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Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Summary of the Basel Committee’s
“The New Basel Capital Accord”

On January 16, 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Committee) released the
second consultative package on the new Basel Capital Accord (new Accord). The proposal
modifies and substantially expands a proposal issued for comment by the Committee in
June 1999 and describes the methods by which banks can determine their minimum regulatory
capital requirements. Comments are due on the proposal by May 31, 2001 and the Committee
intends to finalize the Accord by year-end 2001. The new Accord will apply to all “significant”
banks, as well as to holding companies that are parents of banking groups.
The consultative package has three parts, each of which is increasingly more detailed. The
package opens with an Executive Summary and Overview paper, which discusses the rationale
behind the changes and highlights the primary elements of the new approach. The second
section is known as the “Rules” document; it provides the details of the revisions and is intended
to be the focal point of national rule-making processes. The final section comprises seven
Supporting Technical Documents. Each of these documents focuses on a specific area of the
proposal and provides the technical details on the different issues, along with focused questions.
The seven documents address the standardized approach, the internal ratings-based (IRB)
approach, supervisory review, asset securitization, interest rate risk, operational risk and
disclosure.
The proposed new Accord contains a number of complex elements. Many of the new
approaches include inputs and specific calculations by individual banks, which, in turn, will
require supervisors to validate the models and methods used to develop the inputs. The
Committee has proposed that implementation of the new framework begin in 2004. A great deal
of work will need to be done in the interim to ensure that both banks and supervisors are ready to
implement the new framework by that time.
It is important to recognize that discussion is still ongoing as to the population of banks to which
the new framework will apply. While the 1988 Accord was applied to all banks in the U.S., it
has not been determined how broadly the new approach will be applied, particularly given the
many complex elements that may not be needed for smaller, less complex institutions. There are
several factors that will determine the ultimate implementation in the U.S. One factor will be the
results of the recent comment period on the advanced notice of proposed rule-making for non-

complex institutions 1. Another factor, for the IRB approach, will be whether particular banks
have the data, processes, and controls in place to implement the new framework.
Structure of the New Accord: The Three Pillars
The new Accord has three mutually reinforcing “pillars” that make up the framework for
assessing capital adequacy in a bank. The first pillar of the new Accord is the minimum
regulatory capital charge. The Pillar 1 capital requirement includes both the standardized
approach, updated since the 1988 Accord, and the new IRB approaches (foundation and
advanced). Since this first pillar is likely to be the focal point for industry comment, it is
described in some detail below.
Pillar 2 is supervisory review. It is “intended to ensure not only that banks have adequate capital
to support all the risks in their business, but also to encourage banks to develop and use better
risk management techniques in monitoring and managing these risks.” This pillar encourages
supervisors to assess banks’ internal approaches to capital allocation and internal assessments of
capital adequacy, and, subject to national discretion, provides an opportunity for the supervisor
to indicate where such approaches do not appear sufficient. Pillar 2 should also be seen as a way
to focus supervisors on other means of addressing risks in a bank’s portfolio, such as improving
overall risk management techniques and internal controls.
The third pillar recognizes that market discipline has the potential to reinforce capital regulation
and other supervisory efforts to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system. Thus,
the Committee is proposing a wide range of disclosure initiatives, which are designed to make
the risk and capital positions of a bank more transparent. As a bank begins to use the more
advanced methodologies, such as the IRB approach, the new Accord will require a significant
increase in the level of disclosure. In essence, the tradeoff for greater reliance on a bank’s own
assessment of capital adequacy is greater transparency.
The Standardized Approach
The 1988 Accord introduced the standardized risk-bucket approach for setting the minimum
regulatory capital requirement, which is still used in the U.S. today. The approach has been
subject to increasing criticism that it lacks sufficient risk sensitivity. The revised standardized
approach enhances the 1988 Accord by providing greater, though still limited, risk sensitivity.
Key changes to create a more risk-sensitive framework include the refinement and addition of
risk buckets, the use of external credit ratings, and a wider recognition of credit risk mitigation
techniques. The proposal removes the 50% risk weight cap on derivatives contracts and
increases the credit conversion factor for business commitments under one year to 20%. The
new Accord also provides for a lower risk weight on certain commercial real estate loans that
have historically low default and loss rates. (The agencies note, however, that U.S. commercial
real estate would not be eligible for the preferential treatment.) Risk weights will continue to be
determined by the category of the borrower--sovereign, bank or corporate--but within each of
those categories, changes have been made.
1

“Simplified Capital Framework for Non-Complex Institutions,” Federal Register, November 3, 2000.

