a contract without loss of his job, and that (as Western Cartridge’s contract
with an unaffiliated union shows) these contracts are not repugnant to a col
lective bargain. Western Cartridge also draws to our attention the indirect
impact of any disposition of the 428 contracts in the smokeless-powder division
upon the balance of the approximately 5,100 similar contracts. Both companies
contend that the contracts are not terminable at the will of the employer alone.
In making this contention, East Alton does not assert that it, as distinguished
from the Western Cartridge Co., is now bound by such contracts, and moreover
neither company contends that if it were directed by a governmental agency to
discontinue such contracts it would not be protected by the force majeure clause
in article 9 of the contracts exonerating the company, for “causes beyond the
control of the company.” Both companies also suggest that if the contracts
were unlawful, there are available appropriate judicial processes to test the
matter. It is not clear whether the companies take the position that, despite
the second sentence of section 10 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act, a
judicial tribunal could properly pass on the question in any way except upon
review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board.
27. Proposals advanced during the collective "bargaining process under section
2 (a) of the Executive order.—During the collective bargaining stage of these
proceedings, the panel suggested three alternative solutions for consideration
and bargaining by the parties. Succinctly stated, these were the alternative
proposals: (1) That the question of the legality be referred for final determina
tion by the chairman of the Board or by any neutral qualified person mutually
acceptable; (2) that neither company should take any step to carry out these
individual contracts with any of the employees in the smokeless-powder division
until and unless required so to do by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (3)
that all parties should submit to the National Labor Relations Board the ques
tion of law upon an agreed statement of facts and upon a stipulation for expedi
tious consideration and that pending judicial review, if any, of that Board’s
order, the parties abide by that order. The union was willing to accept any
one of these alternatives. The companies were unwilling to accept any of these
proposals or, during the course of the collective bargaining in Washington, to
suggest any alternative course. On Wednesday, July 23, after these recom
mendations were in draft form, John Olin informed the panel that he had in a
confidential letter to a third party for transmission to the panel indicated three
176
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
possible methods of dealing with individual contracts. The relevant parts of
this letter are quoted in exhibit “C” attached hereto.
28. Recommendations.—Regardless of whether the individual contracts are or
are not valid under the National Labor Relations Act, the panel regards these
contracts in their present form as being inconsistent with a sound collective
bargaining relationship between East Alton Manufacturing Co. and this union.
We, therefore, recommend that East Alton Manufacturing Co. should not assume
or offer to its employees any such individual contracts; that Western Cartridge
Co. or East Alton Manufacturing Co. should repay as of August 1, 1941,
to each employee in the unit represented by this union the amount he personally
has paid to the companies under his contract; that Western Cartridge Co. and
East Alton Manufacturing Co. should take no other steps to enforce the individual
contracts with respect to employees in the unit represented by this union; and
that the union execute on behalf of those it represents, whether members or not,
a release from liability on these individual contracts. This recommendation does
not preclude the East Alton Manufacturing Co. from exacting from each employee
an appropriate personal pledge confined to the nondisclosure of patents and trade
secrets.
B. TYPE OP SHOP
29. Issue.—The second issue on which the panel makes findings and recom
mendations relates to the type of shop, or as it is sometimes called, “union
security.”
30. Union's contentions.—The union seeks a union shop in which every present
employee within the unit, whether or not he is now a member of the union, must
be and remain a member of the union in good standing as a condition of employ
ment, and in which every new employee in the unit must, after a probationary
period of 30 days, become and remain a member of the union in good standing
as a condition of employment. The union agrees that it will take into member
ship every present employee of the smokeless-powder division but it will take
in only such future employees as meet the standards of the union. In support
of its position, the union emphasizes the special facts in this case. The union
asserts that the Western Cartridge Co. and East Alton Manufacturing Co. in their
dealings with the union in Illinois and in Washington and in what the union
claims are the companies* dilatory tactics before this Board have shown an
obvious hostility toward collective bargaining which gives reasonable ground
for fear that unless the union is protected by some type of union security provision
the management will undermine and seek to eliminate it. Among other indicia
of the attitude of the management, the union makes reference to the following:
Western Cartridge’s refusal promptly to honor the National Labor Relations
Board’s certificate or this Board’s recommendations of June 28, 1941; Western
Cartridge’s creation of East Alton as part of what the union fears is a de
vice for checkmating normal growth; the Olins’ refusal to adopt a formula
evolved at the Department of Labor by Western Cartridge’s own lawyers (acting
admittedly only as lawyers, not as corporate officers) ; the withdrawal of the
Olins personally from negotiations in St. Louis, coupled with their delay in
coming to and their promptness in withdrawing from hearings before this Board;
the conferences which supervisory officials of Western Cartridge had with indi
vidual employees in St. Louis to secure their views on individual contracts at
the very time that issue was the subject of collective bargaining negotiations in
Washington before this Board; the grant by Western Cartridge to the unaffiliated
union of a wage increase averaging 5 percent effective July 13, despite the fact
that earlier is the same week both Western Cartridge and East Alton had not
made any offer or concession to the American Federation of Labor union in the
hearings before this Board in this case; and the charges (as yet untried) filed
before the National Labor Relations Board to the effect that Western Cartridge
has violated the National Labor Relations Act by discriminating against union
members.
31. Companies contentions.—Despite Western Cartridge’s earlier position of
going to court to contest the National Labor Relations Board’s certification,
East Alton has now recognized the union as the exclusive representative of the
employees of the company in those classifications which that Board grouped to
gether as an appropriate unit. The companies are not ready to grant voluntarily
a closed shop or a union shop. In their brief, the companies stress their objec
tions to the union’s proposal: (1) “This proposal of the union would mean that
approximately 200 employees in this separate unit, who have up to now refused
to join the union, would be compelled to become members” (Co. Br. 9); (2) There
is an “obvious inappropriateness of such (closed or union shop) restrictions upon
CASE HISTORIES
177
a man’s right to work and an employer’s right to select his employees in the
present emergency, particularly having in mind the occupational responsibility of
the employees by reason of the character of the work” (Co. Br. 10) ; and (3)
in view of the companies’ willingness to recognize individual assignment of wages
for union dues, there is no need for the union “to- fear a loss of the present
membership and hence to insist upon the ‘freezing’ of such membership for the
duration of the contract.” The companies also allege that the union’s demands
in this case and its attitude during negotiations in St. Louis were such as to
indicate that a union shop would not work satisfactorily.
32. Recommendations.—The panel recommends that East Alton Manufactur
ing Co. and the union include in a collective bargaining contract the following
provisions: “The company agrees that any present employee who, on June 24,
1941 (the date this case was certified), was a member of the union or who has
become a member of the union since June 24, 1941, shall, as a condition of con
tinued employment, maintain membership in good standing; and any employee
who hereafter, during the life of this agreement, becomes a member or is rein
stated as a member of the union shall, as a condition of continued employment,
maintain membership in good standing.
In making this recommendation, the panel notes that it in no way impinges
upon the freedom of any individual who has not chosen to join the union. It
does not exercise the type of compulsion specifically adverted to in the com
panies’ brief. It does not restrict the employer in the choice of his employees—
a restriction to which, as noted above, the employer expressed particular oppo
sition. It goes only so far as to preserve the union in the status it has already
achieved and may achieve through voluntary adherence of employees. It pro
tects the union in its capacity to fulfill its contract, and makes certain that
those who authorized the union to act for them will aid their agent in performing
its obligations.
This case seems to us to present strong evidence that some formal assurance
of a stable status of the parties is necessary here. In the hearings before this
Board the companies showed what at best must be described as a complete un
familiarity with the realities of collective bargaining. Either by accident or
by design, the management resorted to practices which undermined the con
fidence of others sitting at the same table with them. If the management’s
tactics were not deliberately dilatory they, at any rate, gave that impression.
If by wage increases to other than those represented before the Board the
management meant merely to carry on in good faith bargaining with the inde
pendent union, the management nonetheless gave the appearance of discrimination.
A workman might reasonably conclude that these companies did not want and
were going to try to eliminate this union’s members. Against this fear, based
upon the recent record, the union members are, we believe, entitled in this case
to be protected. We add that we hope that there are no grounds for the fear
the union has expressed and that the effect of our recommendation will be to
make for better relations by the removal of suspicion.
C. WAGE BATES
33. Issue.—The third issue on which the panel makes findings and recom
mendations relates to wage rates.
34. Facts.—As already noted, the present hourly rates for the smokeless-pow
der division are at a minimum of 52 cents an hour and an average of 71.8 cents
an hour. We are not informed whether this figure of 71.8 cents is calculated on
the basis of the basic rate for a 40-hour week or whether it is increased by
including in the computation overtime hours for which time and one-half is paid.
35. From the brief submitted by the companies, we learn that since January 1,
1941, Western Cartridge has granted “615 separate wage increases affecting a
total of 463 separate employees in the unit” and that these wage increases are
“equivalent to approximately 10 percent (Co. Br. 13). We cannot tell from this
submission whether basic wage rates have been increased. The statement would
be consistent with an entirely different interpretation; for example, that the
learners’ or the helpers’ basic rate has not been increased, but that individuals
have received peresonal increases either by being advanced from one job to another
or by being given an individual merit raise within a particular classification.
36. As previously noted, Western Cartridge as recently as July 13, 1941,
negotiated effective as of the same date, a wage increase averaging 5 percent
for employees outside the smokeless-powder division.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
37. Wage data were submitted by the parties. In addition, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor has given us the following informa
tion as to plants (other than Western Cartridge) which have as their major
product smokeless powder and which report wage data to the Bureau: In April
1941 the five plants then reporting averaged 88.3 cents per hour (including over
time hours) ; in the same month the hourly rate in the lowest-wage plant then
reporting averaged 71.1 cents including overtime hours or approximately 69.7
cents excluding overtime hours, and in the highest-wage plant then reporting
averaged 97.9 cents including overtime hours or approximately 97 cents exclud
ing overtime hours; in June 1941 the four plants then reporting averaged 86.7
cents per hour (including overtime hours); in the same month the hourly rate
in the lowest-wage plant then reporting averaged 74.9 cents including overtime
hours or approximately 69.4 cents excluding overtime hours and in the highestwage plant then reporting averaged 104.5 cents per hour including overtime hours
or approximately 104.4 cents excluding overtime hours. Some of these plants
may be engaged in the manufacture of powder as well as the processing of powder.
38. Union’s contentions.—The union contends that substantial wage-rate in
creases, in some classifications as high as 50 percent, are warranted because of
the earnings and profits of the Western Cartridge Co., the Nation-wide scope
of its business, the hazard of the work, union scales in St. Louis, and the
bonus now available to the Western Cartridge employees under the individual
contracts which the union seeks to have terminated. The union proposes a
minimum of 78 cents an hour (Union Br. 7).
39. Companies9 contentions.—The companies contend that their present wage
scale is satisfactory if “tested first, by the wages being paid generally in the
Alton industrial district, in which they are located; and, second, by wages being
paid in those explosive plants which by reason of geographical location, similarity
of operations and products, and otherwise are most nearly comparable” (Co.
Br. 11).
40. Recommendations.—The panel, upon the basis of the evidence before it and
of its own limited knowledge, cannot intelligently judge what would be fair rates
of wages in the various classifications of the former smokeless-powder division.
From the fact that Western Cartridge has recently given other employees a raise
and from the general data supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the panel
is of the opinion that some wage increase is due. The panel does not suppose
that a wage increase of the magnitude proposed by the union is, however, due
or appropriate. The panel is not prepared to resolve this issue by an arbitrary
proposal of a wage increase of a fixed percentage or a fixed number of cents.
Instead it divides its recommendations into these two parts:
(a) The companies or one of them shall, as of July 13 (the date when Western
Cartridge gave wage increases to other employees), give to employees in jobs
formerly grouped together in the smokeless-powder division, wage increases av
eraging not less than the 5 percent which Western Cartridge gave to its other
employees.
(b) The companies and the union shall submit to arbitration the determination
of whether the companies should give to the employees in those jobs which
formerly constituted the smokeless-powder division any additional wage in
creases. The arbitration shall be by three persons, one named by the companies,
a second by the union, and the third by those two. If the three are not named
within 7 days after these recommendations are issued, i. e., by August 1, 1941,
then this Board shall forthwith name one person to act as arbitrator and he shall
exercise all the arbitral functions. The arbitrators or arbitrator shall have the
power to change general basic wage scales by a fixed percentage or amount and/or
to change particular basic wage scales in the several classifications among the
employees in those jobs which formerly constituted the smokeless-powder division.
These wage changes, if any, shall be retroactive to the date the hearings in this
case closed, i. e., July 15, 1941. These wage changes shall be accepted by both
parties, and, unless the arbitrators or arbitrator for good cause shown otherwise
provide, shall be binding for 1 year. In reaching a determination the arbi
trators or arbitrator shall state findings and reasons as well as conclusions.
D. VACATIONS
41. Issue.—The fourth issue on which the panel makes findings and recom
mendations relates to vacations.
42. Facts.—The companies now give 1 week’s vacation with pay to any em
ployee who has had 1 year of service with the Western Cartridge Co. or its
CASE HISTORIES
179
affiliates. To an employee who has had 10 years of service, the companies give
an additional vacation of 25 percent of 1 week’s pay. After 15 years of service,
the companies give an additional 25 percent of 1 week’s pay; after 20 years an
additional 25 percent, and after 25 years an additional 25 percent of 1 week’s pay
is given.
43. Union's contentions.—The union requests a paid vacation of 1 week after
1 year of service and 2 weeks after 2 years of service.
44. Companies' contentions.—The companies are prepared to revise their
schedule of vacations so that an employee after 1 year of service gets 1 week’s
vacation with pay (just as at present) and that after every 5 years he gets for
that 5 years of service 25 percent of 1 week’s additional vacation with pay.
45. Recommendations.—The panel is of the opinion that the question of
vacations with pay is so closely allied to the question of wages that it, like the
wage question, should go to the arbitrators or arbitrator provided for in para
graph 40 (b) of these findings and recommendations. The arbitrators or arbi
trator shall have the power to determine what vacations with pay shall be given
by the companies on and after July 15, 1941 (the date the hearings in this case
closed), to the employees in the jobs which were formerly grouped together in
the smokeless-powder division of the Western Cartridge Co. The parties shall
be bound by the award of the arbitrators or arbitrator. In making an award,
the arbitrators or arbitrator shall set forth their findings and reasons as well
as their conclusions.
E. JOBS IN THE SMOKELESS-POWDER DIVISION NOT TRANSFERRED TO EAST ALTON
MANUFACTURING CO.
46. Issue.—The fifth issue on which the panel makes findings and recommenda
tions relates to the status for purposes of collective bargaining of those jobs
formerly in the smokeless-powder division of Western Cartridge Co. which were
included by the National Labor Relations Board in the unit of election but
which have not been transferred from Western Cartridge Co. to East Alton
Manufacturing Co.
47. Facts.—Representatives of the companies indicated that they might or
might not transfer from Western Cartridge Co. to East Alton Manufacturing
Co. the jobs known as magazine storekeepers, junior physicists, and junior
chemists, which were within what the National Labor Relations Board has
found to be an appropriate unit for which the union has been certified as the
collective bargaining representative.
48. Union's contentions.—The union contends that if any jobs in the unit
found by the National Labor Relations Board to be appropriate are not trans
ferred from Western Cartridge, then for those employees Western Cartridge is
under duty to bargain with the union.
49. Companies' contentions.—The companies contend that insofar as jobs are
not transferred from Western Cartridge to East Alton, there is no duty on the
part of any company to bargain for them with this union.
50. Recommendations.—Under its recommendations of June 28, 1941, the
panel recommended that Western Cartridge Co. should bargain with the union
for the employees in all the jobs in that unit which were found by the Na
tional Labor Relations Board to be appropriate. Necessarily this recommenda
tion embraced the magazine storekeepers, the junior physicists, and the junior
chemists. Moreover, quite apart from this Board’s earlier recommendations,
it would appear that Western Cartridge Co.’s duty in the premises was clearly
defined by section 8 (5) of the National Labor Relations Act and that it could
not escape the duty to bargain with the union as to those employees who con
tinue in jobs which originally were in the unit found by the National Labor
Relations Board to be appropriate. Accordingly, we recommend that if Western
Cartridge Co. does not transfer the jobs of magazine storekeepers, junior
physicists, and junior chemists to East Alton Manufacturing Co., it should bar
gain collectively respecting them with the union. Furthermore, regardless of
whether the jobs just referred to are or are not transferred from Western
Cartridge to East Alton, all our recommendations (including those relating to
individual contracts, type of shop, wage rates, vacations, and seniority) should
be construed as applicable to those jobs.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
F. SENIORITY
51. Issue.—The' sixth issue on which the panel makes findings and recom
mendations relates to seniority.
52. Facts.—At the conclusion of the hearings before the panel on July 15,
1941, the parties agreed to negotiate the question of seniority in the presence
of the secretary to the panel, Mr. Gill. A seniority clause, a copy of which
is annexed hereto lettered “B” was drafted and agreed to by Mr. Schotters, plant
superintendent of the companies (the only representative of the companies
present), and by the union committee, in the presence of Mr. Gill.
53. Union's contentions.—The union is willing to take the seniority clause
negotiated on July 15,1941.
54. Companies' contentions.—The companies apparently take the position that
the seniority clause attached hereto “might furnish a basis for working out of
a final agreement on this question” (Co. Br. 15). This statement seems to be
the equivalent of a repudiation of the negotiations hitherto conducted.
55. Recommendations.—The panel is of the opinion that the seniority clause
as embodied in the annexed exhibit “B” furnishes a satisfactory working ar
rangement and should be incorporated in a collective bargaining contract between
the parties.
The Board requests each party to notify the Board of its acceptance of these
recommendations not later than July 28,1941.
Concurring Opinion of Roger D. Lapham
I concur in all the recommendations of the panel. The reasons for the recom
mendation on type of shop or “union security” (par. 32) I find no fault with
per se.
But, I believe unless parties voluntarily agree to such a clause the Board
ought ordinarily not to recommend it. It touches upon what is perhaps the most
delicate problem in the whole field of management-union relations. If a general
policy is to be adopted on that problem Congress is, in my opinion, the proper
organ of government to adopt the policy.
However, in view of the action the Board has taken today in the Federal
Shipbuilding Corporation case, I see no reason as a member of this panel to
bring this case to the Board.
E x h ib it A
EXTENSION AGREEMENT
This agreement, made this -------- day of ----------, 19—, by and between the
Western Cartridge Co., a corporation organized under the laws of the State of
Delaware, as party of the first part and hereinafter called “company,” and
-------- o f -------- , party of the second part and hereinafter called “employee”
Witnesseth
That for and in consideration of the mutual covenants herein contained it is
hereby agreed :
1. That for a period of 1 year, beginning-------- , the company agrees to engage
the services of the employee at such time and for such periods as in the dis
cretion of the company its business may require and it is understood that the
company shall have the right at any time during the period of this contract to
reduce the number of employees by lay-offs and that if employee is so laid off
he shall not be entitled to any wages during the period of any such lay-off.
The company agrees to pay the employee the prevailing rate for the class or
classes of work that the employee shall perform from time to time during the
period of this contract. As a declaration of policy both parties hereto recognize
the necessity for modifying wage rates to meet changes in economic and competi
tive conditions.
2. Employer agrees to pay one and one-half the regular wages to employee
for overtime work.
3. That the employee in accepting said employment, represents himself to be
in good physical condition, and agrees to devote his entire time and his best
energies during working hours to the business of the company; to well and
faithfully perform the duties delegated to him by the company, its superintend
ents, or foremen; to abide by the rules of the company; to lend the utmost
CASE HISTORIES
181
cooperation to the company, its superintendents, or foremen, to the end that his
efficiency and productiveness may be increased and the manufacturing cost of
any work or article, upon which he may be engaged, decreased; and in all
reasonable ways to advance the welfare and protect the interests of the
company.
4. That should any of the representations herein made by the employee prove
to be untrue, or should the employee fail during working hours to devote hie
entire time and best energies to the interests of the company, or fail to cooperate
with or carry out the rules and the instructions of the company, its super
intendents, and foremen, or should his efficiency become impaired, or should
he refuse to perform his duties as provided herein, this contract shall become
null and void, and such employee shall be subject to immediate suspension or
dismissal at the option of the company.
5. That inventions and discoveries relating to the manufacture of ammunition,
or any products made by this company, or any appliances connected therewith,
or applicable thereto, developed mentally or by research or experimental work
carried on in whole or in part with material or apparatus, or at the expense of
the company, resulting from the efforts of the employee during the term of his
employment by the company, shall be the property of the company, and upon
its request and at its expense, the employee shall make full disclosure thereof,
shall sign, acknowledge, and verify all petitions, specifications, claims, powers
of attorney, and other papers proper, convenient, or necessary for the making
of application for letters patent and the prosecution of said application, and
will assign such inventions and discoveries and letters patent to be issued
thereon to the company: Provided, however, That nothing in the foregoing shall
be construed to prevent the company from compensating or rewarding the em
ployee in any manner as may seem fit and proper to the company for such
inventions or discoveries.
Any inventions and discoveries made by employee which are not covered
by the foregoing paragraph shall be offered by employee to the company and
the company shall have a reasonable time in which to investigate such inven
tion and discoveries and to negotiate with employee for the purchase of same
before employee discloses or offers said inventions or discoveries to others.
The company declares and employee acknowledges that by action of the board
of directors the business of the company has been declared a secret business
and employee agrees not to disclose to others, not a party hereto, any of the
trade secrets, detail of process of manufacture or equipment, or other informa
tion concerning or related to the company’s business.
6. Both parties hereto agree that on account of the experience necessary to
satisfactorily produce the products of manufacture of the company and to insure
the maintenance of a high standard of quality of such products a minimum labor
turn-over is desirable and therefore, in consideration of the compliance by the
employee with the covenants upon his part above set out, the company agrees
to pay the employee, in addition to the total earnings paid to him as provided
in paragraphs 1 and 2 the following bonus, it being expressly understood that
such bonus is to be paid only in the event employee faithfully fulfills all his
obligations under this agreement.
(a) Two and one-half percent of the total earnings paid the employee under
paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be paid the employee within 3 weeks after the com
pletion of this contract: Provided, however, And it is hereby understood and
expressly agreed, that upon the violation by the employee of any of the cove
nants upon his part herein contained the bonus specified in this paragraph shall
be forfeited forthwith.
(&) In lieu of the aforementioned 2 V2 percent the company agrees to permit
the employee to sign an order authorizing the pay-roll department of the com
pany to deduct from the earnings paid the employee under paragraphs 1 and 2,
a sum up to 4 percent in even multiples of one-half percent of such earnings,
which will be deposited with the company, and upon which the company will
pay interest at the rate of 6 percent per year, and the company will match
the amount so deducted and deposited plus an additional 2 percent of such
earnings, which together with the employee’s contribution outlined herein shall
be paid the employee within 3 weeks after the completion of this contract:
Provided, hoivever, And it is hereby understood and expressly agreed that
upon the violation by the employee of any of the covenants upon his part herein
contained all of that amount to be contributed by the company and specified in
this paragraph shall be forfeited forthwith and only the money contributed by
the employee shall be returned to the employee.
182
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
7. That employee agrees to accept and be guided by and conform to the
instructions issued or given by authority of the board of directors or executive
committee or the executive officers of the company, acting through or by its
various managers, superintendents, or foremen.
8. It is understood and expressly agreed that in the event the employee fails
to continue in the employ of the company for the entire period of this contract,
that the company shall not be obligated to the payment of any bonus under
paragraph 6 hereof, and shall pay to the employee only the amount deducted
from said employee’s wages under paragraph 6 (b) hereof.
9. That in the event of the nonoperation, or the material curtailment of the
operations of the plant of the company due to fire, flood, strikes, business de
pression, changing economic conditions, acts of God, or other causes beyond
the control of the company, this contract may be terminated by the company:
Provided, however, That in the event of the termination of this contract by the
company as outlined in this paragraph for any reason not due to the fault of
the employee, the bonus and deductions, if any, as provided in paragraph 6
shall become due and payable within 3 weeks after such termination.
10. If employee is laid off, and if such lay-off shall continue for 6 consecutive
weeks or more, the employee may terminate this contract, and in that event the
company shall, within 8 weeks after such termination by the employee, pay
over to employee the bonus and deductions, if any, as provided in paragraph 6.
11. It is mutually agreed that this agreement is an extension of an agreement
entered into by the employee and the company o n -------- , 19—, and it is further
agreed that the employee shall have the right to withdraw all or part of the
accumulated fund due him or, so long as employee is employed on an hourly
rate, leave on deposit with the company with interest at the rate of 6 percent per
annum all or any part of the accumulated fund due him o n --------, 19—, which
is the expiration date of the previous agreement.
12. That this contract may with the agreement and consent of both parties
hereto, be amended, renewed, or replaced by a different contract, mutually
satisfactory to both employee and company, at any time during the period
thereof.
In witness whereof, the company has caused its corporate name to be here
unto subscribed and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed by its authorized
officers, and the employee has hereunto subscribed his name as of the day and
year first above written.
W estern Cartridge Co.,
B y -------------------, Secretary.
-------- , -------- , Employee.
E xhibit B
agreed
In eases of promotions, transfers, and lay-offs, where the factors of (a) ability
to do the Job in question, (b) attitude toward safety, and ( c ) skill, are approxi
mately equal, seniority shall govern. Any disputes in regard to qualifications
other than those listed above which the company believes necessary to consider,
shall be handled through the regular grievance procedure. The employer agrees
not to tolerate any favoritism by foremen or supervisors and to make available
to qualified employees such opportunities for advancement as may arise, from
time to time, even though such employees are particularly qualified on their
present job. All employees laid off shall be returned in the reverse order of
having been laid off before new employees are taken on.
E xhibit C
1. Individual contracts, so far as union members are concerned, may be can
celled by the action of the union organization. That is to say, we will honor
any cancellation request signed by any employee, secured by the union or other
wise, and pay the employee his contribution made to the contract. The same
proposal will extend to nonmembers of the union. This is, of course, limited to
the employees of the East Alton Manufacturing Co.’s operations.
2. The same as No. 1, except I indicated to you in confidence the maximum
which the companies would agree to with respect to the amounts of money
involved. I will not even record the full text of the suggestion herein because I
think you have it clearly in mind.
CASE HISTORIES
183
3. As an alternative to the above, or in connection therewith, under proper
circumstances we will consider the establishment of a safety or accident reserve
fund similar in principle to the plan which is in effect in several of our explosive
manufacturing operations—that is to say, explosive plants in associated com
panies. There is attached hereto a copy of the agreement outlining the accidentreserve fund in some of our explosives operations that where there are no serious
accidents, the amount of fund accumulated is equivalent to approximately 6 per
cent of the wages of the employees and therefore a transfer could be made from the
individual contracts to the accident-reserve fund without material difference in
wage or bonus payments. Under these circumstances and with the union’s
cooperation and acceptance of the plan, we would endeavor to transfer the
individual contract plan to the accident-reserve fund plan.
Recommendations
September 15
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. This is the same case which was the subject of hearing, findings, and recom
mendations on June 28, 1941, and again the subject of hearings from July 11 to
15, 1941, resulting in further findings and recommendations on July 24, 1941.
2. Pursuant to the recommendations of July 24, 1941, representatives of the
East Alton Manufacturing Co. and the union resolved almost all the points in
controversy and embodied their agreement in a collective-bargaining contract
dated August 2,1941.
3. The principal issue left unresolved by the contract of August 2, 1941, con
cerned wage rates, wage classifications, and vacations with pay.
4. East Alton’s representatives presented a first proposal which was rejected
by the representatives of the union. Further negotiations resulted in a second
proposal by East Alton Manufacturing Co., which was modified still further, after
presentation, by the parties. This last proposal, as modified, provided in sub
stance for an average increase of approximately 14 percent over the wages in
effect July 12, 1941, or of approximately 29 percent over those in effect on
January 1,1941 (or, in the case of employees hired since that date, the entering
rate of pay). The average hourly wage rate proposed is approximately 79%
cents. Moreover, 395 employees will each get a further 3 cents an hour increase
before January 1, 1942, and some employees will get further increases before
July 1942. The proposal likewise contained certain provisions for vacations with
pay which it is unnecessary to detail here. In support of this proposal, East
Alton’s representatives pointed out, inter alia, before this Board that some 73
percent of the employees affected had had no experience in manufacturing opera
tions prior to their employment with the companies and that most of the
employees were new—of the total of approximately 600 employees involved, 300
had been employed during 1941 and almost 200 more were employed during the
last 6 months of 1940.
5. This proposal was accepted by the representatives of the union, who agreed to
recommend its acceptance by the membership of the union. At a meeting of the
union membership on September 3, 1941, 87 voted in favor of the proposal and 67
voted against the proposal. However, the balloting continued into the next day,
so that other union members could cast their ballots, and the final tabulation was
112 in favor of the proposal, and 120 against the proposal, out of a total of
approximately 500 union members eligible to vote.
6. This Board subsequently scheduled the hearing of September 15, 1941, at
the request of both the union and the companies* representatives.
conclusion
7. The Board has examined the as yet unratified agreement negotiated by the
representatives of the East Alton Manufacturing Co. and of the union. The Board
finds nothing unfair in this agreement The Board believes that the interests of
national defense and of collective bargaining will best be promoted by the member
ship of the union ratifying the agreement negotiated by their accredited repre
sentatives.
184
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 45
W e s t e r n P e n n s y l v a n i a L ab o r R e l a t i o n s A s s o c ia t io n ,
Pittsburgh, Pa.
I n t e r n a t io n a l B r o t h e r h o o d o f T e a m sters, C h a u f f e u r s , W a r e h o u se m e n ,
a n d H e lp e r s of A m e r ic a , L o c a l 249,
A. F. L.
Certified June 25. Strike June 1-30. Hearing June 30-July 1. 2,800 workers
involved. Closed July 8
Panel: Stocking, Connelly, Woods. Assistant, Gill (Maxwell Feller).
On May 31 contracts with the union covering three branches of the trucking
industry in the Pittsburgh area, namely, city freight, heavy hauling, and road haul
ing, had expired. After unsuccessful efforts of the Conciliation Service and the
Mayor of Pittsburgh to mediate the dispute, a strike was called on June 1. The
Board’s arbitration award, entitled “Findings,” states the facts relating to the
settlement.
Findings
July 8
The above case was certified to the National Defense Mediation Board on June
25, 1941. Subsequent to this date the parties to the controversy entered into a
voluntary arbitration agreement under the terms of which the striking employees
were to return to work with a general increase in hourly wages of 6 cents to all
employees, with the exception of those working on heavy-duty trailers (over 20
tons) and helpers on machinery, who were to receive an increase of 10 cents per
hour. The arbitration agreement further provided that this wage adjustment
should prevail only until the question of the difference between the wage rates
as proposed by the union and those tentatively granted by the employer should be
determined by the National Defense Mediation Board. It further provided that
the Board’s findings should be final and binding upon both parties, and that the
wage adjustment as decided by the Board should be retroactive to the date upon
which work was resumed.
The panel designated to hear this case was composed of George W. Stocking,,
representing the public; John E. Connelly, representing the employers; and Herbert
Woods, representing the employees. Hearings were held in Washington on June
30 and July 1.
In the course of the hearings it developed that matters other than wages were
in controversy between the parties and both parties requested the Board to make
a finding on these other matters and agreed to accept the Board’s findings as final
and binding.
As a result of the arbitration agreement previously entered into and the discus
sions during the hearings, the matters placed before the Board were as follows:
1. Hourly wage rates.
2. Vacations.
3. Arbitration machinery for the settlement of grievances.
4. Conditions governing lay-over time for road drivers.
5. Minimum hours of pay for reporting to work in heavy hauling operations.
All other matters initially in controversy were settled by negotiation and
agreement between the parties.
After hearing the parties and on the basis of all of the evidence and argu
ments presented, the Board’s findings with regard to these matters are as follows:
1. All employees other than those working on heavy-duty trailers (over 20
tons) and helpers on machinery shall receive an increase in hourly wage rates
of 71/2 cents above those prevailing immediately prior to the strike. Workers on
heavy-duty trailers and helpers on machinery shall receive the 10 cents per hour
increase as granted in the arbitration agreement.
2. Conditions and practices governing vacations prevailing prior to the strike
shall continue, with the exception that temporary lay-offs of employees caused
by lack of business not exceeding 60 days in the aggregate, or absence due to
illness not exceeding 60 days in the aggregate, shall not limit or abridge the
employee’s right to vacation with pay, and except as further modified by the
agreement already reached between the parties.
3. The following provisions shall govern the settlement of grievances and dis
putes arising under the agreements between the employees and employers;
CASE HISTORIES
185
In the event of any grievance, complaint, or dispute on the part of a union
member, it shall be handled in the following manner:
(1) The union member shall report it to his shop steward who shall attempt
to adjust the matter with the employer.
(2) Failing to agree, the shop steward shall report the matter to the union
which shall submit it in writing and attempt to adjust the same with the
employer.
(3) Failure to agree shall be reported in writing to the employer and to the
union, and thereupon each shall select three representatives to hear and adjust
the matter within 48 hours.
(4) In the event any matter cannot be adjusted by the method set forth
above, or in case of any other dispute arising under this contract pertaining to
its meaning or application, each party shall forthwith name three arbitrators
and the six so chosen shall within 48 hours name a neutral arbitrator. If the
six do not agree upon a neutral within 48 hours, the Director of Conciliation of
the United States Conciliation Service, shall be requested to name such neutral.
The expense of the neutral, if any, shall be shared equally by the parties. Each
party agrees to accept and abide by any award made by the majority of the arbi
tration board so constituted.
(5) There shall be no cessation of work during the pendency of the arbitration
proceeding.
4. Road drivers on a trip or hourly basis, held away from their home terminal,
shall be paid lay-over time after 16 hours at the rate of the first 8 hours out of
each 24 hours.
5. Any regular employee ordered to work under the agreement governing
heavy hauling shall receive no less than 6 consecutive hours’ pay; any extra man
called from the union under the heavy-hauling agreement shall receive no less
than 4 hours’ consecutive pay.
CASE No. 46
F ederal S h ip b u il d in g & D r y D o c k
Kearny, N. J.
Co.,
I n d u s t r ia l U n io n of M a r i n e a n d S h i p B u il d in g W o r k e r s o f A m e r ic a , L o c a l
16, C. I. O.
Certified June 30. Strike August 7-24. Hearing July 8, 10, 14, 15. 16,000
workers involved. Closed August 23
Panel: Stacy, C. E. Adams, Carey. Assistant, Kirstein.
In May, the Government, through O. P. M., the Maritime Commission, and the
Navy, was able to work out an agreement, with employers and representatives
of employees, entitled Atlantic Coast Zone Standards. This agreement set up
wage rates, grievance procedure, and some other major matters. Its purpose was
to stabilize the shipbuilding industry for a period of 2 years. These standards
were to be embodied in all east coast collective contracts.
The company and the union agreed to include the Atlantic Coast Zone Standards,
but their negotiations about other points did not result in an agreement. Certain
matters pertaining to yard procedure and methods were settled during the hear
ings, but not the question of union security. The panel, also unable to agree,
referred the matter to the full Board. The issues were canvassed. A majority
of the Board voted to return the case to the panel for further consideration and
decision. On July 26, the Board (i. e., the panel) issued the following recommen
dation, Mr. Adams dissenting without opinion.
Recommendation
July 26
Since July 8, 1941, the dispute between the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. and the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America,
Involving a number of questions in difference, has been before the National Defense
Mediation Board on a certification from the Secretary of Labor. During this
time the parties have reached an agreement in collective bargaining on all
questions in difference except the one pertaining to union security. It is con
ceded that further effort to reach an accord on this issue would be fruitless.
186
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The matter was referred to a regular meeting of the Board with full oppor
tunity to dispose of it. After discussion, it was remanded to the division orig
inally assigned to hear the case. Upon further consideration a majority of the
division recommends the acceptance by the parties of the following provision in
respect of this item.
“In view of the joint responsibilities of the parties to the national defense,
of their mutual obligations to maintain production during the present emergency,
and of their reciprocal guaranties that there shall be no strikes or lock-outs for a
period of 2 years from June 23, 1941, as set out in the ‘Atlantic Coast Zone
Standards,* incorporated herein and made a part hereof, the company engages
on its part that any employee who is now a member of the union, or who here
after voluntarily becomes a member during the life of this agreement, shall, as
a condition of continued employment, maintain membership in the union in good
standing.**
Some weeks later, Mr. Adams wrote the following letter to the chairman explain
ing his dissent:
August 18,1941,
Hon. W
P. S
, Chairman.
Federal Shipbuilding dc Dry Dock Co, Panel.
D
J
S
: As the dissenting member of the division of the National
Defense Mediation Board which considered the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. case, I wish to place in the record a short statement indicating my reasons
for dissenting.
The issue, on which the parties who conducted collective bargaining finally and
definitely split, was the open shop versus the closed shop. The management,
at the instigation of one of the National Defense Mediation Board, agreed to
incorporate in the contract between it and the union the following clause:
“Your attention is called to the fact that the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. has a labor agreement with the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding
Workers of America, Local No. 16.
“In view of the parties* mutual guaranties that there shall be neither strikes
nor lock-outs for a period of 2 years from June 23,1941, you are advised that the
employer approves of its employees being members of the union and your doing
so will not interfere in any way with your employment nor retard your advance
ment
“The management requests that you examine a copy of the agreement handed
to you herewith.
“For further information you are referred to the union shop steward in your
department or to the union office at 582 Westside Ave., Jersey City, N. J.”
As a result of this clause the plant would remain, as it always has been, an
open shop, but a modified open shop, in that the management throughout the life
of the contract would always be publicly on record as approving of its employees
joining the bargaining union.
The union, at the instigation of two of the National Defense Mediation Board,
agreed to incorporate in the contract the following clause:
“In view of the joint responsibilities of the parties to the national defense,
of their mutual obligations to maintain production during the present emergency
and of their reciprocal guaranties that there shall be no strikes or lock-outs for
a period of 2 years from June 23, 1941, as set out in the ‘Atlantic Coast Zone
Standards,* incorporated herein and made a part hereof, the company engages
on its part that any employee who is now a member of the union, or who here
after voluntarily becomes a member during the life of this agreement, shall, as
a condition of continued employment, maintain membership in the union in good
standing.”
As a result of this clause the plant would become for the first time a closed
shop, though a modified closed shop. The clause quoted above was referred to
in just these terms by one of the negotiators for the union, and has been in the
past so referred to by the Labor Department.
