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Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, October 9, 10, and i i , 1893.



S P E E C H

H O N . F. M. 0 0 C K K E L L .
Monday, October


The Senatehaving under consideration the bill (H. R. 1) torepeala part of
a n act, approved July 14, 1890, entitled "An act directing the purchase of silver
bullion and the issue of Treasury notes thereon, and for other purposes"—

Mr. COCKRELL said:
Mr. P R E S I D E N T : N O more important measure has ever been
pending in the Senate than the present bill, no measure fraught
with more important results to the present and coming generations. Its importance demands and justifies its fullest consideration.
Gold and silver by the common law of England, transplanted
here by our ancestors, were money and a full legal tender in payment of debts upon a perfect equality as coin and bullion down
to the adoption of our Constitution. W e had the true bimetallic system.
By the express terms of our Constitution—
The Congress shall have power * * * to coin money, regulate the value
thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures.

And f u r t h e r :
No state shall * * • coin money * * * or make anything but gold
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.

Our Constitution clearly establishes bimetallism, and vests in
the Congress the exclusive power to provide by laws for coining
gold and silver metal into money, and then to regulate and fix the
legal-tender value of such coin and of foreign coin as such money.
T h e Constitution does not give Congress the power to regulate
the value, the market value, the commercial value, of gold and
silver as metals, as commodities. I t only gives the power to
regulate the value of the coined gold and silver, whether of domestic or foreign coinage. I t clearly gives to each State t h e
r i g h t to make such gold and silver coins a legal tender in payment of debts.
Gold and silver coins are the money of our Constitution, which,
when enacted, only recognized what previously existed. Congress has no power to declare that either gold or silver coin shall
not be money—no power to demonetize either gold or silver coin
or both. Well did Daniel Webster declare:
I am clearly of opinion that gold and silver at rates fixed by Congress constitute the legal standard of value in this country, and that neither Congress
nor any State has authority to establish any other standard or to displace
this standard.

W h e n we demand that Congress shall by law fix the ratios between gold and silver coined in our mints into money and give

to each equal powers and privileges, free or equal unlimited
coinage, we demand only obedience to our Constitution.
Congress, by i 'An act establishing a mint and regulating the
coins of the United States," approved April 2, 1792, exercised
its constitutional power by establishing a mint and authorizing
the coinage of gold, silver, and copper coins, and placed gold and
silver upon a perfect equality, and gave to each unlimited coinage, and to the coins of each full legal tender in all payments,
the gold coins to be eagles, half eagles, and quarter eagles of the
declared value of ten, five, and two and one-half dollars, respectively, 11 parts pure gold to 1 of alloy; and the silver coin to be dollars or units, half dollars, quarter dollars, dimes, and half dimes,
and made them all a full legal tender in payment of any and all
The weight of the gold in one dollar if coined would have been
27 grains standard and 24.75 pure, and the weight of the silver
in the dollar or unit was 416 grains standard and 371± grains pure,
and the value of this silver dollar was to be that of the Spanish
milled dollar as then current. This law further declared—
That the money of account of the United States shall toe expressed m dollars or units, dimes, or tenths, • * * and that all accounts of the public
officers and all proceedings in the Congress of the United States shall be
kept in due conformity with this regulation—

that the proportionate value of gold and silver in all coins which shall by
law be current as money within the United States shall be as 15 to 1.

This, our first monetary'law, continued in force until June 28,
Congress, by "An act concerning the gold coins of the United
States, and for other purposes," approved June 28,1834, and to
take effect July 31, 1834, reduced the standard weight and fineness of the gold coins from 27 grains standard and 24.75 pure in
the dollar to 25.8 standard and 23.2 grains pure to the dollar, being a reduction of the standard gold of 1.2 grains and of the pure
gold 1.55 grains to the dollar, and declared the new gold coins a
full legal tender in all payments, and made all gold coins previously minted receivable in all payments at the rate of 94.8 cents
per pennyweight.
Congress, by "An act tq establish a mint and regulate the coins
of the United States," approved January 18,1837, fixed the standard for both gold and silver coin of the United States at 9
parts pure to 1 of alloy, and the weight of the silver dollar at 412l
grains, and of the half dollars, quarter dollars, dimes, and halfdimes correspondingly, and made them all legal tenders for all
sums whatever. Thus the alloy was reduced, while the pur©
silver of 37li grains was retained in the standard silver dollar.
The standard weight of the gold coins was not changed, but
the fineness was fractionally advanced, so that a gold dollar if
coined would have contained 23.22 grains pure gold instead of
23.20* and these reductions by the laws of 1834 and 1837 of the
weight and fineness of the gold coins changed the relative valuation or ratio of gold and silver in coinage from 1 to 15 to 1 to
15.988, and increased the coining rate or legal-tender value jjf
gold in this country 6.589 per cent, and both go'd and silver
bullion and coin were continued upon a perfect equality at the
prescribed ratio.
Congress, by " A n act to authorize the coinage of gold dollars

and double eagles,"approved March 3,1849, authorized the coinage of " gold dollars, each to be of the value of $1, or unit " and
" double eagles, each to be of the value of $20, or units," with
full legal tender and free coinage.
Congress, by "An act amendatory of existing laws relative to
the half dollar, quarter dollar, dime, and half dime," approved
February 21,1853, reduced the standard weight of the half dollar from 206± grains to 192 grains, a reduction of 14i grains, and
the quarter dollar, dime, and half dime correspondingly, to take
effect from June 1,1853, and made them legal tender for all sums
not exceeding $5, and they could only be coined upon Government account from silver purchased in the market.
This law continued the unlimited coinage, with full legal tender, of gold and silver bullion into gold coins and the standard
silver dollar, and imposed a mint charge upon the depositor,
whether the metal was coined or cast into ingots or bars, of onehalf of 1 per cent. This law also authorized the coinage of the
three-dollar gold piece, with full legal tender, and by the act of
March 3,1853, this law was made to take effectfrom A^ril 1,1853,
and the charge for casting gold or silver into bars or ingots was
reduced to the actual cost thereof.
By the law of March 3, 1853, the Secretary of the Treasury
was authorized to establish in New York City an assay office for
assaying and casting gold and silver bullion and foreign coin
into bars, ingots, or disks, and the assistant treasurer at New
York was made the treasurer of such assay office, and was authorized, upon the deposit of gold or silver bullion or foreign
coin and the ascertainment of its net value to " issue his certificate of the net value thereof, payable in coins of the same metal
as that deposited, * * * which certificates shall be receivable at any time within sixty d<iys from the date thereof in payment of all debts due to the United States at the port of New
York, for the full sum therein certified," and the same charge
was made as at the mint. This is the origin of our gold and
silver certificates.
Congress, by "An act to provide ways and means for the support of the Government," approved March 3,1863, authorized
the Secretary of the Treasury to issue certificates for gold coin
or bullion deposited in sums of not less than $20, such certificates
to be receivable in payment of interest on the public debt and
duties on imports.
Congress, by 4 4 An act revising and amending the laws relative
to the mint, assay office, and coinage of the United States," approved February 12, 1873, and known as the coinage act of that
year, established a single gold standard' and declared the gold
dollar piece, of the standard weight of 25.8 grains, the unit of
value, and prohibited the coinage of the silver dollar of 412i
grains, but continued the coinage of the half dollar, quarter
dollar, and dime, increasing the weight of the half dollar ninetenths of a grain, or to 192.9, and the quarter dollar and dime
correspondingly, and limited their legal tender to any amount
not exceeding $5 in one payment, the silver bullion to be purchased for such coinage "and coined on Government account,
(and also authorized the coinage of the trade dollar of 420 grains
standard silver, to be a legal tender for $5, which legal tender
was repealed by the law of July 22,1876.
From the foundation of our constitutional Government to February 12,1873, our laws maintained our constitutional bimetallic

system unimpaired—gold and silver upon a perfect equality with
ull monetary functions.
The standard silver dollar, containing 371i grains of pure silver, was maintained as the unit of value. The law of January
18,1837, only reduced the alloy in the silver dollar 3i grains, and
made the dollar, silver and gold, 9 parts pure and 1 part alloy,
instead of 11 parts fine and 1 part alloy.
The law of February 12,1873, establishing the single gold standard and demonetizing the standard silver dollar of 37 l i grains
pure silver and 412£ grains standard silver, nine-tenths fine and
one-tenth alloy, was passed by a Congress overwhelmingly Republican in House and Senate, and was approved by a Republican President.
The Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHEKMAN] was the chairman of
the Senate Committee on Finance, and had charge of the bill
in the Senate and well knew its provisions and effects. It is
almost absolutely certain that there were not three other Senators, nor five members of the House, who knew at the time that
law was enacted that it demonetized the standard silver dollar
or established^ the single gold standard.
At that time there was no discussion of the coinage question.
There was no public demand for any legislation relative to the
value, the fineness, or the ratio of goid and silver coin. Neither
one of them was in actual circulation as money. Each one of
them was at a large premium. A silver dollar of 371 \ grains pu re
was more valuable than a gold dollar of 23.22 grains pure; or the
standard silver dollar of 412£ grains was of more value as an
article of merchandise in the open markets than the standard
gold dollar of 25.8 grains.
There was something back of this, Mr. President. I am not
going into a controversy at this time in regard to the motives
that inspired the action which deliberately and intentionally
led to the enactment of the law of 1873, and for which this
country must hold the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio
alone responsible, because I do not believe another Senator knew
what was contained in that bill. The Senator from Ohio did
know it.
Mr. PALMER. Mr. President
The P R E S I D I N G O F F I C E R (Mr. F A U L K N E R in the chair).
Does the Senator from Missouri yield to the Senator from Illinois?
Mr. COCKRELL. With a great deal of pleasure.
Mr. PALMER. I am curious to know why some other Senator did not know it.
,Mr. COCKRELL. * Simply because there was no discussion.
Every Senator who was here then, and who has ever spoken on
the subject since, has admitted that he did not know it: and the
documents I have here give a full and complete history of this
whole movement from 1861; they are included in the reports of
the Comptroller of the Currency and the Director of the Mint.
But the history of it is contained specially in documents sent to
Congress and which were not laid upon the desks of Senators, in
all probability, or if they were, they were treated by Senators
just as such documents are too often treated to-day—they did
not read them, that was all. They ought to have known it, but
they did not.
Mr. PALMER. I have understood from the history of the
matter that the bill was several times printed and amended.

Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, I have here a more complete collection of the documents on that question than I have
ever yet seen or heard read in the Senate from the beginning-,
the recommendations of the mint officers, and the letters they
sent out all over the country to doctrinaires to get their views
upon coinage, and the recommendations they have given here
for striking down the standard silver dollar, and all that. But
I doubt whether any one solitary Senator ever read them. The
Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN] is the only one that has ever
pretended to know, and he pretends to be as innocent as an unborn child of what was going to be the effect of it, as I shall show
before I get through.
Mr. PALMER. Innocence seems to have been the general
condition of the Senate about that time.
Mr. COCKRELL. I t seems so. Why? Because of the haste
with which the measure was pressed through after it was brought
up. I t was brought up, read, and passed upon the assurance
that it was simply a coinage law. No controversy arose over it
to amount to anything. It was a bill of sixty-five or sixty-six
sections. I t received the same consideration that many long
bills receive that are brought up here and upon which no discussion arises, no demand is made for the reading and Senators
know nothing about them, and with regard to which the great
masses of the people of this country have never been informed.
They were not heard upon this matter. There was no demand
for that legislation from any part of the world.
At that time, or rather on June 30,1872, we had $1,794,277,650
outstanding interest-bearing United States bonds and $413,566,968 noninterest-bearing obligations, mostly United States notes,
makingatotaloE $2,207,844,618 liabilities—interest andnoninterest bearing—of which $200,000,000 were the funded loan of 1881,
issued under the law of July 14, 1870, and payable in coin of the
standard value of the United States gold and silver dollars on
said July 14,1870. Nearly all the remaining liabilities—over
two billions—were payable in any legal-tender dollars—gold, silver, or greenbacks. The distinguished Senator from Ohio has
time and again—and I have his quotations here—asserted upon
this floor t h a t the 5-20 bonds were honestly and justly redeema b l e and payable in legal-tender greenbacks, that they were
sold for greenbacks, exchanged for them, and could lawfully and
justly be paid in them.
In the calendar years 1871 and 1872 we coined $1,117,136 and
$1,118,600, and in the one month and twelve days—January 1,
1873, up to February 12,1873—when its coinage was prohibited
we had coined $296,"000 standard silver dollars, showing a very
rapid increase in the coinage of such dollars.
Yet. with this record standing upon our books, the Senator
from Ohio, who has been Secretary of the Treasury and ought
to know this record, and the Senators who favor gold monometallism and oppose the rehabilitation of silver, have time and
again proclaimed to the world that the people would not have
silver coined into dollars.
The Senator from Ohio said in his speech here this very session that it was dropped because nobody was having it coined.
Yet here is the record. In the two years one month and twelve
days prior to February 12,1873, we had coined 2,531,736 standard silver dollars—nearly one-third of the total coinage of such
dollars to that date,

Mr. P E F F E R . Will the Senator from Missouri be kind
enough to give the aggregate production of our silver mines for
those years?
Mr. COCKRELL. I will give it hereafter. I do not want to
put it in at this point. I have the complete figures, but they
come under another head.
I shall hereafter discuss the causes leading to the passage of
the law of February 12, 1873. It was not generally known for
months after, that the coinage law of February 12,1873, had
demonetized the old standard dollar, and authorized a trade
dollar of 420 grains with legal tender limited to $5, and established the single gold standard. The coinage of trade dollars followed at once the standard dollar, and they were used
for sometime before the change was fully noted.
Suffice it to «ay that it was not in t h e minds of the people, was
not generally known for months afterwards, that the coinage law
of February 12,1873, had demonetized the old standard dollar, but
simply authorized the trade dollar of 420 grains with legal tender quality limited to $5.
How was that received by the people? W h a t effect had t h a t
and the legislation of foreign nations upon the financial condition of this country?
The panicof September, 1873, swept like a deadly simoom from
one end of this land to the other, and affected to a very large extent foreign nations, sweeping away millions and billions of their
gains from hard labor. No less a cyclone politically followed
this action of the Republican party. In the next general election in November, 1874, the Democratic party elected an overwhelming majority of Representatives to the Forty-fourth Congress, and the scepter of full power passed from the Republican
Mr. President, something has been said, a good deal has been
said, in regard to the record of the two parties upon the silver
question. I propose briefly to give that record, the record of
the Democratic party and the record of the Republican party as
well, upon this silver question.
In the Forty-fourth Congress, March 4, 1875, to March 4,1877,
the President was Republican. In the Senate there were 46
Republicans, 29 Democrats, 1 vacancy. In the House of Representatives there were 107 Republicans, 186 Democrats. Congress
convened December 6,1875. On March 27,1876, H. R. 2450, from
the Committee on Appropriations,was pending. I t appropriated
money for a deficiency for the Bureau of Engraving and P r i n t ing, and in section 2 provided for the issue of subsidiary silver
coins in the redemption of fractional currency.
Mr. Reagan, of Texas, offered an amendment making the
trade dollar legal tender for any amount not exceeding $50, and
the silver coins less than a dollar for any amount not exceeding
'$25. This was agreed to. Yeas 124—99 Democrats, 22 Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 94—28 Democrats, 65 Republicans, 1
Independent. As amended the bill passed. Yeas 122—50 Democrats, 70 Republicans, and 2 Independents; nays 100—80 Democrats. 18 Republicans, and 2 Independents.
April 10,1876, in the Senate, Mr. SHERMAN, from the Finance
Committee, reported the bill with amendments; one amending
section 3 so as to authorize the coinage of a silver dollar of 412.8
grains—a legal tender not exceeding$20 in anyone payment
except for customs dues and interest on public debt, and

stopped the coinage of trade dollars. Another—a new section
4—authorized the exchange of silver dollars for an equal amount
of United States notes to be retired, canceled, and not reissued;
and also for silver bullion at its market value.
That was the policy at that time of the senior Senator from
Ohio. I t was to substitute a standard silver dollar of 412.8
grains, and that would make it the exact mathematical ratio of
36 to 1; it was to issue those silver dollars and with them retire
and cancel the greenbacks, the full legal-tender United States
By changing the bullion in silver dollars to 412.8 grains the
exact ratio of silver to gold—16 to 1—was proposed. After discussion and a full speech by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. S H E R MAN], he moved to strike out all after section 2 of the bill, in order to disembarrass the bill of a silver-coinage question, and
leave it as an independent question to be afterwards settled. This
motion was agreed to, and the Reagan amendment was stricken
The House concurred in the Senate amendments for the same
reason, and the bill became the law of April 17, 1876.
On June 10,1876, Mr. S. S. Cox, from the Committee on Banking and Currency, reported a joint resolution to issue the silver
coins in the Treasury to an amount not exceeding $10,000,000 in
exchange for an equal amount of legal-tender notes, to be kept
as a special fund, to ba reissued only upon the retirement of
fractional currency; which was passed without a division.
June 21, 1876, in the Senate, the House joint resolution was
amended by adding a section prohibiting the coinage of the trade
dollar except for export trade; thus striking down the trade dollar, the only dollar authorized by the coinage law of 1873.
That was the action of the Republican Senate at that time destroying every solitary silver dollar, even the trade dollar.
June ^8, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Payne, from the
Banking and Currency Committee, reported for concurrence in
the Senate amendments. Mr. P. Landers, of Indiana, moved to
amend the Senate amendments by adding an amendment for free
and unlimited coinage of the standard silver dollar of 412i grains,
with full legal tender, which was agreed to; yeas 110—85 Democrats, *23 Republicans, 2 Independents; nays 55—16 Democrats,
37 Republicans, 2 Independents.
July 1,1876, in the Senate the Finance Committee reported nonconcurrence, and a conference was asked and agreed to without
The House agreed to the conference.
The conferees, except Mr. Landers, reported to the House of
Representatives an agreement, receding from the Landers
amendment with substitute of sections 3 and 4, increasing the
amount of subsidiary silver coin to be issued in redemption of
fractional currency, not to exceed 810,000,000, and authorizing
the purchase of the silver bullion for such coinage at market
rate, to be made without loss in such coinage and issue, and took
from the trade dollars any legal tender and limited their coinage to export demand. Agreed to. Yeas 129—66 Democrats, 62
Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 76—50 Democrats, 15 Republicans, 2 Independents.
July 14, in the Senate the report was adopted without division.
I t became the law, as the joint resolution of July 22, 1876.
On June 10,1876. Mr. S. S. Cox, from the Committee on Bank649

ing and Currency, reported H. R. 3398, of three sections—very
similar to the joint resolution of July 22, 1876. It was passed
without division.
In the Senate June 27,1876, the bill was considered on the report of the Finance Committee to strike out all after the enacting
clause and insert four new sections. This was a substitute proposed by the Senate Committee on Finance, headed by the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio.
Section 1 provided for the coinage of silver dollars of 412.8
grains, to be legal tender for sums not exceeding $20.
Section 2 provided for exchanging such dollars and minor
coins for legal tenders to be canceled and not reissued or replaced.
Section 3 provided for purchasing silver bullion at market
rates for such coinage, to be made without loss in coinage and
Section 4, prohibiting legal tender of the trade dollar, and
limiting its coinage to export demand. This was before the law
of July 22, 1876, had been enacted.
On June 28,1876, Senator Bogy moved to strike out in section
1 the words " n o t exceeding $20," the effect of which was to
leave that dollar with full legal-tender quality in the payment
of all debts. That was agreed to. Yeas 18—8 Democrats, 10 Republicans; nays 14—3 Democrats, 11 Republicans. On June 29
the bill was recommitted to the Finance Committee and was never
reported back. It was killed in a Republican Senate.
July 24,1876, in the House of Representatives, Hon. William
D. Kelley, Republican, moved to suspend the rules and pass a
free and'unlimited coinage bill. Yeas 119—84 Democrats, 33 Republicans, 2 Independents; nays 68—27 Democrats, 40 Republicans, 1 Independent. Two-thirds not voting yea, it failed.
On July 19,1876, in the House of Representatives, Mr. B L A N D ,
from the Committee on Mines and Mining, reported H. R. 3635,
for free coinage of gold and silver. December 13,1876, at the second session of the Forty-fourth Congress, Mr. B L A N D offered a
substitute for H. R. 3635, for free and unlimited coinage of silver
dollar of 412£ grains, with full legal-tender power.
Mr. President, this was placing the standard silver dollar just
where it had been from the organization of our Governuient up
to the date of the passage of the law of February 12,1873. I t
was restoring to it all the functions of money, the same as were
enjoyed by gold coin. This was agreed to, and then passed:
Yeas 168—123 Democrats, 45 Republicans; nays 53—17 Democrats, 36 Republicans. The bill as passed was sent to the Republican Senate, and never considered in the Senate. I t slept
the sleep that knows no waking, under the kindly care of the
distinguished Senators from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN], from Iowa
[Mr. A L L I S O N ] , and from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL].
That is for the Forty-fourth Congress, the first Democratic
House of Representatives. Now, what were the actions of the
Democratic party and its results in that Congress?
First. The Democratic House of Representatives passed* provision increasing the legal tender of the trade dollar of 420
grains from $5 to $50, and the subsidiary coins from $5 to $25, by
124 yeas—99 Democrats, 22 Republicans, and 1 Independent;
nays 94—28 Democrats, 65 Republicans, and 1 Independent. The
Republican Senate amended, authorizing silver dollars of 412.8
grains legal tender to $20, except customs and interest and their

exchanges for greenbacks to be retired and canceled, and for silver
bullion at market rates. That was the answer made by the Republican Senate to the demands of the Democratic House.
Second. The Landers free coinage amendment was agreed to
in the House of Representatives by—yeas, 85 Democrats, 23 Republicans. 1 Independent; nays, 16 Democrats, 37 Republicans,
2 Independents. Defeated by a Republican Senate.
Third. House bill 3398 for subsidiary coins for redemption of
fractional currency, amended in a Republican Senate, for silver
dollars of 412.8 grains legal tender to $20, and exchangable for
greenbacks to be canceled; and on motion of Mr. Bogy the restriction of legal tender to $20 was stricken out by—8 Democrats
and 10 Republicans, to 3 Democrats and 11 Republicans. Recommitted and killed in committee.
Fourth. Kelley's free*coinage bill received—84 Democrats, 33
Republicans, and 2 Independents, to 27 Democrats, 40 Republicans, and 1 Independent.
Fifth. B L A N D ' S ( H . R. 3 6 3 5 ) substitute for free, unlimited coinage, passed by—123 Democrats and 45 Republicans to 17 Democrats and 36 Republicans; and in the Senate killed in the Finance
W e come now to the Forty-fifth Congress, from March 4,1877,
to March 4,1879. At that time there was a Republican President. In the Senats there were 39 Republican Senators, 36 Democratic Senators, and 1 Independent, David Davis. In the House
of Representatives there were 136 Republicans, 156 Democrats,
1 vacancy.
In the first or called session of the Forty-fifth Congress, on November 5,1877, in the House of Representatives, Mr. B L A N D
moved to suspend the rules and pass " A n act to authorize the
free coinage of the standard silver dollar and to restore its legaltender character." Agreed to. Yeas 164—97 Democrats and 67
Republicans: nays 34, only 10 Democrats and 21 Republicans.
Among the yeas were Messrs. Carlisle, H U N T O N , and M I L L S .
This bill, as pKssed by the House, was as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That there shall he coined, at the several
mints of the United States, silver dollars of the weight of 412J graius troy
of standard silver, as provided in the act of January 18,1837, on which shall be
the devices and superscription^ provided by said act; which coins, together
With all silver dollars heretofore coined by the United States of like weight
and fineness, shall be alegal tender, at their nominal value, for all debts and
dues, public and private, except where otherwise provided by contract; and
any owner of silver bullion may deposit the same at any United States coinage mint or assay office, to be coined into such dollars, for his benefit, upon
the same terms and conditions as gold bullion is deposited for coinage under
existing laws.
SEC. 2. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this
act are hereby repealed.
Passed the House of Representatives November 5,1877.

November 21,1877, Mr. ALLISON, from the Finance Committee, reported the bill, with amendments to strike out the clause
beginning " a n d any owner of silver bullion," and to insert his
purchasing clause, and to add section 2 for an international monetary conference.
In oth'ir words, the distinguished Senator from Iowa, as the
mou hpiece of the Republican Finance Committee, reported to
strike out the free and unlimited coinage cl iuse of this House
bill and to place in it the silver-purchasing clause of not less

than $2,000,000 nor more than $4,000,000 of silver per month;
and then to sugar-coat it with the international monetary conference.
February 15,1878, this amendment was agreed to. Yeas 49—
16 Democrats, 33 Republicans; nays 22—17 Democrats, 4 Republicans, 1 Independent (Mr. Davis). The amendment—section 2—
was agreed to. Yeas 40—10 Democrats, 29 Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 30—24 Democrats, 6 Republicans. Mr. Booth's
amendment by a new section for silver certificates was agreed
to. Yeas 49—21 Democrats, 27 Republicans, 1 Independent;
nays 14—8 Democrats, 6 Republicans. Other amendments wero
voted down and the bill as amended passed. Yeas 48—24 Democrats, 23 Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 21—7 Democrats, 14
February 21,1878, in the House of Representatives the purchasing clause was concurred in. Yeas 203—74 Democrats,
129 Republicans; nays 72—68 Democrats, 4 Republicans. The
international-agreement section was agreed to. Yeas, 196—77
Democrats, 119 Republicans; nays, 71—03 Democrats, 8 Republicans.
February 28,1878, the bill was vetoed by President Hayes, and
passed on same day over his veto. In the House of Representatives, yeas 198—118 Democrats, 78 Republicans; nays 73—22
Democrats, 51 Republicans. In the Senate, yeas 46—25 Democrats, 20 Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 19—9 Democrats, 10
Under this act 378,166,793 silver dollars have been coined from
silver bullion, costing $308,199,262, leaving the seigniorage at
Mr. President, it was known at the time when this bill was
passed, from the published declarations of President Hayes,
that a free and unlimit3d coinage silver bill would be vetoed.
This bill, the Allison-Bland bill, or the Bland-Allison bill, or
the law of February 28,1878, was not what the friends of bimetallism and the true friends of unlimited coinage of silver demanded.
I t was all that they could get. I t was then held over them
in terror that the President would veto any bill recognizing the
unlimited coinage of silver. Not only was that carried out, but
after it was limited to not less than $2,000,000 nor more than $4,000,000 he still vetoed the bill, because it was a subv 3rsion of the
policy of the Republican party which it had deliberately established after the close of the war—the single gold standard.
This was the first encroachment made upon tne single gold
standard, and that it has resulted in untold blessings to the
people no one can deny.
Where would the country be to-day if you were to strike out
all this money circulation, these 378,000,000 of silver dollars that
have been coined from year to year? They have been a part of the
currency of this country, and they have been an aid to prevent
more dire calamities than have already befallen us.
January 16,1878, in the Senate, Mr. Matthews submitted his concurrent resolution, declaring that all United States bonds issuedunder the refunding and redemption acts of July 14,1870, and
January 14, 1875, could be paid at the option of the Gov3rnment in standard silver dollars of 412£ grains without violation
of public faith or in derogation of the rights of public c r e d i t o r s .
It was then hurled in our teeth, every time \ve mentioned the
Bubject of unlimited coinage of standard silver dollars, that we

were repudiators, that we were trying to pay the bonds, the
precious bonds «of the Government, which ought to be paid in
gold, in a debased standard silver dollar. To put an end to this
the distinguished Senator from Ohio, Mr. Matthews, afterwards
one of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,
introduced this resolution; and, after the fullest discussion in
the Senate, that resolution was agreed to. Yeas 4 3 — 2 3 Democrats, 19 Republicans, and the Independent, Judge David Davis,
of Illinois; nays 2 2 — 7 Democrats and 15 Republicans.
That was sent to the House, and on January 29,1878, it was
agreed to. Yeas 189—116 Democrats, including Messrs. Carlisle
and MILLS, 73 Republicans; nays 79—23 Democrats, 56 Republicans.
Here was a positive declaration that all the bonds of the Government, including the funded loan of 1907, could honestly and
justly be paid in the standard silver dollars of 412£ grains. That
passed the Republican Senate by the vote I have just given, and
was passed in the Democratic House by an overwhelming vote.
I t was intended as a declaration of the law upon that question
and the line of conduct to be pursued by the Administration in
its execution of the law of February 28, 1878, the Bland-Allison
March 5 , 1 8 7 8 , in the House of Representatives, Mr. S P R I N G E R
moved to suspend the rules and pass a bill " t o authorize the
coinage of gold and silver upon the same terms, and to permit
deposits thereof in the Treasury for the same purposes." I t
provided for unlimited coinage of each' alike, with full legal
tender, subject to mint charge of actual coinage cost. (This
was after the passage of the Bland-Allison act.) Yeas 140—
1 0 2 Democrats, 3 8 Republicans; nays 1 0 2 — 2 5 Democrats, 7 7 Republicans. Two-thirds not favoring, it failed.
December 9,1878, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Durham moved to suspend the rules and pass a bill to stop coining
trade dollars, and to exchange standard silver dollars of 412*
grains for them, and then recoin such trade dollars into the
standard full legal-tender dollars. Yeas 153—104 Democrats,
49 Republicans: nays 91—20 Democrats, 71 Republicans. I t
failed, two-thirds not voting in the affirmative.
On the same day, Mr. Fort moved a suspension of the rules
and passage of a bill declaring any discrimination against standard silver dollars by national banking associations a defiance
of our laws, and instructing the Committee on Banking and Currency to report a bill for withdrawing their circulation. Yeas
151—106 Democrats, 45 Republicans; nays 89—16 Democrats, 73
Republicans. Not two-thirds in the affirmative, it failed.
Scarcely had the Bland-Allison law been enacted a!hd a dollar
coined and issued under it, when the national banks of New York
conspired to prevent any beneficial results flowing from its enactment, and ever since that day they have fought it with all
the power they could bring to bear. They have refused to recognize it. They have refused largely to keep it as a part of their
reserve. In other words, they have put the mark of condemnation upon it in every way that it wasjpossible for them to do.
I come now, Mr. President, to the Forty-sixth Congress—1879
to 1881.
The President was Republican; the Senate, 42 Democrats, 33
Republicans, 1 Independent. In the House of Representatives,

148 Damocrats, 130 Republicans, 15 Nationals. President Hayes
called an extra session March 18; 1879.
June 2 7 , 1 8 7 9 , in the Senate Mr! V E S T offered a concurrent resolution, declaring u that the complete remonetization of silver,
its full restoration as a money metal, and its free coinage are
demanded alike by the dictates of justice and sound statesmanship." Mr. A L L I S O N moved its reference to the Finance Committee. Agreed to. Yeas 2 3 — 4 Democrats, 1 9 Republicans;
nays 2 2 — 2 1 Democrats, 1 Independent.
At that time the distinguished Senator from Delaware, Mr.
Bayard, now our ambassador to England, was chairman of the.
Committee on Finance. The resolution slept the sleep that
knows no waking.
May 24, 1879, in the House of Representatives "An act to
amend certain sections of the Revised Statutes of the United
States relating to coinage and coin and bullion certificates, and
for other purposes," was passed. Yeas 114—99 Democrats, 6 Republicans, 9 Independents; nays 97—89 Republicans, 8 Democrats.
It will be necessary to give a little history of this bill 564*
On April 30,1879."in the House of Representatives Hon. A. J .
Warner, from the Coinage Committee, reported this bill, with
eleven sections, providing for the perfect equality of gold and
silver as bullion and coin, free mintage with unlimited legal
tender. Section 2 restored the standard silver dollar of 412£
grains. Section 3 gave it full and unlimited coinage. Section 4
prescribed the charges for melting and refining bullion.
May 15, 1879, Mr. Killinger moved that the bill do lie on the
table. Yeas 109—14 Democrats, 95 Republicans; nays 126—107
Democrats, 10 Republicans, 9 Independents.
Mr. Caulkins moved to add to section 3 a provision for purchasing the silver bullion for such coinage at its market rates.
Yeas 114—10 Democrats, 104 Republicans; nays 115—103 Democrats, 3 Republicans, 9 Independents. Disagreed to.
May 16, Mr. M I L L S of Texas offered a substitute for section 3.
This substitute required the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase without limit all silver bullion, trade dollars, and foreign
coins offered for sale, at the market value of silver, as long as
412£ grains standard silver could be purchased for $1 of legaltender Treasury notes, and to pay for such purchases with a
new issue of legal-tender Treasury notes, and the silver coins to
be exchangeable at par, in sums not less than $20, for such Treasury notes, to be full legal tender for all debts and receivable for
Government dues, and the silver bullion, trade dollars, and foreign silver coins to be coined as fast as possible into American
silver coins, and all silver coins coming into the treasury to be
applied to paying the interest and principle of the public debt
before using any of the gold or Treasury notes for such purpose.
Disagreed to. Yeas 60—50 Democrats, 10 Independents; nays
May 20, Mr. Fort offered a substitute for section 3, authorizing the deposit of silver bullion at its market value and payment
therefor in standard dollars, and the coinage of the bullion into
standard dollars. Dis igreed to. Yeas 101—14 Democrats, 1 Independent, and 89 Republicans. Nays 118—98 Damoorats, including Messrs. Carlisle and MILLS; 11 Republicans, 9 Independents.
The third section was agreed to. Yeas 113—100 Democrats,

including Messrs. Carlisle, HUNTON, and M I L L S ; 3 Republicans,
and 10 Independents. Nays 110—9 Democrats, 100 Republicans,
1 Independent.
Mr. Maish moved to insert in beginning of section 4 an amendment providing mint charges for coining gold and silver bullion into coin equal to the difference between the market value
of the bullion and the legal-tender value of the coin. Agreed
to. Yeas 118—15 Democrats, 100 Republicans, 3 Independents.
Nays, 105—95 Democrats, 2 Republicans, 8 Independents.
The fourth section was agreed to. Yeas 113—14 Democrats,
98 Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 109—98 Democrats, 2 Republicans, 9 Independents.
May 24, Mr. Thomas Ryan moved a substitute for the bill, authorizing the purchase of silver bullion at its market price, to be
coined into standard silver dollars as fast as could be done by
the mints, subject to gold coinage, until the price of the standard silver bullion was equal to the coined dollar, and then for
free and-unlimited coinage.
Disagreed to. Yeas 69—2 Democrats, 67 Republicans; nays
137—105 Democrats, 24 Republicans, 8 Irdependents. In the
Senate Mr. Bayard, February 2, 1880, reported adversely; and
no further action.
On December 8,1879, Senator VOORHEES introduced a resolution (Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 13), which, after reciting the singularly unanimous demand of the people for the
passage of the law of February 2S, 1878, and also the law of May
31, 1878, preventing further retirement of greenbacks and the
great blessings resulting therefrom to the country, proposed to
express immediate and unqualified condemnation of the President and the Secretary of the Treasury for their recommendations for suspending the coinage of silver dollars and for retiring
t h e greenbacks, heard with profound astonishment and regret,
and resolving—
That the true interests of the country require the free and unlimited coinage of both gold and silver onconditions of exact equality; and that it is the
part of a wise financial policy to maintain the United States legal-tender note
circulation, commonly lenown as greenbacks, in volume not less than now
exists, and to preserve its legal*tender quality unrestricted as to amount,
and unimpaired in legal efTect.

No fin-il action was had.
In the Forty seventh Congress there was still a Republican
President; from 1881 to 1883 the Senate was 37 Republicans, 37
Democrats, 1 Independent, and 1 Readjuster. The House of
Representatives was 150 Republicans, 131 Democrats, 10 Nationals. and 2 Readjusters.
March 17,1882, a resolution of Mr. Brown, of Georgia, in the
Senate, declaring i t u inexpedient and unwise to contract the currency by withdrawing silver certificates or to discontinue orfurther'restrict the coinage of silver, and that gold and silver coin
upon a proper ratio of equivalence between the two metals and
paper issues predicated upon and conveptible into such coin constitute the proper circulating medium," was referred to the Finance Committee. Yeas 30—2 Democrats, 28 Republicans; nays
23 Democrats and 1 Independent (Mr. Davis
This is the only effort in the Forty-seventh Republican Congress to rehabilitate silver.
Now, we come to the Forty-eighth Congress; the President
Republican, extending from 1883 to 1885—the Senate 40 Repub619

licans, 36 Democrats. The House of Representatives 201 Democrats, 110 Republicans, 4 Independents, 1 Greenbacker.
April 1 , 1 8 8 4 , House bill 4 9 7 6 , pending- in the House of Representatives, authorizing 1 receipt to January 1, 1886, of trade dollars for all dues to United States; section 2, exchangeable for
standard dollars; section 3, to be sent to mints for coinage; section
4 , to be part of coinage under act of February 2 8 , 1 8 7 8 . Mr. B L A N D
moved to strike out section 4 . Agreed to. Yeas 1 3 1 — 1 1 5 Democrats, 1 4 Republicans, 2 Independents; nays 1 1 9 — 3 7 Democrats;
8 1 Republicans, 1 Independent.
Passed. ' Yeas 1 9 8 — 1 4 0 Democrats; 56 Republicans; 2 Independents; nays 45—11 Democrats;
33 Republicans; 1 Independent.
In the Senate, second session Forty-eighth Congress, the Finance Committee reported a substitute of five sections. Section
1 authorized exchange for standard dollars to July 1,1885; section 2, to be sent to mints for coinage as part of bullion under
act of February 28, 1878; section 4, to renew negotiations with
Latin Union and other foreign powers for treaties to open mints
to free coinage; section 5, if no such treaties be ratified before
August 1,1886, then suspension of act of February 28,1878. Feb*
ruary 4,1885, Mr. Ingalls moved to strike out section5. No other
In the House of Representatives, February 26,1885, House bill
B256, being the sundry civil appropriation bill, was pending with
a clause in it to suspend the operations of the law of February
28,1878. In other words, to susp3nd the further purchase of
silver, just as is proposed in this bill.
Mr. Randall moved to suspend the rules and consider said
clause. I t was disagreed to—yeas 118, nays 152; and it was abandoned and stricken from the bill.
You will remember that this was just preceding the inauguration of President Cleveland on the 4th of March, 1885.
We come to the Forty-ninth Congress, 1885 to 1887,Mr. Cleveland President, the Senate, 41 Republicans, 35 Democrats; the
Souse of Representatives, 184 Democrats, 139 Republicans,
•Greenback-Labor, 2.
April 8, 1886, in the House of Representatives, House bill
5690, for the free coinage of silver dollars and placing silver on
ah equality with gold, reported adversely by the Coinage Committee, was pending. Mr. Dibble's amendment to strike out
and substitute a provision for the repeal of the act of February
28, .1878, unless silver be remonetized by the concurrent action
of the nations of Europe with* the United States, was disagreed
to. Yeas 84—33 Democrats, 51 Republicans; nays 201—130 Democrats, 71 Republicans. The bill was then rejected. Yeas 126—
96 Democrats, 30 Republicans; nays 163—70 Democrats, 93 Republicans.
December 17,1886, in the Senate, Senate bill 199, for the exchange to July 1,1887, of trade for standard dollars, and to be
sent to mints for coinage as part of the bullion to be purchased
under act of February 28,1878, was passed without division.
In the House of Representatives. February 12,1887, Senate bill
199 was pending. Lanham's amendment as substituted, authorizing the receipt of trade dollars for Government dues and for
exchange for standard dollars, and for coining the same into
standard dollars, not as part of the bullion and coinage, under
act of February 28,1878, was agreed to on divis!on. Yeas 127,
nays 99; and passed, yeas 174, nays 36, and went to conference*

The committee of conference reported a substitute, providing
for the exchange for six months from date of trade for standard
dollars or subsidiary coins, and for coining of the same not to
be counted, under act of February 28, 1878. In the Senate this
amendment was agreed to. Yeas 49—23 Democrats, 26 Republicans; nays 5—2 Democrats, 3 Republicans. In the House of
Representatives it was agreed to without division.
It simply authorizes the trade dollars to be exchanged dollar
for dollar for the standard silver dollars and then required such
trade dollars to be taken to the mints and coined as additional
coinage to the coinage under the act of February 28,1878. President Cleveland, without approving or disapproving it and without returning it to the House, wherein it originated, kept it for
ten days and it became a law.
In the Fiftieth Congress, 1887 to 1889, Mr. Cleveland was
President. The Senate was 39 Republicans, 37 Democrats, and
the House of Representatives 169 Democrats, 152 Republicans,
2 Labor, 2 Independents.
In the House of Representatives on February 29,1888, House
bill 5034, authorizing the application of the surplus in the Treasury to the purchase or redemption of United States bonds, was
passed. In the Senate, on March 26, 1888, Senator Spooner's
substitute, declaring section 2 of the sundry civil appropriation
law of June 30, 1882, " a permanent provision," was agreed to.
Senator Beck offered a section, directing the Secretary of the
Treasury on the retirement of national-bank circulation and failu r e of other such banks to take out equal amount, then to purchase an equivalent amount of silver bullion in excess of the
minimum required under the law of February 28, 1878, to be
coined and used as provided in said act, which was agreed to*
Yeas 38—22 Democrats, 16 Republicans; nays 13—2 Democrats,
11 Republicans. No action in the House of Representatives.
In the Fifty-first Congress, March 4, 1889, to March 4,1891,
Mr. Harrison, Republican, was President. The Senate was 47
Republicans, 37 Democrats. The House of Representatives, 173
Republicans, 154 Democrats, 1 Wheeler, 1 vacancy.
June 5,1890, in the House of Representatives, House bill 5381,
known as the Windom silver bullion purchase bill, was pending.
Mr. B L A N D moved to recommit, with instructions to report
back a bill for the free coinage of silver. Yeas 116—101 Democrats, 14 Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 140—12 Democrats,
128 Republicans. The substitute offered by Mr. Conger was
then passed. Yeas 135—135 Republicans, not a Democrat; nays
119—112 Democrats, 7 Republicans.
June 17, the bill was reported by the Finance Committee of
t h e Senate "with sundry amendments; while i t was pending Mr.
Plumb offered an amendment for free and unlimited coinage,
which was agreed to. Yeas 43—28 Democrats, 15 Republicans;
nays 24—3 Democrats, 21 Republicans. The bill so amended into
af ree, unlimited coinage measure was passed. .Yeas 42—27 Democrats, 15 Republicans; nays 25—3 Democrats, 22 Republican*
After long wrangling in the House of Representatives June
25, a vote was had on the Senate free-coinage amendment. Yeas
1 3 5 — 1 1 3 Democrats, including the Hon. R O G E R Q . M I L L S , 2 1
Republicans, 1 Independent; nays 1 5 2 — 2 2 Democrats, 1 3 0 Republicans. The Senate amendments were then nonconcurred
in and conference had. The conference report was agreed to in
t h e Senate July 10, by a vote of 39 yeas, all Republicans} and 26


nays, all Democrats, and in the House of Representatives, July
12, by 122 yeas—121 Republicans, 1 Independent (Featherstone),
and 90 nays, all Democrats.
The conferees agreed to a bill with sundry amendments. The
conference committee substituted in the bill as it passed 4,500,000
ounces for $4,500,000, and they modified the legal tenders " except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contracts,"
and they substituted for the bullion redemption provision a requirement that upon demand the Secretary of the Treasury
shall redeem the notes in gold or silver coin in his discretion—
and the declaration that it is the established policy of the United
States to maintain a parity between the two metals at the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law, and to
require 2,000,000 ounces of the bullion purchased to be coined
monthly into dollars until July 1,1891.
Mr. President, this was practically and entirely a new bill,
agreed to in the conference led by the distinguished Senator
from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN], the great bimetallic leader of the
Senate to-day. The changes entirely subverted the bill, bad as
it was as it passed the Senate and as it passed the other House.
Instead of redeeming the Treasury notes issued in the purchase
of silver bullion with their equivalent in silver, upon the demand of the holder, the Secretary of the Treasury was required
to redeem these notes in gold or silver coin in his discretion;
and then the promise of the policy of the United States was put
in here to maintain a parity between the two metals at the present legal ratio. I shall have occasion hereafter to comment on
this matter in connection with the Presidents message. I t was
to maintain the parity of the two metals, not the two coins.
These were the most material changes, and I had the privilege and the honor of protesting against those changes and in
predicting that the law would 4be misconstrued and enforced by
an unwilling^ administration, just as it has been. I am glad to
realize (I am sorry for the consequence of the realization, however) that every prediction I made upon the floor of the Senate
in opposition to the approval of that bill as reported by the conference committee, has been verified. The distinguished junior
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. LINDSAY] did me the honor to
quote a large number of passages from that speech, and I stand
here to-day without any apology for uttering one of them. Were
that bill pending again to-day as it was then, I would simply repeat what I then said.
But what has been done since, Mr. President? I want to get
at all the efforts at legislation on the silver question before discussing it.
On January 5,1891, Mr. S T E W A R T moved to consider Senate
bill 4G75, displacing the Federal election bill. That was agreed to.
Yeas 34—26 Democrats, 8 Republicans; nays 29 Republicans.
On January 14, 1891, Mr. S T E W A R T moved a free coinage
amendment to the bill, which had been laid aside up to that
time. That was agreed to. Yeas 4 2 — 2 6 Democrats, 1 6 Republicans; nays 30—3 Democrats, 27 Republicans.
After the bill had been discussed a long time and various amendments made, my colleague [Mr. VEST] offered a free and unlimited coinage provision as a substitute, and that was agreed to.
y e a s 39—24 Democrats and 15 Republicans; nays 27,1 Democrat
^nd 26 Republicans.
iNow, remember this was only a short time ago in the Senate,

only in 1891, two and a half years ago. A great many of the same
Senators are still here.
January 15,1891, in the House of Representatives the bill was
referred to the Coinage Committee and reported February 21,
1891, adversely and by order of t h e committee placed on the
Calendar and no f u r t h e r action was had.
In the House of Representatives, February 6, 1891, on the
sundry civil appropriation bill, Mr. B L A N D moved a free coinage
amendment, but was ruled out on a point of order. Then Mr.
BLAND,appealed from the decision of the Speaker, and the ruling
of the Speaker was sustained. Yeas 134—7 Democrats, 127 Republicans; nays 127—116 Democrats, 11 Republicans.
Now we come to the Fifty-second Congress—1891 to 1893—Mr.
Harrison, President; the Senate 47 Republicans, 39 Democrats,
2 Independents; the House of Representatives 235 Democrats,
86 Republicans, 9 People's party, 2 vacancies.
In t h e House of Representatives March 2 4 , 1 8 9 2 , House bill
4 4 2 6 , for the free coinage of silver, etc., was pending. On motion
of Mr. B U R R O W S to lay on table the yeas were 1 4 8 — 8 0 Democrats,
6 8 Republicans; nays 1 4 9 — 1 3 0 Democrats, 1 2 Republicans, 7
People's party. A motion to reconsider was agreed to—yeas 150,
nays 148; and the motion to lay on table again defeated—yeas 145,
nays 149. A f t e r continued filibustering the House adjourned,
and no f u r t h e r action was had.
July 1,1892, in the Senate Senate bill 51 for free coinage, com J
plete as amended, passed. Yeas 29—17 Democrats, 10 Republicans,
2 Independents; nays 25—7 Democrats, 18 Republicans. Sixteen
paired for and 16 against it—13 Democrats and 3 Republicans
paired for, and 2 Democrats and 14 Republicans against. Counting votes and pairs and the yeas would be 45—30 Democrats, 13 Republicans, 2 Independents: nays 41—9 Democrats, 32 Republicans.
In the House of Representatives, July 5,1892, the bill was referred to the Coinage Committee. July 6, Mr; T R A C E Y ' S motion
to refer the bill to the Committee on Banking and Currency was
disagreed to—yeas 43, nays 129. Other filibustering motions
were resorted to.
July 13—Mr. CATCHINGS, from the Committee on Rules, reported a resolution to consider Senate bill 51. T h e previous
question on the same was ordered. Yeas 162, nays 130—101 Democrats, 61 Republicans, yeas; 114 Democrats and 16 Republicans
and Independents, nays. T h e resolution was then rejected. Yeas
136—118 Democrats, 9 Republicans, and 9 Alliance; nays 154—94
Democrats, 60 Republicans.
' T h a t was only a little over a year ago—a short time.
Now, I want to go a little f u r t h e r in the Fifty-second Congress. '
December 7, 1892, t h e distinguished Senator from New Y o r k
[Mr. HILL] introduced Senate bill 2534 for the repeal of the law
of July 14,1890, except the fifth and sixth sections, and as this
is a very remarkable bill I am very glad the distinguished Sena t o r is present. I say the Senator from New York introduced
Senate trill 3524 for the repeal of the law of July 14,1890, except
t h e fifth and sixth sections, which was referred to t h e Finance
Committee, and was never reported back to the Senate.
This is a very remarkable financial measure, evidently representing the matured thought and judgment of the distinguished
Democratic leader from the Empire State of New York. I t proposes to stop the purchase of silver and the issue of Treasury

notes, and all coinage of the silver bullion already purchased, and
to leave in the Treasury the great mass of silver bullion uncoined—and a mere commodity—and the large amount of United
States Treasury notes issued and outstanding deprived of all
monetary functions, including legal tender and redemption in
coin—a bastard; an illegitimate issue of United States notes.
Well may we all pause before this wonderful prodigy for financial legislation. The junior Senator from Nevada [Mr. S T E W ART] came to its rescue on December 12 by introducing and having referred to the Finance Committee an amendment adding to
Senate bill 3524 a provision for the free and unlimited coinage of
the standard silver dollar.
December 21, 1892, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. MCPHERSON] introduced a joint resolution (S. R . 126) for the suspension of all purchases of silver bullion under the-law of July
1 4 , 1 8 9 0 , until otherwise ordered by Congress.
Ordered to lie
on the table. No further action had.
On January 4 , 1 8 9 3 , t h e Senator from Nevada [Mr. STEWART]
offered a free-coinage amendment, which was laid on the table
and printed.
January 9 , 1 8 9 3 , the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. ALDRICH]
offered a substitute, reaffirming our purpose to maintain the
parity in the 7alue of gold and silver coins and United States
notes and for the issue of bonds—here is the milk in the cocoanut—
to be sold for gold to maintain such parity, and the suspension
of purchase of silver bullion in the discretion of the President,
and repealing the purchasing clause if there was no international bimetallic agreement, before January 1, 1894.
But to go back a little to show the interest of the distinguished
Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN] in anything that squints of
international bimetallism or international monetary - conferences: July 14, 1892, the Senator from Ohio introduced and had
referred to the Finance Committee, Senate bill 3 4 2 3 , for the repeal of the clauses of t h e law of July 1 4 , 1 8 9 0 , for the purchase of
silver bullion and issue of Treasury notes in the purchase, to
take effect January 1, 1893.
July 6,1892, the'distinguished Senator from Iowa [Mr. ALLISON], as chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, had reported the sundry civil appropriation bill, with an amendment,
providing for the international monetary conference t h a t met at
Brussels last year, and of which he was a member. That was on
July 6. Immediately, on July 14, t h e distinguished Senator from
Ohio brings in his bill to repeal his own protege and wipe it out
of existence, in ample time to have its proper effect on the proceedings of the international monetary conference to be held at
Brussels, and to be referred to in their proceedings, as it was.
I will read t h a t now, to see how our representatives over t h e r e
talked to those clad in the purple robes of authority—kingly
regal authority.