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For sovereign exposures, membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development will no longer provide the benchmark for a preferential risk weight. Instead, the
sovereign risk weight will depend on the assessments of “eligible external credit assessment
institutions” (ECAIs). To be an ECAI, the entity must meet certain criteria. Under the proposal,
a sovereign with a AAA rating would receive a 0% risk weight, while a sovereign rated below Bwould be subject to a 150% weight. The Committee has also developed an alternative proposal
to allow supervisors to use ratings developed by certain export credit agencies.
There are two options in the treatment of claims on banks. National supervisors must select one
of the options to apply to all banks. The first option requires that banks be assigned a risk weight
that is one category less favorable than that assigned to the sovereign of incorporation. The
second option bases the risk weight on the external credit assessment of the bank. Under this
option, the bank can obtain a more preferential risk weight vis-à-vis the sovereign, but the
overall risk weight cannot be lower than 20%.
Several changes have been made to provide a more risk-sensitive framework for corporate
claims. Moving away from the uniform 100% risk weight for all corporate credits, a corporate
claim would receive a risk weight of 20%, 50%, 100%, or 150% depending on its external credit
rating. Unrated corporate credits will be rated at 100%; that is considered a floor and supervisors
may raise the risk weight where default rates or other conditions warrant a higher capital
allocation.
The Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) Approach
The IRB approach represents a fundamental shift in the Committee’s thinking on regulatory
capital. It builds on internal credit risk rating practices of banks used by some institutions to
estimate the amount of capital they believe necessary to support their economic risks. In recent
years, as a result of technological and financial innovations and the growth of the securities
markets, leading banking institutions throughout the world have improved their measurement
and management of credit risks. These developments have encouraged the supervisory
authorities to devote greater attention to developing more risk-sensitive regulatory capital
requirements, particularly for large, complex banking organizations.
Banks must meet an extensive set of eligibility standards or “minimum requirements” in order to
use the IRB approach. Because the requirements are qualitative measures, national supervisors
will need to evaluate compliance with them to determine which banks may apply the new
framework. The requirements vary by both the type of exposure and whether the bank intends to
use the simpler “foundation” IRB framework or the more advanced IRB framework. A small
sample of the minimum requirements includes:
§
§

The bank has a risk rating system that can differentiate borrowers and facilities into
groupings that are of similar levels of credit risk and across all levels of risk.
There should be a meaningful distribution of exposure across grades with no
excessive concentrations in any one grade.

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§
§

§
§

Borrower risk ratings must be assigned before there is a commitment to lend and must
be reviewed periodically by an independent source.
The board of directors and senior management have a responsibility to oversee all
material aspects of the IRB framework, including rating and probability of default
(PD) estimation processes, frequency and content of risk rating management reports,
documentation of risk rating determinations, and evaluation of control functions.
A one-year PD estimate for each grade must be provided as a minimum input.
Banks must collect and store historical data on borrower defaults, rating decisions,
rating histories, rating migration, information used to assign ratings, PD estimate
histories, key borrower characteristics, and facility information.

As mentioned above, the requirements that a bank must meet are partially dependent upon which
of the two IRB approaches a bank will use. The first methodology, called the “foundation”
approach, requires few direct inputs by banks and provides several supervisory parameters that,
in many cases, carry over from those proposed for the standardized approach. The second
approach, the “advanced” approach, allows banks much greater use of their internal assessments
in calculating their regulatory capital requirements. This flexibility is subject to the constraints
of prudential regulation, current banking practices and capabilities, and the need for sufficiently
compatible standards among countries to maintain competitive equality among banks worldwide.
There are four key inputs that are needed under IRB, for both the foundation and advanced
approaches. The first element is the probability of default (PD) of a borrower; the bank is
required to provide the PD in both the foundation and the advanced approaches. The second
piece is the estimated loss severity, known as the loss given default (LGD). The final two
elements are the amount at risk in the event of default or exposure at default (EAD) and the
facility’s remaining maturity (M). LGD, EAD and M are provided by supervisors in the
foundation approach, but in the advanced approach banks are expected to provide them (subject
to supervisory review and validation). For each exposure, the risk weight is a function of PD,
LGD, and M.
The IRB approach envisions internal rating systems that are two-dimensional. One dimension
focuses on the borrower’s financial capacity and PD estimates that quantify the likelihood of
default by the borrower, independent of the structure of the facility. The other dimension takes
into account transaction-specific factors such as terms, structure, and collateral. These
characteristics would determine the second dimension, i.e., the LGD. Implicit in this treatment is
the assumption that when a borrower defaults on one obligation, it will generally default on all
its obligations. (This assumption is relaxed with the IRB treatment of retail portfolios.)
Calculating the capital charge under the IRB approach involves several steps. The first of these
steps is the breakdown of the bank’s portfolio into six categories: corporate, retail, bank,
sovereign, equity, and project finance. The IRB rules differ to varying degrees across these
portfolios. As a result, the IRB charge is calculated by category, with the PD, LGD, and EAD
inputs potentially differing across these categories. Supervisory approval is needed before banks
can use the IRB approach for any of the six categories. The minimum requirements described
above also differ somewhat across these six types of exposure. The IRB approaches are most
developed for portfolios of exposures to banks, corporates, and sovereigns.