I was and am convinced that the adoption of the modified closed-shop clause
in the proposed contract means a completely closed shop in a very short time.
The word voluntarily has no factual effect. A militant minority only has to
force an employee into line once and then the company has to keep him there.
Under the conditions at Kearny the result is inevitable.
I am opposed to the National Defense Mediation Board using the power of its
recommendation on this issue where such conditions exist, both in principle and
alter
ear
udge
tacy
tacy
CASE HISTORIES
187
for the reason that I feel strongly that, in the all too near future, it will result
in decreased production of essential defense materials.
The union can determine within itself whether or not any employee is in
good standing, and if not, demand his discharge. The union, I understand, can
change its constitution or union rules with the greatest of ease to suit its own
purpose, and certainly management is not consulted with reference to such
changes. The result of this feature of the proposed clause is the transfer of a
large share of discipline from management to union, and the slowing down of
individual effort to the rate of the least efficient man.
The question of the union agreement not to strike under the zone stabiliza
tion plan is one that can be determined on the facts. Both sides agreed to no
strikes and no lock-outs while the matter was before our panel.
In this case, as in many others now coming before the Board, the unions are
using the emergency and, I fear, trying to use the Board to force a closed or
modified closed shop on industry in cases where the open shop has been in suc
cessful operation for many years, in cases where the unions have been able to
make great strides in their membership and where management is intelligent,
skillful, and open minded, as witnessed in this instance, by the clause offered
by it.
Sincerely yours,
Charles E. A dams.
t
The Board’s recommendation was twice rejected by the union—first at a
meeting July 27, then by mail ballot the following week. Finally, at a meeting
August 3, the union voted to accept the recommendation. Meanwhile, the
Board received word from the company that it refused to accept. The union
called a strike effective at midnight on August 6. After considering the case at
its regular meeting the following day, the full Board voted to take no further
action in the dispute.
On August 11, L. H. Korndorff, president of the company, in a telegram to
the Secretary of the Navy, offered the shipyard to the Navy Department for
immediate possession and operation. At the same time, he issued the follow
ing statement:
Statement by L . H. Korndorff, President, Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
Kearny, N. J., August 11
Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. has sent a telegram this afternoon to
the Secretary of the Navy reading as follows:
The Hon. F rank K nox,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.
In the interest of national defense we hereby offer our shipyard at Kearny,
N. J., to the Navy Department for immediate possession and operation. The
yard has been closed for 4 days by a strike which involves no issue but the
maintenance of the open shop. We are unwilling to abandon the defense of the
freedom of the American worker to choose whether he will belong to a union
or not. We will fully cooperate with you in making this offer effective.
F ederal S hipbuilding & D ry D ock Co.
(Signed) L. H. K orndorff, President
At midnight last Wednesday an unjustified strike was called at our shipyard
at Kearny, N. J., by local 16 of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuild
ing Workers of America in violation of the union’s recent agreement outlawing
strikes in our yard for a period of 2 years—a strike having for its sole purpose
the enforcement of the union’s demand for a closed shop. In our opinion the
issue involved in this strike is of vital importance to this Nation and the best
interests of all our citizens. That issue is whether the American worker shall
be permitted to retain his traditional freedom of action and be allowed to deter
mine for himself whether or not he shall belong to a labor union.
In our judgment no union should be permitted to use the present national
emergency as a club to obtain its own selfish ends through forcing industry to
accept the closed shop. If this union is successful in this instance, a similar
contest is almost certain to follow in all other Atlantic coast shipyards, soon
spreading to defense industries in general.
469872°—42---- 18
188
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOABD
The closed shop has no legitimate connection with national defense—its
aim is purely selfish, namely, to enhance and perpetuate the power of the
union.
Furthermore, we believe that a right on the part of the union to dictate
that an employee shall not be permitted to work in our shipyard unless he
maintains his union membership in good standing will seriously interfere with
our efficient operation of the yard and with the successful fulfillment of
our defense contracts. Such a right to dictate is thoroughly undemocratic
and contrary to long-established American principles of individual freedom
of action. If these principles are to be fundamentally altered and the closed
shop made a mandatory national labor policy, it should be brought about
by an act of Congress. When one thoroughly believes in the right and sound
ness of his convictions and furthermore that these convictions are distinctly
in the public interest, there can be no compromise with principle. Accord
ingly, this company could not conscientiously accept the recommendation of
two members constituting a majority of a division of the National Defense
Mediation Board, one additional member dissenting, that this company volun
tarily accede to the union's demand for a closed shop.
The Secretary of Labor certified this matter to the Mediation Board while
collective bargaining negotiations with the union were still in progress. There
was never any agreement on our part to abide by the recommendation of the
Mediation Board.
Naturally, we will be sorry thus to give up our shipyard, which has estab
lished a remarkable performance record, but we sincerly believe that a proper
solution of the vital principle involved in this strike is of far greater moment
in carrying forward the all-important national defense effort and in safe
guarding the welfare of this Nation than the fate of any single shipyard or
company.
On August 13, William H. Davis, Chairman of the Board, wrote the following
letter to the Secretary of the Navy:
N ational D efense Mediation B oard,
The Hon. F rank K nox,
August 13, 1941.
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. G.
My D ear Mr. S ecretary: In the matter of the Federal Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., it seems to me a pity that discussions should proceed under
the misapprehension revealed in the statement released to the press by Mr.
Korndorff and of which copies were sent to you and to the Mediation Board.
1. Mr. Korndorff says that the “issue is whether the American worker
shall be permitted to retain his traditional freedom of action and be allowed
to determine for himself whether or not he shall belong to a labor union,"
and it might be supposed from the whole tenor of his statement that the
Mediation Board has recommended that the company shall employ or retain
in its employment only members of the union. The fact is that though the
union’s demands included such a provision the Mediation Board declined to
recommend any provision which would compel any present employee or any
future employee to join the union or lose his job.
The Board’s recommendation of maintenance of membership for the dura
tion of the proposed new agreement between the company and the union
applies only to employees who are now members of the union, or who here
after voluntarily become members. The Board’s recommendation is predicated
upon the voluntary act of the worker who has chosen to join the union, so
that each worker is allowed to determine for himself whether or not he shall
belong to the union.
Among the employees of the company, of whom there are more than 16,000,
some 2,000 have not chosen to join the union. Under the agreement recom
mended by the Mediation Board these 2,000 would be under no more com
pulsion to join the union than they have been in the past. The right of the
company to freely choose its new employees, regardless of union affiliation,
is in no wise limited and new employees are not required to join the union
if they do not choose to do so.
2. Mr. Korndorff has expressed apprehension that under the recommended
agreement the union could bring about the discharge of an employee who is
a member of the union by arbitrarily determining that the member is not
CASE HISTORIES
189
in good standing. No such arbitrary action is possible. Under the constitu
tion and bylaws of the union the right of membership is amply protected
by express provisions for charges, trial, appeal to the full membership, and
further appeal to the international executive board. Every member of the
union has a property right to his membership and cannot be arbitrarily
deprived of that right.
3. As you know, the Board’s recommendation was made in connection with
the shipbuilding stabilization plan, and the recommended agreement includes
the “Atlantic Coast Zone Standards” which fixes wages for a period of 2
years, and the agreement includes a provision that there shall be no strike
or lock-out. The purpose of the Board’s recommendation was to secure sta
bility without impairing the right of the workers to maintain and extend voluntary
self-organization.
The no-strike provision was not, however, to become effective in the plant
of the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. until the new agreement in
corporating the Atlantic Coast Zone Standards and the no-strike provision
was signed. The present strike is not, as Mr. Korndorff in his statement says
it is, “in violation of the union’s recent agreement outlawing strikes in our
yard for a period of 2 years.’’
Very truly yours,
W iixiam H. D avis,
Chairman, National Defense Mediation Board.
On August 16 this letter was made public together with the following statement
by Mr. Davis:
Statement ~by Mr. William H. Davis, Chairman, National Defense Mediation Board
August 16
Word has gone across the country that in the case of the Federal Shipbuild
ing & Dry Dock Co. at Kearny, N. J., the National Defense Mediation Board has
recommended a closed shop. That is not true. The Mediation Board refused to
recommend a closed shop or a union shop or any provision which would compel
anyone to join the union. I explained this in my letter of August 13 to the Secre
tary of the Navy, commenting upon the statement released to the press by Mr.
Korndorff, president of the company. A copy of my letter to the Secretary is
attached.
The maintenance of membership clause recommended by the National Defense
Mediation Board in that case requires that an employee who has already vol
untarily joined, or who hereafter voluntarily joins the union must, as a condition
of employment, remain a member of the union in good standing during the limited
period covered by the contract between the company and the union. There is no
restriction of the worker’s choice as to whether he will or will not join the union.
It has been suggested that this clause does restrict the worker’s freedom of
action in some measure, because when he has joined the union he cannot get out.
But a few words will show that this is in reality a restriction which he has chosen
to impose upon himself; and self-imposed restriction is the essence of freedom.
Every man who joins the union agrees to be bound by its majority action, and
those who are now members of the union have voted by overwhelming majority
for a union shop which would make their jobs depend upon their union member
ship. New employees who may hereafter voluntarily join the union will know
beforehand that if they join the union they will have to remain members for the
2-year duration of the shipyard contract.
The maintenance of membership clause is not a new device. It has been widely
used in American labor agreements and gives stability and develops disciplined
and responsible conduct. It has virtually become the pattern voluntarily adopted
by management and labor in the northwestern pulp and lumber industries, where
it has tended to minimize union friction for the duration of the contract after the
contract is signed with one or the other of the two competing unions. It has not
led to a closed shop.
The records of the Mediation Board show that the clause is not at all regarded
by the Mediation Board as appropriate in all cases. On the contrary, it has been
recommended only for special reasons developed by the facts in particular cases.
In a majority of the cases in which the issue of union security has been raised
the Board has made settlements or made recommendations which include no
union security clause of any kind.
190
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The Mediation Board was set up to prevent interruption of defense production.
It was instructed to and it does explore every possibility of working out a mutually
satisfactory agreement by mediation. If despite all efforts it fails in mediation,
it is instructed to offer the parties voluntary arbitration of any part or all of
their dispute. If that fails, the Board is authorized to make an investigation
with findings of fact and to formulate recommendations for the settlement of the
dispute. It has been and will be the purpose of the Mediation Board to make
fact findings that are accurate and recommendations that are fair and just in the
light of the facts as they are found in each case. The Board profits by criticism
and welcomes enlightened discussion which may help it in its emergency task of
substituting reason for force in industrial disputes which affect the defense of
our country.
A week later, the President directed the Secretary of the Navy to take over the
plant.
Executive Order
August 23
W hereas on the 27th day of May, 1941, a Presidential proclamation was issued,
declaring an unlimited national emergency and calling upon all loyal citizens in
production for defense to give precedence to the needs of the Nation to the end that
a system of government which makes private enterprise possible may survive; and
calling upon our loyal workmen and employers to merge their lesser differences in
the larger effort to insure the survival of the only kind of government which recog
nizes the rights of labor or of capital, and calling upon all loyal citizens to place
the Nation’s needs first in mind and in action to the end that we may mobilize and
have ready for instant defensive use, all of the physical powers, all of the moral
strength and all of the material resources of the Nation; and
W hereas the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. has contracted with the
United States, its departments and agencies for the construction and manufacture
of vessels, facilities, and other material and equipment vital to the defense of the
United States, and such vessels, facilities, material, and equipment have been in
the course of construction and manufacture at the plant of said company and the
United States owns vessels and facilities in the course of construction and mate
rial and equipment there situated; and
W hereas a controversy arose concerning the terms and conditions of employ
ment between said company and its workers which they have been unable to ad
just by collective bargaining, and the controversy was duly certified to the Na
tional Defense Mediation Board, established by Executive order of March 19,
1941; and the said Board has made a recommendation which the company has
refused to accept; and
W hereas as a result of such refusal, the construction and manufacture at said
company’s plant of vessels, facilities, material, and equipment has been inter
rupted by a strike which still continues, the objectives of said proclamation of
May 27, 1941, are jeopardized, and the immediate resumption of the construction
and manufacture of said vessels, facilities, material, and equipment is essential
to the defense of the United States; and
W hereas for the time being and under the circumstances set forth, it is essen
tial, in order that operation at said plant be continued, that the plant be operated
by or under the control of the United States:
Now, T herefo re , I, F r a n k l in D. R oosevelt , pursuant to the powers vested in
me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, as President of the United
States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of the Navy immediately to take posses
sion of and operate the plant of the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., through
and with the aid of such person or persons or instrumentality as may be desig
nated, and insofar as may be necessary or desirable, to produce the vessels,
facilities, material, and equipment called for by the company’s contracts with the
United States, its departments and agencies, or otherwise, and do all things neces
sary or incidental to that end. There shall be employed such employees, including
a competent civilian adviser on industrial relations, as are necessary to carry out
the provisions of this order, and, in furtherance of the purposes of this order, the
Secretary of the Navy may exercise any existing contract rights with said com
pany, or take such other steps as may be necessary or desirable.
Possession and operation hereunder shall be terminated by the President as
soon as he determines that the plant will be privately operated in a manner con
sistent with the needs of national defense.
F ranklin
D.
R oosevelt.
CASE HISTORIES
191
The union returned to work with the taking over of the plant by the Govern
ment, which operated it from August 25 to January 7, when it was returned to the
corporation pursuant to Executive order of January 5, 1942. During this period
the question arose whether the Board’s maintenance of membership recommenda
tion was in conformity with the National Labor Relations Act and should be put
in force as well as the other terms on which agreement between the union and the
company had been reached. The President asked the Board to consider this ques
tion, “if necessary with the members of the National Labor Relations Board.”
The general counsel of the Labor Relations Board thereupon rendered the follow
ing opinion:
“Does an employer engage in unfair labor practices within the meaning of sec
tion 8 of the National Labor Relations Act by making an agreement with a labor
organization—not established, maintained, or assisted by an unfair labor practice,
and the exclusive representative of the employees in an appropriate unit when
made—to require as a condition of employment that employees in the appropriate
unit who become members in such labor organization should maintain their mem
bership therein? (Such a provision is hereinafter referred to as a maintenanceof-membership clause.)
“The proviso to section 8 (3) of the act1 provides that nothing in the act or in
any other statute of the United States shall preclude an employer from making cer
tain agreements. Consequently, if a maintenance-of-membership clause comes
within the terms of the proviso to section 8 (3) it is not unlawful under section 8
of the act. The proviso states two requirements which may be disposed of sum
marily : (a) the contracting labor organization must not be one established, main
tained, or assisted by an unfair labor practice and (b) it must be the exclusive
representative of the employees in an appropriate unit. This memorandum as
sumes that the maintenance-of-membership clause is incorporated in a contract
between an employer and an unassisted labor organization which is the duly
designated exclusive representative.
“The agreements protected by the terms of the proviso to section 8 (3) are
those which ‘require as a condition of employment membership* in the con
tracting labor organization. Clearly the maintenance-of-membership clause does
no more than ‘require as a condition of employment membership’ in the con
tracting union. By virtue of this type of clause an employee who becomes a
member of the union must, upon pain of discharge, remain a member for a
limited period. The closed-shop provision and the maintenance-of-membership
clause differ only in that the former makes union membership a condition of
employment with respect to all employees, whereas the maintenance-of-member
ship clause is more limited, making membership a condition of employment
only with respect to employees who have already joined the union, either before
or during the life of the contract. While one provision is more severe than
the other, both fall within the terms of the proviso, since they ‘require as a
condition of employment membership’ in the contracting union
“While the respective reports of the House and Senate committees recom
mending adoption of the act discuss the proviso to section 8 (3) in relation
to its effect upon closed-shop contracts, the legislative history of the act does
not warrant any conclusion that Congress intended to confine the protection
of the proviso to closed-shop contracts. As the reports on their face disclose,
the congressional committees discussed the closed-shop type of provision speci
fically because they felt that the effect which the proviso would have upon the
practice of having closed shops and upon industry was being misinterpreted.
Thus, for example, the report of the United States Senate Committee on
Education and Labor states in this connection: -Propaganda has been wide
spread that this proviso tends to supply legal sanctions to the closed shop or
seeks to impose it upon all industry. This propaganda is absolutely false.’
The report, continuing, explains that the proviso does not compel the closed
shop but simply provides that if the conditions prescribed in the proviso are
1 Sec. 8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided,
That nothing in this act, or in the National Industrial Recovery Act (U. S. C., supp. VII,
title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended from time to time, or in any code or agreement approved
or prescribed thereunder, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained,
or assisted by any action defined in this act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a con
dition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative
of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit
covered by such agreement when made.
192
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
met, tlie closed-shop contract should not be deemed unlawful under the act or
under other Federal legislation. (74th Cong. 1st sess., S. Rep. 573, p. 11.) In
sum, although the legislative history of the act shows specific discussion of the
relation between the proviso and closed-shop contracts, there is no reason to
believe that Congress intended the proviso to section 8 (3) to protect only one
species of agreement requiring as a condition of employment membership in a
contracting labor organization.
“The National Labor Relations Board has frequently held, of course, that
the closed-shop contract may be lawful because of the pioviso to section 8 (3)
(Matter of Ansley Radio Corporation and Local 1221, United Electrical and
Radio Workers of America, O. J. O., 18 N. L. R. B. 1028, and cases therein
cited). The Board, however, has not confined the protection of the proviso
to closed-shop contracts. Thus, in Matter of Isthmian Steamship Co. and Na
tional Maritime Union of America, 22 N. L. R. B. 689, the employer and the
exclusive representative executed a non-closed-shop contract providing for pref
erence of employment to members of the contracting union, as vacancies oc
curred. The Board sustained the validity of this preferential hiring contract
under the act and held, accordingly, that the employer acted lawfully in filling
vacancies with members of the contracting union. That the preferential employ
ment contract, that is, a contract which requires union membership as a con
dition of employment but not amounting to a closed-shop contract, comes within
the scope of the proviso to section 8 (3) has also been established in court
(Peninsular and Occidental Shipping Co. v. N. L. R. B., 98 F. (2d) 411 (C. C. A. 5),
cert, den’d, 305 U. S. 653).
“Upon the basis of the above discussion I conclude: (1) That the proviso to
section 8 (3) makes it lawful under the National Labor Relations Act and
under any other statute of the United States for an employer to make an
agreement with an unassisted union, which is the exclusive representative of
the employees in an appropriate unit, requiring as a condition of employment
that such employees be members of the contracting union; (2) that the proviso
is not confined to the closed-shop variety of contract; and (3) that an employer
does not engage in unfair labor practices within section 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act by including in a contract with a proper labor organization,
a maintenance-of-membership clause.”
On September 17, Chairman Davis informed the President that the Board
was unanimous in holding that the language of the National Labor Relations
Act, section 8 (3) “constitutes an express statutory sanction of the mainte
nance-of-membership clause” recommended by the Board and that this opinion
was confirmed by that of the general counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board.
The same day the Secretary of the Navy issued a directive, stating that if
any case arose to which this recommendation would apply, it would be referred
to the Board for action. On November 7, the union charged that 10 men had
failed to maintain their membership in good standing and requested that they
be discharged. The Secretary of the Navy referred these charges to the Board
which appointed Burton A. Zorn, New York attorney, to investigate them.
Pursuant to authorization by the Board, the chairman made findings with
respect to these employees and transmitted them to the Secretary of the Navy
December 9. No further action was taken during the life of the Board.
(For subsequent documents in this case see pt. Y.)
CASE No. 47
Cheney B rothers, South Manchester, T extile W orkers U nion of A merica,
Conn.
L ocal 63, C. I. O.
Certified July 2. No strike. Hearing July 8-10. 2,300 workers involved. Closed
July 16
Panel: Graham, Hamilton, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
An agreement had existed between the parties for 4 years. The company had
encouraged union membership. An impasse was reached in respect of a demand
CASE HISTORIES
193
for the closed shop. Because the company made parachutes the case was certified,
though the panel doubted that defense operations were seriously involved. The
president of the company, though apparently friendly to the union, was opposed
to the principle of the closed shop or the check-off. The union complained that it
was losing its members to the higher-paid neighboring plants. On the suggestion
of the panel chairman there was finally agreement to a voluntary check-off with
an escape clause for causes unconnected with working conditions; the right to
escape was to be judged by a joint employer-employee committee. If the commit
tee did not agree, the question was to be arbitrated. This clause was a Board
innovation. Thereafter other issues were easily disposed of. Chief of them was
a demand for a 10 cents per hour increase which was settled at 5 cents.
S cullin S teel
CASE No. 48
Co., St. Louis, Mo. Steel W orkers Organizing Committee,
L ocal 1062, C. I. O.
S cullin S teel Co. E mployees Mutual
A id A ssociation, I nch
Certified July 7,1941. No strike. Hearing July 14-15. 2,200 workers involved.
Closed July 15
Panel: Stocking, Teagle, Kennedy. Assistant, Leiserson.
The S. W. O. C. did not attempt to renew its contract with the company which
ran from May 15,1937, to February 28,1938. On December 19,1938, the company
recognized and signed a contract with the Scullin Steel Co. Employees Mutual Aid
Association, Inc. S. W. O. C. renewed its organization in January 1941, asked
for recognition in March, and charged that the association was company-sup
ported. After hearing, the S. W. O. C. accepted the panel’s informal recommen
dation that it place the issues before the N. L. R. B.
CASE No. 49
B reeze Corporations, I nc., Elizabeth,
U nited A utomobile W orkers of
N. J.
A merica, L ocal 871, C. I. O.
Certified July 12. Strikes October 2-3, November 12-14. Hearings July 22-24,
September 30, October 1, 2, 6-10,14, 15. 520 workers involved. Closed Novem
ber 24
Panel: Wyzanski, Meyer, Brophy. Assistant, Cox.
On June 4 the National Labor Relations Board certified Local 871, U. A. W., as
representative of the company’s Waverly plant employees. The company has three
plants. Previously the company had signed contracts with the same union cover
ing the two Newark plants. Although signed at separate dates, the two contracts
were virtually the same, both to expire December 22, 1941. The certification
named only the Waverly plant. At the hearing it was deemed advisable to
include the other two plants in negotiations.
The union demanded an increase in wages, liberalized vacations with pay, and
a union shop. It already had a union maintenance clause.
As a result of the first hearing, the Board appointed Messrs. Harold B. Bergen,
Ewing W. Reilley, and Philip S. Babb as agents to investigate the issues. Upon
receipt of their report, the parties were recalled on September 30 and after 2
weeks of negotiations no agreement was reached. Then it was agreed that the
parties return home to negotiate concerning the Waverly plant alone, with the
understanding that the Board would recommend terms for Waverly if called upon.
During the hearing there was a short strike, which was called off at the Board’s
request. Another brief strike occurred before the parties on November 24 signed
a final agreement.
194
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 50
P art I
T ennessee Coal, I ron & R ailroad Co., Office and T echnical W orkers, L ocal
Birmingham, Ala.
U nion No. 2210, C. I. O.
P art II
T ennessee Coal, I ron & R ailroad Co., I nternational B rotherhood of E lectriBirmingham, Ala.
cal W orkers, L ocal B-287, A. F. L.
Certified July 14. No Strike. Hearing July 18, 19, 21. 1,000 workers involved.
Closed August 8
Panel: Graham, Ching, Hamilton, Watt, Rieve. Assistant, Kirstein.
P art I
Negotiations between the office workers and the company became deadlocked
and a strike was threatened on July 14. The strike was postponed at the request
of the Board and after several hours of negotiations between the union and the
company an agreement on all points in difference was reached. The Board took
little or no part in shaping this agreement, which was promptly ratified.
P art II
A dispute arose between the Electrical Workers and the company over the
issues of recognition and wages. A strike deadline was set for July 18, and this
case was certified at the same time and with the same case number as the one
above. After 2 days of conferences, the question of recognition of the union was
withdrawn by the union which recognized that this matter came under the juris
diction of the N. L. R. B. An agreement was reached on the wage matter by
company’s promising to confer about instituting an incentive plan which had
been long under consideration and which would result in a substantial increase
in hourly earnings. After some delay this was ratified August 8.
CASE No. 51
A ir A ssociates, I nc., Bendix, N. J.
U nited A utomobile W orkers
A merica, C. I. O.
of
Certified July 17. Strike July 12-27. Hearings July 22, 23, October 6, 8, 15.
525 workers involved. Closed December 31
Panel: Graham, Ching, Lyons. Assistant, Gill.
The facts up to the time of the issuance of the Board’s final findings and recom
mendations on October 9 are set out in detail therein. These, together with the
Board’s earlier recommendations of July 23 and 29 are printed below.
The union accepted the recommendations of October 9, but the company rejected
them, and on October 21 the Board “transferred” the case to the Office of Produc
tion Management “for appropriate action.” Efforts by the O. P. M. and the War
Department (which had important defense contracts with the company), to
induce the company to accept the recommendations, were of no avail, and a com
plete stoppage of production was imminent. On October 30, the President directed
the Secretary of War to take over and operate the plant. The Army immediately
put all the strikers back to work; production well in excess of the previous level
was quickly attained. The board of directors of the company thereafter in
stalled a new management, which on December 26 signed a complete collective
bargaining contract, settling all outstanding issues. The Army then immediately
withdrew and turned the operation of the plant back to the management.
(The Executive order directing the Secretary of War to take over the plant, as
well as the text of the agreement of December 26, 1941, are given in pt. V.)
CASE HISTORIES
195
Recommendation
July 23
Following hearings in Washington, D. C., on July 22 and 23, 1941, the Board
makes the following recommendations:
1. The prompt return to work of all employees in any way involved in this
dispute, without discrimination.
2. All questions in dispute involving back pay to be submitted to an arbitrator
appointed by this Board.
3. The parties immediately to start negotiations at a mutually agreeable
place with a view to arriving at a satisfactory collective bargaining agreement by
August 9,1941. If satisfactory progress is being made, the time for negotiations
may be extended by the Board or by mutual agreement of the parties. In event
they are unable to agree, the matters in dispute to be submitted to the arbitrator.
4. All decisions of the arbitrator are to be binding on both parties.
5. That the parties cooperate to the fullest extent in promoting orderly,
responsible, and harmonious relations for the maintenance of shop discipline
and maximum defense production.
Recommendation
July 29
The National Defense Mediation Board having, on July 23, 1941, issued recom
mendations in this case, the following is a supplement to and clarification of
those recommendations, and is the position of the National Defense Mediation
Board.
1. All employees in any way involved in this dispute are to return to work
promptly, without discrimination.
2. Due to the fact that the National Labor Relations Board, subsequent to
the issuance of this Board’s recommendations on July 23, has issued a formal
complaint covering the question of back pay for the 24 employees allegedly dis
criminated against in this case, that back-pay issue automatically is subject to
the decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
3. Negotiations for a collective bargaining contract between the company and
the union are to begin immediately at a mutually agreeable place. A repre
sentative of the National Defense Mediation Board will sit in on these negotia
tions as an observer.
4. The Board sets the date of August 9, 1941, as a reasonable time in which
negotiations can be concluded. The period for negotiations may be extended by
mutual agreement of the parties. Such issues as are not agreed to between
the parties may be submitted to arbitration by mutual agreement of the parties.
The Board appoints Harry Shulman, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Uni
versity, to serve as arbitrator for such purpose. Issues on which no agreement
is reached and which are not submitted to arbitration shall be the subject of a
prompt and thorough investigation by Professor Shulman. Following such in
vestigation, he shall make his report to the National Defense Mediation Board
and the Board will issue formal findings and recommendations.
5. The parties shall cooperate to the fullest extent in promoting orderly, re
sponsible, and harmonious relations for the maintenance of shop discipline and
maximum defense production.
Findings and Recommendations
October 9
PRELIMINARY RECITALS
This case was certified to the National Defense Mediation Board by the Secre
tary of Labor on July 17,1941. The Board held hearings in Washington, D. C., on
July 22 and 23, 1941, and issued preliminary recommendations on July 23. On
July 29 the Board issued supplemental and clarifying recommendations. Fur
ther hearings were held in Washington, D. C., on October 6, 7, and 8, 1941, and
the Board now makes the following findings and recommendations:
196
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
FINDINGS
1. The company produces aircraft parts, and has its manufacturing plant at
Bendix, N. J., employing over 600 workers. It has defense contracts totaling
over 5 million dollars, the major part of which consists of subcontracts with
virtually all of the leading aircraft companies, and the balance consisting of
direct contracts with the Government.
2. On July 1, 1941, the National Labor Relations Board conducted an election
among the company’s employees, resulting in a vote of 206 in favor of representa
tion by the union, and 188 against such representation. The parties were apprised
of the results of the election promptly after it was held, although the formal
certification of the N. L. R. B. was not issued until July 18,1941.
3. On July 2 and 3 the company laid off a number of employees, assertedly
because of lack of materials. The union charged that the lay-offs were discrim
inatory and filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board to that
effect.
4. On July 11, the union-shop committee waited upon Mr. F. Leroy Hill, presi
dent of the company, to discuss a grievance, and a heated controversy ensued
over Mr. Hill’s refusal to discuss the matter with the committee unless a ver
batim transcript of the discussion was recorded on a dictaphone installed in his
office. The committee withdrew from the office to discuss this patter among
themselves, and the facts as to what happened next are in serious conflict. The
company asserts that the members of the committee proceeded through the plant,
attempting to incite a strike, and that they were for that reason evicted from
the plant; the union asserts that the committee merely stepped outside one of
the plant doors to consider the problem of presenting their grievance under
Mr. Hill’s conditions, and were locked out when they attempted to step back into
the plant. In any event, both sides are agreed that the committee then got in
touch with the union representatives, who called an immediate strike in protest
over the alleged lock-out.
5. The strike, beginning on July 12, was still in progress when the case was
certified here on July 17. The Board held hearings on July 22 and 23 and issued
preliminary recommendations on the evening of July 23.
6. These recommendations provided in substance that all strikers should
promptly return to work without discrimination, that questions in dispute in
volving back pay for the workers allegedly discriminated against should be settled
by an arbitrator appointed by the Board, and that the parties should begin
bargaining negotiations promptly, with any issues on which agreement could
not be reached to be submitted to the arbitrator.
7. The union accepted the recommendations immediately. On July 27 the
company responded, agreeing to take back all striking employees without dis
crimination, and to start negotiations for a contract immediately. The company
pointed out, however, that the back-pay issues had by that time become the sub
ject of a formal complaint by the N. L. R. B. The company rejected the Board’s
proposal of arbitration of unsettled bargaining issues.
8. On July 29, the Board issued supplemental and clarifying recommendations,
providing that all employees should return to work promptly without discrimina
tion ; that bargaining negotiations should begin at once; that if the parties agreed
to submit any particular issues to arbitration, Harry Shulman, Sterling
Professor of Law, Yale University, should act as arbitrator; that disputed issues
not submitted to arbitration should be the subject of prompt investigation and
report to the Board by Professor Shulman; and that the back-pay questions
should be left to the determination of the N. L. R. B. in view of the fact that it
had by that time issued a formal complaint covering such matters.
9. These recommendations were satisfactory to the parties, and contract nego
tiations were conducted in New York City from July 30 through August 8, 1941.
At the company’s insistence, the union reluctantly agreed to permit the company
to make a verbatim transcript of all these negotiations. Such a transcript was
made and was thereafter distributed by the company, in part at least, to the
employees in the plant and to the press.
10. The bargaining negotiations concluded on August 8,1941, with the parties in
disagreement on virtually the entire contract. The only important issue on which
agreement was reached was that the company recognized the union as the ex
clusive bargaining agency of the employees pursuant to the N. L. R. B. certifi
cation of July 18,1941.
CASE HISTORIES
197
11. The union then proposed that all disputed issues be submitted to arbitra
tion by Professor Shulman as was permitted, but not required, under the Board’s
recommendations.
12. The company responded to this proposal by refusing to arbitrate any
questions except two.
13. The first was a claim by the company for ‘‘reparation” from the union
for alleged damage suffered during the strike. The union refused to arbitrate
that claim, taking the position that such a matter had no place in bargaining
negotiations, and that if the company pressed the matter, the union was prepared
to submit a counterclaim against the company for losses suffered by the union
and its members during the strike.
14. The second point which the company offered to arbitrate concerned the
recognition of the union. Although the company had previously agreed to
recognize the union pursuant to the N. L. R. B. certificate, the company now
claimed that there was doubt as to whether the union continued to represent a
majority of the employees. The union refused to arbitrate this question.
15. Since that time, the company has consistently adhered to the position that
the status of the union as bargaining agency for its employees should be rede
termined now, despite the N. L. R. B.’s certificate of July 18,1941. As the Board
has made clear to the parties during the hearings in Washington on October 6-8,
1941, it is the position of this Board that it must and does honor the certificate
of the N. L. R. B., dated July 18, 1941, that the union is the duly selected bar
gaining agency of the employees. The N. L. R. B. is a coordinate agency of the
Federal Government established to determine questions of representation, and the
rulings of the N. L. R. B. on such questions are not subject to review before this
Board. The company’s position is particularly without merit in view of the short
time which has elapsed since the N. L. R. B.’s certificate.
16. Since the company refused to arbitrate the disputed contractual provisions,
all of which the union proposed to submit to arbitration, and since the union
refused to arbitrate the two other matters which the company desired to arbitrate,
Professor Shulman proceeded to make his investigation of the issues in dispute
pursuant to the Board recommendations.
17. On September 30, 1941, before Professor Shulman’s report was completed,
the union called another strike at the company’s Bendix plant. The company
contends that this strike was entirely without cause. The union advances a num
ber of reasons for its action. The first is the company’s insistence, already re
ferred to above, upon reopening the question of representation after having previ
ously agreed to abide by the N. L. R. B. certificate. The second is the fact that
the union shop committee had recently been unsuccessful in attempting to secure
meetings on grievances with Mr. Hill, president of the company and the sole execu
tive empowered to make final decisions in labor matters. This was a departure
from the company’s former practice, Mr. Hill having previously met with the
committee upon request. Whether or not the company so intended, the reversal
of policy led the union to feel that the company was determined to undermine
its organization. The third is what the union describes as a campaign of harass
ment of union members in the plant on the part of the company’s supervisors,
including threats of loss of employment. It should be noted in this connection
that the N. L. R. B. has recently issued a formal complaint charging the company
with a wide variety of unfair labor practices directed against the union and its
members during the period in question, and that on July 9,1941, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed down a decision approving N. L. R. B.
findings in a previous case against the company to the effect that the company
had discharged 5 employees for union activities. Finally, the union asserts that
just before the strike, the company began moving various machines out of the
plant and into another building at a nearby town. In the absence of being given
any explanation of this move by the company, the union felt that it was another
antiunion maneuver. The company sharply disputes the fact in this latter con
nection, stating that it merely placed some new machinery in this other building,
pending expansion of the plant to provide for additional space.
18. At about this time, Professor Shulman submitted his report to the Board,
and the Board scheduled a hearing for the afternoon of Thursday, October 2,
1941. Mr. Hill informed the Board that he was obliged to be elsewhere at that
time on urgent defense business, and neither he nor any of his associates appeared
for the hearing, although the members of the panel and the representatives of
the union came to Washington for the hearing. The chairmaji of the panel
bearing the case spent 3 hours on the afternoon of October 2, and a large part of
198
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
the morning of October 3, in an effort to reach Mr. Hill by telephone, the repre
sentatives of the union and the members of the panel meanwhile standing by and
waiting. Mr. Hill was finally reached by telephone on October 3, having returned
to the plant, and he consented to be present in Washington on Monday, October 6.
19. At the hearings on October 6, 7, and 8, the Board undertook to work out with
the parties a mutually satisfactory contract. Professor Shulman’s report was not
served on the parties, pending the outcome of these efforts in securing a mutual
agreement by the parties themselves. On October 7, the members of the panel
drafted a suggested form of contract, exclusive of wages, embodying parts of the
contracts proposed by each party, and conforming closely to established practices.
On the morning of October 6, the parties expressed their views as to this informal
proposal by the Board. The union listed a few points which it desired to have
added to the contract, and the company requested various changes and additions.
20. In the middle of the afternoon of October 8, at which time the negotiations
were just getting under way, following the preliminary statements outlined above,
Mr. Hill and Mr. Walter Chalaire, counsel for the company, informed the Board
that they would have to return to New Jersey that evening because of an urgent
appointment on the following morning with representatives of the United States
Army on defense-contract matters. The Board got in touch with the Army repre
sentatives involved and secured their agreement to postpone the conference in
question until Friday morning, October 10, in view of the urgency of the dispute
before the Board. When this information was transmitted to Mr. Hill and Mr.
Chalaire, they informed the Board that they were leaving Washington that eve
ning, anyway, Mr. Hill asserting that he had to be at the plant in the morning
irrespective of the conference with representatives of the Army.
21. The company representatives adhered to this position despite the urgent
request of the Board to stay here until the next day and attempt to work out a
fair contract with the assistance of the Board. This is the first occasion in the
existence of the Board when representatives of either party have walked out on
the Board in the middle of its mediation efforts.
22. In view of the adamant position of the company in insisting on leaving the
negotiations that evening, the Board attempted to work out during the balance of
afternoon some form of interim settlement of the dispute, the first point being a
request that the union call off the strike and that the company return the strikers
to their jobs in the plant immediately. The company representatives stated that
they had hired new employees to take the places of the strikers, and that they were
unwilling to dismiss these new employees to make room for the strikers, but that
they would, take the strikers back whenever jobs were available. The members
of the panel pointed out that the Board was not asking them to dismiss the new
employees out of hand, and that the company was quite free to find other jobs for
these new employees, either in the company’s plant or at other plants, or indeed
to make whatever financial settlements with these men the company felt obligated
to make. The only recommendation of the Board was that the strikers be returned
to work immediately if the union would agree to call off the strike in the interests
of national defense—a request which, it was pointed out, is the standard practice
of the Board. The company flatly refused to accept this proposal.
23. The Board thereupon informed the representatives of both parties that since
the company refused to take the strikers back to work, efforts to settle the strike
were necessarily unavailing at this time, and that the Board was forced to proceed
to issue formal recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS1
1. The Board recommends that the union, in the interests of national defense,
immediately call off the strike.
2. The Board recommends that the company, in the interests of national
defense, immediately return all the strikers, upon application, to their former
jobs, without discrimination.
3. Following the return of the strikers to their jobs, the Board will call the
parties to Washington for a further hearing in an effort to reach a speedy and
reasonable agreement upon a collective bargaining contract to insure harmonious
relations and maximum defense production.