This is by Mr. Cannon—
The present policy of the United States, in regard to the purchase of silver. was defined by Mr. Cannon in the following terms:
"The United States has seriously taken into consideration the idea of repealing the silver-purchase act or 1890: the two political parties as well as—

Oh, yes; " a s well as"—
the great bankers of New York have advised this repeal, and if during this
conference some arrangement is not attained, it is more than probable that

America will not continue disposed to buy annually 54,000,000 ounces of silver at the market price.

Was it not peculiar that just as soon as any indication of an
international monetary conference wag visible upon the horizon
by a proposed amendment in the sundry civil appropriation bill,
the senior Senator from Ohio, claiming to strongly favor bimetallism, should come in with a bill for the destruction of his own
On January 17,1893, Senate bill 3423 was reported from the
Finance Committee by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN],
amended by changing the repeal from January 1, 1893, to January 1,1894, and adding a new section authorizing national banks
to issue notes to face value of bonds.
Now, Mr. President, remember this bill was introduced on
the 14th day of July, 1892. Congress was in session for some
time afterwards. I t convened again in December. Not until
January 17, 1893, did the distinguished Senator from Ohio
bring back his own bill for action in the Senate. He must have
been exceedingly anxious for the passage of the bill, considering
the long time he consumed before reporting it back. Then
what was it when reported back? It repealed the purchasing
clauses after January 1, 1894, and then added a new section
authorizing the issue by national banks of dollar for dollar of
their circulation, the very identical kind of a bill that the distinguished Senator from Indiana, the chairman of the Finance
Committee, has already reported to the Senate and is now pending on the Calendar. That amendment was exactly in the language almost of the present bill. I t gave the banks the power
o issue up to the full face value of their bonds.
January 1 9 , 1 8 9 3 , the senior Senator from Colorado [Mr. T E L LER] offered a substitute for free coinage of silver.
January 19,1893, the junior Senator from Colorado [Mr. WOLCOTT] ottered a substitute for coining all silver purchased and to
be purchased under said act, differing in that respect. I t was
simply to compel the coinage of all the silver purchased and to
be purchased under that act.
February 6,1S&3—now we are in the present year—my colleague [Mr. VEST] offered an amendment restoring the BlandAllison law of February 28, 1878, as a substitute.
February 6, 1893, the distinguished Senator from New York
[Mr. HILL] made a speech, and moved to consider the bill reported by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN].
The junior Senator from Indiana [Mr. VOORHEES] moved to
lajr that motion on the table. That was ruled out of order on a
point made by the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. HOAR].
The motion was then voted on; yeas 23—12 Democrats, 11 Republicans; nays 42—20 Democrats, 20 Republicans, and 2 Independents.
Mr. President, that was only last February. Now, if our Republican friends were so exceedingly anxious -for the repeal of
the act of 1890 why did they not repeal it when they had the
President, the Senate, and the House? Why did they not make
more determined efforts when they had the power and the responsibility? Did we see any of them turning somersaults trying to get a vote upon a repeal clause? Not a bit of it, Mr.
President. They were not half as anxious to repeal that act under a Republican Administration as they are to repeal it under
a Democratic Administration. For many years they had borne

the odium of the gold standard they had established in 1873, and
they were not willing under their own Administration to unconditionally repeal the law of 1890 and reestablish the gold monometallism of 1873; but they are willing to do it under a Democratic
Administration. Wonderful patriotism! Wonderful disinterestedness!
But, Mr. President, what has been done under the so-called
Sherman law of July 14, 1890? Up to September 1, 1893—1 did
not have time to get the data up to October 1—up to September
1,1893, $151,804,170 in the United States Treasury notes therein
authorized have been issued in the purchase of 163,047,664 ounces
of fine silver of the coinage value of $210,809,100; and 36,087,185
standard silver dollars—costing for the bullion $29,110,116.25, the
seigniorage being $6,977,068.75—have been coined. If all the
bullion purchased up to September 1,1893, were coined the number of silver dollars in excess of the Treasury notes then outstanding would be $60,318,741.
Probably about fifty millions of the Treasury notes have been
redeemed in gold, and very little in sitver dollars. Over $150,000,000 have been added to the volume of our money circulation.
Why have $50,000,000 in gold been paid out in the redemption
of these Treasury notes instead of silver dollars? The law of
July 14,1890, says that these notes " shall be redeemable on demand in coin," and u that upon demand of the holder * * *
the Secretary of the Treasury shall, under such regulations as
he may prescribe, redeem such notes in gold or silver coin a t
his discretion, it being the established policy of the United
States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other
upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided
by law." And that after July 1, 1891, " he," the Secretary of the
Treasury, "shall coin of the silver bullion purchased under the
provisions erf this act as much as may be necessary to provide
for the redemption of the Treasury notes herein provided for,
ana any gain or seigniorage arising from such coinage shall be
accounted for and paid into the Treasury."
These words I have quoted are all parts of the same law—must
be construed together and according to their cl&ir intent. The
first clause makes the Treasury notes redeemable in coin—the
standard silver dollar is coin—is money absolute—a full legal
tender in payment of " a l l debts and dues public and private,
except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract."
The Treasury notes are debts of the United States—are public
dues. There is no express stipulation in the law for their payment in gold. Why, then, have they been redeemed in gold?
I t is claimed that the declaration " i t being the established
policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a
parity with each other upon the present legal ratio "#so controls
the action of the Secretary as to prevent his exercising the discretion nominally vested in him if by such action the parity between gold and silver may be disturbed. The law says nothing
about the parity between' gold and silver. It says to maintain
the two metals on a parity with each other.
Has the Secretary maintained the two metals, gold and silver,
on a parity with each other by redeeming the Treasury, notes in
gold? I t is absurd to claim that he has, while with the very Treasury notes he has been purchasing silver bullion at about 56 to 64
cents on the 412£ grains standard silver. He has utterly failed
to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other. While

the law gives the Secretary the right to 44 redeem such notes in
gold or silver coin at his discretion," yet in the very next sentence it tells him expressly and unequivocally, and not nominally, how he shall exercise that discretion, namely:
He shall coin of the silver bullion purchased * * * as much as may he
necessary to provide for the re<2emption of the Treasury notes herein provided for.

I t does not say for a j)art of such notes, or such part of them as
may not be redeemed in his discretion in gold, but for the redemption of the Treasury notes herein provided for; for the redemption of every Treasury note authorized to be issued by him
by said act. Manifestly, then, a refusal by the Secretary to pay
these notes in gold if demanded would not destroy the parity between the two metals—gold metal and silver metal—and would
not establish a discrimination in favor of gold, but, on the contraryydoes actually establish a discrimination against the silver
dollar just as fully and effectually as if on demand he should redeem silver certificates issued for silver dollars in gold.
Mr. President, I confess that I have been greatly astonished to
be informed, as I believe reliably, that under the present Democratic Administration silver certificates calling for so many
silver dollars deposited in the Treasury to be returned on demand have on presentation been paid in gold.
Mr. MCPHERSON. Does it weaken them?
Mr. COCKRELL. Does it harm them? I t is a breach of trust,
a breach of faith. I t is yielding to a dishonest and a dishonorable demand. I t is bowing the knee to gold monometallism. I t
is acknowledging and establishing gold as the single standard.
I t is degrading the money of the world imd the money of the
United States, the silver dollar, and making it a subsidiary coin
worth nothing by itself until it is redeemed in gold.
Mr. GEORGE. Is there any law authorizing the Secretary
to pay silver certificates in gold?
Mr. COCKRELL. There is not on the face of any book of
law in the United States an act authorizing the Seoretary of the
Treasury on the demand of any king or potentate or representative of any foreign syndicate or gold syndicate to redeem silverdollar certificates in gold coin. No man can show it. Read
your silver certificate, if you have one in your pocket. There
is no question about what it means. I have here a little one,
but it is just as good as a big one, 1 presume.
This certifies that there has been deposited in the Treasury of the United
States one silver dollar payable to bearer on demand.

One silver dollar payable to bearer on demand;" and yet I
am told that our Secretary of the Treasury has upon the demand
of the holders of these silver-dollar certificates paid them in
gold. I say he has no right to do it. I say it is not in pursuance
of the Democratic policy of the United States, maintained from
the foundation of our Government up to this day. I say it is in
violation of every principle and policy which our Government
has ever proclaimed. W e have made silver money as absolutely
and unqualifiedly irredeemable without price as we have made
gold: and he had no r i g h t when a man came to him with an
illegal, unjust, infamous, and iniquitous demand, made for ulterior ends and ulterior purposes, to force this country to a single gold standard, to tow to any such demand and pay out any
such gold dollars.
Mr. P E F F E R . Here is the law.

Mr. COCKRELL. There is no question about it. It is simply
a certificate that so many silver dollars have been put there and
they are kept on deposit to be returned to the holder. Now I
will read the law.
Section 3 of the Bland act provides—
That any holder of the coin authorized by this act may deposit the same
with the Treasurer or any assistant treasurer of the United States, in sums
not less than $10, and receive therefor certificates of not less than $10 each,
corresponding with the denominations of the United States notes. The
coin deposited for or representing the certificates shall be retained in the
Treasury for the payment of the same on demand. Said certificates shall
be receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues, and, when so received,
may be reissued.

As a matter of course, any banker or any gentleman h a v i n g
financial transactions with a friend would,'if that friend came
and asked that he might have gold in lieu of silver certificates,
or in lieu of fractional money, or in lieu of greenbacks, or anything of the kind, give it to him; but when a man comes with
silver certificates and makes a legal peremptory demand upon
any United States Secretary of the Treasury or subtreasurer
that they must be redeemed in gold, I care not whether he is the
representative of the Rothchildsof England, or of Great Britain itself, or of Germany, or any other nations or kindred on
earth, he has no right to be n.iid the gold.
Mr. MCPHERSON. Will*the Senator from Missouri permit
me to ask him a question?
Mr. COCKRELL. W i t h a great deal of pleasure.
Mr. McPHERSON. This morning we listened to a very severe
criticism by the honorable Senator from Alabama [Mr. MORGAN], in which he found much fault with the Committee on
Finance for striking from the House bill a certain provision,
which I will read:
And the faith and credit of the United States—

Mark the language—
And the faith and credit of the United are hereby pledged to maintain
the parity of the standard gold and silver coins of the United States at the
present legal ratio, or such other ratio as maybe established bylaw.

I should like to know whether the Senator from Alabama or the
Senator from Missouri best represents the contention of the silver advocates in the Senate. The Senator from Alabama criticises us for striking from the bill a provision of law which would
require a demand that the Treasury of the United States shall
redeem the silver coin in a way to preserve the parity. The
Senator from Missouri now declares that it is contrary to law;
that it is a degradation of silver, and the Secretary of the Treasury has no right to redeem gold. Who represents the contention of the silver advocates here, the Senator from Missouri
or the Senator from Alabama?
Mr. COCKRELL. lean answer that we both represent it; and
we both represent that grand old party which has maintained
it organization for over a century amid all the storms and political upheavals that have driven every other political organization out of existence. We represent the system of money that
it maintained until that system was supplanted by the Republican
policy of 1873, est iblishing the gold standard. I wanted the Senator to ask me that identical question, because we shall have
much to do with it hereafter. Does the maintenance of two
metals at a parity demand that one of them, just as absolute and
as irredeemable as the other, shall ba redeemed in the other?

No, sir- That is a false interpretation of the law. I have quoted
it. I have shown that the pretended claim that the Secretary of
the Treasury had to redeem these Treasury notes in gold to maintain the parity is false. There is not>a particle of foundation for
it, in my judgment. He violated the spirit of the law. It is true
he has the option, but that option is further governed by the
declaration that he shall coin of the bullion purchased with Treasury notes a sufficient amount to redeem the Treasury notes—
every one of them.
Mr. McPHERSON. Let me ask the Senator from Missouri
what is to assist the silver coin to keep step with gold in exchanges and maintain the parity if it be not an exchangeability
into gold?
Mr. COCKRELL. Oh, that has nothing to do with it. Money
Is without price and is irredeemable. We have made silver
money. We have not made it a limping leg to gold. We have
not made it subordinate to gold. Anyone who undertakes to interpret the law in such a way that the silver dollars coined under
t h e law are redeemable in gold is the worst kind of 9 gold monometallism
No, Mr. President, I care not who it is, I do not stand with
anyone upon that kind of bimetallism. The silver dollar is
money, absolute money. It is irredeemable in anything on
earth, or above It, or beneath it. It is the equal of gold in every,
respect. We do not seek to maintain silver in the light in which
the'Senator from New Jersey speaks of it. We say let it walk
side by side with gold. I t will do it if you just let it alone. I t
will walk with it as it has always done. It commanded a premium in your cowardly gold metal r i g h t in the markets of New
York during the recent panic. Yes, sir, it has always maintained it. You can take your silver dollar and go into any market in the United States and buy with it just as much as you can
buy with the gold dollar.
Mr. McPHERSON. Will the Senator yield to me for another
Mr. COCKRELL. W i t h a great deal of pleasure.
Mr. McPHERSON. In respect to the attitude of the silver
advocates in this body a great panic has unquestionably been
maintained; and I want to say to the Senator that a well-executed
counterfeit would have commanded a premium sometimes during
the panic.
Mr. COCKRELL. It would doit now if nobody could discover
it. No, Mr. President, this panic has not been produced by the
silver dollar. It has had nothing more to do with producing the
panic than the gentle evening zephyrs. This panic has been
growing for years; and the conditions were in such a state of
progress that the bankers intended to force this country to redeem all its money in gold, just as the Senator is wanting to do,
and whom he is representing, and the aristocratic nations of Europe have joined them. They say we will have the single gold
standard and we will have the money of the world redeemable in
that single gold standard. That is the battle we are fighting
That is the enemy we are contending against now. He is covered behind the breastworks of distinguished citizens here and
taking refuge behind them and their opinions, but that is the
real enemy we are fighting. When this Government goes to redeem absolute money with any other money, particularly when

that is silver, and demanding t h a t it shall be done, it is degrading the silver. You do not redeem money, absolute money,
metallic money. You may redeem legal-tender paper currency,
but you do not redeem gold and silver. A mangoes to the bank,
of France with a million or a billion dollars of silver francs and
demands gold. Does he get it?
Mr. COCKRELL. Simply because they do not intend to degrade silver by making it subsidiary to gold.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. May I ask the Senator a question?
Mr. COCKRELL. W i t h infinite pleasure.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. Is not every dollar of silver in
circulation to-day by express terms redeemable in gold?
Mr. COCKRELL. Not one of them.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. The Senator and myself differ on
t h a t point.
Mr. COCKRELL. I challenge the Senator to show one line
of law authorizing any United States officer to redeem a silver
dollar in gold.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. I do not speak of the United
States, but of France. The Senator was referring to France.
Mr. COCKRELL. Oh, I beg the Senator's pardon.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. I ask the Senator whether every
French silver dollar extant to-day is not redeemable in gold?
Mr. COCKRELL. Not one of them.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. By the terms of the Latin Union?
Mr. COCKRELL. Not by the terms of the Latin Union.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. By the terms of the Latin Union
each respective nation agreed t h a t it would redeem and exchange every silver dollar outstanding in the hands of a citizen
of every other country for gold.
Mr. COCKRELL. Yes; but t h a t is not silver in France, and
the Senator knows it. He knows that is a miserable subterfuge.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. The Senator uses harsh language
when he says it is a miserable subterfuge.
Mr. COCKRELL. I mean no offense.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. I am accustomed in debate to be
civil. If we are to bandy approbrious epithets, if the Senate is
to degenerate into mud-slinging, I think, with all due respect t o
my venerable friend, t h a t I could sling as much mud as he.
Mr. COCKRELL. ^Undoubtedly, and more.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. But my sense of propriety and decency would prevent me.
Mr. COCKRELL. When I said it was a subterfuge I meant
simply in argument, and the Senator knows it is a subterfuge.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. I know nothing of the kind.
Mr. COCKRELL. I will show him that it is.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. I believe the contrary.
Mr. COCKRELL. I will show the Senator. He is a strong
lawyer, and he knows what it is to dodge around a point.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. Let me tell the Senator I never
dodge half as much as he does. I think he is as artful a dodger
as I ever met in my life.
Mr. COCKRELL. Now, let us see what the Lation Union Is.
W e all know about that. The Latin Union binds France to redeem its coin held by other nations.
Mr. T E L L E R . Not the individuals.
Mr. COCKRELL. It does not relate to the redemption of sil649

ver coin circulating in France, and my good friend from Louis-;
iana, whom I love so tenderly, will admit it. There is no us^
talking about that.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. Will the Senator from Missouri
allow me?
Mr. COCKRELL. With a great deal of pleasure.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. If my answer to the question which
the Senator has made does not affirm the proposition which I
stated, then I do not know how a proposition can be affirmed. If
silver is outstanding issued by the French Government and the
French Government has entered into an obligation not treating
it as ultimate money, but that every dollar of it outstanding held
by another nation shall be redeemed in gold, the existence of
that obligation renders every dollar redeemable in gold, because
the man who desires to redeem the silver in gold has only to put
it into a position where it comes under the obligation which
forces it to be redeemed in gold.
Mr. COCKRELL. That does not relate to silver in circulation in France, as the Senator knows. I say that silver money
circulating in France and in the hands of the people within its
territorial dominion is not redeemable in gold.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. Ah, yes, if the Senator will allow
me; but the faculty and power to put a dollar in a position where
it has a r i g h t to demand gold follows that dollar in the hands of
every individual in the world, and gives it an attribute which
makes it as good as gold.
Mr. COCKRELL. How can the citizens of France, with 600,000,000 silver dollars, place that silver coin in the hands*>f a foreign government?
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. Very readily, when the time
Mr. COCKRELL. The idea that six or seven hundred million
of coined legal-tender dollars in France, equal there to gold in
t h e payment of the national debt, and in the payment of taxes,
and m the payment of the personal obligations and the purchase
of millions and billions of dollars' worth of products there, is going to be sent to some foreign government, Belgium, Switzerland, Italy, or Greece, forming the Latin Union, and given into
t h e hands of those governments, in order that they may come
back to France and demand under the Latin Union that those
coins shall be redeemed in gold, is an impossibility.
Mr. TELLER. I ask the Senator if he will allow me to make
a suggestion in reference to the statement made by the Senator
from Louisiana? *
Mr. COCKRELL. W i t h pleasure.
Mr. TELLER. The Latin Union provides that when France
shall have Italian money, and Italy has French money, that they
shall strike the balance, and if it shall be found that France has
more of the Italian money than Italy has of the French money,
t h a t that shall be redeemed in gold. That is the Italian money
which will be redeemed, which is circulating out of the country
in which it is coined. Under no provision of law or any practice
in France has a single French 5-franc piece ever been exchanged
for gold, and i t can not be done by law.
Mr. MCPHERSON. Why not?
Mr. T E L L E R . The Senator from New Jersey asks why not.
Because there is no law requiring it. I do not mean to say t h a t
a Frenchman may not, if he chooses, exchange a 5-franc piece,

or a number of them, for gold, but there is no policy in Franoe
for redeeming silver in gold; and if any Senator makes such a
statement he is making that which he can not sustain.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. If the Senator from Missouri will
allow me one moment, I will make clear the statement I made.
The Senator from Missouri made a broad statement that any
money which was redeemable was not ultimate money.
Mr. COCKRELL. Metallic money, I mean.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. Metallic money. Then he went
on and referred to the Latin Union, and I immediately called
attention to the fact that the very states that form the Latin
Union found it necessary in order to form it to enter into an
agreement among themselves that this money should be redeemed in gold.
Mr. TELLER. If I may suggest, the contract was this: As
long as Italy had French money she redeemed French money in
French money.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. She redeemed it in gold.
Mr. TELLER. Not at all. She struck the balance, and when
she could no longer redeem it in silver, because she had not
French silver, then she was obliged to redeem it in gold.
Mr. W H I T E of Louisiana. Then I say this was not ultimate
money, and they provided that she should get gold for it by the
terms of the Latin Union. My argument is that the faculty of
redeeming that money in gold, however remote that faculty was,
gives the attribute to the money which makes it equivalent
with gold resulting from that very stipulation; and-that, in my
judgment, is what enabled the Latin Union to keep the silver
afloat which it has kept afloat.
Mr. COCKRELL. That is a contingency so far remote t h a t
it does not have upon the circulation of the francs of France
within the territorial dominions of that great Republic even the
influence that ordinary moonshine would have upon it. I t is
simply mythical. It has grown up in the vivid imagination of
the distinguished Senator from Louisiana.
Mr. MCPHERSON. NOW, if the Senator from Missouri will
yield to me for a single moment, I want him to be exactly correct in his speech here, which he is soon to publish, I suppose,
and judging from the amount of references that he has before
him he has camped here for a week or two, and therefore it will
be no interference.
Mr. COCKRELL. I t never is any interference, whether I am
making a long or a short speech.
Mr. McPHERSON. The agreement made between France and
the states of the Latin Union is an agreement which relates only
to intercourse between those nations and must end at the termination of the period of time for which the agreement was made.
If there is an Italian coin or Belgian coin in her possession,
Italy and Belgium are required to pay her in gold, and vice versa.
The Senator is quite right, however, when he says that France
is not obliged by law to compel the redemption of silver coin in
gold coin to maintain the parity; but that she does it in practice
is obvious and certain. No man who goes to the Bank of France,
or to any bank in France, and asks for the exchange of a certain
amount of silver coin or silver francs in gold coins, Napoleons,
if you please, is turned away empty.
Mr. COCKRELL. As a matter of course not.
Mr. McPHERSON. Silver—the silver franc being the unit

and standard of value in France, the charter of the Bank of
Prance requires the bank to receive these coins on deposit and
pay them out to those who deposit them; that is, the public.
Therefore, the silver coins stand alone; but in practice France
does exactly what the Government of the United States does.
I t always redeems the coin in gold when gold is asked for, not
hi sums suited for export, because upon export gold they demand a slight premium. The premium is very slight, for the
reason that if gold cannot be exported, commodities must be exported to take the place of gold; and if a high premium is put
upon it, i t bears very heavily upon the exchange of commodities.
Mr. COCKRELL. There is no doubt but that a banker in the
United States or anywhere else who had a spirit of accommodation and any of the milk of human kindness about him would exchange a few dollars of gold for a few dollars of silver, or anything of that kiiid. But I say if a citizen of the United States
were to go to the Bank of France and present any considerable
number of silver dollars for gold and demand them as his r i g h t
he would be quickly turned out of the Bank of France.
Mr. McPHERSON. If the Senator will allow me a moment
longer, I was going to ask him a further question. The Bank
of France to-day has some $250,000,000 of gold coin. I speak in
round numbers.
Mr. COCKRELL. That is about right.
Mr. McPHERSON. The Treasury of the United States has
$100,000,000 of gold coin standing under and behind her $1,000,000,000 of silver money and paper money. The Bank of France
is abundantly able to make exchanges as she pleases; and there
is no condition, no pledge, and no law requiring the exchange.
The Government of the United States, upon the other hand, is
confronted by a positive law which says that you must maintain
the parity between the two metals. W i t h $100,000,000 of gold
in our Treasury to redeem a thousand or eleven hundred million
dollars of paper and silver, and to maintain the parity between
the different kinds of money, certainly there is a wide difference
between the situation of France and the situation in this country.
Mr. COCKRELL. I understand the Senator, and will he permit me to answer his question in the Yankee fashion of his own
State by an interrogatory? The Senator holds that the silver
dollars/the silver certificates, the United States Treasury notes
issued for the purchase of silver bullion, and the greenbacks are
redeemable in gold?
Mr. McPHERSON. I mean that we have Treasury notes issued to the extent of $150,000,000, and under the law which authorizes their issue for the purchase of silver that it is provided
t h a t they shall be redeemed in gold at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and there is no discretion left with him.
And I say if he fails to pay in gold those notes with which he is
expressly required and commanded to maintain the parity, then
all the silver issues of the Government stand practically upon
the same foundation.
Mr. COCKRELL. In other words, then, all the silver dollars
are redeemable in gold?
Mr. MCPHERSON. Not at all.
Mr. COCKRELL. This is a very important question, and I
want to know exactly where we are. The Senator contends that

the United States Treasury notes issued under the law of July
14,1890, in the purchase of silver bullion under the Sherman law
are redeemable in gold or silver, at the option of the Secretary
of the Treasury, and if gold is demanded he must pay gold. Now,
what relation does that have to the silver certificates issued for
the silver dollars coined under the Bland act?
Mr. McPHERSON. If that money itself is discredited by the
failure of the Secretary of the Treasury to maintain the parity
it affects in like manner every silver issue by the Government,
because the contention of people to-day is that the Government
has proceeded in the direction of injecting silver into the circulation to such an extent that it is impossible to maintain the
parity and we are fast drifting to a silver basis. That is the
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, the people of the United
States do not make any such contention. A few Bull Run panicstricken bankers of New York may make the prediction that
they are scared to death over silver dollars. The masses of the
people in New Jersey, the toiling masses, are not sending up
their petitions here telling you and me that they are afraid to
receive silver dollars. This panic made to order has demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt the unbounded illimitable and
unlimited confidence the masses of the people have in the standard
silver dollar. You may search the United States from Maine to
Texas, and from Florida to Alaska and you can not find a man,
woman, or child who will refuse to receive the silver dollar just
as quickly as the gold dollar, the silver certificate just as quickly
as the gold certificate, and to receive the greenbacks or any of
The people of the United States are intelligent and patriotic
enough to know that every dollar, of money issued by authority
of Congress is just as good as any other dollar, and they treat it
as such. I t is only the bankers who have lost confidence, and
that is done because of their overnervousness and their fears and
apprehensions of what may come to pass in the future, based upon
the ulterior object of establishing a single gold standard, and
that is the aim of my friend. He has said enough here to convince me that he stands for the single gold standard and for
everything in the shape of money in the United States to be redeemable in gold—the silver dollar and the silver certificate. I
have, then, truthfully said that the battle waging in the Senate
is between the bankers and the plutocrats of the world on one
side for a single gold standard, in which all other moneys shall
be redeemable at their sweet will and pleasure, and the people on
the other side for the maintenance unimpaired of the monetary
functions of silver as an equal money with gold, whatever amount
may be coined by our Government.
I am very glad this colloquy has come up. I t is a question
that I intended to discuss further on, and I am glad that it has
been developed now. We know where the friends of this bill
stand. W e know the battle that is before us. We know the objects to be attained* W e know the interest our toiling masses
have in this great struggle; and we propose to stand by them
mid defend their interests against the combined powers of the
plutocrats of the United States and of every nation, kindred, and
tongue on earth; and you shall not succeed.
But, Mr. President, I was criticising the distinguished Secretary of the Treasury, for, as I was told by a distinguished Sena649

tor, the holders of these silver coin certificates had demanded
gold, and he had yielded to that demand. I say it was wrong.
I say furthermore he has a perfect right in equity and justice,
under the law, to redeem the United States certificates that were
given in payment of the purchase of bullion in silver coin, and
while the law gives him nominally the right to redeem in gold
or silver at his discretion, yet under that right his discretion ia
modified. Now, I will read that clause of the law.
Mr. TELLER. I wish to interrupt the Senator to know if I
,understood him aright.
Mr. COCKRELL. I will yield with pleasure.
Mr. TELLER. Did the Senator from Missouri state that the
Treasury Department had redeemed silver certificates proper in
Mr. COCKRELL. Silver coin certificates. T h a t is my information.
Mr. T E L L E R . I will state that a few days ago—not more
than twenty—I called on the Treasurer of the United States and
made that inquiry, and he informed me that they never had redeemed the silver certificate proper in gold. I do not mean the
Treasury notes, but the silver certificates. He said they never
had redeemed them in gold, and I venture to say now there
never has been a dollar of them redeemed in gold.
Mr. COCKRELL. My colleague gave me the information.
Mr. T E L L E R . It is a mistake.
Mr. COCKRELL. I understood my colleague to say expressly
t h a t silver coin certificates—not the United States Treasury
notes issued for the purchase of bullion—had been redeemed in
Mr. VEST. At the time that the first million dollars was
drawn out in gold from the United States Treasury for exportation it was stated in the press, and I have always understood it
to be true, that a large amount in silver certificates was included
in the million dollars, and that the Treasury Department paid
out gold indifferently upon any of the paper circulation of the
United States. I so understood from the President's declaration
at the time it was made. I do not remember the exact date, but
it was a formal declaration made by the President to the effect
that every dollar issued by the United States in any sort of obligation (I suppose, of course, that it referred to the paper obligations of the Government) should be paid in the com which the
holder demanded. If reference can be made to t h a t statement,
which I have not at command, I tl^ink it will be found to amount
to that.
Mr. TELLER. Will the Senator from Missouri allow me?
Mr. COCKRELL. Certainly; I only want to get at the facts*
I t wa s in conversation with my colleague that I got this information, and I am glad that he has explained it just as it is. I
do not want to do injustice to any human being on earth.
Mr. T E L L E R . The $1,000,000 referred to by the junior Senator from Missouri were not silver certificates, but Treasury
notes. Since t h a t time I have put 09 record a letter from the
Treasurer and a letter from the Secretary. The Secretary of
the, Treasury replied to a Senate resolution declaring that no
silver certificates have been redeemed in gold.
The editor of the Century Magazine, in an article about three
months ago, declared that all* the silver certificates were re649

deemable in gold, and that is why they continue to circulate aa
money. A friend of mine in Colorado, a distinguished lawyer
of the State, addressed him a courteous letter, saying that he
thought he was mistaken, and called his attention to the documents I had had presented to the Senate on that point. The editor
replied in a brief letter I declining to publish the gentleman's
letter, as the class of people who make such charges always do,
without knowing anything about it) that " no matter what Mr.
Foster has done, I have the evidence that Mr. Carlisle is redeeming them in gold." So when I came here I went to the Treasury Department, rather than put in a resolution of inquiry, and
asked the present Treasurer, Mr. Morgan, whether that had
been done, and he informed me that it had not been done. If it
has been done at all it has been done since the 4th of March, and
I do not believe it has been done at all.
Mr. PALMER. Will the Senator from Missouri allow me to
ask the Senator from Colorado a question?
Mr. COCKRELL. With pleasure.
Mr. PALMER. The Senator from Colorado says the notes he
describes have not been redeemed in gold. Have they been redeemed at all, any of them?
Mr. TELLER. They have not. In reply to the resolution of
the Senate the Secretary answered about a year ago, that they
had not been redeemed in gold nor in any paper that drew gold
o>could command gold. They have been redeemed, of course, in
silver coin.
Mr. PALMER. Is it an established fact that they have been
redeemed in silver coin?
Mr. TELLER. I t is an established fact that they have been
redeemed in silver coin. Quite a quantity have been redeemed
in silver coin.
Mr. VEST. If it does not interrupt my colleague
Mr. COCKRELL. No, certainly not.
Mr. VEST. I wish simply to make one suggestion. I t seems
to me rather an immaterial point so far as this discussion is concerned whether the silver certificates have been paid in gold by
the Treasury or not, because the bullion notes, as they are called,
the Treasury notes issued under the Sherman act in payment of
silver bullion purchased by the Government, unquestionably are
paid in gold, and under the terms of those notes they are payable in silver, because there is a lien upon the silver bullion that
is purchased for the payment of those notes, and the discretion
is given to the Secretary of the Treasury to coin all the bullion
that he deems necessary to redeem those outstanding bullion
notes. So, in point of fact, it makes very little difference logically as to whether the Treasury Department has paid the silver-coin notes in gold or not.
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, there is a vast difference
in the legal effect of a certificate calling for so many dollars,
stating that so many dollars have been issued returnable to the
holder on demand, as to whether it is to be paid in a different
kind of coin or not. That is a material question. I do not withdraw one solitary word I said about anybody who would redeem
those silver-coin certificates in gold simply upon demand and not
simply as a mere accommodation, because he has no right to do
it in the world; but when it comes to the United States Treasury
notes issued under the law of July 14,1890, in the purchase of
silver bullion, the law expressly gives to the Secretary the r i g h t

to redeem them in gold or silver coin at his discretion. There
is no question but that it is in his discretion; but it is contended
t h a t certain clauses in that law compel him to pay gold.
Mr. GEORGE. That it takes away the discretion?
Mr. COCKRELL. That it takes away the discretion. On the
contrary, I say that certain clauses in that law ought to control
and limit his discretion.
Mr. GRAY. W h a t clause?
Mr. COCKRELL. The last clause.
Mr. GRAY. The parity clause.
Mr. P E F F E R . The clause requiring only coin enough to redeem them.
Mr. COCKRELL. Here is the provision I refer to; that after
the 1st of July, 1891—
He shall coin of the silver bullion purchased under the provisions of tljis
act as much as maybe necessary to provide for the redemption of the Treasury notes herein provided lor.

That follows after the parity clause, and after the provision
for redemption in the discretion of the Secretary in gold or silver.
Mr. GRAY. May I ask the Senator from Missouri, then ,what
relation in his opinion the parity clause in the law of 1890 has
to the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury in redeeming those
notes in coin, or whether it has any or not?
Mr. COCKRELL. That parity ciause was put in inconference.
I t is the provision of the distinguished Senator from Ohio, and it
is a peculiar makeshift. I t is made to catch going either way.
Now let us look at it:
That upon demand of the holder of any of the Treasury notes herein provided for the Secretary of the Treasury shall, under such regulations as he
may prescribe, redeem such notes in gold or silver coin, at his discretion, it
being the established policy of the United States to maintain—

the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present legal ratio, or
such ratio as may be provided by law.

Now, shall the Secretary of the Treasury, beginning under
Secretary Foster and continued under Secretary Carlisle, by redeeming these Treasury notes in gold bring up a metal containing 412£ grains of standard silver equal to the gold? That is
the question. That is what the law says. I t says the metal. I
say that the Secretary did not accomplish it. I t is a mere subterfuge, a pretext to say that that law, which is impossible of
execution, has compelled him to do anything of that kind. Oh,
no, Mr. President. You can not interpret that law to mean t h a t
he shall keep the gold and silver metals on a parity with each
other by redeeming the silver coin in gold. I t does not say anything of the kind.
Mr. GRAY. If I do not interrupt the Senator
Mr. COCKRELL. Oh, no.
Mr. GRAY. I wish to ask him, if he will allow me, whether
h e thinks that the Secretary of the Treasury in construing his
duty under the last paragraph of the second section of the act of
July 14,1890, ought to exercise his ingenuity to see how he could
evade the obvious, apparent, perfectly .plain meaning of that
clause by a verbal construction which would transfer his duty
in maintaining a parity between the two metals to merely a
duty to maintain the parity between the two metals as bullion
without regard at all to the obligation to maintain the two met649 3

als at a parity as coin? Whatever wo may say and however nice
we may be in our distinction between metal in bullion and metal
in coin, undeniably metal in coin is as much metal as metil in
bullion, and the only metal that he could possibly maintain the
parity of with gold was the metal in coin.
Mr. COCKRELL. Metal in coin ceases to be metal and becomes money.
Mr. GRAY. Oh, well, metal in bullion ceases to be metal and
becomes bullion.
Mr. COCKRELL. There is no money unless it is coined.
Mr. GRAY. It is precisely the same as to say that metal in
bullion ceases to be metal and becomes bullion.
Mr. PALMER. May I ask the Senator from Missouri a question?
Mr. COCKRELL. Certainly.
Mr. PALMER. W h a t does'he do with the ratios? They are
to be maintained at the present or at some other ratio. Has not
that ratio relation to coinage alone and not to the metal or the
Mr. COCKRELL. The Senator from Ohio, who fathered the
amendment in conference, has never yet been able to explain
exactly what it meant or what it does mean. I do not know that
it was intended that it should be plain. It was passed in an emergency. It was passed in order to kill the free-coinige bill which
had been passed by the Senate, and which, if the conference committee report had been rejected, would have become a law or
would have been vetoed by the President a t that session. This
provision was put in in conference, and it was a makeshift. I t
could not be anything else, because it says the notes shall be redeemable in coin; and then it goes on and says that they shall
be redeemable in gold or silver coin at the discretion of the Secretary, and then they inject a little stump speech and a little
promise into the law, such as is proposed to be injected into this
bill, and then they set that up as a pretext for doing just what
they want to do, and that is, to establish the single gold standard.
Mr. McPHERSON. Will the Senator yield to me a moment?
Mr. COCKRELL. Certainly.
Mr. MCPHERSON. I want the distinguished Senator to understand that so far as I am individually concerned, and as I understand it so far as those who think and vote with me upon this
question are concerned, we resist no contention on the part of
the Senitor from Missouri or any other Senator which proclaims that it is the intention, the desire, the determination of
this Government, whether you like it or not, whether you wish
it or not, to maintain all the money of this country, whether it
be paper money or silver money, whether it be in bullion or in
coin, on a parity with gold. Now, let us have no controversy
on that subject.
Mr. COCKRELL. I do not occupy that position. I am for
good money. 1 am for honest money. I am for one kind of
money and only one kind of money, and that is a full legal-tender
money, good money; good for the bondholder and the banker,
good for the soldier and the citizen, good for the millionaire and
the toiling laborer alike; paying a thousand million dollars of indebtedness or baying a dollars worth of groceries. I want the
same kind of money maintained by the sovereign power of the
United States as absolute and irredeemable money whenever it
is made out of metal. I want the paper money redeemable in
04 I)

the metallic money. You have my financial system—gold and
silver unlimited in amount and irredeemable in quantity, absolute money in the hands of the people, and no paper that is not
redeemable in either gold or silver. To-day there is not a dollar
issued by the sanction of the United States within its territorial
limits that is not just as good as any other dollar.
Mr. GRAY. Why not?
M •. COCKRELL. Because it is a legal tender by the power
of the Government. It is law that gives it money value, pure
and simple.
Mr. GRAY. How maintained?
Mr. COCKRELL. Maintained because everybody wants it to
pay debts. I t will buy anything a man wants. This despised
and abused silver dollar even among the gold plutocrats of New
York commanded a premium of 3 and 4 per cent, and some of
the gold-monometallist bankers a made a handsome profit in selling the silver dollar as full mon y. I understood from the newspapers t h a t one broker there made nearly $1,000,000 in selling
silver money.
Mr. GRAY. If the Senator will permit mp, do I understand
his proposition to be that the declaration of the Government
that both coins shall be full legal tender is all that in his opinion
is necessary to maintain that parity which he talks so much
Mr. COCKRELL. I think it is.
Mr. GRAY. How does he account for the fact (for I would
really like to know) that a t the time of the demonetization of
silver in 1873 you could not exchange at a parity five gold dollars
for five silver "dollars when they were both full legal tender?
Mr. COCKRELL. There was none coined.
Mr. GRAY. There was an absolute premium of about 3 per
Mr. COCKRELL. There was a premium on silver over the
gold. If you have a silver dollar and the silver in that dollar in
some other place is worth 3 cents more than the gold dollar, and
you have a neighbor who is so obliging as to want to make 3
cents out of you and is going to such other place and proposes
to give you a gold dollar, I do not suppose you would refuse it
to him. The metals in the silver and gold dollars were above
the coining value. I admit that up to 100 cants the silver dql>
lar could not pay any debt in the United States better than the
legal-tender dollar.
Mr. GRAY. The Senator and I agree precisely as to the fact,
and the cause of that fact, it seems to me, would settle the question I asked.
Mr. COCKRELL. Not at all; it does not settle it. The value
was not as money. The value by the Government remained unchangeable. The metal in the coin may be far more valuable
before coinage than its money value after being coined into
money, and the silver metal of 412i grains is worth 103 cents,
while when coined it is as lawful money worth only 100 cents.
Mr. GRAY. I ask the Senator, if it does not disturb him,
whether the same reasoning would not apply to the greenback
as it was in 1865 and the gold and silver dollars when they were
both legal tender and full legal tender.
Mr. COCKRELL. The gold dollar paid no more than the silver,
the silver dollar no more than the gold, and the greenback as
much as either one of them in legal tender. When you interns

vene between individuals and the payment of debts then your
gold would buy more because then we had no specie resumption.
We were not on a metallic basis at all. To-day your silver dollar
is worth just as much as your gold dollar. You can not maku
any distinction between them.
Mr. GRAY. Then I agree with the Senator, and the reasoning would apply of course if you made a dollar out of 412 grains
of copper.
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, I was criticising the construction placed upon the law of July 14,1890. When it is said
that it compelled the Secretary of the Treasury to redeem in
gold, I say when the whole of it is taken together with the last
clause, which says that the Secretary shall coin of the bullion
purchased by the notes issued under this act a sufficient amount
to redeem the Treasury notes, it means what it says, that the
Secretary has a perfect right under that provision to coin every
solitary dollar of the silver bullion which is now in the Treasury,
and he has the right whenever one of these Treasury notes is
presented for redemption to pay it in a coin dollar, and in my
judgment he ought to do it. It would not destroy the parity
between the coined silver dollar and the gold dollar, but it would
establish and maintain that parity. As it is, preference is given
to gold and silver is made inferior Silver is not held hp side
by side with gold, and silver ought to be paid in the redemption
of those notes.
Mr. McPHERSON. If the Senator will allow me, in considering the instructions found in the law of 1890, does he draw a
distinction between the right to do and the power to do?
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, I do not know that there is
any great difference between them. I would construe the law
for the purpose of maintaining silver and not for the purpose of
degrading it. I would make silver as respectable as gold, and
whenever a man came and demanded gold I would make him take
some silver, and I would show him that in my estimation silver
was tho equal of gold. Tha t is done in Prance; we have the right
to do it here; but we are the only nation in the world, so far as
I know, that bows the knee to every foreigner or anybody else
who wants gold.
Mr. McPHERSON. Rather than degrade silver, as the Senator states it, he would allow the parity to take care of itself and
silver to travel alone. That is the idea.
Mr. COCKRELL. The Senator can have his own idea of it.
Every silver dollar now in circulation and every silver dollar to
be coined under existing law is absolute money, and I say that
it is a proper subject for the redemption of any outstanding obligation of the Government except the gold certificates. There
is not a bond of the Government to-day which can not be paid
honestly, justly, and equitably in standard silver dollars—not
The very object that these foreign bankers and brokers and
money loaners have had in coming to the Treasury under Secretary Foster and demanding of him the redemption of the Treasury notes in gold, was to degrade and debase silver and establish
the single gold standard practically in this country. In my humble judgment, when the late Secretary Foster yielded to the importunate demands of the gold ring and the gold brokers of New
York for t h e redemption of United States Treasury notes in gold;
he failed in administering and executing that law fairly and

justly, established an unwise and unjust precedent, and gave into
the hands of the gold brokers and bullion speculators unjust and
dangerous privileges and powers. I t gave them the weapons
and the pretexts for demanding the issue of gold bonds and" the
repeal of the Sherman law.
Had he executed the law in a friendly spirit and coined the
bullion and redeemed the Treasury notes issued in its purchase
in the standard silver dollar, not a dollar of gold would have left
this country more than did leave it, and the people of the country would have rejoiced with exceeding great joy to see the
standard silver dollar in the eyes of the law the full equal of the
gold dollar in legal-tender and debt-paying power, so recognized
and proclaimed by the Government and by the new incoming
Democratic Administration. The precedent he established
should have been held up " n o t as a pattern to emulate, but as
an example to deter," and should never have been followed. I
think that very fact had a good deal to do with the scare and with
the r»anicky fears which have been engendered in the minds of
Mr. McPHERSON. Will the Senator permit me a moment
r i g h t on that point, for I know he is exceedingly good natured
Mr. COCKRELL. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. McPHERSON. I know the Senator means to get a t the
exact facts of this case. I want to ask the Senator, suppose the
Secretary of the Treasury had acted upon the proposition just
now made by the Senator and had not redeemed the Treasury
notes, as he did redeem them, in gold, but had made those notes
or obligations payable in silver, what would have been the result
upon the panicky condition of the country? I t was feared that
the Secretary was going to do that very thing, and he came
very near doing it because of the want of free gold to do otherwise. W h a t would have been the effect, as I said, upon the
panicky condition of the country to know that we had gone
upon a silver basis?
Mr. COCKRELL. My judgment is that we should have h a d
no panic. My judgment is that then there would have been no
reason for manufacturing the scare which holds the distinguished Senator from New Jersey. We should have had none
of it. That added to the intensity of the panic. Why? I am
not quoting dates, and I am not in the habit of referring to newspapers for authority, but it has been quoted time and again, and
I believe it has been quoted here in the Senate, first, that the
Secretary had intimated that he was going to redeem these Treasury notes in silver dollars, and it did not produce any panic. Afterwards the President issued his pronunciamento, in which it
was stated again—I do not know whether the President said it or
not; I am not responsible for the statement, for I am not responsible for all the newspapers say—but the newspapers reported, apparently by authority from the White House, that the
President had stated that all the obligations of the Government
should be redeemed in gold.
Up to that time the only paper currency in the United States
redeemable in gold or silver were the United States legal-tender
no ten, the greenbacks. They were expressly redeemable in gold
or in silver. Then the greenbacks stood upon the silver coinage
and upon the gold coinage. That was their metallic base. I t

gave a wide and substantial base sufficient to have held a superstructure of a billion dollars.
M r . MCPHERSON r o s e .

Mr. COCKRELL. I hope the Senator will wait a moment
and let me answer his question. He thinks he knows what I am
going to say, but I am not going to stop until I answer his question.
Mr. MCPHERSON. Very well.
Mr. COCKRELL. There was the base. Three hundred and
forty-six million dollars in greenbacks were outstanding and over
$150,000,000 of United States Treasury notes issued for the purchase of silver bullion under a law which certainly, beyond any
question, gave the Secretary the i*ight to redeem in silver. The
President proclaimed to the world that all these obligations
should be redeemed in gold. The silver coin was knocked from
under the financial body, and it began to totter and sway here
and there, because, instead of $346,000,000 in greenbacks resting
upon the silver and the gold, it had the whole amount resting
upon the gold, with the addition of $350,000,000 of silver coin
certificates and $150,000,000 of United States Treasury notes.
The bankers of Europe saw it, the financiers of this country saw
it, and they said this mass all thrown upon the one gold base
can not be supported by that one golden leg, and all the other
props and foundations have been ruthlessly torn away from under
the fabric by the proclamation of the President.
W h a t occurred? Foreign bankers refused to continue their
advances to make invest ments. Tbev said,' * You can not hold up
that great fabric on this one golden leg of $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . " Hence
came the demand for bonds, then came down the representatives
of the foreign bankers, and they had the audacity to demand of
Secretary Carlisle, as I read in the speech of the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky [Mr. BLACKBURN], the issue of $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 000 of gold bonds to add to the strength of this one golden leg,
trying to support this mass which was making it wave here and
there like a broken reed.
Here was the pretext. Then they said, " N o w is the golden
opportunity; we will force the United States to come to a single
gold standard and to continue to redeem all its obligations, silver dollars and all, in gold coin; we will force them to issue
bonds to get the gold; we shall have the selling of those bonds,
with the interest, commissions, and brokerage, and we shall
have that much of a safe fund in which to invest the money that
we secure through our binking operations." No. no, Mr. President. There it was they commenced squeezing. The New York
bankers joined them. I do not mean all the bankers, but the
leading ones there, who are interested in foreign exchanges, the
Eeidelbachs, the Ickelheimers, and other foreigners here who
are speculating off the world's exchanges. They had a right
to do that; but they had no right to come and ask the Government of the United States, the grandest nation on earth, to bow
to their infamous and imperious demands.
They then commenced the squeezing process, and they kept
on extending it. They intended to extend it only far enough to
scare the Senator from New Jersey and the rest of us. This is
just what they wanted to do. Then they commenced the process of sending to every organized community wherever they
had the name of a man, or a registry, or a city directory, or a
county directory, circulars telling them to telegraph the Presi649

dent to call Congress together to repeal the Sherman law, or the
country is going to hades. They sent telegraphic messages by
the cartload and Congress has been convened: and here we are
[laughter], and there is not yet unconditional repeal at the demand and behest of the foreign gold rings and syndicates.
This is the best time this country has ever had to establish a
permanent financial system. We have no election coming on
this fall, we have all an abundance of leisure on our hands, and
I am convinced that we are batter informed upon the financial
question to-day than the Senate ever has been or will be.again.
Now is the accepted time; now is the day of salvation. [Laughter.] We had for years a monetary financial system independent
of the systems of any nation, kindred, or tongue upon the earth.
Loss than four millions strong in 1776, we proclaimed ourselves
entitled to be a free and independent nation, and for eight long
years we resisted the power of the mistress of the seas, old England, established our independence politically, socially, civilly,
and in every other way, and entered upon a financial system
without having once conferred with England.
W e paid no more attention to old England when we established our financial system than we did to the Hottentots. As
an independent nation, endowed with all the attributes of sovereignty, we proclaimed to the world our system without calling
on them. Great Britain undertook to thrash us and make us
yield to the imperious demands of her empire t h a t " once a subject of Great Britain, always a subject;" that when one of her
citizens came to the United States and be'came panoplied with
the rights and authority of American citizenship, she still had
a right to take him upon the high seas and impress him back
into her service. It was under a Democratic Administration that
this infamous demand was resisted. The war of 1812-1814 followed. W e were only in our teens, in our minority, comparatively with other nations, but we whipped old England and drove
back the old lion to his island lair, and we have made him stay
there, closely confined, ever since. [Applause in the galleries.]
The VICE-PRESIDENT rapped with his gavel.
Mr. COCKRELL. We have no favor to ask of any nation
when it comes to establishing our financial system. They do
not ask any favors of us. Think of the miserable position in
which we are placed. Mexico established her financial system
and never sent any monetary commissioners to confer with us.
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and what not, all over the
world, England, France, Austria, Russia, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, all of these countries established their financial systems,
and we have never been honored with a monetary delegation
from any nation on earth sent at its own request; and yet we
must not move a peg; we must stand still and wait for an international agreement. I am tired of it; I am sick of it. I want
to see the Senate rise to the dignity and the power which the
. people in their sovereign capacity have confided to it in the Constitution. I want to see it establish a monetary policy for the
United States and maintain it; and when any syndicates or combinations or rings come here and undertake to juggle with our
finances, with our Secretary of the Treasury, and try to intimidate him and drive him to grant their requests, we will have it
in the code of the United States that they are to be shown the
door with the tip of the boot.
Mr. VEST. Mr. President, if my colleague is not interrupted

too much I should like to recur to the point in regard to the payment of the silver certificates in gold. I did not think I was mistaken about the construction the Secretary of the Treasury put
upon the power conferred upon him. As to whether he has
actually paid any of these silver certificates, of course I make no
issue of fact, and his statement will be conclusive, but that a
silver certificate must be paid in gold, if demand is made upon
him by the holder, is unquestionably the declaration of the
President and the Secretary. I i hold in my hand a letter from
Mr. Carlisle, published some months since for the purpose of informing the people of the United States as to the policy of his
Department. Referring to the Sherman act he uses this language:
By the terms of the act the Secretary was required to pay for all silver
bullion purchased by the issue of new United States Treasury notes, payable in coin, and it provided that upon demand of the holder of any such
notes they should be redeemed in gold or silver coin, at the discretion of the
Secretary, •• it being," in the language of the act, "the established policy of
the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other
upon the present legal ratio, or such ratio as may be provided by law."