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Another important step is the determination by the bank of the PDs for its loan grading
categories in both the foundation and advanced IRB approaches. The PD of an exposure is the
one-year PD associated with the borrower grade, subject to a floor of 0.03% (except for
sovereign exposures, which are exempt from the 0.03% floor). The determination of PDs for
borrowers supported by guarantees or credit derivatives is more complex. Banks under the
advanced approach would use their internal assessments of the degree of risk transfer within
supervisory defined parameters, while those under the foundation approach would use the
framework set forth in the credit risk mitigation section. Overall, the PD must be “grounded in
historical experience and empirical evidence,” while being “forward looking” and
“conservative.” A reference definition of default has been developed for use in PD estimation
and internal data collection of realized defaults.
Once the PD has been established, a second credit risk dimension -- loss severity or LGD -- must
be determined. Under the foundation approach, the bank simply matches the collateral
characteristics of the exposure to a specified list of LGDs, expressed as a proportion of the credit
exposure. If the collateral type is not specified in the Accord, the exposure is considered
unsecured and receives the corresponding LGD. If banks can meet the requirements for using
their own LGD estimates, they can implement the advanced approach.
Then, for each facility the effective maturity, M, must be determined. To limit burden, under the
foundation IRB approach each facility’s M is assumed to equal three years. The Committee is
considering several options for the advanced approach, of which the most developed would
involve basing M on each facility’s remaining contractual maturity.
After the bank determines the PDs and LGDs for all applicable exposures, those combinations
can be mapped into regulatory risk weights. The risk weights are calibrated to include coverage
for both expected and unexpected losses. Unexpected loss is a probability-based assessment of
the losses that would occur under severe stress conditions. The risk weights are expressed as a
continuous function, which provides maximum risk sensitivity and flexibility in accommodating
diverse bank risk rating systems.
The capital charge is determined by multiplying the risk weight by the amount expected to be
outstanding at the time of default, known as the EAD, and by 8%. If a bank has a high degree of
single-borrower or single-group credit risk concentrations (a “non-granular” portfolio) within its
non-retail credit portfolios, the bank would be required to increase the regulatory capital
minimum by the granularity adjustment which is specified in the proposal. The adjustment
would be a reduction in capital for a bank with a relatively low degree of single-borrower risk.
A final step in this process involves the ongoing review by the supervisors of the systems used to
develop the IRB capital charge. Periodically, supervisors will need to validate these systems and
review the internal controls that provide the foundation for the IRB approach. In addition,
supervisors will also have to consider, under Pillar 2, whether the amount of capital generated by
the IRB approach is commensurate with the bank’s risk profile.