In issuing these recommendations, the Board urgently calls to the attention of
the parties the vital importance to the national defense effort of harmonious
relations between the company and the union, which is the exclusive bargaining
agency certified by the National Labor delations Board. On the basis of the
CASE HISTORIES
199
entire record ,in this case, the Board feels obliged to observe that this company
has not exhibited toward either this certified union or the National Defense Medi
ation Board that attitude of cooperation to which the public is entitled on the
part of a company whose operations are essential to the defense of the nation.
The parties are given until 10 a. m. on Saturday, October 11, 1941, to inform
the Board, by telegram, of their acceptance of these recommendations.
CASE No. 52
F ederal Mogul Corporation,
Detroit, Mich.
U nited A utomobile W orkers of A merica, Local 202, C. I. O.
Certified July 2. Strike (slowdown) July 10-22. Hearing July 25-26. 1,500
workers involved. Closed September 19
Panel: Stocking, Connelly, Lyons. Assistant, Kirstein.
The facts are stated in the following opinion by which the Board in substance
referred the case to the National Labor Relations Board.
Recommendation
July 26
On July 21, 1941, the Secretary of Labor certified to this Board that the dis
pute between the Federal Mogul Corporation, Detroit, Mich., and the United Auto
mobile Workers of America, Local 202, C. I. O., threatened to burden or obstruct
the production or transportation of equipment or materials essential to national
defense and had not been adjusted by the Commissioners of Conciliation of the
Department of Labor. Thereupon, the Board set a date for a hearing of this
matter and notified the parties of the said hearing and requested their attendance
thereon. In doing so, the Board wired both parties in part as follows:
“In the meantime the Board expresses to both parties its serious concern over
the present slowdown in the defense production of the Federal Mogul Corporation.
In view of the unlimited national emergency recently proclaimed by the President,
the Board calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate to insure full production
pending the Board’s consideration of this dispute.”
The panel designated to hear this case was composed of George W. Stocking,
representing the public, John E. Connelly, representing employers, and Hugh
Lyons, representing employees. Hearings were held in Washington, D. C., on
July 25,1941, and July 26,1941.
BACKGROUND OF CONTROVERSY
In 1939 a strike of 6^ weeks’ duration was conducted by the employees of the
Federal Mogul Corporation at the corporation’s Detroit Shoemaker Avenue plant
The strike was precipitated by negotiations over the renewal of a contract which
had been in force since 1937. The strike appears to have been characterized by
extreme bitterness but was settled by a new agreement. Subsequent to the strike,
in November 1939, the Federal Mogul Corporation opened a small plant at Green
ville, Mich., about 150 miles from Detroit. Thereafter the company expanded its
Detroit operations by erecting a plant about 150 yards from its Shoemaker Avenue
building. As there was an interchange of operations and workers between these
adjacent plants, the contract in existence with the United Automobile Workers of
America, C. I. O., was extended to cover the employees of the new plant. After
a comparison of union signatures with the company’s pay roll, the company
recognized the United Automobile Workers of America, C. I. O., as the proper
bargaining agency for the employees of the company at its John R service plant.
In February 1941, after a comparison of union signatures with the company’s
pay roll, the Federal Mogul Corporation recognized the Federal Mogul Employees
Association, an independent association incorporated under the laws of the State
of Michigan, as the bargaining agency for its members at the Greenville plant.
In the spring of 1941 the United Automobile Workers of America initiated
an effort to organize the Greenville plant. On July 3, 1941, two of the organizers
while in Greenville in connection with their organization campaign were taken
from a car as they were departing from a Greenville hotel and were subjected
200
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
to physical violence by a group of men, with injuries sufficiently serious that they
had to be hospitalized. Subsequent to these events, on July 10 a slowdown
occurred in the Detroit Shoemaker Avenue plants of the Federal Mogul Corpo
ration. Two or three days later the slowdown spread to the John R service
plant. According to the company’s statement, the slowdown resulted in a stop
page of about 90 percent of the plant’s current production.
The efforts of the Michigan State Mediation Board and the Federal Conciliation
Service of the Department of Labor failed to result in a resumption of full pro
duction and the case was certified to the National Defense Mediation Board.
union ’s position
The union contends—
1. That the plant at Greenville was established by the Federal Mogul Corpora
tion as a means of escaping its obligations under its agreement with the United
Automobile Workers of America at its Detroit plant;
2. That the company has transferred nondefense work which normally would
have been done at the Detroit plant to the Greenville plant as a part of a program
to expand the Greenville plant at the expense of the Detroit plant;
3. That the Federal Mogul Employees Association at the Greenville plant is
company dominated and is, in fact, a company union;
4. That the employees at the Greenville plant have been intimidated;
5. The union representatives imply in their discussions that the company was
in some way implicated in the assault on their organizers on July 3 and allege
that the organizers are denied police protection for the lawful organizing activi
ties in Greenville.
6. The union contends, further, that it should be recognized as the agency
for collective bargaining representing the employees in the Greenville plant.
company’s position1
1. The company denies that the Greenville plant is being expanded at the
expense of its Detroit operations. On the other hand, it declares that the Detroit
operations have been expanded to a greater extent than operations at the Green
ville plant and that no work has been transferred except in the interest of
efficient operation;
2. The company denies that the Federal Mogul Employees Association at the
Greenville plant is company-dominated or is a company union. It alleges that
the Federal Mogul Employees Association was recognized in the same manner
as was the United Automobile Workers of America, O. I. O., union, at the
John R service plant.
3. The company denies any connection with the physical violence suffered by
the organizers on July 3.
4. The company contends that it cannot recognize the United Automobile
Workers of America as the bargaining agency for its Greenville employees,
inasmuch as it has a contract with the Federal Mogul Employees Association.
5. The company contends that the slowdown was in violation of section 5 of
the agreement with the United Automobile Workers of America, C. I. O., signed
November 1,1940. Section 5 reads as follows:
“The union and its members individually and collectively agree that during
the term of this agreement they will not cause or permit or take part in any
picketing, strike, or other curtailment of work until the procedure provided
herein for settlement of grievances has been completely exhausted and in no
case until negotiations have continued for at least 10 days, and then not until
sanctioned by the international union.”
The procedure for settling grievances is set forth in the agreement, as follows,
in sections 7 through 14:
“7. For employee representation and disposition of grievances, there shall be
an executive shop committee consisting of 7 employee members including the
president of the local union, each of whom shall have been in the continuous em
ploy of the company for at least 1 year. One of these committeemen shall
be chosen from either tool room, machine repair, millwrights, or sample room
and one shall be chosen from the foundry building. Not more than five com
mittee members, however, are to be present during meetings with the manage-
CASE HISTORIES
201
ment. It shall be the responsibility of the committee to select from its members
the five representatives who are to attend the meetings.
'‘8. Within 24 hours after the executive shop committee and stewards desig
nated in the preceding sections take office, the secretary of the union shall
furnish in writing to the personnel office of the company the names and offices
held by each. Upon any change in personnel of either the executive shop com
mittee or the stewards during the term of this contract, written notice of such
change shall be furnished in similar manner.
“9. In case a grievance, complaint, or request arises which cannot be im
mediately settled by the steward of the department or group in which it arises
and the foreman of that department or group, the steward shall present such
grievance, complaint, or request to the foreman of the department in writing
in quadruplicate and signed by the steward and the complaining employee on
forms provided by the company.
“10. Upon receipt of the grievance in writing on forms provided by the com
pany, the chief steward shall take the matter up with the division superin
tendent who will attempt to adjust the grievance.
“11. If the procedure outlined above does not result in a satisfactory adjust
ment, the case shall then be referred to the executive shop committee who shall
then take the matter up with the plant manager of the company.
“12. Cases which cannot be satisfactorily settled as hereinbefore provided,
shall be reviewed jointly by a representative of the company and a representa
tive of the international union, with such additional representatives as either
party may desire.
“13. The departmental steward and the employee will be notified by the fore
man in writing before an employee is discharged or transferred from his depart
ment. It is further agreed that no emloyee shall lose any time by discipline
for any cause without first receiving a hearing between the shop committee and
the management: Provided, however, An employee may be sent home and pay
terminated immediately in case of an emergency, but should it be found in the
hearing that the employee was unjustly sent home, the company agrees to pay
this employee for all time lost for such discipline.
“14. The steps set forth in paragraphs 9 and 10 shall take place immediately
upon a grievance, complaint, or request being made. The meeting between the
executive shop committee and the company shall take place by appointment
during working hours on company time. An agenda of grievances shall be sub
mitted by the executive shop committee to the management at the time of
request for the appointment.”
THE ISSUES IN THE CONTROVERSY
1. Is the Federal Mogul Employees Association a company union?
2. What constitutes the proper unit and the proper agencies for representing
the employees in the Greenville plant for the purpose of collective bargaining?
FINDINGS OF FACT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Board finds that the issues in this controversy are matters which prop
erly come within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and
recommends that the controversy be disposed of by the United Automobile
Workers of America, Local 202, filing with that Board appropriate complaints
in order that the issues may be heard and properly determined. In accordance
with paragraph 2, section (e), of the Executive order of March 19, 1941, estab
lishing the National Defense Mediation Board, the Board will thereafter request
the National Labor Relations Board to expedite, as much as posible, the disposi
tion of these issues.
The Board further recommends that the company cooperate in insuring
that any complaint filed with the National Labor Relations Board will be
expeditiously handled.
The Board further recommends that all grievances or controversies which may
meanwhile threaten to obstruct or curtail production be disposed of in accordance
with the provisions of the agreement now in effect between International Union
United Automobile Workers of America, C. I. O., and the Federal Mogul
Corporation.
202
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 53
Gulf States U tilities Co.
Baton Rouge, La.
I nternational B rotherhood of E leotrical W orkers, A. F. L., and Gulf
S tates E lectrical Service E mployees
A ssociation
Certified July 22, 1941. Strike July 9-20. Hearing July 28, 29. 200 workers
involved. Closed July 29
Panel: Fisher, Mead, Wilson. Assistant, Leiserson.
This controversy arose over union recognition. The I. B. E. W. in November
1940 began organizing the employees of the company in Louisiana. The company
operated also in Texas. In December 1940 the Gulf States Electrical Service
Employees Association began to organize employees in both Louisiana and Texas.
The company recognized and signed a contract with the latter union.
The I. B. E. W. filed a petition with N. L. R. B. requesting certification as sole
bargaining agent for its members. This petition was dismissed by N. L. R. B.
Charges of company domination were then filed. The union requested recogni
tion for presentation of grievances, which was refused.
The panel heard the case and issued the following recommendations to which
both parties agreed.
Recommendations
July 29
To facilitate and expedite an adjustment of the controversy presently existing
between the Gulf States Utilities Co. and the International Brotherhood of Electical Workers, the National Defense Mediation Board recommends that the
following procedures be carried out:
1. The employees of the company now on strike shall immediately return to work
with all employment relationships unimpaired, including their classifications and
seniorities.
2. Any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right to
present any grievance or grievances to the company regarding the application of
any rules or standards of employment, either in person or by any person or
persons, including representatives of the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, when such employee or employees desire such representation.
3. These procedures shall be effective immediately and pending a disposition
of the charges of unfair labor practices now on file with the National Labor
Relations Board, made by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
4. In the event the parties hereto are unable mutually to agree to a satisfactory
adjustment of any grievance or grievances referred to herein, the matter shall be
taken up with the proper Federal agencies or with the Labor Division of the Office
of Production Management for assistance in effecting a settlement.
CASE No. 54
A rmour & Co. (15 plants)
P ackinghouse W orkers Organizing
Committee, C. I. O.
Certified July 26. No strike. Hearing August 7 and 8. 14,000 workers
involved; number elsewhere unknown. Closed September 7
Panel: Wyzanski, Mead, Carey (Brophy). Assistant, Leiserson.
During 1938 and 1939 National Labor Relations Board certified the union in
15 of the company’s plants. In February 1941 the union proposed a master agree
ment in renewal of the 15 separate contracts. The company refused. Local
bargaining proceeded, but was broken off in April by the union. The principal
demands were for a 20 cents per hour wage increase and the closed shop.
Without consulting the union, the company announced a general 8-percent
increase in wages. This the union resented. Negotiations were resumed, which
again bogged down in June. A commissioner of conciliation was assigned to
assist, but no agreement was reached.
The major issues which came before the Board, in addition to the master agree
ment proposal, were a grievance procedure, wages, and the closed shop. After
CASE HISTORIES
203
2 days’ negotiation before the panel, an interim agreement was reached on the
basis of a letter from the National Labor Relations Board providing that the
parties would negotiate a single master agreement, which should include a provi
sion permitting shop stewards to handle grievances, and give a 10-cent increase
over the old rates. The closed-shop issue was tacitly dropped by the union.
Negotiations toward such a contract began the last week in August. On
September 7 a single master agreement was signed.
Bobg-Warner Corporation
U niversal J oint
CASE No. 55
(M echanics U nited A utomobile W orkers of A merD ivision ), Rockica, Local 225, C. I. O.
ford, 111.
Certified July 26. Strike August 20-27. Hearing August 5, 6. 868 workers
involved. Closed September 11
Panel: Stacy, Connelly, Rieve. Assistant, Leiserson.
The issues were wages and union security. On July 18 a conciliator and an
O. P. M. representative recommended (1) 13-percent increase in wages, and (2)
maintenance of membership. The union accepted both but the company accepted
only the wage term.
When the hearing adjourned it was understood the panel would meet again to
make recommendations, but instead it asked the parties to hold one more confer
ence. They did on August 20, but it failed. The union leaders called a strike the
same day and notified the Board that the union considered the panel’s conduct
an indication of disinclination to act on the case. Chairman Davis informally
advised the union that if the Board did act, it would probably not favor the
maintenance of membership clause and he suggested the union accept settlement
on the basis of the 13-percent wage increase. On August 27 after the local
negotiations such a settlement was made.
CASE No. 56
A luminum Co. of A merica, Yernon, U nited Automobile W orkers of A merCalif.
ica, L ocal 808, C. I. O.
Certified July 28. No strike. Hearing August 6, 7. 1,750 workers involved.
Closed August 7
Panel: Graham, Swope, Golden. Assistant, Kirstein.
Unsuccessful negotiations for a contract followed an N. L. R. B. election
held in April 1941. A strike threatened over the issues of wages, vacations, nightshift bonus, union security, and check-off. Agreement was reached before the
Board on August 7. The union had demanded a 78 cents minimum and a 15
cents per hour raise; it got 72 cents and 9 cents, which more or less conformed
to the company’s Cleveland rate, but which, according to the company, was in
excess of prevailing local rates. Though protesting night-shift bonuses as un
usual in the Los Angeles area, it gave 3 cents and 5 cents to the respective
night shifts. Other issues were postponed pending a joint conference to work
out the general relationships between the C. I. O. and Alcoa.
CASE No. 57
L incoln Mills of A labama, Hunts- T extile W orkers U nion oof A merica,
ville, Ala.
C. I. O.
Certified July 28, 1941. Hearing August 4-7. 1,800 workers involved. Closed
October 13
Panel: Fisher, Adams, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
The contract between the company and T. W. U. A., the company’s first, ex
pired September 23, 1940. Negotiations for a renewal extended to July 1941,
469872°— 42------14
204
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
with the old contract continued from time to time for short periods. A strike
was voted for July 29. The Board asked that production be maintained.
The issues were (1) union security, (2) wages, and (3) arbitration of future
wage disputes. From remarks made by the company’s officers the Board came
to understand that the company was not strongly opposed to a union main
tenance clause; consequently it recommended it with a so-called “escape clause”
as well as a voluntary check-off; and it appointed Mr. Francis Goodell to inves
tigate the wage question. Mr. Goodell recommended that all employees receiv
ing more than the minimum rates should receive increases so as to establish
sufficient spreads to provide incentive which, he believed, the increase of the
minimums under the Wage and Hour Law had destroyed. His recommendations
involved a total increase of about 7.3 percent. Hearings were resumed on Sep
tember 16. After Mr. Goodell’s report had been submitted to the parties an agree
ment on the wage issue was reached.
The company rejected the Board’s recommendation on union security.
T. W. U. A. called a number of departmental strikes and, on September 26, the
company closed down the plant “indefinitely.” On October 10, the parties signed
an agreement including the Board’s recommendations. It is understood that
apprehension with respect to securing Government contracts may have been
instrumental in the acceptance ultimately of the recommendations. The recom
mendations follow:
Findings and Recommendations
August 7
Following certification to this Board, extensive hearings and informal con
ferences have been held before the division named to act in the controversy,
on the questions in issue in the negotiation of a renewal contract between the
company and the union. By collective bargaining the parties have agreed on all
clauses of the proposed contract except those relevant to wages and to union
security. It is apparent that further negotiations would be fruitless at this
time.
1. The Board recommends that the parties shall execute at this time a con
tract embodying the clauses upon which they have agreed together with those
hereafter recommended.
2. Upon the wage issue the union asks for a 10-percent wage increase, for
establishment of a minimum wage of 40 cents an hour, and for provision that
wages be the subject of negotiation at the end of 6 months and, in the event of
disagreement, of arbitration. The company urges that under present condi
tions the wages paid by it are equitable and offers to include in the contract
appropriate provisions for reopening the wage question for negotiation, but not
for arbitration, at the end of 90-day periods.
In order that it may be fully informed upon this issue the Board will appoint
a special agent to investigate the question of what will be appropriate wages for
the company to pay and to report to the Board within 3 weeks. Upon receiving
the special agent’s report, the Board will endeavor to promote an agreement on
the matter by collective bargaining. If an agreement is not reached the Board
will make findings and recommendations on this issue.
To cover this matter in the agreement now to be executed, the Board recom
mends the inclusion of this clause:
“(a) The wage rates, including piece rates, to be paid by the company are left
for future determination. The parties agree to resume negotiations concerning
them after 30 days. In the meantime the existing rates shall be paid.”
3. Upon the issue of union security the union asks for a check-off and some
form of union shop or maintenance of membership clause. The company is
unwilling to assent to either.
The Board recommends, after full consideration of all the circumstances of
this case, that both parties accept the following clause for inclusion in the
contract between them:
“Upon receipt of proper authorization the company agrees to deduct from the
weekly earnings union dues in the amount of 25 cents per week, to be paid
to the union.
“All employees now members of the union, or who may become members
of the union shall, as a condition of employment, remain members in good stand
ing during the life of the contract, provided that individuals may withdraw
from the organization for legitimate reasons. Any individual desiring to with
draw from the union shall set forth in writing the legitimate reason for such
205
CASE HISTORIES
withdrawal. Such legitimate reasons shall not be related to wages, hours, and
conditions of employment and shall be subject to review and approval of a
Board consisting of two representatives of the union and two representatives
of the company. In accepting or rejecting the reasons advanced by the employee
wishing to withdraw, a decision of the Board shall be unanimous. In the event
the Board is unable to agree unanimously as to whether or not the reasons ad
vanced are legitimate reasons, the matter shall then be referred to an impartial
person for determination. Should the Board be unable to agree to an impartial
party to whom the matter is to be referred, he shall be selected by the Director
of Conciliation, United States Department of Labor. Decisions of such impartial
persons shall in no way be considered as establishing precedents.,,
CASE No. 58
O h io B rass Co., Mansfield and Barber- U
ton, Ohio
W
n it e d
E l e c t r ic a l , R a d io & M a c h i n e
L o c a ls 747 a n d 758,
I. O .,
orkers,
and N ational B rotherhood
erative P otters, A. F. L.
C.
of
Op
Certified August 1. Strike June 16-September 16. Hearings August 11, 12, 13,
and 14, and September 9. 1,800 workers involved. Transferred to National
War Labor Board
Panel: Stacy, Connelly, Golden. Assistant, Cox.
Interim Findings and Recommendations
August 14
Hearings were begun in this case on August 11, 1941, and continued through
August 14. The Board was notified at the opening of the hearings that a peti
tion for certification would be filed before the National Labor Relations Board
by the National Brotherhood of Operative Potters, A. F. L., to determine the
appropriate representative for collective bargaining at the Barberton plant of
the Ohio Brass Co. This petition was filed on August 12.
The present proceedings grew out of negotiations which began in February
1939, when Local 747 of the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of
America was certified as the bargaining agency for the employees of the com
pany at its Barberton plant. Negotiations continued intermittently until June
10, 1941, when the union called a strike to enforce its demand for a collective
bargaining agreement. Representatives of the United States Conciliation Serv
ice and the Office of Production Management were unable to effect a settlement
of the dispute. Since certification of the dispute to the National Defense Media
tion Board by the Secretary of Labor, the company has taken the position that
further proceedings before this Board with respect to a collective bargaining
agreement are inappropriate until the question of representation has been de
cided by the National Labor Relations Board.
This Board has been informed by the Office of Production Management that
shipment of essential materials for the operation of electric utilities has been
interrupted by the strike and that resumption of operations at the Ohio Brass
Co. would relieve pressure on other producers of similar defense materials and
would greatly aid the defense program.
In the interest of promoting national defense, it is the opinion of the panel
that the strike should be terminated and production resumed by the company
as rapidly as practicable. To this end, the panel makes the following ad interim
recommendations:
1. All employees should be returned to their former jobs without discrimina
tion and without prejudice to seniority rights. All employees should report to
the plant not later than August 25, 1941, that they are available for work.
2. Wage adjustments, if any, resulting from the outcome of further negotia
tions between the company and Local 747, or from proceedings before the National
Defense Mediation Board, should be retroactive to the date upon which opera
tions are resumed at the Barberton works of the company.
3. After the disposition by the National Labor Relations Board of the petition
filed by the National Brotherhood of Operative Potters, the National Defense
206
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Mediation Board will resume hearings to take appropriate action under the
provisions of the Executive order of March 19,1941.
The company at first objected to all three points. N. L. R. B. dismissed the
brotherhood’s petition and this Board rescheduled hearings. Meantime the
company followed recommendation No. 1 and reinstated all employees.
At the second hearing after mediation failed, an investigator was appointed.
Before he concluded his report, however, the C. I. O. withdrew the case when
its members left the Board.
CASE No 59
E r w in C otton M il l s C o., Durham, N . C. T ex tile W orkers U n io n of A m erica ,
L ocal 246, C. I. O.
Certified August 6. No strike. Hearings August 18-22. 2,000 workers involved.
Closed August 24
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapham, Lyons. Assistant, David C. Acheson.
Negotiations between the company and the union on union security, arbitra
tion, security, and wages coming to no conclusion, the union voted a strike for
August 6.
The union demanded a 40 cents per hour minimum and a 10-percent raise.
The panel was not sympathetic to the demand. The Fair Labor Standards Act
had recently boosted the minimum to 37% cents and the company had just raised
it to 38% cents and had given a 10-percent increase. The agreement on this issue
involved arbitration on job classifications for which the union was eager. The
new classifications were to be dovetailed into the wage scales of the contract.
The union was unable to offer support for its demand for a union shop or union
maintenance provision. The panel suggested a check-off and this was agreed to
with an escape clause similar to that in case No. 47, Cheney Brothers. This
allowed escape for reasons not connected with working conditions. If a dispute
as to the right to withdraw authority to check off cannot be settled then the
parties are to refer it to a person to be nominated by Frank P. Graham, or, if he
cannot make the nomination, by the American Arbitration Association.
CASE No. 60
U n it e d S ta tes G y p s u m
Co. (17 p la n ts)
G a s , B y -P roducts , C o k e an d C h e m ic a l
W orkers U n io n , D istr ict No. 50,
U. M. W. A., C. I. O.
Certified August 6. Strike June 26-September 2. Hearing August 18,19. 3,000
workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Graham, C. E. Adams, Rieve. Assistant, Cox.
The union had been named exclusive representative for bargaining in 17 of
the 42 plants of the employer. The union demanded that the company make an
agreement in respect to wages, vacations, and union security covering the 17
plants. The company refused to enter upon such a negotiation. On June 26,
the employees at 4 plants struck. The others followed. The company pointed
out that the National Labor Relations Board had dismissed a petition filed by
the union for certification of the 17 plants as a single unit. The N. L. R. B.
in a letter to the union, however, stated that this action constituted no legal
obstacle to joint conferences looking to the negotiation of a model collective bar
gaining contract effective in all plants. The Board, to meet the position taken
by the company that it must make a separate contract for each plant and at the
same time to keep negotiations at Washington under the auspices of the Board,
made an—
CASE HISTORIES
207
Interim Recommendation
August 19
The issues between the parties are involved in the five points submitted by
the union as the basis for the settlement of the strike.
1. Master agreement for the 17 plants on strike.
2. 10 cents per hour general increase.
3. Liberalized vacation provisions.
4. Arbitration machinery for unadjusted grievances.
5. Provision for union security.
The Board so far has considered only the first proposal regarding the matter
of bargining on a 17-plant basis for a master agreement. Since the first issue,
if settled to the satisfaction of both parties, will establish a machinery of col
lective bargaining which will make it posisble for the parties to settle the other
issues by direct negotiation, the Board has decided for the present to issue only a
recommendation having to do with the machinery of collective bargaining. In
the event that parties thereafter are unable to settle the remaining issues, the
Board will recall the parties with the purpose of continuing mediation of the
dispute. The union contends that the settlement of the whole strike, and the
establishment of a collective bargaining relationship that will promote indus
trial peace in the future, requires the negotiation of a master multiplant con
tract. The company on the other hand contends that for these purposes collec
tive bargaining should be carried out on an individual plant basis at the plants.
The Board finds that a number of the basic matters of collective bargaining are
determined by the central policy of the corporation, and that these basic matters
are also subject for the consideration and policies of the national union.
The company has taken the position that it will not make 1 contract for
all the 17 plants even on those matters which may be common to all 17 plants.
In order to meet this situation, and at the same time keep the negotiations in
Washington under the auspices of the Mediation Board, the Board recommends
that the company shall bring to Washington forthwith, in addition to their
executive officers, the appropriate officers of the 17 plants involved, and that
the union shall bring to Washington, in addition to their national officers,
representatives of each of its 17 local unions.
The company may ask the union representatives from any plant to establish
in a reasonable way that they are entitled to recognition. Bargaining shall
then proceed between each plant management and the union representatives of
each plant.
The union accepted but the company rejected this recommendation. The
Board thereupon tried the course of ordering an investigation.
Interlocutory Findings and Order
August 28
This dispute comes before the National Defense Mediation Board on a certif
icate from the Secretary of Labor dated August 6, 1941, that the dispute
threatens to burden or obstruct the production or transportation of equipment
or materials essential to national defense.
United States Gypsum Co., the employer, mines gypsum and fabricates plas
ters, wallboards, and similar products for use in building construction. It
operates 42 plants spread over the country—mines, factories, and warehouses—
and controls a very large proportion of the available supply. Full production
is, therefore, important to the defense housing program and thus to the national
defense.
Gas, By-Products, Coke and Chemical Workers Union, District No. 50, U. M.
W. A., C. I. O., alleges that it has been named exclusive representative for the pur
poses of collective bargaining by the employees at 17 of the company’s 42 plants.
It has had contracts at at least 2 of those plants and has in the past been recog
nized at a majority of the 17. The employees at some of the other plants are
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor and at others are not organ
ized.
In the spring of 1941 District No. 50 demanded that the company sign one
master agreement covering all the plants represented by it. Negotiations were
held from time to time but repeatedly broke down on this point. On June 26,
208
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
1941, the employees at 14 plants struck; a few days later they were followed
by those at 3 other plants. The strike affects 40 percent of the national pro
duction of gypsum-plaster and wallboard.
At the hearings before the National Defense Mediation Board it appeared
that there were five issues between the company and the representatives of its
employees.
1. Master agreement for the 17 plants on strike.—The union argued that the
settlement of the whole strike and the establishment of a collective bargaining
relationship which would promote industrial peace in the future required the
negotiation of a master multiplant contract. The company contended that to
achieve these purposes, collective bargaining should be carried out on an indi
vidual plant basis at the various plants. It pointed out that the National
Labor Relations Board dismissed a petition filed by the union for certification
for a single unit of 17 plants. A letter from that Board to the union, however,
establishes that “The Board’s action of June 20, 1941, in dismissing the peti
tion referred to above should not in any manner be construed as constituting
a legal obstacle to representatives of the United States Gypsum Co. and the
representatives of District 50, United Mine Workers of America, participating
in joint conferences looking towards the settlement of the current strike through
the negotiation of a model collective bargaining contract, which contract would
apply and be equally effective in all plants now on strike.”
2. General wage increases.—The union asked for a general wage increase of
10 cents per hour. In support of its demand it argued (a) that there is an
urgent need for wage increases, (&) that the United States Gypsum Co. is pay
ing less than is paid for labor in comparable occupations, and (c) that the
United States Gypsum Co. is clearly in a position to pay higher wages. The
company did not reply to these arguments but indicated its belief that wage
questions could be settled after the procedure for collective bargaining was
determined.
3. Vacations.—The union demanded that the company’s vacation plan be lib
eralized and that a uniform plan be put into effect at the 17 plants. The com
pany took the same position in respect to vacation that it did in respect to wages.
4. Arbitration of grievances.—The union argued that in the interest of indus
trial peace any contract between it and the company should provide some ma
chinery for the arbitration of grievances so that it would not be necessary for the
union in each instance to accept the company’s final judgment or else call a
strike. The company replied that the management had the responsibility of
making the final decision on all grievances and that it could not surrender it.
5. Union security.—At the hearings, the union added to its previous demands a
request for some measure of union security. It stated that this was made
necessary by the strike and the tactics of the company during the strike.
On August 19, 1941, the Board issued an interim recommendation covering the
first of the 5 issues in the controversy. In order to meet the position taken by
the company that it must make a separate contract for each plant and in order
at the same time to keep the negotiations at Washington under the auspices of
the Board, the Board recommended “that the company shall bring to Washington
forthwith, in addition to their executive officers, the appropriate officers of the
17 plants involved, and that the union shall bring to Washington, in addition to
their national officers, representatives of each of its 17 plants.” The recommen
dation requires the union to waive for the present its demand for a master con
tract. The union accepted the recommendation in the interests of national de
fense. The recommendation that the company commence negotiations for the
separate plant contracts under the auspices of the Board has been refused by
the company. It therefore becomes necessary for the Board to proceed to con
sideration of the four remaining issues in the controversy and to act upon them
in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of the Executive order of March 19, 1941.
The Board has determined that the following measures should be taken there
under :
1. The Board will appoint a special representative to act in its behalf, under
the provisions of paragraph 2 (d) of the Executive order of March 19, 1941, to
investigate the four remaining issues between the employer and its employees,
and practices and activities thereof with respect to the controversy or dispute
above identified; to conduct hearings, take testimony, and make findings of fact
for the information of the Board. The special representative may, to any extent
requested by the Board, supplement his findings on any or all points of the
controversy by any such suggestions or recommendations as may seem to him
appropriate.
CASE HISTORIES
209
2. Each party shall be given full opportunity to present to the special repre
sentative any data which such party considers relevant to the issue.
3. The report of the special representative shall be made available to both
parties after it has been filed with the Board.
4. The Board will request the investigator to complete the investigation and
make a report within 30 days unless the time is extended by the Board at the
request of the investigator.
5. Upon receipt of the report of the special representative, the Board will re
sume consideration of the dispute in an effort to adjust and settle it by agree
ment between the parties. Should it prove impossible to reach such an agree
ment, the Board will then proceed to make its findings of fact and recommenda
tions in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of the Executive order of March 19,
1941.
Upon the basis of the foregoing action, the National Defense Mediation Board
asks the union and its members to resume and continue the production of these
essential defense materials until an agreement is reached or the Board has made
its final recommendations.
The Board appointed Owen D. Young to investigate all issues. He held in
formal hearings in New York, and later formal hearings, after which he prepared
tentative findings. Before filing his report, however, the C. I. O. members of
the Board withdrew and the case was in abeyance till its transfer to the new
board.
CASE No. 61
C onsolidated E d iso n C o.
I n c ., New York,
of
N e w Y ork , I n t e r n a t io n a l B rotherhood of E lec trical W orkers , L ocal N o . 3, A . F . L.
B rotherhood of C o nsolidated E d iso n
E m ployees
N. Y.
Certified August 7. Strike July 2^-August 11. Hearings August 14, 15; and
September 16. 6,500 workers involved. Closed September 26
Panel: Davis, Mead, Lynch. Assistant, Gill.
Local No. 3 called a general strike of electrical construction workers in New
York City, for the purpose of focusing public attention on their dispute with the
company concerning employment on construction jobs. Certification of the dis
pute to this Board on August 7 resulted in the termination by local No. 3 of the
general strike. Local No. 3 continued to picket the company’s Sherman Creek
project; it, however, had no members on that job so that the job continued
without interruption.
The Board held two hearings. Between them, it had Arthur Meyer investi
gate and report. The Board issued the following recommendations, which were
neither accepted nor rejected by the parties, and the Board took no further
action:
Recommendations
September 26
This case was certified to the National Defense Mediation Board by the Sec
retary of Labor on August 7, 1941.
Hearings before the Board were held in Washington, D. C., on August 14 and
15, 1941.
The issue in the dispute concerns the demand of local No. 3 for jurisdiction over
certain electrical work at two projects now in process of construction by the
company (generating stations at Sherman Creek and Waterside), and for a
commitment from the company that similar work in the future will be given
to members of local No. 3. This work* is now being done by electricians on the
company’s regular pay-roll, who are members of the Brotherhood of Consolidated
Edison Employees, with which organization the company has a collective bar
gaining contract. The brotherhood is the certified representative of the com
pany’s employees pursuant to a National Labor Relations Board election. The
members of local No. 3 are not employees of the company, but are customarily
engaged by independent contractors to do electrical work upon jobs which the
company from time to time lets out to such contractors. The contract between
the brotherhood and the company provides that “wherever it is deemed by the
210
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Edison Co. to be practicable work on company premises and in the streets, which
can be economically performed by company employees, will not be let out.”
It is the contention of local No. 3 that the decision of the company to permit
the electrical work at the Sherman Creek, Waterside, and similar jobs to be done
by its own employees, members of the brotherhood, represents a departure from
an established practice of many years to let out such work to independent con
tractors, who would employ members of local No. 3. The company contests this
assertion, and claims that it is bound by its contract with the exclusive bargain
ing agent to give this work to its own employees, since it is work on the company
premises and can, in the company’s judgment, be economically performed by
company employees. The company states that it has in the past given a great
deal of work to members of local No. 3, that it is currently doing so on various
other projects, and that it intends to continue to do so in the future whenever
it is appropriate in the light of its contract with the brotherhood and the exigen
cies of the narticular work to be performed.
On August 18, 1941, the Board appointed Arthur S. Meyer, chairman of the
New York State Mediation Board, as a special agent of this Board to investigate
the issues in this dispute and to make findings and recommendations to this
Board. Mr. Meyer submitted a report on September 2, 1941, copies of which
were made available to the parties.
In his report, Mr. Meyer reviewed in detail the evidence and arguments of the
parties, and concluded that the claim of local No. 3 to the jobs at Sherman
Creek and Waterside was not well taken.
Without finding that the company is bound by contract to give all its construc
tion work to the brotherhood union, Mr. Meyer has stated that the company could
scarcely, as a practical matter, enter into any labor engagement affecting the
brotherhood union without securing its approval. At the same time he noted that
the company was the sole owner that failed, either directly or through con*.
tractors, to employ the members of local No. 3 on construction work and pointed
out that, through its association with the building trades council, local No. 3
might, without impropriety, prevent the company from employing some of the
building-trades unions unless it employed all. Accordingly, to avoid serious
controversies that would arise if the company contracted some of its construction
work but reserved the electrical work for its own employees, he recommended
that this Board make further attempts at mediation in an effort to reach an
understanding between the parties as to a practical method of avoiding such
controversies.
The parties were summoned to Washington for a further hearing on September
16, 1941. It was not possible to secure a mutual agreement of the parties on
the issue of local No. 3’s claim to the work now being performed by company
employees at the Waterside and Sherman Creek jobs. The Board also explored
the possibilities of working out between the parties some formula for the alloca
tion of future work in accordance with the proposal of Mr. Meyer that further
mediation be attempted to that end, but it became apparent that mediation at
this stage could not succeed in securing any agreement upon such a formula.
In view of the circumstances set forth above, the Board hereby makes the
following recommendations:
1. The claim of local No. 3 to jurisdiction over the electrical work on the jobs
at Waterside and Sherman Creek is not well taken, and the Board recommends
no change in the present allocation of that work.
2. The Board finds no basis, in the absence of any immediate controversy over
other jobs bearing on defense production, for recommending a particular line of
demarcation to govern the allocation of future electrical work as between the
brotherhood and local No. 3.
3. The Board does recommend, however, that whenever such a question arises
in the future as to jobs on which the company employs the other building-trades
unions for construction work, the company shall, before allocating such work, con
sult with both the brotherhood and local No. 3 as interested parties to that alloca
tion, and endeavor to work out a solution which is fair and calculated to avoid
industrial strife. In the event that a mutual agreement cannot be reached in
any such case, the Board recommends that the parties shall promptly avail
themselves of the offices of the New York State Mediation Board in resolving
the controversy.
CASE HISTORIES
211
CASE No. 62
T odd G alveston D r y D o ck s , I n c ., G al-
G alveston M e t a l T rades C o u n c il ,
veston, Tex.
A. F. L.
Certified August 7. Strike July 15-August 11. Hearing August 15, 16. 1,850
workers involved. Closed August 23
Panel: Fisher, Hamilton, Wilson. Assistant Leiserson.
Todd Galveston Dry Docks, Inc., a subsidiary of the Todd Shipyards Corpora
tion, was wholly engaged in ship repair work. It had had, since 1937, verbal
agreements with the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Build
ers and Helpers of America, the International Association of Machinists, and
several other unions affiliated with the A. F. L, Metal Trades Department. In
May and June 1941 this company and the unions involved had participated in
the Gulf Coast Zone Labor Standards conferences, which had been initiated by
the Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee of O. P. M., the Navy Department, and
the Maritime Commission. These negotiations had been concluded in June, with
the understanding that the zone labor standards agreed upon, subject to ratifi
cation, were to be included in all agreements negotiated locally between the
unions and the several shipbuilding and ship repair companies, and it was agreed
that the standards and contracts were to continue for 2 years.
The negotiations between Todd Galveston Dry Docks, Inc., and the unions
in the present case had begun about July 10. These negotiations lasted for less
than 1 week, because it was the employer’s understanding that the zone-standards
conferences had completed the negotiations, while the union wished to continue
bargaining on the union-shop question and on the question of a premium or extra
pay for work in tankers and double bottoms, which is done under confined, pecu
liarly disagreeable conditions. A strike was called July 16. The O. P. M. Labor
Division requested the national officers of the metal-trades unions to arrange a
return to work on the understanding that the case would be certified to the
Board.