Now, says the Secretary
Mr. TELLER. From what does the Senator read?
Mr. VEST. From Secretary Carlisle's letter published in the
Washington Post.
Mr. GEORGE. What is the date?
Mr. VEST. I do not see the date.
Mr. TELLER. It was published some time ago.
Mr. VEST. I t was published in July, some three months ago.
I t was published at the time this so-called panic commenced, before this session of Congress was called.
Now, I come to the material part of it:
In the execution of this declared policy of Congress it is the duty of the
Secretary of the Treasury, when the necessity arises, to exercise all the
powers conferred upon him by law in order to keep the Government in a
condition to redeem its obligations in such coin as may be demanded, and
to prevent the depreciation of either as compared With the other.

That does not apply to the Treasury notes alone, but to all the
obligations of the Government, and it is beyond any sort of question whatever. The fact is it has been placed in practical operation, and this Administration has declared, both through its
President and its Secretary of the Treasury, that holders of silver-coin certificates will be paid in gold if they demand it. If
that is not the meaning of this language, then the English language has ceased to mean anything.
Mr. TELLER. Will the Senator from Missouri allow me?
Mr. COCKRELL. Certainly.
Mr. TELLER. On the 10th day of March, 1892, the Senate
passed the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury is herebv directed to inform
the Senate what amount of Treasury notes has been issued under the provisions of the act of July 14,1890.
The amount of bilver dollars coined under the provisions of said act.
The amount of silver bullion now in the Treasury purchased under the
provisions of that act.
Whether the silver doUars coined under the provisions of that act were
available for the ordinary expenses of the Government or whether they are
held for the redemption of Treasury notes.
Whether silver dollars or silver certificates have been redeemed or exchanged for gold, and, if such redemption or exchange has been made, the
amount thereof.
Whether silver dollars and silver certificates that are received for public
dues are used in the discharge of Government obligations; and, if so, what
class of obligations are discharged with silver certificates and silver dollars.

I need only read the reply of the Secretary as to the redemption
of the silver certificates, that being1 the only matter in discussion.
I quote from his reply of the 22d day of March, 1892, the following:
Respecting redemptions or exchanges of silver dollars and certificates,
I have to state that the Department has not redeemed silver dollars or silver certificates in gold or gold certificates, nor has it exchanged silver dol*
Jars or certificates for gold or gold certificates.

That seems to be explicit on that point. On February 13,1892,
I received from the Treasurer of the United States, in answer to
a letter which I had addressed to him, the following:

Washington, February 13,1892.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your favor of the 12th instant, In which you ask whether silver certificates have been redeemed i n
gold coin, in what amount, and on what authority.
I have to state in reply thereto that, so far as this office is concerned, it
has never been done, nor have any of the subtreasury offices been authorized to do so, and no departmental instructions have been issued to that
Respectfully, yours,
Treasurer United States.
Hon. H. M. TELLER, United states Senate.

On the 7th of December, 1892, the Secretary of the Treasury
addressed the following letter to me, in answer to a letter of mine
to him:
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, Washington. December 7, 1892.
MY DEAR SIR: I have your favor of December 7. I beg to inform you that
silver dollars are not i n l a w or in practice exchanged for gold or for paper
that calls for gold.
Very respectfully, yours,
H o n . H . M . TELLER,

United States Senate.

To that I have nothing to add, except the statement that I was
recently informed by the Secretary that the same practice prevailed, of paying the silver certificates only in silver dollars, not
in gold.
Mr. H A R R I S . Does the Senator mean tjie present Secretary?
Mr. T E L L E R . Not the present Secretary. I have never conversed with the Secretary on the subject, and know nothing
about what he may think OIJ. the subject.
Mr. McPHERSON. The Senator from Missouri on my r i g h t
[Mr. VEST] will please note that in the letter which he has read
from the Secretary of the Treasury, the Treasury does not recognize the silver certificates as an obligation of the Government.
The Government coins money; it coins silver dollars. The Government does not redeem its coins, unless it may be to call them
in for abrasion or something of that character. For the convenience of the people of this country it issues a certificate which
stands before the coin dollar, and does serve us as money. The
certificate calls for its own redeemer under the law. I t maybe
surrendered at the Treasury, and the Government is obligated
to pay to the holder a silver dollar in exchange for his certificate issued. I t is not an obligation of the Government in the
sense used in the letter, and as distinguished from the obligation of the Government based upon the deposit of bullion and
the bullion certificate.
Mr. VEST. I should like to see where that is stated in t h e
letter from which I have read.

Mr. McPHERSON. The law states it for itself. The law
makes no obligation upon the Treasury to redeem a silver certificate in gold. The Government itself proposes to accept the
silver dollar and the coined dollar for all debts, obligations,
taxes, revenue, and everything due to it. The Treasury of the
United States redeems them every day through the customhouse. They are received in New York for customs dues; they
come to the Treasury, and the Treasury redeems them. That
is the redemption which the Treasurer of the United States
gives the silver dollar or to the silver certificate; but in the
sense employed by Secretary Carlisle, he does not treat it as an
obligation of the Government; that is, as he treats Treasury
notes, of which he was speaking in the same letter.
Mr. VEST. W e have had a great many surprises in this debate, but J must confess that this confession is the most surprising of all. I rather think when the Senator from New Jersey convinces the people of the United States, and especially the
capitalists of New York and elsewhere, that the silver certificates are not an obligation of this Government, he will find them
rapidly discredited.
W h a t is an obligation of this Government? I t is a promise to
do something; it is obligatory on the Government to do something. W h a t is a silver certificate? It says that the Government
of the United States shall pay a certtin amonnt of standard
money, silver dollars, to the holder of that certificate. Is not
that an obligation of this Government? Upon whom rests any
obligation at all as to the silver certificate if not on the Government of the United States?
More than that, if it did not interrupt my colleague too
much, I could go on and read from Mr. Carlisle to show his argument that all these silver certificates rest upon so much gold.
Again and again the New York newspapers and all the advocates of the policy which the Senator from New Jersey has been
so conspicuous in urging upon us have claimed that one defect,
and one great defect, in our system was that we had an enormous pyramid of silver resting upon a small pedestal of gold.
If the silver certificates are not part of that pyramid, I confess
that I am enlightened to a very large extent.
Mr. McPHERSON. If the Senator from Missouri on my left
[Mr. COCKRELL] will bear with me a moment, I want the Senator from Missouri on my right [Mr. VEST] to understand that I
contend that the Government of the^United States is impliedly
bound to keep every obligation of this Government, gold, silver
certificates, and all, I do not care what they may be, in coin or
paper, on a parity with gold.
Mr. VEST. That is all of it.
Mr. McPHERSON. I was speaking of the Secretary's letter,
and I say that there is no law which will require the Secretary
to redeem that obligation. W h a t is it? Let us read it:
This certifies that there has been deposited in the Treasury of the United
States ona silver dollar, payable to the bearer on demand.

How payable? The law steps in and tells you that the holder
of that silver certificate is entitled to a silver dollar at the Treasury of the United Statesoratasubtreasury of the United States.
I t is nothing more nor less than a warehouse receipt, under the
law. Therefore, I say that the Secretary of the Treasury in the
letter from which the Senator read* unquestionably, in speaking
of the obligations of the Government, did not treat the silver cer643

tificate as an obligation of the Government which it was required
to redeem irugold, under the law.
Mr. VEST. I differ with the Senator as to what the Secretary
of the Treasury means. I think, upon asking the Secretary,
the Senator will find that the Secretary did include the certificates.
I should like to ask the Senator another question as to a
higher authority than the Secretary of the Treasury. I ask him
if the President of the United States five months ago did not
state further that every obligation of this Government and every
dollar issued by it of every description should be payable in the
coin demanded by the holder?
Mr. McPHERSON. I do not recall the exact language. If
the Senator has the letter of the President an £ has quoted the
exact language, I should like to see it. I assume that the President of the United States gave utterance to some such declaration; but I want the Senator to understand that the contention I
make in this matter—and I presume it is the same contention
made by the President, because I do not think I differ very mi; eh
with the President in regard to these matters—is that very obligation of this Government in the form of money of whatever
nature or character, be it silver dollars or paper dollars, it is
the duty of this Government to maintain upon a parity with the
very bast money of the world.
Mr. VEST. The Senator is unquestionably clear enough upon
that point. I think, too, the President has been clear enough
upon it. I am not attacking the sincerity of the Senator or the
President or the integrity of their intentions in that regard at
all. I t has passed into current political and financial history
that for a time the impression prevailed in the city of New York
amongst the speculators and capitalists, that if Mr. Carlisle, the
Secretary of the Treasury, reached his $100,000,000 reserve, as
it is called, which is the proceeds of the sale of bonds under the
act of 1875, to make good the use of greenbacks, he would then
refuse to pay gold except upon greenbacks or gold certificates.
The stock market fell from 6 to 10 points under that rumor.
I t was believed in New York that the subtreasurer, Mr. Jordan,
had received instructions not to pay out any gold except upon
greenbacks after that reserve was reached; and it is notorious
that this became a subject of discussion in the Cabinet, and that
20 minutes after 2 o'clock on that eventful day Mr. Carlisle telegraphed to the subtreasurer to pay out the gold. At any rate,
if I am inaccurate as to details, the New York capitalists held
that every obligation of this Government, including silver certificates, would be paid in gold. I was therefore mpst profoundly
astonished to hear from ths Senator from Colorado [Mr. T E L L E R ]
this afternoon that the Treasury Department had informed him
by implication that that was not the policy of this Government.
'Mr. TELLER. I did not say that the Treasurer said it was
not the policy of the Government. I simply asked him if the
Department was redeeming silver certificates in gold, and he
stated to me that it was not. That is as far as he went. He did
not say anything about the policy of the Government.
Mr. VEST. I am responsible for the word "implication." I
understood the meaning of that communication to be that they
were not paying for silver certificates in gold. Here is the question—and there is no use of evading it—suppose I go to the subtreasury or to the Treasury here in the city of Washington to649

morrow, present a silver certificate, and demand gold, would it
be paid in gold or not? Without undertaking to answer for the
Administration—for I have no right to do so—I have no question
that it would, or else the declaration of Mr. Cleveland as President, in which he declared that evdry obligation of this Government would be paid in gold, would be negatived. I have no idea
that the Treasury would take refuge behind the construction
that we hear to-day for the first time from the Senator from
New Jersey, that silver certificates are not obligations of this
Mr. McPHERSON. I assume that the Senator from Missouri
has no disposition to do me an injustice In the broad statement
he has made.
Mr VEST. Not the slightest.
Mr. McPHERSON. I think he has not quoted me exactly correct. I do say—at least if I did not so say, I intended to say—
that a silver certificate was not an obligation of this Government, in the sense in which Mr. Carlisle was speaking of it in his
letter, nor was it an obligation of this Government in the sense
that the Treasury was compelled to redeem it in gold.
Mr. PALMER. If the Senator from Missouri will allow me to
proceed4or a moment pex-haps he may be able to give me the information I am seeking.
Mr. COCKRELL. I yield to the Senator.
Mr. PALMER. I find in the report from the Treasury on the
1st day of October that there was in circulation of silver certificates $326,849,827. I have believed that they were a part of the
Government's indebtedness, which was redeemable at the Treasury and payable in gold. Now, I wish to ask if any Senator will
furnish me the information, whether it is true that there is in
circulation now $324,955,134 which is understood to be redeemable in silver—I mean according to the practice of the Department—or whether it is not the practice of the Treasury to treat
the silver certificates as a part of the indebtedness to be provided for in gold? I ask for information.
Mr. COCKRELL. To what does the Senator refer?
Mr. PALMER. I am reading a statement. , I have the official
Treasury statement. I refer to the fifth item in the list^-silver
Mr. COCKRELL. In circulation?
Mr. PALMER. In circulation, $324,955,134.
Mr. COCKRELL. Those were silver certificates issued under
the Bland law, which I will read.
Mr. PALMER. Without discussing the question, I desire to
ask the Senator, with his permission, for specific information,
whether that amount is regarded by the Treasury Department
as redeemable in silver?
Mr. COCKRELL. I can not speak for the Treasury Department. I know that for every dollar of these silver certificates
outstanding there is a coin dollar in the Treasury of the UnitedStates, and I was astonished when informed by my colleague
that those certificates had been redeemed in gold.
Mr. PALMER. The Senator from New Jersey referred to
the $324,000,000 a moment ago, but, as a matter of fact, I desire
to know whether it is true that that amount is regarded by the
Treasury as so far distinct from other Government issues, that
the other Government issues are redeemable in gold while this
amount is redeemable in silver?

Mr. McPHERSON. Allow me to answer the Senator in this
way: In practice, yes. The Treasury maintains a parity. Under
the law there is* no requirement upon the Treasury to redeem
the silver certificates in gold or to redeem them in anything except the standard silver dollars which are in the Treasury for
the purpose of making those redemptions upon demand. The
Sherman law, as the Senator is aware, does provide for the parity
to be maintained as between the two metals. Prior to the passage of the Sherman law there was never any obligation, as I understand, on the part of the Government as to silver issues that
should be redeemed in gold.
Mr. PALMER. The Senator does not quite meet my question, whether, as a matter of fact and practice, this amount of
$324,000,000 in silver certificates is treated as redeemable by the
Mr. McPHERSON. I repeat, practically, yes; as a matter of
law, no.
Mr. TELLER rose.
Mr. COCKRELL. I yield to the Senator from Colorado to
offer a resolution.
Mr. TELLER. I ask to offer a resolution in order to settle
the question whether the Government is redeeming in gold or
not. I will read it because I think I can read it better than it
can be read at the desk:
Resolved, That the Secretary of the Treasury he, and he is hereby, directed to
inform the Senate whether silver dollars or silver coin certificates have been
redeemed or exchanged for gold or paper that are by law or practice of the
Government redeemable In gold.

I desire to ascertain whether they have been exchanged for
gold, or greenbacks, or Treasury notes.
Mr. McPHERSON. The Senator ought to say '4 redeemed by
t h e Treasury." He has not stated that.
Mr. VEST. I will state to the Senator from Colorado that
that does not exactly meet the point which we are discussing. I
understand that the Treasury has already informed him that they
have not redeemed silver certificates. The point I should like
to be informed about is whether the holder of a silver certificate
can obtain gold upon it now, under existing laws, from the Treasury.
Mr. VANCE. I desire to remind Senators of the fact that a
few weeks ago the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. JONES] introduced a resolution calling upon the Secretary of the Treasury to
say whether or not applications which had been made at the
Treasury for silver had been refused; and if so, why. My recollection is that the answer of the Secretary of the Treasury was
t h a t there had been applications made, which had been refused
for the reason that the silver in the Treasury by law was required
to redeem the certificates outstanding against it. Perhaps some
Senator may remember when that was, and remember correctly
if I have erred in my statement.
Mr. COCKRELL. The Senator is correct about that. The
answer was made, and it is printed as a document, to the effect
that the Department had not issued silver certificates in exchange for gold because the silver in the Treasury was required
to meet the silver certificates outstanding.
Let the resolution offered by the Senator from Colorado be
Mr. McPHERSON. I desire to call the attention of the Sen649

ator from Colorado, before the resolution is acted upon, to a fact
which seems very apparent to everybody, and that is, since the
present Administration came into power—and I -assume that this
is addressed to the present Secretary and to his administration
Mr. TELLER. Certainly.
Mr. McPHERSON. There had been then no free gold in the
Treasury, and the Secretary was working upon the reserve.
Therefore, if it had been the practical policy of this Government
in the past, say, during the former Administration, when there
W S an abundance of gold to do it, I assume that that ought to
be brought out by the resolution, because I take it that since this
Administration cams into power there has been no gold whatever
with which to redeem any silver.
Mr. TELLER. W e have in the neighborhood of $100,000,000
of gold. I t ran down, I believe, to $02,000,000, but has not been
below that.
Mr. VEST. We have had free gold in the Treasury within
the last three weeks.
Mr. TELLER. Certainly. I now ask for the present consideration of this resolution as I have modified it.
The VICE-PRESIDENT. The resolution will be read as
The Secretary read as follows:
Resolved,1 That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he Is hereby, directed
to inform the Senate whether silver dollars or silver coin certificates have
been redeemed by the Treasury Department or exchanged for gold or paper
that are by law or the practice of the Government redeemable in gold.

The resolution was considered by unanimous consent, and
agreed to.
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, I have passed in review the
legislation up to the act of July 14, 1S90. I come now to the
question, what is proposed to be done by the pending bill? Let
me give its history.
House bill No. 1, to repeal a part of the act of July 14, 1890.
In tjie House of Representative August 28, 1893, on the freecoin ge amendment at present ratio the yeas were 124—100 Democrats, 13 Republicans, 11 Populists; nays 227—116 Democrats,
111 Republicans. On free coinage at 20 to 1—yeas 122; nays 222.
On the restoration of the Bland-Allison law, yaas 136—110 Democrats, 15 Republicans, 11 Populists; nays 213—103 Democrats,
110 Republicans. On the final passage, yeas 240—139 Democrats,
101 Republicans; nays 110—76 Democrats, 23 Republicans, 11
In the Senate, August 28, 1893, House bill No. 1, referred to
the Finance Committee; August 23, 1893, reported by Mr. V O O R HEES with an amendment substituting Senate bill 570. This report of the substitute by Mr. VOORHEE3 represents the majority of the Finance Committee of the Senate, composed of 11
Senators—6 Democrats and 5 Republicans—and is favored by 2
Democrats (Messrs. VOORHEES 'and MCPHERSON) and 4 Republicans (Messrs. MORHILL, SHERMAN, A L L I S O N , and A L DRICH), and is opposed by tho minority, 4 Democrats (Messrs.
HARRIS, VANCE, V E S T , and JONES of Arkansas) and by 1 Republican (JONES of Nevada).
The bill proposes the repeal of the classes of the law of July
14,1890. authorizing the purchase of silver bullion and the issue
of United States Treasury notes for its purchase, and declares
our policy to continue the use of both gold and silver as standard

money, and to coin both gold and silver into money of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, such equality to be secured
through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as will insure the maintenance of the parity in value of
the coins of the two metals and the equal power of every dollar
at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts; and
further declares that the efforts of the Government should be
steadily directed to the establishment of such a safe system of
bimetallism as will maintain at all times the equal power of every
dollar coined or issued by the United States in the markets and
in the payment of debt3.
Suppose the bill passed and became a law, what would be our
monetary condition"? We would have in our Treasury silver
bullion of the coinage v. lue of $176,990,207, and the only authority for its coinage into standard dollars would be the words in
section 3—
He shall coin of the silver bullion purchased under the provisions of this act
as much as may be necessary to provide for the redemption of the Treasury
notes herein provided for.

How much would be coined without any additional legislation?
This is a material and vital question, considering the past and
tlii statement of the President in his message to this session.
This declaration-

Referring to the established policy to maintain the two metals
at a parity—
so controls the action of the Secretary of the Treasury as to prevent his exert ising the discretion nominally vested in him, if by such action the parity between gold and silver be disturbed.

And that—
A refusal to pay these notes in gold, if demanded, would discredit and depreciate obligations payable only in silver, destroy the parity between the
two metals by establishing a discrimination in favor of gold.

I t seems to me almost absolutely certain that no more silver
bullion would be coined. I can not reasonably come to any other
conclusion. There would be left in the Treasury a hoard of silver
metal of the coin value I have just stated.
While I firmly believe the Secretary of the Treasury would
still have ample authority to coin all the bullion into standard
dollars, yet it seems to be absolutely essential that there should
be added to the bill express requirement to coin all such bullion
into standard dollars. Without such coinage of the bullion on
hand we would have $383,245,365 coined under the laws of February 28,1878, and $36,087,185 coined under law of July 14,1870,
making a total of 419,332,550 standard silver dollars added to
our money currency, having full legal-tender power in the payment of all debts, public and private, and before the law and in
the confidence of the honest toiling masses the equal in every
respect of the precious, cowardly, idolized gold dollar and baaring the sacred inscription " In God we trust," first used by our
National Mint in issuing the 2-cent copper coins in 1864, during
the depths of the late rebellion. The subsequent use of the
motto on all our larger coins, both of silver and gold, was expressly authorized by the act of Congress of March 3, 1S65.
These solemn words, so full of historic significance, are now permanently interwoven as a vital portion of our national coinage,"
quoting the language of Hon. Samuel R. Ruggles. Now we are
tantalized and ridiculed by the enemies of silver becnuse we have
that sacred and consecrated inscription placed upon the silver

dollar. They say to us, You want us to trust in that motto for
the 20 or 25 cents that the silver dollar lacks of being equal to
the gold dollar.
These would be the only fruits of our twenty years' struggle
in behalf of silver as the money of our Constitution. The passage of the pending bill " would absolutely demonetize silver as
to the future coinage, and leave it supported by not one word of
legislation," and "absolutely sweep from under the silver currency every vestige of law." I t would restore in full force and
vigor the despised and abused law of February 12,1873, demonetizing the silver dollar, stopping its further coinage, and establishing the single gold standard.
For twenty years the Democratic party has denounced from
every house top, in every highway and by way the crime of 1873,
and has struggled in Congress—beginning in 1876 with the first
Democratic House of Representatives elected since 1860—to expunge it from our records and substitute for it laws rehabilitating silver as money equal with gold. I have given the record
of these fierce struggles during this period. W i t h singular
unanimity our party passed the free-coinage bill in November,
1877, but in consequence of the Senate being Republican we had
to yield to the Bland-Allison act. Even that was vetoed by a
Republican President and was passed over his veto.
The record shows the struggles our party made for a better
law, and in the great contest of 1800, with the President, Senate, and House Republican, the Republican House passed the
bullion purchase bill, repealing the purchasing and coining provisions of the Bland-Allison law over a solid Democratic vote.
In the Senate a free-coinage substitute was passed, receiving
28 Democratic votes and 15 Republicans, with 3 Democratic votes
and 21 Republican votes against. The Sherman law did not
rcceive a Democratic vote in either the House of Representatives or the Senate,
Mr. DOLPH. If the Senator will yield to me for a question, I
desire to ask him if the Democrats have possession of both
branches of Congress, the Senate and House of Representatives,
and the Administration besides, why do they not pass a freecoinage law?
Mr. COCKRELL. W e will if we can.
Had that bill been an unconditional repeal of the Bland-Allison law, and thereby have restored the law of 1873, I believe I
am justified in saying not a Dsmocratic Senator would have voted
for it. Is there one who would?
If there is one I will th ink him to answer. I pause for a reply.
Our Republican friends in full control passed the Sherman
law—not as good a law as the Bland-Allison law—but infinitely
better than the law of 1873. We were then unwilling to substitute it for the B1 md law, and I reiterate every word I then uttered against it. Every prediction I made in regard to its execution by unfriendly executive officers has bean verified. Were
i t pending to-day, as it was then, I would repeat the speech I
then made, and the Senator from Indiana would doubtless do
likewise. I t is not pending as a measure in lieu of the Bland
That is the proposition, pure and simple. You can not avoid
it, you can not run around it. There it is. Whether you intend
it or not, you accomplish it. The pending measure is to repeal
it. and with it the Bland law, and restore the crime of 1873, the

demonetization of silver and the establishment of the single gold
I shall never vote to restore the odious law of 1873. Yet I am
asked to so vote. My answer is given in the eloquent language
of the senior Senator from Indiana—spoken with so much force
and emphasis on this floor on February 17,1893, as follows:
I should vote to-day lor the coinage of all the American product of silver.
I would go further. I would vote as Thomas Jefferson advised, for free coinage of silver the same as gold. I would vote, in the language of the Democratic platform laid down at Chicago last June, that " We hold to both gold
and silver as the standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both gold
and silver without discrimination against either metal and without charge
for mintage," only stipulating, as we did in that great platform, that the two
dollars, the one of silver and the other of gold, shall be of equal Intrinsic
value and purchasing power.
I should have voted the other day to take tip what is known as the Sherman act, and for its repeal, but for the fact that its passage would absolutely
demonetize silver and leave it supported by not one word of legislation. I
thought the measure waa audacious. I thought it an outrage to ask men like
myself and others to absolutely sweep from under the silver currency every
vestige of law. That is not what we meant at Chicago; that is not what the
people mean.
I should vote for the repeal of the Sherman act simply because it is vicious
In principle, but it must be in connection with something better. You might
as well authorize a circulating medium based upon tobacco by the hogshead, or cotton by the bale, as upon silver in its bullion shape. It must be
coined into money, and such is the position of the Democratic party as declared in national convention.

And still I am asked to vote for this bill and thereby vote to
restore in full force and effect the crime of 1873. Again, my
answer is in the forceful language of Kentucky's most gifted
eon, Hon. John G. Carlisle, uttered in the House of Representatives on February 21, 1878:
According to my view of the subject, the conspiracy which seems to have
been formed here and in Europe to destroy by legislation and otherwise
from three-sevenths to one-half of the metallic money of the world is the most
gigantic crime of this or any other age. The consummation of such a scheme
would ultimately entail more misery upon the human race than all the wars,
pestilence, and famine that ever occurred in the history of the world. The
absolute and instantaneous destruction of half the entire movable property
of the world, including houses, ships, railroads, and all other appliances for
carrying on commerce, while it would be felt more sensibly at the moment,
would not produce anything like the prolonged distress and disorganization
Of society that must inevitably result from the permanent annihilation of
one-half of the metallic money of the world.

I can never vote for restoring such a law, the result of such a
conspiracy, and surely entailing the dire results therein so graphically portrayed.
But, say the Democratic advocates of repeal, we do not propose to stop with the simple repeal. After t h a t is secure we
promise and solemnly declare 41 that the efforts of the Government should be directed to the establishment of such a safe system of bimetallism as will maintain at all times the equal power
of every dollar coined or issued by the United States in the
markets and in the payments of debts."
T h a t is a futile promise. I t is already an accomplished fact.
Every silver dollar coined by our mints to-day has equal power
with any other dollar—coined or issued by us—in the payment
of debts and in the purchase of articles m our markets. The
standard silver dollar to-day has equal debt-paying and purchasing power with the gold dollar within our domain, and in all our
markets—the only markets over which we have any control—
legislative or otherwise.
W h y then this pretext in this bill of promising something

which already exists and to the strength of which no supplementary law we can enact will add anything?
Again our friends say that is not our only promise. We declare expressly that it is—
the policy ot the United States to continue the use of both gold and silver
as standard money, and to coin both gold and silver into money of equal
intrinsic and exchangeable value, such equality to be secured through
international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as will insure
the maintenance of tbe parity in value of the coins of the two metals and
the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets, and in the payment of debts. %

You say this is the promise of our last national platform. I
admit it; but I ask by whom, by what body was that platform
promise to be redeemed, and how? Your only answer must be
by Congress and by Congressional legislation, and not by mere
Congressional promises. Think of the absurdity, the ridiculousness of the pretense of redeeming a platform promise by a
Congressional repetition of such promise! Is this the redemption the voters in November last expected and voted for?
We can make no legislative promises binding any subsequent
Congress. If such promises bind at all, they can only bind us,
this Fifty-third Congress.
Why, then, shall we m i k e this promise without any effort
whatever to redeem it? Why not strike out the promise and do
now what we promise? When shall we have more time? When
shall we understand the situation, the monetary conditions, any
better? Think of the abundant leisure we shall have from now
on until the close of this Fifty-third Congress, on the 4th of
March, 1S95. Here we are, robust, healthy, capable of the vastest physical endurance—sixty hours if you want. Why should
we not do it now?
How, in what manner, by what legislative process or otherwise,
do you propose to redeem this promise? If by Congressional
action, then why not make it a part and parcel of this measure?
No, Mr. President, there will never be such a glorious opportunity for the Congress of the United States toestablish its financisd system as it has to-day. We know more than we have ever
known before; we have more leisure than we ever had before; we are all in a better humor than we have ever been before;
we are all more patriotic and less partisan, because we behold a
majority of the Republican party in the front ranks of the Administration, leading the Democratic Administration to victory!
[Laughter.] It is a glorious spectacle, and what a splendid time
for nonpartisan and patriotic legislation, with our Republican
friends coming over and helping us, and ail bimetailists 1 There
is not a Senator here who does not declare himself a bimetallist
except my distinguished friend from New Jersey [Mr. M C P H E R SON], who, I believe, is the only one who has not planted himself
squarely upon bimetallism. W h y can we not get together? W h y
can we not, as sensible men, enact a financial system for this great
But some Senators wjio favor this bill say that we as a nation
can only maintain bimetallism with a perfect equality of gold
and silver, with unlimited coinage and full legal tender, by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of
Europe. I ask, why not? Senators will doubtless reply because
the value of silver has so largely depreciated that we as a nation, independently of other leading nations, can not open our
mints for the free and unlimited coinage of the silver dollar

of 412£ grains and maintain it at a parity with gold; that that
quantity of silver is only worth in the markets of the world
from 54 to 65 cents on the dollar.
In response to this statement I beg the indulgence of the
Senate to present in detail the reasons why, in my judgment,
an international agreement with European nations is absolutely
impossible now, and the causes which have produced the depreciation of silver as a metal. .
[At this point the honorable Senator yielded for a motion to
proceed to the consideration of executive business.]
Tuesday t October 10,1893.
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, in my rejoinder to the reply of our opponents that we can not independently of other nations open our mints for the free and unlimited coinage of silver,
I beg the indulgence of the Senate to present in detail the reasons why, in my judgment, any international bimetallic agreement with European nations is impossible now, and the causes
which have produced the depreciation of silver as a metal.
I assert these propositions: That the United States by the misrepresentations and unfounded statements of our citizen and official representatives have caused the discriminating legislation
of European nations and our own nation in favor of gold and
against silver, and that this discriminating legislation alone has
caused the depreciation of silver measured by or relatively to
gold; and that our own conduct, the actions of our representa/tives, have made such international bimetallism impossible now.
International agreement upon the relative value or ratio of the
coinage of nations and the unity of coins has been the dream of
doctrinaire statesmen for years past.
Under a joint resolution of Congress of February 26, 1857, the
Secretary of the Treasury, Howell Cobb, appointed Prof. J . H.
Alexander, of Baltimore, a commissioner to confer with the
functionaries of Great Britain relative to some plan "of so mutually arranging, on the decimal basis, the coinage of the two
countries as that the respective units shall hereafter be easily and
exactly commensurable."
Prof . Alexander visited England in 1857 and 1858 and made
known his mission. He was referred by the lords of the treasury
to the master of the mint, and was finally informed by Malsbury,
of the foreign office, that Her Majesty's Government was not prepared to invite a conference on a project requiring parliamentaryaction and not considered by the public nor discussed in Parliament, but would confer and oonsider with him on any proposal
which he might be instructed to make. Prof. Alexander, in his
report, says:
This conclusion expressed with a caution that is, I believe, habitual with
the Government of Great Britain in contemplation of any change in existing institutions or establishments there, is in reality all that could be arrWed
at under the conditions of my instructions.

Nothing was accomplished.
W h a t were the causes leading to and influencing the discriminating legislation in favor of gold against silver? It is astonishing to me that among all the writers upon the financial
troubles beginning after 1865, no one of them has undertaken
to show the moving causes which induced so many nations in
Europe to change from the single silver to the single gold stand649

ard and to abandon bimetallism. There was some cause for
these things. This no one can doubt. Why have these economic
writers not gone to the foundation and ascertained what caused
Germany to change from a single silver standard to a single gold
Btandard? She had, under the excitement of an overflow of gold
in 1857, changed to a single silver standard to avoid an overflow
of money. In 1871-'73 she changed to a single gold standard.
Other nations did the same. W h a t were the motives which led
them to enact this discriminating legislation? I say it is remarkably strange that no economic or financial writer has ever
attempted to trace these causes.
Take the monetary status of 1860. Great Britain, Portugal,
and Turkey were the only three European nations having a single
gold standard. Great Britain had maintained the double standard at the ratio of 15.2 to 1 from 1717 to 1797, when specie payments
were suspended and continued up to 1821, and on June 2:2, 1816,
during this specie suspension, adopted the single gold standard,
which was the first discrimination by law of any important commercial nation against silver, and in her markets the price for
silver, a mere commodity, has ever since been regulated by the
value of her single-standard legal-tender gold coins.
The cause prompting England in establishing her single gold
standard is manifest. Specie payments were suspended, and she
had a great mass of worn, clipped, and mutilated coin, current
and legal tender, and yet varying greatly in metal value and
weight, and was looking forward to the early resumption of
specie payments, and was a great creditor nation, having vast
commercial transactions with the civilized countries, and was
practically the money center of the world, with the nations paying tribute to her and interest in money on loans, and desired to
unify her coinage in the interest of her creditor-ruling classes
and increase the purchasing power of the dollar, its value, and
hence adopted the single gold standard, and yet retained a subsidiary silver coinage with legal tender for 40 shillings for the
transaction of the vast amount of business among her masses, and
established the grand central market in London for the sale and
disposition of the entire silver products of the world, as a mere
metal or commodity, to be there measured by her own gold legaltender coins.
In 1860 all Asia used silver as the standard money. AustriaHungary, The Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain,
and Russia had the single silver standard. Prance, Belgium,
Switzerland, and Italy had the double standard with free coinage aud full legal tender at the ratio of 15.5 to 1. Germany
had the single silver standard at the ratio of 15.5 to 1, adopted
on January 24, 1857.
Such was the condition of coinage in 1860.
Now, let us trace our own action; let us see what influence we,
through our Representatives, one of whom, the senior Senator
from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN], is upon this floor to-day—have had
in bringing about the present condition. In 1862, the Commissioner of the General Land Office of the United States, Hon. J .
M. Edmunds, in his annual report to the Secretary of the Interior, described—
the great auriferous region of the United States * * * embracing portions of Dakota. Nebraska, Colorado, all of NewMexico, with Arizona, Utah,
Nevada, California, Oregon, and Washington Territory, and other mountain

And then said—
These mountains are literally stocked with minerals, gold and silver being
Interspersed in profusion over this immense surface and daily brought to
light by new discoveries. The precious metals are found imbedded in mountains of quartz, rich washings marking the pathway of rivers and floods.
Besides their wealth In gold, no part of the world is so rich in silver mines
as Nevada and New Mexico, and yet these may be estimated as only in proort ion to the gold fields, which are in process of development with amaz-

Slg results.

The recent discoveries in the Colorado or southern portion of California,
and in the regions stretching thence away up to and north of the Salmon
Eiver in Washington Territory, are every day stimulating the mining enterriso of our people. Prior to the gold discoveries in 1848, at Sutter's race in
alifornia. the gold product of the world was only an average of eightetn
millions. In 1853 the yield of Calfornia was seventy millions, about four times
the aggregate gold product of the world prior to 1848, and that sum may be
Bet down as the present average from that State alone. If we compare tbe
known gold fields elsewhere in our domain with the yield of California, we
would have, if an equal ratio of labor was applied, an annual value of between three and four hundred millions. That an adequate amount of labor
to this end will be at hand when peace returns is not to be doubted.


H e then suggests that an immense revenue maybe readily obtained by subjecting the public mines there to lease under quarterly payments. Mark the language, because it has been mis' leading in Europe ever since.

An immense revenue may be Readily obtained by subjecting the public
mines there to lease under quarterly payments, or quarterly tax, as seigniorage upon the actual product.

And then states the amount of the public debt, and that—
A tax of some 8 per cent on the whole yield of the mines * * * would
pay off the interest.

And then says:
*The yield of the precious metals alone of this region will not fall below
flOO,000,000 the present year, and it will augment with the increase of population for centuries to come. The value of these mines is absolutely incalculable. * * * Within ten years the annual product of these mines wiU
reach $200,000,000 in the precious metals alone.

There is a distinct statement that these 'mines were public
mines belonging to the Government, upon which a tax could be
levied, and m a t statement has been thrown in the face of our
delegates to almost every international monetary conference we
have had.
He asserts that while his estimate may be somewhat extravagant he believes "experience will demonstrate that the estimate is too low."

The Secretary of the Interior, Hon. Caleb B. Smith, in transmitting this report to the President, quoted from it and said:
The present annual production in CaUfornia is estimated to average 170,000,000, and the commissioner after extensive inquiry from all available
Sources estimates the production of gold the present year at $100,000,000.

And then said:
If an amount of labor relatively equal to that expended in California had
been applied to the gold fields already known to exist outside of that State,
It is believed that the production of this year, including that of California,
would have exceeded 1400,000,000.

Pour hundred million dollars in one year, and you ask me how
did these exaggerations and misrepresentations of our officials
have any weight or influence with foreign nations? I answer:
I n September, 1863, at Berlin, an international statistical congress was convened for the express purpose of considering the
question of weights, measures, and coins, and was composed of
delegates from Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Prance, Great
Britain, Holland, Italy, Norway. Portugal, Prussia, Russia,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. Turkey, t.nd many other nation649

alities and provinces, and our Goverment was there represented
by Hon. Samuel B. Ruggles, duly appointed and accredited by
the President of the United States.
On September 11,1863, Mr. Ruggles, as our representative,
presented to that congress a written statement in which he
quoted from the official report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office of 1862, t h o parts which I have just read, and
then added:
From the documents and other evidences now before the international
statistical congress, it must be apparent that the auriferous regions of the
United States are destined sooner or later to add materially to the supply
of precious metals, and thereby to affect the currency of the "world, especially if taken in connection with the capacity of the auriferous regions of
Russia, Australia, and British America, and the possibility of increased activity in the mines of Mexico.

He then suggested the appointment of a commission—
To collect such facts as may be gathered from authentic sources in respect
to the probable future production of gold and silver, and to present them
for consideration to the international statistical congress at the next or
some future session.

I t is easy to imagine with what alarm, apprehension, and consternation these glowing descriptions, exaggerated statements,
of the rapidly approaching avalanche of gold and silver must
have been received, considered, and digested by these assembled doctrinaires from the nations of the earth in their efforts
to solve the question and to determine and agree upon the weight
and standard for the coinage of such masses of the precious
These exaggerations were continued from year to year. They
were all spread before the representative men of every nation in
the world, the men who were delegated by their governments to
represent them in considering the question of weights, measures, and coinage. As a matter of course those reports were
made back to every, one of the governments represented just as
a full report was made to our Government here. But I shall go
on and show that these exaggerations continued from year to
The Secretary of the Treasury, in the finance report of December 4,1862, in speaking of the metalliferous regions of the United
States, said:
This product of gold and silver during the current year will not, probably,
fall very much, if at all, short of f100,000,000, and it must long continue gradually yet rapidly to increase. If this product be subjected to a reasonable
seigniorage as suggested by some, or if, as suggested by others, the mineral
lands be subdivided and sold in convenient parcels with proper reservations
in favor of the miners now in occupation of particular localities, a very considerable revenue may doubtless be obtained from these regions without
hardship to the actual settlers or occupiers.

Here is another intimation that these are public mines.
The Director of the Mint, in his report of October 27, 1862, to
the Secretary of the Treasury, described in glowing colors the
gold and silver yield of our country, and said:
Adding together all these sources of supply of both gold and silver, we may
safely estimate an annual yield in these times of f 175,000,000, or seven times
the amount produced annually for some years prior to the year 1815.

The Director of the Mint, in his report of November 23,1864,
quotes from the report of the Commissioner of the General Land
Office of 1862, and then goes on to describe the probable yield of
the precious metals in this country, and says:

I anticipate a production of gold and silver for the year 1866 of 1200,000,000.


He also estimated the yield of 1865 at $120,000,000, and then
In submitting the above estimates of the annual production of gold and
silver I concur with the Commissioner of the General Land Office, who com-'
puted the yield of the precious metals in 1862 at $100,000,000, although I am
not unaware that the computation of the San Francisco press greatly reduces the aggregate.

The Director of the Mint, in his report of September 29,1865,
The reports from the gold and silver mining portions of the United States
are of the most encouraging character. The developments of the past year
prove the supply of these minerals to be inexhaustible. * * * It is not
easy to obtain any other reliable statistics than those officially appended to
the report of the Director of the Mint, but these do not assume to give the
amount of the entire production of the precious metals. The shipments to
other countries must be large.
For example, we are vaguely assured that the silver mines of Nevada average a shipment of one ton daily .which would equal $12,000,000 annually. * * *
We have had frequent opportunities for conversation with persons who
travel or reside in the various mining regions of the United States and of
contiguous provinces, and it is interesting to hear their accounts of the vast
development of wealth and prospects of profitable industry. We also have
an interesting statement, and one particularly so at this juncture of our national affairs, from a proprietor in the gold region of Xorth Carolina, that
"the system of paid labor is likely to show its just and natural effects in the
increased return of gold."

In order to ascertain with accuracy our productions of gold
and silver, Congress, in the sundry civil appropriation law of
July 28,1866, appropriated $10,000 to enable the Secretary of the
Treasury to collect reliable statistical information concerning
the gold and silver mines of the Western States and Territories. Mr. J . Ross Browne was appointed the special commissioner for the collection of the mining statistics, and on November 24, 1866, submitted his preliminary report, accompanied by
many statistical and special reports, and said:
Assuming the estimate of the product of bullion as above given to be approximately correct, it will be seen that the States and Territories on the
Pacific Slope produce annually upwards of $100,000,000 of the precious metals,
a quantity more than four times as great as the total product of the world
less than thirty years ago. The improved processes for the extraction of
these metals from their ores made within the past two years and the constantly increasing area over which gold and silver mines are being developed
furnish strong guaranties that there will be no abatement of the product for
years to come * * * The approximate estimate already given of the gold
and silver product of the Western States and Territories for 1866 shows a
total of $106,000,000, or nearly double the combined bullion of the Government and all the banks of the country.

Much consideration is given to the celebrated Comstock lode,
and Mr. Browne quotes from a report made by Baron Richtofen
in 1866 on the Comstock lode, its character, and the probable
mode of its continuance and depth, in which he said:
In windingup these considerations we come to the positive conclusion that
the amount of nearly $30,000,000 which have been extracted from the Comstock lode is but a small proportion of the silver awaiting future extraction
In the virgin portions of the vein from the lowest level explored down to indefinite depth; but that, from analogy with other argentiferous veins as well
as from facts observed on the Comstock lode, the diffusion of silver through
extensive deposits of middle and low-grade ores is far more probable than its
accumulation in bodies of rich ore.

On March 5,1868, Mr. Brown submitted a full and final report
under said appropriation, in which he said:
N o uneasiness need be felt as to a decrease m the source of supply. After
many years of travel through the mining regions I feel iustified in asserting
th t our mineral resources are practically without limit. Explorations
made by competent parties during the past year in many parts of the mineral region hitherto unknown demonstrate that tue area of mineral deposit
is much larger than was ever before supposed.

And then, referring to the probable production in Mexico'
The production should rise to $50,000,000 or $100,000,000 a year, and those
companies which could get possession of the best mines should make princely
fortunes for all their shareholders.

And then, speaking of the yield throughout the world, said:
A great increase in the production of gold and silver is probable. In California, Australia, and Siberia gold-mining is now conducted under many

And, in speaking of the results of the mining, discussed how individuals are enriched by mining and how nations are enriched
by mining and how the precious metals fall in value, saying:
A third effect of the production of the precious metals in large quantities
is that the prices of other articles generally are affected. We want gold and
silver for coin and for use in the arts, and the smaller the supply relative to
the demand, the higher the value.

And then says:
But whatever may be the relative position of the two metals, it is certain
that the time is not far distant when the price of the two as compared with,
other products of human labor must fall. They are now increasing far more
rapidly than is the demand for them, and at the present rate of increase
they would soon have to begin to fall perceptibly. But the production will
become much greater than it is. The vast improvements that have been
made both in gold and silver mining in the last twenty years are applied to
only a few mines, and the reward for those who introduce them into other
Sarts of the world is so large and so certain that the introduction cannot be
elayed to any remote period. If ail the argentiferous lodes of Mexico,
Peru, and Bolivia known to be rich were worked with the machinery used
at Washoe their yield would really flood the world. * * * The inevitable
fall in the value of precious metals will be of benefit to mankind generally.
It will reduce the wealth of the rich and the debts of nations. Those national debts now existing will be reduced 20 or 30 per cent, the interest as
Well as the principal.

All these statements have been published abroad throughout
Europe and are as familiar to the citizens and financiers there
as here—in fact, are far more generally known there than here.
While we were thus appalling the nations of Europe and their
learned doctrinaires with these fairy tales of the inexhaustible
and incalculable production of gold and silver—an overwhelming
flood—our officials were not idle in demanding and pleading for
the single gold standard and the demonetization of the standard
silver, dollar, the utter destruction of our Democratic constitutional bimetallic system maintained from the foundation of our
I will throw a little light now upon the demonetization act of
1873, as to how it came to be passed.
The Director of our Mint, in his report of October 10,1861, said:
The gold dollar of the United States, conforming in standard value and
decimal character to all the gold and silver coinage of the country except
the silver dollar, has been properly selected and should be retained for the
standard of value for all coins used or employed in commercial or governmental transactions with other nations.
The silver dollar of the United States, differing as it does in commercial
or decimal value from the other silver coins in our country, cannot, without
disturbing our decimal system and producing confusion in the relative value
of our gold and silver coinage, be used as a standard. * * # As the dollar,
which is the unit of our money, is represented in gold coin, it would seem
desirable not to have any other dollar in any other metal; but, if this is inadmissible and the silver dollar should be retained, then it should be reduced to eight-tenths of an ounce to be in true relation to our other silver
coins. * * * The reason for its retention having ceased, either we should
cease to coin the silver dollar or it should be made to conform in weight and
value to our lesser silver coins.

The Secretary of the Treasury, in his finance report for 1862,
In his last report, the Secretary took occasion to invite the attention of
Congress to the importance of uniform weights, measures, and coins, and
the worth of the decimal system in the commerce of the world. He now ventures to suggest that the present demonetization of gold may well be availed
of for the purpose of taking one considerable step toward these great ends.
If the half eagle of the Union be made of equal weight and fineness of the
gold sovereign of Great Britain, no sensible injury could possibly arise from
the change; while, on the resumption of specie payments, its great advantages would be felt in the equalization of exchange and the convenience of
commerce. This act of the United States, moreover, might be followed by
the adoption by Great Britain of the Federal decimal divisions of the coin,
and thus a most important advance might be secured toward an internatibual coinage, with values decimally expressed.

The Director of the Mint, in his report of October 21,1863,
Permit me again to refer to the anomalous character of the silver dollar
of the United states and to the remark on this subject in my report for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1861. The dollar is our unit of value, but the
value of the gold and silver dollars under existing laws is not the same, and
therefore we have no certain or determined standard of value. Gold, being
more fixed and certain in its valuation, is not only better than silver as a
standard of value in our monetary system, but better expresses the equivalent value of foreign coin in our currency, and therefore the gold dollar
should be by law adopted as the unit of value of our money. •

The Director of the Mint, in his report of October 3,1864,
Permit me again to refer to the anomalous character of the- silver dollar
of the United States and to the observations on this subject in former reports. The whole dollar should be made in weight and value the exact multiple of our fractional silver currency, and the gold dollar should be by law
declared to be the unit of the value of our money.

The Director of the Mint, in his report of October 25,1867,
Speaking of international coinage, says:
The first claim that meets us is the fact that in some commercial countries
gold is the principal medium of trade, in others silver. To maintain these
a t a steady relation may be given up as an impossibility. We must theretore calculate or assume that as the world grows richer one nation after
another will fall into the wake of those which have taken the lead in adopting gold as the standard, using silver only for subsidiary purposes. * * *

Gold for the civilized, intelligent, aristocratic classes, and
silver for the toiling millions, the masses of the people; and
that, too, to be a subsidiary silver coinage, limited according to
t h e laws of England to $10 of legal tender!
Nearly five years ago (December 31, 1862) a letter on this subject was addressed to the Treasury Department from the Mint, in which the precise
ground was taken which has lately been agreed upon by the Paris conference. * * *

I will come to that directly.
If the proposed international coinage of gold should become a law of the
United States the reduced weight would call for a recoinage; and this would
be a proper moment to introduce an improvement which the progress of
counterfeiting loudly calls for.

In connection with these exaggerations and falsehoods let us
trace their effect. W h a t effect did they have? Here are causes,
falsehoods, misrepresentations, but believed to be true, and when
believed to be true having just as much effect as if true.
On the 23d day of December, 1865, France, Belgium, Italy, and
Switzerland united in the monetary treaty "to regulate the
weight, title, form, and circulation of their gold and silver coins,"
whereby they agreed to coin of gold only the pieces of 100, 50,20,
10, and 5 francs in weight, standard, tolerance, and diameter, and
of silver only the five-franc pieces of standard weight and fine649

ness, with unlimited coinage and legal tender for such coins; and
further agreed to coin in amounts as herein prescribed for each
State, silver coins of 1 and 2 francs, 50 and 20 centimes, of reduced fineness and limited in legal tender to 50 francs; and that
any nation could join the' convention by adopting its monetary
system in regard to gold and silver coins, and that the convention should remain in force until January 1, 1880.
In this convention, known generally as the Latin Union, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland strongly favored a single gold
standard, with subsidiary silver coins under 5 francs.
W h a t induced this convention and the formation of the Latin
^-The minister of finance, in his report in 1866 to the Emperor
of Prance, concerning a bill relating to this monetary treaty, for
it was necessary in order to carry out the provisions of the monetary treaty that act should be passed by the Corps Legislatif,
For ages the yield of silver has been greater in value than that of gold.
Since 1846 the proportion between the values of the quantities of the two
metals annually extracted from the mines has been reverse A. * * * These
great quantities of gold, coming for the most part from California and Australia, have thus rendered this metal far more abundant in the issues of
coin in all the^ountries which admitted it, either as principal money, as,
for example, England, Portugal, Brazil, the city of Bremen, or as money
concurrently with silver, as did France and Italy. The abundance of gold
has even caused the introduction of this metal into the monetary system of
countries which lately rejected it, as, for example, Switzerland, Belgium,
and English India.

And states to the emperor that the silver 5-franc pieces were
either exported or melted down and replaced by gold, the cheaper
metal, and the object was to reduce the fineness of the silver
coins and retain them in circulation. Here we see a scare, a
dread, and an excited apprehension of an avalanche of gold to
the banishment of silver."
The States of the Church on June 18,1866, and Greece and
Roumania in April, 1867, joined this Latin Union.
In March, 1865, the Government of France called the attention
of our Government to the project of the Paris Universal Exposition of 1867, and our Government agreed to participate, and
appointed Hon. N. M. Beckwith commissioner-general for the
United States, who, on July 17,1866, transmitted to Secretary of
State Seward Document No. 216, containing the project of a law
submitted to the Corps LSgislatif for a coinage as proposed by
the Latin Union, and giving reasons in favor of that monetary
treaty, and detailing the proceedings, wherein it was stated that
" the opinion in regard to a single standard is still divided, both
in the financial and scientific world."4
A number of sensible men believed 4 that while Australian and
Californian gold inundates European markets the double standard is useful in making the value of silver sustain the value of
And some go so far as to say that, with the double standard
in commercial and financial crises, one metal serves as a counterpoise to the other. And for the sams reason they say we
must not expect silver to go out of circulation, for the discovery
of new mines, improved methods of working them, and the return of silver coin accumulated in the East, caused by the introduction of gold as money in those remote and unopened regions, will restore the former abundance of that metal.