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Operational Risk
One of the most significant changes in the new Accord is the proposal for an operational risk
charge. It is expected to represent, on average, 20% of the minimum regulatory capital charge.
The framework is based upon the following operational risk definition: “the risk of direct or
indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from
external events.” Although the focus of operational risk is on the Pillar 1 capital charge, it also
brings in elements of Pillar 2 (strong control environment) and Pillar 3 (disclosure).
The Committee is proposing a spectrum of approaches, which represent a continuum of
increasing sophistication and risk sensitivity. The Basic Indicator Approach is the simplest of
the three approaches to determine an operational risk charge. It allocates operational risk capital
using a single indicator as a proxy for an institution’s overall operational risk exposure. The
current proposal would require banks to hold capital equal to a fixed percentage of its gross
income. The Committee expects only the least sophisticated institutions to use this method.
To the extent that banks can demonstrate to supervisors an increased sophistication and precision
in their measurement, management and control of operational risk, they would move along the
spectrum to a more advanced approach, the Standardized Approach. Under this approach,
supervisors establish standardized business lines (e.g., asset management), standardized broad
indicators (e.g., total funds under management), and standardized loss factors (the beta) per
business line. Within each business line, the capital charge will be calculated by multiplying the
bank’s relevant broad indicator measurement by the relevant beta factor. The total capital charge
for operational risk would be the sum of the business line charges.
The most complex approach presented by the Committee as a current option is the Internal
Measurement Approach. This approach, unlike the first two approaches, allows banks more
direct input into calculating the operational risk capital charge. For standardized business lines
banks would provide the following: an exposure indicator (EI), which is a proxy for the size or
amount of risk of each business line; a parameter representing the probability of a loss event
(PE); and a parameter representing the loss given that event (LGE). The product of EI*PE*LGE
produces an expected loss (EL) for each business line/risk type combination. Regulators provide
a standardized factor (gamma) per business line that translates the EL into a capital charge.
There are still a number of open issues related to operational risk and much work is needed to
finalize the proposals, particularly the Internal Measurement Approach. The Committee has
recognized this and is encouraging greater industry input in the development of an operational
risk capital charge. In particular, there is currently only limited data to support the various
operational risk charges. Additionally, more work is needed on defining loss types and loss
events, risk categories, and business types. As part of this, the Committee will also have to look
closely at the betas associated with the Standardized Approach to ensure that they appropriately
reflect the risk associated with the individual business lines.

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Asset Securitization
Given the rapid pace of innovation in the financial markets since the introduction of the 1988
Accord, the Committee believes that it is important to construct a more comprehensive
framework to better reflect the risks inherent in the many forms of asset securitizations,
including traditional and synthetic forms. The current Basel proposal is broadly similar to the
proposals issued for public comment by the agencies in March 2000, although there are some
differences. Similar to the U.S. proposal, the new Accord would use external ratings to assign
asset-backed securities to the appropriate risk category. Also, the new Accord proposes methods
to quantify the risks that are retained by banks after asset sales, e.g., the retention of residual or
other subordinate tranches, servicing assets, etc. Another important feature is the proposal to
incorporate an additional capital requirement in revolving securitizations that incorporate early
amortization provisions.
Of particular interest to some U.S. banks is the new feature that would assess capital against
short-term liquidity commitments, including servicer cash advances. Under the current Accord
and U.S. regulations, no regulatory capital is required for these commitments. Finally, the Basel
proposal outlines "clean break" criteria that must be met in order to remove securitized assets
from the risk-based capital calculation. The proposed clean break criteria are analogous to the
current sale criteria under GAAP. Unless all of the clean break criteria are met, a bank would
receive no capital reduction when securitizing assets, because the bank would still be vulnerable
to credit-related losses on those assets.
In addition to the ex ante criteria for a "true sale" the Committee also discusses ex post credit
enhancements that might be provided by sellers of assets into securitizations. Specifically, there
is concern that a bank might provide implicit recourse on the sold assets by supporting
securitizations in instances where the pool of underlying assets experiences meaningful credit
deterioration. This might be done through asset repurchases at prices that exceed the thencurrent market value, lending to the structure in ways that are not required by the contractual
arrangement, or forgoing fees that the seller is otherwise entitled to receive. If a bank was to
provide an ex post credit enhancement, the new Accord describes significant supervisory
responses. These entail adding the credit risk amounts of the sold assets back to the bank’s riskweighted assets.
The papers highlight the Committee's intent to continue to work on a more risk-sensitive
treatment for securitization under the IRB approach. In addition, treatments for synthetic
securitizations under both the standardized and IRB approaches will be developed. The agencies
expect this work to progress during the consultative period so that a more refined framework
may be discussed with the industry in the latter part of this year.
Credit Risk Mitigation
The section on credit risk mitigation incorporates into the standardized and foundation IRB
approaches rough approximations of the risk reduction attributable to various forms of