On August 7 the case was certified, and 4 days later, the men returned to work.
The unions and the company agreed to dispose of the question of premium rates
for work in confined spaces through the ordinary grievance procedure, the com
pany undertaking to give such complaints serious consideration.
On the main issue which led to the strike—the union shop—the union claimed
that it had had an oral understanding with the company since February 1938
which amounted to a union-shop agreement. The company did not deny that it
had cooperated to some extent with the unions but did deny that it had a closedshop agreement. It stated itself unwilling to enter into any written closed-shop
contract, such arrangements being unknown on the Gulf coast. The Board recom
mended the following provision, which the parties incorporated into their contract
signed August 16 and effective, upon ratification by the local unions, on August 23.
Recommendation
August 16
The National Defense Mediation Board having held hearings concerning the
dispute between Todd Galveston Dry Docks, Inc., and the several unions affili
ated with the American Federation of Labor involved, recommends for the approval
of the parties the inclusion in their union agreement of the following:
“The company recognizes that a large majority of its employees for some years
past have been members of the unions with which it now has a labor agreement,
and relations have in general been mutually satisfactory. In consequence of the
foregoing, the union and the company agree that it is for their mutual interest
to maintain existing practices and agree to do so. The company looks with favor
on its employees becoming members of the unions parties to this agreement.,,
212
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
R ockford D rop F orge
111.
CASE No. 63
Co., Rockford, I n t er n a tio n a l B rotherhood of B l a c k s m it h s , D rop F orgers a n d H elpers ,
L ocal 614, A. F. L., a n d I n t e r n a t io n a l
A ssociation
of
M a c h in is t s , A . F . L.
Certified August 9. No strike. Hearing August 19, 20. 300 workers involved.
Closed August 24
Panel: Stacy, Ching, Brown. Assistant, Leiserson.
On June 9 the International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths, Drop Forgers and
Helpers was certified as the result of an N. L. R. B. election in the company’s
forge shop. On June 18 the union submitted a copy of a proposed contract to the
company. Delays by the company in setting a date for negotiations'resulted in a
strike July 21. On July 31 the strike was called off at the request of the Concilia
tion Service.
On July 26 the employees in the machine shop invited the machinists to represent
them, and on August 1 a consent election was held which the machinists won.
In the course of negotiations before the Board, through mediation by the panel,
the unions dropped their union-shop demand and the parties agreed to schedules
of wage rates for the forge shop and the machine shop which amounted to increases
ranging from 10 cents to 30 cents per hour, which were what the union had asked
for. Having agreed to a disposition of the union shop and wage issues, the parties
within 3 hours agreed upon and signed a full working agreement covering
grievance procedure, hours, seniority, and termination clause. On August 24 the
membership ratified the agreement.
CASE No. 64
C ur ttss -W r ig h t C orporation (C u r t is s I n t e r n a t io n a l A sso c ia t io n of M a P ro peller D iv is io n ), Caldwell, N. J.
c h in is t s , A ircraft L odge N o . 703,
A. F . L ., an d P ropeller C raft , I n c .
Certified August 13. Strike August 8-14. Hearing August 22, 23, 28, September
5. 740 workers involved. Closed September 5
Panel: Fisher, Hamilton, Watt. Assistant, Leiserson.
The plant at Clifton was established in October 1938, and the plant at Cald
well, in September 1940. A contract with Propeller Craft, an independent
union, was put into effect for the employees at Clifton in 1938, then extended
to Caldwell in 1940. Aircraft Lodge No. 703 was organized largely among
employees of the steel-blade department at Caldwell. By March 1941 it claimed
to represent a majority of the employees at Caldwell and filed charges with the
N. L. R. B. alleging company domination of Propeller Craft. These charges
were subsequently withdrawn and on May 29 a petition was filed with the
N. L. R. B. for certification as exclusive bargaining representative at the Cald
well plant. On July 17 the Board ordered an election among the employees of
the company at both the Clifton and the Caldwell plants, accepting the con
tentions of Propeller Craft and the company that both plants were the appro
priate unit. On August 7 an election was held at which Lodge No. 703 received
527 votes, while Propeller Craft received 1,094.
On the following day a committee of Lodge No. 703 made formal wage de
mands upon the plant superintendent at Caldwell. This superintendent advised
Lodge No. 703 he could not deal with them because they were not the certified
bargaining representatives. The same day employees of the steel-blade de
partment walked out, succeeding in shutting down the plant. Representatives
of the O. P. M. immediately intervened in the situation. At a conference held
in Washington on August 13 in the offices of Mr. Hillman, the representatives
of the I. A. M. agreed to return to work if the case were certified to the Board.
At the conclusion of the second day of hearing, August 23, the representatives
of the company announced they would open negotiations with Propeller Craft,
looking to an increase in wages. The panel thereupon recessed the hearing until
September 5. At the request of Lodge No. 703, however, a hearing was held on
CASE HISTORIES
213
August 28. At this meeting the representatives of the I. A. M. presented evi
dence to show that wage increases were long overdue at the company’s plant
in Caldwell and that wages had been the cause of the strike on August 8.
On August 29 the company and Propeller Craft reached a new wage agree
ment providing for a 10-cent hourly increase in wages for all employees hired prior
to May 15. At the hearing on September 5 the representatives of the company
informed the Board of this action. The representatives of the I. A. M. took the
position that these increases were entirely unacceptable. The panel thereupon
adjourned the hearing and closed the case.
CASE No. 65
S olvay P booess Co., I nc ., Baton Rouge, Oil W orkers I nternational U nio n ,
La.
L ocal 424, C. I. O.
C h em ical W orkers U n io n , L ocal 22609,
A. F. L.
Certified August 15. Strike September 1-3. Hearing August 22-24. 275
workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Stocking, Lapham, Brophy. Assistant, Kirstein.
In April 1938 the union charged the company with unfair labor practice,
and in 1940 the National Labor Relations Board directed the company to deal
with the union. This decision was appealed, and the circuit court handed down
a decision which was not clear to the parties.
A strike was threatened for August 16, 1941, but was postponed at the Board’s
request. After the hearing, the parties were recessed to await the recommenda
tion. Before receiving the recommendation, the union, on September 1, at
tempted to strike the plant. This strike was terminated at the request of
the Board on September 3. The following recommendation was submitted to
the parties on September 17.
Recommendation
September 17
This dispute between Solvay Process Co. and its employees at its plant in
Baton Rouge, La., comes before the National Defense Mediation Board on
certificate from the Secretary of Labor dated August 15, 1941, that it threatens
to burden or obstruct the production or transportation of materials essential
to national defense.
The broad issue in controversy is whether the company shall commence bar
gaining with Local No. 424, Oil Workers International Union, C. I. O., as the
representative of its employees at the Baton Rouge plant. The Board held
hearings on August 23 and 24 but was unable to settle the controversy by agree
ment between the parties.
Proceeding under paragraph 2 (d) of the Executive order of March 19, 1941,
the Board makes the following findings of fact:
1. Solvay Process Co., Inc., at its plant in Baton Rouge, La., manufactures
chemicals, chiefly chlorine, caustic soda, and soda ash. Production at this plant
is essential to national defense not only because brine is supplied to the ethylgasoline plant at Baton Rouge, but also because the chlorine is an important and
scarce chemical under mandatory priority.
2. Continuously since March 1938, Local No. 424, Oil Workers International
Union, C. I. O., has asserted that it was and is the exclusive representative for
the purpose of collective bargaining of all the company’s employees at the Baton
Rouge plant, exclusive of clerical and supervisory employees, laboratory employees,
brine-well employees, and mill, water, and wharf employees.
In 1938 Local No. 424, C. I. O., filed with the National Labor Relations Board
an amended charge that the company had committed unfair labor practices
under the National Labor Relations Act in that it (a) had interfered with the
employees’ exercise of their right to form, join, and assist a labor organization,
(&) had dominated and contributed support to a company union, and (c) had
refused to bargain collectively with Local No. 424, C. I. O., the representative of
its employees. The National Labor Relations Board issued its complaint alleg
ing the same violations. Hearings were held. In December of 1938 the trial
examiner made his intermediate report, and during the same month the company
and the alleged company-dominated union filed exceptions. A year later the
214
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
National Labor Relations Board heard argument and on March 22,1940, rendered
a decision sustaining the complaint.1 It ordered among other things that the
company “upon request bargain collectively with Oil Workers International
Union, Local No. 424, as the exclusive representative of all the employees at the
(company’s) Baton Rouge, La., plant, exclusive of clerical and supervisory em
ployees, laboratory employees, brine-well employees, and mill, water, and wharf
employees, in respect to rates of pay, wages, and hours of work and other
conditions of employment.”
The company thereafter filed in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit a petition to review the order of the National Labor Relations
Board. The case was not argued until the fall of 1940. On January 4, 1941, the
court handed down an opinion dismissing the petition for review and directing
that a decree be entered enforcing the order of the National Labor Relations
Board.12 The court said in its opinion: “We think the steadfast unwillingness of
the manager to negotiate with this committee (of the union) and his continuing
failure to consent to impartial determination of the propriety of their requests for
recognition, when viewed in the light of his active disparagement of union organ
izations, disclosed a determined course of deliberate noncompliance from which
the inference that it was an unwarranted refusal to bargain could be drawn
by reasonable men.”
On February 20, 1941, the company filed a petition for rehearing, which was .
denied. On March 27, 1941, the court of appeals entered its decree enforcing the
order of the National Labor Relations Board with this modification: After order
ing the company to bargain with local No. 424, the decree provided “that Solvay
Process Co. or any labor organization at its Baton Rouge, La., plant * * *
may petition the Board for a certification of representatives, in which event the
company may abide the decision of the Board and comply with any supplemental
order to enforce certification by the Board, in lieu of bargaining collectively with
Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 424, as herein ordered.” The proviso
was added at the request of the company and over the objection of the National
Labor Relations Board. On May 20, 1941, the company filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. On June 2, 1941,
that petition was denied and the decree ordering the company to bargain with
local No. 424 remained in force.
During these protracted legal proceedings there have been organizing activities
among the employees by Chemical Workers Union No. 22609, A. F. L., which
now contends that the majority of the 250 production employees of the company
have become members of that local. On June 10,1941, 8 days after the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in the proceedings before the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap
peals, the American Federation of Labor filed with the National Labor Relations
Board a petition for investigation and certification of representatives, claiming to
represent the company’s employees at its Baton Rouge plant. The National
Labor Relations Board dismissed the petition on June 27, 1941, pointing out that
the company “has taken no steps to comply with the said decree” of the circuit
court of appeals.
On July 9, 1941, the company filed an employers’ petition for investigation and
certification of representatives of the employees at its Baton Rouge plant, alleging
that both Local No. 424, C. I. O., and the Chemical Workers Union, No. 22609,
A. F. L., claimed to represent such employees. On July 12, 1941, the National
Labor Relations Board dismissed that petition.
3. Following the dismissal of the petitions last mentioned, Local No. 424,
C. I. O., renewed its demand upon the company to bargain with it. Upon
refusal, it threatened direct action; it took a strike vote but the strike was post
poned while the case was before the United States Conciliation Service and until
August 29,1941.
4. Chemical Workers Union No. 22609, A. F. L., was not certified as party
to the dispute, but its position was set forth in a telegram to the Board by E. H.
Williams, organizer for the American Federation of Labor. It claims to represent
the workers at the Baton Rouge plant and threatened “Any decision favorable to
minority group (the C. I. O. union) will result in strike by A. F. L.”
5. The company takes the following positions:
{a) That if it proceeds to recognize the C. I. O. as bargaining agency for its
employees, it will be confronted by a strike led by Chemical Workers Union
No. 22609. That, in its judgment, such a strike will interfere more seriously with
1 In the M atter of Solvay Process Co.t Baton Rouge, La., 21 N. L. R. B., No. 90.
2 Solvay Process Co. V. National Labor Relations Board, ll7 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 5).
CASE HISTORIES
215
its plant operations than the threatened strike led by C. I. O. That, there is,
moreover, a real danger that a strike by A. F. L. at the Baton Rouge plant will be
supported by a sympathetic strike at the stone quarry at Winnfield, La., where
the company has a contract with the A. F. L. and upon which its operations at
the Baton Rouge plant are dependent.
(&) That, despite the decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, it is
under no legal obligation to bargain. It argues that the proviso in the decree of
the circuit court of appeals, quoted above, must be read as requiring the National
Labor Relations Board to hold an election before the company is to be under any
obligation to bargain collectively with local No. 424, and that the decisions dis
missing the petitions filed in June and July were in violation of the decree and
contrary to law.
The National Defense Mediation Board is here confronted with a dispute in
which a conflict of organizing activities between the Congress of Industrial
Organizations and the American Federation of Labor is involved, and in which
the National Labor Relations Board still has jurisdiction of a complaint of unfair
labor practices brought against the company by the C. I. O. In such a case the
principles which must determine the action of the Mediation Board, and which
should determine the action of all the parties, are very clear. The Mediation
Board, as a matter of course, gives full faith and credit to the action of the
National Labor Relations Board at whatever stage the proceedings before that
Board may have reached. In this period of emergency the spirit of the National
Labor Relations Act and respect for prevailing opinion demand universal and un
grudging acceptance by all employers.of the processes and implications of col
lective bargaining. Any refusal at this time by any employer to accord to labor
its full rights of self-organization and collective bargaining stipulated in the act
is an inexcusable interference with production of materials necessary to the wel
fare of the Nation. The decision of the National Labor Relations Board dis
missing the two petitions filed in June and July involved an interpretation by
that Board, adverse to the company’s present contention of the ambiguous
language above quoted from the decree of the circuit court of appeals, and the
company assumes a heavy weight of responsibility when it continues to refuse to
bargain with the C. I. O. union. The O. I. O. union may very naturally feel that the
company’s insistence upon further jurisdictional procedure is but another mani
festation of the company’s “steadfast unwillingness” to bargain which was
characterized by the court of appeals “as a determined course of deliberate
noncompliance.”
Indeed, if this were the usual case of final decision by the National Labor
Relations Board, in which the only further legal proceeding possible would
be a proceeding for contempt because of the company’s defiance of the deci
sion of the National Labor Relations Board, we could not find any justifica
tion for the company’s refusal to bargain in the first point advanced by the
company which has to do with an asserted apprehension that if the company
bargains with the C. I. O. there will be a strike by the A. F. L. The
obligation of employers which we have just mentioned is accompanied by a
correlative obligation of the complaining union, in cases of this character, to
follow its legal remedies under the National Labor Relations Act to their con
clusion, in preference to direct action; and there is a corresponding obligation
on all other labor organizations to accept without reserve the final outcome
of the proceedings before the Natiopal Labor Relations Board. The National
Defense Mediation Board cannot interfere in any way with those proceedings.
The Mediation Board has, however, under paragraph 2 (e) of the Executive
order of March 19, 1941, the power to request the National Labor Relations
Board, in any controversy or dispute relating to the appropriate unit or ap
propriate representatives to be designated for purposes of collective bar
gaining, to expedite as much as possible the determination of the appropriate
unit or appropriate representatives of the workers. In this case, which is
complicated by the ambiguity of the decree of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap
peals, and after conference with the officials of the National Labor Relations
Board, the National Defense Mediation Board is of the opinion that the
most expeditious procedure would be to secure from the court of appeals
a prompt interpretation of the disputed phraseology.
Therefore, the National Defense Mediation Board, acting under paragraph
2 (e) of the Executive order of March 19, 1941, in view of the company’s
continuing refusal to bargain with the C. I. O. union, and in view of the fact
that there exists this alternative legal procedure which seems capable of af
fording a definite settlement to the issue of the right to an election raised by
216
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
the company, will request the National Labor Relations Board to obtain a
clarification of the decree by bringing the questions before the circuit court
of appeals at once. All parties should accept short notices and cooperate to
expedite the proceedings. The National Defense Mediation Board is confident
that the court will find it possible in the interests of national defense to hear
the cause and render a decision quickly.
Pending decision in the manner provided by law, the status quo should be
maintained. The President has declared an unlimited emergency. Continued
production at the Baton Rouge plant of the Solvay Process Co. is an essential
part of the national defense. The National Defense Mediation Board, there
fore, recommends that all the workers remain at their posts pending the
court’s decision, both those affiliated with the C. I. O. and those affiliated with
the A. F. L. The Board also recommends that the company cooperate in every
way to expedite the decision.
The National Defense Mediation Board reserves jurisdiction of the con
troversy in order to consider all questions arising subsequent to the decision
of the court.
On October 7, the circuit court clarified the language of its previous decision
and directed the company to bargain with the union. Negotiations proceeded
after this decision and on January 19, 1942, had not yet resulted in a contract.
The company informed the Board that the A. F. L. had again petitioned the
N. L. R. B. for a determination of representation and that there was a likeli
hood that all parties, the company, the 0. I. O., and the A. F. L. would consent
to an election.
CASE No. 66
A l u m in u m Co. of A m erica (5 p la n ts)
A l u m in u m W orkers
of
A m eric a , L ocal
2, C. I. O.
Certified August 16. No strike. Hearing August 23-26. 18,925 workers involved.
Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Davis, Ching, Carey. Assistant, Cox.
The facts are stated in the Board’s opinion.
Interim Findings cmd Recommendations
August 27
This dispute comes before the National Defense Mediation Board on a certifica
tion of the Secretary of Labor dated August 16, 1941, that the dispute threatens
to burden or obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or materials
essential to national defense.
The dispute involves employees of the company at five of its plants in which
aluminum and aluminum products are produced and in which the workers are
represented by the Aluminum Workers of America, C. I. O. These plants are at
Detroit, Mich.; Edgewater, N. J .; New Kensington, Pa.; Alcoa, Tenn.; and Badin,
N. C. The company has other plants at which the employees are represented (1)
by other unions affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, (2) by
unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor; and in addition there
are some plants of the company in which the employees are not organized.
The agreement between the Aluminum Workers of America, C. I. O., and the
company covering the five plants involved in this dispute is the outgrowth of col
lective bargaining resulting in contractual relations which began in 1934. The
contract does not set forth wage rates.
The issue in the present dispute arises out of wage differentials among the
plants in which the employees are represented by the Aluminum Workers of
America, C. I. O., sometimes referred to herein as “the union.”
The union contends that the wage differential between the company’s southern
plants at Alcoa and Badin and the company’s northern plants at Detroit, Edgewater, and New Kensington should be eliminated, that a minimum starting rate
of pay of 75 cents per hour should be established at such plants, and that all
other rates should be adjusted accordingly. It urges three arguments.
1. There is no economic justification for lower payments in the South.
2. The company can afford to eliminate the differential. It makes large profits
on its southern operations.
CASE HISTORIES
217
3. The company charges but one price for its products regardless of where they
are made.
The company contends that the wage differential should not be eliminated. In
response to the union’s demand it urges the following arguments:
1. It is paying wages equal to or above the prevailing rates in each community.
2. In view of differences in the cost of living and other factors there is ample
justification for the differentials existing between these southern and northern
plants of the company.
3. The wage rates in question cannot properly or justifiably be based upon the
company’s costs of production, profits, or selling prices.
4. Present wages at these plants and the wage history of the company show
that no increase is justified at this time.
At the same time, and quite apart from the question of wage differentials, the
union demands on behalf of the employees at the company’s plant in New Kensing
ton, Pa., an extra 10 cents per hour for the afternoon and night shifts, referred
to as the B and C shifts. This demand has not been discussed in the proceedings
before the National Defense Mediation Board, for the reason that it was the
purpose of the union to have its side of this question presented by representatives
of the New Kensington local, and upon failure of the main proceedings to bring
about an agreement on the issue of wage differentials, with the resultant neces
sity for a factual investigation under section 2 (d) of the Executive order of
March 19, 1941, it has been decided to have the factual investigation cover also
this separate issue.
The National Defense Mediation Board held hearings on August 23, 25, and 26,
1941. The transcript of so much of those proceedings as were put on the record,
together with the documents which were presented during those proceedings, will
be made available to the fact investigator referred to below. It proved impossible
to reach an agreement between the parties by collective bargaining.
The National Defense Mediation Board makes the following interim recom
mendation, which both parties have agreed to accept;
I. (1) The National Defense Mediation Board will appoint a special repre
sentative, hereinafter called “investigator” to act on its behalf under the pro
visions of paragraph 2 (d) of the Executive order of March 19, 1941, to investi
gate the issues between the employer and its employees, and practices and
activities thereof with respect to the controversy or dispute certified or above
identified, to conduct hearings, take testimony, and make findings of fact for
the information of the National Defense Mediation Board. The investigator
may, to any extent requested by the National Defense Mediation Board, sup
plement his findings on any or all points of the controversy by any such sugges
tions or recommendations as may seem to him appropriate.
(2) Each party will appoint an individual to assist, advise, and cooperate
with the investigator in his investigation and in the preparation of his findngs.
(3) Ether party will present and make available to the investigator all data
which it considers relevant to the issues.
(4) The report of the investigator shall be made available to both parties,
after it has been filed with the Board.
II. (1) The hearing before the National Defense Mediation Board shall be
recessed until it receives the report of such investigator.
(2) There shall be no change at the five plants represented by Aluminum
Workers of America in the conditions existing under the present contract, or
in the now prevailing wages, without mutual consent, and no strike, lock-out,
or other work stoppage at such plants until an agreement between the parties
has been reached with respect to this dispute or until the National Defense
Mediation Board has made its final recommendations.
(3) The investigator shall file his report with the National Defense Media
tion Board on or before October 11, 1941, unless the time is extended by the
Natioinal Defense Mediation Board after consulting both parties.
(4) Upon receipt of the report of the investigator, the National Defense
Mediation Board will resume the consideration of the dispute in an effort
to adjust and settle it by agreement between the parties. Should it prove
impossible to reach such an agreement, the Board will then proceed to make
its findings of fact and recommendations in accordance with paragraph 2 (d)
of the Executive order of March 19, 1941.
(5) During these proceedings the Board has stated to both parties its
conviction that whatever settlement of this wage dispute is finally arrived at
should be embodied in a written contract for 1 year.
218
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Paul Hays, a member of the New York State Board of Mediation, ap
pointed special representative, made the investigation and filed his report with
the Board November 16. On November 25 the chairman of the panel and of the
Board met representatives of Alcoa and of the Aluminum Workers and released
the report to them. He explained that they could withdiaw the case from
consideration by the Board only by settling it. Shortly thereafter direct nego
tiations between the parties were opened in Pittsburgh, but they did not result
in a settlement.
CASE No. 67
P a c ific S ta te s C a s t I ron P ip e Co.,
Provo, U ta h
S teel W orkers O rganizing C o m m itte e ,
L ocal 1654, C. I. O.
Certified August 18. Strike July 15-August 19. Hearing September 8-10. 438
workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Fisher, Mead, Lyons. Assistant, Leiserson.
In February 1940 an independent union which had a written agreement with
this company affiliated itself with the S. W. O. C. and won an N. L. R. B. election.
The company refused to sign a new contract with this union. Local 1654 filed
charges with the N. L. R. B. alleging intimidation, discriminatory discharges, and
refusal to bargain.
On July 15,1941, after the N. L. R. B. trial examiner’s report found the company
guilty of these charges, the union struck. At the Board’s request production was
resumed pending hearing.
After 3 days of hearing and negotiation, the company and the union on Sep
tember 10 agreed on all provisions of a proposed contract except wages for all
employees and the overtime rates for truck drivers. On these points the parties
accepted an interim recommendation providing for investigation and findings by
a special agent of the Board. All other questions were reduced to writing and
embodied in a signed agreement, dated September 10.
Interim Findings and Recommendations
September 10
Following certification to this Board, extensive hearings and informal confer
ences have been held before the Board on the questions at issue in the negotiation
of a contract between the company and the union. By collective bargaining, the
parties have agreed on all clauses of the proposed contract except those relevant
to wages and the application of the overtime provisions to truck drivers.
In order that the Board may be fully informed upon the wage issue, the Board
will appoint a special agent to investigate the question of what will be an appro
priate wage scale (including bonus payments) for the company to pay.
In the meantime, the company and the union should endeavor to reach an
agreement on the matter by collective bargaining.
If an agreement is not reached by the time the Board has received the report
of the special agent, the Board will make findings and recommendations on the
above issues, and also such other findings and recommendations as it may think
proper.
James H. Wolfe, Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, appointed
special representative September 20, submitted his report November 14. No fur
ther action was taken due to the withdrawal of the C. I. O. from the Board.
CASE No. 68
A m erican C ar a n d F oundry C o., Chi- U nited A utomobile W orkers of A m eri cago, 111.
ca , L ocal 805, C. I. O.
Certified August 19. Strike July 10-August 22. Hearing August 28-30. 600
workers involved. Closed September 3
Panel; Fisher, Lapham, Lyons. Assistant, Leiserson.
In March 1941 the parties signed their first collective bargaining agreement,
which was followed May 8 by a supplemental agreement covering rates of pay.
The latter provided alternative hourly rates and piece-work rates which latter
219
CASE HISTORIES
were expected to yield far in excess of the hourly rates. For example, riveters
under the contract were expected to receive $1.14% per hour on piece work,
though their hourly rate was 75 cents. The piece-work earnings were expressly
not guaranteed by the company, but were predicated upon an estimated produc
tion of 18 cars per day.
After the contract was signed, on several orders the men failed to get ex
pected earnings because the daily production fell far below the schedule.
Several unauthorized stoppages occurred in June, and finally on July 10 the
union called a strike. On July 14 the union served a formal demand on the
company which amounted practically to asking a guaranty of production.
A panel of the Conciliation Service on July 22 recommended investigation by
the Department of Labor, which suggestion was accepted by the union and
rejected by the company. On August 20, the day after certification, the Board
successfully requested an immediate resumption of production, with the under
standing that any wage adjustments made would become retroactive to the
date of resumption of operations. At 2:30 a. m. on August 30, after a 2-day
hearing, the following recommendation was accepted by the employer and,
subject to ratification, by the union, which ratified it.
Recommendation
August 30
The National Defense Mediation Board recommends that:
1. The employees shall continue to remain at work under the terms and pro
visions of the existing written agreements between the International Union,
United Automobile Workers of America, Local 805, and the American Car &
Foundry Co. (Chicago plant) for the balance of the term of said agreements.
2. All grievances which at this date are unsettled and all future grievances
shall be settled in accordance with the grievance procedure set forth in article
IV of the agreement dated March 20, 1941.
3. In the event a question is not settled by representatives of the international
union and the company as provided in the agreement (article IV) dated March
20, 1941, it shall be submitted to arbitration. If the parties are unable to
agree upon an arbitrator within 3 days after the representatives of the inter
national union and the company have considered the question and failed
to reach an agreement, the National Defense Mediation Board shall appoint
a competent person to act as arbitrator whose decision shall be final and binding
upon both parties.
The Board was eventually asked to appoint an arbitrator. On December 9 it
appointed Prof. Elmo P. Hohman of Northwestern University.
CASE No. 69
P ullman Standard Car Manufacture S teel W orkers Organizing Committee,
ing Co., Bessemer, Ala.
L ocal 1466, C. I. O.
I n t e r n a t io n a l A s s o c ia t io n of M a c h
i n i s t s , L o c a l 359, A .
L.
I n t e r n a t io n a l B r o th e r h o o d of E lec
t r ic a l W o r k e r s , L o c a l B -2 8 7 , A .
L.
F.
F.
Certified August 21. Strike August 11-25. Hearing September 4. 1,260 workers
involved. Closed October 8
Panel: Wyzanski, Teagle, Lapham, Lynch, Rieve. Assistant, Kirstein.
The case is described in the panel chairman's—
Memorandum and Report
September 5
1. This case was certified to the Board by the Secretary of Labor, August 21,
1941.
2. Hearings were held on September 4, 1941, by a panel of the Board, con
sisting of Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., representing the public; Roger D. Lapham
469872°— 42------ 15
220
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
and Walter C. Teagle, representing employers; and George Q. Lynch and Emil
Rieve, representing employees.
3. On August 11, 1941, a strike occurred at the Bessemer, Ala., plant of the
Pullman Standard Car Manufacturing Co. Approximately 1,260 workers were
directly or indirectly affected by the strike. Following certification, this Board
on August 21 sent telegrams to the parties requesting that they resume work and
appear before the Board. These requests were complied with and the strike
was terminated on August 25,1941.
4. Two issues were presented: One with respect to the appropriate unit for
collective bargaining at the Bessemer plant; the other with respect to the ter
mination of James Johnson’s employment.
5. As to the first issue, it appeared that the Steel Workers Organizing Com
mittee had filed a petition with the National Labor Relations Board, Tenth
Region, on August 10,1941. At a hearing held August 28 before a trial examiner
of that Board, representatives of the Steel Workers Organizing Committee, the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the International Association
of Machinists, and a federal union affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor, presented evidence to support their positions in regard to the appropriate
bargaining unit for the plant. The company also presented testimony. As yet
that Board has not made its decision and direction of election. Before this
Board all the parties agreed that the proper course was to await the National
Labor Relations Board’s decision in regard to the proper bargaining unit.
6. The National Defense Mediation Board assured the parties that in accord
ance with paragraph 2 ( e ) of the Executive order of March 19, 1941, it would
request the National Labor Relations Board to expedite as much as possible the
determination of the appropriate unit and appropriate representatives of workers.
7. The second issue related to the termination of employment of James John
son, a bucker (or riveter’s helper). The company contends that Johnson volun
tarily resigned. The Steel Workers Organizing Committee contends that the
company terminated Johnson’s employment in violation of the National Labor
Relations Act.
8. After vainly attempting to secure agreement by the parties as to the dispo
sition of this second issue, the National Defense Mediation Board suggested that
if James Johnson or his representative, the Steel Workers Organizing Committee,
is of the view that the company violated the National Labor Relations Act in
terminating Johnson’s employment, he or the union should promptly file charges
to that effect with the National Labor Relations Board, the tribunal created for
the determination of such cases.
9. To avoid delay, this Board agreed to request the National Labor Relations
Board to expedite the holding of a hearing on such charge if filed.
10. This Board also suggested that the company and the union agree to accept
short orders of notice in the anticipated case before the National Labor Relations
Board and that in that case the parties formally stipulate to accept as final and
binding without further review any report and recommendations which the trial
examiner may make.
11. The company agreed to this suggestion; the Steel Workers Organizing
Committee agreed that if, in accordance with this Board’s suggestion, the matter
were presented to the National Labor Relations Board, the Steel Workers Organ
izing Committee would expedite the determination of the controversy; and the
other unions stated that they had no interest in this phase of the dispute.
CASE No. 70
H enrt Vogt Machine Co., Louisville, Steel W orkers Organizing Committee,
Ky.
L ocal 1693, C. I. O.
Certified August 22. Strike August 11-September 4. 1,000 workers involved.
Closed September 4
The plant was struck as a result of the inability of the parties to agree on a
contract. As a hearing date could not be arranged for 2 weeks, the Board
requested the parties to resume negotiations. Before the Board heard the case
all the issues were agreed upon in Louisville.
CASE HISTORIES
221
CASE No. 71
P ullman S tandard Cab Manufactub- B rotherhood of R ailway Cabmen
ing Co., Michigan City, Ind.
A mebica, Local 290, A. F. L.
of
Certified August 26. Strike August 14-September 13. Hearing September 8, 9,
10. 1,800 workers involved. Closed September 13
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapbam, Brown. Assistant, Kirstein.
In March 1941 the National Labor Relations Board certified the union, and
negotiations for a contract began. On August 14, a strike was called over
unsettled issues. An agreement on all points was reached between the parties
before the Board as a result of the company’s agreeing to the union’s demand
for machinery and the union’s withdrawing its demand for a union shop. The
chairman of the panel had pointed out that a union shop was unusual in a first
agreement as well as unlawful in the related railroad industry, and had suggested
that an arbitration of grievances would help the union to maintain itself. The
agreement was ratified on September 12.
Aluminum Co.
of A merica,
CASE No. 72
Vancouver, Aluminum T rades Council, A. F. L.
Wash.
Certified September 3. No strike. Hearings September 18, 19. 730 workers
involved. Closed September 23
Panel: Fisher, Ching, Woods. Assistant, GilL
The facts are adequately recounted in the—
Recommendations
September 23
1. This case was certified to the National Defense Mediation Board by the
Secretary of Labor on September 3,1941.
2. The dispute is between the Aluminum Co. of America, at its Vancouver, Wash.,
nlant, and the Aluminum Trades Council, a bargaining agency consisting of several
unions in the plant affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. On Feb
ruary 5, 1941, pursuant to a check of the unions’ records against the company
pay roll by consent of the parties, the regional director for the National Labor
Relations Board at Seattle, Wash., announced that the Aluminum Trades Council
had been designated by a majority of the company’s employees as their collective
bargaining representative, and the company has since that time recognized the
status of the Aluminum Trades Council as the exclusive bargaining agency for
the employees at the Vancouver plant.
3. The Vancouver plant is a comparatively new unit of the Aluminum Co. of
America, having been put into operation in August 1940. The present negotiations
are accordingly directed toward the first collective bargaining contract between
the parties at this particular plant.
4. The negotiations began in the latter part of February 1941 and continued
from time to time until the case was certified to this Board.
5. Hearings were held before the Board in Washington on September 18 and 19,
1941.
6. Both the representatives of the union and of the company stated to the
Board that while there were various questions which had not yet been finally
worked out between them, the only issue which appeared to be incapable of solu
tion between the parties themselves was the demand of the union for a union
shop. The Board finds that the sole issue presenting an obstacle to complete
agreement is the union-shop issue.
7. The company has consistently refused to grant the union’s demand for a
union shop or for any modified form thereof,
8. The company has 18 other aluminum plants in operation in various sections
of the country.
9. In eight of these plants the Congress of Industrial Organizations is recog
nized as the collective bargaining agency, and in three of the plants, other than
222
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
the Vancouver plant, the American Federation of Labor is the recognized bargain
ing agency. The company has agreements covering all of these other plants in
which bargaining agencies have been recognized, and none of these agreements
contains any provision for a union shop or any modified form thereof.
10. The company has been before this Board in three other cases. Agreements
have been reached in two of those cases under the auspices of the Board, neither
agreement containing any provision for a union shop or any modified form thereof.
The issues in the third case are still under investigation.
11. There is a master agreement between the company and the Congress of
Industrial Organizations covering all the company’s plants at which the Congress
of Industrial Organizations is the recognized collective bargaining agency. Within
approximately 2 months negotiations are to take place between the company and
the Congress of Industrial Organizations for a new master agreement covering
these plants.
12. There is likewise a master agreement between the company and the Ameri
can Federation of Labor covering the three plants, other than the Vancouver
plant, at which the American Federation of Labor is the recognized collective
bargaining agency.
13. The hearings before this Board in the present case on September 18 and 19,
1941, failed to effect any agreement between the parties upon the union’s demand
for a union shop at the Vancouver plant.
In view of the above findings of fact, the Board hereby makes the following
recommendations:
1. The Board recommends that a new master agreement between the company
and the American Federation of Labor, covering the Vancouver plant as well as
the other plants of the company at which the American Federation of Labor is
the recognized collective bargaining agency, shall be negotiated at a mutually
satisfactory time. This procedure will accord not only with the fact that there is
at present a master agreement covering the three plants, other than the Van
couver plant, at which the American Federation of Labor is the recognized bar
gaining agency, but also with the practice followed by the company and the Con
gress of Industrial Organizations, as to the plants at which the Congress of Indus
trial Organizations is the recognized collective bargaining agency. No considera
tions were presented to the Board indicating any impracticability in extending
this type of master agreement to the Vancouver plant.
2. The Board recommends that, to cover the interim period pending the nego
tiation of such a new master agreement, the company and the union sign a sep
arate contract covering the Vancouver plant, embodying the points upon which
substantial agreement between the parties has already been reached, and that
negotiations concerning the union’s demand for a union shop be deferred for
consideration in the negotiations for a new master agreement.
3. The Board asks that both parties cooperate to the fullest extent to resolve
the controversy through the peaceful and orderly means outlined above, and to
insure the uninterrupted production of aluminum which is vital to the defense of
the nation.
On September 29 the company accepted the recommendation. On October 9 the
union rejected the proposal of a master agreement and stated that the recom
mendation for a contract covering these points on which agreement had already
been reached was “being given serious consideration.” No strike was called, and
no further action was taken by the Board.
Though the union expressed rejection of the master agreement proposal, there
was no further development.
CASE No. 73
Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
Kansas City, Mo.
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local B-412, A. F. L.
I ndependent U nion of U tility
E mployees
Certified September 5. Strike September 17-18. Hearing September 15, 16.
350 workers involved. Closed September 29
Panel: Stocking, Hamilton, Woods. Assistant, Kirstein.
A strike was threatened on September 5 by the Brotherhood because it wished to
represent certain of the company’s employees who were being represented by the
Independent Union of Utility Employees. At the close of the hearings, the Board
issued the following recommendation.
CASE HISTORIES
223
Recommendation
September 16
On September 5, 1941, the Secretary of Labor certified to this Board that the
dispute between the Kansas City Power & Light Co., and Local Union B-412 of
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, affiliated with the American
Federation of Labor, and Independent Union of Utility Employees, threatened to
burden or obstruct the production or transportation of equipment or materials
essential to national defense and had not been adjusted by the Commissioners of
Conciliation of the Department of Labor. Thereupon, the Board set a date for a
hearing of this matter and notified the parties of the said hearing and requested
their attendance thereon. In doing so, the Board wired both parties in part as
follows: “In the meantime the Board calls upon all parties in the interest of na
tional defense to remain at work and to prevent any interruption of the supply of
power for defense production pending the Board’s consideration of the case.”
The division of the Board designated to hear this case was composed of George
W. Stocking, representing the public; Holland J. Hamilton, representing em
ployers; and Herbert Woods, representing employees. Hearings were held in
Washington, D. C., on September 15 and 16, 1941.
Background of controversy.
This company, located in Kansas City, Mo., furnishes practically all of the
electric power used in the community in which it is located. Furthermore, in
Kansas City, the water system is operated by electric pumps the power for
which is furnished by this company. Among other defense plants dependent for
power upon this company is the Government ammunition plant at Lake City,
Mo.