Mr. Beckwith also transmitted Document No. 232, being "Report of the committee to examine a bill relative to a monetary
convention passed between France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland." This report approved the monetary convention and submitted a bill for carrying it into effect, which was duly passed
into law.
The committee discussed the question of double "standard as
A question of another nature arose in the committee. As the two monetary standards have long heen a source of annoyance, why did we not adopt
gold as the only standard, like England and many other nations, and thus
settle it definitely at once? The committee wa§ not in favor of it. We certainly can not say what the future may have in store for us, but nobody can
say but what the measure nlay be soon adopted. It is too soon yet. Though
theory and logic may be for a single standard, facts show that the double
standard oners great advantages in practice.
The two help each other, and in time of crises one serves as a balance to
the other. The use of both metals moreover facilitates our commercial relations with other countries by allowing our merchants a choice of the coin,
best suited to the stranger. Does a difference of the value between the two
metals of late years give a sufficient cause for such a radical reform? If silver is preferred to-day, the preference may change by the discovery of vast
silver mines or a great reflux of silver from the East by reason of the sale
of our manufactures in those countries. The proposed law prudently confines itself to present necessities without pretending to look into the future.

Mr. Beckwith also transmitted a copy of the monetary convention of December 23, 1865. We now see clearly the actual
scare and apprehension of a continued deluge of gold; and that
the convention, the Latin Union, was formed primarily for the
protection and preservation of silver as money, then so scarce
compared with gold, and the maintenance of bimetallism:
ARTICLE 12. Any other nation can Join the present convention by accepting
its obligations and adopting the monetary system of the Union in regard to
gold and silver coins.

Here is international bimetallism established by France, Italy,
Belgium, Switzerland, and Greece. France alone had maintained
bimetallism ever since October, 1785. Now Italy, Belgium,
Switzerland, and Greece join this bimetallic league. There is
no question of their ability to maintain it. But we see what
caused this monetary conference. It was to keep silver in their
countries and not have it entirely expelled by the overabundance of gold with which they were being flooded. To do that
they reduced the quantity of silver in the minor coins and left
the five-franc {the dollar) with full legal tender, unlimited and
free in coinage. '
A t this very time, as I stated before, France was preparing for
the Paris Universal Exposition, to begin in April.
In March, 1865, she had called the attention of our Government to it, and Mr. Lincoln had appointed Mr. N. M. Beckwith,
commissioner-general. An advisory committee had also been
appointed in New York, of which Mr. Samuel B. Ruggles—this
sajne man who was in the Berlin statistical congress of 1863—was
a member, and chairman of group 5, on mines, metallurgy, etc.
On October 9, 1866, Hon. Samuel B. Ruggles was designated
by Secretary Seward to take charge of that branch of the representation at the exposition relating to uniform weights, measures, and coins.
Now, Mr. Ruggles gets himself appointed as the representative of our Government to the Paris Universal Exposition on the
subject of weights, measures, and coins.
Meetings, composed of members of the scientific commission,

the imperial commission, and the foreign commissioners a t
Paris, for consultation regarding measures for drawing public
attention to the subject of uniformity in weights, measures, and
coins, were held.
I want to show just exactly the connection of Mr. Ruggles,
and how he, in connection with the distinguished Senator from
Ohio [Mr, SHERMAN], manipulated the proceedings to be had in
the international monetary conference of 1867.
I do this to show what position he was in, and how he could
use that position.
On January 4, 1867, Mr. Berthemy, envoy of France to the
United States, submitted to Secretary Seward a copy of the
monetary convention of December 23, 1865, and invited the
United States to become a party to it.
That is the only time the United States was ever offered an
opportunity to become a member of an international bimetallic
union. Here it is. I want the Senate to understand it, and I
want the country to know why we did not accept it. Here was
a bimetallic system upon the ratio of 15£ to 1 maintained by
France since Ootober 30, 1785, and all we had to do was simply
to subscribe to it. There was no international complication
connected with it; nothing to do but simply subscribe to it, and
agree that we would coin certain coins. In order to come to
that, we only had to strike out about 12£ grains of our standard
silver dollar, reduce it to 400 grains, and thus bring it down to
the ratio of 15i to 1.
I want to read to the Senate from the documents before me,
because I propose to show that this was an opportunity, an invitation, to the United States to join an international bimetallic
union of Europe, and the distinguished Senator from Ohio and
Mr. Ruggles prevented it. Never was such a chance had before,
and never has there been such a chance since. Here was the
standard perfected, tested for nearly a hundred years, already
agreed to, with an open clause, with an open door for any nation
to join in it; and that great nation, France, once our ally in our
sore trouble, the nation which helped give us our independence
from Great Britain, the nation which has stood by us closer than
any other foreign nation, came with the friendly offering of international bimetallic coinage, the thing we have been talking
about ever since 1S73.
I shall read from these documents a few passages so that we
may understand exactly the situation. I do not desire to do an
injustice to anyone, but I think the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio has never been given credit—so called—for the
very efficient part he took in bringing about a single gold standard.
I quote now from Senate Executive Document No. 14, Fortieth
Congress, second session, the message of the President of the
United States in answer to a resolution of the Senate transmitting a report from the Secretary of State concerning the international monetary conference held at Paris in June, 1867. This
is the letter of Mr. Berthemy, representing France, to Mr.
SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith to ydur excellency a copy of
the text of the monetary convention, concluded December 23,1865, between
France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland.
As you will see, Mr. Secretary of State, this act went into force the 1st of
August last, reconstituted, under the guaranty of an international contract,
a monetary union which h a i existed in fact between these four states, but

which diverse measures, adopted without preliminary understanding, had
broken up during late years.
For the purpose of satisfying the just claims and pressing interests of trade
the government of the Emperor last year proposed to Belgium, to Italy, and
to Switzerland, to intrust to a mixed international commission the care of
reestablishing the ancient uniformity by taking account of facts accomlished, and of the new conditions of the monetary circulation of Europe.
ommissioners appointed by these different states assembled at Paris under
the presidency of M. de Parieu, vice-president of the council of state, and,
in stating the causes for the convention of the 23d December last, they have
fully met the immediate end which was assigned for their labors, according
to the expression used by the minister of finance of Belgium, on submitting
to the Belgium Chamber the project of law intended to sanction the convention: "This act contains in effect, within itself, saving the unity of
stamp, a monetary system, complete for moneys (coin), properly so called,
to the exclusion of billon (base coin)."
At this time the gold and silver coinage of these four States is conducted
under conditions that are identical.
In fine, you will remark, Mr. Secretary of State, a clause which is
detached from the rest of the stipulations, exclusively destined to determine the monetary regulations of the four countries. I desire to say
something of the accession which article 12 guarantees to any other State.
This clause may be considered as the manifestation of a wish that sprung
up in the proceedings of the international conference, and has not been
without influence on the happy issue of the negotiations. After having
brought about the disappearance of divergencies of which they recognized the inconveniences, the delegates of France, of Belgium, of Italy, and
of Switzerland, seeing a population of 70,000,000 of souls thenceforth endowed with the same monetary system, must quite naturally have been led
to fix attention on an interest more general. Without entering on the examination of a question which it was not their mission to solve, they expressed in the name of their governments the desire—


The desire—
to see the Union, as yet restricted to four countries, become the germ of a
union more extended, and of the establishment of a general monetary circulation among all civilized states.

Mr. President, here it was; and here we are urged to become
a party to it, which we could have done without sacrificing one
particle of honor, one particle of convenience, or the sustaining
Of one nickel or a penny of cost.
I read further:
The Government of the Emperor would be very happy to see this proposition well received, but, at the same time can not dissemble the difficulties
and objections it might encounter.
If for the moment objections too weighty prevent the Federal Govern*

Pleading with us now—
If for the moment objections too weighty prevent the Federal Government
from adhesion to the convention of 23d December, the Government of the
Emperor would not the less attach special value to being informed of these
obstacles, and to learn what observations may have been drawn forth by the
examination of that international act.
Thus also, in case the Federal Government, without wishing to accede to
the union actually constituted, should be disposed, either to enter into arrangements destined to establish equations between some of its monetary
types of gold or silver, and those which the convention may determine, or
to take part in an international conference at which might be discussed the
means of arriving at a more extended monetary understanding, the Government of the Emperor will entertain with readiness the overtures which
might be addressed to it in this view.

Now, Mr. President, we see the offer. W e see the pleading
of this great nation. Now let us trace the progress of it.
Mr. Seward, February 13,1867, says:
Having consulted the Secretary of the Treasury upon the subject, I have
the honor to state in reply to your note that this Government, both in its

legislative and executive departments, has repeatedly manifested its interest in the question of international unification of monetary standards; that
the importance of a standard unit of equal value in all commercial countries for the uses of account and currency is fully recognized and appreciated; ana that the ideal object presented in your communication being acceptable, it only remains to be decided how the desired result may b®
brought about.
It is to be hoped that neither the quadripartite convention nor the proceedings already adopted by the four governments under its provisions, will
be held to preclude any of those governments from entertaining considera*
tions in favor of its modification which may be offered by other governments in the interests of a system universally acceptable.

Mr. Berthemy replied May 27,1867, to Mr. Seward's letter,
and after stating the preliminaries, says;
In consequence, a formal proposition has been transmitted* through the
diplomatic medium to divers governments in order that they might cause
themselves to be represented in a commission which should meet at Paris
on Monday, the 17th of June next, at the hotel of the department for foreign
affairs. This conference would be presided over conjointly by the minister
for foreign affairs and the minister of finance.

W h e n our replies were received the Frenoh Government determined then to hold an international monetary conference so
that we could have a full opportunity of discussing this question
and entering into it. I will read further from what Mr. Berthemy said. I have just read from page 5 giving the notice to our
Government that the monetary conference had been called. I
now read from page 6:
There is no need to add that the commissioners will assemble'without any
programme arranged in anticipation—

Now, mark you; this is very important—
There is no need to add that the commissioners will assemble without any
programme arranged in anticipation. They will thus be able to look more
treely for a solution of the difficulties which would oppose an assimilation
between the systems actually in operation. This mode of proceeding.which
has already received so happy application at the conferences of 1865, appears
at this time of greater utility, inasmuch as different countries, while appreciating the importance of the object to be attained, would have the means
of recurring to divergent opinions. The conference proposed has not otherwise any immediate object than to call out an interchange of views and discussion of principles; in a word, to seek for the basis of ulterior negotiations.

That conference was to meet on June 37,1867, and Mr. Seward
appointed Mr. Buggies as the representative of the United
States to that international monetary conference. But before
the monetary conference met Mr. Ruggles, who was already the
commissioner of the United States to the Universal Exposition
on the subject of weights, measures, and coinage, was there getting in his work, in direct violation and disregard of what the
French Government had said should be the meeting of the conference, no programme laid out, or anything of the kind. Mr.
Ruggles, as a member of the preliminary international committee on the uniformity of coinage organized by the imperial commission, had been at work. For what? For the single gold
Mr. ALLISON. How was that preliminary committee arranged?
Mr. COCKRELL. The preliminary committee was arranged
by the commissioners of the different nations to the Universal Exposition. The several representatives got together and formed
a preliminary committee, and this preliminary committee had
gotten together and determined in their wisdom to anticipate the
action of the convention and have a cut-and-dried platform for
the convention to act upon when it met, I t was just like when

a political meeting is to be held a few gentlemen get together
and draw up the resolutions that must be adopted.
Now, somebody else was aiding Mr. Ruggles in this important
work of representing the United States. He had in that important work the potential influence of the distinguished senior Senator from Ohio, Hon. J O H N SHERMAN, then chairman of the Pinance Committee of the Senate. Now, mark you, we were invited to join the Latin Union for bimetallism. W h a t were our
representatives there doing? Invited to a feast to partake of bimetallism, and our representatives go there with a dish of their
own and say, " Not one of the dishes you have invited us to partake of will we partake of. No, no. W e must have our own
diet." I want to read the letter of Senator SHERMAN. Remember this monetary conference was to meet on the 17th of June.
On the 17th of May, just a month bofore it was to meet, Hon.
Samuel B. Ruggles addresses a letter to Senator S H E R M A N in
which he invites him to give some expression of his views, etc.,
and Senator S H E R M A N replies as follows:

My DEAR SIR: Your note of yesterday, inquiring whether Congress would
probably, in future coinage, make our gold dollar conform in value to the
gold 5-franc piece, has been received.
There has been so little discussion in Congress upon the subject that I
can not base m y opinion upon anything said or done there.
The subject has, however, excited the attention of several important commercial bodies in the United States, and the time is now so favorable that I
feel quite sure that Congress will adopt any practical measure that will secure to the commercial world a uniform standard of value and exchange.
The only question will be, how this can be accomplished?
The treaty of December 23, 1865, between France, Italy, Belgium, and
Switzerland, and the probable acquiescence in that treaty by Prussia, has
laid the foundation for such a standard. If Great Britain will reduce the
value of her sovereign 2 pence and the United States will reduce the value
of her dollar something over 3 cents; we then have a coinage in the franc,
dollar, and sovereign, easily computed, and which will readily pass in all
countries, the dollar as 5 francs and the sovereign as 25 francs.
If this be done France will surely abandon the impossible effort of m a k i n g
t w o standards of value. Gold coins will answer all the purposes of European commerce. A common gold standard will regulate silver coinage, of
which the United States will furnish the greater part, especially for the Chinese trade.
I have thought a good deal of how the object you propose may be m o s t
readily accomplished.

Now, here is the gist of it:
Itis clear that the United States can not become a party to the treaty referred to—

That is the language.

This is the reason given—

They could not agree upon the silver standard; nor could we limit the
amount of our coinage as proposed by the treaty. The United States is s o
large in extent, is so sparsely populated, and the price of labor is so much
higher than in Europe, that we require more currency per capita. We n o w
produce the larger part of the gold and silver of the world, and can not limit
our coinage, except by the wants of our people and the demands of commerce.

Here the Senator writes a letter one month before this monetary conference is to be held to one of the delegates to t h a t
conference, who is also representing and manipulating another
intermediate or preliminary committee.
It is clear that the United States can not become a party to the treaty referred to. They could not agree upon the silver standard.

That is, they would not agree upon the bimetallic standard of
t h e Latin Union. They must have the silver part of the bimetallism stricken out.
You may ask how did that letter have any influence? Was i t

published? Did it fall into the hands of anybody? In order to
show exactly how Mr. Ruggles manipulated and used the influence of Senator SHERMAN, I quote from page 7.
Mr. Ruggles to Mr. Seward, May 30. 1807.

Remember, Mr. Ruggles had gotten Senator SHERMAN'S letter on May 18. He refers to Mr. Berthemy transmitting to our
Government the Latin Union conference, and says:
To that treaty the United States are now invited to become a party, in the
communication from M. Berthemy, minister of France at Washington, to
the Secretary of State of the United States, a copy of which, forwarded from
Washington by the Department of State, reached the undersigned on the
29th of May, instant.

He then goes on and states that he had suggested to M. de
Parieu the necessity of a modification in the common unit of gold
coin, and then that he had been introduced to the French Emperor; and I read now from page 8 what he says:
Upon that occasion the Emperor, after expressing very cordially his
gratification that the United States of America had shown their willingness
to aid in tmifying the coin of the world, proceeded in a straightforward,
business way to a s k , W i i A t do you wish France to do in aid of the work?*
To that interrogatory it was answered, first, that much could be done by*
distinctly recognizing in the official documents and discourses of the Government the international unification of coin, as aresult of cardinal importance
to be attained at the Universal Exposition.

Then he goes on and says:
It was further urged that the United States of America, politically, commercially, and geographically had a peculiar interest in the subject, etc.
In answer, the Emperor asked, In a kindly t o n e -

No doubt, as Mr. Ruggles had proposed nothing and asked for
nothing, but told about the desire of our country and its greatness
and grandeur—
Can France do anything more in aid of the work*

A very pertinent question.
To which it was replied, France can coin a piece of gold of 25 francs, t o
circulate side by side on terms of absolute equality with the half eagle of the
United States and the sovereign, or nound sterling, of Great Britain, when
reduced, as they readily might be, precisely to the value of 25 francs. The
Emperor then asked, " Will not a French coin of 25 francs impair the symmetry of the French decimal system?" To which it was answered, " N o
more than it is affected, if at all, by the existing gold coin of 5 francs;" that
it was only the silver coins of France which were of even metric weight,
while every one of its gold coins, without exception, represented unequal
fractions of the meter.
It was then stated to the Emperor that an eminent American statesman*
Mr. SHERMAN, Senator from Ohio, chairman of the Finance Committee of
the Senate of the United States, and recently in Paris, had written an important and interesting letter, expressing his opinion that the gold dollar
of the United States ought to be and readily might be reduced by Congress,
In weight and value, to correspond with the gold 5-franc piece of France;
that the letter w a s now before—

the international committee having the question of uniform coin under
special examination, t o which letter, as being one of the best interpretations
of the views of the American people, the attention of the public authorities
of France was respectfully invited. The Emperor then closed the audience
by repeating the assurances of his gratification that the important international measure in question was likely to receive active support from the
United States.
The letter of Mr. SHERMAN, above referred to, dated the 18th of May, 186T,
originally written in English, was presented in a French translation a few
days afterwards to the international committee in full session, where it w a s
received with unusual Interest and ordered by the committee to be printed i n
both languages. A copy is herewith transmitted for the information of the
Department of State.

Now, I rend from page 13, the letter of Mr. Buggies to Mr.
Seward of July 18,1867. He says:
The undersigned is gratified to learn, by the communication from the Department of State of the 21st of June last, that the steps thus taken for securing the uniformity of money are approved bjThis Government; that he
is warranted in encouraging the expectation that the United States may
give its adhesion to a conventional arrangement which may be susceptible
of termination within a period to be specified in such arrangements." and
that " the views so ably set forth in the letter of Mr. SHERM AN " will be so
far approved by the public sentiment, the Congress, and the Executive of
the United States as to secure a concurrence of the Government in any reasonable plan for producing the desired reform."

Now, you must remember that this is the preliminary conference before which he laid this letter. What does he say?
The subject of a uniform coin did not actually come into discussion, either
in the international committee or the subcommlssion on coins, until early
in the month of May.

On the 17th of May the undersigned presented to the International committee the letter of Senator SHERMAN in a French translation, which was received with lively interest, and forthwith ordered, with the approbation of
the imperial commission, to be published both in French and English. It is
but due to the history of the unification of money to state* that the earnest
and active agitation of the subject in a practical form on the part of the
United States exerted its full share of influence in leading the Government
of France to adopt the decisive measure of inviting in diplomatic form an
authoritative ''conference" of delegates, duly accredited, from all the nations of the European and American world practically accessible to meet at
Paris on the 17th of June, not merely for an exchange of views or a discus»ion of general principles, but "practically to seek for the basis of ulterior
negotiation" between the nations.
The importance of this step had become evident at an early day to the
French authorities, and especially to Monsieur Esquirou de Farieu, first
vice-president of the "conseil d'etat," preeminently distinguished by his
long and well-directed labors in the cause of monetary unification, adorned
by his learned and eloquent writings, replete alike with accurate knowledge
and classic taste. He was one of the delegates on the part of France who
successfully negotiated the quadripartite monetary treaty of the-23d of December, 1865, between France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Italy, the beneficent
effects of which enlightened measure are now illuminating continental western Europe from the German Ocean to the Mediterranean, carrying, in his
own graphic language, "a common coin of equal value from Antwerp, across
the mountains of the Oberland, to the classic coast of Brundusium/'

[At this point the honorable Senator yielded to Mr. A L L E N . ]
Mr. COCKRELL. I was reading from the letter of Mr. Ruggles, transmitting these reports and commenting upon it, which
gives the insight into the modus operandi by which the preliminary programme for the monetary conference of 1867 was cut
and dr;ied and presented to it, and the influence and power that
the distinguished Senator from Ohio exerted. I am going to
state what occurred. He tells what he did himself. He says on
page 16:
On this occasion the very Important question of abolishing the double
standard of money, retaining only gold, was elaborately discussed, and with
singular ability and ingenuity by distinguished French economists holding
opposite opinions. On putting the question to the vote of the numerous and
intelligent audience, the single standard of gold was adopted by a large majority. The question of the gold unit then coming up, the English delegates—

Now, mark you—

the English delegates earnestly opposed the proposition of the international
committee adopting as the unit the gold 5 francs, and urged the substitution of 10 francs in its stead, expressing their belief that the Government of
Great Britain would consent to issue for the purpose a gold coin of that
amount to be denominated a "ducat."

Thus before the international monetary conference had met
this preliminary committee, an international committee, had cut


and dried the whole programme of a single gold standard.
Ruggles goes on and says:


The advocates of a uniform coin cherished the belief that the Government
of the United States is not to be discouraged or discomposed by the temporary delay or hesitation of any government in Europe to participate in the
widespread work of monetary unification, destined sooner or later to become
the crowning civic achievement of modern times.
In the earlier agitation of this subje2t at the International Statistical
Congress at Berlin in 1863, the delegate from the United States found a large
and influential delegation from Great Britain zealously engaged in the great
endeavor to unify the money of the world. In the present effort of the assembled nations "not for a day, but for all times," the clear good sense and
sterling liberality of the English people will not allow their Government to
lag or linger much benind. The fire but recently kindled is rapidly diffusing its light throughout the world.
The farsighted negotiators of the quadripartite monetary treaty of 1865,
though seriously embarrassed by the fallacy of a double standard, now generally discarded, succeeded in establishing a uniform system not only of
gold, but of silver, over a large and populous portion of Europe, since increased by the adhesion of the pontirical states and of Greece; thus including by a singular felicity in this newly enlightened region of the globe the
two great seats of ancient civilization.

Now, I wish to read from what one of the English delegates
said in that monetary conference, a gentleman who has figured
in almost every other conference since then, Mr. Rivers Wilson.
I read from page 55:
The English Government was obliged t o accept the cordial invit ation from
the Government of the Emperor to participate in this conference, because a
refusal would have shown a want of courtesy, and would have made it liable
to accusations of prejudices upon this very important question.
Indeed the English nation is in a position much more independent upon
this question than most continental nations.
So long as public opinion has not decided in favor of a change of the present system, which offers no serious inconveniences either in wholesale or retail trade, and until it shall be incontestibly demonstrated that the n e w s y s t e m
offers advantages sufficiently commanding to justify the abandonment of
that which is approved by experience and rooted in the habits of the people,
the English Government could not believe it to be its duty to take the initiative in assimilating its coinage with those of the countries of the Continent.
But the English Government will be always ready to aid and attempt to enlighten and guide public opinion in ihe appreciation of the question, and
facilitate the discussion of the means by which such an assimilation so advantageous in theory may be effected.

The attitude of Germany was that at that time she was considering herself a political programme which might inol ude her local
monetary question, and therefore she would not be bound by anything that was done.
Baron de Hock submitted report No. 4 on the unification of
coinage, and the recommendation was the adoption of the series
of gold coins now in use in Prance, adopted by a large part of
the population of Europe, and recommending this as the basis of
the uniform system sought.
It is extremely desirable that the system of two different monetary standards should be discon tinued wherever it still exists.

That the gold standard should be adopted.
I read the remarks of Mr. Meinecke, of Prussia, on page 34 of
this report. The German Empire had not then been formed,
and Prussia was represented by Mr. Meinecke. He said;
He did not pretend to ask the sympathies of the conference in favor of the
Prussian monetary system, for he thinks that the standard of gold in the
countries which have adopted it can not be replaced by the standard of silver in force in Prussia only. Prussia, then, must renounce its standard if
she wished to rally under a general monetary union. However. Prussia is
content with a silver standard: the monetary circulation of which it is the
basis is excellent, and there is no urgent reason for introducing there a
change so considerable as that which would result from the change of this


standard. On the other hand, the difficulty of adopting the gold standard is
much greater for Prussia than for any other country. Nevertheless without
having the thought of modifying at this time its monetary system, the Prussian Government Vould not fail to take the matter into consideration if the
labors of the conference should aim at establishing a basis for a general
monetary arrangement.

The international monetary conference continued in session
until July 6, 1867, when it adjourned. During its discussions, on
page 36—
Mr. Ruggles said it would be as impossible to abolish the expressions of
the dollar in the United States as that of the sovereign In England, but that
both might be retained in reducing their intrinsic values. For the sovereign it would be a reduction of only 20 centimes: for the dollar, on the other
hand, the reluction would be 3iper cent on its value. The United States
were ready to make this sacriticein view of monetary unification; such was
the opinion of the American people, and after the next winter a general reminting of coin, however considerable, might commence.

Mr. Ruggles further said, as the representative of our Government, that the double standard had never practically existed
in this country, and said—now listen:
The original act of Congress, which was passed at a time when we were
less enlightened than to-day, either by study or experience, sought to establish a double standard by giving to gold coin and sdver coin equal legal
currency in payments, whatever might be the amount of the debt.

Less enlightened than now! Jefferson and Madison, and Hamilton and Washington were ignorami on the financial question;
they amount to nothing; they imagined that they could establish a double standard, but they had failed. Now, what further
does he say:
And that we have sufficiently learned that the system of a double standard
is not only a fallacy, but an impossibility, in assuming a fixed relation between the values of two different products, gold and silver. The value of
each of these depends upon the quantity produced, and thi^ quantity is beyond the power of legislation. A diminution of value is and ever will be the
Inevitable result of the increase of supply.

I want to read a little further from Mr. Ruggles.
page 41;

Says he on

-ut is true that the silver dollar is still retained as lawful money for debts
of any amount, but of a total silver coinage of $136,351,512. 4,366,340 on^y are
in dollars, while 8131,985,472 consist of subdivisions of the dollar.
Almost all the divisional pieces which had been coined before the passage
of the law of 1853 have disappeared, in obedience to the fundamental and inexorable law of demand and supply, which sets at naught all attempts made
to fix by legislation the relative values of the two metals. The legislators
and the people of the United States have sufficiently learned, if not by study,
at least by expef ience, that the system of a double standard is not only a
fallacy, but an impossibility, in assuming a fixed relation between the values
of two different products, gold and silver. The value of each of these depends unon the quantity produced, and this quantity is beyond the power of
During the fifty-six years which immediately preceded the year 1850 the
United State coined in gold dollars $85,588,038. and in silver $78,323,969, which
represents a supply of about 1.12 of gold to $1 of silver. From 1850 to 1866 inclusive, the coinageof gold has been $rs9.648.453 and of silver$59,027,843, which
represents about $12.50 in gold to $1 of silver.
Admonished by so great a change in the relative supply of the two metals
the United States now share without reserve the conviction more and more
extended through the civilized world that it is impossible to establish a
double standard which must presuppose a fixed relation between the values
of the two metals.

In a written argument presented to this international monetary conference on June 28,1867, he discussed the probable yield
of gold and silver in the United States, an£ said—I want the
Senate to note this:
Its annual product, now nearly $t03,000.000, may eventually reach three hundred or four hundred millions. The money of the world must be unified now
or never. * * * It is moreover to be considered that the United States and
Great Britain may continue to add for many successive periods of fifteen


years, the gold to he produced in America and Australia, which will probably fall little short for each period of $655,352,335 for the United States and
$455,235,695 for Great Britain, the amounts respectively coined during the fifteen years just elapsed. We will not dwell upon what can not be forgotten,
the possibility of a still more enormous product that would result from the
more extensive developments and discoveries in the vast auriferous interior
of the United States, a field as yet only partially explored.
Without going too far in measuring the gigantic monetary future in reserve for the world, we will simply say that the work of unification can not
begin too soon.

I could read many other extracts here.
This international monetary conference after discussing the
various monetary systems, utterly ignored the monetary conference of December, 1865, the Latin Union.
No wonder, Mr. President, that this international monetary
conference recommended the establishment of the single standard of gold, with silver as a subsidiary minor coin, when they
were enlightened by such exaggerations as I have just read,
coming from officials of our own Government professing to be
statisticians and to know the facts they presented!
This international monetary convention unanimously decided
against the adoption of the single silver standard, and in favor
of the single gold standard exclusively, The Netherlands alone
dissenting on the gold standard, and unanimously affirmed that
it was "more easy to realize monetary unification by mutual
coordination of existing systems, taking into account the scientific advantages of certain types and of the numbers of the populations which have already adopted them."
Now, I want to repeat to the Senate, here was an international
bimetallic union composed of France, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, and Roumania, maintaining a bimetallic standard
at the ratio of 15i to 1, and that ratio had been maintained from
October, 1785, down to that date by France with slight cooperation
from the other governments, notwithstanding the overflow of
gold from California and Australia from 1850 to 1860. These
nations had agreed upon a bimetallic system, and France, the
great nation of Europe which had aided us in securing our independence, had sent us a formal and cordial invitation to come
and become a member of that international bimetallic union;
we sent Hon. Samuel B. Ruggles as a representative there to
represent us; and the distinguished Senator from Ohio was there,
not authorized by the Government, but introduced and presented
as the chairman of the Committee on Finance in the United
States Senate; and they discarded and rejected every overture
of bimetallism presented and demanded the single gold standard
and that silver should be stricken down.
W e now see the germination and the budding of the monetary
policy produced by the distinguished Senator from Ohio and Mr.
Ruggles, which is now throughout the world aggressive and
brutal. I t is a single gold standard, the only money of ultimate
redemption, with silver and all other money and coin and paper
merely subsidiary and redeemable in gold. The only time that
has ever occurred in the history of the world where an international bimetallic agreement could have bean made was when
France offered to us that bimetallic system, and the Senator from
Ohio more than any one man is responsible for its rejection.
But now let us trace out this determination to have a single
gold standard.
On January 6 , 1 8 6 8 , Senator SHERMAN introduced S . 217, in

relation to gold and silver coinage. Referred to Finance Committee.
On June 9,1868, Senator SHERMAN, from t h a t committee, reported the bill back to the Senate with proposed amendments,
reducing t h e weight of the gold coins, and also of silver half
dollar, quarter, and dime, and making such silver coins a legal
tender for $10, and prohibiting the coinage of the standard silver
This was in 1868, and the Senator from Ohio [Mr. S H E R M A N ]
then proposed to strike down the standard silver dollar and coin
only half dollars, quarter dollars, and dimes of less intrinsic and
coining value and make them a legal tender for only a small sum,
H e made a written report to accompany t h a t bill. I have t h e
report h e r e before me. There was a majority and minority report, Senate Report 117, Fortieth Congress, second session, t h e
majority report made by Senator S H E R M A N and the views of t h e
minority submitted by Senator Morgan, of New York. Now listen to the-report of the majority:
The United States is the great gold-producing country of the world, now
producing more than all other nations combined, and with a capacity for
future production almost without limit. (See reports of Mr. Ruggles and J.
Ross Browne.) Gold with us is, like cotton, a raw product. Its production
here affects and regulates its value throughout the world.
The United States is a new nation, and therefore a debtor nation. By placing ourselves in harmony with the money units of creditor nations we pro*
mote the easy borrowing of money and payment of debts without the loss of
recoinage or exchange, always paid by the debtor.

He t h e n indorsed t h e recommendations of the P a r i s International Monetary Conference of 1867, and said:
The single standard of gold is an American idea, yielded reluctantly by
France and other countries where sUver is the chief standard of value.
All the provisions of the plan proposed are in harmony with the American
s y s t e m of coinage. They are either already adopted or may be withoutinconvenience.
France, whose standard is adopted, mak es a new coin similar to our half
eagle. She yields to our demand for the sole standard of gold.

H e r e we have conclusive proof of the indorsement of the
Jiighly exaggerated stitements of the productions of the precious me talis in our own country made broadcast in Europe by Mr.
Ruggles in 1863 and 1867, and our other officials from 1862 to
186S, and the world is told t h a t we demanded the single gold
standard, and to secure i t were ready and willing to debase and
reduce the value of our gold dollar 3£ cents. W h y ? For t h e
honorable, noble, and unselfish reason t h a t our country was t h e
g r e a t gold-producing country, and would deluge t h e world w i t h
gold, and, being a creditor nation, could pay our debts more
easily in sucn debased, reduced coinage (!)
The Latin Union coined gold pieces of 5,10, 20, 50, and 100
francs, and silver 5 francs, ratio 15£ to 1, or about 400 grains of
standard silver in each 5 francs.
Upon this bimetallism we were asked to unite with t h e states
of the Latin Union.
W e answered through Senator S H E R M A N and Mr. Ruggles by
proposing to reduce the gold in our dollar 3i cents to correspond
with t h e live-franc gold piece, and peremptorily refused to consider
•even recognition of silver as lull legal tender, when, if we had
agreed to reduce the silver in our dollar, t h e n worth 3 cents
more t h a n the gold dollar and more when the gold was reduced
cents, we would have had bimetallism at the ratio of 15£ to

1. Our bimetallist-now Senator, would not consent, and "bimetallism failed and he is the responsible party.
Now, Mr. President. I want to put this matter beyond any
doubt. I continue the proofs to sustain the proposition.
On April 25, 1870, the Secretary of the Treasury transmitted
to Senator SHERMAN, " A bill revising the laws relative to the
Mint, assay offices, and coinage of the United States," with a
lengthy report of John Jay.Knox, Deputy Comptroller of the
Currency, explaining the bill and the reasons for it, published
in Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 132, Forty-first Congress,
second session.
In this report, with draft of a coinage law, Mr. Knox says:

The coinage of the silver dollar piece * * * is discontinued in the proposed hill. It is by law the dollar unit, ana assuming the value of gold to
be fifteen and one-half times that of silver, being about the mean ratio for
the past six years, is worth in gold a premium of about 3 per cent (its valu©
being $1.0312), and intrinsically mox-e than 7 per cent premium in our other
silver coins, its value thus being $1.0742. The present laws consequently authorize both a gold-dollar unit and a silver*dollar unit, differing from each
other in intrinsic value. The present gold dollar is made the dollar unit i n
the proposed bill, and the silver-dollar piece is discontinued.

On June 25,1870, in response to a House resolution of June 4,
the.Secretary of the Treasury transmitted to the Speaker a report of Mr. Knox, giving copies of a voluminous correspondence
between the Department and officers of the different mints, as <ay
offices, and other persons, touching the bill and report submitted'
April 25,1870. In this correspondence some favored and others
opposed the proposed discontinuance of the silver dollar.
The Government oi: Sweden and Norway instituted a commission known as the Swedish Commission on Coin sge, and in July,
1870, our minister there submitted to this commission copies of
a letter from our Secretary of State, of June 13,1870, " on the
subject of promoting a common unit and standard of international coinage."
This commission in 1870 submitted their report containing^
about 300 p iges, and in it discussed, with great particularity as
to dates, names, etc., every step then t iken in regard to a universal coinage, referring to the statements and reports of Mr.
Ruggles, Senator SHERMAN'S letter to Ruggles, his report and
bill in 1868, to which I have just referred, and the proposal of
our Government, and rejected it. But the next year they adopted
it. Germany, which had adopted the single silver standard in
1857, over a scare produced by the overflow of gold from California and Australia, December 4,1871, then flushed with her victories over France and th3 indemnity of $1,000,000,000 and the
consolidation and unification of all her different provinces into
one grand empire, desiring to unify the coinage, introduced a
new coinage of gold based upon gold, the mark as the unit, and
that single gold standard was perfected in 1873.
Denmark, Norway, and Sweilen in pursuance of the convention
of Sweden and Norway disc i rded their&ingle silver and adopted
a gold standard. In connection with the acts of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Germany, the United States the 12th of February, 1873, demonetized the standard silver dollar. These
things occurring in rapid succession the nations of the Latin
Union had to limit the amount of pieces to be coined by each,
and another convention was held in 1875 and a l i m i t e d coinage
continued, and finally the mint5 of the Latin Union were closed

to the coinage of silver. In 1876 Russia changed to a silver
standard; that is, she stopped the coinage of silver on private
account and only allowed it to he coined for export to China.
Now, here are these data. They show cause and effect. The
exaggerated statements and misrepresentations of our own officers and representatives in regard to the production of gold, and
our own determination to honor and magnify gold, establish the
single standard, debase and degrade silver, caused the legal discrimination to be enacted by other nations.
How ridiculous some of these misrepresentations are I will
illustrate by our monetary commission of 1876, of which the
senior Senator from Nevada [Mr. JONES] was a member.
Among the witnesses whose testimony was taken and reported
was Hon. Edward Atkinson, who testified in regard to the yield
of silver, and said:
1 should question the evidence as to the total production of silver, partly
on the ground of what I saw in the centennial exhibition from Mexico.

Remember. Mr. President, that the world was to be deluged
with gold and silver, with from $200,000,000 to $400,000,000 annually. These exaggerated falsehoods and misrepresentations were
continued until when? Until the nations had come to a single
gold standard, until gold monometallism had been established
in the United States and the friends of silver began efforts for
its rehabilitation. From that time on to this there has been no
talk of any overflow from gold, no flooding of the world with
gold, but the flooding of the world with silver. The talk has all
been directed to silver.
Mr. Atkinson says in reply to the question as to what he had
seen at the Centennial in Philadelphia:
A very curious mass of silver, thick in the center and thin at the edge, as
if it had been cast in an earthen pan. It was afterward explained to me how
it was obtained: that there were cliffs containing veins of metals, against
which piles of combustible materials were placed and set on fire, and the
production was collected in what might be called an earthen pan, and this
was alleged to be a rough production by this process. I at once inferred in
relation to silver production that statistics might be fallacious.

This is the statement of a distinguished statistician, which
has been published all over the world, of mountains of silver and
the silver so soft that a pile of combustible material set up
against the side of it and set on fire causes it to pour down in a
Mr. President, I have thus traced, in as consecutive chronological order as possible the facts and figures in regard to the
fab.ilous, mythical exaggerations of the probable production of
gold and silver in the United States, in such amounts as to literally flood, deluge the world and seriously impair the currency
value of these metals, especially of gold; and in regard to the
representations and efforts of Senator SHERMAN, Ruggles, and
other officials and representatives of our Government, made to
secure the single gold standard in this country, and their bold
proposal to the nations of the world to debase and reduce our
gold dollar
cents in value because of the excessive production
of gold and its depreciation: and then in regard to the actions
and legislation of European governments changing their coinage and their discrimination in favor of gold and against silver,
in order that we might correctly see the producing causes and
the resulting effects.
Beyond question in my mind, the statements and actions of

the representatives of our country, which I have shown, caused,
forced the discriminating legislation of European nations in
favor of gold and against silver, and all combined have caused
the change in the ratio of gold to silver.
The actions and legislation which I have stated, abandoning
the single silver standard and adopting the single gold standard,
and abandoning the double standard by adopting the single gold
standard, and by stopping the coinage of full legal-tender silver
and continuing the unlimited coinage of gold with full tender,
have necessarily and unavoidably caused an enhanced demand
for gold and thrown upon the markets of the world an enhanced
supply of silver, and very largely decreased the demand for silver, and have broken the connecting link forged and maintained
by law for so many years previously at a fixed ratio with very
slight changes,and have stricken down silver as a money metal
of the world and debased it from money to a mere commodity, a
mere metal, like nickel and copper, in the markets, and consequently, when measured by the full legal-tender gold metal, silver has fallen in value.
In further support of my propositions I will quote from the final
report of the royal commission of Great Britain—appointed in
1886 to inquire into the recent changes in the relative values of
the precious metals—made in 1888. This commission examined
fully into all the facts, and in their unanimous report say:
189. Looking then to the vast changes which occurred prior to 1873 in the
relative production of the two metals without any corresponding disturbance in their market value, it.appears to us difficult to resist the conclusion
that some influence was then at work tending to steady the price of silver
and to keep the ratio which it bore to gold approximately stable.
190. There i s another fact to which we have already drawn attention,
pointing decidedly i n the same direction. Prior to 1873 the fluctuations i n
the price of silver were gradual in their character and ranged within narrow limits.
192. * * * Now undoubtedly the date which forms the dividing line between an epoch of approximate affinity in the relative value of gold aud silver and one of marked instability is the year when the bimetallic system
which had previously been in force in the Latin Union ceased to be in full
operation; and we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that the operation
of that system, estaplished as it was in countries the population and commerce of which were considerable, exerted a material influence upon the
relative value of the two metals. So long as that system was in force we
think that, notwithstanding the changes in the production and use of the
precious metals, it kept the market price of silver approximately steady at
the ratio fixed by law between them, namely, 15J to l.
193. Nor does it appear to us a priori unreasonable to suppose that the existence in the Latin Union of a bimetallic system with a ratio of 15£ to 1, fixed
between the two metals should have been capable of keeping the market
price of silver steady at approximately that ratio.
The view that it could only affect the market price to the extent to which
there w a s a demand for it for currency purposes in the Latin Union, or to
which it w a s actually taken to the mints of those countries, is, we think,
The f .tct that the owner of silver could, in the last resort, take it to those
mints and have it converted into coin, which would purchase commodities
at the ratio of 15J of silver to 1 of gold, would, in our opinion, be likely to
affect the price of silver in the markets generally, whoever the purchaser
and for whatever country it was destined. It would enable the seller to
stand out for a price approximating to the legal ratio, and would tend to
keep the market steady at about that point.







198. To s u m up our conclusions on this part of the case, we are of opinion
that the true explanation of the phenomena which we are directed to investigate is to be found in a combination of causes, and can not be attributed to
any one cause alone. The action of the Latin Union in 1873 broke the link between silver and gold, which had keptthe price of the former, as measuredby
the latter, constant at about the legal ratio; and when this link was broken
the silver market was o»sn to the influence of all the factors which go to
affect the price of a commodity. These factors happen s i n c e 1873 to have

operated in the direction of a fall in the gold price of that metal, and the frequent fluctuations in its value are accounted for by the fact that the market
has become fully sensitive to the other influences, to which we have called
attention above.

Remember, Mr. President, that these are the conclusions, after
a thorough investigation, of gold-monometallist Englishmen.
Suppose, now, that all this discriminating legislation had been
against gold and in favor of silver, where would gold be to-day
compared with silver? I t would be much less valuable, measured by silver, than silver is to-day measured by gold.
Can any sane man doubt that, if we had agreed to the bimetallic system of the Latin Union in 1897, as we were invited to do,
that the market value of silver throughout the world would be
to-day equal to gold at the ratio of 151 to 1, or that the European
nations would not have adopted the discriminating legislation
in favor of gold and against silver, which I have shown.
Certainly they would not. Can any sane man, can even the
Senator from Ohio, doubt to-day that his own actions and representations, coupled with the exaggerated statements and misrepresentations of Mr. Rugglesandour own Government officials
as to the enormous yield of gold from our auriferous regions and
their refusal to enter the Latin Union for bimetallism, and their
demand for the single gold standard—the American idea— have
caused the European nations to enact the discriminating legislation against silver and the depreciation in the relative value
of silver as a metal measured by gold as money, and have practically made international bimetallism now an impossibility?
In my judgment there can be no question of it. I think I have
conclusively proved the propositions I asserted. But " to make
assurance doubly sure" and to remove any lingering doubt in
any man's mind we will trace the record further.
As soon as the discriminating legislation referred to had been
secured in Europe and the United States enthroning gold, the
idol, and demonetizing and degrading silver to the condition of
a mere commodity, the necessary inevitable result, the depreciation pf silver as a metal, a commodity measured by gold as
money followed.
Then our bimetallist friends insisted upon international agreements. Oh, yes, after international agreements were made impossible, then the opponents of silver, whenever any legislative
effort has been made for its rehabilitation, have interposed some
project for international bimetallism. When the Bland bill of
November, 1877, for the free and unlimited coinage of silver was
passed by the Democratic House of Representatives and came to
the Senate, the Senator from Iowa [Mr. ALLISON] insisted upon
limiting the coinage and inviting the governments of Europe to
an international monetary conference at Paris, to be held in August, 1878.
I t was doubtless hoped by him and those who agreed with him
that European governments might agree to some bimetallic system. I do not intend to cast any reflection upon the honesty and
sincerity of any one who then held or who may now hold to the
possibility of such a chimera or delusion. They were then, as
now, mistaken in my judgment, and the very measure of limiting the coinage instead of unlimited coinage was a hindrance
and an obstacle to the possibility of such a project.
Messrs. Fenton, Groesbeck, and Walker were our delegates,
with Mr. Horton as secretary. The principal nations of Europe,

except Germany, were represented. Germany declined to send
any delegate.
At the first meeting on August 10, 1878, Dr. Broch, of Sweden
and Norway, laid before the conference certain tables, from
which I read, on page 11:
Mr. SHERMAN, as Senator of the United State3, prooosei as an international coin a piece of gold of 1255 troy grains nine-tenths fine; it will weigh
8.1358j8 grams, and will contain 7.3££i8l grams of fine gold.
It will be in fact the English sovereign recoined at the fineness of ninetenths; it will only differ from it by one three-hundredths of an English
Mr. SHERMAN proposes to accept it as $5, although, in comparison with the
American eagle of $10, it is only worth $4.8665.

This showing that they had before them all the documents
which we have published in regard to coinage.
At the second meeting this same Dr. Broch laid before the
conference the views of the delegates of Norway, Denmark, and
Sweden, that they could enter into no agreement which would
be binding.
Mr. Groesbeck, as our representative, on page 20, addressing
the conference, said:
Mr. Groesbeck then directed attention to an error, a prejudice, which it
appeared had found its way to many minds. It Was said that the United
States had taken the initiative in the conference because they Were a silverproducing country, and that they had as a state peculiar interest in the
monetary question. This was not correct. The United States as a state
had no interest in the working either of silver or of gold mines.

Now you see the effect of the falsehood stated in the report of
the Commissioner of the General Land Office and the Secretary
of the Interior about these public mines and the levying of a tax
upon them, which would yield dividends enough at 8 per cent
to pay the interest on the national debt, thus connecting the
whole matter link by link. All these things were known to
And besides, were the United States, he asked, as great producers of
silver as had been represented? Here was another error which he also desired to rectify. In the last quarter of a century the yield of gold mines in
the United States had been four times as great as that of the silver mines.
The yield of the gold mines had, it was true, decreased, and that of the silver
mines increased in enormous proportions. But it was well that it should be
understood that in the great Comstock lode, which was the most productve
of all. such a depth had now been reached that the time was near when the
working would have to be suspended, unless At should be extremely remunerative.







The remonetization of silver is therefore in no sense an enterprise undertaken by the United States selfishly with a view to private profit; nor is it a
new undertaking. They have been in the use of the two metals from the
time the Government was organized. It is no new system which they propose to establish; it is the old system, that under which they have long lived
and prospered, to which they are returning. From 1792 to the day when, by
a sort of inadvertence, in 1873, the silver standard was suppressed not a
merchant, not a banker, not a manufacturer, not an establishment nor an
interest of any kind could be cited as having raise! any objection to the
simultaneous use of the two metals. Bimetallism is therefore in the United
States not only a tradition of the law, but has entered deeply into the habits
of the people.

Here was another error which he also desired to rectify. W h y
were these errors there? W h y did not Mr. Groesbeck in a manly
way tell them, "Yes, our represantatives made misrepresentations when they came here in 1833, 1865, and 1867, and represented to you and to the nations of the world that we were about
to produce from $200,')00,000 to $400,000,000 of the precious metals and would flood the world with them; they have made un619

truthful statements, they were mistaken"? Why did he not do
that? These misrepresentations and unfounded statements have
been thrown in our teeth in every monetary conference that has
been held.
But here is something amusing. Mr. Groesbeck said:
In 1873, in a law which did not very accurately carry out its purpose, silver was made to disappear through inadvertence, rather than intentionally,
by an omission to say anything about it.

That is a very elegant description of the crime of 1873! But
did they swallow that explanation? Was it satisfactory? We
shall see. I quote now from Mr. Feer-Herzog, of Switzerland.
He remarked that—
long before the law of 1873 silver had disappeared from circulation in the
"United States. The actual circulation consisted of gold and paper money.

Gold and paper in 1873!
During the long period of time of which Mr. Groesback spoke, from 1792 to
1873, there had only been coined about 8,000,000 silver dollars—

How much like the Senator from Ohio fMr. SHERMAN] and
the Senator from Vermont [Mr. MORRILL] that sounds! They
are the same things that we have been hearing ever since 1878,
thrown back in our faces. Mr. Feer-Herzog continued:
while in the three or four months that had succeeded the passage of the
Bland bill an equal amount of these dollars had been coined.
As to what Mr. Groesbeck had said of the " inadvertence " in consequence
©f which the law of 1873 had been passed, and of the surprise which the effects
of this law were supposed to have provoked in consequence, Mr. Feer-Herzog
l a i i upon the table documents relating to the preliminary preparation of
that law—documents published by the Government of the "United States. It
appeared, he said, from these documents, that it was not by a mere accidental
oversight, but voluntarily and with reflection, that the suppression of the
silver standard was determined upon. It was expressly stated that gold was
to be in the future the sole monetary standard of the United States, and that
silver should cease to be a standard. (Exhibit D, second session.)
It is, therefore, said Mr. Feer-Herzog. difficult to admit that there was any

No, no. There was not any inadvertence upon the part of
Senator S H E R M A N and probably two or three in the Senate—not
more than that—and I do not believe there were three who
understood exactly what was in that bill of 1873.
Now, as I said in regard to the views of Senator ALLISON, insisting upon the limit, of coinage and with limited coinage
operating against the possibility of bimetallism, I quote from
the remarks of Mr. Say, president of this monetary conference:
Mr. Say insisted upon the question which he had stated at the opening or
the conference, namely, why did not the United States in restoring the
double standard permit the unlimited coinage of silver as well as that of

Why did it not? Continuing, he said:
It has been said by the Hon. Mr. Groesbeck that the restriction of the coinage of silver by the Latin Union had supplied a motive for the restriction in
the United States, but this view did not seem to be well founded. It was by
an amendment of the law that a limit was fixed to the coinage of silver dollars, and Mr. Say felt constrained to believe that this amendment was a
mode of agreement, a compromise by means of which a majority could be
obtained. The influence of the Latin Union seemed to have counted for so
little in the resolution adopted by Congress on this occasion that it does
not appear that ihere was. even for a moment, any question of conforming
the American system to that of the Latin Union by the adoption of the relation of 1 to

Mr. Feer-Herzog supported the observations of the president,
by calling attention to the fact that the bill in its original form
permitted the coinage of silver without limit.

I read from the reply oE Mr. Horton:
Mr. Horton, in reply to the points raised by the president of the conference, called attention to the fact that the majority report of the commission
appointed by Congress in 1876 to investigate the silver question had recommended the adoption by the United States of the ratio of 1 to 15J because it
•was the ratio of the Latin Union. The bill ltnown as the Bland bill had been
proposed in Congress in the summer of 1876. Between that time and the
passage of the law in pursuance of which the conference met, the whole
question had been thoroughly discussed in the United States in all its phases.
In this discussion the situation of the Latin Union had not been lost sight
of, but had been made the subject of special attention.