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collateralized credit exposures, guarantees, credit derivatives, and on-balance sheet netting
arrangements. The Committee proposes a conceptual approach to these risk mitigation techniques
that, while recognizing their risk reduction benefits, attempts to capture the additional risks posed
by such transactions.
Collateralized credit exposures would include those arising from the lending of securities or the
posting of securities as collateral that are secured by the cash or securities borrowed, such as occurs
in repurchase agreements and securities lending transactions. Recognition is given only to financial
collateral and includes listed corporate equities and investment-grade debt, in addition to cash and
sovereign securities rated at least BB. Under the comprehensive approach, the risk that, in the
event the counterparty defaults, the realized value of the collateral may be less--or that the value of
the exposure may be more--than at last valuation is captured quantitatively in a haircut parameter,
“H,” that reduces the recognized collateral coverage. The values of H are collateral-specific and are
set to approximate (in a very general way) the potential volatility in the value of the instrument over
a ten-day holding period. Certain banks would be allowed to develop and use their own estimates
of H based on specifications provided by the Committee.
A second parameter, "w", establishes a floor, below which the risk weight on the collateralized
portion of the exposure will not fall. This formulation is based on the assumption that, regardless of
the amount of collateral posted by the borrower, there remain unavoidable risks. For most
transactions, “w” is set at 15%. For certain very low risk transactions, “w” is set at zero (and
supervisors also may set H at zero). As an alternative to the comprehensive approach, a simple
approach based on substitution with a floor is offered for collateral recognition.
A substitution approach that does not take into account double default effects is proposed for
guarantees and credit derivatives extended by sovereigns and banks, as well as corporates rated A
or better. Non-bank and non-sovereign guarantees would be discounted by a “w” factor of 15
percent, as would all credit derivatives. Only credit derivatives that meet certain criteria and take
the form of a credit default or total rate of return swap are recognized.
The proposal would permit netting of on-balance sheet loans and deposits with a single
counterparty where certain conditions are met. It would require portfolio netting arrangements to
be decomposed and netted on an individual basis.
The proposal also describes a formulaic proportional adjustment to risk weights in instances where
the collateral, guarantee, credit derivative, or netting arrangement will not be in place for the entire
remaining maturity of the credit exposure. When the exposure enters the last year of its contractual
maturity, no reduction in the risk weight would be permitted below that which would normally
apply to the borrower (i.e., there would be no recognition given to the presence of the credit risk
mitigant).
Future Work
The Committee will continue work on the revisions to the new Accord during the consultation
period. There are a number of issues that are still to be resolved. These include:

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§
§

§

§
§

Equity Portfolios: The objective will be to develop a risk-sensitive approach to
treating equity positions held in the banking book that is based on banks’ internal
approaches and takes appropriate account of the different types of equity holdings.
Project Finance Portfolios: A working group will focus on mapping project finance
exposures into a PD/LGD framework.
Retail Portfolios: There are several key issues to resolve. The current risk weight
formulas will need further refinement once additional data is available. The
Committee will also explore the need for further risk weight parameters for different
retail products.
Securitization and Credit Risk Mitigation: Several elements remain to be
completed, including the development of an approach to synthetic securitization
under the standardized approach and treatments of securitization, guarantees, and
credit derivatives under the IRB approach.
Maturity: The Committee is examining various approaches to measuring M and
calibrating the impact of effective maturity on risk weights.
Overall capital: The Committee will be seeking to ensure that, on an overall basis,
the proposals result in an appropriate amount of regulatory capital.

As part of these efforts, the Committee will also be working to collect data on the impact of the
new Accord. It is possible that the Committee will release additional documents for industry
consideration as some of the outstanding issues are resolved.
Following the conclusion of the comment deadline, the Committee will focus on finalizing the
new Accord. Currently, the Committee plans to release a final version of the Accord by year-end
2001. Based on that release date, the implementation date has been set for 2004 to allow for
domestic rule-making processes, and to allow banks and supervisors to adequately prepare for
the use of this new Accord.