In 1937, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers petitioned the
National Labor Relations Board to certify it as the proper agency for purposes
of collective bargaining in the production department of the company. Shortly
after the filing of this petition, charges of unfair labor practice were filed with
the National Labor Relations Board by the International Brotherhood of Elec
trical Workers, charging that the company dominated an independent union and
further that it had discharged some 16 employees in a discriminatory manner
and illegally.
In 1936 this case was heard by the National Labor Relations Board and in
1939 that Board handed down a decision ordering the company to disestablish
the company union. The company appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit from this decision of the National Labor Relations Board.
In 1940, the circuit court of appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor
Relations Board as modified and an election was held to determine the proper
bargaining agency for employees in the production department of the company.
This election was won by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
and negotiations for a contract proceeded at once. Such a contract was exe
cuted by the parties on September 7, 1940, of 1 year’s duration.
At about the same time as these events were occurring, another group of em
ployees called upon representatives of the company, stating that they repre
sented a majority of the company’s employees, exclusive of those in the produc
tion department. This group of employees were representatives of the Inde
pendent Union of Utility Employees. The company requested the National
Labor Relations Board to check membership cards in this union against the
company’s pay roll with a view towards its being certified as the proper bar
gaining agency for the company’s employees, exclusive of the production depart
ment. The National Labor Relations Board refused to comply with this request
and the company conducted a check of membership cards against its pay roll.
They found that out of approximately 1,300 employees the Indepenent Union
of Utility Employees had 900 signed membership cards. The company then nego
tiated a master agreement with this union which was executed on August 3,
1940, for 1 year’s duration. It contained a provision that it would automati
cally renew itself from year to year unless either party served notice on the
other that it was to be terminated. On October 2, 1940, the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers filed a petition with the National Labor
Relations Board asking to be certified as the proper agency for purposes of
collective bargaining in the building maintenance department of the company
and in the control division overhead department. On October 9, 1940, a fur
ther petition was filed by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
for the western division overhead department.
224
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
In December 1940 the Independent Union of Utility Workers filed a petition
with the National Labor Relations Board asking that they be designated as the
proper agency for purposes of collective bargaining for all manual employees of
the company or for all manual employees exclusive of the production department.
The National Labor Relations Board, in considering these petitions, combined
them. A hearing was set in this matter for December 1940, but by mutual con
sent this was postponed until January 1941. At this time the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers filed with the National Labor Relations
Board charges of unfair labor practice against the company. The National
Labor Relations Board then refused to conduct its hearing that was scheduled
for January pending decision on the unfair labor practice charge. The National
Labor Relations Board thereafter instituted contempt proceedings against the
company before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit charging
that the company had not followed the court’s instructions and had not dises
tablished the company union. This case is scheduled for a hearing on October
11,1941.
In August 1941 the National Labor Relations Board dismissed the petition of
the Independent Union of Utility Employees which asked the Board to certify
them as the proper bargaining agency for all manual employees, or for all
manual employees exclusive of the production department. On August 23, 1941,
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers withdrew their petition for
certification as the proper bargaining agency in the three divisions of the com
pany above mentioned. In the same month the Independent Union of Utility
Employees filed a similar petition with the National Labor Relations Board, which
is still pending before that Board. In September 1941 the company filed a peti
tion with the National Labor Relations Board asking that the Board name an
appropriate unit with a view towards holding an election and finding the proper
agency for purposes of collective bargaining. On September 9, 1941, the National
Labor Relations Board dismissed this petition.
To summarize, the two matters that are still pending are (1) a petition by the
Independent Union of Utility Employees to the National Labor Relations Board,
similar in most respects to the one that the Board previously dismissed, and
(2) the contempt proceedings instituted by the National Labor Relations Board
before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The position of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
B-412.
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local B-412, contends:
1. That an overwhelming majority of the company’s employees in the steam
distribution department and in the overhead distribution department wish to be
represented, for purposes of collective bargaining, by the International Brother
hood of Electrical Workers, Local B-412.
2. That because of the lengthy legal proceedings which the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local B-412, went through to gain recogni
tion in the production department of the company, they are unwilling to wait
longer or go through additional legal processes to gain recognition for purposes
of collective bargaining in the steam distribution department and in the overhead
distribution department.
3. That the contract which the Independent Union of Utility Employees enjoys
with the company is not, in fact, a binding contract because the Independent Union
of Utility Employees has never been certified as the proper bargaining agency
by the National Labor Relations Board and because the Independent Union of
Utility Employees is in fact a company-dominated union.
4. That therefore the company should immediately enter into negotiations with
a view towards making a contract with the International Brotherhood of Elec
trical Workers, Local B-412, for the company’s employees in the steam distribu
tion department and in the overhead distribution department.
The position of the Independent Union of Utility Employees.
The Independent Union of Utility Employees contend:
1. That their union is in every sense an independent union and is not subject
to company domination.
2. That the contempt proceedings which are presently pending before the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit will determine finally the status of their
union.
3. That, pending determination of the contempt charge by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, no change in the bargaining agency as it is
presently established should be made.
CASE HISTORIES
225
4. That, while they do not deny that the International Brotherhood of Elec
trical Workers, Local B-412, does in fact have as members a majority of the
company’s employees in the steam distribution department and in the overhead
distribution department, the Independent Union of Utility Employees contends
that they had valid contracts with the company entered into as recently as June
24, 1941, which are binding on the company.
5. That the steam distribution department and the overhead distribution de
partment are not proper units for collective bargaining, but belong properly with
the departments of which they are a subordinate part
The company’s position.
The company contends:
1. That before entering into any final agreement with the International Brother
hood of Electrical Workers, Local B-412, for the company’s employees in the steam
distribution department and in the overhead distribution department, the con
tempt proceedings which are now before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit should be disposed of.
2. That until these contempt proceedings are disposed of the contract which the
Independent Union of Utility Employees enjoys with the company is valid and
therefore negotiating another contract with the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local B-412, would be in breach of contract and in breach
of good faith.
8. That it makes absolutely no difference to the company which organization
of its employees it recognizes for purposes of collective bargaining as long as it
does not enter into an illegal contract or breach a present valid contract.
The issues in the controversy.
1. Should the company negotiate at once with the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers, Local B-412, for that organization’s members in the
company’s steam distribution department and overhead distribution department?
2. Is the Independent Union of Utility Employees in fact a company-dominated
union as is charged by the National Labor Relations Board in its petition to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit?
3. Is the steam distribution department and the overhead distribution depart
ment, taken together with the production department, an appropriate bargaining
unit for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local B-412, to
represent?
Findings and recommendation.
The Board finds that the issues in this controversy are matters which properly
come within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit and the National Labor Relations Board.
In view of the fact that those issues are now before these bodies and in view
of the fact that an early date has been set by the court for hearing on the charges
of contempt made by the National Labor Relations Board, and in view of the
importance of the continued operation of the Kansas City Power & Light Co.,
both to the defense program and to the health and welfare of the communities,
the Board urges that the parties to the controversy permit the issues to be
resolved without cessation of the operations of the Kansas City Power & Light Co.
A few hours after the issuance of this recommendation, the union struck the
power plant which virtually left Kansas City without electricity. On September
IS, the strike was terminated at the request of the Board, and Mr. John Lapp
was appointed to investigate the issues in dispute. His report on September 29
confirmed the Board’s recommendation.
CASE No. 74
P ressed Steel Car Co.,
McKees Rocks, Pa.
Car and F oundry W orkers U nion , L ocal N o. 1, and Steel W orkers Organ
izing Committee, L ocal No. 1844,
C. I. O.
Certified September 5. Strike August 29-September 8. No hearing. 2,600
workers involved. Closed October 31
The Steel Workers Organizing Committee had been attempting to organize this
company since 1938. In June 1938 the N. L. R. B. directed au electiou between
226
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
the S. W. O. 0. and the independent union. The election was called off until
charges of discrimination, could be heard. On February 23, 1940, after election,
the Board certified the independent union. The independent secured a contract
in April 1941, which would expire in March 1942, but S. W. O. O. continued
organizing.
On August 4 S. W. O. C. called a strike for recognition which was called off
on August 15 when the parties were invited to a conference under the auspices
of the Conciliation Service. The Conciliation Service made recommendations.
S. W. O. C. claimed that the company had failed to observe them and struck again
on August 29. S. W. O. C. filed a petition for certification with N. L. R. B. Sep
tember 3. The Board secured an agreement to return to work on September 8.
The N. L. R. B. heard the petition despite its rule that it would not ordinarily
investigate a question of representation while a contract was extant, and on
October 31 dismissed the petition.
Lamson & Sessions Co.,
CASE No. 75
U nited A utomobile W obkebs
of
Cleveland, Ohio
A merica, L ocal 217, C. I. O.
Certified September 8. No strike. Hearing September 17-20. 1,000 workers
involved. Closed September 21
Panel: Graham, Lapham, Rieve. Assistant, Kirstein.
Following a strike in the company’s east-side plant in June, the N. L. R. B.
held an election which was won by the union. In August an election with like
result was held at the west-side plant. Negotiations for a contract covering both
plants followed, but were unsuccessful, and a strike was threatened. The prin
cipal issues in dispute were wages, union security, rate of pay for Saturday work,
and a separation allowance for draftees. There were also a number of minor
issues relating to shop conditions.
At the hearing the company rejected the union shop demands, pointing out that
this was the first contract; it agreed to call to the attention of employees the
benefits conferred by the union, and to discipline those who interfered with “the
status and responsibility of the union as sole bargaining agent certified by the
N. L. R. B.” On wages the union demanded a 15 cents per hour increase. The
company had already given 4 cents. The settlement provided for 10 cents more.
This agreement was ratified the next day.
CASE No. 76
Amebican B rake S hoe & F oundby Co., I nternational Moldebs’ and F oundby
Mahwah, N. J.
W obkebs’ U nion , Local 315, A. F. L.
Certified September 10. Strike July 28-September 24. Hearing October 1-3.
440 workers involved. Closed October 9
Panel: Fisher, Hamilton, Googe. Assistant, Gill.
On June 22 a contract between the company and a federal labor union (A. F. L.)
expired, and the Molders’ Union advised the company that it had taken jurisdic
tion from the federal union. Negotiations between the company and the Molders’
Union took place between June 22 and July 28, at which time a strike was called.
On August 7 the National Labor Relations Board certified the Molders’ Union
as the exclusive bargaining agent. Negotiations were then reopened but without
success.
As the Board was unable to arrange for a hearing immediately, it did not
request resumption of production upon notifying the parties that it had received
the case. But on September 23 when it summoned the parties it did so request
and on September 24 work was resumed. An agreement was reached October 3,
after hearing, without any Board recommendation. The main issues were union
shop and wages. The union shop issue was settled with a “harmony” clause, in
which the company agreed to discipline antiunion activity on company time. On
wages, the company had already granted a 7 cents an hour increase, the union
was demanding 10 cents, and the settlement was 8% cents.
CASE HISTORIES
227
CASE No. 77
D uquesne Light Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., I ndependent A ssociation of E mployees
and Citrtiss-Weight Cobporation, of D uquesne Light Co. and A ssociBeaver, Pa.
ated Companies and B uilding and
C o n s t r u c t i o n Trades Council,
A. F. L.
Certified September 11, 12. Strike September 10-25. Hearings 16, 17, 18, 19.
Number of workers involved unknown. Closed September 25
Panel: Wyzanski, Connelly, Watt. Assistant, Cox.
A strike of 134 construction employees affiliated with the Pittsburgh Building
and Construction Trades Council (A. F. L.) was delaying the construction of a
$5,000,000 plant to be operated by Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Curtiss Pro
peller Division, at Beaver, Pa., in the manufacture of steel propellers. The sole
issue in the dispute was whether certain electrical facilities leading to and
within the plant—about 500 man-hours of work—should be done by the A. F. L.
building-trades unions or by employees of Duquesne Light Co. who belonged
to Independent Association of Employees of Duquesne Light Co. and Associated
Companies. The latter had threatened to strike and not cut in the power if they
were not permitted to do the work. On September 13 the Board set a hearing for
September 16 but did not request the A. F. L. unions to return to work. Mr.
Arthur Meyer of the New York State Mediation Board, invited to assist the
National Defense Mediation Board because of his familiarity with this type
of dispute, attempted to mediate between the parties and bring about a solution
not only of the particular controversy before the Board but of the broader dispute
between the two unions over the distribution of electrical construction work in
Pittsburgh.
The independent union, as the result of informal conferences with one member
of the Board, signed a statement to be effective upon approval by the general
committee of the independent union that “in view of the existing national emer
gency and the pressing need of continuous maximum production of implements
of defense” the representatives of the independent association “do hereby offer
and propose to permit labor incident to the installation of transformer equipment
at the plant of Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Propeller Division, at Beaver, Pa.,
to be performed by the employees of Curtiss-Wright Corporation’s general con
tractor.” The offer was made voluntarily and not as the result of bargaining
and with the understanding that it was not to be considered a precedent in the
broader phases of the controversy. The offer was approved by the general
committee of the independent union. Thereafter Curtiss-Wright Corporation and
Duquesne Light Co. in independent negotiations reached an agreement by which
the construction work in dispute would be performed by A. F. L. labor. On
September 25 following that agreement the A. F. L. Building and Construction
Trades Council called off the strike and construction was resumed.
CASE No. 78
B endix A viation Corporation (B endix U nited A utomobile W orkers of A merP roducts D ivision ), South Bend, Ind.
ioa, Local N o, 9, C. I. O.
Certified September 15. Hearing September 24, 25, 26, 27. 8,400 workers in
volved. Closed October 8
Panel: Wyzanski, Ching, Carey. Assistant, Gill.
A strike was threatened over a controversy concerning an existing contract.
Four days of hearing culminated in the following—
Recommendations
September 27
1. The company has employed female bench inspectors for inspection in de
partments 183,198, and 194. The union says in doing so the company has violated
article IY, sec. 1 (d) of the contract between the above parties, dated November
15, 1940. The company denies this. The question is one of interpretation of the
contract. The Board is not agreed on the answer to this question. The Board
228
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
recommends that Mr. George W. Taylor shall make a final decision of this
question to be binding on all parties for the period of the contract. If Mr. Taylor
cannot serve, the three members of the Board who heard this case will unani
mously select a substitute. The Board further recommends that if Mr. Taylor
or his substitute decides against the company, the company shall pay such
female bench inspectors for the time they have been or may be employed in those
departments during the contract period amounts equivalent to the going rate for
male bench inspectors. Such payments shall be regarded as the equivalent of
damages for breach of contract and shall not be regarded as a ruling or prece
dent upon the wage rate appropriate for female bench inspectors in the plant.
2. There is in the background another larger problem. The company is
planning to increase its output and make changes in its operations. These
changes may involve new mass production methods, simplification, and a training
and upgrading program. To carry through such a program promptly and fairly
there should be a free, frank, and prompt discussion between the parties of all
the aspects of this problem, including appropriate guarantees to the workers and
appropriate steps to aid the maximum production of defense material. To aid
in this negotiation, the three members of the Board who heard this case will
appoint a representative (not Mr. Taylor, or his substitute), who shall sit in on
such negotiations as a mediator and who shall report progress to the Board.
These recommendations were accepted by both parties, and on October 8 Mr.
Taylor handed down his decision, after an investigation at the plant, ruling
that the company had violated the contract. Also on October 8, the Board
appointed Mr. William Conover (Assistant Director of the Training Within In
dustry Branch of the Labor Division of O. P. M.) as the Board’s representative
to sit in on the negotiations concerning the second problem described in the
recommendations. The Board took no further action in the case, nor was it
advised of the progress of negotiations after the withdrawal of the C. I. O.
CASE No. 79
H endey Machine Co., Torrington, U nited Automobile W obkers of A merConn.
ioa, L ocal 398, C. I. O.
Certified September 18. Strike September 5-22. Hearings September 26, 27,
October 23. 1,429 workers involved. Closed October 23
Panel: Stacy, Adams, Lyons. Assistant Leiserson.
On May 25,1940, a contract for a 2-year period was entered into by the parties.
This contract was modified in January 1941 to provide for a wage increase. In
spite of this agreement, on September 5, the plant was struck because of a dispute
over further wage increases.
As the Board considered it iqadvisible, in view of the contract, to make recom
mendations for increased wages, the parties agreed to a Board recommendation
to have an incentive system studied by an industrial engineering company.
Recommendation
September 27
The National Defense Mediation Board considers that the hearing in this mat
ter should be continued subject to resumption upon notice from the Board to
both parties.
The Board will forthwith designate a competent industrial engineer with
experience in the machine-tool field satisfactory to both parties to investigate
and report back to the Board as soon as possible, and in any event not later than
30 days from date, whether it is feasible to develop and install in the Hendey
plant a plan designed to increase the earnings of the employees, and as to the
time required to install it, the expense of such survey to be paid by the company.
It is to be understood that this arrangement is made without modification of the
contractual rights and responsibilities of the parties, which are clear.
The plan presented by the industrial engineering firm of Stevenson, Jordan,
and Harrison seemed satisfactory to both parties, as it would result in increased
wages and lower production costs. The Board thereupon recommended that the
plan be tried out.
CASE HISTORIES
229
Recommendation
October 23
Pursuant to the stipulation of September 27,1941, the panel met on October 23,
1941, to receive the report of the engineers appointed to investigate and report
on this matter.
After full discussion both parties express a willingness that the method sug
gested by Stevenson, Jordan, and Harrison for increasing production at the Hendey
Machine Co. be put into effect and given a fair trial, with both parties faithfully
cooperating to this end. Neither party, however, presently binds itself finally
to accept the system or method unless mutually satisfactory.
With this understanding the case may be closed on the docket of the National
Defense Mediation Board.
CASE No. 80
A merican Merchant Marine I nstitute, Seafarers I nternational U nion of
I nc., New York, N. Y.
N orth A merica, A. F. L.
P acific A merican S hipowners Asso- Sailors U nion of the P acific, A. F. L.
ciation, San Francisco, Calif.
Waterman S teamship Corporation, Mo
bile, Ala.
Certified September 23. Strike September 18-25. Hearing September 29,
October 1-4. 20,000 workers involved. Closed October 17
Panel: Wyzanski, Mead, Watt (Patrick Murphy). Assistant, Kirstein.
This case arose out of demands made by the seaman’s unions, one representing
east-coast, the other west-coast seamen, for bonuses for unlicensed personnel in
connection with voyages to places and in waters made dangerous by war.
The bonus system was inaugurated piecemeal, beginning with the Spanish
Civil War. By the time this dispute matured a $60 monthly bonus had become
general on trips to Iceland, Greenland, Europe, Africa, and the Orient. With
some lines the bonus area in the Pacific Ocean lay west of the one hundred and
sixtieth meridian west; with the majority west of the one hundred and sixtieth
meridian east. A few isolated companies paid bonuses to belligerent ports in
the West Indies. A bonus of $100 was paid for entry into the Port of Suez;
$45 into Aden; in a few cases $200 had been paid into Vladivostok.
The Seafarers International Union of North America representing east-coast
and Gulf-coast seamen demanded increased bonuses and inclusion of voyages to
the West Indian ports. A ship of one of the east-coast companies was struck
on June 12. Negotiations took place June 18 to June 20, and June 24 a con
ciliator of the Department of Labor was called in and secured the release of
the ship. Another ship was held up on June 23. Conferences were had from
July 1 to July 8, resulting in an agreement with 4 of the 5 eastern companies
here involved to submit the whole question to a general conference to be called
in Washington by the Maritime Commission and the Department of Labor. It
was agreed that if this conference did not secure an agreement, the matter
would be put to arbitration. The conference was held August 12-16 and agree
ment secured, but only for the licensed personnel. On August 19, a conference
covering unlicensed personnel convened, but was adjourned ostensibly to secure
data on war-risk insurance rates. Eventually the union refused to participate
in the conference, apparently on the ground that the negotiation of a separate
agreement for licensed personnel was contrary to .the agreement of July 8. On
September 4, four of the five eastern companies concerned invoked the arbitra
tion clause in the agreement of July 8. The union refused to submit to arbi
tration and again tied up ships on September 13. On September 16 the Maritime
Commission demanded release of the ships, which was refused. On September
17 it warned that unless an agreement were reached it would take over the
ships, which it did September 18.
In the meantime, a similar dispute was taking place on the west coast between
the Sailors Union of the Pacific and the Pacific American Shipowners Associa
tion, including nearly all west-coast shippers to foreign parts. These parties
had a contract which required arbitration of disputes and forbade the striking
230
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
of ships. S. U. P. struck some ships while on the east coast on September 18.
The owners refused to negotiate, assigning as reason the breach of the agreement.
On September 22 the Maritime Commission offered its good offices. When they
were refused, the case was certified to the Board.
S. U. P. demanded:
1. That the bonus be increased from $60 to $90, monthly; that the danger
zone begin at the one hundred sixtieth meridian west as was then the practice
of the Waterman and Bernstein lines.
2. That the bonus to Suez and Said be $300; to Persian Gulf ports, $100; to
west, south, and east African ports outside of the Red Sea, $50; to Vladivostok,
$200; to any port under continuous bombardment, $300.
3. That where the cargo is contraband of war, wages be increased 200 per
cent.
4. That the amount of war-risk insurance taken out by the companies for
each man be increased from $5,000 to $10,000.
5. That the allowance for clothes of a shipwrecked seaman be increased from
$150 to $250 with $100 extra for carpenters’ tools.
6. That where a seaman is interned by the enemy, his pay continue until he
is released.
The S. I. U. demanded:
1. That bonus be increased from $60 to $150.
2. That the danger zone include the voyage to belligerent ports in Canada
and the West Indies, though for these less dangerous voyages the bonus be $60
monthly rather than $150; that the zone include also any part of the Pacific
Ocean in connection with runs from the east coast.
3. In addition to the special bonus ports specified in the demands of S. U. P.,
S. I. U. included Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese ports for which it asked
$75 and African ports for which it asked $60 instead of the $50 demanded by
S. U. P.
4. S. I. U. asked also for the 200-percent bonus for contraband cargoes, but
seems to have interpreted it somewhat differently.
The companies were eager to have arbitration machinery for future disputes
established. This the unions opposed.
At the close of the hearing the Board made its recommendations which were
subsequently accepted by the parties:
Recommendations
October 4
1. Crews on American vessels sailing to foreign ports perform an essential role
in the national defense effort. Sound relationships between representatives of
these crews and owners of these vessels are of great consequence to the Nation.
2. The Seas Shipping Co., Inc., the Calmar Steamship Corporation, the South
Atlantic Steamship Co., and the Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., on the east coast
are associated in the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc. Most of the
owners on the west coast are associated in the Pacific American Shipowners Asso
ciation. The Waterman Steamship Corporation is not affiliated with either group.
3. The unlicensed personnel before the National Defense Mediation Board are
represented by Seafarers International Union of North America and Sailors
Union of the Pacific. (The licensed personnel are represented by other unions.
Their problem is not dealt with here.)
4. Collective bargaining relationships have been established by most of these
owners with one or the other of these unions. In most cases, collective bargaining
contracts now exist or have just expired. For the negotiation of such general
contracts the parties have worked out among themselves appropriate methods.
These methods usually include the parties requesting the United States Depart
ment of Labor to station a commissioner of conciliation as an observer and
mediator at the collective bargaining negotiations. These recommendations do
not affect those methods or any unexpired contracts.
5. However, a special problem arises from the risk run by men who go to sea
in time of war. This problem has not been solved by the existing or contemplated
contracts. It is with this problem that these recommendations are concerned.
6. The first part of this problem is to provide for bonuses for war risk which
will be fair under present conditions. The second part of this problem is to provide
machinery for malting equitable future adjustments if conditions change.
CASE HISTORIES
231
7. To meet the first part of the problem, the National Defense Mediation Board
recommends that until changed, as provided in paragraph 8, the following warbonus rules shall govern those who become signatory to these recommendations:
( a ) There shall be five war-risk areas, namely:
(1) Trans-Atlantic voyages to Spain, Portugal, east south or west coasts of
Africa, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, India, Iceland, and Greenland. (Whole voyage;
except that if any vessel continues eastbound to the United States ports via India
and the Pacific Ocean said bonus rates for such area will continue until the
vessel passes the one hundred eightieth meridian, eastbound, and thereafter no
further bonuses will be payable.)
(2) Trans-Atlantic voyages to Russia (Archangel, etc.). (Whole voyage.)
(3) Trans-Pacific voyages to Japan, Philippine Islands, China, Indo-China, East
Indies, Malayan Peninsula. (After crossing the one hundred eightieth meridian
westbound, until recrossing the same meridian eastbound.)
(4) Trans-Pacific voyages to New Zealand or Australia. (From arrival of vessel
in Suva or the crossing of the one hundred eightieth meridian, westbound, until
departure from Suva or crossing the one hundred eightieth meridian, eastbound.)
(5) Canada (Atlantic coast). (While vessel is north of latitude 35° N. when
bound to or from a Canadian port.)
(b) An able-bodied seaman shall be paid a war-risk bonus at the rate of $80
a month in the first four areas and $33 in the fifth area. Other unlicensed per
sonnel shall be paid the same bonus.
(c) There shall be paid to able-bodied seamen in addition to the area bonus
just provided, the following port bonuses:
(1) . For the port of Suez, or any other port which is subject to regular bomb
ing, $100, plus $5 per day for each day beyond 5 days that the vessel is in that port.
(2) . For any port in the Red Sea or in the Persian Gulf not covered by para
graph supra, $45. The same bonuses shall be paid other unlicensed personnel.
The Board makes no recommendation as to port bonuses for Vladivostok or ports
in Iceland.
8. To meet the second part of the problem, the National Defense Mediation
Board recommends that the following machinery for making equitable future
adjustments shall govern those who become signatory to these recommendations:
(a) Any signatory may ask for a change, an addition to, or subtraction from
the present war-bonus rules set forth above if the present situation is changed
by an act of Congress, executive action, the spread or contraction of the area of
hostilities in the Eastern or Western Hemispheres, the entry into the war or
withdrawal from the war of belligerents, or the rise or fall of sinkings of Ameri
can vessels. Such proposed change shall be limited to the areas where condi
tions are alleged to have changed.
(6) The signatory asking for the change shall present his request in writing to
the party from whom the change is sought. (Meetings shall occur at once.) If
agreement between them is not reached 1 week after the request is presented,
either party may present the matter to the United States Department of Labor,
Division of Conciliation for conciliation. If conciliation is not successful in 1
week after the matter was presented to the Division of Conciliation, the Director
of the Division may then refer the case to a board composed of three disinter
ested persons to be appointed by the President of the United States. Such Board
shall have power to make .recommendations.
9. The recommendations in paragraph 8 shall be effective until November 1,
1943. Paragraph 7 shall be effective until November 1, 1942. During the period
of these recommendations there shall be in connection with and on account of
war-bonus issues, no lock-out, strike, slowdown, or like action by either owners or
men represented by those who become signatories to these recommendations.
10. Nothing in these recommendations shall be interpreted so as to reduce bene
fits now existing under collective bargaining contracts. Except as herein modi
fied, existing contracts and arrangements shall continue.
11. These recommendations shall become effective upon all ships which sailed on
or after August 16,1941, or any earlier effective date set by special rider.
12. If any dispute arises as to the interpretation of these recommendations, and
if the parties cannot adjust that dispute by collective bargaining, either party
may refer it to the Division of Conciliation for conciliation, and, if conciliation
fails, either party may refer it to the three-man board referred to in paragraph
8 for interpretation.
232
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 81
Consolidated A ircraft Corporation, I nternational A ssociation of Machin San Diego, Calif.
ists , Aircraft L odge 1125, A. F. L.
Certified September 24. No strike. Hearing October 2-3. 27,000 workers in
volved. Closed October 10
Panel: Stocking, Swope, Watt (Frank Fenton). Assistant, McConnell.
Aircraft Lodge 1125 for several years had been the bargaining representative of
the workers. On June 12 the company and the union had signed a new contract.
It provided a minimum rate of 55 cents an hour, a 5 cents an hour increase, and
semiannual review of rates. The company agreed to allocate for each such review
a sum computed at 5 cents per hour times two-thirds of its employees covered by
the agreement at the time of the review. In the event standard rates of pay
should be adopted by the aircraft industry under any executive law or ruling of
the President of the United States or certain other agencies, such standard was to
supersede the contract provisions.
After this contract went into effect, Lockheed and Vultee aircraft companies in
September put into effect general 10-cent increases in wages and wages for be
ginners starting at 60 cents per hour and increasing periodically until they reach
75 cents per hour after 3 months, these increases to be retroactive to July 1, 1941.
These contracts followed generally the terms worked out in No. 36, North
American Aviation.
The union contended that standard rates of pay had been adopted by a Govern
ment agency and the contract Should be opened up to conform with the Lockheed
and Vultee companies’ increases. The company contended that there had been
no general stabilization agreement but seemed ready generally to increase its
rates to conform with those adopted by Lockheed and Vultee.
On September 22, the union voted to call a strike for September 29, but agreed
to continue production while the matter was before the Board.
The hearing October 2 and 3 turned into direct negotiations between the parties
and resulted in the management’s placing two proposals before the union repre
sentatives which they agreed to submit to their membership:
Proposal No. 1 .—“As a substitute for the October 1941 review, Consolidated
Aircraft will grant as of October 4, 1941, a 12-cent blanket increase for all men
over 63 cents and a beginners’ rate of 60 cents to 75 cents as of July 5,1941, with
reviews (without jackpots) in April and October of each year.”
Proposal No. 2.—“As a substitute for the October 1941 review, Consolidated
Aircraft will grant as of October 4, 1941, a 13-cent blanket increase for all men
over 65 cents and a beginners’ rate of 60 cents to 75 cents as of July 5,1941, with
reviews (without jackpots) in April and October of each year.”
Both parties returned to California with the understanding that the Board
retained jurisdiction until final settlement had been reached.
On October 6 the union rejected both proposals. It was evident that the
union members preferred the second proposal put to them, but were dissatisfied
with the retroactive date of the 13-cent blanket increase for employees earning
over 65 cents an hour. On October 7, the chairman received a wire signed
jointly by the management and the union requesting that the Board “suggest”
August 9 as a compromise retroactive date to all employees affected by both
the 60- and 75-cent beginners’ rate and the 13-cent blanket increase. On October
8, the chairman sent the telegram as suggested. On October 10, the management
and the union wired that the members had voted to agree on a 60- to 75-cent
beginners’ wage and 13-cent blanket raise for all men earning 65 cents or over,
both increases to be effective as of August 9.
CASE No. 82
S haw -Box Crane & H oist D ivision of I nternational U nion U nited AtjtomoManning , Maxwell, & Moore, I nc., bile W orkers of A merica, L ocal N o.
Muskegon, Mich.
644, A. F. L.
Certified October 1. Strike September 17-October 6. 583 workers involved.
Closed October 7
A contract existed between the company and the union which would expire
in February 1942. A strike was called over demands for increased wages and
CASE HISTORIES
233
the union shop. The company took the position that the contract in existence
settled these matters until it expired. The Board attempted to affect a resumption
of production. Negotiations so opened resulted in agreement on all points in
controversy.
CASE No. 83
A gar P acking & P rovision Corpora- P ackinghouse W orkers Organizing
tion, P. B rennan Co., I llinois Meat
Committee, C. I. O.
P acking Co., Chicago, 111.
Certified October 1,1941. Strike August 28-October 12. Hearings October 8 and 9.
1,500 workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Fisher, Ching, Brophy. Assistant, McConnell.
The strike in progress when this case was certified to the Board was called
when the employers, having taken back the rest of their employees, refused to
reinstate union officers who had led an unauthorized strike which the national
officers of the union had canceled. The union admitted that the original strike
had been in violation of the collective contract and contended that the employers’
discriminatory reinstatement practice, because contrary to the National Labor
Relations Act, justified the second strike, whatever the no-strike and grievance
provisions of the contract The employers claimed the men denied reinstatement
were contract breakers, troublemakers and saboteurs. The parties agreed that
the question of reinstatement should be arbitrated, but the union insisted all
its members should be reinstated pending the arbitration, while the employers
insisted on excluding specified persons.
When the hearing did not bring about a voluntary settlement, the Board, passing
over the legal problems, made the following—
Findings and Recommendations
October 12
The Board finds that:
The parties had had contractual relations since 1938 and at the time of this
controversy had a contract in effect.
On August 28, 1941, the union went out on an unauthorized strike. The union
concedes that this strike was unauthorized; and on September 3 the employees
were ordered back to work by J. C. Lewis, National Chairman of the Packing
house Workers Organizing Committee.
On September 4 all the employees returned to work except 18 officers of the
union whom the companies refused to reinstate on the ground that they had
instigated the strike. Because of this refusal a new strike was called on Sep
tember 10 with the approval of Mr. Lewis. That strike commenced on September
11 and is still in effect, although the companies are conducting operations to a
limited extent.
The Board recommends:
Strike to be called off at once. The cases of men in dispute to be submitted
at once to an arbitrator to be selected by the Mayor of Chicago. The arbitrator
is to decide whether under the provisions of the existing contract, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, the companies were justified in refusing rein
statement of those men whose cases are in dispute. In the event that the
arbitrator should decide on reinstatement of any or all, then those reinstated
shall receive full pay from the time they were refused employment until they
are reinstated.
These were supplemented by—
Additional Findings and Recommendations
October 31
The Board finds that:
The union promptly accepted the recommendations of the Board of October
12,1941, and voted to return to work on October 13, 1941.
234
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The companies, on October 18, 1941, filed objections and a protest rejecting the
recommendations. The Board finds that these objections and protest are with
out merit.
During the hearings in Washington, the companies took the position that they
were willing to reinstate all employees except 18 officers of the union (whom
the companies refused to reinstate on the ground that they had instigated the
strike) and that they were willing to submit to an arbitrator, to be appointed by
the Mayor of Chicago, the question of their right not to employ the 18 persons
mentioned. The union took the position that it was also willing to submit to
such an arbitrator the rights of the 18 persons, provided they were reinstated
in advance of arbitration. The only issue that prevented an agreement of the
parties was this question of whether the cases of the 18 employees would be
arbitrated before or after reinstatement.
After the Board had on October 12,1941, made a recommendation substantially
in accord with the company’s position, the companies rejected the recommenda
tion. The Board has been informed orally by the attorneys for both parties that
the companies have refused to reinstate employees other than and in addition
to the 18 persons mentioned.
In the interest of the production of military supplies for the National Defense,
the Board, in accordance witfi its previous recommendation, recommends that
the companies reinstate immediately all employees except the 18 mentioned, and
submit the cases of the 18 to an arbitrator to be selected by the Mayor of Chicago.
When the employers continued to deny employment to the larger distrusted
group, the union asked the Board for effective redress but did not call another
strike up to January 12,1942.
CASE No. 84
Arcade Malleable I ron Co., I nc.,
Steel W orkers Organizing Committee,
Worcester, Mass.
C. I. O.
Certified October 3. Strike August 5-October 4. Hearing October 22, 23. 300
workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Stocking, Connelly, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
During the strike, which began August 5, the S. W. O. C. won a National Labor
Relations Board election and was certified as the bargaining agency. The strike
was called off at the request of this Board following certification, and, after 2
days of fruitless mediation by the panel, the parties were sent home to await the
appointment of a Board agent to investigate the issues. On November 3, the
Board appointed Charles G. Rugg, of Boston, as its special representative for
this purpose. The principal issues are wages, union shop, seniority, arbitration,
and grievance procedure.
On January 12, Mr. Rugg’s investigation was still in progress.
CASE No. 85
A labama D ry D ock & S hipbuilding
Co., Mobile, Ala.
I ndustrial U nion of Marine and S hif building W orkers of A m e r i c a ,
C. I. O.
Certified October 6. No strike. Hearing October 15,16. 4,800 workers involved.
Closed November 10
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapham, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
The following statement signed by the panel sets forth the facts. Although
the union expressed vigorous dissatisfaction, it conformed with the recom
mendation.
Recommendation
November 10
This case was certified to the National Defense Mediation Board on October
6, 1941. No strike was in progress on that date but one had been called for
CASE HISTORIES
235
6 p. m. that evening. At the request of the Board both parties continued
production pending its consideration of the case except for a 1-day walk-out
without sanction of the international union.
The division of the Board which heard this case was composed of Charles E.
Wyzanski, Jr., representing the public; Roger D. Lapham, representing em
ployers ; and Hugh Lyons, representing employees.
Hearings were held on October 15 and 16, 1941. Pursuant to leave granted
at the hearings both parties subsequently submitted additional information upon
the issue.
Parties.
1. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. operates two shipyards at Mobile,
Ala., at which it currently employs about 4,800 men in the construction and
repair of ships. It has contracts for 13 “ugly ducklings” and 36 high-speed
tankers and is also engaged in repairing British ships.
2. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of America, Local 18,
C. I. O., was certified by the National Labor Relations Board to be the repre
sentative of the company’s employees for collective bargaining. I. U. M. S. W.
claims to have signed as members 80 percent of the employees, but admits that
most of them are delinquent. The company recognizes I. U. M. S. W. as
bargaining agent and has had contractual relations with it for 3 y2 years.
Issue.
3. In this case there is one issue. I. U. M. S. W. requests that when the parties
amend their collective bargaining contract of February 3, 1941, to add thereto
the provisions of the Gulf States Shipbuilding Stabilization Agreement of July
18, 1941, Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. agree to a provision for a
“union shop.” By a union shop I. U. M. S. W. means an arrangement under
which every present employee and, after a probationary period, every future
employee, shall be required as a condition of employment to become, be, and
remain a member in good standing of the union until August 1,1943.
Facts.
4. February 3, 1941, Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. and I. U. M. S. W.
executed a collective bargaining contract. The contract covers the usual subjects
of hours, wages, and working conditions. It provides for recognition of
I. U. M. S. W. as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit
covered by the contract. It incorporates by reference a statement that “member
ship or nonmembership in any organization is not a condition of employment.”
In article 2, the contract provides: “There shall be no strike or other curtailment
of production, nor shall there be a lock-out, because of any dispute or grievance
which is subject to arbitration or because of any labor dispute in which the
company is not involved. The contract states it is binding until February 3,
1942, and thereafter from year to year unless terminated by one party.
5. May 13, 1941, representatives of the Office of Production Management, the
Navy Department, the Maritime Commission, Alabama Dry Dock & Ship
building Co. and other companies, and I. U. M. S. W. and other unions, met at
New Orleans to prepare a “Gulf Shipbuilding and Repair Zone Standards
Agreement.