Mr. President, what was the"attitude there of foreign nations?
The delegates of the European states represented in the conference desire
to express their sincere thanks to the Government of the United States for
having procured an international exchange of opinion upon a subject of so
much importance as the monetary question.
Having maturely considered the proposals of the representatives of tbp
United States, they recognize:
1. That it is necessary to maintain in the world the monetary functions of
silver as well as those of gold, but that the selection for use of one or the
other of the two metals, or of both simultaneously, should be governed by
the special position of each state or group of states.
2. That the question of the restriction of the coinage of silver should
equally be left to the discretion of each state or group of states, according
to the particular circumstances in which they may find themselves placed;
and the more so, in that the disturbance produced during the recent years
in the silver market has variously affected the monetary situation of the
several countries.
3. That the differences of opinion which have appeared and the fact that
even some of the states which have the double standard find it impossible
to enter into a mutual engagement with regard to the free coinage of silver, exclude the discussion of the adoption of a common ratio between the
two metals.

After the bimetallic union had been formed and we had been
earnestly invited to become a member of it and had refused, no
wonder then after the European nations had, each for itself,
adopted its own standard, that they have rejected all overtures
made by us.
Our commissioners submitted their report, but I will only read
a few lines from it:
The states which had, in the past, performed this grand service to the
world appeared in the conference of 1878 with a divided opinion; and it is,
we think, to the delicate relations, political and financial, of the Latin Union,
that the failure of the conference to adopt any positive measures is primarily to be referred.
Switzerland appeared as the uncompromising advocate of gold monometallism for Europe.
The delegation from Belgium also was unfavorable.







France, the leading state of the Union, declared through her finance minister, the president of the conference, that, in suspending the coinage of
silver, she did not incline to the single gold standard, but, on the contrary,
she occupied a position in which she might await the favorable moment to
reenter upon the system of the double standard.
The United States appeared at the conference at a disadvantage by reason
of the belief, quite commonly entertained in Europe, that the action of Congress had been mainly determined by the consideration that the United
States are largely producers of silver. This opinion exhibited not a little
vitality, and your commissioners found it necessary to combat it. They
showed that not only has the Government of the United States no royalty on
the production of the mines of the precious metals, but that, through the
absence of any accumulated stock, it has in fact far less of a special interest
in the question under consideration than many or even most of the states
represented in the conference; that the effect of a given decline in silver
had been, and would continue to be. a more serious loss to the accumulated
wealth of France, Belgium, riolland, and especially Great Britain, through

its Indian dominions, than to the United States; that as a branch of industry
the production of silver is but one of many occupations to which our available labor and capital have hitherto been inadequate; and that even as a
debtor, the United States, a country of vast undeveloped resources, could
better bear the weight which would be added to its debts by a diminution of
the money supply of the world, than could other states with less recuperative power and a narrower margin for future growth.
Your commissioners have reason to think that these views, during the
course of the conference, prevailed over the opinion referred to respecting
the motives which had actuated the United States in the recent legislation
respecting silver. They believe that the European delegates came to fully
recognize the preponderating motive of that legislation as springing from
a general interest in an undiminished money supply, and not from the wish
to support a particular branch of American industry.

The record of that entire conference was that the nations refused to agree to international bimetallism. How could you
have expected them to agree to it?
But in 1869, after the monetary conference of 1867, England and
France made a little effort at international bimetallism. France
appealed to England, as the United States had rejected her overtures, and was willing to join England in abandoning the silver
standard, as the United States had refused to recognize bimetallism. But the distinguished bimetallist of the Senate, Mr.
SHERMAN, had something to do with this monetary conference
of 1878. He was then Secretary of the Treasury, and wrote a
letter to Mr. Groesbeck, dated July 15,1878. A letter, you will
remember, turned up from him, addressed to the Paris Monetary Conference, which destroyed the possibility of international
bimetallism at that convention. He says in this letter:
During the monetary conference in Paris, when silver In our country was
excluded from circulation by being undervalued, I was strongly in favor of
the single standard of gold, and wrote a letter, which you will find in the
proceedings of that conference, stating briefly my view. At that time the
wisest among us did not anticipate the sudden fall of silver or the rise of
gold that has occurred. This uncertainty of the relation between the two
metals is one of the chief arguments in favor of a monometallic system, but
other arguments, showing the dangerous effect upon Industry by dropping
one of the precious metals from the standard of value, outweigh in my mind
all theoretical objections to the bimetallic system. I am thoroughly convinced that if it were possible for the leadng commercial nations to fix by
agreement an arbitrary relation between sliver and gold, even though the
market value might vary somewhat from time to time, it would be a measure
of the greatest good to all nations. My earnest desire is that you may succeed in doing this.

No one anticipated, said he, that there would be any fall in the
price of silver, or any rise in the price of gold. Why? Because
his financial views are based upon the idea that law had nothing
to do with the values of the two metals, gold and silver. That
has been the theory. I t is the theory of many that law does not
give to gold coin a value as m o n e y over and above its metallic
value. Senator SHERMAN in his wisdom then proposed that the
United States and other nations should come together and agree
to demonetize silver, and it would not affect the market value
of silver; that demonetizing silver and throwing all the demand
for money upon gold would not increase the purchasing power
of srold or cause a rise in the value of gold.
The various delegates to this international convention declared
that they were not ready to abandon the systems which they then
had. T h a t looks to me like a statement which ought to have
been sufficient to satisfy us that there was no earthly chance of
international bimetallism, but it was not.
In 1881, under a provision in the appropriation law for the sundry civil expenses of the Government, approved March 3, 1881,
the President was authorized to appoint, and did appoint," three

commissioners to represent the United States at a conference to
be called to adopt a common ratio between gold and silver for
the purpose of establishing internationally the use of bimetlllic
money and securing fixity of relative value between thoss two
met ils," namely, Hon. William M. Evarts, Hon. Timothy O.
Howe, and Hon. Allen G. Tnurman, with Hon. Dana Horton as
secretary. This conference mat at Paris, April 19, 1881.
I shall not consume the time Of the Senate in reading all these
extracts. I will simply refer to them in the proceedings of the
International Monetary Conference of 1881.
The first is the declaration of Germany on page 29. I read
this to show that those governments peremptorily refused to
change their standards and said they were satisfied with them,
and that they simply met us out of politeness through our invitation. That was practically the whole thing.
I read from pages 28 and 29 in regard to Germany; from page
31 in regard to England; page 31 in regard to the British Empire; page 32 in regard to Denmark; from page 32 in regard to
Portugal; from page 33 in regard to Russia; from page 34 in regard to Greece; from page 36 in regard to Djnmark, Norway,
and Sweden; from pages 36 and 39 from Mr. Cernuschi, and
France from pages 38 and 39:

It is generally agreed to attribute this fall less to the sales of silver made
by Germany than to themeasure adopted by our Government of taking from
silver its quality of legal tender, an action which led the states of the Latin
Union to put a stop to their coinage of silver;
It can not be denied that this latter measure, by doing away with the compensating effect which, until then, had maintained within narrow limits the
oscillations in the price of silver, removed all obstacles to a progressive and
limitless fall; it i3, on the other hand, but just to admit that the fear of finding themselves compelled to receive a half milliard of marks of German silver, which could not fail to depreciate in a v^ry considerable degree their
own circulation, had no little influence in the decision taken by the Latin
The fall of silver would, nevertheless, not have reached the point it did if,
at the same time, the production or that m-atal had not consilerably augmented in America, while the demand in Asia was diminishing.
In view of these combined circumstances, the Imperial Government, in
the month of May, 1879. resolved to suspend its sales of silver, and they have
not since been resumed. This action, by giving lirniness to the metal market. tended to facilitate the initiative of those powers which were interested
in the rehabilitation of silver. It also had the effect of diminishing the demand for gold, a fact the more important in that the decreasing production
of the latter metal, in the face of a constantly growing demand, had, within
the last few years, caused a certain degree of tension in the market.
We recognize, without reserve, that a rehabilitation of silver is to be desired, and that it might be attained by the re establishment of the free coinage of silver in a certain number of the most populous states represented
at this conference, if these states, to this end, should adopt as a basis a fixed
relation between the value of gold and that of silver. Nevertheless, Germany,
whose monetary reform is already so far advanced, and whose general monetary situation does not seem to call for a change of system so vast in scope,
does not find herself in a position, so far as she is concerned, to concede the
free coinage of silver.
Her delegates are, therefore, not able to subscribe to a proposition looking
to such action.

Now, gentlemen, the monetary system of the United Kingdom since 1816;
that is to say, for more than sixty years, has rested on gold as a single standard, and this system has satisfied all the needs of the country without giving
rise to those disadvantages which have shown themselves elsewhere, and under other monetary regulations; and, for thesereasons.ithas been accepted by
the governments of all parties and by the nation. The Government of Her
Majestv could not, therefore, take part in a conference as supporting the
principle of the double standard, and its answer to the invitation of France
and the United States necessarily set forth the reasons which prevented it
from taking part in the reunion which had been proposed. (Page 31.)





Mr. President, and gentlemen, the government of British India, in sending
delegates to the conference, is not to be regarded as having, by this fact,
admitted the adoption of the principle of bimetallism in the British Indies;
and in order that it may be free from responsibility for the conclusions
, which might be reached by the conference, its delegates are not authorized
to take part in the votes of that body.
Although the secretary of state, as well as the council of British India, do
not believe it possible to nourish the hope, in the present circumstances, of
a radical reform of the monetary system of India, they are ready to take
into consideration such measures as might be proposed for introduction
into India with the object of restoring the value of silver.

As the Danish Government has no intention of abandoning the single gold
standard introduced into the country a few years ago, I have received instructions on the part of my Government to abstain from all discussion of
the manner {quo modo) by which the bimetallic system could be regulated.

Mr. President, and gentlemen of the conference, the Portuguese Govern*
ment, in accepting the cordial invitation of the Governments of France and
of the United States of America, represented at this conference, desired,
while fulfilling a duty of international courtesy, to give to these two governments a proof, in all respects deserved, of consideration and deference; but
it frankly stated to them that the Portuguese monetary system now in force
would not allow of its entry into the bimetallic union now contemplated.
(Page 32.)
But, at the same time, the Russian Government reserves to itself entirely
its right of opinion upon this whole matter, and in nothing renounces its
liberty of action by reason of any resolutions of the conference. (Page 33.)

The delegate of Greece, in presence of the declarations made by the honorable delegates of England, of Russia, of Portugal, etc., considers it his duty
also to declare that, in his capacity of representative of a state which has
adopted monometallism, he would not be able to Join in any measure which
might lead to a change in this system. He will be most happy to take part
in the labors of the conference, and he will, while reserving to it full liberty
of action, most willingly repo t to his Government upon any other question
which may be proposed and discussed. (Page 34.)

You are aware, gentlemen, that the Scandinavian countries have a monetary union based upon the single standard of gold; my government reserves all its rights, but has given me entire freedom to take part in the discussions, saving only my obligation to report to it tinally. (Page 35.)

Mr. Cernuschi, delegate of France, desired, in the first place, to convey to
the conference the impression which had been made upon him by the declarations just read, notably those of the honorable delegates of Germany
and of Great Britain. The conference could not fail to note the very considerable importance of these declarations.
Upon what condition, in reality, did the success of the work deDend upon
Which the assembly was entering to-day? Upon the concord of the four
great metallic powers of the globe, France, the United States, Germany, and
Great Britain. The understanding between France and the United States
was already an accomplished fact, of which the meeting of the present conference, called as it had been by the two Republics, might be considered the
official confirmation. The success of the conference, and the fate of bimetallism, then only depended upon Germany and England. If [continued Mr.
Cernuschi] these two join France and the United States, bimetallism becomes the monetary law of the whole world; if one of them should join, it
would still be possible; if both should refuse their cooperation, It would be
condemned to remain Impracticable.
Now, what is the purport of the declarations which have just been read to
the conference? It is. in the first place, that the concurrence of Great Britain is, for the time being, refused. (Pages 36. 37.)
Germany was the first to go into the experiment of gold monometallism,
at a time when that monetary system was the object of a universal infatuation. amounting almost to a craze. In 1869. the chancellor of the exchequer,
Mr. Lowe, was able to declare in full Parliament, on the occasion of the
propositions for monetary unification made by France, that he would never
treat with a country which retained bimetallism: but he expressed himself
as disposed to reduce by one grain the weight of the pound sterling, in order
to bring it nearer to the International pieoe of ih francs, but only upon the

absolute condition that France should give up the coinage of silver;'and he
was able to add, without being contradicted, that the French Government
was inclined to subscribe to such an arrangement. At the same time, on this
side of the channel, a vast monetary investigation was being carried on with
6clat before the superior council of agriculture and commerce, the conclusions of which examination were favorable to the adoption of gold monometallism. An international conference, called upon the occasion of the Universal Exhibition of 1867, had already pronounced in favor of the same
views; and it may be said that everything seemed to presage the early triumph of monometallism.
In the present condition of affairs, what is the proper thing to do? We
must, so to speak, blot out from history these last ten years, and return t o
the status quo which obtained before the monetary war; in a word, we must
liquidate the disastrous experiment attempted by Germany.

I call special attention to Mr. CernuscM, delegate for France,
who makes the statement I have read:
Germany was the first to go into the experiment of gold monometallism at
a time when that monetary system was the object of a universal infatuation
amounting to almost a craze.

Why? Because of the wonderful fairy tales and unfounded exaggerations and representations of the officers and representatives of the United States in Europe that we had an auriferous
and argentiferous region extending from Mexico clear up to
Alaska, a region which was mountainous and filled with the precious metals which would yield annually from $200,000,000 to
$400,000,000; and that the world was to be flooded. They became
wild. Europe had seen the deluge that came from California
and Australia, and here was another which was to be fourfold
that which came from California and Australia, more gold than
they ever produced annually, to continue for all time to come.
These were the representations. As Germany had been scared
in 1857 into establishing a single silver standard because of the
surplus of gold, no wonder she was made^to change from t h a t
single silver standard to a single gold standard in 1871-3 by
reason of these misrepresentations and exaggerations.
We see now the effect of the misstatements and misrepresentations of Mr. Ruggles and Senator SHERMAN. I now quote from
that part relating to India, on pages 266 and 267:
As to India, the great wish of the financial authorities in. that country h a s
been, if possible, to have a common monetary system with England.
Silver being impossible, on account of the English system, they m u s t
choose between bimetallism or gold, and although for the present the latter
solution would be too difficult, it is certain that If the depreciation of silver
continues, and if by reason of the discovery of fresh deposits of gold, or
from some other cause, the opportunity should offer itself, we should only be
too ready to seize it, and to return to the proposals of the commission which
sat at Calcutta in 1868, and to enter, though much against our wish, into the
struggle which is about to commence between the nations of the earth for
the sole metal which will be left to us as the solid basis of an International

Then the effects of the representations of Senator SHERMAN
and Mr. Rugglesweredisclosedintheremarks made by Mr. Horton, on page 305. W h a t does he say?
The fact was thus recalled to me that a great deal had been written and
said in various quarters about the United States, and about the reasons
which had led my country to interest itself in the silver question, and that
the press had largely reproduced these observations.
I can not say that it surprises me to observe a certain confusion of ideas
with reference to the monetary Dolicy of my country. This is the fourth
time that I have come to Europe since my entry, in 1876, Into monetary controversy as an apostle or advocate, in my way, of a bimetallic monetary
•union, and each time I have been able to recognize the same phenomenon;
it is all very natural; the New World is a long way off.

And exaggerations, as a matter of course, are firmly established in the mind.

Mr. President, in this conference every one of the nations refused. They attended out of deference to the United States, and
it would seem that that was sufficient to settle forever the fact
that we could not have an international agreement upon that
I also quote from Mr. Evarts's speech, on pages 322 and 323:
Mr. Evarts, chief delegate of the United States, then addressed the conference (in English) as follows:
Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Conference, the first disturbance in
what was a satisfactory condition in the working of the money market of
the world, become so by either a fortuitous or a circumspect consent which
had obtained between the nations theretofore; the first disturbance in that
condition of things grew out of the debates, and came as a sequel of a conference that really had no function or duty in the matter which we now discuss. The conference of 1867, meeting for and undertaking to treat that important consideration of convenience and utility, the unification of the coins
used in the computations and transactions of the world, naturally, under a
scientific, a mathematical, a symmetrical consideration of the subject, felt
a s if there were but one metal money in the world, it would be easier to
have a universal system of coinage. Bent, with the zeal of their work, upon
accomplishing that secondary result, and finding that the reduplicated impediments grew out, both of the use of the two metals, and of the great
diversity of coinage in the two, they thought that the way to get at a unity
of coinage w a s to have but one metal in the service of the world for its
money. This w a s a clear subordination of the end to the means; this was a
sacr iice of money that could not be spared In its volume and in Its force, in
order that the symmetry of the mintage might be more conveniently attained. This was in the nature of a sacrifice of the great and manifold
transactions of an open commerce to the convenience and the simplicity
of the bookkeeping wbich records it.
Unluckily, this scientific appreciation fell upon two great countries under
circumstances which hid, perhaps, from their eyes the mischiefs, and made
of less consideration the responsibilities of an effort toward the demonetization of silver. Germany, interested in its own unification, the great
political transaction of our age, found political reasons why the unity of
money in Germany was of great importance to the unity of* society and of
the State. Then this unhappy idea that, as the diversity was most in the
silver, and the habits, antagonisms, and preferences of the people were most
Involved with the silver, if y o u would unify the money by having only the
gold, the empire with its golden currency would easily master the suppression of the diversities of the inferior coinage. In the United States these
ideas of the conference of 1867 reached us when we were using neither silver
nor gold, and when the public mind was inattentive to the consideration of
so intimate, so comprehensive, so universal an influence upon all the Interests of a State as a change In their money might exert. In the presence,
then, of the fact that neither silver nor gold w a s the practical and present
money in our daily use, the money In which we, to the common apprehension, had to accommodate our relations to the other nations of the world,
the movement took place by the act of 1873, a coinage act, as I understand it
to have been; which, under this unlucky incident of regulating coin, has
seemed to suppress one-half the Intrinsic money of the State.

Now, I want to put the matter still further beyond doubt. I
know some of my bimetallic monometallists will not believe anything that occurs unless it comes filtered through certain channels. I shall now read from President Cleveland's message of
December 8, 1885, and I know you will believe him. In listening to the same kind of a message in behalf of the repeal of the
Bland bill and picturing the consequences flowing from it, it
would be very difficult for a practiced ear to distinguish between
the parts of that message referring to the Bland act and the
present message referring to the Sherman act. You would
think they were about the same subject-matter and referring to
the same time. The same evil is predicted and the same result.
But I am quoting him now in regard to the possibility of an international bimetallic agreement, because that is the dernier ressort
of the opponents of silver, and has been all the way through
this fight.
H e had sent delegates over there of his own choice and selec649—6

tion—Mr. Manton Marble, Mr. Edward Atkinson—who saw this
pile of silver that had flowed out of the mountain side, and
others. Mr. Cleveland says:
It may be said, in brief, as the result of these efforts, that the attitude of
the leading powers remains substantially unchanged since the monetary
conference of 1881, nor is it to be questioned that the views of these governments are in each instance supported by the weight of public opinion.
The steps thus taken have therefore only more fully demonstrated the
uselessness of further attempts at present to arrive at any agreement on
the subject with other nations.

Mr. President, I desire to read a little more of what was said
in 1885. The President himself now refers to international
agreement just as if there were a possibility of such a thing. I
quote now from Senate Executive Document No. 29, Forty-ninth
Congress, first session, being a message of the President of the
United States, transmitting, in response to Senate resolution ol
December 9,1885, a report of the Secretary of State, with information relative to the gold and silver coinage of Europe. This
is the report of the Secretary of State transmitting letters to
Mr. Manton Marble from the Secretary of State to Mr. Phelps,
our minister to Great Britain, and to Mr. McLane, our minister
to France, etc. They were instructed to make full inquiry. Mr,
Phelps says to Mr. Bayard (No. 4, page 5):
Prom these, as well as other sources, I am satisfied that the British Government will inflexibly—

Now, listen, Mr. President—
From these, as well as other sources, I am satisfied that the British Government will inflexibly adhere to their past and present policy in respect to
coinage; that they will not depart from the gold standard now and so long
established; that they will not become party to any international arrangement
or union for the creation of a bimetallic standard or of a common ratio between gold and silver, for the purpose of making both an unlimited legal
tender, nor adopt such double standard or common ratio in Great Britain.
On this point both political parties quite concur, and I believe that if either
were to attempt to introduce such a departure from the existing money
standard it would be driven out of power by the force of public opinion.

Now I quote from McLane to Secretary Bayard:
Referring to my separate dispatch,under date September 11,1 have to renew the opinion therein expressed, that while France would gladly receive
the intelligence that the United States would adopt the French ratio of 15J
of silver to 1 of gold, no consideration of future consequences, whether for
good or evil, could induce her to adopt the American ratio of 16 to 1; still
less would she adopt any higher ratio to assimilate the present commercial
or market value of silver with the value of gold, nor would she consent at»
any ratio now to permit an unrestricted or even a limited coinage of silver
at her mints, the present opinion and purpose of her Government and people being to maintain, if possible, the two metals at their present ratio of
15J to l in domestic circulation and international exchange.

Now I read from Hon. George H. Pendleton to Mr. Bayard,
on page 9:
The adhesion of Germany to an international bimetallic union, such as
was proposed by the United States and France in 1881, can scarcely be expected, it seems to me, within any limit of -time now to be predicted.
The cooperation of Germany in an international bimetallic union may be
sought with fair hopes of success whenever It becomes possible to include
in such a union England and Russia, the former of which seems to cleave
tenaciously to her gold monometallism, while the latter staggers under the
evils of a depreciated and largely fluctuating paper money. The adhesion
of England at least is certainly now, and would probably for an indefinite
period be, regarded by Germany as a sine qua non.

I will read a few more extracts from this document. There
was an international monetary conference of the Latin Union
held in Paris in 1885 among European nations only, a t some exposition there, and Mr. George Walker was delegated by President Cleveland to represent the United States. I wish to read

a few lines to show the financial standing of the Administration
at that time. Mr. Walker was consul-general there, and this is
his observation addressed to the delegates of the Latin monetary union assembled in conference at Paris July 20, 1885:
I am Instructed to say to you that the policy of the new American Government, in respect to the continuance of silver coinage, does not differ from
that of its predecessors. The newly elected President, Mr. Cleveland, on the
24th of February last, in reply to a letter addressed to him by certain members of the House of Representatives, before his assumption of office, declared his opinions very frankly on the silver question, and showed himself
to be in perfect accord with the Presidents who have preceded him, on the
essential question now under discussion in the United States—namely, the
continuance of silver coinage under the Bland bill. He did not hesitate to
avow that it was, in his opinion, the duty of Congress to suspend further
He declared that a disastrous crisis was close at hand in which gold is likely
to disappear from circulation and when we shall be reduced to silver alone;
that under the operation of the silver coinage law the flow of gold into the
Federal Treasury had been steadily diminished, and that silver and silver
certificates had displaced, and were then displacing, gold in the Treasury, and
that the sum of gold available for the payment of the gold obligations of the
United States, and for the redemption of the circulating notes called "greenbacks," if not already encroached upon, was perilously near such an encroachment.
These being the facts of our present condition, our danger, and our duty to
avert the danger seemed to the President to be plain. To maintain and to
continue in use the mass of our gold coin is possible by a present suspension
of the purchase and coinage of silver, and the President affirmed that he was
not aware that by any other method it Is possible.

That is a beautiful message to convey to bimetallists in Europe
in 1885, that this country was going to destruction, that our gold
was being driven out of the country and out of our Treasury, and
that we would not have gold enough left to redeem the greenbacks. These dire disasters are repeated as the predictions of
our President in 1885, and that there was no difference between
his position on the finances and the position of his Republican
predecessors. I thought there was some difference. I m a y h a v e
been mistaken.
I t does seem to me that these things show beyond any question
whatever the impossibility of international bimetallism. Mr.
Cleveland's own agents and representatives sent there have demonstrated the fact.
I wish to settle this matter beyond any possibility of doubt.
Hon. Edward Atkinson was sent as a representative of this Government by Mr. Bayard in 1887. His report is found in the reports of the United States consuls, October, 1887, volume 24. I
will read just enough to give an idea of his views. Remember,
this is the same gentleman who had the exaggerated idea in his
mind of mountains of silver in Mexico, and how the silver metal
could be melted away from it and produced in an open hearth, as
it were. Mr. Atkinson's report is dated October 1,1887. He
I have further stated that if the principal commercial and manufacturing
states of Europe had no immediate intention of changing from the present
status of a limited coinage of silver for subsidiary use, the standard of full
legal tender being limited in practice to gold coin only, then it might become
the true policy of the United States to take action to maintain the gold dollar
as the "unit of value " according to the present statute, and for the Executive
to recommend to Congress suitable measures, if any further action Is necessary, to maintain permanently the present interchangeable quality or convertibility of our currency into gold coin on demand, whether consisting of
notes, silver coin, or silver certificates.

A magnificent representative of bimetallism in the United
States, going to Europe as representing President Cleveland's
first Administration, and tolling them that he wanted to know

what they were doing, and if they did not do something it might
become necessary for the United States " to maintain the gold
dollar as the unit of value according to the present statute, and
for the Executive to recommend to Congress suitable measures, if
any further recognition is necessary, to maintain permanently the
present interchangeable quality or convertibility of our currency
into gold coin on demand, whether consisting of notes, silver coin,
or silver certificates." This is remarkable language for a delegate
of the United St ites'in a foreign country attempting to establish
bimetallism. Permit me to say that too often in our efforts for
international bimetallism have we been represented in the same
way, beginning at the statistical congress in 1803, and the monetary conference of 1865, and so on. But he says:
I have reason to believe that my efforts in this direction may have partly
removed the dread of a prospective "avalanche of silver," as it is sometimes
called, from the continent of North America, especially from the United
States, and that this fear, which has been perhaps the most potent cause of
the unwillingness even to consider the question of bimetallism, may be
wholly removed by the further investigation as to the relative production of
silver and gold which may ensue. Another dread may also have been removed, to wit. that of a sudden change of policy in the United States leading
to the cessation of silver coinage and also to the possible attempt to dispose
of a considerable part of the present stock of silver coin.

Oh, yes, he has disabused the mind of that, and yet told them
that we would do it. What is his belief? Here is the point that
I wish specially to bring out:
1. There is no prospect of any change in the present monetary system of
European states which can modify or influence the financial policy of the
United States at the present time.
2. There are no indications of any change in the policy of the financial
authorities of the several states visited by me which warrant any expectation that the subject of a bimetallic treaty for a common legal tender,,
coupled with the free coinage of silver, will be seriously considered at the
present time by them.
3. There is no indication that the subject of bimetallism has received any
intelligent or serious consideration outside of a small circle in each country
named, as a probable or possible remedy for the existing causes of alleged
depression in trade.
4 There is no considerable politically organized body of influential persons
in either country with whom a combination could be made, if such a combination or cooperation were desirable on the part of a similar body in the
United States for promoting any definite or practicable measures of legislation to bring about the adoption of the bimetallic theory according to the
commonly accepted meaning of that term. The discussion is as yet almost
wholly personal, and without concentration of purpose or the presentation
of any well-devised measure capable of being acted upon.

Mr. President, it does seem to me that this ought to be sufficient to satisfy anyone that bimetallism by international agreement is an impossibility. I t is useless for us to waste time in
trying to get foreign nations to agree upon international bimetallism with us.
The quotation I have just read is a graphic, painful, and yet,
doubtless, truthful statement of the views and opinions generally prevalent in Europe in regard to the motives and purposes of our Government. Their origin is easily traced, and Mr*
Atkinson is in part responsible for their existence.
The financiers, statisticians, and business men of Europe read
and believed all the exaggerations, to use a very mild term, in regard to the certain deluge of the world with the precious metals,
and the statements made in our efforts to establish the single
gold standard and the resulting action and legislation of our own
and their own Governments, discriminating in favor of gold and
against silver, and thsn as soon as gold h id been enthroned as
th J only money, the changed hue and cry raised by the gold mono649

metallists in this country as to the excessive production of silver,.and then the bitter denunciations poured out against every
effort made in this country to restore silver as a money metal
and the unfounded statements as to the production of silver and
the refusal of our own people to use the silver dollars as money,
and very naturally came to entertain the views, opinions, and
feelings so forcibly stated by Mr. Atkinson.
I t is therefore useless to make any further efforts for any international agreement to restore silver as a money metal to its
old equality and par with gold.
But, Mr. President, we were not satisfied with what was done
in .1885,1886, and 1887; and when the Presidential election was
to be held in 1892 the sundry civil appropriation law contained a
provision for an international monetary conference and the delegates were appointed by President Harrison to meet, I think, in
November, 1892. They were Senators A L L I S O N of Iowa, and
J O H N P . J O N E S of Nevada, and Representative J A M E S
MCCKEAKY, and Messrs. Henry W . Cannon, E. Benjamin Andrews, and Edwin H. Terrell.
Mr. ALLISON. I think the Senator should state in this connection that the President of the United States had already invited the nations in conference before the clause was inserted in
the appropriation act to which he refers.
Mr. COCKRELL. I think that was done in pursuance of a
former provision for that objcct.
Mr. ALLISON. The invitation had already been extended to
those governments before the item to which the Senator alludes
was inserted in the appropriation act.
Mr. COCKRELL. I understand that, but I say it was in pursuance of some existing provision of law. I hold in my hand the
report of the International Monetary Conference at Brussels. I
will not consume the time of the Senate in reading it, but at
p ge 50 the delegate of Germany gave his views to show that
they did not want to make any change, and at pages 69 and 70
Mr. Rothschild said:
Apart from other considerations, it seems to me impossible to come to an
universal arrangement in respect to a general currency question, as no two
countries are alike as regards their individual wealth, resources, and expenditure.

Now look at pages 203, 205, and 206, and we will see the position of Prance:
France, under present circumstances, has n o cause to complain of her
monetary situation, and she does not complain.
She has attempted at various times, and notably in 1881, to come t o an
agreement with the United States, and it w a s thus that the way was paved
for the conference of 18S1, which w a s only a continuation of that of 1878.

Then on page 205:
If France and the Latin Union—I believe that for the moment I may speak in
its name—should alone open their mints to the free coinage of silver, all the
surplus silver of the United States and of Mexico would go to France, to Italy,
t o Belgium. And where would these countries be able to use It? Nowhere,
since in the rest of Europe none wish to admit i t as legal tender.
I should never advise such a measure to the government which I have the
honor to represent.
If, on the contrary; other European powers, such as England, the German
Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Scandinavian States, and others,
would consent t o open their mints to the free coinage of silver, then the aspect of the question would be changed. B u t have we reached that point?

And then on page 206:
Since the first day we have heard upon this point declarations which were
perfectly frank ana sincere, declarations for which I, on m y part, am grate*

ful to their authors, because it is well to know upon what we may rely. We
have heard the minister of Germany and the minister of Austria-Hungary,
and then Sir Rivers Wilson declare that neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary nor England had any intention of modifying their monetary systems,
with which they declared themselves satisfied. Under these conditions we
evidently can not reestablish free coinage, and I have not the vanity to believe that I should succeed in pursuading the governments of these great
countries and their eminent representatives that they are mistaken, that
they have taken the wrong road, and that they are in error in remaining attached to monometallism.
I consider, therefore, until some change takes place, that the question of
free coinage Is decided so far as we are concerned.

On page 361 of this same report is other evidence to the same
effect. I will not quote that, nor ask to have it printed, because it
is simply the declaration of Mr. Currie as to what England would
do, and of Mr. Wilson, both of them saying that England would
under no circumstances agree to it. So it does seem to me that
each nation, as each individual, must work out its own destiny.
International bimetallism in impossible.
Mr. H A W L E Y . Will the Senator allow me to ask him a
Mr. COCKRELL. Certainly.
"Mr. H A W L E Y . Do I understand him to claim that the nations generally are oppos3d to an international agreement?
Mr. COCKRELL. I have not yet found one solitary nation, in
all the international conferences, that was willing to give up its
monetary system for any other one that was proposed.
Mr. H A W L E Y . Let me call the Senator's attention to the
somewhat famous debate in the House of Commons last March,
in.which several members said substantially that Great Britain
alone is in the way of an internation \1 agreement. If the Senator
will look at the document from which he has just been reading
he will find in one of what I may call the minority reports the
statement of Mr. Leonard Courtney, as follows:
I am myself drawn to the conclusion that the home Government is the
greatest obstacle, perhaps the only substantial obstacle, to the establishment
of an international agreement for the use of silver as money, which, without
attempting to restore the position of twenty years since, would relieve India
from the anxiety of a further depreciation of its revenue in relation to its

I think it is the understanding of the bimetal! ists of Great
Britain that it is only their Government, and perhaps only the
existing ministry, that stands in the way.
Mr. COCKRELL. I understand; but you may read quotations
from the remarks of this distinguished citizen and all the others
and you will find even in the Brussels conference that one of the
English delegates differed from the others. But I wish to read
what Mr. Edward Atkinson said in regard to those cases:
There is no considerable politically organized body of influential persons
in either country with whom a combination could be made, if such a combination or cooperation were desirable on the part of a similar body in the
United States for promoting any definite or practicable measures of legislation to bring about the adoption of the bimetallic theory according to the
commonly accepted meaning of that term. The discussion is as yet almost
wholly personal, and without concentration of purpose or the presentation
of any well-devised measure capable of being acted upon.

That is the point I make. You can find distinguished Englishmen, and Germans, and Frenchmen, and others who are advocating bimetallism; and we all know that as England commenced
the movement for a gold standard and established it she has determined to maintain it ever since, and that she will not change
under any conditions until her Government is overthrown, until
the power that rules there is overthrown. I t will take a. cabinet,

it will take a House of Commons entirely changed from the present complexion of all the political parties there. The time may
come, and I hope it will, but it will only come by open and free
discussion before the people of England. I t will not come by
any measures of the aristocratic and plutocratic class that control the administration of the Government.
International bimetallism is a mere dream. Look at it a moment. You had just as well seek an international language.
International bimetallism was prevented when the language of
the world was confused at the Tower of Babel and the people
were scattered, forming independent nations, each nation to take
care of itself and work out its own destiny. We have been trying to get an international agreement upon weights and measures
ever since our Government was organized and yet we have not
obtained it.
Mr. President, it is not necessary, it is not essential. Every
government establishes its own system. I t has its own constitution; it has its own laws; it has its own distinctive features
peculiar to its own people; its own traditions, its own ancestral
memories and cherished antiquities. They will adhere to them;
they will not give them up easily. England will not give up
her pound sterling. The people of the United States will not
give up their dollar.
Mr. H A W L E Y , By the way, Mr. President,.the Senator will
allow me to observe that i t happens to be the old Spanish coin,
and we borrowed it from another country. The Senator says
there is no international relation between our Government and
others in the mattar of currency. W e founded our dollar upon
the Spanish dollar.
Mr. COCKRELL. We were scarcely anybody: a few citizens
of other countries residing upon this soil under the dominion of
England. As a matter of course we had nothing of our own, separate and distinct from other people. But we were rebellious.
W e rebelled. We established our rebellion into revolution and
patriotism, and we established our Government, and then we established dollars and cents as the money of account,not pounds,
shillings, and pence, not francs, but dollars and cents; and we
made the silver dollar which was in circulation amongst us a
Spanish coined dollar, because we had no mints, we had no coinage, we had no silver produced in this country to coin if we
we wanted it, so that we had to take a foreign coin and have it
made into our standard dollar. W e adopted that, and we have
maintained it. Then we were only about three and a half million in population I believe, but we did not consult the King of
England, we did not bow the knee to His Majesty, and ask him
what kind of a financial system Ave should establish. We did not
bow to France and ask her to cooperate with us in establishing a
financial system for our youthful Republic, W e had some confidence in our own individuality and some self-reliance, and some
determination to maintain our independence and our nationality
and our principles and our policies in the face of the world.
Mr. ALLISON. Will the Senator allow me for a moment to
call his attention to the fact that we adopted as nearly as we
could their system and the ratio which we supposed they maintained between the two metals?
Mr. COCKRELL. That who maintained?
Mr. ALLISON. England and France. W e did not adopt t h e
Spanish ratio. We adopted as nearly as we could the ratio which

was then supposed to exist i n continental Europe and in England.
Mr. COCKRELL. We adopted what was believed to be the
weight of the money current in our country, and you will find it
on a critical examination made of the Spanish dollar and tha
number of grains it was supposed to contain, and then we made
it to correspond with that.
Mr. ALLISON. That is very true; but when we did that we
also adopted a ratio between that and gold which should make
both metals, as was supposed, circulate freely in our own country as they were then circulating, but for war, in all Europe.
Mr. COCKRELL. I beg pardon; in 1785 France had established the bimetal] ic system at the ratio of 15£ to 1. It was in the
law. It was not done in 1803. Then, when our Constitution was
formed and when we came to the mint question in 1792 we h id
the record of France before us establishing her standard of 15£ to
1, and we did not establish it.
Mr. ALLISON. If the Senator will a moment, I will
state that the ratio adopted in 1785 in France was not then a
practical ratio as to coinage.
Mr. COCKRELL. W h y not a practical ratio?
Mr. ALLISON. Because very soon after it was adopted they
went to the system of paper money and had neither gold nor
Mr. COCKRELL. Oh, they did have ^old and silver.
Mr. ALLISON. They did not have it in circulation.
Mr. COCKRELL. I beg pardon; it was the lawful ratio, the
legal ratio, I understand.
Mr. ALLISON. I agree with that.
Mr. COCKRELL. And it prescribed it exactly. Now, in our
act of 1792 establishing the mint we established a system of 15 to
1. That was not the system of France at that time; it was not
the system of England.
Mr. ALLISON. Fifteen and two hundred and eleven onethousandths, or very near that, was the system.
Mr. COCKRELL. Fifteen and two-tenths was that of England.
Ours was not che system of any other nation; and as I understand
it was ascertained from the reports that were then made by the
officers to whom reference was made, and especially with the
Spanish dollars.
Mr. HARRIS. A thousand Spanish milled dollars were taken.
Mr. COCKRELL. A thousand milled dollars were taken and
assayed, and from their assay we established our ratio.
But, Mr. President, we must present after a century of existence a wonderful spectacle to foreign nations. Think of it! After
we had r ejected international bimetallism in 1865 -67 and then went
on and established our single gold standard, we did not ask other
nations to agree with us there. The Senator from Ohio, when
he led the gold monometallic hosts of this country, unknown
among the masses of the people, unrecognized, and thereby secured the law of February 12,1873, did not go and consult other
countries. He did not even reduce the gold in the gold dollar
cents, as he promised to do in France, in order to make them
abandon silver." No, no; but the very moment the friends of silver, the true bimetallists, make an effort to restore silver in this
country, then we hear the plea for international conferences and
.international agreements.
European nations, suspicious and jealous of this great Republic,

the greatest and most powerful nation to-day in all the essential
elements of an independent nationality, can not believe our efforts to secure international bimetallism to be pure and disinterested and unselfish. They know what we have told them
heretofore; they think something is concealed; they look with
wonder, admiration, and astonishment at our remarkable career
as a young nation, our unparalleled development and progress.
They beheld us only a few years ago engaged in the most fearful fratricidal war ever waged on earth. They saw us emerge
from that war an indisolluble union of indestructible States, with
our financial resources apparently exhausted, with an enormous
debt—a debt on August 31,1865, of $2,845,907,626.56, and wondered how we could ever liquidate it. They have watched our
progress more closely than we imagine. They have seen us raise
the revenues and pay in discharge of that vast debt the enormous
Bums of $1,701,590,978.80 of the principal, and $2,370,616,966.70 of
the interest, aggregating $4,072,207,945.50 up to August 31,1893,
in principal and interest paid on our national bebt.
In addition, they have seen us collect from our revenues $6,953,990,881, paid out in defraying the ordinary expenses of our
National Government, making a total expenditure of $11,036,198,837 from August 31,1865, up to August 31,1893—an amazing
result, never before in the history of the world achieved by any
other nation.
The nations of the world stand aghast at our hesitation, our
refusal, our timidity to establish independently of them our own
monetary system and policy. They can not understand why we
are time after time beseeching them to meet in international
conferences to agree upon the policy we shall pursue. Out of
mere deference to us as a nation they generally accept our invitations and meet with our delegates, and then tell them, and through
them tell us and the'world, that they each have their own systems and policies and are content and do not desire to change.
Great Britain tells us that her gold monometallism is satisfactory and she does not desire a change. Prussia told us in the conference of 1867 that she was content with her single silver standard adopted in 1857: yet she did not deign to consult us or any
other nation when she changed to the single gold standard in
1871 and 1873, nor did Russia, Denmark, Norway and Sweden,
Austria-Hungary, or any other European nation.
Prance in 1867 held out to us the willing hand of a true bimetallic system and we knocked it back in her face by peremptorily refusing to recognize silver and demanding the single gold
standard as the American idea, of which great feat of statesmanship the distinguished Senator from Ohio boasted in his report
quoted. They met us in friendly conference in 1878, and very
politely recalled to us our own exaggerations and statements, and
our conduct in the statistical congress of 1863, and the monetary
conference of 1867, and reminded our delegate? that we had not
done what we were urging them to do, that the Bland bill as
passed by the House was for the free and unlimited coinage of
the standard dollar, and was subsequently changed to a limited
coinage measure, and only the minimum coined. They have
placed us on the defensive in every convention. They know as
well as we do that our representatives deceived and misled them
by the unfounded and exaggerated statements of our auriferous
and argentiferous productions, made in 1863, and again in 1867,

and upon which and under the belief of the truth of which they
made the changes in their monetary standards I have shown.
• They ever since have viewed, and now view, with suspicion
and doubt the real facts we show them from official records, the
truth as it is.
Shall we longer plead with them our dependence, our inability
to establish and maintain our own national monetary system,
such a one as we desire?
Let us take an exact re view of the relative conditions existing
in the past and at present between silver and gold, in order to
determine our line of duty and interest now.
According to the tables published in the report of the Director
of the Mint, showing the ratio of silver to gold each year since
1687, we find the ratio in 1687 was 14.94 silver to lof gold, or 14.94
to 1; and in 1871 was 15.57 to 1, and that-the two greatest divergencies from this ratio were in 1760, when the ratio was 14.14 to
1, and in 1813, when the ratio was 16.25 to 1; but in the next year,
1814, it was 15.04 to 1.
The average ratios during these one hundred and eighty-five
years, 1687-1872, was about 15.5 to 1, showing a remarkable
steadiness in the relative values. The ratio in 1872 was 15.63 to
1; in 1873,15.92 to 1; in 1874,16.17 to 1: in 1875,16.59 to 1; in
1876, 17.88 to 1, and in 1888, 21.99 to 1, and in 1889, 22.10 to 1; in
1890,19.76 to 1; in 1891, 20.92 to 1; 1892, 23.72 to 1; 1893, 28.52
to 1.
These ratios are taken from 1687 to 1832 from tables by Dr.
Soetbeer from quotations of such prices at Hamburg; and from
1833 to 1878 from Pixley & Abell's tables of quotations in the
London market; and since 1878 from the daily telegrams from
London to our Mint Bureau.
London for many years has been the great market for the
world in fixing the price of silver as a metal by the gold standard.
W e see here a remarkable stability in the ratios from 1687 to
and including 1872, at or about the average of 15.5 to 1.
We see a wide divergence in their ratios since 1873. W h a t
caused this divergence?
£ assert that it was not caused by any excessive production of
silver over gold throughout the world.
In proof of this I give the following statements of the average
percentage in the value of gold to silver in the productions of
the world, in the periods of years indicated:
Statement of the production of gold and silver in the world sines the discovery of
[Prom 1493 to 1883 is from table of averages for certain periods compUed by
Dr. Adolph Soetbeer. For the years 1836-1892 the production is the annual
estimate of the Bureau of the Mint.]
Total value Total coining
value of
of gold for
the period. silver for the





327i 221,000

Percentage of production.
By weight.

By value.

Gold. Silver. Gold. Silver.




Statement of the production of gold and silver in the world, etc.—Continued.


1856-1860 . . . . . . .
1861-1865. ..

Total value Total coining
of gold for silver forof
the period.

Percentage of production.
By weight.

By value.

Gold. Silver. Gold. Silver.
















The average percentage for the whole period is 45.8 to 54.2.
From the discovery of America in 1492 to this date, four hundred years, of every dollar of the world's aggregate product of
both gold and silver, 45.8 cents were gold and 54.2 cents were
The information available for estimates of the world's production of gold and silver prior to 1687 is not considered definite or
reliable by Br. A. Soetbeer, of Germany, now deceased, who in
my opinion was the most impartial and accurate of statisticians,
and was a single gold standard advocate.
The estimates of the ratios of silver to gold throughout the
world prior to 1687 are uncertain and unreliable, as little is
known with certainty as to the fineness of the gold or silver in
the coins.
From the reports of the Director of the Mint, I have compiled
some data.
.1 n the years 1801 to 1810, inclusive, of the world's production of
gold and silver, the proportion or percentage of gold to silver was
24.1 dollars or 24.1 cents of gold to 75.9 dollars or cents of silver.
Notwithstanding this large difference in the product, there was
great stability in the ratios or relative values.
In t h e ten years, 1852-1861, inclusive, the world produced
$1,724,750,000 of gold and silver, of which the gold was $1,314,150,000, or 76.2 per cent, while the silver produced was only
$410,600,000, or 23.8 per cent, and yet there was no very great
divergence in their ratios or relative values. The cause of this
remarkable stability in ratio or value was the fact that the mints


of the United States were open to the free and unlimited coinage of silver at 16 to 1. And the mints of France from October
30,1785, were open to like coinage at the ratio of 15£ to 1.
There was a scare in this period of 1852-1861 in regard to an
overflow, a deluge of gold from California and Australia, very
similar to the scare since that date in regard first to an overflow, a deluge, of both metals, and then when gold was enthroned as the single standard, as I have shown—then as to an
overflow—a deluge of silver—which still exists in the vain imaginations of our gold monometallist bimetallic friends.
Have these doctrinaire prophets, Mr. Ruggles, Senator S H E R MAN, and others realized the falsity of their predictions and the
true facts as to the production of gold and silver? Please recall
their fairy tales of the production from our own mines of from
two hundred to four hundred millions annually, so persistently
proclaimed in Europe in 1863 to 1868, and then hear the truth
as shown by the records.
In the ten years, 1862 to 1871, inclusive, the production of gold
and silver in the entire world was only $1,616,200,000, an annual
average of only $161,620,000 of both metals. Think of it. Mr.
Ruggles and Mr. S H E R M A N told them we were going to produce
from $200,000,000 to $400,000,000 a year in the United States alone,
and yet the world produced in that time only an annual average
of $161,620,000 of both metals, gold and silver.
In this period the gold product alone was $1,102,825,000, or
68.24 per cent of the aggregate product of both metals, while
the silver product was only $513,375,000, or only 31.76 per cent
of the aggregate product.
During the entire period, when these sages and doctrinaire
statesmen were enthroning gold and demanding the single gold
standard, refusing to agree with the nations of the Latin Union
to free and unlimited bimetallic coinage, and practically driving
them to join in degrading, depreciating, and demonetizing silver and destroying nearly one-half of the world's money, the
world was producing 68.24 dollars of gold to 31.76 dollars of silver.
These facts throw an arc electric light upon the unreliability
and the falsity of the judgment, opinions, and predictions of
such leaders. If so egregiously mistaken then, may not they be
mistaken now, and their prophetic warnings prove a delusion, a
snare, a will-o-the-wisp?
Take the entire period, 1862 to 1892, inclusive, thirty-one years,
and the world's product of gold and silver has been $6,284,666,000, an annual average of only $202,731,161.
During this period the gold product has been $3,359,422,000, or
53.45 per cent of the aggregate of both metals, while the silver
product has been only $2,925,144,000, or 46.55 per cent of the
If every nation had had at the beginning of this period of
thirty-one years an adequate supply of gold and silver for all
monetary purposes, then this annual average product of both
metals, after deducting the demands for such metals for industrial purposes and the loss by wear and tear and abrasion, would
have oeen barely sufficient to maintain the average per capita
circulation required by the increase of population and to meet
the increasing demands for money in the rapidly expanding commerce of the nations of the earth, domestic and foreign.
W h a t has been the product of g_>ld and silver in the United

States? In the twelve years, 1862 to 1873, inclusive, the aggregate product of gold and silver in the United States was $733,000,000, an annual average product of only $61,083,333,331. The
gold product was $546,750,000, an annual average of $45,562,500,
or 74.60 per cent of the aggregate, while the silver product
was only $186,250,000, an annual average of $15,520,833, or only
25.40 per cent of the aggregate—ahout one-third.
These figures, in juxtaposition with the deliberate, carefully
prepared statements of our distinguished representatives and
officials, published by them to the nations of the world in 1863
and since, should bring crimson to their cheeks. I do not give
them to the Senate as a pattern to imitate, but as an example to
The largest yield of gold in any one year in the United States
was $65,000,000 in the calendar year 1853. The largest yields
since 1862 were $53,500,000 in 1866, $53,225,000 in 1865. and $51,725,000 in 1867, while our annual average yield of gold in the
twelve years, 1881-1892, inclusive, was only $32,733,000. These
facts seem to me to prove conclusively that the depreciation of
silver has not been caused by any excessive production relatively to gold.
The conclusion seems to me irresistible that the depreciation
has been caused almost entirely by the legislation of the various
nations discriminating against silver and in favor of gold, closing their mints against the free and unlimited coinage of silver,
making it a mere commodity—merchandise, and keeping their
mints open to gold, and making gold, in bullion as well as in coin,
money with full legal tender, and thereby appreciating and increasing the value of gold.
I can not forbear at this point to prove this beyond a reasonable doubt by the solemn declarations of the senior Senator from
I quote from Senator SHERMAN'S speech in the Senate on April
11,1876. He said:
The enormous effect of this law in Germany—

Referring to the demonetization of silver there—
The enormous effect of this law in Germany, and as a consequence the partial demonetization of silver coins, I suppose is felt by every man, woman and
child who buys or sells anything. I suppose there is no act of any parliament that has so wide-reaching effect as this act of the German Parliament.
The amount of coin in the world is estimated by Mr. Seyd and other technical writers at $3,200,000,000 silver and $3,500,000,000 in gold. So the effect of
the act of Germany, aided no doubt somewhat by the large supply of silver
by our mines, has been to reduce the purchasing power of the whole of this
enormous sum of thirty-two hundred millions of silver fully 10 per cent. The
fall of the silver trade dollar in this country has been from 103 to 91.
This effect extended itself to what is called the Latin League, who feared
that German silver would be carried rapidly into Italy, France, and the nations of the league, for coinage purposes, and they interfered at once and
stopped the coinage of silver. It also created an Impression in India; so that,
for the first time for two hundred years, the current flow of silver into China
and India was arrested, but only for a short time, however. It is one of the
remarkable currents of trade ki the history of mankind that with the silver
that has been coined in the world the greater part flows in a continuous
stream Into these Oriental countries; and for three or four months a feeling
of alarm was created there lest that which they cherish as the measure of
all their values should become valueless to them. It created a partial panic,
but that panic has passed, and now the stream goes on; silver flows into India
and China and all the Asiatic countries as heretofore.
That was not the worst of it. A struggle for the possession of gold at once
arose between all the great nations, because everybody could see that if
$3,200,000,000 of silver coin were demonetized and $3,500,000,000 of gold coin
made the sole standard it would enormously add to the value of gold, and
the Bank of France, the Bank of England, and the Imperial Bank of Ger<549

many at once commenced grasping for gold in whatever form. Therefore
what we have observed recently is not so much a fall of silver as it is a rise
of gold, the inevitable effect of a fear of the demonetization of silver; and
now the Bank of France has in its vaults the enormous amount of $300,000,000
of gold in coin and bullion; the Bank of England has $170,000,000, and the
Imperial Bank of Germany, has $125,000,000. So in these three depositories
there is over $600,000,000 of gold, or nearly one-fifth of the supply of the world.