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Discussion Issues for Industry Consideration
Respondents are encouraged to review and provide comments on the entire range of topics
covered in the Committee proposal and to consider questions raised throughout. The agencies
have highlighted below a number of specific issues of particular significance for the U.S.
banking system and on which comment would be particularly welcome.
As commenters are analyzing the various approaches in the proposal, the agencies would be
interested in any and all information and projections on the potential impact of the approaches to
regulatory capital requirements. Most useful would be comparative analysis of the potential
impact under each of the regulatory capital approaches set forth. This information may be
provided directly to the agencies on a confidential basis. The agencies also will be participating
with other members of the Committee in an exercise designed to provide estimates of the
quantitative impact of various aspects of the proposal on a comparable basis.
Commenters on the Basel proposal who wish to submit comments directly to the agencies should
address them as follows: Basel 2001 Capital Proposal, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, mailstop 3-6, 250 E Street, SW, Washington, DC, 20219; Federal Reserve Board,
Basel 2001 Capital Proposal, mailstop 179, 21st and C Streets, NW, Washington DC 20551;
Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention: Comments/OES, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20429.
Consistency with Broad Objectives
In all areas of the proposal, the agencies solicit comment on whether it achieves the following
broad objectives:
1. Risk sensitivity: Would the proposal result in capital charges that are aligned with underlying
risks? Would the proposal generate reasonably comparable levels of capital for equivalent risk
taking? Are the proposed capital treatments, minimum requirements, and disclosure standards
consistent with current and emerging sound banking practice?
2. Incentive compatibility: Would the proposal promote better risk management, rewarding
better risk management processes while penalizing less effective processes? Do the different
standards set forth in the proposal appropriately address and eliminate incentives for capital
arbitrage (e.g., in comparing the standardized versus IRB treatments of credit risk, and in its
treatments of securitization and credit derivatives)? Does the proposal provide adequate
incentives for institutions to move beyond the standardized approach to the IRB approaches?
3. Competitive equity: Would the proposal place certain banks at competitive disadvantage to
other banks or nonbanks? Among internationally active banks (using either the standardized or
IRB approaches), would the proposal generate sufficient consistency in capital treatments across
instrument types and national jurisdictions? Should some banks be required to operate under a
particular approach? How could this be determined?

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4. Safety and soundness: What are the industry’s views on the overall amount of capital that
would be generated by the proposal? Would the proposal generate prudential levels of bank
capital while promoting economic efficiency and overall financial and macroeconomic stability?
What effects, if any, are the changes in capital treatments under any of the approaches described
likely to have on particular markets and/or the general availability of credit?
5. Market discipline: Would the proposal, which includes expanded risk disclosures by banks,
enhance overall market discipline within the banking industry? Could the proposed disclosure
requirements be improved? Has the Committee achieved the correct balance between burden
and data required for effective market discipline? In particular, for disclosures related to the IRB
approach, the Committee set forth a wide range of information from which its final disclosures
will be crafted. Which of these disclosures are most relevant? For certain core disclosures that
are not tied to explicit regulatory capital treatments, will market discipline effectively require
banks to make such disclosures?
6. Implementation: Do the methodologies and standards required in the proposal achieve the
right balance between rigor and burden? Can banks take the steps necessary to implement
approaches under the proposal in a cost-effective manner within a reasonable amount of time?
What are the industry’s views on the proposed implementation date of 2004, given the current
state of risk measurement practices?
Scope of Application
1. The proposal expands the application of the capital framework to holding companies that are
parents of banking groups and requires the deduction of investments in insurance companies.
What are the industry’s views on these proposals?
The Standardized Approach to Credit Risk Capital
1. Are the “mappings” that assign ranges of external credit ratings to the various risk weight
categories appropriate, for example with regard to corporate exposures? What overall
percentage of the credit portfolio will likely be affected by the potential use of external credit
ratings for corporate exposures? Are the risk weights that would be assigned to impaired and
below-investment-grade exposures (which in many cases are less than called for under the
foundation IRB approach) sufficient to ensure prudential amounts of capital and appropriate
incentives to migrate to the IRB approach?
2. The proposed 20% and 50% credit conversion factors for short- and long-term lending
commitments are substantially less than the 75% factor that would apply under the IRB
foundation approach, although in the latter case capital requirements would also be affected by
the PD and LGD associated with each exposure in question. Would such a disparity be
important in influencing the decision to participate in the IRB approach or otherwise create a
significant overall inconsistency between the two approaches?
3. Are the proposed criteria for “eligible” ECAIs sufficient to ensure the reliability of their rating
processes? In addition to providing rating information to institutions with legitimate interests,