6. This conference prepared and on June 18, 1941, published “Gulf Shipbuilding
and Repair Zone Standards Agreement.” These zone standards set forth pro
visions with respect to wages, hours, and certain working conditions. In para
graph 7 the zone standards provide: “There shall be no lock-outs on the part of
the employer nor suspension of work nor picketing of the company’s plant on the
part of the employees. This agreement is a guaranty that there will be neither
strikes nor lock-outs.” The zone standards, however, do not purport to cover
all conditions which should go into an agreement.
7. With respect to existing labor contracts, the letter from Monsignor Wynhoven as chairman of the conference transmitting the zone standards to the
Office of Production Management, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Maritime
Commission states:
“The conferees further agree that as soon as practicable, following such ap
proval and ratiflcaction of this Gulf Zone Standards agreement, any existing labor
agreements between shipbuilders and ship repairers and representatives of their
469872°—42-----16
236
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
employees shall be modified to conform with these zone standards, and any new
labor agreements shall also conform to them; provided that such conformity with
the zone standards shall not be required to extend beyond the termination date of
the zone standards agreement itself.”
8. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. accepted these zone standards in
June 1941. The general executive board of I. U. M. S. W. accepted the recom
mendations on June 24, 1941. On June 29, the zone standards were read out
paragraph by paragraph, at a meeting of Local 18 of the Industrial Union Marine
and Shipbuilding Workers of America, and by a formal vote at the meeting were
unanimously approved.
9. August 4, 1941, the Office of Production Management announced that the
“Gulf standards will be effective throughout the Gulf zone as of the first regular
day shift as of the 1st of August 1941.”
10. On September 5, 1941, during negotiations between the company and
I. U. M. S. W. in which I. U. M. S. W. demanded a union-shop provision, the com
pany in a written statement expressed its conviction that the contract should not
be reopened to include any new terms other than the zone standards but expressed
its willingness, in view of the national emergency, to open the agreement to in
clude the following provision:
“Following the principles of collective bargaining, the company agrees to in
form those of its employees who are now members of the union in good standing
or who hereafter voluntarily become members of the union during the life of this
contract, that the company regards with favor the maintenance of their mem
bership in the union.” I. U. M. S. W. rejected the offer.
Position of the parties.
11. I. U. M. S. W. argues from the premise that today it is not bound by any
contract with the company. While agreeing that the wage provisions of the zone
standards became effective on August 1, 1941, it urges that the “no strike” clause
and grievance machinery can be effective only when incbrporated in a collective
bargaining contract. As for the February contract, I. U. M. S. W. says it is
not in effect for these reasons: It is in some respects inconsistent with the zone
standards; therefore since the old agreement is to be modified in part, every
section of it is thrown open for negotiation: moreover the zone standards con
template collective bargaining agreements to implement them, for example, rates
of pay were to be fixed. Representatives of I. U. M. S. W. frankly stated that
under their view the negotiation of the zone standards agreements for Atlantic
and Pacific coasts and the Great Lakes and Gulf voided every shipbuilding and
ship-repairing collective bargaining agreement then in existence. To support
it they submitted a stenographic transcript of a telephone conversation held prior
to the zone standards conference in which Capt. J. W. Powell, United States
Navy, stated in the presence of representatives of the shipyards and the unions
that the zone standards would be negotiated into a new contract so that all con
tracts would begin on the same date and have the same termination. They cited
the example of New York Shipbuilding Corporation, which had reopened its con
tract on the Atlantic coast and granted a union-shop provision, as an example
of the application of this understanding and urged that the company itself had
recognized it by offering to reopen the February contract to include the clause
encouraging voluntary maintenance of membership in the union.
12. The company rests its case on the one proposition that there is in effect
until February 3, 1942, the contract of February 3, 1941, modified to accord with
the zone standards but otherwise effective without change. In support of this
proposition the company referred to the paragraph from Monsignor Wynhoven’s
letter quoted in paragraph 7 and submitted statements from Monsignor Wynhoven, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Bard, Captain Powell (the officer who
took part in the telephone conversation on which I. U. M. S. W. relies), and an
official of the company at the conference, all categorically confirming that the
zone standards conference intended that existing contracts should not be reopened
except to insert the zone standards. The company pointed out that its proposal
referred to by the union to modify the February contract in one other respect
was in no wise inconsistent with this position, for in the written offer the com
pany expressly stated that it contended the contract did not terminate until
February 3, 1942, and expressly limited its willingness to open the present agrees
ment to an assent to modify it by encouraging voluntary maintenance of member
ship in the union.
CASE HISTORIES
237
13. The company concedes that in February of 1942, the expiration date of the
contract, I. U. M. S. W. is free to propose changes in the contract, not incon
sistent with the zone standards.
Reasoning.
14. The contract of February 3,1941, states that at the company’s yards “mem
bership or nonmembership In any organization is not a condition of employment.”
The contract provides that it shall continue in force until February 3, 1942, and
from year to year thereafter unless terminated by either party. I. U. M. S. W.
has stated that it would not have been entitled to demand a union-shop provision
if that contract remained in force. We agree with that view. Any other view
would undermine the stability of collective bargaining agreements.
15. The ratification of the zone standards by both parties did not terminate
the contract. The letter above mentioned from Monsignor Wynhoven states
that the conferees agreed “that as soon as practicable * * * any existing
labor contracts between shipbuilders, ship repairers and representatives of their
employees shall be modified to conform with these zone standards and any new
labor agreements shall also conform to them.” This language shows an intention
to modify existing contracts only so far as necessary to conform to the zone
standards and to leave them in full force and effect in all other respects. That
this was the intention of the Gulf Zone Standards Conference is also made un
mistakably clear by the above-mentioned statements of Monsignor Wynhoven,
Assistant Secretary Bard, and Captain Powell, copies of which are attached.
Moreover, I. U. M. S. W. has been unable to find any support for its view. The
company’s offer was strictly limited to a proposal to encourage voluntary main
tenance of membership and, being coupled with an expressed statement that
the company insisted that the February contract was in force, in no way threw
open the entire contract. We conclude, therefore, that this case is governed by
the principle that a collective bargaining agreement once made should be given
effect so long as it endures. On February 3, 1942, I. U. M. S. W. will be free to
negotiate for a union shop if it desires and to bring the case here if negotiations
reach an impasse.
16. The presence of a valid subsisting collective bargaining agreement dis
tinguishes the present case from case No. 46 involving the Kearny plant of the
Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Corporation, for in that case the existing
contract had expired and both parties agreed that all subjects appropriate for
collective bargaining not covered by the Atlantic Coast Zone Standards were
open for negotiation. I. U. M. S. W. also urged that case No. 37 involving the
Bethlehem Steel Co., Shipbuilding Division, is controlling, but there was no
proof here that all the companies in the particular industry in the Gulf region had
executed closed-shop agreements as a result of collective bargaining.
17. We recommend that until February 3, T942, the relations between the
company and I. U. M. S. W. shall be governed by the existing contract of February
3, 1941, modified to the extent required by the Gulf Zone Standards of July 18,
1941, and no further.
A ttached Statements
Our Lady of L ourdes R ectory,
R t. R ev. Monsignor P eter M. H. W ynhoven,
JM28 LaSalle Street, New Orleans, La., October 19,1941.
To Whom It May Concern:
Following is my impression and personal belief in re the relationship between
the employer and the employee as affected by the Gulf Shipbuilding Stabilization
Conference agreements, signed on June 18,1941, and ratified and being made effec
tive August 1, 1941.
1. That all zone standards be incorporated in contracts existing before August
1, 1941, and new contracts effective after that date.
2. That the Government had no intention of interfering with individual con
tracts between shipyard management and unions, hence contracts to remain in
force till their natural expiration, unless both parties to a contract agree to make
changes in their working agreements.
Therefore I personally feel that the contract signed by the Alabama Dry Dock
& Shipbuilding Co., and Local 18, C. I. O., on February 1, 1941, to terminate on
February 3,1942, could only be opened for the purpose of inserting the zone stand
ards. The contractual provisions of the existing agreement, to expire on February
238
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
3,1942, are purely a matter of mutual agreement between employer and employees.
Any new contract should embody the zone standards as officially ratified and
promulgated by the national O. P. M.
(Signed) P eter M. H. W ynhoven.
D epartment of the N avy,
Office of the Secretary,
, 0., October 24, 1941*
You have handed me a memorandum with reference to the Gulf Zone Standards,
asking for my understanding of the interpretation of certain questions that
have arisen in connection with them. I quote these questions and follow them
with my answers:
Question 1. Was it intended that there should be inserted in the existing contract
only the zone standards and the supplementary provisions which the zone stand
ards on their face specifically require; or was it intended that the existing contract
should be entirely open except on such subjects as were precisely covered by the
zone standards?
Answer. It was definitely intended that the zone standards should be included
in existing contracts, as these standards were written, replacing all clauses
in those contracts that were inconsistent with the approved zone standards. This
did not in any way open up any other subjects under existing contracts.
Question 2. If in answering question 1 the conclusion is that the existing con
tract was open only to the extent necessary to include the zone standards and
the supplementary provisions which the zone standards specifically require, do
the other provisions of the old existing contracts expire on February 3, 1942 (as
originally intended), or on August 1, 1943?
Answer. Since the zone standards definitely include a provision for the term
it was to remain in force, the addition of these standards to an existing contract
automatically extend it to the date of the termination of the zone standards. The
zone standards are definitely “not separable’' and must be treated as an indivisible
whole.
Question 3. If the present contract is modified to include until its expiration
date, February 3, 1942, the zone standards, then on February 3, 1942, when the
contract expires are the zone standards (including the no-strike clause) then
binding, or are they not binding until incorporated in a new agreement?
Answer. If it were decided that an existing contract should terminate on the
date as originally specified therein, i. e., in the case cited, on February 3, 1942,
the zone standards would continue to be binding (including the no-strike clause)
until their specified expiration date. The company would continue to pay the
higher wages, overtime, and shift premiums, and the agreement on the part of
labor and industry that there should be no strikes or lock-outs would continue in
force.
Yours very truly,
(Signed) J. W. P owelr ,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. R oger L apham ,
National Defense Mediation Board, Social Security Building, Washington, D. C.
D ear Mr. L apham :
Washington D.
D epartment of the N avy,
Office of the A ssistant S ecretary,
,
,
In a personal letter addressed to Admiral C. W. Fisher by Mr. Philip H.
Van Gelder, secretary-treasurer of your organization, there were asked certain
questions relative to interpretations of the Gulf Shipbuilding Zone Standards
Agreement, for use in connection with a dispute now before the National Defense
Mediation Board.
In order that your organization may be informed of the understanding of the
Navy Department in respect to these matters, the questions presented are below
categorically answered.
Question 1. Was it intended that there should be inserted in the existing
contract only the zone standards and the supplementary provisions which the
zone standards on their face specifically require; or was it intended that the
existing contract should be entirely open except on such subjects as were precisely
covered by the zone standards?
My D ear Mr. Green :
Washington D. C., October 29 1941.
239
CASE HISTORIES
Answer. It was intended that there should be inserted in existing contracts
only the zone standards and the supplementary provisions which the zone
standards, on their face, specifically require. It was not intended that existing
contracts should be reopened for complete reconsideration of all provisions
contained therein, nor that the opportunity was available through the zone
standards to modify any conditions of existing contracts upon which the new
provisions of the zone standards agreements had no bearing.
Question 2. If in answering question 1 the conclusion is that the existing
contract was open only to the extent necessary to include the zone standards
and the supplementary provisions, which the zone standards specifically require,
do the other provisions of the old existing contracts expire on February 3, 1942
(as originally intended), or on August 1,1943?
Answer. It is the understanding that on the basis of the condition imposed
by the answer to the above question 1, the expiration dates of existing contracts
would remain unchanged in spite of modifications inserted therein pursuant to
the provisions of the zone standards.
Question 3. If the present contract is modified to include until its expiration
date, February 3, 1942, the zone standards, then on February 3, 1942, when the
contract expires are the zone standards (including the no-strike clause) then
binding, or are they not binding until incorporated in a new agreement?
Answer. The zone standards having been set up and ratified by all parties con
cerned independently Of specific employer-employee contracts, their ratifiation
establishes them as binding continuously for the period and under the conditions
as stated in section 9 of the Gulf Shipbuilding and Repair Zone Standards
Agreement. Accordingly it is considered that any review, renewal, or revision
of labor contracts which may take place by agreement of the parties thereto
would necessarily include as an accepted fact the provisions of the zone standards
agreement during the life of that agreement. The agreement having been
ratified independently, its provisions continue to be binding on the parties
concerned until the agreement may be no longer in existence, regardless of the
negotiation of other provisions in any specific labor agreements.
Very sincerely yours,
R alph A. B ard,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.
Mr. J ohn Green,
President, I. TJ. M. S. W. A., 534 Cooper Street, Camden, N. J.
CASE No. 86
Cleveland Graphite B ronze Co., Cleve- Mechanics E ducational Society
land, Ohio
A merica, L ocal N o. 5
of
Certified October 7. Strike October 3-8. Hearings October 15, 16, and November
27. 2,500 workers involved. Closed December 17
Panel: Graham, Hamilton, Watt (Googe). Assistant, Gill.
The issue concerned a change-over from piece-work rates to day rates within
department 33 of the company’s Cleveland plant. An agreement appeared to
have been reached late in September, but was disapproved by higher officials
of the company, and a strike was called on October 3. The men returned to
work on October 8 at the request of the Board, pending consideration of the
case. On October 16 an agreement was signed, and on October 26 ratified by
the union membership,
A dispute arose later as to whether the company was carrying out the
agreement concerning minimum rates for learners and probationary employees.
Following a further hearing on November 27, an investigation at the plant in
Cleveland by the panel assistant, and the submission of his written report, the
parties reached an agreement on December 17 disposing of the matter without
recommendations by the Board.
240
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 87
A lu m in u m W orkers of A merica , C. I. O.
Fairmont, W. Ya.
Certified October 7. No strike. Hearing October 16, 17. 375 workers involved.
Closed October 29
Panel: Fisher, Mead, Brophy. Assistant, Leiserson.
This case was exclusively a wage dispute. The parties had had contractual
relations for several years, and the controversy over wages arose pursuant to
a reopening of that question in April 1941 as permitted by the current contract.
Negotiations dragged along until fall while the parties cooperated in an effort
to secure more defense business for the company so as to enable it to grant a
wage increase. When the case was heard before the panel in October, the parties
had agreed upon an 8-cent increase, and the only dispute concerned making it
retroactive.
No agreement was reached during the hearing, but subsequently Mr. Mead
secured an offer from the company, over the telephone, to make the increase
retroactive to May in return for a provision freezing the wages for a full year
from that date. This proposal was transmitted to, and accepted by, the union,
and the union membership ratified the settlement on October 29.
F airmont A lum inum Co.,
CASE No. 88
A merican Cyan am id Co. (C aloo Chem - Chemical W orkers U nion , L ocal 22051,
ical D ivision ), Bound Brook, N. J.
A. F. L., and U nited Min e W orkers
of A merica , C. I. O.
Certified October 7. Strike September 29-October 13. Hearing October 20, 21, 22.
3,200 workers involved Closed October 24
Panel: Stacy, Lapham, Rieve (Googe). Assistant, Gill.
Negotiations between the A. F. L. and the company for a new contract began
early in September 1941. Complications entered in when the C. I. O. demanded
recognition and filed a petiton with the N. L. R. B. for an election. The stalemate
in the negotiations which resulted from this development led to a strike by the
A. F. L. which was ended upon the case’s being certified.
On October 2 the N. L. R. B. dismissed the C. I. O. petition on the ground that
it was unable to produce sufficient evidence of membership to warrant an election,
and, shortly before the Mediation Board’s hearing, it denied a motion by the
C. I. O. to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. When apprised of the
N. L. R. B.’s action, the C. I. O. representatives withdrew from the Mediation
Board hearing, and the Board proceeded to consider the issues between the com
pany and the A. F. L.
The principal issues were union security and wages.
On October 21 agreement was reached on the first issue in the form quoted
below. This article was drafted by the Board, but the parties had already in
dicated their willingness to accept the substance of it.
The union asked a wage increase of 10 cents per hour. The company offered
7 cents and reopening if the cost of living went up 5 points. The Board pre
vailed upon the company to give an outright additonal 3 “cents in 6 months. The
contract was signed on that basis on October 22 by the parties and the panel and
was promptly ratified. There follows the first article of this—
Agreement
October 22
Article 1
.—The company expects that employees who are or. who
become members of the union, will maintain such membership in good standing
during the life of this contract. In the event an employee fails to maintain
his union membership in good standing, the company will, upon request by the
union, call in the employee for a conference with an appropriate official or officials
of the company (and, if the union so desires, with a representative of the union
present), who will remind the employee of the company’s expectation that he
Union membership
CASE HISTORIES
241
maintain his union membership, as stated above, in order to do his part in carry
ing out the obligations of the union as a party hereto. In the event any em
ployee engages in activity in the plant calculated to undermine the status of the
union as the bargaining agency, the company agrees to take appropriate dis
ciplinary action. The union agrees to instruct its officers and inembers that it
is a violation of the company’s rules to engage in union activities during working
hours exclusive of proper grievance procedure.
New employees will be presented with a copy of this contract by the company,
upon hiring, and will be asked to cooperate with the union to carry out the
obligations of the contract.
CASE No. 89
(See Case No. 4, p. 95.)
CASE No. 90
H illsdale S teel P roducts (S picer I nternational U nion U nited A tjtomoM anufacturing Corporation), Hills- bile W orkers op A merica , L ocal 663,
dale Mich., and S picer Manufactur - A. F. L., and U nited A utomobile
ing Corporation, Toledo, Ohio
W orkers of A merica, L ocal 701,
C. I. O.
Certified October 14. Strike October 9-October 15. Hearing October 27, 28, 29.
3,200 workers involved. Closed January 12
Panel: Wyzanski, Lapham, Connelly, Googe, Brophy. Assistant, Cox.
This case involved both the Hillsdale plant and the Toledo plant of the Spicer
Corporation. At the Hillsdale plant, the A. F. L. won a labor board election from
the C. I. O. by a slight margin in April 1941 and signed a contract (not a closedshop contract) in June. The C. I. O. had bargaining rights and a contract at the
Toledo plant.
In August and again in October a number of C. I. O. members were discharged
at the Hillsdale plant, and others were forcibly ejected from the plant by A. F. L.
workers. A general free-for-all broke out at Hillsdale as a result of these events.
In October the Hillsdale plant was struck by the C. I. O. and the Toledo plant
likewise went down because the C. I. O. members there refused to handle the
Hillsdale products.
The stride was called off at the request of this Board following certification,
and the Board appointed an “impartial observer” to help keep the peace at Hills
dale. No settlement was reached in the 3 days of hearing before the panel. The
parties were sent home on October 29 to await recommendations. However, the
Board was subsequently advised that all the discharged men were back at work
except two who got jobs elsewhere, and that the difficulty appeared to have sub
sided. Accordingly no recommendations were issued and the case was closed.
CASE No. 91
J ohn A. R oebung ’s S ons Co., Roebling, B rotherhood of R ailroad T rainmen ,
N. J.
S ubordinate L odge N o. 867
Certified October 15. No strike. Hearings November 5, 6, December 16,17. 8,500
workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Stocking, Connelly, Woods. Assistant, Gill.
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen was certified by the National Labor
Relations Board as the bargaining agency for the company’s intraplant railroad
employees on June 19. Negotiations for a contract, the first between the parties,
dragged along without success until the case was certified.
A number of the issues were worked out by the Board’s mediation efforts, but
tne negotiations finally broke down because the B. R. T. representative admitted
242
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
lack of authority to negotiate any changes in certain of the union’s proposed
articles. On December 18 the Board adjourned the hearing until such time as
the B. R. T. sent a representative fully authorized to negotiate on all the issues
in dispute. A formal letter from the Board to the B. R. T. representative explain
ing this action, copies of which were given to both parties, is as follows:
Letter
December 18
In re: John A. Roebling’s Sons Co., and
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Subordinate Lodge 867.
D eab M r. R eed :
This will confirm, for the purposes of the record, the decision of the Board
as to the further procedure to be followed in the above-entitled case.
As to a number of the most important issues in dispute between the brother
hood and the company, you have informed the Board that under the laws of your
brotherhood you are not permitted, without express authority from the president
of the brotherhood, to make any deviation from certain of the brotherhood’s stand
ard rules, which you have proposed be incorporated in an agreement with the
company, and that you have not received such authority. These standard rules
are rules which have been agreed upon by representatives of common carrier class
I railways and of the brotherhood, at proceedings to which the Roebling Co. whose
railway operations are conducted merely as plant facilities, was not a party.
They are in various respects unacceptable to the company in their present form.
The Board has succeeded in working out an agreement on most of the disputed
points, other than those involving the standard rules, but it is apparent that a
complete agreement between the parties cannot be reached without an agree
ment upon the provisions which do involve the standard rules.
The Board obviously cannot function in its mediation capacity unless the
representatives of each party are empowered to bargain collectively upon all the
issues in dispute. The company representatives in this case are so empowered,
and are prepared to negotiate concerning compromises on these issues. Since you
are not so empowered, however, the Board has decided to recess the hearings
until such time as the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen arranges to have present
at the hearings a representative, either yourself or someone else, with authority
to negotiate upon all the issues in dispute.
Meanwhile, the Board is retaining jurisdiction over the case with the under
standing heretofore agreed to by both parties, that production at the company’s
plant will not be interrupted while the case remains before the Board.
Very sincerely yours,
N ational D efense M ediation B oard,
By George W. S tocking, Public Representative.
J. E. Connelly , Employer Representative.
H erbert W oods, Employee Representative.
Mr. W. L. R eed,
Vice President, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen,
820 Superior Avenue, West, Cleveland, Ohio
The case remained in this situation until its transfer.
CASE No. 92
I ngalls S h ip B uilding Corporation,
P ascagoula M etal T rades Council ,
Pascagoula, Miss.
A. F. L.
Certified October 15. Strike October 13-15. Hearings October 28-29. 3,000
workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Fisher, Meyer, Googe (Calvin). Assistant, McConnell.
The facts leading up to and embracing the dispute are stated in the findings
and recommendations. The Metal Trades Council by a majority vote of the
membership refused to accept them, announcing it would accept nothing other
CASE HISTORIES
243
than the union-shop provision demanded by it. Thus, though the plant is in
operation, there is no agreement.
Findings and Recommendations
November 12
STATEMENT
The Ingalls Ship Building Corporation is in the business of constructing ships
at Pascagoula, Miss. At the present time it has contracts for the delivery of
considerable tonnage to the United States Maritime Commission and the Navy.
The Pascagoula Metal Trades Council is a council composed of representatives
from the various local A. F. L. unions in the shipyards.
On October 13, 1941, a strike took place in the yards and on October 15 the
Secretary of Labor certified the dispute to this Board, and at the Board's request
the men returned to work on that day. Thereafter hearings were held before the
Board on October 28 and 29, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement
with respect to the points in issue and returned to Pascagoula with the under
standing with the Board that neither party would take any action until it made
its findings and recommendations.
FINDINGS
1. The Ingalls Ship Building Corporation was organized in 1938 and sometime
in that year acquired properties in Pascagoula, Miss., a town of approximately
4.000 people located on the Gulf of Mexico. Thereafter it constructed ways and
other facilities for shipbuilding and at the present 'time employs approximately
3.000 men. Both parties seem to agree that under present conditions the company
will continue to expand and additional men will be employed.
2. In 1939 representatives of the Metal Trades Department of the A. F. L.
carried on organizing work in the yards, and in July of 1940 the National Labor
Relations Board certified it as the bargaining agency for the employees. It is
stated that about 95 or 97 percent of the men belong to the various unions affili
ated with the Metal Trades Department.
3. In July 1940 the Metal Trades Department and the corporation executed a
contract which was comprehensive in its terms and was evidently designed to
cover in detail the relationship between the company and the men. This contract
contained a general provision with respect to wages and working conditions.
It did not contain any clause relating to a union shop or other form of union
security. Likewise, it did not have a provision under which the union agreed
not to strike. By its terms the contract would remain in force until July 16,
1941, and would continue in effect thereafter until either party gave 15 days
notice that it wished to negotiate a new agreement.
4. On June 18, 1941, various negotiations directed toward the stabilization of
labor relations in the shipbuilding industries under the auspices of the Office
of Production Management and other Government agencies resulted in what is
known as the Gulf Shipbuilding and Repair Zone Standards Agreement. These
zone standards consist of certain clauses deemed desirable for inclusion in labor
contracts, among them a no-strike and no-lock-out clause.
5. On June 28, 1941, Pascagoula Metal Trades Council notified the company
that it was prepared to renegotiate the contract which expired on June 16, and
negotiations were entered into at that time which are still in progress, and it is
out of them that the present difference arises. In the negotiations the company
and the union have reached agreement with respect to all items except a union
security clause and the no-strike, no-lock-out clause of the zone agreement.
While both parties desire to uphold the zone standards, it is the union’s contention
that it should not be called upon to sign the no-strike clause without some cor
relative clause which guaranteed security to it. The present dispute arises solely
out of the question of what should be the substantive provisions and wording of
a proposed article 4, dealing with this subject.
6. Basically the union demands that article 4 contain a clause providing that
membership in the union be a condition of employment. They, likewise, ask that
the company give preference to union members in employment. The company, on
the other hand, proposes that the clause contain an assurance on its part that it
will cooperate and encourage the union but insists that it should not give a strict
244
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
union maintenance or shop provision. It is willing to give some form of preference
of employment clause.
7. In support of its demand, the union contends:
(a) That in giving away the right to strike for 2 years it needs for its pro
tection complete union security by contract. This is particularly true because
the industry is new, in the process of expansion, and neither the company nor the
membership of the union has been accustomed to union conditions over a long
period of time.
(&) It is contended that a general assurance clause in the form which the
company proposes would be insufficient for the protection of the union because
of an alleged tendency on the part of the company to render lip service only to
such clause while seeking really to hamper the growth of the union in various
ways.
On its part the company contends:
(a) That as a matter of principle it cannot agree to impose any obligation of
joining the union on the men which it employs.
(b) The company contends that the union’s contentions that it has not and
will not in good faith encourage and cooperate with the union are without
foundation.
(c) The company is willing to give some form of preferential clause but could
not completely bind itself because it had entered into an agreement with the
officials of Jackson County, by the terms of which it agreed to give priority to
county residents.
8. Toward the end of the hearing before the Board the company proposed the
following wording for article 4, in line with its position outlined above:
“A r tic le 4. The company advocates that those that are now members or who
may become members of the union continue their membership and will cooperate
with the union for the purpose of carrying out this agreement, provided it is
understood that their obligation to cooperation will not' require the company
to discharge a man for nonpayment of dues or nonmembership in the union.
“The company will fully instruct its supervisory employees as to the terms
and conditions of this agreement and will discipline any such employee violating
the terms hereof or advocating a policy contrary to that set out herein.
“The company believes the interests of the employees are best served by being
members of the union and looks with favor upon all employees covered by this
agreement and all employees who are now members or who become members
continuing their membership.
“All things being equal and when practicable, members of the said union will
be given preference in the hiring of men when said members have registered with
the employer’s employment office and with the union’s and are available within
24 hours. The company will not support or encourage any dual union and will
not recognize any union of production or maintenance employees other than those
with which it has contractual relations through the Metal Trades Department,
affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, which is certified by the
National Labor Relations Board as sole collective bargaining agent. The company
will print copies of this agreement and will furnish each employee a copy thereof.”
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Board has considered carefully the dispute between the parties and has
come to the conclusion that the clause proposed by the company, if carried into
operation with good faith upon the part of both parties, should form a basis for
stable relations between the company and the union and guard the security of
the union during the life of the contract. Therefore, the Board recommends
that article 4 of the proposed contract be substantially in the form of the com
pany’s proposal outlined above with the addition of the following paragraph:
“In the event the union shall believe that any supervisory employee of the
company is not in good faith carrying out the policies announced herein, upon
written request of the union the company will join it in requesting the attendance
at Pascagoula of some disinterested person designated by the National Defense
Mediation Board for the purpose of investigating the complaint. If such person
shall deem it necessary, then at a meeting attended by such employee, a repre
sentative of the company, a representative of the union, and such person desig
nated by the National Defense Mediation Board, such supervisory employee shall
be advised in what manner and to what extent he has deviated from such policies
and shall be instructed not to repeat the offense. If the union shall so request,
the National Defense Mediation Board will at the present time or at some other
CASE HISTORIES
245
time appoint such a disinterested person to proceed to Pascagoula to study
the situation in advance of any complaint being made.”
Amendment to Findings and Recommendations
November 15
In the findings and recommendations filed in this case by the Board November
12, 1941, it was stated in paragraph 3 thereof that the contract entered into be
tween the Metal Trades Department and the corporation in July 1940 did not
have a provision under which the union agreed not to strike. This statement was
in error. Therefore, the Board hereby amends the findings and recommendations
by striking out the sentence beginning “Likewise, it did — paragraph 3 of the
findings and recommendations.
CASE No. 93
A merican E ngineering Go., Philadel- I ndustrial U nion of M arine and S h ip *
phia, Pa.
building W orkers of A merica , L ocal
35, C. I. O.
Certified October 18. Strike September 27-Oetober 22. 570 workers involved.
Closed January 7
Panel: Adams, Fales, Brophy. Assistant, Leiserson.
The Board’s request that the parties resume operation was heeded but the
hearing early in November yielded no agreement on wages, the sole important
issue. However, as negotiations for a renewal of the entire contract were scheduled
to begin within a month, the Board recessed the hearing without making any
recommendation, with the understanding that the wage question was to be taken
up by the parties in connection with the impending negotiations for a renewal of
the contract.
On November 22 the union advised the Board that negotiations for a new
contract had reached a stalemate. Meanwhile the C. I. O. members of the Board
had resigned. The Conciliation Service succeeded in bringing about an agree
ment on January 7.
CASE No. 94
S loss-S heffield S teel & I ron Co., U nited M in e W orkers of A merica ,
Birmingham, Ala.
L ocal N o. 12014, C. I. O.
Certified October 20. Strike October 21. Hearing October 28, 29, November 1, 2,
3, 4, 5. 900 workers involved. Closed December 17
Panel: Graham, Hamilton, Lyons. Assistant, Tomey.
This dispute was certified on October 20 and telegrams were dispatched to both
parties immediately asking that they “refrain from any action which might
aggravate the situation or render the controversy more difficult to solve.” The
union, however, refused to comply with the request of the Board and the plants
were struck at midnight October 20. On October 21, the Board notified the parties
that a hearing had been set for October 28, and requested the immediate and
complete resumption of production. Production was resumed at 10 p. m.,
October 21.
The hearing began on October 28 in conjunction with that on the dispute
involving the Alabama By-Products Company of Birmingham, Ala., and United
Mine Workers of America, Local 12136, Case No. 95, which had been certified to
the Board at the same time as the instant case and which, the union contended,
should be heard with it. At the conclusion of the opening statements by all the
parties, the Board decided that the two cases should not be heard simultaneously.
During the negotiations before the Board, none of the principal issues in dis
pute was resolved by collective bargaining. Therefore, the Board issued its—
Recommendation
November 10
1. A main point in the union demands is the so-called “union shop.’’ During
the course of the hearing before the Board the union modified their demand to
246
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
the “maintenance of membership’’ provision. The company remained adamant
in its stand against any form of “union shop” or “maintenance of membership”
basing their objection on the ground that such an arrangement does not exist
in the pig-iron industry in the Birmingham area and that they are opposed to
it as a matter of company policy. The union pointed to its maturity and high
percentage of membership in the plants in question as the basis for granting this
provision. The Board has given careful consideration to all the arguments and
does not in this case recommend either of these proposals, but recommends the
inclusion of the following statement in the contract between the company and
the union:
“The company recognizes, does not object to, and will not interfere with the
rights of the employees to become members of the union. The company will not
tolerate any of its agents engaging, at any time, in any activities against the union
signatory to this contract. The company agrees that there shall be no discrimina
tion against any employee because of his acting as an officer or in any other
legitimate capacity on behalf of the union. The company will not tolerate and will
discipline any employee, who, on company time, carries on antiunion activities or
seeks to interfere with the membership or status of this union.
“The company has good will toward membership in the certified union as a
basic part of our industry and a vital partner in defense production. The com
pany and union agree to cooperate for harmonious relations, for orderly and effi
cient shop discipline, and maximum defense production.”
2. A second principal point of dispute was the execution of one single con
tract covering operations in the byproducts plant and blast furnaces, instead of
executing two separate contracts as has been done heretofore. During the course
of the hearings before the Board, the company agreed to this demand of the
union. Accordingly, the Board recommends that one contract be executed cover
ing both operations and with separate parts or divisions only where the opera
tions are distinctly different and separate provisions are necessary. Unless
operations are dissimilar, one provision shall be made applicable to both opera
tions.
3. On the question of holidays, the union requested a provision for the payment
of time and one-half for certain named holidays (Fourth of July, Labor Day,
Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day). The company again pointed to the
absence of any similar provision in the pig-iron industry in the Birmingham area
where continuous operations are involved, but did agree that should the practice
become prevalent in that industry in Birmingham, the company would be willing
to open negotiations on this question. The Board recommends that a provision
be inserted in the contract providing for the opening of negotiations when and if
the payment of time and one-half for these named holidays becomes prevalent
in the pig-iron industry in the Birmingham district.
4. On the issue of wage adjustments, the Board is not prepared at this time to
make final recommendations. The Board, however, makes an interim recommen
dation of an increase of 2 cents per hour for all regular employees covered by the
byproducts plant and blast furnace contracts. This increase is not to effect the
wage rate of men not regularly employed, or the wage rate of common labor
hereafter employed, but the present 55-cent rate prevailing in the Birmingham
district shall be retained for such common labor. The necessary data for the
determination of any further wage adjustments are not now available to the
Board. The payment of any further wage increase up to the 5 cents demanded
by the union, or any part thereof, should be based upon the ability of the company
to meet the increased costs out of its present earnings and upon other economic
factors governing the operations of the company. Accordingly, the Board shall
appoint a special representative to investigate the question of what, under all
the circumstances, will be an appropriate increase for the company to pay. All
parties shall be given an opportunity to present evidence on this question and
on the basis of this evidence the special representative shall report his findings
to this Board, at which time recommendations on this question will be made.
The 2-cent increase and any further increase recommended shall be retroactive
to October 22, 1941, the date operations were resumed following the strike.
5. With respect to vacations, the method of computing vacations as well as the
number of days to be allowed, were issues in dispute. Again on this question
the Board is not prepared to make its final recommendations, but as an interim
proposal recommends the adoption of plan No. 2 proposed by the company, which
provided for vacations in accordance with the following schedule: 2 to 4 years,
3 days; 4 to 8 years, 6 days; 8 to 10 years, 7 days; 10 to 15 years, 8 days; over 15
years, 10 days.
CASE HISTORIES
247
Any liberalization of vacations above that recommended and any changes in
the method of computation shall be the subject of the study of the special repre
sentative, who shall take into account the ability of the company to meet the
increased costs out_of its present earnings and upon all other economic factors
governing the operations of the company. Then upon the basis of this report,
the Board will make final recommendations on this question.
6. On the question of collecting union dues, the Board recommends that the
present system be retained with the 60-day-notice provision. This provision should
be added to the present check-off authorization provision in accordance with
the agreement reached between the parties prior to the hearings in Washington.
In issuing these recommendations, the Board urgently calls to the attention
of the parties the vital importance of harmonious relations between the company
and the union, and uninterrupted production in the national defense effort
On November 11, the president of District 50, United Mine Workers of America,
requested that the case be withdrawn from further consideration by the Board in
view of the resignation of the C. I O. representatives on the Board.
In a letter dated December 17, the company advised that direct negotiations
between the company and union had resulted in an agreement of all matters in
dispute.
CASE No. 95
A labama B y -P roducts Corporation,
U nited M in e W orkers of A merica,
Birmingham, Ala.
L ocal 12136, C. I. O.
Certified October 20. No strike. Hearing October 28-November 1. 250 workers
involved. Closed November 12
Panel: Graham, Hamilton, Lyons. Assistant, Gill.
Negotiations for renewal of a contract between the union and the company,
due to expire October 19, broke down and a threatened strike was averted by
certification of the case to the Board. The principal issues were union shop, wage
adjustments, and overpay for certain holidays.
A settlement was negotiated before the panel, and accepted by both parties,
subject to ratification. The union-shop issue was settled with a maintenance
of membership clause and a requirement that new employees join the union (to
which the company had agreed before the case came to Washington); certain
wage adjustments were made; and the holiday issue was settled by providing
that, should any of the company’s competitors in the area adopt a policy of
paying time and one-half for the holidays in question, this company would imme
diately adopt the same policy.
Although the Board formally recommended the acceptance of this settlement,
the terms had actually been worked out by mediation, the recommendation being
merely a formality desired by the parties. The agreement was ratified sometime
between November 1 and 12, at which time the Board was advised of the ratifi
cation and the case closed.
CASE No. 96
B ell A ircraft Corporation,
U nited A utomobile W orkers of A mer-
Buffalo, N. Y.
ica , L ocal 501, C. I. O.
Certified October 24. No strike. Hearings November 10-12. 12,000 workers
involved. Closed December 11
Panel: Stacy, C. E. Adams, Brophy. Assistant, McConnell.
The company has been bargaining collectively with the union since 1936 and
was one of the first aviation employers to sign an agreement with the U. A. W.C. I. O. On August 26, 1941, the union proposed a supplement to the existing
agreement containing demands for a union shop, check-off, 20 cents an hour
general wage increase, and an increase in the starting rate from 50 cents to 75
cents an hour. No progress was made in joint conferences or conferences with
the Conciliation Service, so the case was certified to the Board.
248
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
The negotiations in Washington were recessed after 3 days because of the with
drawal of the G. I. O. members from the Board November 11. Thereafter the
parties agreed to submit the decision to an arbitrator. On December 19, Thomas
E. Murray, the arbitrator, succeeded in obtaining an agreement in lieu of arbitra
tion which provided for a 65-cent starting wage to be increased to 75 cents after
60 days, and a general wage increase of 12% cents an hour. The union agreed
to withdraw its demands for a closed shop and not to reopen the question during
the life of the agreement. The wage increases were made retroactive to
September 2.
CASE No. 97
R obins D ry D ock & R epair Co., New I ndustrial U nion of M arine & S h ip York, N. Y.
building W orkers of A m e r i c a ,
C. I. O.
Certified October 25. Strike October 27-November 3. Hearing November 10, 11.
6,000 workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Fisher, Fales, Lyons. Assistant, Cox.