Then in the same speech the Senator from Ohio said:
The demonetizing of silver tends to add to the value of gold, and though
its relative value changes it is more stable compared to gold than any other
metal or production. '

This was the Senator from Ohio in 1876, who was then apparently
perfectly unconscious of having himself done anything to contribute to the action of Germany in the change from a single silver
standard to a single gold standard, perfectly unconscious that
anybody paid any attention to his refusal there in France as a
Senator of the United States and chairman of the Finance Committee, to join Mr. Ruggles in agreeing upon the bimetallic system of the Latin Union in 1867, which was offered to us.
A bird's-eye view of all these actions will only occupy a few
In 1870 the mints of all Europe, except Great Britain, Portugal, and Turkey, were open to .the free and unlimited coinage of
silver into full legal-tender money, the same as gjold, at the ratio
of 15£ to 1, and the mints of the United States, in the same condition, at the ratio of 16 to 1; and silver as metal and money at
such ratio was the full equal of gold, and there was a greater
demand for silver for monetary purposes than there was a
In July, 1870, the Government of Sweden and Norway created
the monetary commission, joined by Denmark in 1872, and the
result was the abandonment of their single silver standard and
the adoption of the single gold standard.
I n 1871 Germany instituted her change from a single silver
standard to the single gold standard, and completed the same
July 9,1873.
The United States, by the coinage act of February 12,1873,
prohibited the coinage of the standard silver dollar and established the single gold standard.
On January 30,1874, the nations of the Latin Union by a supplementary treaty denied free coinage of silver to individuals,
limited their coinage, and finally, in 1877, suspended further
coinage of full legal-tender silver.
In l875-'76 the Netherlands changed from the single silver
standard to a single gold standard and stopped the free coinage
of silver.
In 1876 Russia suspended the free coinage of silver.
Look at these unprecedented changes. W h a t is the inevitable
result? An immense mass, many hundreds of millions of coined
silver money made a mere metal commodity, like iron, and thrown
upon the markets for sale as such.
This mass of demonetized silver coins made an abnormal addi*
tion to the current production of silver, created for the time grave
apprehensions as to its future use as money, and destroyed largely
the demand for its monetary use, and a t the same time created
an abnormal and unprecedented demand for an amount of gold
to supply its place for money far beyond the sufficiency of the
existing stock of gold then in the world and the current production to supply it.

The natural and inevitable result followed: The depreciation of
silver measured by gold as money, and a rapid increase or appreciation in the value of gold, not only as compared with silver, but also as compared with the staple products of the world,
produced by the sweat and toil of the great masses of the people.
Not only did these great evils result, but the stable foundations of the monetary system of the world were grievously
shaken by destruction, ruthlessly made, of one of the two foundations and pillars upon which they rested.
Gold monometallists, in their idolatrous devotion to and worship of the golden calf, were blind to the inevitable consequences.
They feared no danger, no calamity, no evil, no impoverishment,
no financial disturbances.
The true friends of silver and gold, the true bimetallists, alone
foresaw the consequences and predicted them in unmistakable
T a prove this beyond cavil, I read the prophecies of Messrs.
Seyd and Wolowski, republished in the United States in 1880 by
Henry Carey Baird & Co., Philadelphia, in a small volume entitled " T h e Gold Standard; its causes, its effects, and its future,"
from the German of Baron William Yon Kardorf-Wabnitz, who
served more .than ten years in the German Reichstag.
This is one of the most wonderful predictions in regard to financial matters which has ever been made in the world. I t has been
literally fulfilled, and is being fulfilled to-day:
Count Wolowski and Mr. Seyd published the following theses in 1868, the
year m which the agitation for the introduction of the gold standard began
in Paris—

This was in 1868, the vefy year that the Senator from Ohio introduced the bill in the United States Senate and made his famous
reportin favor of demonetizing silver and establishing the single
gold standard in the United States. They say:
The demonetization of silver, they predicted, by any great civilized nation,
must produce the following results:
1. The international trade of the world will instantly show signs of decline,
to the special injury of countries having the largest international trade.
2. The spirit of public enterprise, in railroad sand other useful undertakings,
will be immediately checked, and consequently the general progress of civilization will suffer.
3. The decline in prices win compel countries internationally indebted to
depart more and more from the principles of free trade toward a policy of
4. The nations of the world will be divided into two groups—the one trading in gold, the other in silver—and this condition will render commerce between them unsafe and precarious.
5. Throughout the world a decline in prices will follow, injurious alike to
owners of real property and the laboring classes, and advantageous only—
and unjustly so—to the holders of State bonds and similar securities.
6. One of the principal difficulties in this period of general depression will
be that people will look for its causes in all possible directions. The advocates of the gold standard will offer all possible groundless and fantastic excuses or reasons of a secondary nature only, and the real cause, the demonetization of silver, will he overlooked until the perspicuity of the phenomena
and dire necessity shall force thinking men to point It out.

That is a remarkable and wonderful prophecy, and it has been
Carried out.
I now quote from Lord Beaconsfield, of England, in the same
volume. The Senator from Ohio, as I shall quote hereafter,
stated that nobody could anticipate such a thing. I want to show
that there were some statesmen who did, even if he did not apprehend anything:
The views of Messrs. Seyd and Wolowski were also held by the distinguished statesman who is now the head of the British cabinet—Lord Bea640

consfleld—who, in 1873, foresaw the coming and the obstinancy of the recent
great commercial crisis, and in his above-cited speech said:
"X attribute the great monetary disturbance that has occurred, and is now
to a certain degree acting very injuriously to trade—I attribute it to the great
changes which the governments in Europe are making with reference to their
standards of value."
And again:
"It is quite evident we must prepare ourselves for great convulsions in the
money market, not occasioned by speculation or any old cause, as has been
alleged, but by a new cause with which we are not sufficiently acquainted,
and the consequences of which are very embarrassing."
And finally:
"Convulsions must come, and no one will be able to form an adequate Idea
of the monetary derangement of the time in which he lives if he omits from
his consideration the important subject to which I have called your attention."

I also refer to a quotation from Mr. Goschen, found at pages
51 and 52 of the conference of 1878. He said.
England had plainly stated her intention of maintaining her gold standard; Norway had said so, too; Germany was of the same opinion; while the
Latin Union was not disposed at present to resume the free coinage'of silver, or depart from the ratio of 1 to 15£, by which they are now bound. Very
little, therefore, could result from the conference, because most of the states
had decided beforehand on a particular policy. Austria, Italy, and Russia
might vote for the proposition as a theoretical question, buthavinga forced
currency they could not give practical support.
A theoretical discussion of the double standard, or of the advantages of
the single standard, would accordingly, in his judgment, be d waste of time.
Of what avail would it be to discuss theories out of which It was known beforehand no practical result could arise, and thus to lay down principles
which one was not about to follow. If the question of the double standard,
however, were set aside, another question might fairly be put to the conference, and one of a most practical and useful character. Assuming that
the universal double standard preferred by the United States be not adopted,
what will be the future of silver? And toward what end ought all states
to work, as far as practicable? The aim, he thought, should be to maintain
silver as the ally of gold in all parts of the world where this could be done.
A campaign against silver would be extremely dangerous, even for countries with a gold standard.







The Indian government had suffered a great loss; the merchants had suffered from fluctuations in value, and public functionaries had suffered from
the depreciation, but England had given proof of her faith In regard to silver by waiting to see whether it would not recover its former value. Had
the example of other countries been followed in India, and precautions taken
by limiting the mintage or introducing gold, silver might have fallen an additional 10 or 15 per cent. The laissez faire policy in India had done more
than anything else to keep up the value of silver. If, however, other States
were to carry on a propaganda in favor of a gold standard and of the demonetization of silver, the Indian government would be obliged to reconsider its position, and might be forced by events to take measures similar
to those taken elsewhere. In that case the scramble to get rid of silver might
provoke one of the gravest crises ever undergone by commere. One or two
states might demonetize silver without serious results, but if all demonetized, there would be no buyers, and silver would fall in alarming proportions. Thus all or nearly all st ates were interested In silver. He would not
enter on the situation of France, but take the case of Belgium. Belgium had
coined a large quantity of 5-franc pieces, and if the Latin Union came to an
end, these coins would necessarily flow back to Belgium, which country
would then not escape the general embarrassment.
If all states should resolve on the adoption of a gold standard, the question arose, would there be sufficient gold for the purpose without a tremendous crisis? There would be a fear, on the one hand, of a depreciation of
silver, and one, on the other, of a rise in the value of gold and a corresponding fall in the prices of all commodities.
Again, there was a further important question. Italy, Russia, and Austria, whenever they resumed specie payments, would require metal, and if
all other states went in the direction of a gold standard, these countries, too,
would be forced to take gold. Resumption on their part would be facilitated by the maintenance of silver as a part of the legal tender of the world.
The American proposal for a universal double standard seemed impossible
of realization, a veritable Utopia; but the theory of a universal gold standard was equally Utopian, and, indeed. Involved a false Utopia. It was
better for the world at large that the two metals should continue in circulation than that one should be universally substituted for the other.

The conference could not adopt the American proposition, hut an attempt
might be made, perhaps, elsewhere, to overcome the temporary and abnormal difficulties created by the German stock of £15,000X00 of silver. At
present there was a vicious circle; states were afraid of employing silver on
account of the depreciation, and the depreciation continued because states
refused to employ it. As long as this sum of £15,COO,000 of silver was in the
market, an expectant attitude must be maintained.

Mr. Mees, another delegate to that conference, said:
Mr. Mees stated that he had no instructions which would permit him to
vote for the propositions of the United States. It is the opinion, he said, of
the Government of the Netherlands that so Ion?: as England and Germany
shall retain the system of the single gold standard, it will remain impossibk'Tor Holland to adopt another system. Not only she can not bind herself
internationally in this matter, but she could not even adopt separately any
other than her present system. Such was the sole declaration which the
delegate of the Netherlands was authorized to make in the name of his Government.







Mr. Mees added that if the universal double standard was an Utopia, the
Single gold standard was also an Utopia, and one that wouldbe very dangerous, if by some Impossible combination of circumstances it should come to
be realized. The general demonetization of silver undertaken everywhere
at once would have the most fatal consequences. It would bring in its train
an enormous depreciation in the value of that metal, and would occasion
crises alarming in their economic effects. "What would be better for everybody would be that the two metals should continue to serve simultaneously
and, as Mr. Goschen had said, lend each other a mutual support.

Have these prophecies been fulfilled? Mr. President, no such
prophets have ever made predictions in behalf of the gold standard and had them fulfilled. Here we have pointed out for successive years exactly what would resultfrom the demonetization
of silver. Here we have prophecies as to what it would be.
W h a t was the general result, all over the world, of this demonetization of silver? The general result, Mr. President, was a
fall in the market value of all the great staple products of the
world. 1 quote from Dr. A. Soetbeer, who made a thorough examination and a statement. He says:
Taking the whole one hundred articles together, we find that the general
level of prices was higher in 1886 than in 1847-1850 by 4.96 per cent. The case
is very different if we compare the average prices of 1886 with those of the
period of 1871-1875. This becomes plain if we compare the prices of different
groups in 1871-1875 and in 1886. Taking one hundred ^s the prices in 18711875, we find that a fall in prices had taken place, as follows:
Per cent.
I. Agricultural products
Group II. Animal products
Group III. Southern products
Group IV. Tropical products
Group V. Minerals and metals
Group VI, Textile material
Group VII. Miscellaneous
For all the one hundred articles the comparative prices show a fall in 1886
compartd to 1871-1875 of 22 per cent.

Mr. President, I will read a short extract from this same work,
Gold Standard, from page 31:
If we observe that the commencement of the great crisis in the commerce
and trade of the world coincides precisely with the demonetization of silver
in North America and Germany, we shall easily perceive the connection of
causes between that fact and these phenomena, and see that the mischievous results of the demonetization of silver must, from year to year, become
more apparent.

But what was the result in England? England demonetized
silver in 1816, and at t h a t time England had depreciated paper
The immense resources—
G49 7

I am reading from Gold Standard again, pages 16 and 17—
The immense resources of the British Empire; its supremacy in the commerce of the world; the rapid development of those astonishing industries,
resting upon its natural treasures of iron and coal, which the inventions of
Watt and Arkwright had called into life; the ceaseless influx of the wealth
of India into the British Islands; all this could not prevent the fearful crises
which the seveial rapidly changing phases of the British finance and hank*
ing policy necessarily brought on.
First, following out the doctrines of the prevailing financial school, there
was a strong contraction of the note circulation in order to'force the resumption of specie payments, in consequence of which a business and financial
crisis occurred, whosa severity has not been exceeded by any in our times.
Then inflation, great increase in the issue of notes, and in consequence of
this apparent prosperity, apparent rapid growth of the national interests;
thena second contraction of the currency and consequent return of the crisis;
and so on, until ultimately the present bank act came into existence, the
note circulation acquired a certain stability, and the inexhaustible resources
of British prosperity were able, undisturbed by human folly, to enrich the

W h a t was the condition in Germany, Mr. President? The
same result occurred after the demonetization of silver in Germany. The same author, a German author, speaking of the demonetization of silver by Germany, says:
The fact that a number of smaller states would be forced to follow the example of Germany; that the embarrassments of countries having depreciate! standards, as Austria and Russia, would be increased by our proceeding; that France would be compelled to stop its coinage of silver; all this
was then considered as unimportant and even as desirable. Even the question whether a general depreciation of silver would follow appeared important only in so far as slower sales of silver would cause greater losses to







The adoption of the gold standard by the German Empire was the signal
for the immense commercial collapse the deplorable effects of which have
not yet been effaced. The like action by the North American Union by later
legislation would have remained isolated, and could hardly have produced
similar results. There was in that country no large stock of silver which,
like that of Germany, had to be placed on the market; there the greenbacics^
the national paper money—still formed the basis of circulation. If under
these circumstances the United States alone had adopted the gold standard, and Germany retained the silver standard with subsidiary gold coinage, the United States would probably have experienced difficulties and embarrassments, but the acute and general depreciation of silver which resulted from the change in the German standard would never have occurred.
The introduction of the gold standard in Germany caused no decrease i n
the circulation of metallic money, as not only the withdrawn German silver
and gold coins, but also the not inconsiderable amount of foreign gold circulating in Germany (Napoleons, 10 guldens, 5 franc3, Austrian thalers
and guldens), were amply replaced; indeed, the minute calculations by Soetbeer suggest that, including the changes in note circulation caused by the
German bank law, the amount of circulating medium has been increased.
This, according to the scholastic theory, should have resulted in advanced
prices of all commodities and in an export of money. But the higher gold
prices, in conjunction with the introduction of free-trade practices in our
commercial policy, produced the opposite result, namely, a perceptible increased purchasing power of money, a n i a decrease in the price of all commodities. The wild chase after gold, in which all countries immediately
joined, enhanced the price of gold, and thus caused an unprecedented depreciation of the value of land and commodities. The imperial board was
obliged to exercise all circumspection and caution to secure to the country
its share of gold by a timely increase in the rate of discount, not to the advantage of production.

Now, Mr. President, what was the result in the United States
of the demonetization of silver? I t was the coinage act of February 12,1873, and in the following September such a panic as
this country never before experienced shook it from center to
circumference, a financial depression which brought hundreds
and thousands of citizens of the country into bankruptcy and
ruin. So that in every country where it has been adopted the
result has bean a crisis, a commercial depression, bankruptcy,
and ruin.

Sir W . Houldsworth. a delegate of. Great Britain, said, at the
3russels Conference, in 1892:
In the first place, I am, from my position and antecedents, more peculiarly identified with industrial and commercial life than any of my honorable colleagues, and I need scarcely stay to remark that it is industry and
commerce in their widest aspects which are most vitally interested in and
will be most profoundly affected by the decisions at which this conference
• arrives. In the second place, 1 have had the honor and the responsibility of
sitting upon both of those important commissions in England, which were
appointed specially to examine into questions intimately connected with
that which we are called upon to discuss here. I refer to the royal commission on the depression of trade, which sat in 1885, and the gold and silver
commission, which sat in 1887-.88.
Now, with regard to the first of these commissions, without going into details, I feel bound to bring before this conference certain conclusions which
appear in the reports. The origin of the commission was the widespread
feeling in Great Britain, even so far back as fifteen years ago, that a deep
and abnormal depression of trade had set in, wnich, unlike previous depressions, showed no signs of recovery. All available statistics were brought
before us, and a large body of evidence was taken. Conflicting opinions
were expressed both as to the extent and as to the causes of the depression;
but at last these Ave definite conclusions were arrived at:
1. That the depression dated from the year 1873 or thereabouts.
2. That it extended to nearly every branch of industry, including agriculture, manufactures, and mining, and that it was not confined to England,
hut had been experienced to a greater or less degree in all the industrial
countries of the world.
3. That it appeared to be closely connected with the serious fall in general prices, which even then was most observable, though it has since been
more strongly marked, resulting in the diminution—in some cases even the
total loss—of profit, and consequent irregularity of employment to the wageearners.
4. That the duration of the depression has been most unusual and abnormal.
5. That no adequate cause for this state of things was discoverable, unless it could be found in some general dislocation of values caused by cur-rency changes, and which would be capable of affecting an area equal to that
* which the depression of trade covered.
It was in consequence of this report, and at the express recommendation
-of the depression of trade commissioners themselves, that the gold and silver royal commission was appointed to examine into the recent changes
in the relative values of the precious metals." I will not dwell on the report of that second commission, as I feel sure its main conclusions are
within the knowledge of most if not all the delegates at this conference. It
will be enough to say that it confirmed the findings of the previous commission as to the date of the disturbance, as to the fall in prices, as to the effect
of such fall upon all industries; and, in addition, it revealed the serious
consequences which had resulted from the destruction of that par of exchange between silver and gold at about 15} to 1 which had practically existed
uninterruptedly for seventy years before 1873, the disruption of which hau
-dislocated, embarrassed, and to some extent destroyed the trade between
silver-using and gold-using countries, and turned legitimate commerce into
little better than gambling.

In further substantiation of what I have said I quote from the
speech of Sir Guilford L. Moles worth, delegate of British India,
-at the Brussels Monetary Conference:
Now, this state of things was clearly predicted by Ernest Seyd in 1871, when
the severance of the link between gold and silver was first contemplated.
Bis prediction has been so remarkably fulfilled that Imu3t quote his words:
'•It is a great mistake to suppose that the adoption of the gold valuation
by'other States besides England will be beneficial. It will only lead to the
destruction of the monetary equilibrium hitherto existing, and cause a fall
In the value of silver, from which England's trade and the Indian silver valuation will suffer more than all other interests, grievous as the general decline of prosperty all over the world will be.
The strong doctrinarianism existing in England as regards the gold valuation is so blind that when the time of depression sets in there will be this
special feature; the economical authorities of the country will refuse to
listen to the cause here foreshadowed, every possible attempt will be made
to prove that the decline of commerce is due to all sorts of causes and irreconcilable matters; the workman and his strikes will be the first convenient
target; ttten speculation and overtrading will have their turn. * * *
Many other allegations will be made totally irrelevant to the real issue, but
rsatisfactory to the moralizingtendency of financial writers. The greatdan649

ger of the time will be that among all this confusion and strife England*®
supremacy in commerce and manufactures may go backward to an extent
which cannot be redressed when the real cause becomes recognized and the
natural remedy is applied,"
In fulfillment of this prediction, we find that the difficulties under which
we labor have been attributed to all sorts of irreconcilable causes. It has
been necessary to invent a theory that progress in manufactures, in improved transport, Inventions, and banking have caused a species of economic revolution, which has created a new state in the conditions of trade and
commerce differing from that which previously existed. But they overlook
the fact that the alleged causes have been in active operation during the
greater portion of the century (and when compared with the previous progress, they were far more pronounced during the middle of the century than
at present).
It is obvious, therefore, that such a revolution, if It existed, should have
arisen at an earlier period, ajLd that it should have developed gradually, Instead of setting in suddenly at the exact moment when the link was broken
between gold and silver. Moreover, this theory involves another irreconcilable position. It is absurd to suppose that a revolution of this character
could have affected gold prices so seriously, and yet should have left silver
prices unaffected. Silver is the standard of value of more than half the
world, yet silver prices have remained stable, whilst gold prices have fallen
from 40 to 50 per cent. Whilst shutting their eyes to these facts, the advocates of such a theory are also blind to the following facts:
1. That the depression which has occurred as a necessary consequence o
the suspension of free coinage of silver in France was predicted, and the
prediction has been fulfilled to the letter.
2. That since 1871 the population demanding gold has quadrupled, and the
foreign trade demanding gold has trebled.
3. That the demonetization of silver for international monetary purposes
in Europe has caused gold to perform, single-handed, the work previously
done by gold and silver combined.
4. That the annual supply of gold scarcely exceeds the amount required
for industrial purposes.
It follows, as necessary consequences of these facts, that with the increased
demand for gold its value must rise, or, In other words, gold prices must
The judicial blindness must be great which, Ignoring this strong evidence
of facts, seeks an explanation In irreconcilable theories.
A very distinguished member of this conference has likened silver to a sick
man whose state has been but aggravated by medicines which have been administered to cure him; but I think that this is not surprising, Inasmuch as
the physicians have not merely mistaken the character of the illness, but
they have mistaken the invalid. It is gold who is the sick man, not silver.
They have mistaken the bloated condition of gold for a symptom of health,
whereas it is the symptom of a dangerous disease which now threatens to
develop into a fearful crisis, which, as Mr. Rothschild says," would be frightful to contemplate."

I could go on indefinitely quoting authorities and facts, conclusively establishing what I have asserted.
Cast your eyes over the world's history since 1873 and see the
wrecks, financial crises, panics, failures, depreciation of the
prices of the vvorld:s products, the constant rise in the purchasing power of gold, the shrinkage in the market values of bonds
and stocks, entailing losses to the amount of billions of dollars, all
graphically foretold b^ the friends of bimetallism; the gold monometallists in the meantime, just asSeydandWolowski predicted,
attributing these dire results to every imaginable cause except
the true one, the striking down by discriminating laws one-half
of the metallic money of the world and establishing gold only as
Our own country has not escaped. We had the panic of 1873,
and several severe financial crises prior to the present one. Yet
our gold-standard financiers and doctrinaires attribute the causes
not to the true one. the demonetization of silver in the United
States in 1873 and throughout the world, but to our legislation
for the rehabilitation of silver.
Now, the so-called Sherman law is made the scapegoat and
must be unceremoniously and unconditionally driven into t h e

wilderness, and with its banishment halcyon days of financial
prosperity and restored confidence are to be ushered in.
The so-called Sherman law has had no influence whatever on
the exports of gold, to which reference has been made. In the
fiscal year 1889 our exports of gold were $49,607,427 in excess of
our imports. In 1890 they were $4,331,149; in 1891, $68,130,087;
in 1892, $495,873; in 1893, $87,506,463. Think of sane men undertaking to make other sane men believe that the Sherman
law drove this gold out of the country! It is ridiculous.
I wish to quote here from the speech of my distinguished friend
from Kentucky, Mr. BLACKBURN, in regard to whether the Sherman law drove gold out of the country or not. I quote from his
Bpeech on page 2215 of the RECORD, and I doubt not he has verified it:
The records of-the country show that for days and weeks, beginning in the
latter part of April, and it is more noticeably true in the month of May, for
days and weeks gold left this country at the rate of five millions a week,
until thirty-eight millions had gone, until a panic had been produced, until
values had been upset and unsettled, until the business of tue country had
been disturbed. At the rate of five millions a week your gold was shipped
out of the country, when never in one day nor one hour nor one Instant had
loreign exchange been above the rate I have named.
It is plain on the face of paper that one of two things was true, either the
shipper was paying ocean freights at a loss out of his pocket or else he was
receiving a commission from some one upon every dollar that was shinped.
"Who shipped this gold? I do not charge that all of the bankers ot New York
or "Wall street were engaged in it. There are bankers there whose character stands too high for me to believe that they were guilty of such a combination; but I know that there are bankers there who represent the Rothschilds, who did ship—Heidelbach, Ikleheimer & Co. and Lazarus Fr6res &
Co. These were the exporters of your gold. They were shipping it when
the rate of exchange proved beyond controversy that they were shipping it
a t a loss; they were either paying the ocean freights out of their pockets or
receiving a commission.

I t was fictitious, it was planned to order. There is no doubt
of this, and I quote this to show exactly what was the reason.
If the Sherman law sent gold out, it brought it back very quickly.
The financial collapse in the Argentine Republic occurred in
1890, and was followed in the year 1891 by the failure of the
English banking house of Baring Brothers, when it is charged
that England's investors lost $1,000,000,000. Gold was demanded
and taken from us as stated. Failures in Australia to the amount
of many millions have occurred, and gold monometallic England
was again shaken to the center. These exports of gold were no
more caused by the Sherman law than by an evening zephyr.
The present crisis was plainly predicted by Mr. Alfred de Rothschild, delegate from Great Britain to the Brussels conference.
This is a very remarkable prediction. He said:
Gentlemen, I need hardly remind you that the stock of silver in the world
i s estimated at some thousands of millions, and if this conference were to
break up without arriving at any definite result there would be a depreciation in the value of that commodity which it would be frightful to contemplate and out of which a monetary panic would ensue, the far-spreading effects of which it would be impossible to foretell.

There it is as plain as A B C, in the Brussels conference, predicted just as it has come to pass, and the cause stated, and yet
none of these gold monometallic doctrinaires will believe anything about it. They will shut their eyes to all these things.
You could not make my friend from New Jersey [Mr. M C P H E R SON] read that and comprehend it. He would think it was something else, although it is the opinion of one of his own monometallic friends.
From this same report I have quoted from Sir G. Molesworth,

representing India, to show that he predicted that India would
change to a single gold standard if that monetary conference adjourned without any agreement.
There was in that monetary conference a Mr. Currie, who was
also on the Indian currency commission to settle the financial
question in India.
Mr. P L A T T . On the Herschell commission?
Mr. COCKRELL. Yes, sir. Mr. Currie was a delegate to the
Brussels conference, and at the same time he was a member of
the Indian commission. Our commissioners unwittingly told
him what we were going to do, or what they thought we were
going to do, without any authority to say so. I read from page
118 of the Brussels conference. I do not want to do any injustice
to any distinguished gentleman who represented us in that body,
but I want to show what they said and how we were represented.
W e have a r i g h t to know that.
Governor MCCREARY, of Kentucky, a representative of t h e
Government of the United States, made an address before that
conference, in which he went on to speak in behalf of silver, and
then told about the election and about the Democratic platform,
which he quoted, and then said:
Speaking for myself only, I express the opinion that the silver law known
as the act of 1890 now in force in m y country will be repealed. It is possiblothis will be done at the present session of Congress—

That is, at the last session of the last Congress.
If not this session, I believe it will certainly be repealed at the next session of Congress.

Oh, yes; we are going to repeal. " You had better get scared
now and come to an international agreement because we shall repeal this law." W h a t did Mr. Cannon, another delegate, say at.
that conference?
The United States has seriously taken into consideration the idea of repealing the silver purchase act of 1890; the two political paz'ties as well as
the great bankers of New York have advised this repeal, and if during this
conference some arrangement is not attained, it is more than probable that
America will not continue disposed to buy annually 54,000,000 ounces of silver at the market price.

Yes. we by our delegates told that monetary conference we
were going to drop it, silver, and that they had better come to
some agreement. The conference adjourned, and was to have
met last spring, I believe, was it not?
Mr. ALLISON. I t was to have met on the 30th of May.
Mr. COCKRELL. I believe that Indian currency commission
lust held back long enough to get ahead of us and strike down
silver first, and let us bear the brunt of it if we repeal the existing law. We told them what we were going to do. W e have
always told them in advance we were going to do something to
strike at silver, with the expectation of scaring them. There
never has been but one time, Mr. President, that the agents and
representatives of the United States have ever been able to scare
Europe into changing its monetary system, and that was in 1863
to 1865 and in 1873, when we told them that we would flood the
world with gold and silver and depreciate the purchasing power
of their invested securities. W e told them that we were t h e
great gold-producing country, as the Senator from Ohio said r
and the gold system had to be established; and we went on and
established it, and they we.e foolish enough to believe that w h a t

we said wns true, and they changed their whole system to a single gold standard.
The Indian currency commission was appointed October 21,
1892. As predicted by Sir Moles worth, in anticipation of the
repeal of the Sherman law by us, India has closed her mints to
the free coinage of silver and the crisis predicted is upon us, intensified by many other combinations and causes, and silver has
fallen most fearfully in value measured by the gold standard,
just as expected by India and England. And we are now callcd
upon to repeal the Sherman law unconditionally, reestablish the
gold standard and practically closs the mints of the whole world
to the free and unlimited coinage of silver and make silver everywhere a mere commodity, a mere ordinary metal without any
monetary functions by the laws of any nation, and still further
depreciate it, lessen its value, etc.
Think of the ridiculousness of the proposition that we must
demonetize silver and destroy value in order to make Europe
come to international agreement! I t is perfectly absurd upon
its face. We destroy its value or make it'the world over a mere
commodity, and what greater harm will be done to Europe th^n
to us? W h a t greater losses will they suffer than we shalP W e
are producing more silver, and gold too, than any other nation.
Would not we be the greatest sufferers in the depreciation in
prices? Yet it is pretended that we should be in some way or
other the beneficiary. There was never such sophistry proclaimed to intelligent free men in the world.
Then truly we would have throughout the world the idealistic
doctrinaire single gold standard, which would entail for ages to
come upon the toiling masses of every country in the world untold and inconceivable sufferings, losses, financial disturbances,
and crises, depressions of all kinds of business, a rapid increase
in the purchasing power of gold and a still greater fall in the
prices of the woHd's products.
This Utopian single gold standard. This is what we are coming to, if unconditional repeal is carried.
Mr. President, let us examine this single gold standard—this
American idea, so called—boasted of by the senior Senator from
I assert that there is not only not a sufficient amount of gold
in the world to answer the demands of the worldTs commerce and
business for monetary purposes, but not enough gold and silver
combined to. meet the monetary wants and demands of the nations.
The estimate of Dr. A. Soetbeer, of Germany, from 1493 to
1885. and since that date of our Mint Bureau, places the world's
production of gold and silver for that period. 1493 to 1892. inclusive—four hundred years—as follows: Gold, $8,204,303,000. and
silver, $9,726,072,000, being in the proportion of $45.80 of gold to
$54.20 of silver, making an aggregate amount of $17,930,375,000.
If this vast amount were all in existence to-day it would only
be a fraction over $14.81 per capita of the world's population, estimated at 1,210,000,000.
W h a t has become of this vast sum of the precious metals, and
what proportion can be found in all the nations of the world? I t
has been subjected to all the multitudinous mutations, strifes,
and contentions of the peoples of the world during these four
hundred years to losses, abrasions, wear and teiir, and to all the
uses for industrial purposes.

The losses by abrasion are estimated annually for gold about
$500,000 and for silver, including subsidiary coins, about $2,000,000.
Now, search and examine the treasuries of the nations the
world over for the existing gold and silver; and from the most
reliable data available, our Mint Bureau, we can only find $3,532,605.000 of gold coin and bullion, and $3,469,100,000 of full legaltender silver coin9, aggregating $7,051,703,000.
The percentage or proportion of gold to silver is 50.8 gold to
49.2 silver, nearly equal in value. This aggregate of goin coin
and bullion and silver coins in the world gives lor gold $2.96 per
capita and for silver $2.86 per capita, and combined, only a fraction over $5.82 per capita to the population of the world, a wholly
inadequate and insufficient supply for monetary purposes.
The conclusive proof of this is found in the fact that according to statistics of our Mint Bureau there is to-day in existence
among the nations of the world an immense mass of irredeemable or uncovered paper money, without any metallic basis for
redemption, aggregating the sum of $2,635,873,000, including
$300,000.000in South America, $500,000,000 in Russia, $163,000,000
in Italy, $100,000,000 in Spain, $260,000,000 in Austria-Hungary,
which latter adopted the single gold standard in August, 1832.
Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, as well as other nations,
having such uncovered paper money, are grabbing for gold in
every direction in order to resume specie redemption on a gold
basis. India has in this year closed her mints to the coinage of
silver and adopted the gold standard, and entered on the scramble
for gold.
This scramble, this grabbing for gold, will more distinctly appear from a careful consideration of the estimates by our Mint
Bureau of the world's production and coinage of gold and silver.
I applied to the Director of the Mint for an estim ite as far
back as the statistics accessible enabled him to make, and he furnished me the statement published in Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 34, present session, giving the production and coinage
for 1873-1891, inclusive, as follows:
World's product or gold $2,030,141,579, an 1 coinage $3,752,927,453. The excess
of the coinage in these nineteen years over the gross product is $672,78 :,877.
Silver product
Silver coinage
Coinage excess


To sea still more distinctly the shifting of gold from one nation
to another, and its recoina^e, first by one and then by another
nation, and so on, let us consider the varied consumption of gold
and silver for industrial uses, in industry, manufactures and fine
The two principal demands o? USBS for gold and silver are for
coinage —monetary purposes—and for industrial uses. The eminent statistician, Dr. A. Soetbeer, in his "Materials toward the
elucidation of the economic conditions affecting the precious metals,55 prepared October 1, 1886, estimates for the three recent
years an average net annual consumption of the precious metals
for "industrial uses" in civilized nations as foil ows: Of gold,
90,000 kilograms, $59,814,000 (the kilogram baing $664.60), and
of silver, 515,000 kilograms), $21,403,400 (the kilogram being
$11.56). In giving these figures he says:
Surprising as the enormous extent ot the estimated annual consumption
of gold for ornaments and other jmrposes in the arts may seem, any doufct

as to the probable correctness of the estimate will disappear on considerat i o n of the increasing use of gold for ornament and for Industrial purposes
with the growth of population and wealth .—Volume 24, Consular Reports,
page 5134.

In the ten years. 1876-1885, inclusive, just preceding the date
of this estimate, the world's product of gold was, according to
our Mint Bureau, $1,067,721,842, and the consumption in industrial uses, according to Dr. Soetbeer's estimate of $59,814,000
annually, being 56 per cent, was $598,140,000, which left for coinage only $469,581,842. And the actual coinage was $1,372,407,272,
"heing an excess of coinage of $902,825,4o0.
This was an enormous excess of coinage in these ten years over
the balance of the total production of gold left after deducting
the amount consumed in industrial uses. Now, this balance of
$469,581,842, left for monetary uses throughout the world in the
period of 1876-1885, inclusive, was only 46.95 cents per capita of
the world's population, estimated at 1,000,000,000 people, a low
estimate, and 4.691 cents per capita of population for each year
during the ten years, to be added to the stock of money in existence to meet the wants and demands of the world's increase of
population, commerce, and business.
In this same period of ten years, from 1876 to 1885, inclusive,
the world's product of silver, according to our Mint Bureau, was
$1,016,586,116, and the consumption in industrial uses according
t o Dr. Soetbeer's estimate of $21,403,400 annually, being 21 per
cent, was $214,034,000, which left for monetary uses for coinage
$802,552,116, while the actual coinage was $1,103,371,395, which
shows an excess of silver coinage in these ten years of $300,819,279.
This balance of $802,552,116 left for monetary uses in the world
in these ten years was only 80.25 cents per capita of population,
and only a fraction over 8 cents per capita for each of the ten
years to meet the wants and demands of the world's increase of
population, commerce, and business.
Take the world's product of both gold and silver during this
ten-year period, and deduct therefrom the amounts consumed
I n industrial uses, according to Dr. Soetbeer, and the balance left
for monetary uses was only $1.27^ per capita of the world's population, and for each of the ten years was only 12f02n cents per
capita of population, a wholly inadequate sum to meet the wants
and demands of the increase of population, commerce, and business*
in confirmation of the correctness of these estimates as to the
world's consumption of gold and silver for industrial uses, I now
state the estimates of our Mint Bureau as to the product and
such consumption of gold and silver in the United States for the
five years from 1888 to 1892, inclusive.
189 1

Industrial PerGold
Silver Industrial Perproduct. consump- cent- product. consump- centage,



164,995,000 90,331,901 •55



159,195,000 15,280,000
64,646,000 8,766,000
70,464,000 9,231,178
75,417,000 9,630,000
73,697,000 9,301,000


343,419,000 42,208,178


Consider the vast significance of these figures.
The world's stock of gold coin and bullion is $2.96 per capita of"
the world's population, and of full legal tender, silver coins only
$2.86 per capita.
Since 1857, the largest annual product of gold in the world was
$130,817,000 in the year 1892, equal to only the insignificant sum
of 10.81 cents per capita of the world's population. With this
momentous increase annually to the gold money of the world to
meet the increase of population and of the world's commerce and
business, it is imperiously demanded of us to vote for the pending measure, unconditionally repealing the Sherman law and
restoring the single gold standard of the coinage act of February
12,1873, a beautiful basis to ask for such a vote.
But examining a little more critically, we find that of the annual product of gold in the world of $130,817,000 in 1892, we produced in the United States $33,000,000, or a fraction over 25.22
per cent, and of our product we consumed for industrial uses
about 5S.6 per cent, equal to $19,329,000,leaving us only $13,671,000, or only 20.40 cents per capita, estimating our population at
the close of 1892 at 67,000,000 people.
A still more critical examination, according to the estimate
of Dr. Soetbeer, of an average annual net consumption of 56 per
cent of the world's gold product in industrial uses, shows $73,257,520 of the $130,817,000 of gold produced in the world in 1892,
used for such industrial purposes, and leaves for monetary purposes in the wide world $57,559,480—equal to 4.75 cents per capita of the world's population. .
In the name of reason, of ordinary common sense, I ask is this4! cents per capita increase of the gold money of the world sufficient to meet the wants, the demands of the increasing population, commerce, and business of the world? Is not gold monometallism'not only an Utopia, but also a ruinously false Utopia—
a mere doctrinaire's summer dream.
And we are urged to repeal the existing Sherman law, without any amendment or substitute of any kind whatever, and
thereby restore and leave in full force and operation the Sherman coinage law of February 12, 1873, establishing the single
gold standard, this Utopia, and wipe'fromour laws e v e r y vestige
of legislation recognizing the true Democratic bimetallic monetary system.
No alternative is offered us. Wheresoever we seek refuge,
relief, we must fall in the embraces of Sherman legislation, an
audacious demand. We want no more of it. Neither the present
Sherman law nor the Sherman law of 1873, but the restorationof the constitutional bimetallic system, maintained by successive
Democratic Administrations for over half a century.
[At this point the honorable Senator yielded for an executive
Wednesday, October 11,1893.
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. President, why not restore true bimetallism? W h y not restore silver to all the monetary functionsgiven by our laws to gold as coin and money? W h y not make
them the equals in every respect by proper legislation now byamendments to the pending bill?
According to professions all of us on both sides of this Chamber, as well as the Executive, are the friends of silver.

If friends, then why not give some tangible evidence of our
friendship for silver by proper legislative recognition now?
Now is the accepted opportunity. Procrastination is the thief
of time.
The President, in the proper exercise of his constitutional
prerogative " f r o m time to time to give to the Congress information of the state of the Union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," and " o n extraordinary occasions to convene both
Houses or either of them," has "convened this extraordinary
session of both Houses and submitted to them his views of the
state of the Union, and recommended to their consideration such
measures as he judges necessary and expedient. We have his
message, his views of the existing conditions, and his recommendation.
1 quote his recommendation—the only one in his message. He
I earnestly recommend the prompt repeal of the provisions of the act
passed July 14, 1890, authorizing the purchase of silver bullion, and that
other legislative action may put beyond all doubt or mistake the intention
and the ability of the Government to fulfill its pecuniary obligations in
money universally recognized by all civilized countries.

This recommendation, the only one given to this Congress, is
all in one sentence and all one recommendation—the repeal of
the purchasing provisions of the act of Juty 14,1800, and other
legislative action putting beyond doubt or mistake the intention
and ability of the Government to fulfill its pecuniary obligations
in money universally recognized by all civilized countries. As
a personal and political friend of the President, I stand ready
and anxious to carry out by appropriate legislation on tne pending bill the recommendation, the only recommendation made by
the President.
Why do the Senators on each side of this Chamber, under the
leadership of the senior Senators Irom Indiana and New Jersey,
and from Ohio and Rhode Island, claiming to represent the Administration, insist upon and urge the passage of the pending
bill without any amendment, simply repealing the purchasing
clauses of the Sherman law, and wholly ignoring the most vital
and essential part of the President's single and only recommendation:
Other legislative action putting beyond all doubt the intention and ability
of th#Government to fulfill its pecuniary obligations in money universally
recognized by all civilized countries.

This is by far the most important p a r t of this one recommendation of the President.
The charge is iterated and reiterated, day by day and week by
week, that the Senators opposing the passage of the pending bill
for simple unconditional repeal are obstructionists—are filibustering, whatever that may mean—and are opposing the wise and
judicious recommendation of legislation by the President. This
is a false and unfounded charge. If there be obstructionists, it
can only be those Senators who insist upon ignoring the most essential and necessary legislation recommended to our consideration.
I believe I am justified in saying, in behalf of the Senators opposing the pending bill, that we stand ready to-day, and will so
stand throughout this struggle, ready and anxious to pass this,
bill with amendments, with " legislation putting beyond all mis049

take the intention and the ability of our Government to fulfill
every one of its pecuniary obligations in money universally recognized by all civilized countries." We ars notrepudiationists.
There is not one in this Senate, so far as I know. We are not
inflationists. We do not believe in fiat money.
We advocate " honest money—the strict maintenance of t h e
public faith—consisting of gold and silver and paper convertible
into coin on demand," in the words of the national Democratic
platform of 1880.
Again, Mr. President, " we believe in honest money, the gold
and silver coinage of the Constitution, ana a circulating medium
convertible into such money without loss," as declared in the na/tional Democratic platform of 1884, upon which the present President was first elected, and which was readopted in the platform of
We favor now legislation on this bill, not mere idle promises,
" t o continue the use of both gold and silver as standard money,
and to coin both gold and silver into money of equal intrinsic
and exchangeable value," and we want now " to secure such
equality by such safeguards of legislation," to be enacted now, and
not merely promised, as will insure the maintenance of the parity
in value of the coins of the two metals and 4 the equal power of
every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of
We are now steadily, persistently, and consistently directing—
not merely promising to direct—" the efforts of the Government
and of this Senate to the establishment of such a safe system of bimetallism as will maintain at all times the equal power of every
dollar coined or issued by the United States in the markets and
in the payment of debts."
W e want to engraft on the pending bill, not these idle promises contained in the bill, but the legislation therein promised
and recommended by the President.
Is this obstruction? Is this filibustering? W e are ready,
waiting, to join the ad vocates of this bill in appropriate legislation to carry out and redeem the promises set forth in it.
W e favor legislative action, not legislative promises. You
may ask by what legislative action do we propose " to put beyond
all doubt or mistake the intention and the ability of the Government to fulfil its pecuniary obligations in money universally recognized by all civilized countries?"
"According to the American Yankee idea, I answer by $ro*
pounding to you, what legislation do you propose? You are occupying the affirmative, you are promising legislation. The
country and the Senate want to know what that legislation is.
W h a t does the President propose? We have his message. He
has exercised his constitutional prerogative, and we know what
i t is. Is there anything there? That other legislation, which
I have just quoted, to make manifest the intention of the Government to redeem all its pecuniary obligations in money recognized by all civilized countries.
We stand ready to carry out that kind of legislation: but t h e
friends of this bill and the President have failed to tell the country what legislation they want. They are as dumb and as silent
as oysters.
Mr. PALMER. Will the Senator from Missouri allow me to
say a word?

The VICE-PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Missouri
yield to the Senator from Illinois?
Mr. COCKRELL. W i t h pleasure.
Mr. PALMER. The Executive has asked us to pass the pending bill. There is no silence about that.
Mr. COCKRELL. Is that a financial plan?
Mr. PALMER. Yes, sir; that is part of it?
Mr. COCKRELL. That, then, according to the Senator from
Illinois, is the financial plan of the national Democratic party of
the United States, simply a patchwork to repeal the Sherman
Mr. PALMER. Itrequired six days to create the world. This
is one step in the direction of a financial policy.
Mr. COCKRELL. Tken it is not a policy?
Mr. PALMER. It is not a policy.
Mr. COCKRELL. It is a step, a miserable, pitiful step on a
broken leg. We want a system, a policy. What is this?
Mr. PALMER. May I be allowed to ask the Senator from
Missouri, will he present his plan? I understood the Senator to
Mr. WOLCOTT. We can not hear the Senator.
The VICE-PRESIDENT. The Senate will be in order. I t
is impossible to hear the remarks of the Senator from Illinois.
Mr. PALMER. The Senator from Missouri claims that this
is no plan. This is to remove an obstruction out of the way of
a plan, but the Senators who complain of the silence of the supporters of this bill ought kindly to present a plan of their own,
that the two may be contrasted; but, above all, Senators who
have plans, should come forward to the rescue and put their
plans in comprehensible shape—something more than mere declamation for free silver. I submit that as an answer to the
Mr. COCKRELL. I submit that it is no answer at all. The
President of the United States has convened the Congress in extraordinary session because of our financial condition. That is
the expressed subject submitted to us, and it is simply proposed,
according to this bill, to repeal the power given in the Sherman
law to purchase 4,500,000 ounces of silver per month, and stop
Mr. PALMER. The Senator is right. The bill proposes no
more and no less than that; but it is an essential part of any
financial or any monetary measure
Mr. COCKRELL. And that leaves us upon the Sherman law
of 1873, establishing tha single gold standard, and giving to gold
only the right of coinage.
Mr. PALMER. I will say frankly to the Senator that it leaves
all laws in force other than the one repealed.
Mr. COCKRELL. That is the only law on the subject in force.
The Senator can not evade that.
Mr. PALMER. That is a matter of judgment for the Sonator
Mr. COCKRELL. I ask tho Senator to show any other law
on the subject that would be in force?
Mr. PALMER. Whatever other provisions the law makes
are in force. The silver dollars are left by law a legal tender.
Mr. COCKRELL. There is no doubt about that; I stated that.
Butwhat law is there recognizing the right of silver to coinage?

Mr. COCKRELL. W h a t law is there that does not make
-gold the single standard in this country and the only metal that
is admitted to coinage?
Mr. PALMER. This bill only does what it professes to do.
T h a t is all.
Mr. COCKRELL. Yes; and we are not going to permit you
to evade the issue. This bill, if passed, places the United States
Government on the single gold standard.
Mr. P A L M E R . The Senator will pardon me for saying one
word more. He has argued elaborately that that was done by
the act of 1873.
Mr. COCKRELL. Then this bill puts the act of 1873 in force
a g rin.
Mr. PALMER. I think not.
Mr. COCKRELL. There is no question about that. I t h i n k
if the Senator will look over the law he will see that that is the
Mr. P A L M E R . I understand the law which makes a silver
•dollar a legal tender is unrepealed.
Mr. COCKRELL. Everybody knows that; but is there any
law authorizing the coinage of a solitary silver dollar after this
bill is passed? Is there any law authorizing any coinage except
gold coinage?
Mr. PALMER. None, I think, except the discretionary power
•contained in the act itself.
Mr. COCKRELL. To coin the bullion on hand, and no further
and no more than that.
Mr. PALMER. There is none that I know of.
Mr. COCKRELL. That is right. Now we understand each
other. This bill does not give any additional power, not a particle.
Mr. VOORHEES. I do not intend to interfere in the debate.
My attention was called yesterday by the senior Senator from
Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN] to a continuing provision of law, of which
I was not aware the other day when I was on the floor, authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase bullion for subsidiary coin.
Mr. COCKRELL. There is no doubt about that; I do*not dis4
pute that.
Mr. VOORHEES. I am not interfering in the debate. I
merely wanted to contribute that fact to the general knowledge
upon this subject.
Mr. COCKRELL. There is no doubt about that.
Mr. VOORHEES. That is a large discretion which might
•extend to $100,000,000. We have seventy-seven millions of subsidiary coin now, and it is generally understood that it ought to be
I did not rise as I said, however, for the purpose of interfering
in the debate, but merely to contribute that fact, that future'silver coinage is provided for by a general and continuing law maki n g such coinage a legal tender for $10.
Mr. COCKRELL. For ten dollars?
Mr. COCKRELL. There is no question in the world about
•the power to coin the subsidiary silver, which is a legal tender
for five or ten dollars, as I believe it is now.
Mr. COCKRELL. I t was increased to $10. T h a t law is con649

*tinued. Nobody denies that. That is a class distinction between
the toiling masses. We provide a subsidiary silver coin, half
and quarter dollars, dimes and half dimes, a legal tender for $10.
for the laboring and toiling millions; but for the millionaires,
the aristocrats, and the plutocrats, we only furniBh gold, the
precious gold. We do not degrade them by making them carry
around silver, which is a legal tender for only $10. I am opposed
to class legislation on money or on anything else.
I will answer the question I asked. What do you propose? In
•order to do so, however, we must see what are the existing pecuniary obligations of oivr Government, and in what kind of money
they are payable according to the terms of the obligations, and
the laws existing wh^n created and when payable.
It can be safely said that every civilized country, every nation
in the world claims and recognizes that its pecuniary obligations
can be and must be equitably and fully paid in the money called
for and specified in the obligations, etc., which was a full legal
tender for such payment when the obligations were created and
when they are to be paid. That is a sound principle of law, national and international.
If the obligations specify the kind or character of money or
currency in which they are to be paid then they can only be paid
in such specified money. If the obligations do not specify the
kind of money and only specify the amount then they can be lawfully and equitably paid in any full legal-tender money. If the
coin or paper money was a full legal tender at the time the obligation was created and is such full legal tender when it matures
then no question of equity or good faith can ever arise.
The demand for any other coin or paper money would be in
direct violation of the obligation and open practical repudiation
and dishonesty.
The existing pecuniary obligations of our Government are as
JTunded loan of 1891, issued under law of July 14,1870, 2 per
Punded loan of 1907, issued under law of July 14, 1870, 4 per
.Refunding certificates, issued under law of February 26,1879,
4 per cent
Total interest-bearing bonds
'Old matured debt, not presented for payment; interest ceased.
United States notes, legal tenders or greenbacks
Old demand notes, national-bank notes, redemption fund, and
fractional currency
Gold certificates
Silver certificates
•Certificates of deposit under act June 8, 1872, in exchange for
• Treasury notes of 1890
Pacific Railroad bonds

l, 984,770.26

The funded loans of 1891 and 1907 are Government pecuniary
-obligations issued under the law of July 14,1870, which required
that the bonds should be "redeemable in coin of the present standard value." * * * "And the said bonds shall have set forth and
-expressed upon their face the above specified conditions." Each
one of those bonds specifies the law under which issued, and then
has in plain English upon its face set forth and expressed, " is
redeemable in coin of the standard value of the United States on
^aid July 14,1870, with interest in such coin."
The senior Senator from Ohio doubtless had charge of this re649

funding law in its passage, and was determined to protect t h e
interests of the purchasers and holders of such bonds and maintain unsullied the public faith. Hence the requirements of the
law and the language of the bonds, about which there can be no
question of good faith or honesty. They are payable at the option of the Government, by the recognized laws of every civilized
nation, in coin money of the standard value of the United States
on said July 14, 1870. And no man living can truthfully say or
pretend t h a t the coin of the standard value on said day and now
was other than the silver dollar of 412^ grains, 9 parts fine, and
the gold dollar of 25.8 grains, 9 parts fine. They were the coin
money specified in the law and on the face of the bonds. They
can be just as equitably and legally paid in the standard silver
dollar, then and now a full legal tender in all payments, as in
the gold dollar, without the least particle of tarnishing the public honor or breaking the public faith.
As to the refunding certificates and certificates of deposit, they
were issued in exchange for lawful money and are payable in any
full legal-tender money.
The old matured debt can be paid in honesty and good faith in
the standard silver dollar.
The United States notes or greenbacks, the old demand notes,
national-bank notes, and fractional currency can also be paid in
honesty and good faith in standard silver dollars.
But, Mr. President, it seems t h a t there is some dispute about
the r i g h t to pay silver or redeem the greenbacks in standard
silver dollars. I t seems that the Administration has some scruples about redeeming, greenbacks, United States legal-tender
notes, in the standard silver dolars. Can they be honestly and
justly paid in the standard silver dollar? Let me read what the
distinguished senior Senator from Ohio said. You know he is
not a greenbacker, nor a populist, nor a repudiationist. I quote
from the speech of the senior Senator from Ohio, on t h e 11th
day of April, 1876, on a bill then pending in the Senate in regard to fractional currency and silver coinage. That Senator
then said:
But the vital question presented by the amendments of the committee Is
the restoration of the silver dollar. Why restore the silver dollar when it is
now so depreciated by the events that X have named? Well, sir. the answer is that we have a large amount, some 1400,000,000 of United States notes,
which now are a legal tender for all purposes, and the time has arrived when
we can redeem them all with the old dollar of the United States. We do not
create a dollar; we simply provide forits issue. The law was, I have shown
you, up to 1873, that this old silver dollar could be tendered for the payment
of all debts; but it was simply not coined because the silver dollar w a s
worth more than the gold dollar. Does that prevent us from coining it?
Not in the least.