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should rating information also be made available to the general public to promote market
discipline?
4. The proposal permits a preferential risk weight for certain commercial real estate loans in
qualifying markets. Are the conditions for this preferential treatment set forth in the rules paper,
along with the additional conditions that are available from the Basel Committee Secretariat,
reasonable and appropriate given the risks traditionally associated with commercial real estate
lending?
The IRB Approach to Credit Risk Capital
1. Are the proposed minimum requirements for the IRB approach, as well as the additional
requirements for use of the advanced approach, consistent with sound banking practice and
sufficient to provide confidence that minimum capital requirements for credit risk will be
adequate and prudent?
2. Is the proposed structure of absolute and relative risk weights consistent with banks’ internal
credit risk measurement systems and, more generally, with ensuring prudential levels of capital?
3. The proposed IRB risk weights are calibrated to encompass both unexpected and expected
credit losses because total capital is defined to incorporate general reserves. Therefore, not
including expected losses could result in the same capital being assigned to cover both expected
and unexpected losses. What are the industry’s views on this issue? Are there alternative
approaches that could achieve the same objectives in a different manner?
4. Similarly, because the framework focuses on the amount of total capital required, calibration
of the IRB risk weights entails assumptions about the average composition of capital between
tier one and tier two elements. To what extent, if any, does the proposal create incentives for
banks to modify their existing mix of such capital elements?
5. Under the foundation IRB proposal, risk weights for loans to banks, sovereigns, and
corporates are calibrated under the assumption that all such loans have an average maturity of
three years. What are the industry’s views on the overall appropriateness of this treatment?
Does this approach strike a reasonable balance between the additional burden of a separate
maturity dimension and the desire to increase risk sensitivity? What impact, if any, would such
an approach have on lending practices and, in particular, on the extension of short maturity
credits?
6. Within the advanced IRB methodology--and possibly at national discretion, for the foundation
methodology--the Committee is examining alternative approaches for linking risk weights and
remaining maturity. One approach would permit use of banks’ internal methods for estimating
effective maturity. If banks were permitted to estimate effective maturity using their own
internal methods, what minimum standards would be necessary?

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7. The IRB Supporting Technical Document describes alternative approaches to calibrating the
effects of maturity on risk weights. What criteria should guide the Committee in deciding how
to incorporate maturity effects?
8. There is a tension between the prudent desire for banks to take a longer-term view of a
borrower’s credit quality and the need under the IRB approach to provide conservative estimates
of average one-year default probabilities that can be used as a common metric for empirical
validation and setting IRB risk weights. How do banks expect to resolve this tension? In
particular, are credit assessments likely to be excessively focused on the next twelve months (i.e.,
in relation to well-established sound lending practice)? How could supervisors ensure that banks
would conservatively and appropriately incorporate longer-term considerations in their rating
and risk management processes?
9. Under the foundation IRB approach, senior and subordinated loans to corporates and banks
would receive LGDs of 50% and 75%, respectively. In addition, real estate would be the only
type of physical collateral recognized as a credit risk mitigant, and could potentially reduce the
LGD to 40%. What are commenters’ views on these proposed treatments? Is subordination
sufficiently well defined for use in this context?
10. In regard to retail exposures, the proposal requires that PD, LGD, and/or EL be calculated
separately for segments chosen by the bank but incorporating at least four risk factors – product
type, borrower risk (e.g., credit score or equivalent), delinquency status, and time period of
origination (i.e., vintage). Are these dimensions adequate to capture the risk characteristics of
retail portfolios or should additional risk factors be required? Are the requirements consistent
with sound retail lending and risk management practices?
11. Are the proposed risk weights for retail portfolios reasonable, especially for loans having
high expected loss rates, such as credit cards? Specific recommendations as to alternative risk
weights and estimation methodologies are encouraged.
12. Under the proposal, the same mapping from PDs and LGDs into risk weights would be
applied to all retail exposures. Is this appropriate, or would separate risk weight calibrations for
specific retail portfolios be worth the additional complexity?
13. A bank would not be required to estimate explicit credit conversion factors for uncommitted
and undrawn retail lines of credit, such as credit cards. However, to ensure adequate coverage of
potential credit losses, such a bank would be expected to reflect potential credit losses on such
undrawn lines in its LGD estimates. Can such LGD estimates be developed in a robust and costeffective manner? Should either approach be viewed as more risk-sensitive and more consistent
with sound risk management practice?
14. Does the definition of retail exposures provide sufficient clarity as to whether and when
small business lending should be considered a retail or a corporate exposure? How could this
definition be enhanced to provide greater clarity and ensure that appropriate capital requirements
are applied?