In this case the union was certified by the National Labor Relations Board
in August 1940, and negotiations proceeded without an agreement from December
1940. Termination of a strike which began just after the case was certified was
worked out in informal conferences between the parties and the chairman and
executive secretary of the Board.
At the hearing the issues (wages, grievance procedure, union shop, appren
tices, prohibition of union activities on company property) were explored. Upon
withdrawal of the C. I. O. members from the Board in connection with the Cap
tive Mines dispute, this case was recessed along with all other C. I. O. cases
then pending.
On January 12,1942, the case remained unsettled, but production was proceed
ing without interruption.
CASE No. 98
U nion E lectric Co., St. Louis, Mo.
T ri-S tate U tility W orkers U nion
Certified October 28. No strike. 2,846 workers involved. Closed November 4
This controversy arose over wages. The company had recently entered into a
wage agreement with the International Union of Operating Engineers and refused
to make a more favorable agreement with the Tri-State Utility Workers Union.
Just before the case was certified, the labor disputes division of the Office of
Production Management had arranged for a conference between its consultants
and the parties in St. Louis. The Board made these consultants its special rep
resentatives. At the conference in St. Louis on October 31 a formula was worked
out which was agreeable to both parties. The parties on November 1 accepted the
“report and recommendations” of this Board, which added an interpretative letter
on November 4.
CASE No. 99
Y ork Corrugating Co., York, Pa.
I nternational A ssociation of M a c h in
ists , L ocal 1462, A. F. L.
Certified October 30. Strike October 9-November 6. 260 workers involved.
Closed November 6
This strike was called over a dispute about wages. A contract was in force.
The Board attempted to effect a resumption of production. The company offered
a wage increase and insisted on a settlement before resuming operation. Before
the Board heard the case, the parties, by direct bargaining in York, worked out an
agreement on all matters in controversy.
CASE HISTORIES
249
CASE No. 100
W olverine T ube Co., D etroit, Mich.
U nited A utomobile W orkers of A mer
ica , L ocal 174, C. I. O.
Certified October 30. Strike September 9-November 3. 1,000 workers involved.
Transferred to the National War Labor Board
The strike was called over a failure to agree on wages. A contract expiring in
May 1942 was in existence between the company and the union. The Board was
able to effect a resumption in production pending a hearing, but before a hearing
could be held the C. I. O. members of the Board withdrew and the hearing was
postponed indefinitely.
CASE No. 101
Chris Craft Corporation, Algonac, Mich.
F ederal L abor U nion No. 20783,
A. F. L.
Certified October 30. Strike October 2-November 7. Hearings November 13, 21.
400 workers involved. Closed December 15
Panel: Stacy, Fales, Calvin. Assistant, Cox.
In this case the employer and the union entered into a contract for 2 years on
January 1, 1941. Nevertheless, in August the union demanded increased wages
and went on strike from October 2 until November 7, when the strike was termin
ated at the request of this Board.
The company, while pointing out that the existing contract gave it the right
to reject any changes until January 1943, expressed a willingness to reexamine
wages in the event it received additional defense contracts. On November 21, an
agreement was reached before the panel providing that operations will continue
under the present agreement, and that a new wage scale would be negotiated
when and if the company receives additional defense contracts. This agreement
was facilitated by the panels undertaking to bring the company’s situation to the
attention of the O. P. M. with a view toward securing further defense orders for
the company. After the agreement was executed, Judge Stacy advised Mr. Sid
ney Hillman of the situation, and the case was closed.
A merican Can Co., Chicago, 111.
CASE No. 102
S teel W orkers Organizing Committee ,
Locals No 2041 and No. 1478, C. I. O.
Certified November 3. Strike September 16-November 5. 2,600 workers involved.
Transferred to National War Labor Board
In the course of negotiations for a first collective bargaining agreement 17 men
were dismissed. A strike resulted and the union filed unfair labor practice
charges with the National Labor Relations Board. After the case was certified,
the Mediation Board was able to effect a resumption of production by getting the
company to agree to take the dismissed men back and getting the union to with
draw the unfair practice charges. A date for hearing on the deadlocked con
tract negotiations concerning wages was set by the Board, but before this date the
C. I. O. members withdrew from the Board.
CASE No. 103
N evada Consolidated Copper Corpora- B rotherhood of L ocomotive E ngineers ,
tion , Ely, Nev.
D ivision 596
Certified November 7. No strike. Hearings November 18,19, 29. 6,000 workers
involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Seward, Connelly, Lynch. Assistant, Cox.
This dispute arose out of a dispute as to whether under the agreement between
the union and the company, the union’s members were entitled to perform certain
250
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
work. Strike action was threatened. The Board asked the parties to continue
production. The Board appointed Frank M. Swacker to investigate the question.
He submitted his report on December SO. The Board was unable to act on it be
fore its dissolution.
CASE No. 104
W aterfront E mployers A ssociation of I nternational L ongshoremen ’s AssoW ashington , Tacoma, Port Angeles,
ciation , A. F. L.
and Anacortes, Wash.
Certified November 10. No strike. Hearing November 24, 25. 1,315 workers
involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Adams, Ching, Googe. Assistant, Cox.
This case concerned a dispute, primarily over wages, between the I. L. A.
as the representative of the longshoremen, checkers, and supercargoes at Tacoma,
Port Angeles, and Anacortes, and the Waterfront Employers Association of
Washington, representing the shipping companies doing business at those ports.
From 1937 until the summer of 1941, these three ports were blanketed in with
all the other Pacific-coast ports in a single bargaining unit, for which the
International Longshore Workers Union (C. I. O.) was certified by the N. L. R. B.
as exclusive bargaining agent. In April 1941 the N. L. R. B. reversed its decision
as to a coast-wide bargaining unit, and certified the I. L. A. as the bargaining
representative for these three ports, as separate bargaining units. The remain
ing ports on the coast, which were all organized by the I. L. W. U., remained
as a single unit. In the fall, negotiations for a contract at the three Washing
ton ports broke down over a number of issues, but mainly over wages.
Meanwhile a wage dispute between the I. L. W. U. and the employers at other
Pacific coast ports was submitted to arbitration in the summer of 1941, and
at the time the I. L. A. case was certified to the Board, the I. L. W. U. arbitration
proceeding was in progress before Dean Morse of the University of Oregon.
Since the Morse arbitration would determine the wages for all other ports on
the coasts, negotiation concerning wages at the three I. L. A. ports was difficult.
After 2 days of hearing, the parties signed the following agreement, execution
of which was recommended by the Board, as was attested by the members of
the panel.
Agreement
November 25
The International Longshoremen’s Association, Pacific Coast District No. 38,
and Waterfront Employers Association of the Pacific Coast, acting on behalf
of Waterfront Employers of Washington and its members, having conducted
negotiations looking to a contract relative to wages, hours, and conditions for
longshoremen in the ports of Tacoma, Anacortes, and Port Angeles, and a contract
for checkers represented by Local 38-36, in conformity with the recommendations
made by the National Defense Mediation Board, agree to promptly complete
negotiations for such contracts, incorporating all provisions except those fixing
the basic straight and overtime wage rates and salaries, and to reduce the same
to writing and file them with the National Defense Mediation Board; and they
further agree to submit to the National Defense Mediation Board for determina
tion and settlement, the initial basic wage rates and salaries to be incorporated
in such agreements, it being understood that:
(a) The Board shall direct a survey of the industry involved and such addi
tional hearings as it considers necessary.
(ft) Pending determination of wages by the Board, there shall be no strikes
or work stoppages or lock-outs.
On December 11 the Board appointed Prof. Donald H. MacKenzie, of the
University of Washington, as its representative to conduct the survey referred
to in the agreement. On January 12 Professor MacKenzie’s survey was still
in progress.
CASE HISTORIES
251
CASE No. 105
Central S tates E mployers’ N egotiating Central S tates D rivers’ Council, I n Committee
TERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAM
STERS, Chauffeurs, W arehousemen
and H elpers of A merica, A. F. L.
Certified November 18. No strike. Hearings December 2-5, 15-17. 225,000
men involved. Closed January 3, 1942
Panel: Davis, Seward, Lapham, Fales, Meany, Watt. Assistant, Neblett.
The facts are set forth in the following decision:
D e c is io n
January 3,1942
preliminary recital
The Central States Employers’ Negotiating Committee is an organization rep
resenting approximately 800 common and contract carriers engaged in motortrucking operations in the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, and Kansas.
The Central States Drivers’ Council similarly represents approximately 330
locals of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse
men and Helpers of America (A. F. L.) in the same area.
These two organizations were formed in 1938 for the purpose of establishing
by collective bargaining uniform standards of wages and working conditions
in the trucking industry for the “over-the-road” truck drivers (i.e., those drivers
engaged in transporting goods from city to city, rather than in making local
deliveries within a town or city) within that area. In August 1938 the two
committees negotiated a contract which became effective October 1, 1938, and
ran to October 31, 1939. In 1939, this contract was renewed for a period of
approximately 2 years, expiring on November 15, 1941. The negotiations for the
renewal of this contract led to the present dispute.
Following a deadlock in these negotiations, the parties on November 15, 1941,
entered into the following arbitration agreement:
“It is hereby agreed by the unions and employers involved in negotiating the
contract to replace the existing contract affecting over-the-road motor freight
drivers which expires midnight November 15, 1941, that there shall be no stop
page of work on the expiration of the present contract and in lieu thereof both
the unions’ and the employers’ committees, through their respective chairmen,
hereby agree to refer to the National Mediation Board1 all conditions still in
dispute. It is further agreed that the articles that appear attached hereto
which have been tentatively agreed to shall be the basis for all operation
commencing 12:01 a. m. of November 16, 1941. In addition to these articles,
it is understood that the present wage scale shall apply pending the Mediation
Board1 determination. The decision of the National Mediation Board1 shall
be binding upon the parties hereto and shall be retroactive to 12:01 a. m., No
vember 16, 1941.
“Immediate steps shall be taken to place this dispute before the National
Mediation Board1 for a speedy determination.”
On November 18, 1941, the dispute was certified to this Board by the Secretary
of Labor. Operations were continued without interruption, as provided in the
arbitration agreement.
On November 30, 1941, the Board received a telegram from L. P. O’Brien,
chairman of the Ohio Over-the-Road Employers, stating that for the past 2%
years the State of Ohio employers had had in effect a separate labor agreement
with the teamsters governing drivers domiciled in Ohio, and that another separate
agreement was being negotiated. They asked that it be definitely understood
that the State of Ohio was not to be included in the proceedings before this
Board. On December 13, 1941, while hearings w’ere in progress before the
Board, a number of employers from the State of Michigan likewise notified the
1 During the course of subsequent proceedings both parties made clear that the use of the
title “National Mediation Board” in this agreement was in error, and that the title “Na
tional Defense Mediation Board” should have been used.
469872°—42-----17
252
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Board that they were withdrawing from the Central States Employers’ Nego
tiating Committee and from the proceedings before this Board.
This Board’s responsibilities are fixed by the Executive Order of March 19,
1941, and by the certification of the Secretary of Labor. The employers in the
States of Ohio and Michigan, previously signatories to the 12-State agreement,
were included in the certification of the Secretary of Labor. Our responsibility
cannot be affected by any purported “withdrawal.” The relationship of these
employers to the Central States Employers’ Negotiating Committee is, of course,
a matter which they must decide for themselves. Regardless of any action
which they may take, however, the duty of this Board to endeavor to effect
peaceful settlement of the dispute and to prevent any interruption of the trans
portation of war materials continues unchanged.
Hearings on the dispute were opened on December 1, 1941, before a division
of this Board consisting of William H. Davis, chairman, and Ralph T. Seward,
representing the public: Roger Lapham and Frederick F. Fales, representing
employers; and George Meany and Robert Watt, representing employees.
The hearings were closed on December 17,1941.
Following the closing of the hearings, the Central States Employers’ Negotiat
ing Committee through R. J. Appel, its secretary, on December 23,1941, presented
for inclusipn in the record certain documents consisting, for the most part, of
telegrams from individual employers stating the financial results of their op
erations during the month of November 1941. The union representatives have
filed with the Board an objection to their acceptance and consideration. These
telegrams relate to the operator’s ability to pay. We had considered them, but
they must be discounted by seasonal factors and the uncertainties due to
shift from peacetime to wartime production. They have little weight, particu
larly in view of what we say hereinafter on the subject of ability to pay.
THE ISSUES
The articles of a new contract which had been agreed upon by both parties, and
proposed articles still in dispute and which were submitted to this Board for
decision, are attached hereto as appendixes A and B, respectively. [The appen
dixes have not been printed.] The points in dispute between the parties may be
listed as follows:
1. The basic mileage and hourly wage rate for over-the-road drivers.
2. Whether any differential in this wage rate should be written into the contract
in favor of operators in certain of the western states in the 12-State area.
3. The scope and amount of the differential in the basic wage rate to be paid
to drivers of combinations of property-carrying units, such as tandems and
double bottoms, other than straight trucks.
4. Whether drivers should be paid for preparatory time, i. e., for work done in
the terminals in preparing the equipment for the trip, such as checking safety
devices, etc.
5. The amount to be paid for employees called in to work and not actually put
to work.
6. The amount of the minimum to be guaranteed to employees who are put to
work, regardless of the length of time actually occupied by their runs.
7. The compensation for lay-over time spent away from the home terminal,
including (1) the time when such guaranteed lay-over pay should begin, (2) the
furnishing of meals, as well as lodging, by the employers, and (3) payment of
lay-over compensation for Sundays and holidays.
8. Whether drivers on runs exceeding 180 miles should be required to make
local pick-ups and deliveries.
9. Compensation to be paid for employees laid off because of impassable high
ways.
10. Compensation to be paid for employees engaged in deadheading operations.
11. The establishment of rules governing the taking of a rest period by overthe-road drivers.
12. The rules governing two-man operations and the compensation for such
operations.
13. The nature of the lodging to be furnished by the employers and the amount
which the employer may elect to pay in lieu of furnishing lodging.
14. Overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of 60 per week.
15. Vacations with pay.
CASE HISTORIES
253
16. Rules governing the hiring or leasing of equipment by operating com
panies and, in particular, fixing the amounts to be paid to the lessors of this
equipment over and above the wage rates and other supplementary allowances
fixed elsewhere in the contract.
17. Provisions governing the termination of the agreement.
THE BASIC WAGE BATE
Long as is this list, and important as are all of the issues listed, nevertheless
the basic issue which divides the parties is the general wage rate for over-the-road
drivers. Most of the argument and evidence presented to the Board is directed
to this issue. With but few exceptions, the other issues are dependent upon it.
Determination of the amounts to be paid for driving special equipment, for lay-offs
due to impassable highways, for lay-overs away from the home terminal, or for
time spent in preparing a truck to take the road, is impossible so long as the
basic wage rate is in dispute. Once it is settled, these other issues should present
little difficulty.
The wage rate established by the agreement which expired November 15 of
this year was 3 cents a mile to drivers paid on a mileage basis and 80 cents an hour
to those paid by the hour. The union has asked that these rates be increased to
5 cents a mile and $1 an hour. The employers are offering the present rates.
To support their respective positions, the parties have presented to the Board
a wealth of data regarding the financial condition of the industry and its ability
to pay higher wages; recent wage trends in this and other industries; changes
in the hazards of truck driving and in the effort, skill, and responsibility required
of the driver; seasonal changes in revenue and operating conditions in the in
dustry; and changes in the cost of living in the 12-State area. In addition, the
Board itself, in cooperation with representatives of both parties, secured con
siderable information bearing on these subjects from other Government agencies.
Among the sources of information to which the Board has thus had access are
the official annual and quarterly reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission
and a number of unpublished tables prepared for the Board by the staff of that
Commission concerning employment, wages, expenses, and revenues of motor
carriers in this area at periods since the last official reports were published.
Official records of the Bureau of Labor Statistics regarding industrial wage trends
and trends in the cost of living are before us, as is also the data collected by the
Interstate Commerce Commission for the Wage and Hour Division of the De
partment of Labor in connection with the recent establishment of minimum
wage scales in the trucking industry.
The employers’ representatives have put in evidence the reports to the Presi
dent of the Emergency Board appointed by him on September 10, 1941, under the
Railway Labor Act, and have submitted information compiled from the answers
to questionnaires sent to the individual employers during the course of the pro
ceedings. A number of individual employers have submitted testimony and
exhibits intended to clarify the special conditions obtaining in the localities in
which they operate. The union, for its part, has furnished the Board with in
formation concerning mileage and hourly earnings compiled from, the records
of numerous individual truck drivers and with much general material dealing
with wage trends and with cost-of-living changes.
We have carefully studied this material. Our study has led us to these con
clusions :
1. Over-the-road drivers’ earnings have risen far more rapidly over the last
4 years than has the cost of living. The cost of living, however, is now rising at a
rapidly increasing rate.
It thus appears from the evidence that on this question we must discount
the more extreme arguments of both parties. On the one hand it seems clear
that the real wages of the over-the-road drivers in this area have risen sub
stantially since 1937, and that even without an increase it might be some time
before living costs as a whole caught up to the increase in earnings to reduce real
wages to the 1937 level. On the other hand, it seems unsound to take real wages
in 1937, the year before the first general contract was negotiated, as necessarily
the standard, or to assume that the lower standard of living then existing among
the drivers was proper and should now be reestablished. We must differentiate
between the standards reached by workers through individual bargaining or
through bargaining in local and limited groups and those reached by industry
wide bargaining of the type with which we are here dealing. Absolute standards
254
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
of fair real wages, of course, clo not exist. But when dealing with an organized
industry it seems to us fairer and more desirable to take as the standard that
balance between wages and living costs which has been reached through industry
wide bargaining, than to go back to the levels existing before such bargaining
began.
It seems all too clear, from the record before us and from our experience as
a Nation in prior wars, that the cost of living will increase further during the
life of this contract. The extent of that increase we cannot judge.
We do conclude, however, that some wage increase to meet the rising cost of
living is necessary and in order.
2. The ability of the individual carriers to pay increased wages varies greatly
within the area. It seems certain, moreover, that this ability will be drastically
affected by the dislocation and alteration of transportation requirements incident
to the program of military production. The nature and extent of this alteration
we are unable to determine, though from the evidence before us it seems certain
that the change will not be uniform throughout the area and that some carriers
will be affected very advantageously and others seriously injured.
In dealing with this question, however, we must of necessity consider the
industry in this area as a whole and not the individual carriers. Moreover, as
we stated at the hearing, we do not regard ability to pay as a factor in determin
ing the “fairness” of a wage in the first instance. It does not determine the price
which these carriers must pay for their fuel, buildings, or equipment. It should
not determine the price they must pay for labor. Wages should not be made the
only costs which must vary with an industry’s returns. Once the minimum “failwage” in terms of the cost of living, and the trend in competing industries has
been determined, of course, ability to pay is indeed a factor in deciding whether
or not wages should be set any higher. We frankly state that consideration of
this industry’s ability to pay has led us to restrict the increase we award to the
minimum which these other factors have seemed to dictate.
We are here confronted by an industry which is sharing with the Nation the
disruption and uncertainties incident to the present war. The economic life of
the country is undergoing a vast transformation whose repercussions are certain
to be felt in this industry as in all others. To some it has brought prosperity;
to others, disaster. And this variation and uncertainty will be particularly true in
a service industry such as this. In this situation past trends, as a basis for
prophecy, are of doubtful utility. Our practical objective must be to conserve
so far as possible those established economic relationships which have so far
proved workable and sound; to conserve for the individual driver some degree
of the established balance between his living costs and his wages; to conserve for
the industry the established relationship between its own labor costs and those of
competing industries. We must therefore turn to a consideration of the compara
tive wage trends in this and related industries.
3. In recent years, and particularly since 1937, wages for over-the-road drivers
in the trucking industry in the 12 States have risen far more rapidly than wages
in manufacturing industries in general, or in the transportation industries in par
ticular. The argument of the union that the full increase demanded is necessary
to keep these drivers abreast in their wages with advances in other industries
can, therefore, not fully be accepted. On the other hand, it cannot be urged that
because of their recent increases no further increase to these drivers should be
granted. This area of the industry was organized upon an industry-wide basis
for collective bargaining only 3 years ago. It is unsound to lay conclusive weight
upon a comparison between the wage trend in an industry or company immediately
following organization and the trend in other industries or companies which have
been organized for a longer period. As a general rule, it is only after some years
of collective bargaining that the proper competitive balance between a newly
organized industry and those longer organized is established. When that balance
is reached, of course, can only be judged by rule of thumb. But it seems fair to
assume from the evidence before us that if the proper balance in labor costs be
tween this industry and its chief competitor, the railroads, has in fact been
reached, it was only when the advances established by the recently expiring con
tract became effective in 1940.
The relationship between the labor costs in the trucking and railroad indus
tries existing in 1940 has been altered by the award of the President’s Emergency
Board in the recent railway wage dispute. This award granted to all railroad
operating employees a wage increase of 914 cents an hour, and to all nonoperating
CASE HISTORIES
255
employees 10 cents an hour. We believe that the prior relationship between the
labor costs for employees in the two industries should be given very substantial
weight in arriving at a proper wage increase in this arbitration.
After careful analysis of the evidence, we have concluded that adequate com
pensation for rising living costs and the reestablishment of the balance between
wages for operating employees in the railroads and in the trucking industry in
this area can be achieved by an increase in the basic wage scale for over-theroad drivers in the 12-State area of four-tenths of a cent per mile and 10 cents
per hour. We will so award.
REGIONAL DIFFERENTIALS
The record leaves no doubt that a number of employers in this area, particularly
those located in States west of the Mississippi, operate under substantially differ
ent conditions than those which confront operators in the remainder of the
territory. This western area is predominantly agricultural; there are fewer
industries requiring trucking services; the distances to be covered are greater;
the roads are poorer; the winters, in the North at least, are harder and more
damaging to road transportation; the population to be served is smaller. The
Board has had the advantage of much testimony and numerous exhibits submit
ted by employers from the western and northwestern States emphasizing these
disadvantages. While it is true that this testimony is considerably offset by
evidence from the Interstate Commerce Commission showing that average operat
ing revenues per carrier in this area have been higher for some time than in the
East, the fact that numerous carriers operate to a disadvantage in the western
and northwestern States, is nevertheless, we believe, established.
In the past, the union has recognized and met this situation by negotiating
with individual employers or with State-wide groups of employers in these areas
special supplementary agreements, commonly referred to as “riders”, altering
in favor of these employers the basic mileage and hourly wage rates. Such
riders are in effect for certain employers or groups of employers operating in or
into South Dakota, Iowa, Nebraska, and Minnesota. There are also riders cover
ing certain runs in and out of Detroit, Mich., Racine, Wis., and Milwaukee, Wis.,
which provide for wage rates higher or working conditions more favorable to
employees than those established in the basic area agreement. Any employer
or groups of employers may through the ordinary processes of collective bar
gaining apply to the union for the negotiation of such special riders. Machinery
is provided for the final determination of disputes concerning such riders by the
central-area committee, composed of representatives of both of the parties
before us.
The Central States Employers* Negotiating Committee has asked that this Board
replace this present system by setting up within the area two zones and establish
ing for them two different basic wage rates. While we appreciate the need for
maintaining fair wage differentials, we do not believe that the proposed method
of determining them is the best. Industry-wide collective bargaining and the
arbitral awards which may be incident to it should be limited, wherever possible,
to the establishment of general standards of wages and working conditions for
the entire industry. Variations from these standards by individual employers
or localities where necessary should be arranged through local agreements. The
permissibility of such variations, moreover, is preeminently a jnatter for the men
engaged in the industry to judge, for they alone have the experience and the
intimate knowledge of the difficulties and advantages arising out of local con
ditions which is necessary for a realistic decision. For this Board itself to
attempt to examine the operating conditions in each State in this area and decide
the scope and extent of the differential of the basic wage rate which individual
localities should enjoy during the entire life of this contract would be to substitute
rigidity where flexibility is necessary, and the judgment of observers for that of
labor leaders and industrialists experienced in the industry.
The union has formally stated at the hearing that it is its intention to maintain
by new riders differentials from the new basic wage rate similar to the different
tials from the old rate contained in the riders to the expired contract. They
have offered further to consider through the ordinary established procedures
such applications for new riders as may be made. In view of this formal offer,
we believe that the present system of negotiating regional differentials should be
continued. We shall so rule.
256
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
VACATIONS WITH PAY
The union has asked that all employees with 1 year or more of service shall
receive a vacation of 1 week at the maximum number of hours of pay at the
regular rate of pay in advance, such vacations to be taken between May 1 and
October 1 of each year, unless otherwise agreed to by the union and the employer.
We believe that this demand should in substance be granted.
A vacation clause is rapidly becoming a standard provision of collective bar
gaining contracts in many industries. The desirability of a vacation from the
standpoint of the health and welfare of the individual worker needs no argument.
The increasing acceptance of the principle in industry, moreover, testifies to the
growing conviction on the part of industrialists that vacations result in increased
production and in better working morale among employees.
The employers have argued that a vacation, however desirable in ordinary
times, should not be granted during this period of emergency. A similar argu
ment was recently presented by the railroads to the President’s Emergency Board
in reply to the request of the nonoperating employees for a vacation. That Board
replies “that if a vacation plan is inherently sound under more normal conditions,
it is equally sound under emergency conditions that increase the strain upon the
physical and mental powers of the employees.” The Board supported its decision
with the remarks of Prime Minister Winston Churchill with regard to holidays
and vacatioias for British workers during the war in which the Prime Minister
asserted that the war would have to be won largely by staying power and that
for that purpose reasonable minimum holidays for the masses of the workers in
Great Britain had been allowed. The Prime Minister concluded: “I am quite
sure that if we had not done so we should have had a serious crack which would
have cost far more in production than these brief periods of rest from labor.”
We believe this reasoning is sound and that the war emergency presents an
added argument for a vacation rather than a reason for denying one. The work
of the over-the-road driver is arduous and tiring. We believe that the industry
as a whole will benefit if for a short period once a year the drivers are relieved
of the constant strain and responsibility of their work and allowed a few days
for rest and relaxation. No convincing evidence has been presented to us, more
over, that a vacation for over-the-road truck drivers cannot practically be
arranged.
It follows from the above, however, that we are deciding in favor of an actual
vacation and not of a bonus in lieu of a vacation. Rest and relaxation comes
with the taking of a vacation, not from extra pay for declining to take it. The
vacation privilege, moreover, should be limited to those employees who have
worked sufficiently during the prior year to require it. We shall rule, therefore,
that a vacation of 6 consecutive working days shall be granted with pay to all
employee who does not take the 6-day vacation shall not be entitled to the vacation
total working days during the calendar year prior to November 15, 1941, and
that any employee who does not take the 6-day vacation shall not be entitled to
vacation pay. To assist the employers in making arrangements for such vaca
tions, we shall rule that the vacations may be taken at any time during the year
at dates to be fixed by the employer, who shall give due regard to the desires and
preferences of the employees consistent with efficient operation. We further
suggest that the union should hold itself in readiness to consider requests by
individual employers for alterations in this vacation plan which are based upon
operating requirements rather than upon costs.
THE OTHER ISSUES
As we have said before, the other issues which have been presented to us are,
for the most part, dependent for their solution upon the fixing of the basic wage
rate. Until that rate was fixed, they necessarily remained in dispute and thus
were presented to us for decision. Now that the rate is fixed we see no major
obstacle to their settlement by direct collective bargaining between the parties.
These issues concern for the most part working rules. Even more clearly than
in the case of the area differentials, they are technical matters which can most
realistically be decided by the employees and the employers themselves. We have
determined, therefore, to make no ruling upon them, but to refer them back to the
parties for further direct negotiations.
We are likewise referring back for direct negotiations the dispute concerning
the articles governing the leasing of equipment. Serious legal objections have
CASE HISTORIES
257
been raised to paragraph 1 of these proposed articles, which governs the rates
at which such trucking equipment; can be leased. Counsel for the union indicated
at the hearing his willingness to consider the redrafting of this proposed article
in such a way as to eliminate these legal objections. We believe that if such legal
objections can be removed, the subject is appropriate for inclusion in the collective
bargaining contract as a means of protecting the basic wage scale. We suggest,
therefore, that the parties jointly explore the possibility of so altering the draft
of the article as to make it legally acceptable to all concerned.
AWARD
1. The contract between the parties shall b§ of 2 years’ duration, effective
November 16, 1941, to expire November 15, 1943, unless extended by agreement.
Either party may open the contract for the purpose of negotiating changes at the
end of the first year, provided notice in writing of the desired changes is given
to the other party 60 days prior to November 15, 1942.
2. The contract shall include those articles as agreed upon prior to the submis
sion of the dispute to the Board (appendix A) and appropriate paragraphs
embodying the awards of the Board set forth herein. Those articles in dispute
which were submitted to the Board but upon which the Board does not here rule,
shall be the subject of further negotiations between the parties. (See appendix B ).
Such of these articles as may be agreed upon as a result of such negotiations shall
be included in the contract.
3. There shall be an increase of 10 cents per hour in the hourly rates and an
increase of four-tenths of a cent per mile in the mileage rate of all employees
covered by the contract. There shall be an equal increase in the minimum
hourly and mileage rates of such employees. As previously agreed by the parties,
these increases shall be retroactive to November 16,1941.
4. The Board recommends no change in the principle of differentials between
geographic or Stare areas covered by the contract as heretofore accepted by the
parties. Fair differentials should be established and maintained by agreement
between the parties, arrived at through the same machinery of collective repre
sentation and to lake the same form of supplementary agreements as has been
the practice in the past.
5. A vacation of 6 consecutive working days shall be granted with pay to all
employees covered by the contract who have worked 60 percent or more of the
total forking days during the calendar year, prior to November 15, 1941. Any
employee who does not take the 6-day vacation shall not be entitled to the vacation
pay. The vacation period of each employee shall be before November 15, 1942,
and shall be set by his employer, with due regard to the desires and preferences
of the employers consistent with efficient operation. The union shall consider
requests by individual employers for alterations in this vacation plan which are
based upon operating requirements rather than upon costs. Similarly, all such
employees who have been so employed during the year preceding November 15,
1942, shall receive vacations with pay between November 15,1942, and November
15,1943.
A merican S hipbuilding
CASE No. 106
Co., Cleveland, Metal T rades D epartment, A. F. L.
Ohio
Certified November 19. No strike. Hearing December 1, 3, 4, 5. 3,000 men
involved. Closed December 31
Panel: Stacy, Fales, Wilson. Assistant, Tomey.
The previous contract between the company and the unions expired April 15,
and negotiations between the parties continued intermittently until the case was
certified to the Board. These negotiations had been delayed at different stages
as a result of the Government-sponsored shipbuilding stabilization program and
by the claims of a rival organization for representation.
At the initial hearing on December 1, the parties enumerated eight points in
dispute and, at the request of the Board, eliminated most of these issues by direct
negotiations on December 1 and 2. The two remaining issues were (1) closed
shop and (2) wage rates.
258
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
Through mediation by the panel, the parties agreed to a form of maintenance
of membership as follows:
“It is agreed that ail employees of the company who are now members of the
unions parties to this agreement, or who may hereafter become members and
accept the benefits hereof, have an obligation to maintain such membership in
good standing. In the event an employee fails to maintain his membership in
the unions as stated, the company will, upon request by the unions, call in the
employee (with a representative of the unions) for a conference with an appro
priate official of the company, who will advise the employee of his obligation. New
employees will be presented with a copy of this agreement by the company, upon
hiring, and will be asked to cooperate with the unions to carry out the obligations
of this contract.
“The company also agrees to contact the offices of the unions when in need
of new employees.,,
On the question of wage rates, the company agreed to the elimination of certain
classifications and to the reclassification of employees under a promotion program
extending over a period of 90 days. The company also agreed to numerous adjust
ments in the basic wage rates of other workers.
The Board was notified on December 31 that all unions signatory to the agree
ment had ratified.
CASE No. 107
B urgess B attery Co., Freeport, 111.
I nternational A ssociation of Machin
ists , Lodge 1096, A. F. L.
Certified November 24. Strike October 13-November 25. Hearing December 1,
2,3. 750 workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Fisher, Adams, Wilson. Assistant, Gill.
The strike was terminated on the day following certification by agreement of
the parties.
At the time of the hearing the National Labor Relations Board had not yet acted
on petitions for an election filed by the company and an independent union; it also
had pending before it charges of unfair labor practices filed against the company
by the I. A. M. While the company was unwilling to recognize and bargain with
the I. A. M. until the N. L. R. B. had decided the question of representation, it
was willing to cooperate meanwhile in a wage investigation so the Board issued—
In tc rim
R eco m m en d a tio n s
December 3
1. Questions concerning representation and charges of unfair labor practices
now pending before the National Labor Relations Board will be left to the dispo
sition of the National Labor Relations Board. The National Defense Mediation
Board will request the National Labor Relations Board to expedite the disposition
of such matters as much as possible.
2. Meanwhile, the National Defense Mediation Board will promptly appoint a
special representative to make a thorough investigation of the company’s wage
rates at its Freeport, 111., plant, taking into account all relevant factors bearing
upon the question of appropriate revisions in such rates. The special representa
tive will submit to the National Defense Mediation Board, as promptly as possible,
a written report, containing his recommendations on wages.
3. The hearings before the National Defense Mediation Board will be recessed
pending the receipts of the report of the special representative.
These recommendations were accepted by both parties; and on December 11 the
Board appointed Robert J. Myers, Chief of the Division of Wage and Hour Statis
tics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, as its special representative to conduct the wage
investigation.
CASE HISTORIES
259
CASE No. 108
N evada Consolidated Copper Corpora- Chino Metal T rades Council of S anta
tion , Santa Rita and Hurley, N. Mex.
R ita and H urley, N. Mex., A. F. L.,
B rotherhood of L ocomotive F iremen
and E nginemen , and B rotherhood of
R ailroad T rainmen
Certified November 29. No strike. Hearing December 15, 16. 2,300 workers in
volved. Closed December 16
Panel: Rice, Fales, Brown. Assistant, Tomey.
This dispute arose over the company’s refusal to bargain with any union be
cause the National Labor Relations Board had not held a hearing or election to
determine the bargaining agent. The Chino Metal Trades Council of Santa Rita
and Hurley (A. F. L.) and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers (C. I. O.) wanted bargaining rights with this company, and the Brother
hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen wanted representation for their own membership.
On July 28 it was proposed that the company agree to a consent election which
would work out to the satisfaction of all the organizations claiming jurisdiction
over the employees in this company. The Metal Trades Council (A. F. L.) wanted
the election by crafts, while the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (C. I. O.) wanted
the election to be held on a plant-wide basis. All interested parties agreed to
take this proposal up with their international officers.
A Commissioner of Conciliation contacted the general manager of the company,
Mr. Horace Moses, and the assistant general manager, Mr. P. E. Buchella, in
reference to the proposed consent election. Both were agreeable to consent elec
tion if all parties claiming jurisdiction in any department signed a stipulation
that they would abide by the results of the election.
The representatives of the M. M. S. W. local were then contacted and the Com
missioner was advised that they would not consider a craft unit election. In view
of the inability to obtain the necessary consent to’an election, no further effort
was made along that line. Further discussions were unsuccessful as both the
A. F. L. and C. I. O. maintaind their original positions. At midnight Saturday,
August 10, a strike occurred involving approximately 2,300 men. The strike was
called by the A. F. L.
On August 11, Mr. Keenan, labor adviser for O. P. M. interested himself in the
situation and developed a memorandum of agreement as follows:
“Representatives of the company, the O. P. M., the A. F. L. unions, and the rail
road brotherhoods will appear before the Labor Board in Washington and urge
that the Labor Board take action in clearing the deck on an immediate hearing
by the Labor Board so that the bargaining unit can be established. If the Labor
Board refuses to act then the matter will be immediately referred by O. P. M. to
the National Defense Mediation Board and the same representatives will appear
before the said Board and ask for a recommendation in order to avoid any further
stoppage of work in this plant; and both sides subject to the Labor Board’s right
to intervene before the Mediation Board will be bound by the recommendation of
the Mediation Board, as to the bargaining unit or units, representative or repre
sentatives.”
It appears that the National Labor Relations Board proceeded to consider the
case in the light of the above-mentioned memorandum and on August 25, the
National Labor Relations Board advised the parties that as a result of the con
ference August 22, it was advising the regional director of the 22d district to
proceed with a hearing immediately on the A. F. L. petition for certification.
In June 1940, N. L. R. B. had held the company guilty of violations of N. L. R. A.
The circuit court of appeals set aside the Board’s order. On November 17 it was
learned that an appeal from a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth
District, was taken by the National Labor Relations Board aiid was pending in
the United States Supreme Court. The N. L. R. B. therefore, could not proceed
further until this pending situation was determined. The Conciliation Service
was advised that the parties were growing impatient and had threatened to strike.
It was suggested that a temporary agreement be worked out which would pro
vide recognition until the Supreme Court’s decision was rendered.
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
260
A Commissioner of Conciliation was assigned to this dispute on November 22,
in an effort to work out a temporary agreement. Upon contacting the parties,
the Commissioner learned that the company was unwilling to enter into any kind
of temporary settlement, as it took the position that the case had been acted upon
by the N. L. R. B.
A strike was threatened for November 30, and to prevent a stoppage of work
the case was accordingly certified on November 29. The Board asked the parties
to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation.
The company maintained that since no union represented a majority of its
employees it could not under N. L. R. B. bargain with any, even for its members.
The Board asked N. L. R. B. to render an opinion on this point. Robert B. Watts,
General Counsel of N. L. R. B., replied that bargaining with the various unions
for members only would not constitute a violation of N. L. R. A. For this opinion,
it relied upon Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (305
U. S. 197, at p. 237). Mr. Watts’ opinion said further, “the employer may not
discriminate as among minority labor organizations but must treat all such claim
ants on a parity, since recognition of any to the exclusion of some would obviously
constitute material support to the favorite organization. Such contrasting treat
ment might well involve interference, restraint, and coercion flowing from such
support (cf. Matter of The Carborundum Company (36 N. L. R. B. 154) decided by
the Board November 7, 1941).”
Thereupon the Board issued the following recommendations, which were
accepted by both parties :
Recommendations
December 16
After due consideration of the letter of December 16, 1941, from the general
counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, a copy of which is annexed
[described above but not here printed], the National Defense Mediation Board
recommends:
1. That the parties before this Board avoid causing any delays in the disposition
of the case between the employer and the National Labor Relations Board now
before the United States Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari and in the
representation proceedings R-3004 to 3014 now pending before the National Labor
Relations Board.