The silver dollar was, it is true, a legal tender until 1873, and, in strict law,
might be restored to its former position as a standard of value without a
violation of the legal contract between the United States and the bondholder.

Mr. President, is not t h a t pretty good authority? But I wish
to put this question still f u r t h e r beyond t h e possibility of a
doubt. W e all remember with g r e a t pleasure our late distinguished associate and colleague from the State of Vermont, one
of the ablest jurists in the United States. I refer to ex-Senator
Edmunds. Ex-Senator Edmunds, in 1886, said what 1 shall*
quote. I quoted Senator S H E R M A N in 1 8 7 6 , before the passage

of the Bland law. I now quote Senator Edmunds in 1886, after
we had had the silver dollar in circulation for eight years:
Mr. EDMUNDS. It may be that I should agree with the Senator from Kentucky—I certainly agree with him that the silver coin of the United States
Is just as good a legal tender for every bond and debt of the United States,
that does not say gold coin exclusively, if there be such a one. as the gold
is—and so far and to that extent I am just as strong a silver man as my
friend from Kentucky is.

Is there a doubting Thomas now left in the Senate Chamber?
Mr. GRAY. Doubting as to what?
Mr. COCKRELL. That the standard silver dollar can equitably and justly be paid in the redemption of the greenback and
of the funded loan of 1891 and 1907.
Mr. GRAY. I never heard anyone express a doubt that i t
could be legally so used.
Mr. COCKRELL. Then I am gratified that we have other
distinguished jurists who confirm everything that I have said,
and confirm what the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from
Vermont* stated.
Now, Mr. President, I will go to'the next point.
The silver certificates are issued on the deposit of silver dollars, and are only promises to pay silver dollars. Their language is: " This certifies there have been deposited in the Treasury of the United States five silver dollars, payable to the bearer
on demand." It would be a breach of faith to offer to return to
the bearer anything other than the silver dollars named.
The gold certificates are issued on deposit of gold coin or bullion, and are payable only in gold. No one seeks to pay them
otherwise. The gold is simply housed in the Treasury, to be delivered back to the holder of the certificate on demand or presentation.
Mr. P L A T T . Will the Senator from Missouri allow a question?
Mr. COCKRELL. Certainly.
Mr. P L A T T . He is making a most thorough examination of
t h e law and practice, and I wish he would state for the information of Senators, if he knows, who it is that deposits the silver
dollars in the Treasury under the practice of the Treasury Department at the present time?
Mr. COCKRELL. Any holder of them, I presume. The most
of them are deposited there by banks and mercantile establishments, in all probability. I have never investigated that particular point.
Mr. P L A T T . Do they not go in some mysterious way directly from the mint to the Treasury, and the only issue of money
when they are coined is really the silver certificate?
Mr. COCKRELL. I expect that is the truth of the matter,
as to a part of them. I have no doubt of that. When they are
coined they are placed in the Treasury, v and everybody prefers
the certificate to the coin, and then instead of issuing the dollar
the silver certificate is issued.
Now I come to the United States Treasury notes issued under
t h e law of July 14,1890, in payment of silver bullion purchased
under that act. In my opinion, it was clearly the purpose of the
law to have them redeemed in silver dollars coined from the
silver bullion purchased and paid for by them. I have already
fully discussed their payment in another place.
The Pacific railroad bonds are currency bonds issued in aid
of the construction of those several roads, and are payable as well
«49 8

in greenbacks as in silver dollars. Everybody knows they are
payable in anything that is a legal tender.
We have now considered every pecuniary obligation of the
United States and see in what kind of money universally recognized by all civilized countries, by every nation, each kind of
obligation can be paid. We do not propose to pay the gold certificates or the silver certificates, or to redeem the greenbacks
or the Treasury notes, or to pay the interest-bearing bonds in
the legal-tender money of foreign nations—China or Japan, Russia or England—but only in the standard money of the United
States, our own full legal-tender money called for and specified
in them, and in which, by our laws, the only laws creating them
or any obligation to pay them, they can be honestly, legally, and
equitably paid; in short, only in such money as every self-respecting, civilized country or nation issuing and creating them
would pay in pursuance of the law and the terms of the obligation. What more can anyone ask or demand?
Does anyone now claim t h a t we must redeem the silver certificate or the legal-tender notes only in gold? I am exceedingly
anxious to ascertain whether there be one or more Senators who
now so claim.
I will pause for a reply. I want to know if there is any pretense that the silver certificate calling for silver dollars must
only be redeemed in gold, or that the United States greenbacks,
legal tenders, must only be redeemed in gold.
But it may be said, and has probably been said, that the President meant in recommending other legislative action putting
beyond all doubt or mistake the intention and the ability of the
Government to fulfill its pecuniary obligations in money universally recognized by all civilized countries—only gold money;
and that gold money is the only money universally recognized
by ail civilized countries.
Now, let us see if this claim be correct. Is gold the only metal
recognized by all civilized countries? The latest authorities I
know upon this question giving us an idea of what the money of
the world is, is the Indian currency commission report. It is
a report of Lord Herschelland others of England. It was made
in the present year. I t was the report upon winch India went
to a gold standard practically, or suspended the coinage of the
silver rupee. It gives a description of the money of the world,
the financial conditions, the financial policies of the different
nations of the world. I wish to read some from that report. I
read now from page 28:
United Kingdom.

That is Great Britain.
that they have—

As a matter of course we all know

(1) The standard coin to be of one metal, gold.







Goldis the standard or measure, but for the most part not the medium itself.
Though, however, in wholes ale transactions, and in a great many retail purchases, gold is no longer the medium of exchange, the use of gold coins ift
probably greater in the United Kingdom than in most other countries.

In India the silver rupee, at the rate of 15$ to 1, is a full legal
tender in the payment of all debts. It is not now allowed free
mintage or unlimited mintage. It is coined upon account of the
I go then to Canada, our neighbor, The standard is gold, but

they have no mint. There is no Canadian gold coin, and littla
or no gold in circulation. Silver is not convertible into gold.
The American silver dollar circulates at par, at the ratio of 10 t o 1, although a government proclamation was issued in 1870 declaring i t t o be
legal tender up to the amount of 310, but only at 80 cents per dollar.
Silver is not convertible into gold.
This is a very remarkable case, since, without any gold currency, and
without even a mint for gold, dollar notes and silver dollars circulate at the
United States gold-dollar value.

That is right here in our neighboring country, and look how
our gold monometallists begin to tremble when a few million
dollars of gold leave this country!
I now go to the West Indies.
All the West India Islands and British Guiana have adopted the English
currency, gold being the standard, but silver being the legal tender without

They have a nominal standard of gold, with silver a full legal
This Is an Instance of a gold standard without gold and a silver token currency circulating to an unlimited extent at a value based on that gold

I go now to Germany. Germany adopted the single gold standard in 1871-1873 and closed her mints to silver, and they say:
The peculiarity of the case of Germany is that £20,000,000 worth of old silver thalers are retained in circulation at a ratio of 15| to 1, and are legal tender to an unlimited extent.

I go to the Scandinavian country:
The standard has been gold since 1873, and the mints appear to be open to
gold, but there is little gold in circulation. Bank notes convertible into
gold are the ordinary currency.

I go to the Latin Union now—France.
Now I read from it:

W h a t do they say?

The mints are open to gold.
Silver coinage, except of subsidiary coins, has since 1878 been and is now
prohibited under the rules of the Latin Union.
There is a large quantity of gold coin in actual circulation.
The peculiarity of the French currency is the large amount of 5-franc
pieces, which circulate at the old ratio of 15J to 1. They are legal tender to
any amount, and are accepted as freely as gold coin. They are not legally
convertible into gold.

That is what the Herschell commission say, notwithstanding
the views of my distinguished friend from Louisiana [Mr. WHITEJ.
I now go to Belgium. The same condition exists precisely as
in France, the Latin Union embracing France, Belgium, Italy,
Switzerland, and Greece. Italy is the same way.
The rules as to 5-franc pieces, as to the ratio between gold and silver, and
as to legal tender are the same as in France.
There is very little metallic coin in actual circulation; the paper is at a
discount, and the exchange below par.

I go now to Holland and the Dutch East Indies. They had the
single silver standard for a long time, and then they changed to
the single gold standard " a t a ratio of 15f to 1, and the Dutch
mint was opened to gold, whilst the coinage of silver, except of
subsidiary token coins, was prohibited, and remains so at the
present time. Silver florins, at the gold value, were legal tender
to any amount, and, with paper florin notes, which were also at
a gold value, formed tlte internal circulation of the country."
I go now to Austria-Hungary. They had the silver standard
for a long time. They took steps in 1891 to go to the single gold
standard and adopted it in August, 1892. They have no coin,
practically, in circulation. They have a large amount of irre649

deemable paper, and their silver was coined at a ratio, I believe,
of 151 to 1, but they have changed the ratio since.
I go to Brazil:
The case of Brazil is perhaps the most remarkable of all, as showing that a
paper currency without a metallic basis may, if the credit of the country i s
good, be maintained at a high and fairly steady exchange, although it is absolutely inconvertible and has been increased by the act of the Government
out of all proportion to the growth of the population and of its foreign trade.

They sum up this on page 35, but I will not consume the time
of th3 Senate in reading it. It is just what I have read. They
give a summary:

93. It is impossible thus to review foreign systems of currency without
feeling that, however admirable may be the precautions of our own currency
system, other nations have adopted different systems which appear to have
worked without difficulty, and have enabled them to maintain for their respective currencies a gold standard and a substantial parity of exchange
with the gold-using countries of the world, which has, unfortunately, not
been the case with India. This has been effected under all the following conditions, viz:
(а) With a little or no gold coin, as in Scandinavia, Holland, and Canada;
(б) Without a mint or gold coinage, as in Canada and the Dutch East Indies;
(c) With a circulation consisting partly of gold, partly of overvalued and
Inconvertible silver, which is legal tender to an unlimited amount, as in
Prance and other countries of the Latin Union, in the United States, and
also in Germany, though there the proportion of overvalued silver is more
limited, the mints in all these countries being freely open to gold, but not.
to silver, and in some of them the silver coinage having ceased;
(d) With a system under which the banks part with gold freely for export, as in Holland, or refuse it for export, as in France;
(e) With mints closed against private coinage of both silver and gold, and
with a currency of inconvertible paper, as has been temporarily the case i n
( / ) With a circulation based on gold, but consisting of token silver, which,
however, is legal tender to an unlimited extent, as in the West Indies.
The case of Holland and Java is very reniarkable, since in that case the
gold standard has been maintained without difficulty in both countries,
although there is no mint in the Dutch East Indies, no stock of gold there,
and a moderate stock of gold in Holland; whilst the currency consists of
silver and paper legally and practically inconvertible into gold, except for
purposes of export. The case of Canada, which maintains a gold standard
without a gold coinage, is also very remarkable.

We see, Mr. President, what other civilized countries treat a3
money, that silver as money is recognized by nearly every civilized country. Suppose England or Germany should adopt platinum instead of gold and should change their standard, I sup*
pose then the United States must hasten to pay all its pecuniary
obligations in platinum, the only money universally recognized
by all civilized countries. You might just as well mane t h a t
contention as to contend that under the language of the President
you must redeem them all in gold.
I do not know what the President meant except by simply
taking his language as I find it, and I say that according to his
own language silver dollars are full legal tender, the equal of
gold, irredeemable in anything on earth, above it, or beneath it,
the money universally recognized by all civilized countries, in
which the pecuniary obligations of the Government can all be
paid, except only the gold certificates.

Mr. President, we are told of the fearful financial crisis now
pending and the deadly paralysis of business, and that all results
from our legislation in regard to silver.
These are only the same old prophecies we have heard dingdong ever since 1877, the same old scare, and the same old trem649

bling apprehension of dire consequences from the restoration of
silver to its equal monetary functions with gold. What do they
really portend? What is the ulterior object of these predictions?
To what monetary system are they intended to bring us? These
are vital questions to every American freeman, every patriot,
regardless of politics.
X assert that the ulterior object, the final end sought to be attained, is the single gold standard for the United States, with
free and unlimited coinage and full legal tender, and all other
kinds of money, silver and paper currency, to be redeemable in
gold, limited in legal tender and mere subsidiary money.
The senior Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN] has certainly
had more to do in shaping our financial legislation and establishing the single gold standard by the coinage law of February
12,1873, than any one man in the United States. He certainly
understood Clearly the objects sought to be secured.
Now, Mr. President, I am going to show you what is to become
of all these predictions and pretensions. I take the finance report of 1877, when the Senator from Ohio was Secretary of the
Treasury and was making his recommendations to Congress. I
read from page 21: ,
The question of the issue of a silver dollar for circulation as money has
l>een much discussed and carefully examined by a commission organized by
•Congress, which has recommended the coinage of the old silver dollar. With
such legislative provision as will maintain its current value at par with gold,
its issue is respectfully recommended. A gold coin of the denomination of
one dollar is too small for convenient circulation, while such a coin in silver
would be convenient for a multitude of daily transactions, and is in a form
t o satisfy the natural Instinct of hoarding.
It has been the careful study of statesmen for many years to secure a bimetallic currency not subject to the changes of market value, and so adjusted
that both kinds can be kept in circulation together, not alternating with each
other. The growing tendency has been to adopt, for coins, the principle of
**redeemability " applied to different forms of paper money. By limiting
tokens, silver, and paper money to the amount needed for business, and
promptly receiving or redeeming all that may at any time be in excess, all
these forms of money can be kept in circulation, in large amounts, at par
with gold. In this way, tokens of inferior intrinsic value are readily circulated, but do not depreciate below the paper money Into which they are convertible. The fractional silver coin now in circulation, though the silver of
which it is composed is of less market value than the paper money, passes
readily among all classes of people and answers all the purposes for which
It was designed. And so the silver dollar, if restored to our coinage, would
greatly add t o the convenience of the people. But this coin should be subject
to the same rule, as to issue and convertibility, as other forms of money.

There you have it, a silver dollar redeemable in gold.
I read from page 23—


Much complaint has been made that this was done with the d e s i g n -

Keferring to the demonetization of silver—
Much complaint has been made that this was done with the design of depriving the people of the privilege of paying their debts in a cheaper money
than gold, but it is manifest that this is an error. No one then did or could
foresee the subsequent fall in the market value of silver.

That is remarkable for a financier, a statesman for years and
years at the head of the Finance Committee, and who presented
himself in Paris to give financial instruction to the assembled
delegates of the world in a monetary conference, that no one
<;ould conceive of any possibility of the fall in the price of silver
by its demonetization, when in 1868, five years before the demonetization of silver, Wolowski and Seyd had published to the
world, as many other writers had done, exactly what would occur
if silver was demonetized by the world and the mints opened for
gold only. Yet Secretary Sherman says nobody could possibly

have conceived of such a thing. Now, I read from pages 24
and 25:
The Secretary believes that all the beneficial results hoped for from a
liberal issue of silver coin can be secured by issuing this coin, in pursuance
of the general policy of the act of 1853, in exchange for United states notes,
coined from bullion purchased in the open market by the United States,
and maintaining it by redemption or otherwise.

Mr. President, you see exactly what the Senator from Ohio
wants. He wants a silver dollar redeemable in gold. I go to
the finance report of 1S78, page 17, to t h e same effect. It is to
the same effect as the extract I have just read.
And the Secretary respectfully recommends that he be authorized to discontinue the coinage of the silver dollar when the amount outstanding shall
exceed $50,000,000.
The Secretary deems it proper to state that in the meantime, in the execution of the law as it now stands, he will feel it to be his duty to redeem all
United States notes presented on and after January 1, next, at the office of
the assistant treasurer of the United States in the city of-New York, in
sums of not less than $50, with either gold or silver coin, as desired by the
holder, but reserving the legal option of the Government; and to pay out
United States notes for all other demands on the Treasury, except when
coin is demanded on coin liabilities.

Now, I take the finance report of 18S0, also made by Secretary
SHERMAN. I t is to the same effect:
1. It is too bulky for large transactions, and its use i s confined mainly
to payments for manual labor and for market purposes or for change. The
amount needed for these purposes is already in excess of the probable demand.
2. It is known to contain a quantity of silver of less market value than
the gold in gold coin. This fact would not impair the circulation of such
limited amount as experience shows to be convenient for use, but it does
Srevent its being held or hoarded as reserves, or exported, and pushes it
lto active circulation, until it returns to the Treasury, as the least valuable and desirable money in use.
For these reasons the Secretary respectfully but earnestly recommends
that the further compulsory coinage of the silver dollar be suspended.

Now, I will refer to what I have already stated, and that is
Senate bill 217 and Senate report made by the Senator from Ohio
[Mr. SHERMAN], June 9, 1868, establishing the gold standard
with free coinage and unlimited legal tender, and section 2 pro*
vides for silver coinage in these words:
The weight of the half dollar shall be 179 grains, equivalent to 116 decigrams; and the lesser coins shall be in due proportion. But the coinage of
•ilver pieces of $1, 5 cents, and 3 cents shall be discontinued.

Section 3 provided

* * *—

And the silver coins shall be a legal tender to an amount not exceeding $10
In any one payment.

I have here a quotation from the finance report of December,
1881, made by Secretary Folger. I t simply says that they can
not circulate the silver dollars, that there are too many of them
already issued, and that the Bland law must be suspended.
President Arthur in his message of December, 1831, indorsed
Secretary Folger's recommendation. Secretary Polger in 1882
repeated his former recommendation for the susp msion of the
Bland law, and President Arthur in 1882 reaffirmed his message
of 1881 recommending the same thing. Secret try Folger in 1883
referred to and reaffirmed his report of 1881 and 1882, and so
he did in his report of 1884. President Arthur, in December,
1884, made sundry recommendations, and I will ask that they
may be inserted. In his message of 1884, his last message, he
I concur with the Secretary of the Treasury in recommending the immediate suspension of the coinage of silver dollars and of the issuance ot silver

certificates. This is a matter to which, in former communications, I have
more than once Invoked the attention of the National Legislature.
It appears that annually for the past six years there have been coined, in
compliance with the requirements of the act of February 28,1878, more than
twenty-seven million silver dollars. The number now outstanding is reported by the Secretary to be nearly one hundred and eighty-five million,
whereof but little more than forty million, or less than 22 per cent, are in
actual circulation. The mere existence of this fact seems to me to furnish
of itself a cogeiit argument for the repeal of the statute which has made
such fact possible.
But there are other and graver considerations that tend in the same direction.
The S ecretary avows his conviction that unless this coinage and the issuance of silver certificates be suspended, silver is likely at no distant day to
become our sole metallic standard.

^ Mr. President, do they not somewhat remind us of the predictions of to-day. They sound very mucn just as the predictions
of to-day—the dire calamities that then prevailed m»188o and
1886. Now, let us examine and see their sameness. I have before me a letter written by President Cleveland before his inauguration in 1885.
ALBANY, February 24, 1885.

To the Hon. A. J. WARNER and others,
Members of the Forty-eighth Congress:—

In referring to their letter, he says:
It is also fully justified by the nature of the financial crisis, which, under
the operation of the act of Congress of February 28,1878, is now close at
hand. By a compliance with the requirements of that law, all the vaults of
the Federal Treasury have been and are heaped full of silver coins, which
are now worth less than 85 per cent of the gold dollar prescribed as "the
unit of value," In section 14 of the act of February 12, 1873, and which, with
the silver certificates representing such coin, are receivable for all public
dues. Being thus receivable, while also constantly increasing in quantity
at the rate of $28,000,000 a year, it has followed, of necessity, that the flow of
gold into the Treasury has been steadily diminished.
Silver and silver certificates have displaced and are now displacing gold,
and the sum of gold in the Federal Treasury now available for the payment of
the gold obligations of the United States and for the redemption of the United
Statesnotes called "greenbacks," if not already encroached upon, is perilously near such encroachment.







These being the facts of our present condition, our danger and our duty
to avert that danger would seem to be plain.







From these impending calami ties it Is surely a most patriotic and gratelul duty of the representatives of the people to deliver them.

That was February 24,1885. You see where the country was
predicted to be coming. Just upon the brink of a wonderful
precipice. Now, let us see how long that continued, for these
panics do not subside instanter, as a rule.
In December, 1885, the financial report of Secretary Manning
of the Treasury was submitted. Th^report gives at great length
his views, and recommends the repeal of the purchasing clause
of the law of February 28,1878, and the repeal of the law of May
31,1878, forbidding the retirement of greenbacks and requiring
their reissue; in shgrt, to restore bimetallism, stop the coinage
of silver, unconditionally repeal the purchasing clause of the
Bland act, retire and cancel greenbacks, and wait for an international agreement.
An international agreement! Now, I will read President
Cleveland's message in 1885. The President says:
The desire to utilize the silver product of the country should not lead to a
misuse or the perversion of this power.
The necessity for such an addition to the silver currency of the nation aa
is compelled by the silver-coinage act, is negatived by the fact that up to
the present time only about fifty millions of the silver dollars so coined have

actually found their way into circulation, leaving more than one hundred
and sixty-five millions in the possession of the Government, the custody of
which has entailed a considerable expense for the construction of vaults for
Its deposit. Against this latter amount there are outstanding silver certiacates amounting to about $93,000,000.
Every month two millions of gold in the public Treasury are paid out for
two millions or more of silver dollars, to be added to the idle mass already
If continued long enough, this operation will result in the substitution of
silver for all the gold the Government owns applicable to its general purposes. It will not do to rely upon the customs receipts of the Government
to make good this drain of gold, because the silver thus coined having been
made legal tender for all debts and duss, public and private, at times during
the last six months 58 per cent of the receipts for duties has been In silver
or silver certificates, while the average within that period has been 20 per
cent. The proportion of silver and its certificates received by the Government will probably increase as time goes on, for the reason that the nearer
the period approaches when it will be obliged to offer silver in payment of
its obligations, the greater inducement there will be to hoard gold against
depreciation in the value of silver, or for the purpose of speculating.
This hoarding of gold has already begun.
When the time comes that gold has been withdrawn from circulation, then
will be apparent the difference between the real value of the silver dollar
and a dollar in gold, and the two coins will part company. Gold still the
standard of value, and necessary In our dealings with other countries, will
be at a premium over silver; banks which have substituted gold for the deposits of their customers may pay them with silver bought with such gold,
thus making a handsome profit; rich speculators will sell their hoarded gold
to their neighbors who need it to liquidate their foreign debts, at a ruinous
premium over silver, and the laboring men and women of the land, most
defenseless of all, will find that the dollar received for the wage of their toil
has sadly shrunk in Its purchasing power.
The words uttered in 1834 by Daniel Webster in the Senate of the United
States are true to-day: "The very man of all others who has the deepest
Interest in a sound currency, and who suffers most by mischievous legislation in money matters, is the man who earns his daily bread by his daily

Mr. President, if you will read this message of 1885 on the
Bland law, and read the late message you will find this quotation in both of them, and you will find the conditions predicted
almost alike, the same conditions practically, which were predicted as existing,in 1885 and 1886 under the Bland law.
When President Cleveland was first elected, and when he issued the celebrated letter from which I am quoting, and then in
1885 sent to Congress the message to which I have referred,
urging and pleading for the repeal of the Bland law just as
strongly as he asks now for the repeal of the Sherman law, it
precipitated some discussion of what was going on in 1885, and
what was causing the crisis which was then impending, and I
want to examine it.
On July 14,1886, in the House of Representatives—that was
the first Congress assembled after President Cleveland's inauguration—the Forty-ninth Cor^ress. first session, House joint resolution No. 126, directing payment of the surplus in the Treasury
on the public debt was passed; yeas 207—144 Democrats, 61 Republican, 2 Independents; nays 67—14 Democrats, 53 Republicans.
July 27,1836, in the Senate, Mr. A L L I S O N reported it with a
substitute, which was passed. Yes 42—13 Democrats, 29 Republicans; nays 20—14 Democrats, 6 Republicans. It was placed in
conference, and the conference report was adopted in the House
of Representatives August 3,1886. Yeas 120—73 Democrats, 47
Republicans; nays 63—34 Democrats, 23 Rapublicans, 1 Independent, and agreed to in the Senate August 4, 1886, without
The President would not sign it. It went to him on the last
day of the session, and he killed it by what we call a pocket veto;
that is, he refused to sign it. He made no return to Congress,

so far as I have been able to ascertain, of his reasons for it; but in
a, very handsome book called State Papers of Grover Cleveland,
which I possess, I find these remarks made in connection with
t h a t joint resolution:
This resolution involves so much and Is of such serious import, that I do
not deem it hest to discuss it at this time, It is not approved, because I he'
lieve it to he unnecessary, and because I am by no means convinced that its
mere passage and approval at this time may not endanger and embarrass
the successful and useful operations of the Treasury Department and impair the confidence which the people should have in the management of the
finances of the Government.

That was not a very dangerous joint resolution. There was
some question as to the right of the President to pay out certain
amounts to redeem certain bonds, etc. The joint resolution, as
it passed and as it was pocketed by the President, provided:
That whenever the surplus or balance in the Treasury, including amount
held for .redemption of United v States notes, shall exceed the sum of $100,000,€00, it shall be, and is hereby made, the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury
to apply such excess, in sums not less than ten millions per month, during
the existence of any such surplus or excess, to the payment of the interestbearing indebtedness of the United States payable at the option of the Government:







Provided, That no call shall be made under the provisions of this resolution
until a sum equal to the call is in the Treasury over and above the reserve
herein mentioned: And provided further, That the Secretary of the Treasury,
in his discretion, may have in the Treasury, over and above the foregoing
sums, a working balance not exceeding $20,000,000.

One hundred million dollars of actual reserve and $20,000,000
of working balance. It is true that this joint resolution did not
discriminate between silver dollars and gold dollars. It referred
to the surplus in the Treasury, and I apprehend its terms would
have embraced the silver dollars as well as the gold dollars; but
the President did not sign it. That joint resolution was considerably discussed in the Senate, and the causes which had precipitated that panic were discussed; and now I want to read
something of what was said in the discussion as to the causes of
the panic. I read from the C O N G R E S S I O N A L RECORD, volume
17, part 8, Forty-ninth Congress, July 29,1886, page 7674, from
the speech of Senator Beck:
If I may be allowed to guess I could guess that it has a very proper meaning. Last year the Secretary of the Treasury was induced to lock up money
in the Treasury, as we all agree now. greatly beyond what the interest of the
people required, and very much beyond what was needed for the wants or
security of the Government, because of combinations of men of wealth and
power in New York and elsewhere, many of whom held bonds as security
for national-bank circulation. They did not want to have the bonds paid
and the circulation based upon them withdrawn, and they determined that
they would ruin the country rather than receive any part of their principal
or interest in silver coin. They made earnest and successful efforts through
thesr combinations to alarm our Treasury officials. They endeavored to
make them believe that they would bring on a panic in regard to the finances
of the country unless all the surplus money was held in the Treasury; and
their demand for gold, and gold alone, was acceded to. I believe they
alarmed the Secretary of ihe Treasury. I believe that much of the useless
locking up of our money was because of that apprehension, and I do not
speak of these things without authority. I have before me a very able review,
though a somewhat bitter one, of the speech I made in the Senate last winter, by Hon. Horace White, of New York, a very well informed man. In that
review he said, among other things:
"A sort of panic ensued in the money market, and it came to my knowledge that Governor Tilden was one of a considerable number of persons who,
without any concert of action, had bought large amounts of sterling exchange in order to protect themselves against loss in case silver should become our monetary standard. Sterling exchange means gold in London.
Why was Governor Tilden buying sterling exchange ? Because, happening
t o have on hand a certain number of dollars worth 100 cents each in gold and


apprehending that if left in bank they would presently be worth only 90 or
80 or perhaps 75 cents each, he took the precaution to insure that they should
continue to be worth 100 cents. Hehaa only to write a few lines to his banker
to insure this result. This was a typical case of the domineering 'organizations of wealth* that Mr. Beck has conjured up."
And so on.
A very able man, perhaps as able as Mr. White and as well informed, Mr.
Abram Hewitt, of New York, made a speech very lately in which he said:
"I have reason to know when the present Administration came into power
Its first and chiefest concern was to avoid the danger which had been predicted by the Republican Secretary in his official statem ent and in his private communications. The amount of gold in the Treasury on the 4th of
March, 1885, was $126,000,000. This was a much small er sum than had usually
been held in the Treasury in gold since the resumption of specie payment.
It was steadily running down, The public confidence was gone. The hoarding of gold had begun—not by the mass of the people, not in stockings, not
in secret hiding places, but by the masters of finance, the men whose business it is to handle millions and to prevent their deterioration; they began
to prepare for the hour of danger and the collapse which they thought was
"I know three of th e greatest institutions in the city of New York—I shall
not name them lest it might possibly bring down upon them the condemna*
tion of those who are prejudiced against banks—but I know three institutions in the city of New York which had accumulated more than 825,000,000
of gold as a preparation for the collapse which they thought was coming."

Mr. CALL. Who was that?
Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. Abram S. Hewitt, of New York, a gold
monometallist. This was the predicament of President Cleveland in the beginning of his first Administration. The whole
Administration was trembling and shaking with dread and trepidation for fear that the Treasury Department would be dishonored and degraded. Whence did they get their information?
From these masters of finance, the New York bankers, brokers,
and option dealers.
I am quoting now from Senator Beck:
These men were conspiring to break us down. It was a well-organized
effort, no doubt. They sent their emissaries from one end of the land to the
other, they held their conventions all over the country, seeking to alarm the
laboring masses, and to make good their threats if we dared to say that silver and gold should ®tand upon an equality before the law and that they
should be required to take either at the option of the Government, like other
people. It was these combinations, whose power our executive officers
knew, which actuated the Secretary of the Treasury to make, at their suggestion or demand, the miserable, abortive, absurd effort last summer to
save the country from ruin by the exchange for gold of $10,000,000 of fractional currency.

Just think of the great Secretary going up there and bowing
to these masters of finance, and begging them to let him have
gold for subsidiary silver coinage!
That abortion I need not do more than allude to, because it was too contemptible to deceive anybody and fell flat before it was consummated.

Mr. President, I shall not consume the time of the Senate by
reading, but will introduce some extracts from pages 7675 and
1 am not going to say anything now about or against the $100,000,000 reserve; that will not be endangered by the House resolution. I never have
believed there was any necessity for 850,000,000 of reserve; I do not believe it
now. It becomes more and more absurd every day to hear about $100,000,000 guarding greenbacks. I do not believe the credit of this Government
would be impaired one penny if we were to-day to take $50,000,000 or all of
that reserve and pay off the 3 per cent bonds with it.
Whatever may have been thought to be prudent in 1879, when the resumption act was an experiment, eight years of experience have shown that the
greenback needs no protection. When we paid oft 150,000,000 of 3 per cent bonds
between the 1st day of January and the 1st day of July last, nearly $40,000,000 of them were paid in greenbacks at the request of the men who held the
bonds. When the character of money in which our customs dues were paid
at the great port of New York during the month of June was looked into it
was found that nearly 82 par cent of ail ths taxes were pail in greenbacks,

although the law requires coin, and coin alone, for customs dues. T h e
greenbacks in the Treasury held for the redemption of national-bank notes
have been increased in the last five months from 130,000,000 to $60,000,000,
Everybody wants greenbacks; nobody wants to have them redeemed, so
that there is no sense in holding or hoarding gold for their redemption, far
less $100,000,000 that costs us $5,000,000 of interest annually, as we paid 5 per
cent for 16,000,000 of it and 4£ per cent for the Dalance. But I am not going
to argue that question now. I t will be swept away some day along with the
other rubbish.
The 3 per cent bonds provided for in the resolution will all be paid off long
before it is possible for the surplus funds, backed by the monthly surplus, to
come anywhere near low enough to interfere with this $100,000,000 so-called
reserve. Mr. President, this question has been argued all the time as though
the Treasury was a great bank and the people of the United States a great
private banking corporation, and as though everybody connected with the
Treasury or managing its operations had to keep as much reserve in the
Treasury of the people as a private banker would have to keep in order to
save himself from unforeseen reverses. There is no analogy between them.
"Whatever there may be in the theory, the common sense of the proposition
is all against the comparison and the assumption. The Senator from Maryland [Mr. GORMAN] and myself may be carrying on a bank in Baltimore.
"We may have the best men in Baltimore as our depositors; we bank on our
deposits, of course; that is all we want them for.
But these depositors, when they see that the Senator from Maryland and
myself are making money as bankers, and are making it out of their deposits. may say, "It is too good a thing to let Beck and GORMAN have this;
we will set up a bank of ourown." When they do they of course take away
the money they deposited with us, and they takeaway the business of their
friends, who are also our depositors. The two banks divide the profits. W e
must have a reserve to meet unexpected calls like that upon us. If our depositors who are left think that in Chicago, St. Paul, Minn., or somewhere else money can be loaned at 10 or 15 per cent instead of 3 per cent,
which is all they make by depositing in our bank, they draw their money
out. We must have a reserve to meet all these contingencies or fail.
The United States have no such contingencies to guard against. The
United States have no competitor in their financial affairs. The money derived from our custom-houses and our internal-revenue offices and from our
miscellaneous sources comes, as I said, with the certainty of death, and the
more prosperous the country is the larger the receipts are. Nobody can
divide with us or take from us any of our depositors.
Mr. President, no condition of things can break the United States. When
the reserve of a private man is gone he fails. When the reserve of the
United States is gone the Congress of the United States imposes a 5 per
cent tax on all incomes over $5,000,'' and $30,000,000 flows into the Treasury;
or " 5 cents a pound on tea; 10 cents a pound on coffee; double up the tax on
whisky and tobacco," and untold millions roll in. The world knows that;
the plain people of the country understand it; and to argue here that we
are no better off than a private man who must keep a reserve because he has
no other means of payment except bis own property is to my mind preposterous. No man's credit can be compared with that of the United States,
whose power of taxation extends over a continent and over all the wealth of
60,000,000 people.
Everything every bank has can be called on and be required to come to
the rescue of the credit of the United States at any moment when any deficiency is likely to occur, It Is therefore an absurd proposition from a business standpoint to assume that we occupy the relation of private bankers,
although that assumption has alarmed many people and made them believe
that we were in danger of being broken down financially unless we keep this
reserve intact. Even when at the end of each quarter when pensions and
wages are paid, it is thought to be horrible to reduce that $100,000,000 reserve
for a day, although it may be known that It will accumulate and be in large
excess for three months thereafter, or until the next general quarterly payday comes.

I will go, however, to another speech at the same time from
the senior Senator from Maryland [Mr. G O R M A N ] . I quote now
from page 7723:
Mt. Hewitt states that he had that Information from ex-Secretary McCulloch. But that is not all. The fact is that on the 7th day of February, 1885,
nearly one month before the expiration of his term and when the new Administration was about to come into power, he (Mr. McCulloch) was s o
alarmed at the condi ion of affairs he saw, that payments out of the Treasury
of silver certificates were running rapidly back into the subtreasury in New
York from customs and internal revenue, receipts In gold on those account®
diminishing, the gold coin and bullion balance was being rapidly reduced, h e
was compelled on that date, February 7, 1S35, to instruct the subtreasurer

at New York to withhold payment of gold and greenbacks in the ordinary
transaction witb the clearing house in New York. In other words, he issued
an order which suspended the whole operations of the Treasury with the
New York clearing house as they had been carried on since 1879.

Mr, President, I only read this to show what the panic was at
that time:
On the last day of February, 1885, just before this Administration came in,
the balance, excluding the fractional silver coin, was $120,989,674, of which
142,093,056 were silver dollars, leaving a deficit. If all the obligations due in
gold were paid, of $21,123,382. So it ran until July, 1885, when the Treasury
found itself in the condition of having $144,052,929, of which $66,627,842 were
standard silver dollars, leaving them short $22,574,913 of gold if all obligations
were paid.

How similar were those conditions in 1885 and 1886! Just as
bad a panic as we have now practically, and gotten up to order
by the same men and to have effect upon the President. The
President tails us in almost the same language as the present
message of the dire calamities that would befall the country.
Suppose he had called an extra session of Congress to repeal the
Bland act, does any Senator here suppose that it would have
been repealed? No. What did we do upon his recommendation
to repeal the Bland act? We simply ignored it, as we had a
r i g h t to do, being an independent and coordinate branch of the
Government. He exercised his full constitutional prerogative
when he made his recommendation to us, and we recognized our
constitutional prerogative in ignoring it. But, Mr. President,
if they were all mistaken in 1885 and 1886, may they not be mistaken now?
Mr. President, I will ask to insert extracts from this very
able and interesting report of Secretarj' Manning (1886), pages
3T, 39, and 61, where he goes on to show precisely what was the
eause of the depreciation in silver—its demonetization by the
principal nations of the world:

To stop the purchase of silver will enable the Treasury, while the monetary system is restoring to its normal conditions, to maintain with certainty and greater ease the present stock of silver coin at par with gold In
all our fiscal and local uses, to the great relief from distrust, of the owners
and employers of capital, and so to the greater relief and increasing employment of labor—the first fruits of sound finance and the first condition
of prosperity.
To stop the purchase of silver of course will cause a new fall in the London
market. Speedier and more assured will then be the day of its final restoration to its former place in the money of the world. It is the recent heavy
fall which has opened eyes that were blind and ears that were deaf. But
a fall of silver, if the expense and influx to the Treasury are stopped, will
not enhance the trouble of the Treasury or increase the difficulty of the duty
which the laws impose to keep the silver circulation at par with gold within
our own jusisdiction. Of course, compulsory employment of a money temporarily and locally inferior, in funded-debt payments, or in daily expense
of any sort, means compulsory acceptance, and would force the inferiority to
appear, whereas its skillful employment and an optional acceptance, which
the laws of Congress do not forbid, will prevent that inferiority from ap*
pearing in our domestic trade which nothing can disguise in our foreign ex*
If the law were repealed which makes compulsory Treasury purchases of
Silver, and if that repeal were accompanied by the declaration of Congress
that the United States now bold themselves in readiness to unite with France,
Germany, and Great Britain in opening their mints to the free coinage of
silver and gold at a ratio fixed by international agreement, it is the deliberate judgment of the undersigned that before the expiration of another fiscal
iar this international monetary dislocation might be corrected by such an

Sternational concurrence, the

two monetary metals restored to their old
and universal function as the one standard measure of prices for the world's
commodities, the depression of trade and industry relieved, and a general
prosperity renewed.

I respectfully recommend to the wisdom of Congress the unconditional repeal of the act of February 28, 1878, accompanied by such a declaration.

Why did he want to stop the coinage? Upon what ground?
Remember, he claimed to be a bimetallism Upon what ground
did he want the limited coinage of silver under the Bland law
stopped? He wanted it stopped so that it would force England
and other European nations to come to bimetallism. The favorite theory for years and years was that we could never secure
bimetallism until we forced European nations to it; that we
never can force European nations until we stop the coinage of
silver and throw it upon the market, glut the market, and then
they will come down and agree with us. That is the theory.
We have been talking about that theory ever since 1878, and
yet what has been done right in our face?' England has stopped
the coinage of silver in India, and precipitated a crisis such as
the world has not seen. Yet they tell us that if we would stop
the coinage of silver, it would bring about an agreement! Are
we to be fed upon such milk as that? Is there any strengthening power in such an argument and such presentations? Think
of it. I want Senators to think of it. For years and years the
principal argument for stopping1 the coinage of silver under the
Bland law has been that we might get an international agreement. When they saw that we were not going to uphold silver,
the idea was that then they would come down and agree with
us. Yet, whil& we were doing that, England has gone on steadily
and stopped the coinage of silver in India, stopped the mints to
free coinage, without consulting us; and in the Brussels conference they even told us that they intended to do it. I t was intimated to us strongly enough to put us on our guard, and then
we told them we were going to do it.
So that the argument to-day that the stoppage of the coinage
of silver or the purchase of silver under that law will tend to
make foreign nations come to a bimetallic agreement with us is
without foundation. They have taken the lead of us and closed
their mints. We shall have to get something else in order to
have a standing in any proper and fair argument.
Now, Mr. President, I will go on with this panic of 1885-6. In
1886 President Cleveland referred to the Secretary's message,
and again recommended the suspension of the coinage of the
standard silver dollar under the Bland act. But that was still
to the Forty-ninth Congress. Secretary Fairchild then comes
in and makes his report in 1887, and I will insert extracts from
that report from pages 47,48, and 49. They are very interesting:

One of the most interesting facts shown by the foregoing statements is the
decrease in the number of standard silver dollars owned by the Government
and the increased use of the same money by the people in the form of silver
certificates. The five, two, and one dollar certificates furnish a convenient
currency, and it is evident that the future U3e of the silver-dollar will be
almost exclusively in that form.
If the Government held no funds save those needed for its daily expenses,
It would perform no different function toward currency when it had once
coined or printed it than does an individual who receives andpaysout money;
hut the two great trust funds—that for the redemption of United States notes,
(f100,000,000,) and that for the redemption of national-bank notes, at present
more than $100,000,00$, and whatever surplus there may be from to time to
time—form, as it were, a reservoir which takes and holds that kind of currency which the people reject. Were it not for this great Government reservoir a redundancy of any form of currency would be shown either by its exportation to countries where It was needed or by its depreciation here. The

silver dollar can not be exported because the silver of which it is made Is
worth less than 75 cents, and that would be its value for exportation.
The foregoing tables show that during the sixteen months ended November 1,1887, this Department was able to pay out at par and keep in circulation $10,464,905 of the coined silver dollars, and 872,597,732 of their representatives, the certificates, in addition to the amounts of each in circulation July
1, 1886. If the Department had been able to print enough certificates, doubtless the whole of this increased use of silver would have been in the form of
certificates, and few, if any, coined dollars would have been paid out. On
the contrary, many of those out would have been returned and certificates
taken in their place.
There should always be in the Treasury enough silver beside that held
against outstanding certificates to enable the Government to at once supply
any demand for it on the part of the people; but all held in the Treasury in
excess of that amount is absolutely useless for any purpose, and is in fact a
menace to the silver which the people hold and also to the United States
notes and national-bank notes—to the whole circulating medium, except
gold; therefore it would be the part of wisdom to prevent any accumulation
of silver in the Treasury beyond a sufficient reserve needed to meet any demand which may be made for it. This can be done by fixing the amount of
such reserve, and providing that when it is exceeded by say $5,000,000 the
purchase of bullion shall cease until the amount held by the Government
again equals such reserve.

President Cleveland, in his third annual message of December,
1887, makes no mention of the terrible crisis in which the country had been enveloped. That was in 1885. The clouds had
cleared away, and the silver question was not so important.
Mr. President,, has it ever occurred to the friends of unconditional repeal, when they brin^ before us the weighty nower of
the President's recommendation, that it is barely possible t h a t
the President may be mistaken now, as he has been so often mistaken heretofore?
I refer to Secretary Fairchild's report for 1888, page 29:

The ownership of silver by the Government again was largely decreased,
in spite of the increase of the total stock of silver dollars in the country, by
the coinage of sixteen months. During the past few years the decrease of
circulation caused by the cancellation of national*bank notes and by the deposit of money with the Treasurer by the banks to redeem their notes when
presented for that purpose has been but little exceeded by the increased circulation of silver certificates and of standard silver dollars; thus silver
seems to have filled the vacuum caused by the retirement of national-bank
circulation. The circulating medium in small denominations has been
largely converted into silver certificates. And, finally, business has largely
Increased in the South and in portions of the country where there are few
banking facilities.

Now I quote President Cleveland's message of December 23,
1888, the last message, in which he says:
The Secretary recommends the suspension of the further coinage of silver,
and in such recommendation I earnestly concur. For further valuable information and timely recommendations I ask the careful attention of Congress to the Secretary's report.

W e drift along a little further, Mr. President, and I will insert extracts'from President Harrison's message of December 3,
1889, in which he goes on to show how the lowering clouds of
apprehension and danger had passed away and the country was
in good condition:
The evil anticipations which have accompanied the coinage and use of the
sttver dollar have not been realized. As a coin it has not had general use,
and the public Treasury has been compelled to store it. But this is manilestly owing to the fact that its paper representative is more convenient.
The general acceptance and use of the silver certificate show that silver has
n o t been otherwise discredited. Some favorable conditions have contributed
t o maintain this practical equality, in their commercial use, between the
gold and silver doUars. But some of these are trale conditions that statu649

tory enactments do not control, and of the continuance of which wa can
not he certain.
I refer now to his messages of 1890, 1891, and 1892, and to t h e
finance reports.
President Harrison in his message of December 1,1890, in referring to the Sherman law said:
Some months of further trial will be necessary to determine the permanent effect of the recent legislation upon silver values, but it is gratifying to
know that the increased circulation secured by the act has exerted and will
continue to exert a most beneficial influence upon business and upon general values.

In his message of December 9,1891, President Harrison says:
I hope the depression in the priee of silver is temporary, and that a further
trial of this legislation will more favorably affect it. That the increased volume of currency thus supplied for the use of the people was needed, and that
beneficial results upon trade and prices have followed this legislation I think
must be very clear to every one; nor should it be forgotten that for every
dollar of these notes issued a full dollar's worth of silver bullion is at the
time deposited in the Treasury as a security for Its redemption.







I am still of the opinion that the free coinage of silver under existing conditions would disastrously affect our business interests at home and abroad.
" *
The exports of gold to Europe which began in February last and continued until the close of July, aggregated over $70,000. The net loss of gold
puring the fiscal year was nearly $68,000,000. That no serious monetary disturbance resulted was most gratifying, and gave to Europe fresh evidence
of the strength and stability of our financial Institutions. With the movement of crops the outflow of gold was speedily stopped, and a return set in.
Up to December I we had recovered of our gold loss at the port of New
York, 127,854,000, and it is confidently believed that during the winter and
spring this aggregate will be steadily and largely increased.

I t will be remembered that on the 14th of January, 1891, the
free and unlimited coinage amendment of my colleague [Mr.
VEST] was passed by the Senate by 39 yeas—24 Democrats and
15 Republicans; to nays 27—1 Democrat and 26 Republicans;
and was pending in the House of Representatives. What was
done? The business men got up a banquet in New York and
invited ex-President Cleveland—as he was then—to attend and
address the meeting. I now hold in my hand the letter of Mr.
Cleveland to Mr. Anderson, dated from 816 Madison avenue,
February 10,1891, in which he says:
I shall not be able to attend and address the meeting as you request, but
I am glad the business interests of New York are at last to be heard on the

The business interests of New York to be heard!
It surely can not be necessary for me to make formal expression of m y
argument to those who believe that the greatest peril would be initiated by
the adoption of the scheme embraced in the measures now pending in Congress for an unlimited coinage of silver at our mints.

When that sentence was written, then he began to meditate,
and then he puts in—
If we have developed an unexpected capacity for the assimilation of a
largely increased volume of currency, and even If we have demonstrated
the usefulness of such increase, these conditions fall far short of insuring
us against disaster if in the present situation we enter upon the dangerous
and reckless experiment of free, unlimited, and independent silver coinage.

Yes, Mr. President, when he was writing that letter he began
to think of the predictions he had made, beginning in 1885, and
every solitary one of them not having been fulfilled, in whole or
In part.
Mr. P L A T T . W h a t was the date of that letter?
Mr. COCKRELL. That was in 1891, February 10.
You see when he got into the middle of the letter he then

began to reflect about the number of times he had made the
same identical prediction, and every one of those predictions
had failed. He then says:
IX we have developed an unexpected capacity for the assimilation of a
largely increased volume of currency, and even if we have demonstrated
the usefulness of such increase-

Here is an open confession—" good for the soul"—to the world
that the predictions he had made before had not resulted as he
had anticipated, but that, on the contrary, the ignoring of them
by us had been a blessing to the country.
But, Mr. President, why shall we not now, by amendment to
this bill, establish such a safe system of bimetallism as will
maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar coined or
issued by the United States in the markets and in the payment
of debts?
We have ample time; we have all the attainable data, all the
information, facts, and figures necessary to enable us to prepare
and legislate into existence a just, efficient, and sufficient monetary system, founded on the constitutional, old Democratic bimetallic principles.
The opponents of silver coinage answer in the doleful tones of
their long and oft-repeated predictions and shuddering panicky
apprehensions of dire consequences and untold evils to flow from
the further coinage of silver. W e are gravely and solemnly
told—as we have been ever since 1878—that unless we stop all
further coinage of silver dollars we will drive all the gold out of
our country, and will have our country baptized with an overwhelming inflow of silver, and be driven to a single silver standard.
They are the same old stereotyped prophecies. If there be any
foundation for them in fact, there has been ample time since 1878
to prove them true or false.
Now we come to the cold facts and figures. Here we have
had the predictions made ever since 1877 as to what was going
to occur from year to year. Now let us take the cold recorded
facts and figures, and see whether one solitary prediction ever
has been fulfilled. Has gold been driven from our country o u t
of circulation.
The finance report of Secretary Sherman of December 2,1878,
the first one made after the passage of the Bland silver law of
February 28,1878, shows (page 9) that on April 11, 1878, he sold
fifty million 41 per cent bonds, funded loan of 1891, at a premium
of 11 per cent and accrued interest, less a commission of onehalf of 1 per cent, and that on November 23, 1878, there were in
the Treasury, Jn excess of coin liabilities, $141,888,100 in gold.
Statement of gold coin and bullion and silver dollars and bullion in the Treasury
and in circulation on the dates given.