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15. Does the granularity adjustment strike an appropriate balance between complexity and
additional risk sensitivity? Relative to the informational requirements associated with other
aspects of the IRB proposal, what is the incremental burden associated with the proposed
granularity adjustment?
16. As noted in the proposal, the Basel Committee’s work in developing IRB treatments for
equity and project finance exposures is at a relatively early stage. How might the proposed
definitions of these two exposure types be improved? To what extent and in what respects do
banks’ internal risk and capital assessment methodologies for these exposures differ from those
used for corporate loan exposures? What approaches should the Committee consider in
addressing equities and project finance and how might the Committee ensure that, under the IRB
approaches, banks maintain prudent levels of required capital against those portfolios?
Credit Risk Mitigation
1. Does the “H” and ”w” framework for incorporating the risk mitigation effects of various forms
of collateral, guarantees, and credit derivatives strike a reasonable balance between allowing
additional elements of credit risk mitigation and providing safeguards against residual risks? Is
the approach broadly consistent with current bank practices and risk measurement systems? Are
the proposed values of H and w reasonable reflections of the credit risk inherent in different
forms of collateral, as well as the different contract types? Are the required holding period
assumptions appropriate for different types of transactions?
2. The agencies are preliminarily of the view that in lieu of the netting treatment set forth in the
proposal, they would retain the netting criteria established under U.S. GAAP, which is generally
more conservative. What are the potential competitive implications of this approach? Under the
proposed treatment of on-balance-sheet netting, loans and deposits would have to be
decomposed and netted individually. What effect would this treatment have on institutions’
internal reporting systems, in particular for repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements netted
under GAAP, and on incentives for appropriate risk management practices?
3. Is the availability of a simple approach to collateral based on substitution helpful and are there
possible alternative simple approaches that result in at least as much capital as under the
comprehensive approach?
4. Guarantees from banks and sovereigns are provided a more favorable treatment through a
lower w factor than guarantees from other similarly rated entities. Is this treatment warranted?
5. What are the industry’s views on the proposed approach for proportional recognition of
mismatched hedges and the incentives that this approach might produce?
Asset Securitization
1. The risk weights for securitization tranches under the standardized approach are in several
cases higher than the corresponding risk weight for a similarly rated corporate loan. For
example, a BB-rated securitization tranche would receive a 150% risk weight while a BB-rated

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loan would receive a 100% risk weight. In part, this reflects that the ratings for securitization
pools typically incorporate significant diversification benefits, while individual loans can benefit
from additional diversification in the context of a large loan portfolio. What are the industry’s
views on the proposed risk weights for securitization tranches? In particular, are the risk weights
for below-investment-grade tranches sufficient to address their increased risk?
2. The Committee proposes to apply a 20% conversion factor for liquidity facilities that enhance
securitization. Is that conversion factor commensurate with the risk created by such facilities?
3. The Committee proposes to apply a 10% conversion factor to assets sold by sponsors into
securitizations that contain an early amortization clause. Is it appropriate to characterize early
amortization clauses within typical credit card securitization and CLO structures as a credit
enhancement?
4. Under the standardized approach, what standards regarding the management of residual risks
should banks have to meet in order to receive a capital benefit from a synthetic securitization
transaction where the bank retains the most senior tranche of credit risk?
Operational Risk
1. Is the suggested definition of operational risk appropriate? How can loss types be better
specified for inclusion in a robust definition of operational risk? To allow for the development
of more advanced approaches to operational risk, what detailed guidance on loss categorization
and allocation of losses by risk type will be needed?
2. Conceptually, a capital charge for operational risk should cover unexpected losses, while
provisions and current revenues should cover those that are expected. Are accounting rules and
practices among countries sufficiently compatible to accommodate a uniform, international
regulatory capital standard based upon this concept?
3. How do the proposed approaches compare with a bank’s own method for allocating capital for
operational risk? What are the costs and benefits associated with collecting and maintaining
operational loss information by business line?
Supervisory Review of Bank Capital Adequacy
1.Do the four proposed supervisory principles provide a sufficient basis for a consistent approach
to supervisory review processes, including validation of minimum standards for participation in
the IRB approaches, among international supervisors?

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Transition Arrangements
1. Do the proposed transition arrangements regarding the necessary data and other requirements
for the IRB approach strike the proper balance between accommodating the need for banks to
develop fully their systems and measurement capabilities while providing for prudent minimum
capital requirements based on less than complete information?
2. During the first two years of implementation, the overall capital requirement of a bank
following the advanced IRB approach could not fall below a floor equal to 90 percent of its
requirement under a simplified calculation of the foundation IRB approach (see paragraph 162 of
the “Rules” paper). What are the industry’s views on the need for such a floor both in relation to
competitive equity and to the reliability of bank internal estimates of LGD, EAD, and the effect
of guarantees and credit derivatives? In particular, how significant are the differences between
the foundation and advanced IRB approaches likely to be and what would be the source of such
differences (e.g., more accurate estimates of risk)?

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