2. That, until the National Labor Relations Board certifies the workers’ repre
sentatives for collective bargaining under section 9 of the National Labor Rela
tions Act, the employer upon request of the several unions to which workers
employed by the company belong, negotiate with the several unions as representa
tives of their own members.
3. That these negotiations for “members-only” contracts concerning wages and
other terms and conditions of employment begin within 1 month of this date and
proceed as rapidly as possible.
CASE No. 109
A merican Molasses Co., A merican I nternational L ongshoremen’s A ssoSugar R efining Co., R efined Syrups ciation, A. F. L.
S ales Corporation, New York, N. Y.
Certified December 3. No strike. 2,500 workers involved. Closed December 17
With the approval of the Board a panel of the Conciliation Service continued
its settlement efforts after the case was certified, with the result that the case,
primarily a wage dispute, was settled.
CASE No. 110
A naconda Copper Mining Co.
Butte, Mont.
I nternational B rotherhood of E lectrical W orkers, L ocals 65, 122, and
200, A. F. L.
Certified December 13. No strike. Hearings December 17, January 12. 175
workers involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Stacy, Hamilton, Lynch. Assistant, Tomey.
The company negotiated new agreements with the C. I. O. representative of
its miners, and the A. F. L. representative of its metal-trades men in the fall of
CASE HISTORIES
261
1941. These new contracts gave an increase of wage of 75 cents a day. The Elec
trical Workers, who until 1939 had participated in the A. F. L. master agreement
but had bargained separately since then, demanded a basic wage of $9 a day (an
increase of $2.25). The company offered $7.50 (an increase of 75 cents).
The controversy being wholly over wages, the Board, at the first hearing, upon
finding mediation fruitless, appointed Prof. Isidor Loeb of Washington University
(St. Louis) to investigate and recommend an appropriate wage. Upon receiving
his report the Board made its—
Findings and Recommendations
January 12
The parties having failed to reach an agreement in collective bargaining, volun
tary arbitration was suggested, bui not accepted by both parties, whereupon the
Board deemed it advisable to appoint a special representative to investigate the
facts and report the same together with his findings and conclusions * * ♦ .
[The full report of the representative is quoted.] After considering the record
in the case and all the evidence, the Board concurs in the findings and conclusions
reached by the special representative and adopts them as its recommendation.
The company accepted and the union took under advisement this recommenda
tion which proposed a 75-cent raise.
H ammond & I rving, I no.,
Auburn, N. Y.
CASE No. I ll
I nternational A ssociation of Machin ists , L ocal 153, A. F. L., and I nter
national B rotherhood of B lack
smiths , D rop F orgers and H elpers.
L ocal 628, A. F. L.
Certified December 15. Strike December 2-15. Hearing January 5. 160 workers
involved. Closed January 8
Panel: Rice, Fales, Calvin. Assistant Gill.
A strike had closed the plant from December 2 until December 15, at which time
the strike was called off upon certification of the case to the National Defense
Mediation Board. The principal issues were wages and the closed shop.
The company offered 3 cents per hour increase with a clause to reopen the ques
tion of wages in 6 months, both contingent on an open-shop clause. The union
demanded 7% cents per hour increase, a 3 months’ reopening of the wage
question, and maintenance of membership.
After a 1-day hearing, the Board sent the panel assistant to Auburn to make
further investigation of the facts. Settlement was reached in Auburn and
ratified by the union membership on January 8, providing for an increase of 5 cents
an hour and a “voluntary” maintenance of membership clause. Under this clause
employees would not be required to maintain membership in good standing unless
they agreed to do so by voluntarily signing individual pledges.
CASE No. 112
J ohns -Manville P roducts Corporation, R ock P roducts W orkers U nion , Local
Watson, Calif.
21643, A. F. L.
Certified December 20. Strike November 18-December 22. Hearing January 5, 6.
200 workers involved. Closed January 6
Panel: Seward, Connelly, Lynch. Assistant, Neblett.
The controversy arose over the terms of a collective agreement to replace the
one that expired October 28. Inability to agree on wage and other terms led to
a strike and then to reference to the Board. At the end of the hearing the parties
agreed to renew the old contract with higher wage rates and with December 1,
1942, as the expiration date. The memorandum of agreement of January 6 was
“witnessed and approved” by the Board.
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
CASE No. 113
H ighway T ransport A ssociation of I nternational B rotherhood of T eamP ennsylvania , I nc., York, Pa.
sters, Chauffeurs , W arehousemen,
L ancaster T ruckowners N egotiating and H elpers of A merica, Locals N os.
Committee, Lancaster, Pa.
430, 771, and 776, A. F. L.
H arrisburg T ruckowners N egotiating
Committee, Harrisburg, Pa.
Certified (York) December 27. Supplementary certification (Lancaster aud
Harrisburg) December 80. No strike. Hearing January 8, 9. 800 workers
involved. Transferred to National War Labor Board
Panel: Kice, Meyer, Wilson. Assistant, Neblett.
Each controversy related to wage terms of the annual collective contract for
1942. After a summary hearing and unsuccessful mediatory effort to reach an
agreed method of settlement, the Board issued its—
Recommendation
January 12, 1942
Whereas, at the hearing in this case on January 8 and 9,1942, before a division
of this Board consisting of Messrs. William G. Rice, Jr., representing the public;
Eugene Meyer, representing employers; and James Wilson, representing em
ployees, both parties stated that some form of arbitration would provide a solution
of the dispute before the Board, the division unanimously recommends:
1. That each of the three employer parties appoint one person and each of the
three union parties one person who shall meet as quickly as possible to designate
a person to serve as chairman of the boards of arbitration described below.
Unless these six persons agree on such a chairman and notify the Board on or
before January 19,1942, that the designated person has agreed to serve, the desig
nation shall be made by the National Defense Mediation Board.
2. That the chairman of the arbitration board so designated, together with a
person appointed by Local No. 480 and a person appointed by the Highway Trans
port Association arbitrate and render final decision in the dispute at York.
3. That the chairman of the arbitration board so designated, together with a
person appointed by Local No. 771 and a person appointed by the Lancaster Truckowners’ Negotiating Committee arbitrate and render final decision in the dispute
at Lancaster.
4. That the chairman of the arbitration board so designated, together with a
person appointed by Local No. 776 and a person appointed by the Harrisburg
Truckowners’ Negotiating Committee arbitrate and render final decision in the
dispute at Harrisburg.
5. That each decision rendered by the arbitrators be binding upon the parties
concerned.
CASE No. 114
Carolina Transportation A ssociation, I nternational B rotherhood of T eam I nc ., Charlotte, N. C.
sters, Chauffeurs , W arehousemen,
rand H elpers of A merica, L ocal
U nion N o. 71, A. F. L.
Certified January 6. No strike. 500 workers involved. Transferred to National
War Labor Board
The controversy arose in negotiating the renewal of a collective contract, the
principal issues being wages, hours, vacations, lay-overs, holidays, and retro
activity of wage increases.
Part V
Supplementary Documents
263
Supplementary Documents
As earlier noted there were four cases in which action was taken supplementary
to that of the National Defense Mediation Board. These were: No. 36, Nwth
American Aviation; No. 46, Federal Shipbuilding; No. 51, Air Associates; and
No. 20B, Captive Mines. The supplementary action referred to in each of these
cases is given below.
CASE No. 36. NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC.
The final action of the board in this case (see p. 159) was taken on June 28,1941,
when it made a recommendation regarding the matter of maintenance of union
membership. This recommendation was accepted on July 1 by both the company
and the union, and thereupon the President issued the following Executive order
directing the Secretary of War to relinquish possession of the plant:
Executive Or der
W hereas by Executive Order No. 8773, dated the 9th day of June 1941, the
Secretary of War was directed by the President to take possession of and operate
the Inglewood plant of North American Aviation, Inc., in the City of Los Angeles,
State of California, to produce the aircraft and other articles and material called
for by its contracts with the United States, or otherwise, and do all things neces
sary or incidental thereto, and to take such measures as might be necessary to
protect workers returning to the plant; and
W hereas, on the 9th day of June 1941, the Secretary of War, acting pursuant
to said direction, took possession of and is now in possession of the said plant
of North American Aviation, Inc.; and
W hereas said Executive order provides that possession and operation there
under shall be terminated by the President as soon as he determines that the
plant will be privately operated in a manner consistent with the needs of national
defense; and
W hereas, it now appears, and I so determine, that the plant will be privately
operated in a manner consistent with the needs of national defense;
Now, t h e r e fo r e , I, F r a n k l in D. R o osevelt , ns President of the United States,
and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, hereby
direct the Secretary of War immediately to relinquish possession of the said plant
of North American Aviation, Inc., and to issue the necessary orders for carrying
out the aforesaid direction.
F r a n k l in D. R oosevelt .
CASE No. 46. FEDERAL SHIPBUILDING
As noted on page 192 the final action of the Board in this case was taken on
December 9 when the chairman transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy certain
findings regarding the union charge that 10 men had failed to retain their mem
bership in good standing. At that time the Federal Shipbuilding Co. was being
operated by the Navy Department under the Executive order of the President
dated August 23, 1941.
On January 5, 1942, the President issued an Executive order stating that he
was satisfied that the plant would now be privately operated in a manner con
sistent with the needs of the national defense and directed the Secretary of the
Navy to relinquish possession of it. The Executive order was as follows:
Executive Order
W hereas by Executive Order No. 8868, dated the 23d day of August 1941, the
Secretary of the Navy was directed by the President to take possession of and
265
266
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
operate the plant of the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock CCf., to produce the
vessels, facilities, material, and equipment called for by the company’s contracts
with the United States or otherwise and do all things necessary or incidental to
that end; and
W hereas on the 25th day of August 1941, the Secretary of the Navy, acting
pursuant to said direction, took possession of and is now in possession of the said
plant of the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.; and
W hereas said Executive order provides that possession and operation there
under shall be terminated by the President as soon as he determines that the
plant will be privately operated in a manner consistent with the needs of national
defense; and
W hereas it now appears, and I so determine, that the plant will be privately
operated in a manner consistent with the needs of national defense:
Now, therefore, I, F ranklin D. R oosevelt, as President of the United States
and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, hereby
direct the Secretary of the Navy immediately to relinquish possession of the said
plant of the Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., and to issue the necessary
orders for carrying out the aforesaid direction.
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
In announcing the restoration of the plant, Secretary Knox issued the tollowing
statement:
“This is not the time for the Navy to be operating an industrial plant unless it
is absolutely necessary. I am advised that the management and the employees
and everyone concerned are anxious to relieve the Navy of this burden and are
confident that restoration of the plant to its owners will insure maximum pro
duction. As a result of the recent industry-labor conference, there will be no
war work stoppages anywhere and all disputes will be resolved by peaceful means.
Any unsettled issues between the company and the union should be settled by
negotiation and agreement; if not, they can be resolved without interrupting pro
duction by recourse to the machinery established by the President.
“We confidently expect the management and the men to see to it that this
plant is operated at full speed to produce ships we must have and have quickly.
On behalf of the Navy and the Maritime Commission, I want to thank the execu
tive, supervisory, and production personnel, and the local C. I. O. union for their
cooperation which has enabled Admiral Bowen to make a splendid record at Fed
eral and to produce ships substantially ahead of schedule.”
CASE No. 51. AIR ASSOCIATES, INC.
As explained in the summary of this case (p. 194) the Board's findings of October
9,1941, were accepted by the union but rejected by the company. As a result, the
Secretary of War, under Executive order, took over the plant on October 30 and
operated it until about the end of December, a new management set up by the
board of directors of the company having concluded a collective agreement with
the employees on December 26 settling all points in dispute.
The Executive order of the President of October 30,1941, directing the Secretary
of War to take over the plant and also an unofficial summary of the collective
agreement of December 26,1941, referred to above, are given below.
Executive Order
October 30
W hereas on the 27th day of May 1941 a Presidential proclamation was issued,
declaring an unlimited national emergency and calling upon all loyal citizens in
production for defense to give precedence to the needs of the Nation to the end
that a system of government which makes private enterprise possible may sur
vive; and calling upon our loyal workmen and employers to merge their lesser
differences in the larger effort to insure the survival of the only kind of govern
ment which recognizes the rights of labor or of capital, and calling upon all loyal
citizens to place the Nation’s needs first in mind and in action to the end that we
may mobilize and have ready for instant defensive use, all of the physical powers,
all of the moral strength, and all of the material resources of the Nation; and
SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS
267
W hereas, Air Associates, Inc., has contracted to furnish the United States and
its contractors with parts and equipment necessary for the production of military
aircraft vital to the defense of the United States and such parts and equipment
have been in the course of manufacture at the Bendix, N. J., plants of said com
pany, and the United States owns facilities there situated; and
W hereas, a controversy arose concerning the terms and conditions of employ
ment between said company and its workers which they have been unable to ad
just by collective bargaining and the controversy was duly certified to the National
Defense Mediation Board established by Executive order of March 19, 1941; and
whereas production was interrupted at said plants during the course of mediation
before said Board by a strike and the Board, pending further mediation, recom
mended that the workers call off the strike and the company return all strikers
upon application to their former jobs without discrimination, and whereas the
workers affected, through their representatives, have accepted but the company
has failed to carry out the Board’s recommendation; and
W hereas, due to such failure on the part of the company, production has now
been impaired and complete cessation of production is now imminent at said plants
and the objectives of said proclamation of May 27, 1941, are thereby jeopardized
and it is essential to the defense of the United States that normal production be
assured and cessation averted; and
W hereas, for the time being and under the circumstances set forth, it is essen
tial in order that full production at said plants be assured, that the plants be oper
ated by or for the United States in such manner as may be expedient:
Now, therefore, I, F ranklin D. R oosevelt, pursuant to the powers vested in
me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, as President of the United
States and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War immediately, insofar as may be
necessary or desirable, to take possession of and operate the Bendix, N. J., plants
of Air Associates, Inc., through and with the aid of such person or persons or
instrumentality as he may designate, and to produce the military airplane parts
and equipment called for by the company’s contracts or as may be otherwise
required for the national defense, and do all things necessary or incidental
to that end. The Secretary of War shall employ or authorize the employment
of such employees, including a competent civilian adviser on industrial relations,
as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this order, and, in furtherance of
the purposes of this order, the Secretary of War may exercise any existing con
tractual or other rights of said company, or take such other steps as may be
necessary or desirable including the use of troops.
Possession and operation hereunder shall be terminated by the President as
soon as he determines that such possession and operation are no longer required
in the interests of national defense.
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
Agreement Between Air Associates and Union
The agreement Signed on December 26, 1941, was executed between the com
pany and the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers
(C. I. O.). It was signed for the company by Frederic G. Coburn, who was
appointed president after the removal of the former president.
The general contents of the agreement are indicated in the following unofficial
summary:
1. A maintenance-of-membership clause strengthened by a “harmony and good
will” arrangement under which both the company and union agree to call atten
tion of all employees to the existence of the contract.
2. Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs over application of the terms of the
contract or over wage classifications. Grievances are to be handled under a shop
steward system Culminating in arbitration, with provision for prompt appoint
ment of an impartial arbitrator to deal with each dispute.
3. An automatic adjustment of basic wages when the cost of living has changed
by at least 5 percent, but only after established wage rates have been in effect for
6 months.
4. Overtime at the rate of double time is to be pair for Sundays and holidays,
the regular 50-percent premium being paid for hours in excess of 8 daily ahd 40
weekly.
5. Employees inducted into the armed forces are to be paid a bonus consisting
of 2 percent of wages earned from the time of the last vacation period to the time
of induction.
469872°— 42------ 18
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NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
6. Seniority, on a plant basis, is made applicable to employees in the three
plants as if the three plants were one.
7. Among the reasons for loss of seniority is the giving of a false reason in
applying for leave of absence.
8. Union officers may not be made supervisors without the consent of the
union.
CASE No. 20B. CAPTIVE MINES
The Board's connection with the Captive Mines case ceased with its recommenda
tion of November 10, wThich by a vote of 9 to 2 was against the union demand in
the matter of the closed shop, and which was followed by the resignation of the
C. I. O. members from the Board.
The subsequent developments in the case were as follows:
On November 14 the President held a conference of union and steel industry
officials at which he made the following statement:
“I have asked you gentlemen to come here this morning to give you certain facts
covering the business of the Government of the United States operating under the
Constitution. I will ask you when I have finished to withdraw, either to the
Cabinet room or some place of your own choice, in order to confer in a final effort
to insure continued production of coal for the manufacture of steel.
“In the first place, we all know that the United States is in a state of national
emergency. The present and future defense of the United States and of this
hemisphere is at stake. It is essential to national safety that we continue the de
fense production program without delay and at top speed.
“Coal for steel plants is a necessity because steel is an essential in the manufac
ture of munitions. Therefore, the cessation of production in the coal-mine in
dustry would create a further danger to American defense, because at this vital
time it would slow up production of war materials.
“I think that conclusion is unmistakable and is approved by the overwhelming
majority of Americans.
“Because it is essential to national defense that the necessary coal production
be continued and not stopped, it is therefore the indisputable obligation of the
President to see that this is done.
“In spite of what some people say, I seek always to be a constitutional Presi
dent.
“If legislation becomes necessary toward this end, the Congress of the United
States will without any question pass such legislation. And, as some of you know,
the pressure on me to ask for legislation during the past couple of months, for one
reason or another, has been not only constant, but it has been very heavy.
“I am telling you this with absolutely no element of threat. To this conference
I am stating a simple fact. I hope, therefore, that you will work out some method
for the continued production of coal.
“In regard to the collective bargaining, which I am asking you to resume at the
end of this meeting, I have two suggestions for you to consider.
“The first is that you continue negotiations, with the hope that you can arrive
at a conclusion, and that if you do not arrive at a conclusion, you will submit the
point, or points, at issue to an arbiter, or arbiters, or anybody else with any other
name, and that in the meantime coal production continue.
“The second is that you consider other methods relating to employment. As I
understand it, the wage question and the check-off are not involved in this at all.
“I tell you frankly that the Government of the United States will not order, nor
will Congress pass legislation ordering, a so-called closed shop.
“It is true that by agreement between employers and employees in many plants
of various industries the closed shop is now in operation. This is a result of the
legal collective bargaining, and not of Government compulsion on employers or
employees. It is also true that 95 percent or more of the employees in these
particular mines belong to the United Mine Workers Union.
“The Government will never compel this 5 percent to join the union by a Govern
ment decree. That would be too much like the Hitler methods toward labor.
“I must reiterate that because of the need of continuing and speeding up the
defense needs of the United States, because they are so clearly involved, and be
cause lack of coal for our steel plants would injure the defense of the nation, it
is a national necessity that the production of this coal be continued without delay.
“And so I am asking you—I never threaten—I am asking you to please talk
over this problem of continuing coal production. If you can't agree today, please
SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS
269
keep on conferring tomorrow and Sunday. I don’t want any action that is
precipitate. I want every chance given.
“And let me have some kind of a report on Monday next—a report of agreement,
or at least a report that you are making progress.”
Following fruitless negotiations between the two groups on November 14, 15,
and 16, the strike was renewed November 17. The O. I. O. annual convention,
meeting in Detroit, voted full support of the strike.
During the week, the strike spread to many commercial mines in Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, and Kentucky. On Wednesday, November 18, the President of
fered two alternative proposals for ending the dispute—freezing the status quo on
open and closed shops in the mines for the duration, or binding arbitration. On
Saturday, November 22, the policy committee of the union accepted arbitration by
a board composed of John R. Steelman, Director of the Conciliation Service,
Benjamin Fairless, president of United States Steel, and Mr. Lewis. The
strike ended November 24. On December 7, the day of the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, the Board handed down a 2 to 1 decision, Mr. Fairless dissenting,
which granted the union shop to the mine workers.
The correspondence between the President and the union and steel officials, re
ferred to in the preceding paragraph, is given below together with the decision of
the special arbitration board.
Text of the letter 'which President Roosevelt sent today to executives of steel
companies owning coal mines and to John L. Lewis, head of the United Mine
Workers.
November 18, 1941.
Gentlemen :
At my conference with you November 14 I asked you to consider two sugges
tions. First, I urged that you continue negotiations and that, if you did not
arrive at a conclusion, you submit the point or points at issue to an arbitrator
or arbitrators or anybody else with a different name, and that in the meantime
coal production in the captive mines continue. Second, I urged that you consider
other matters relating to employment, as the wage question and check-off were
not involved.
You have now informed me that the negotiations broke down without an agree
ment. The point in dispute has not been submitted to arbitration. Production
of coal at the captive mines has been interrupted by strike.
It is, of course, absolutely clear that no one is asking the coal miners to give
up their union recognition or their union wage scales or their union working
conditions.
Under the auspices of the National Defense Mediation Board, certain agree
ments were reached by the coal operators and the United Mine Workers of
America for the Appalachian area and for other areas.
Under these agreements the United Mine Workers are recognized as the sole
bargaining agent for all the workers in and about the mines. The agreements
fix the highest basic daily wage and the highest tonnage rates paid miners any
where in the world. They provide in many other ways for the security of the
mine worker under union auspices. They include union check weighmen, union
grievance machinery and mine committees, union participation in improved safety
practices in the mines and in hospitalization. They eliminate scrip abuses.
They provide annual vacations with pay, and other benefits. The steel companies
have agreed to all these provisions and are prepared to sign the agreements.
A single issue, that of the closed shop, remains in dispute, but this issue concerns
only 5 percent of the mine workers employed in the captive mines, which is onehalf of 1 percent—one worker out of every 200—of all the mine workers in the
United States.
The National Defense Mediation Board has recommended that these nonunion
workers voluntarily join the United Mine Workers of America and share with
their fellow workers the burdens as well as the benefits of the union, and I have
personally endorsed this suggestion.
The operators also have given to the Mediation Board the assurance in most
positive terms that they are not now opposed to, and do not intend to oppose, the
voluntary growth of union membership at their mines.
The issue in dispute, however strong the feeling about it may be, does not justify
a stoppage of work in a grave national crisis.
The protective wage clause of the Appalachian agreement has no bearing on
this controversy. If the United Mine Workers sign with the operators of the
captive mines an agreement which includes no provision for a closed shop, not a
270
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
single miner will lose any benefit or advantage which he now enjoys under the
Appalachian agreement. The closed-shop contracts that have already been signed
will stand.
In order still further to open the way for settlement of the dispute in the captive
mines, I am doing two things:
(1) I am informing all those coal operators who have signed an agreement
with the closed-shop provisions and the nonstrike penalty clause that they will
be expected in the interest of national defense to continue to operate under those
agreements without change.
(2) la m asking all the operators of the captive mines to reaffirm their assur
ances by notice to each of their employees that they are not opposed to union
organization or collective bargaining, and that they do not wish to discourage
or stand in the way of any employee who chooses to join the United Mine Workers
of America.
But work in the captive mines must recommence.
I repeat what I said to the conference last Friday:
“Because it is essential to national defense that the necessary coal production
be continued and not stopped, it is therefore the indisputable obligation of the
President to see that this is done.”
I am therefore asking all of you, as patriotic Americans, to accept one or the
other of the following alternatives:
(а) Allow the matter of the closed shop in the captive mines to remain in status
quo for the period of the national emergency, all other parts of the Appalachian
agreement applying, or
(б ) Submit this point to arbitration, agreeing in advance to accept the decision
bo made for the period of the national emergency without prejudice to your rights
in the future.
For the common good, for the maintenance of defense production, it is impera
tive that one of these two alternatives be chosen and faithfully performed.
I am sending a similar letter to the United Mine Workers’ representatives.
Yours sincerely,
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
REPLY OF UNITED STATES STEEL
(Telegram)
November 18, 1942.
At your request “for the common goo'd, for the maintenance of defense produc
tion” our coal mining subsidiaries will accept either of the two alternatives set
forth in your letter of today to Messrs. Fairless, Grace, and Purcell, and to the
United Mine Workers of America.
MR. LEWIS’S REPLY
18, 1941.
Your letter of this date addressed to Mr. Philip Murray, Mr. Thomas Kennedy,
and the undersigned is received. Messrs. Murray and Kennedy are absent from
the city, as are most members of the national policy committee of the United Mine
Workers of America. The policy committee will reconvene in Washington at 10
a. m. Saturday. In the meantime, no officer of the union is qualified to give formal
reply to the two alternative proposals which you submit.
Pending consideration of your communication by the full membership of the
policy committee, I trust I may be pardoned in making the following observations
which I express as my own opinions and which are in no manner binding upon
the membership of our union. Your proposal (a) suggests an open-shop agree
ment in the steel companies’ captive mines for the indefinite and undetermined
period of the national emergency. I venture to reiterate the suggestion previously
made you that no officer or representative of the U. M. W. possesses any grant of
authority to execute an open-shop agreement for any period whatsoever. On the
contrary, officers and representatives of the union are under express instructions
of the most recent constitutional convention of the union, composed of delegates
actually employed in the mines, to secure for our membership in the captive mining
operations “the same contract as the commercial mines.”
Resolutions containing these instructions were adopted by the convention with
the unanimous approval of its 2,500 delegates. Representatives of the U. M. W.
D ear Mr. P resident :
November
SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS
271
of America cannot lightly undertake to disregard such express instructions from
the men they have the honor to represent.
Your proposal (&) suggests that the union-shop provision now in controversy
be referred to arbitration with agreement in advance that the umpire’s decision
will be respected for the period of the national emergency. Even if the mine
workers’ representatives possessed the authority to leave the question of the
union shop to the arbitrament of an umpire, it is obvious that a judicial decision
based upon the logic and merit of our contention would be difficult, under existing
circumstances.
Your recent statements on this question, as the Chief Executive of the Nation,
have been so prejudicial to the claim of the mine workers as to make uncertain
that an umpire could be found whose decision would not reflect your interpre
tation of Government policy, Congressional attitude, and public opinion. Admit
tedly, such an umpire could not come from the ranks of labor—he inevitably
would come from a position in life peculiarly susceptible to the claims and
blandishments of those financial and industrial interests wielding great power
and influence in the financial, industrial, social, and political life of the Nation.
In my opinion, the mine workers can not ignore these pertinent facts so hazard
ous to their rights and legitimate interests.
These views thus expressed, Mr. President, are merely my own. They unques
tionably reflect the hopes of the multitudes of mine workers in our Nation in their
desire to be treated fairly by industry and by their Government.
Respectfully yours,
J ohn L. Lewis .
The President today sent the following letter to John L. Lewis, president,
United Mine Workers of America:
D ear Mr. Lewis :
'November 22, 19^1,
On November 18 I addressed a letter to the several steel companies and to the
United Mine Workers of America, parties to the dispute in regard to the captive
mines. In the public interest, I suggested two possible solutions to that dispute.
Proposal (&) of that letter was as follows: “Submit this point to arbitration,
agreeing in advance to accept the decision so made for the period of the national
emergency without prejudice to your rights in the future.”
Since that time the steel companies have advised me of their acceptance of my
proposal (&), and you have advised me that the matter would be considered by
your national policy committee today. In completion of this arrangement, I am
appointing today a board of three members consisting of Dr. John R. Steelman,
as the public representative, Mr. Benjamin Fairless, representative of the steel
industry, and Mr. John L. Lewis, representing the mine workers. Dr. Steelman
possesses the qualifications essential to the task of public representative and is
of unquestioned integrity. Messrs. Fairless and Lewis rate as experts in their
fields and are competent to represent their respective viewpoints of this contro
versy. I am suggesting that this board begin its work immediately and remain
in continuous session until this task is completed.
May I request an immediate reply and acceptance from your national policy
committee?
Very sincerely yours,
F ranklin D. R oosevelt.
November 22, 19Ifl.
The President this afternoon received the following letter from Mr. Lewis:
Sir :
The national policy committee of the United Mine Workers of America con
sidered today your letter of this date, supplemental to your previous letter of
November 18.
By unanimous vote this committee accepts your proposal to refer the captive
mine controversy to a board, consisting of Dr. John R. Steelman, representing the
public, and Messrs. Benjamin F. Fairless and John L. Lewis, representing the
steel companies and the United Mine Workers, respectively.
In consideration of this arrangement, which we accept in the public interest,
the national policy committee is recommending an immediate return to work of
all mine workers employed in the captive and commercial mines, wherever situated.
Respectfully yours,
N ational P olicy Committee,
By J ohn L. Lewis .
272
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
In the matter of the arbitration
between the
U nited Mine W orkers of A merica
and the
Captive Coal Mines
of
U nited S tates Steel Corporation, B ethlehem Steel Corporation, R epublic
S teel Corporation, N ational Steel Corporation, Crucible Steel C o.,
W heeling Steel Corporation, W oodward I ron Co., Y oungstown
S heet & T ube C o., Semet-Solvay C o.
Board of Arbitration: Benjamin F. Fairless, John L. Lewis, and John R. Steelman,
chairman.
OPINION OF JOHN R. STEELMAN, CHAIRMAN
New York, December 7,1941
On November 22, 1941, this Board of Arbitration for the Captive Coal Mine
Dispute, consisting of Benjamin F. Fairless, John L. Lewis, and myself, was ap
pointed by the President. The Board has chosen me as chairman. The dispute
to be arbitrated is between the United Mine Workers of America and certain
captive coal mine operators, all of whom have agreed to abide by the determina
tion of this Board.
The controversy relates to the inclusion of the so-called ‘‘union-shop” clause,
together with the correlative “no-strike” and “penalty” clauses, in the contract to
govern the relations between the operators and their mine employees, until April
1, 1943. These clauses are already a part of the Appalachian agreement and/or
the district agreements based thereon covering about 90 percent of the coal indus
try. The parties hereto have already agreed to accept all other terms and condi
tions of those agreements. The arbitrators are thus called upon to determine
whether 10 percent of the industry should execute the agreement containing the
union shop and related clauses under which 90 percent is now operating.
This 90 percent of the industry which now works under union shop condi
tions consists of all commercial operators,1 for whose mines the United Mine
Workers of America is accepted as bargaining agent, and also a substantial major
ity of the operators of captive mines—mines controlled by railroads, utilities, cer
tain steel companies, and other industrial concerns. The remaining 10 percent
to which the controversy before this Board relates consists of the other captives.
The union now has as members at least 95 percent of the employees of these cap
tives and about 99.5 percent of all the employees whom it represents in the indus
try. In brief, only 1 employee out of every 200 in the industry for whom this union
is bargaining agent does not belong to the union.
The United Mine Workers of America is a labor organization of more than
600,000 persons employed in the coal-mining industry. It has been in existence
over 50 years and has, throughout that period, been the principal labor organiza
tion in this field. It is a so-called “open union,” admitting to membership all
workers in the industry without discrimination; its initiation fees and dues are
moderate. It claims credit for many substantial advances which both the mine
workers and the industry have made. Among these are increased wage scales,
shorter hours, union check weighmen, various safety devices, and effective griev
ance machinery.
Through much of this period this union has had tacit agreements with numerous
operators with whom it has engaged in collective bargaining which required new
employees to join, resulting in substance in the union shop. In 1989 the union
reached an agreement with the commercial operators, which agreement included
the union-shop clause and the no-strike clause. In addition the union fortified the
no-strike clause by a penalty clause in the district agreements. These agreements
were accepted also by a majority of the captive mine operators. The captive mine
1 There is one exception. The Carter Coal Co., a commercial operator but not a mem
ber of the Appalachian conference, was originally included in the present dispute but has
not agreed to be bound by this award.
SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS
273
operators who are parties to the present dispute, however, rejected the clauses in
question. These agreements expired on March 31, 1941.
Negotiations for new agreements began in March 1941. Agreements for the
succeeding 2 years have been executed by the union and all operators except the
present disputants. These agreements contain the union-shop, no-strike, and
penalty, clauses.
Unidn membership in the mines of the operators involved here had by this time
increased to a point where the union felt warranted in insisting that this clause
be made uniformly operative wherever the United Mine Workers of America is
accepted as bargaining agent. It is evident that in this instance the union is
requesting the union shop in the normal course of its development. Whatever
may be the facts in other labor disputes, I find no basis for the charge that the
union here is attempting to take advantage of the present national emergency
for organizational purposes.
II
The union has requested a union shop—not a closed shop. The distinction is of
sufficient importance to justify some words of clarification. A closed shop is one
under which only union members may be considered for employment. This often
means that the union limits the power of the employer’s selection or, to use
language before us, restricts his labor market. It is not unusual in many fields
of our industrial economy for the union to act in effect as the hiring agency for
the employer. However in the Appalachian agreement and the district agreements
based thereon, union membership is not a prerequisite of hire but only of continued
tenure. The Appalachian agreement provides that the union shop clause “becomes
effective and operative after an individual has been employed and starts to work.”
In other words, under the provision in dispute here, the union requires member
ship only of persons employed, but does not control, limit, or determine the labor
market accessible to any employer. In fact, the union admits to membership
only persons actually employed. This is the union shop as distinguished from
the closed shop. The United Mine Workers of America is an “open union” and
the issue narrowly before us, therefore, is that of a union shop agreement with an
open union.
The argument is often made that a closed shop or even a union shop interferes
with management functions. The agreement which the union here presents,
however, contains this clause:
“The management of the mine, the direction of the working force, and the right
to hire and discharge are vested exclusively in the operator and the United Mine
Workers of America shall not abridge these rights.”
For many years this clause has been included in agreements executed by the
United Mine Workers of America. It was not altered in the Appalachian agree
ment of 1939 when the union-shop clause was added. No claim has been made
that the union has not done its full part to make the above management clause
effective. One is led to the judgment that there is no intention on the part of
the union or danger of its usurping management functions.I
III
It has been argued that for an employer to agree to hire only men who will
join a union is a violation of principle. But, as a matter of fact, contracts pro
viding for a union shop have a recognized status in American industrial practice,
and in American law. We are not to decide this case in or for a social vacuum,
but for an economy in which the Congress has guaranteed and protected the
right of labor organization and collective bargaining, and in which relationships
ranging all the way from union recognition to the absolute closed shop have been
legalized. Moreover the time and place and condition to which our decision is
to apply include not only the above-mentioned Congressional sanctions, but we
find recent labor dispute settlements and labor-management arrangements worked
out and approved or sanctioned by various Government agencies, embodying
closed shops, union shops, and compulsory maintenance of membership arrange
ments, depending upon the particular set of circumstances at hand. In the light
of these facts it is easily understood why the United Mine Workers of America
should have reason to expect that a union-shop proposal would be determined
on its merits, whatever they might be.
A recent survey of the Twentieth Century Fund covering 10 of the largest in
dustries in the country shows that more than one-third of all employees work un
274
NATIONAL DEFENSE MEDIATION BOARD
der either closed-shop or union-shop conditions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
reported in October 1939 that more than one-half of the 7,000 then current union
agreements on file contained such provisions. It was also estimated at that time
by the Bureau that about three million of the nearly eight million organized
workers in the United States were then working under such terms.
Thus, under normal conditions and in normal times the union shop admittedly
constitutes a fair subject of collective bargaining. These, however, are not nor
mal times. These are times of grave national emergency, and I am fully aware
that determination of this dispute on the merits cannot sensibly be isolated from
that fact.
IV
On the merits of the issue as it stands between the parties, with full cognizance
of the implications of the existing emergency, and after complete and anxious
consideration of all the facts and contentions put before us, I concur in the fol
lowing views on this very case expressed by the National Defense Mediation Board
without dissent by a single member:
“When we look at the resulting situation from the point of view of the 1 in
dividual in 200 who has not chosen to join the union, in spite of the action of the
overwhelming majority of his fellow-workers and the fact that he enjoys the
benefits of the contracts negotiated and administered by the United Mine Workers
of America at great expense, it is hard to think of a reason why the individual
should persist in refusing to join the union.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
“It was apparent that there had been actual experience on this subject in the
mines of the commercial operators and of many operators of captive mines, who
have within recent years accepted and operated under the union-shop agreement.
“Inquiry from these operators produced evidence which can fairly be summar
ized by saying that while there have been some protests from individuals, there
has been no loss of employees and no perceptible detrimental effect upon the ef
ficient operation of the mines, while the penalty clause has to some extent, but
not entirely, prevented the interruption of production.
“From this immediately practical point of view, and since the acceptance of
the union-shop provision in the coal mines is, in our opinion, divorced by the pecu
liar and exceptional conditions of this case from effect as a precedent in other
industries, it would seem to be the part of wisdom for the operators involved in
this dispute to accept the offer of the United Mine Workers with its added as
surance of full and uninterrupted production at the mines throughout the period
of the contract.”
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
The majority opinion of the National Defense Mediation Board nevertheless
recommended rejection of the union-shop clause. The reasons advanced in sup
port of that action require consideration.
One reason was that the union shop provision “* * * should be arrived at
by collective bargaining with full retention of the right to strike—not by govern
mental compulsion.”
The case as it now stands before us as arbitrators, however, is obviously in an
entirely different posture. No member of this Board does now or ever has func
tioned in the capacity of government policy maker. We are not called upon, in
deed could not usurp the functions of those proper governmental agencies for
making national labor policy. Our determination is binding upon the parties
only by reason of their agreement that it be so. This arbitration is simply an
incident of the processes of collective bargaining. In short, the union shop if
arrived at as a result of the determination of this Board is not the fruit of com
pulsion ; it is the fruit of a voluntary submission to arbitration in the course of
a collective bargaining procedure.
The majority opinion of the National Defense Mediation Board observed that
the right to strike is a normal concomitant of collective bargaining. That, of
course, is true. And the issue which is central in this dispute is in ordinary times
settled, where collective bargaining fails, by such a test of economic power of the
disputants. By this voluntary submission to arbitration, however, the parties
have agreed upon a substitute for the strike; they have thereby acknowledged that
the social and economic costs of a decisive strike in the coal industry cannot be tol
erated in this period of national emergency. Whatever our decision, there will be
no strike or lock-out in the coal mines. The disputants have thus made an im
portant contribution to national safety in a time of national peril. If this prece
dent is followed, it will be a voluntary submission to arbitration, and not a strike,
which will become a normal incident of collective bargaining where the parties
SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS
275
cannot otherwise come to an accofd. If this precedent is followed, there should
be no further occasion for important stoppages of production. So much—and it
is much needed—is already an important sign.
Another reason advanced by the National Defense Mediation Board for its con
clusion was that “* * * the emergency should not be used either to tear
down or to artificially stimulate the normal growth of unionism in defense in
dustries’’. I am wholly in accord with this principle. But it is necessary here
to examine this principle as it applies to the facts of this specific case. If we agree
that no one should be permitted to take advantage of the Nation’s crisis for the
purpose of changing the status quo, we are still confronted with the question,
“What is th
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