Gold coin

Silver dollars and




July 1—

Gold coin
• 646,582,852

Silver dollars and

Gold coin and bullion in Treasury July 1, 1893, $188,555,433. Silrer dollars
coined, 419,332,450; out in circulation, 57,029,743; and in certificates, $330,957,504,
leaving in Treasury only 31,345,203.


Oh, think of the conduct of these silver lunatics from 1878 to
1893! W e have persistently ignored the recommendation of every President who has occupied the Executive chair. While
every President and every Secretary of the Treasury has predicted that the country was going to destruction, that financial
crises would envelop the whole country, we poor silver lunatics
have stood and paid no attention to them, and yet the country
has been prosperous and at rest. What would this country be
to-day if you took the silver money, the coins and the certificates,
out of it? Where would we have anything to circulate? W e
would not be in this cdsis. No; but we would be in the deadly
paralysis of a single gold standard, and the business of this country would be prostrate and shrivelled, tenfold worse than now.
The silver lunatics said " N o , we will not repeal it." And we
did not. Had we obeyed their commands we would have brought
ruin and disaster upon the country.
But now, Mr. President, if all these great statesmen and
learned financiers—Secretary and ex-Senator {and now Senator)
SHERMAN, ex-President Hayes, ex-President Arthur, Secretary
Folger, Secretary McCulloch. President Cleveland, Secretary
Manning, Samuel J. Tilden, the New York bankers who hoarded
twenty-five millions of gold in 1885—if all and everyone of these
have, giving way to their fears and apprenhensions, made predictions which have not been fulfilled, and have every one of
them been mistaken, as the records conclusively and beyond
any reasonable doubt show, and all their predictions have been
absolutely falsified by the record of subsequent events, is it, I
ask, in common reason and sense, criminal, censurable, or improper in us plain, common people to suspect, to believe that
they are now as much mistaken as then?- Their predictions then
were just as honestly and conscientiously made, with all the
lights before them, as now. We do not question their honesty
and sincerity, and their fears. They have up to this date been
grievously mistaken in all their predictions. We just as honestly and sincerely believed then they were mistaken.
The facts and figures show we were correct and right in our
views and judgments, and they were mistaken, wrong, in theirs.
W o u d it be wrong in us now to suggest to them our doubts of
the correctness of their present apprehensions and predictions?
Is it not time, after the lapse of over fifteen years, that these
calamity howls shall be brought to a halt? W e hear a great
deal in the Eastern press about the calamity howlers out West,
but if there have ever been any calamity howlers in the West
equal to those of Wall street and the East I should like to have
them pointed out. Ever since we took away from them their
idol, their god (a single gold standard), they have deluged this
country and the press with their calamity howls of the crises
and the impending dangers. Talk about a Populist in Kansas
being a calamity howler! Put him by the side of a New York
b nker and he would sneak away in shame! [Laughter.]
So much for the assertion that the coinage of silver will drive
gold out of the country and bring us to a silver standard. But
our opponents say we have only had limited coinage of silver,
and that if we give to silver unlimited coinage with full legal
tender, then we will certainly be deluged with an overwhelming mass of silver from every nation, kindred, and tongue, and
wUl have piled into our mints all the old silvor spoons, forks, tear

pots, and plate generally, in addition to the great mass of silver
coins now in the various nations.
This is a mere guess, assertion, prediction, prophecy. I t can
only he determined absolutely by the trial. We can only ascertain all the available data, facts, and figures, and then by reasoning—guided by the past and the probabilities of the future—*
form our conclusions and make up our judgment.
First. Will the silver plate in the world be dumped into our
mints? No one denies that a large amount of silver bullion and
coin has been consumed annually in industrial uses, in ornaments,
in manufactures, and in fine arts.
Is it so consumed in anything near its purity? Certainly not.
I t is debased, mixed in greater or less proportion with baser
metals, and in its present condition could not be received under
any ordinary mintage laws for coinage. I t would then be absolutely necessary to have the silver extracted from the baser
metals, and when purified, then present for coinage.
Now, is not the silver so used in the existing plate, ornaments,
etc., more valuable in the plate, etc., than it would be aftsr paying the cost of extinction and losing the entire value of the
manufactures in which it exists? There certainly can be no
reasonable doubt of this.
The quantity of silver consumed in industrial uses which would
ever find its way toour mints would be infinitesimally small and
of no consequence whatever. This pretended claim is simply
made as a burlesque to bring ridicule and contempt on the silver
Second. Let us now consider how much of the silver coins in
existence in other nations would come to our mints. Would we
be flooded with the silver from India? According to our Mint
Bureau there are $900,000,000 in silver in India, in the rupee
silver coins.
The population of India is 280,000,000, and they have only a
small fraction over $3.21 per capita, and the silver rupee is their
absolute money, with full legal tonter at the ratio of 15 of silver to 1 of gold, and at that ratio has full debt-paying and purchasing power, and for ages past has been their only full legaltender money, used in all the varied and multitudinous transactions and exchanges. The quantity of silvi*r there in the rupee
coins—the full equivalent of the dollar—brought here and placed
in our mints for our coinage at 16 to 1, would be 6.2 cents less
less than $1, and that amount would be an actual loss on every
dollar's worth, beside the cost of transportation, insurance, and
interest during time in transit and up to its recoinage here.
Would it pay them to suffer these losses? In vie^y of their
financially embarrassed treasury it certainly would not. The
Indian Government could not afford it and private citizens
would certainly not. And it is practically all in circulation
among the people and belongs to them and not to the government. I t is their coin money.
Besides all these facts the people have not a sufficient quantity to meet the wants and demands of their daily transactions.
Yet we are told that we are to be flooded from India. It is a
mere chimera. Certainly there could be none from India.
China, with a population of 400.000,000, has, according to our
Mint Bureau, $700,000,000 in silver, which is just $1.75 per capita.
Can anyone believe that there is any danger of a flood from

that source? The silver there is in the hands of the people, in
bullion largely, simply in pieces of silver and used as money in
the ordinary business dealings. I t is not reasonable to suppose
there is any probability of that silver, in whole or even in part,
coming to our mints.
In the Straits Settlements, population not given, there is estimated to be $100,000,000 in silver scattered throughout that
country in the hands of the people, used as their only money,
and so used for ages past. There can not reasonably be expected
any deluge from that source.
In Japan, with a gold coinage of $90,000,000, and $50,000,000 of
full legal-tender silver coined at the ratio of 16.18 to 1, and a population of 40,000,000, and $56,000,000 of uncovered paper currency
without any gold or silver redemption reserve, the silver is
only $1.25 per capita, scattered among the people and in constant
use in their business affairs, as standard money equal to gold, and
to the use of which they have long been accustomed. If sent
here for coinage their silver dollars would only contain 1.01 cents
more than our dollar, and this 1.01 cents per dollar would not
compensate the expenses of transportation insurance, and loss of
interest. No one can reasonably expect any overflow from Japan.
Their dollars would be worth no more here recoined into our
dollars than they are in Japan.
In South America, with a population of 35,000.000, they have
$45,000,000 of gold and $25,000,000^ full legal-tender silver coined
at the ratio of 15i to 1. The amount of silver there is only 71
cents per capita, and besides this they have the enormous sum
of $600,000,000 of uncovered irredeemable paper currency, and
need and require many times more silver than they have for their
daily business transactions. There can not reasonably be any fear
from that source. Their silver dollars at the ratio of 15i to 1 contain 3.1 cents less than ours, which would be an actual loss on
every dollar.
In Mexico, with a population of 11,600,000, they have five millions of gold and fifty millions of full legal-tender silver dollars,
coined at the ratio of 16£ silver to 1 gold, and two milliors of
uncovered paper. Their silver is only $4.31 per capita; is their
only circulating coin money in the hands of the people, used time
immemorial as money. Their silver dollar contains 1.03+ cents
more silver than ours. Being our near neighbors it is probable
that small quantities of their silver coinage might find their way
to our mints, but it would be no deluge, and no material amount.
In Egyjpt, with a population of 7,000,000, they have one hundred millions of gold and fifteen millions of limited legal-tender
coins at a ratio 15.68 to 1. Their silver is a subsidiary coin, and
amounts to only $2.14 per capita, and is in the hands of the people—used as money in the ordinary business transactions. There
would certainly be no deluge from that source, as their dollar
contains 1.03 cents less silver than ours. There could be no motive for sending their coin here.
Turkey, with a population of 33,000,000. has fifty millions of
gold and forty-five millions of limited legal-tender silver coins—
only $1.36^ per capita. Their silver coins are in the hands of the
people, widely scattered over a large area, and are in constant
use in their daily affairs, and all coined at the ratio of 15.1 to 1.
The loss on every dollar would be about 5.6 cents. l e a n not see
any probability of any deluge, or even light shower, of silver from
that country.

Russia, with a population of 113,000,000—doubtless underestimated—has $250,000,000 of gold and $22,000,000 of full legal-tender
silver coins coined at the ratio of 151 to 1, and $38,000,000 of limited legal-tender silver coins, coined at the ratio of 15 to 1, with the
immense sum of $500,000,000 of uncovered paper currency, practically irredeemable and below par. They have use for much
more silver than they have. The actual loss on every dollar of
their full legal-tender silver would be 3.1 cents and on their
limited legal tender would be G.2 cents. Their paper currency
is redeemable in their silver coins.' In this financial condition
is it reasonable to suppose that any part of tha silver coins of
Russia now in the hands of her vast population, widely scattered
over her vast domains, would be gathered up and sent here to
our mints? It seems to me only reasonable and almost absolutely certain that no part of her silver would flow into our
The Scandinavian Union, with a population of 8,600,009, has
thirty-two millions of gold and ten millions of limited legal-tender
^ilver coins at a ratio of 14.88 to 1, and twenty-seven millions uncovered p aper currency. This silver is a subsidiary or minor coin
amounting to $1.16 per capita. If these silver coins were sent to
our mints the loss on each dollar would be 6.3 cents. These silver
coins are in constant use in all money transactions in limited
sums, and no part of it can ba spared or sent to our mints.
The Netherlands, with 4,500,000 population, have twenty-five
millions of gold and $ol,800,000 of full legal-tender silver at the
ratio of 151 t o l , and $3,200,000 limited legal-tender silver coins a t
the ratio of 15 to 1, with forty millions uncovered paper. Neither
their silve/ coins nor their paper currency are convertible into
gold. All their silver coins are in circulation as money in the.
hands of the people. If their full legal-tender" silver coins were
sent to our mints the actual loss on each dollar would be 3.1 cents,
and on each dollar of their limited legal-tender silver would be 6.2
cents. There is no possibility with such a small amount of silver that they will ever be able to spare it. In addition to that,
it does not belong to the government.
AustriarHungary with a population of 40,000,000 has a stock
of $40,000,000 in gold, according to our Mint Bureau, which I
think is much below the actual amount, as that Government
has been grabbing for and accumulating gold for sorn^e time p .st,
having proposed in 1891 to establish the single gold standaVd, and
having established it in August, 1892. They have $90,000,000 of
full legal-tender silver coined at the ratio of 13.69 t o l , and $200,000,000 uncovered paper currency, according to our Mint Bureau,
but which I think far below the actual amount, as they had at
the beginning of 1892 about $345,000,0JO of such uncovered paper
Their silver coins are only $2.25 per capita, while their paper
currency is from $6.50 to $8,621. Their paper currency, as well
as silver, has been inconvertible. It is doubtless their intantion
in the end, when their finances will justify, to retire some of
their paper and make the remainder redeemable and convertible.
Even with their recently established gold standard it does not
seem reasonable or probable that they can resume coin redemption of their uncovered paper, and dispense with their comparatively small amount or silver coins—only $2.25 per capita—
gather their silver into the government treasury and send it to

our mints for coinage. It would certainly involve a serious loss,
amounting to 14.4 cents on every dollar, which any government
in the financial stress of Austria, with a national debt of $70 per
capita, would hesitate to suffer and could illy afford to incur this
loss and send that silver out of the country. There certainly
need be no serious apprehension of any overflow from that country of silver to our mints.
Portugal, with 5,000,000 population, has forty millions gold,
ten millions limited legal-tender silver money at the ratio of 14.0S
to 1—only $2 per capita, and forty-five millions of uncovered paper
money. On every dollar of their silver sent to our mints the
actual loss would be 14.35 cents. It is certain there would be
none sant to our mints.
Spain, with a population of 18,000,000, has forty millions gold,
one hundred and twenty millions full legal-tender silver coined
at the ratio of 15£ to 1, and thirty-eight millions of limited legaltender silver coined at the ratio of 14.38 to 1, and one hundred millions of uncovered paper money. In addition to this uncovered
paper, $5.50 per capita, Spain has a national debt of over $70 per
capita. The full legal-tender silver is $0.66 per capita and the
limited legal tender is $2.11 per capita. On every dollar of the
full le^al tender the actual loss, if recoined in our mints into
our dollars, would be 3.1 cents, and on the limited tender 10.1
Is Spain in the financial condition to gather into her treasury
any considerable portion of her silver coinage from its circulation among a tax-ridden people, dollar for dollar with any and
all other money in their hands, and dump it inio our mints at the
actual loss I have named? There can be no reasonable or wellfounded apprehension of any such action.
Switzerland, with 3,000,000 population, has fifteen millions of
gold. Eleven million four hundred thousand full legal-tender
silver money coined at the ratio of 15| to 1, and $3,600,000 limited
legal-tender silver coined at tho ratio of 14.38 to 1, and fourteen
milons uncovered paper, nearly equal to all her silver.
The actual loss on the full tender coins on every dollar, if sent
to our mints, would be 3.1 cents, and on the limited tender 10.1
cents. All her silver is only $5 per capita, and is in the hands
of the people, equal to gold and as current money in that country
as gold. There can be no reasonable grounds to believe any
portion of* it will be dumped into our mints.
Italy, with 31,000,000 population, has. $93,605,Q00 of gold, sixteen millons full tender silver at a ratio of 15i to 1, and $34,200,000 limited tender silver at 14.38 to 1, and $163,471,000 uncovered
paper, besides a per capita national debt of over $75. Their
paper is at a discount. Their full tender silver is only 51 cents
per capita, and their limited tender only $1.10 ppr capita, combined only $1.61 per. capita. No one can reasonably expect any
of this silver money to be dumped into our mints, the actual
loss being 3.1 on full tender and 10.1 on limited tender.
Belgium, with 6,100,000 population, has, according to our Mint
Bureau, sixty-five millions gold, a largely overestimated sum
according to Indian currency commission's report, and $48,400,000
full tender silver at ratio of 15£ to 1, and $6,600,000 limited tender silver at ratio of 14.38 to 1, and fifty-four millions uncovered
paper, and in addition a national debt of over $60 per capita.
The actual loss on every dollar of her full-tender silver sent
to our mints would be 3.1 cents and on the limited tender 10.1

cents. Certainly Belgium is in no financial condition to gather
up from the hands of the people using and passing her silver
equally with gold and dump it into our mints at the losses indicated.
Now, I go to Germany. Germany is the greatest scarecrow
for deluging us with untold masses of depreciated silver socalled. There is the country that is going to flood the world with
its surplus silver. Germany has a population of 49,500,000, and
according to our Mint Bureau, has six hundred millions in gold,
an overestimate of probably fifty millions, according to Indian
currency commission reports. She has, notwithstanding her single gold standard, one hundred and three millions of full legal
tender silver thalers or dollars, as estimated by our Mint Bureau, coined at the ratio of 15i to 1, in circulation upon a perfect equality with her gold, equal to gold in the payment of all
debts and in all purchases, and only equal to $2.08 per capita,
and one hundred and eight millions of limited legal-tender silver coined at the ratio of 13.957 to 1, and an uncovered paper
circulation of $107,000,000. The per capita of the limited tender
silver is only a fraction over $2.18.
In 1890, according to Eleventh Census Report, the German Empire proper had a debt of only $85,181,250, but the States of Germany had a combined debt of $1,874,437,972 owing in different
amounts by the several states.
If the German full legal-tender silver were dumped into our
mints, the actual loss on each dollar would be 3.1 cents, and on
the limited tender 12.7 cents. Consider her indebtedness, Empire and states, her one hundred and seven millions of piper
money without any gold or silver coin on h md for its redemption, and her $2.08fuillegal tender per capita and her $2.18 limited tender per capita, only $4.2 i combined, per capita, and the
actual and unavoidable loss to ba incurred in sending her silver coinage to our mints, while the coin at home is circulating
side by side with gold, and it seems to me certain that there
can be and would be no deluge of silver from Germany.
There has been so much s iid about the silver in Germany that
I must beg the indulgence of the Senate to not rely simply upon
the reports of our Mint Bureau, but to go to the official records
and see whether the Mint is right, and see whether there are
$103,030,000 there of full legal tender. I confess we have all been
under that impression. I spoke to my friend, the Senator from
Iowa [Mr. ALLISON], and asked him if he could give me ahy estimate of what was stated in the Brussels conference. I had read
the report of the Brussels conference and had found th it the
Germain representatives the^e had submitted a table and that it
was not printed with the proceedings, although it was stated
that it would be printed. I then went back to the report of the
monetary conference of 18S1, and I will now read from that report the official statement of the German repres mtatives in that

[Presented by Baron Von Thielmann, page 13.]

I will not read this because we all know she changed from a
single silver to a single gold standard and introducsd a new coin
as her standard, a gold mark. Then she made the silver coins
Of 5, 3, and 1 mark and 50 and 20 pfennigs, and called in the silt>49

ver coin, and the world has been scared with what she had
ready to dump on it ever since. I will read from pages 17 and 18:
If the provisions of the present monetary statutes should he completely
carried out, and if, by reason thereof, the sales of silver should be resumed,
the Imperial Government would need to dispose of only so much of the four
hundred and ten or five hundred millions of marks in thalers now in circulation, as well as of the bar silver which it has held since 1879, as might not
be required for the augmentation of the circulation of subsidiary silver
As has been stated in the above title I, the total amount of Imperial silver
coins must not, under the present law, exceed 1C marks per capita of the
population of the Empire.
The latter, however, having increased between the census of 1st December,
1875, and that of 1st December, 1880. from 42.727,372 to 45,194,172 souls, making
a gain, therefore, of 2,466,800 souls, it becomes possible, at this date, under
existing legislation, to augment by about 25.000,000 of marks the mass of silver coins struck up to the present time, and which amounts to 427,000,000 of
marks. But, besides this, the Imperial Government has recognized, since
the year 1880, the propriety of raising the rate of the fractional coinage from
10 marks to 12 marks per capita of the population, in case the monetary reform should be allowed to take its course.
If thi * new rate be based upon the total of the present population of Germany it would be necessary to coin a further sum of 115,000,000 of marks in
silver money, and this would absorb the 31,000,000 of marks in silver i n g o t s -

Referred to here. That is all they had in bullion, 31,0G0,000of
marks in bullion. He says:
And this would obsorb the 31,000,000 of marks in silver ingots which are now
on hand, and 73,000,000 of marks in thalers now actually in circulation,
There would remain to be sold, including seventy-four to eighty-one millions of marks in Austrian thalers, amass of three hundred and thirty-seven
to four hundred and twenty-seven millions of marks, that is to say, of 3,740,000 to 4,740.000 pounds of fine silver.
If the Austrian thalers be left out of the calculation, there would only remain to be disposed of two hundred and sixty-thtee to three hundred and
forty-six millions of marks, or, in other words, 2,920,000 to 3,840,000 pounds of
fine silver.

Let us take the reasonable medium estimate there, 4,500,000
pounds of fine silver, its value $69,795,000. W h a t is the increase
of population since 1880? Four million four hundred and five
thousand. What is the per capita? Twelve marks per capita,
equal to $12,686,400, reducing the stock of silver to $57,108,600
in legal thalers, the most of it in bank as reserve money. Did
she coin it? Has she coined any since 18^0?
Germany in 1882 and up to 1889, according to our census reports, and in 1891, coined $11,870,460 in subsidiary silver, which
Shows that she has carried out her monetary policy, and there
can be no possible danger from that source. The Imperial Bank
of Germany on the 18th of August, 1893, had gold coin £36,725,250 and silver £12,241,752; so that from $57,000,000 to $60,000,000
is all there is of standard silver thalers in Germany, and they
are a full legal tender and circulating a t a par with gold. I say
all the pretensions that we are going to be flooded with silver
from Germany are without foundation.
Now go to Great Britain. Nobody can claim that her $100,000,< 00 of silver will ever be brought here. Great Britain, the
United Kingdom, has 38,01)0,000 population, $550,000,000 gold and
$10(),000,0'J0 subsidiary silver coin money, coined at the ratio of
14.28 to 1, and a full legal tender up to $10, now in circulation
as money among the people—used in nearly all the transactions in amounts below $10, and redeemable in gold whenever
gold is wanted.
It is worse than ridiculous to pretend even that any portion of
that silver money will ever be dumped into our mints, at an aom

tual loss in its value of 10.7 cents on every dollar. There is no
danger from that source.
Now for France. France has a population of 39,000,000; eight
hundred millions gold, the largest &tock in any nation, and six
hundred and fifty millions silver, coined at ratio of 151 t o l , and a
full legal tender in all payments, the equal in all respects of her
gold coin, and absolute money, irredeemable in anything, just
like gold.
France also has fifty millions limited legal-tender coins at ratio
of 14.3S to 1. The recoinage into our dollars would entail an
actual loss of 3.1 cents on her full legal tender and 10.1 cents on
her limited tender on every dollar.
France to-day maintains the true bimetallic system, so far as
her coined gold and silver money is concerned, but not as to silver bullion, for her mints are closed to silver-coinage.
France has $81,402,000 of uncovered paper money, without any
metallic reserve for redemption, and an enormous national debt
of $4,446,000,000, exclusive of annuities whose capitalised value
is estimated by good authority to be not less than $2,000,000,000.
That is according to the Eleventh Census Report. This vast indebtedness is held almost entirely by her own citizens, who receive the interest on it, and when paid will receive the principal.
In this condition of France, can any rational person believe it
either probable or even possible for any considerable portion
of this silver coin money to find its way to our mints for recoinage into our silver dollars at the inevitable loss to be incurred? I t
seems to me that any such belief can only arise in drowsy moments when dreams, not reason nor judgment, hold possession of
the mental faculties.
The Bank of France on August 18,1893, held gold $335,000,000
and silver $250,000,000.
In all these countries the silver coins are money in circulation
among the people, and where full legal tenders are money equal
to gold—dollar for dollar. Should they come here it would be as
metal, losing every monetary function the moment they crossed
their territorial boundaries and at very great loss. If they did
come and were coined, what would they do with them? They
would put them into our mints and take the standard silver dollars, and what would they do with them? Take them back to
their country? Oh, no: it would be only bullion the moment it
left the boundaries of the United States. They would buy something that we have to sell. That is what they would do with it.
They would have to do that unless these accommodating New
York calamity-howling bankers would give them gold coin in
exchange for the silver, and I do not believe they would do it.
No, no, Mr. President, we have an abundance to spare of the material products of our labor and our factories and would only too
gladly exchange them for many, many dollars. There is no danger of a flood from that source. There is no accumulation of
silver bullion anywhere in the world;
[At this point the honorable Senator yielded to Mr. S M I T H . ]
Mr. COCKRELL. W h y not then restore that safe system of
bimetallism for which, according to professions, whose sincerity
1 am not questioning, we all hunger and thirst by day and by
But, say our friends, the opponents of unlimited coinage, if,
as you say, there ba no danger of a deluge of silver from the silver coins of foreign countries—the real danger—the deluge from

the annual overproduction of silver in the world, coupled with
the closing of the mints of all other nations to such coinage, will
certainly come, is inevitable.
Here again come predictions, apprehensions of dire calamities,
and panicky fears arising from overnervousness, and not from
facts and figures.
Let us now calmly and dispassionately reason together and
consider the probabilities, based upon the facts and figures of
the past.
In ten years, 1882 to 1891, inclusive, according to our Mint Bureau, the world's product of silver was $1,363,799,078, from which
we must deduct the amount of silver consumed annually for industrial purposes, estimated by Dr. Soetbeer at 21 per cent, and
shown by our Mint Bureau to be in the United States 12.2 per
cent, and which I will estimate at only 15 per cent, to be safe
beyond question. This will amount" to $204,569,860. Deduct
this from the gross product and we have left for coinage $1,159,229,218.
The world's coinage of silver in these ten years, after deducting therefrom all the coinage in the United? States, India, and
Austria, amounted to $638,133,496, which, deducted from the balance left for coinage, leaves only $521,095,722 as the surplus to
be consumed by the unlimited coinage in the United States in
ten years, being only $52,109,572 for each year. That is no deluge. and we should have no overflow from that.
Take five years, 1887-1891:
World's product
. . $787,063,791
Deduct 15 per cent consumed in industrial uses..- 118,059,568
Leaving a balance of
Deduct world's coinage, excluding India, Austria,
and United States
^Leaving a balance for us to coin of
Being only annually

69, 303,031

This would have been no overflow, no inundation of silver.
Suppose our coinage limited to our own product—
In twenty years, 1873-1892, inclusive, we produced.. $992,719,000
Deduct 12 per cent for industrial uses
W e have for our coinage in twenty years
Annually in each of the twenty years.—
In five years, 1888-1892, we produced
Deduct for industrial uses



W e have left for our coinage in five y e a r s . 3 0 1 , 2 1 0 , 8 2 2
For each year, or annually.
There is no deluge in this.
Coinage confined to our own product would, in all reasonable
probability, not exceed one dollar per capita annually, no more
and not as much, in fact, as the increase in population, commerce, and business will absolutely require for monetary uses.
These facts and figures must dispel the trembling fears of a
deluge of silver into our mints if opened to the world's product.

If limited to our own product there can be no possible danger of
a deluge.
The opponents of unlimited silver coinage have.proclaimed all
over the world time and again, and it has bsen repeated by the
gold monometallists in foreign countries, that the United States
have practically had the single gold standard since 1834 and
1837, and silver was practically demonetized in 18">3. There
never has been any ch tnge whatever by our laws touching the
coinage of silver dollars as to 3711 grains pure silver. In
1834-?37 the quantity of gold to the dollar was reduced, so as to
bring us to the standard of 16 to 1. Our mints from 1792 to 1873
were always open to the unlimited coinage of silver dollars and
gold coins'on exactly same terms, and both coins had equal legal
tender—were absolute irredeemable money, without price, and
our silver dollar was maintained as the unit of value.
In addition, the half and quarter dollar, the dime and fivecent pieces, were of standard weight and fineness and full tenders equal to gold, until 1853, when they were reduced in weight
and limited in tender to$5, simply to keep them as change. Why
such misrepresentations? In the Senate, March 8,18")2, Senator
Hunter, of Virginia, reported a bill the object of which was to
retain our silver currency, which was then leaving the country
because of its value being greater than gold: not to demonetize
silver. He insisted on bimetallism.
Once monarchs and kings depreciated the coins by reducing
the quantity of metal and increasing the paying power. Now
governments increase the value and purchasing power by demonetizing one-half of the coin money.
True bimetallism, such as I will show the Senator has recently
advocated, was maintained. Sometimes we had more silver,
sometimes more gold, but always open mints to unlimited coinage
for both alike.
Again, they say our people did not want silver: that no silver
dollars were coined up to 1873. I t has been hurled in our faces
in almost every international monetary conference, and boldly
so proclaimed to foreign nations by our own representatives, and
hundreds of times here in the Senate. Why this concealment
of facts, and these misrepresentations of the conditions existing
under our laws?
Consider the real facts and the true conditions. Prom April
2, 1792. to July 31,1834, we produced of silver metal practically
nothing—insignificant, as stated in Mint Bureau reports.
From July 31, 1834, to December 31, 1844, we produced $2^0,000, or $25,000 yearly. In 1845-18^7—thirteen years—annually
$50,000, amounting only to $650,000 in thirteen years. W h a t did
we do? W e coined of standard silver dollars $2,766,640, and
$39,241,110 in half doUars, beside many millions in quarter dollars,* dimes and half dimes, all full legal tender equally with gold
for all debts up to 1854. From that year on half dollars and
smaller coins were only tenders for $5.
From 1792 to 1853, inclusive, we coined $75,961,554.90 in half
dollars and small coins, in addition to standard dollars amounting to $2,550,000, aggregating $78,511,554.90. And yet the world
is told we coined no silver!
From 1857 to 1873, we coined 5,261,598 standard dollars: in 1870,
$445,462; in 1871, $1,117,136; in 1872, $1,118,< 00, and in one month
and twelve days, up to February 12.1873, $296,600, and if coinage
had been kept up at the same ratio for the remainder of that

year the total coinage of that year would have been over 2,700,000 silver dollars. Such was our coinage at the very time silver
was stricken down by the coinage act of February 12,1873.
There is another reason, Mr. President. Foreign coins of
gold and silver were full legal tender in our country up to 1857;
and we coined during that time much more silver than we produced in our country; and the only other silver which came here
was silver coin. They were full legal tender, and why did anybody want to recoin them into full legal-tender money again?
It has also been circulated in foreign countries, and believed
by them, that our people refused to circulate and use as money
our standard dollars, under the laws of 1878 and 1890. Foreigners
do not understand that in consequence of the era of greenbacks
and fractional currency our people prefer legal tenders, gold and
silver certificates, to the actual coin, and that the silver dollars
in our Treasury are practically in circulation by certificates,
which are preferred to gold in circulation.
The R E C O R D of October 1 , 1 8 9 3 , shows that of a total coinage
of 4 1 9 , 3 3 2 , 5 5 0 silver dollars, only $ 2 9 , 6 3 5 , 5 0 4 are in the Treasury
as a part of its; reserve; and of the balance* $ 5 8 , 8 3 2 , 6 6 8 are in
actual circulation, and $ 3 3 0 , 8 6 4 , 5 0 4 in the Treasury, represented
by outstanding silver certificates, and are simply held on deposit, to be returned on presentation of the certificates—which
simply certify that so many silver dollars have been deposited
in the Treasury, payable to the holder on demand. There is no
pecuniary obligation whatever to do aught except return the
silver dollars specified.
These are the actual, cold facts, and yet the Senator from
Ohio—and it is most remarkable—in his speech on the floor of
the Senate on May 31 and June 1,1892, said—and I call the attention of the Senator to the language—
Shall we sell the silver on hand? We have $400,000,000 in the Treasury.
Our people will not readily take it as money. With all the efforts that have
been made by Congress there are only fifty or sixty million dollars of silver
In circulation. The balance is there in vaults, in cellars, as the security for
the payment of the various forms of paper money. Dare you sell that silver? I wanted to provide in the law of 1890 for the disposition of that silver
in certain cases, but the con erees would not agree to it, and now to attempt
to sell that silver in a falling market would only be adding misery to ruin.
1 do not like to talk about these things, but it is my duty to state my own
opinions. They may be all wrong.

I should not think any Senator having much regard for the
integrity of our financial system would want to talk in that style
about our silver money.
Mr. DOLPH. Who was that?
Mr. COCKRELL. The Senator from Ohio [Mr. SHERMAN] in
his speech in 1892, when he referred to all our silver as metal in
the Treasury, and the question was whether we should sell it or
not. The Senator from Colorado asked this question:
Mr. TELLER. I wish to ask the Senator a question. He says we have $400,000.000 of silver. That statement would go out as if the Government owns
$400,000,000 of silver. Does the Senator mean to make that statement?
Mr. SHERMAN. It is in our Treasury, the property of the Government* and
our Treasury notes are outstanding against it.
Mr. TELLER. Will the Senator tell me who owns that silver, whether it is
the Treasury of the United States or the people of the United States who
hold the certificates?
Mr. SHERMAN. We hold in the Treasury of the United States $413,000,000 of
coined silver. We hold of subsidiary silver $77,000,000. So I was nearly $100,000,000 within the mark. I do not want to say anything about this. We have
got this vast mass, and we can not sell it; we dare not sell it.

The Senator from Ohio would not answer the question of tho
Senator from Colorado, but proclaimed to the world, practically
that the United States had four or five hundred million dollars
of silver in it's Treasury belonging to the United States, which
it could sell without a breach of faith, notwithstanding certificates were out calling for nearly every dollar of it. This is our
monometallic-bimetallic leader upon the floor of the Senate today, and yet he proclaimed that to the world, and it goes into
every nation, kindred, and tongue of the civilized world. But
he was pressed still further.
Mr. TELLER. Will the Senator assert here that the Government has any
right to sell the silver dollars; that if there was a law authorizing it the
Government would sell the silver dollars, when it is a trustee and holds the
money in trust?
Mr. SHERMAN. There is no doubt the Government will hold that coined
money for the payment of these notes outstanding, but it has bullion in its
keeping that it dare not sell; and it owes for It. That is affecting the money
Mr. TELLER. Has it a right to sell a dollar?
Mr. SHERMAN. It has a right to sell the bullion to pay the notes, but there
is no law providing for Its sale.
Mr. TELLER. Then it has not any right to sell it.
Mr. SHERMAN. Suppose, for instance, that these Treasury notes outstanding should come to the Treasury for payment, would you take the gold in
the Treasury to pay them?
Mr. JONES of Nevada. The Government of the United States has no ri^ht
to sell bullion.
Mr. SHERMAN. The very moment you attempted to force the silver dollar
into the hands of the people you would find at once the gap, the dangerous
gap, between silver and gold.
IAt this point the honorable Senator yielded to a motion to adjourn.]

No, Mr. President, the Senator from Ohio ought to have
known and stated distinctly, because he is looked upon as a g r i a t
financial authority throughout the worldj that nearly every dollar of the silver coin in the Treasury was represented by certificates in the hands of the masses of the people, known as silvercoin certificates; that the Government simply held those silver
dollars to be returned to the holders of the certificates, and that
the only bullion which was in the Treasury was that purchased
under the Sherman law. The Treasury had the right to coin
it, but no r i g h t to sell it. Then the people of the country would
have understood it.
No one can tell what was\the effect in foreign countries of the
publication of that speech to the effect that the United States
had $400,000,000 of silver and it was considering the propriety
of selling it. That is the way silver has been handicapped ever
since we undertook to break down gold monometallism established by the law of 1873. It has been misrepresented and falsified on every hand, and that, too, by distinguished gentlemen
whose words have been taken as true.
Mr. President, in the speech of the Senator from Ohio of
August 30,1893, which I shall not consume the time of the Senate in reading, but which I merely refer to, he proposes to coin
this same surplus bullion in the Treasury and use it as full legaltender money.
In 1892, however, it was different. But think of telling the
country that this $400,000,000 was stored in vaults and in cellars
and not circulating through its representatives. I t was a concealment, a suppression of the true facts.
Where is the gold of the United States? Is it in circulation?
Scarcely a dollar of it. It, too, is in the bank vaults and in the
cellars as a reserve. The certificates are outstanding Gold no

more circulates in this country than silver. There is not $1,000,000 of gold to-day in actual circulation.
The panic has demonstrated that there is no difference In the
estimation of the masses of the people between a coined gold
dollar or a coined silver dollar or a greenback or a silver certificate. They have all been taken and hidden away in stockings
and in hiding places and in the vaults of safe-deposit companies,
and even the despised silver dollar has commanded a premium
in the open market in Wall street during the panic. No, there
is not a dollar to-day in the United States of any kind which is
better than the silver dollar in the estimation of the masses of
the people among whom it circulates, and there is not a dollar
of any kind that has more paying power or purchasing power
than the standard silver dollar.
But gold monometallists tell us that gold is the money of
civilization, of enlightened nations, of progressive nations, and
the doctrinaires are to dictate to us the degree of our civilization by the gold we use or do not use.
Mr. President, it has been thrown up in our monetary conferences why gold should be used, that it is necessary to use gold
in large transactions. Mr. Rothschilds, in the Brussels monetary
conference, insisted upon utilizing silver as money, but at the
same time said that for the great commercial transactions of
the world we must have gold. " W h y , " he said, " m y house
sometimes wants to ship millions of dollars, and just think of
the load we should have to carry if it was in silver dollars." In
other words, the money of the world must be made to suit the
convenience of those who handle it by the millions and the tens
of millions, and not the great masses of the people who earn it
and produce the products for which it must be exchanged. That
is the single gold standard.
Our gold monometallists say, "If you give unlimited coinage
to silver we shall have too much money in this country." I challenge any man, historian or doctrinaire, to show me any nation
on this earth, in any age of the world, that has had more full
weighted coins of silver and gold of standard fineness than were
necessary for m o n e t a r y purpos s. No, sir; you may search the
world over, and no nation, no people have ever had more coined
gold and silver of full weight and fineness than they could use
for monetary purposes. Such an instance can not be found.
Talk about flooding the world with money to-day. Cast your
eye over the world and behold it, and what do you find? To-day
all the money of the world, gold and silver, amounts to $5.S2 per
capita, with which to do the business of the entire world. In
what condition is the world? Look at the national debts of foreign countries according to the census of 1890:
National debts of foreign countries
Local debts of foreign countries


This estimate includes eighty*three principal countries, three
hundred and sixty-three principal and a large number of other
foreign cities, and all the departments of Prance.
P e r capitadebt of some nations: Prance, $116.35; Great Britain,
$87.79: Russia, $30.79; Austria-Hungary, $72.42; Italy, $76.06;Belgium, $63.10; Netherlands, $95.56; Spain, $71.27; Canada, $47.51;
New South Wales, $214.87; New Zealand, $298.01; Queensland,

$333.46; South Australia, $321: Portugal, $134.11; while our own
is only $14.24.
This vast debt does not include many hundreds of millions,
even billions of debts on the part of corporations, minor government divisions, and individuals, on which the interest alone
each year is from fifteen hundred to two thousand millions. Then
consider the revenues of all the foreign governments collected for
government purposes, amounting to billions annually. Then consider the billions needed in the billions of transactions between
buyers and sellers of the world's productions, the necessaries and
comforts of life, etc.; these aggregate amounts are almost beyond calculation. We have no statistics sufficient to enable any
fair computation.
One ascertained amount may give some conception of the magnitude of these transactions. According to Mulhall the value in
the year 1888 of all the manufactures of textiles, hard ware, clothing, beer and spirits, and leather in the world, amounted to
$2^,370,000,000, an immense product to be paid for by the consumers annually. All the full legal-tender gold and silver coins
in the world, in every place, would have to be used three times
simply for these products, not considering the purchase of the
other articles.
Now, look a t our own country, according to the census of 1890:
Debt of United States less cash in Treasury
State debts less sinking fund
County debts less sinking fund
Municipal debts less sinking fund
School-district debts less sinking fund


These are the debts upon which interest must be paid each
W h a t are the annual receipts and expenditures of all our governmental machinery, national, State, Territorial, county or
parish, municipal, and school districts? According to the most
reliable data from the Census Office the expenditures are $1,000,000,000, which is rather below than above1 the amount;
this is at least two-thirds of all our available money twice to be
used. The annual interest on national, State, Territorial, county,
municipal, and school-district debts is about $1.50 per capita.
These revenues or taxes paid at different periods require some
hoarding and when paid in are not at once paid out.
Take our railroads in 1893. The funded debts of corporations,
railways, street railways, telephone, telegraph, and other quasi
public corporations are over five thousand millions; the annual
interest to be paid, which, with dividends on stock, rentals, etc.,
amounted in 1892 to $417,861,702. Operating expenses in 1892,
There were paid by travelers and shippers to the railway and
street railwav companies $306,972,023 for passenger fare, and
$898,299,623 for freight, etc.; total, $1,205,272,023, nearly equal
to all our circulating money.
Our census reports in regard to farm and home mortgages are
not completed; when completed they will show many hundreds
of millions, and even billions of indebtedness. I have made no
calculations from the census bulletins only in part issued. Mr.
Frederick C. Waite, of this city, in a letter to the Senator from
Colorado [Mr. TELLER] printed as Senate Miscellaneous Document No. 25, says on page 2, $6,503,000,000. If these figures are

correct tlie annual interest charge can not well be less than 8 per
cent, probably much more, amounting to $510,000,000, one-third
at least of all our circulating money and nearly $8 per capita of
all our people.
I hope the completed and final returns of the Eleventh Census may show these figures too high and above the actual indebtedness. We know this class of indebtedness is very large
and by no means includes all the indebtedness of our people;
the aggregate amount of which can never be ascertained with
Take the banking institutions, national, State, and private
banks, loan and trust companies, and savings associations. According to the report of the Comptroller of the Currency for
1892, their aggregate loans were $4,346,263,221; and their aggregate deposits were $4,888,533,979. An indebtedness to the banks
three times greater than our circulating money; and an indebtedness by the banks to their depositors over three times as much
as our available circulating money.
The interest on loans to b.mks at 6 per cent is over $260,000,000
annually. Then consider the amounts of all the sales of imported
and domestic products to our people for consumption. Our
whole internal commerce, traffic, exchanges, sales, and puschases,
aggregate almost an incalculable sum.
It is impossible to ascertain the gum of all such sales and purchases. In the clearinghouses in fifty-eight principal cities, the
exchanges in 1892 were $'il,017,839,067, and only 8 per cent in
cash or currency used. Drafts drawn by national banks upon
bankers at other places in 1892, $12,994,959,590.
These figures show the vastness of the transactions by banks
alone and their many transfers of money from one point to another while using only about 10 per cent in actual cash.
On September 15,1892, the receipts by the national banks were
$331,205,213, about one-fourth of all the available mone3T in the
country, of which 9.39 per cent was cash, and 89.61 per cent
substitutes, checks, drafts, exchanges, etc.
It is argued that very little money is needed; that these substitutes answer all the purposes of money ai\d are so much more
convenient. They say, look at London, where only 2.77 per
cent of actual cash is used in the billions of dollars of transactions. Great exemplar!
Henry Carey Baird, in a letter entitled t( Bank of France and
French Finance,-' addressed to the Manufacturer and published
in its issue of December 16,1890, says:
But we, in this country, have never in practice seen the bank-credit system run mad as it exists in England, and especially In London. For instance,
the London Economist of November 22 tabulates the statements of eleven
joint-stock banks In London, June 30,1890. so far as regards the two items of
" Liabilities to the public " and " Cash on hand and at the Bank of England.*'
Tbese liabilities were $818,000,000, while the cash, including that In the Bank
of England, was but $87,000,000, or 10.3 cents of so-called " cash " for each 81
of liabilities, exclusive of those to the stockholders.

I have given some of the items in regard to the needs of money
in the world and in this country simply for reflection, for consideration, to show what our pretended financial system is. It
is n o t b ised on metallic money nor yet on paper. We have a
wholly inadequate supply of all combined in the world, and more
especially in this country. We base our system on confidence,
trust, and faith. How easily shaken. And yet with our country
in this condition, with this great demand for money, this abso64y

lute need for an increase of the metallic basis of our financial
system, we are commanded to vote now for the unconditional repeal of the Sherman law and establish and leave in force the
single gold standard of the law of February 12, 1873, striking
down from further coinage the entire silver of the world, so far
as our mints are concerned. Look back at our history and see
what the system has been. One-half of the money of- the world
was stricken down. Jay Cooke's failure in 1873 destroyed confidence, and the deadly panic of 1873 crashed from one end of this
land to the other.
Come up a little later. A New York snipe named Ward began
banking cloaked in the name of our great military chieftain,
Gen. Grant. He became at once a financial oracle in Wall street,
ran his course, and fell, and our whole financial system was
shaken and tottering almost to a panic. Why? Because confidence, faith, trust, were shaken.
In 1885 doctrinaire financiers conjured themselves into the
dreamy belief that some ailment existed in our system, and looking around thought it the Bland silver law, began hoarding
gold for a premium, etc.; almost a panic. So it has been every
few years.
Our Democratic Administration just coming in as now was in
a panicky condition, and the Secretary of the Treasury went to
New York and negotiated with those bankers to exchange $10,000,000 of fractional silver for $10,000,000 of gold, but the scare
got over before they had to use it. President Cleveland came
here pleading, and urging, and recommending the repeal of the
Bland law because of the fearful consequences that would follow.
Coming on down, the Argentine Republic's financial structure,
based on faith, hope, and charity, crumbled into ruins in 1890,
entailing a loss of hundreds of millions in Great Britain, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe. The Baring Brothers, of model
London, were driven to the wall. The world's financial structure moved and swayed to and fro and reeled on the brink of
Seventy million dollars left our country then, and yet Congress was not called in session to repeal the Sherman law, for it
was not in existenc6.
Now, let us go back to 1890 and see what it was. Just see the
doctrinaires and financiers, the great business men in New York,
how much they know about it and how they are affected by every
little evening" zephyr that comes along whispering this t h i n g
and that thing. New York. Wall street in agitation. I will
read the headlines:
November 10f 1890—Notable shrinkage In values of all securities.
November 11,1890—Confusion and demoralization In stock markets.
November 12,1890—Enormous sales of stock on a seesawing market.
November 14,1890—Slor/ly recovering from effects of storm
November 15, 1890—Depressed by rumors. Wall street agitated by report*
from London. The Baring Brothers involved in recent troubles.
November 16,1890—Thrilling financial events on both sides of the ocean.
France stays the tide of panic.
November V7,1890—Ten millions to lend. Clearing house to issue ten millions.' Clearing-house certificates to support the weaker banks.

How much like the present; but the clearing house had to come
to the rescue with $38,000,000 this time, instead of $10,000,000
In May, 3893, the banks of Melbourne, Australia, went to t h e
wall with three hundred millions liabilities, to add to the panic

over the Argentine collapse, scarcely dead, and to the effects of
the Panama Canal collapse, Austria-Hungary in the market for
gold, with gold bonds for sale.
Soon another collapse in Australia; five banks driven to the
wall, with one hundred and twenty-five millions liabilities. Then
our panic.
Why should it not come? It is just as sure as that the day or
night shall succeed each other. I will not qpnsume the time of
the Senate in reading from a speech I delivered here in 1891 on
the free coinage of silver and the increase of the currency. The
very identical things were pointed out there and what would
bring a panic, just precisely as it has occurred. I will ask to insert that in my remarks from page 21.
The P R E S I D I N G O F F I C E R (Mr. F A U L K N E R in the chair).
If their be no objection the request of the Senator from Missouri
will be granted. The Chair hears none.
The matter referred to is as follows:

This circular was issued in the interest of the gold monometallists of the
country and is a protest against the recoinage of the standard silver dollar.
It says:
The rule has heretofore been almost invariable that money returned to
the financial centers in November. Why is this year of 1890 an exception?
The answer must be that distrust has caused hoarding, especially hoarding
of gold.
" The hoarding of gold since the silver act of July 14 went into operation is
clearly shown by the following figures."
Then the circular quotes the figures which it pretends are true and says:
"Therefore, the purpose of the silver men is defeated. They want inflation, but in fact produce severe contraction."
Now I quote from another circular. I quote from resolutions adopted by
the Chicago Board of Trade January 7,1891:
" That we deprecate any further legislation by Congress in regard to silver, believing that further agitation of the subject will be injurious to the
business and commercial interests of the country and tend to retard"—
•• to retard the increasing confidence of the business world and the speedy
return to a healthy state of affairs so much desired by Congress and the country."
YOU must not do anything to retard the growth of confidence. Confidence
Is the substratum orthe financial system of the United States, and when you
shake that the whole fabric totters, and we are told that we must not legislate here in the interest of the great masses of the people and to give a
foundation to this financial structure for fear we shall destroy confidence.
But, Mr. President, I want to quote another circular. This is from the
Circular of Henry Clews, a banker of New York. He says:
The hoarding of gold has largely come from the holders of the 4J -per cent
bonds, which mature next September. Under the Secretary's liberal offer to
redeem the same, both principal and interest, they have obtained payment
therefor and locked it u^ simply because the Government has issued money
backed by a corresponding amount of silver, and they profess to be scared
about the Government credit in connection therewith and make that as a
pretest for hoarding."
In regard to the recent panic, I quote also from this same circular ol Henry
It is apparent now, I think, that in taking a prospective estimate of the
outlook it is necessary to note carefully the conditions of general business
which preceded the panic. It is also important to keep m mind that this
panic differed from almost all its predecessors in the characteristic that it
was a rich man's panic. It resembled more closely the panic of 1684 than
any other historic parallel of this character, but I venture to predict that
the recovery will be quicker and the restoration"—
To what?—
"to confidence more thorough than in the former instance, if all the signs of
the times are not deceptive and misleading. The hardest blows fell this
time where the material and the preparation for resistance were actually
the strongest and not on the rank and file, as In former perturbations of thi*

Mr. COCKRELL. Mr. Clews was so accurate In his description of the " r i c h man's panic'' of 1890, that I will quote from
his financial circular of September 9, 1893, in regard to the panic
of 1893. He says:
"The winter of our discontent has been made glorious summer" by the
death knell of the panic, and now it is over it can be reviewed, and of all the
Sanies that this country has ever had, it has been the silliest, as there was
>ss cause for it than any previous one. It is not unlike the "Bull Run'*
panic during the war period. From the day that memorable event occurred
up to this date, I have never yet been able to And anybody who could give a
reason for its occurrence, whether on the battlefield or oft at the time. The
same can be said of the recent financial panic. I venture to say that no one
can now give a good and justifiable reason for it having occurred; for that
reason it has been a " Bull Run " panic. The whole country, in consequence,
has had to go through a general liquidation of credits. In fact, it started as
a gold panic; then came a silver panic, which was followed by a credit panic,
and the climax was reached by a money panic. Now the corner has been
turned, and building up takes the place of tearing down, the recuperation, I
venture to say, will be more rapid than this country has ever experienced
after any previous financial eruption.

Why, then, Mr. President, shall we not have more metallic
money, silver money us well as gold, irredeemable, absolute
money against which no reserve has to be kept; good wherever
it goes, which is its own redeemer.
All intelligent writers agree that where money is decreasing in amount,
poverty and misery prevail.
But history proves indisputably that every increased influx of the precious
metals into human intercourse, by new discoveries or the increased production of the mines, has always been accompanied by a decided amelioration
of humap necessities by the increase and diffusion of every means for a
more humane existence of the masses, which we call the progress of civilization. The great prosperity of Europe which preceded the age of the Reformation followed in the wake of the great increase in the precious metals
caused by the discovery of America. The immense development of modern
trade by railroads, steamships, and telegraphs followed the tide of gold and
silver with which California and Australia supplied the world.

W h y withhold from out people thess manifold blessings sure
to follow an increase of our metallic money?
If we deny it, what follows? Only what the attempt to establish the gold standard has already caused in the past. The paper inflation dogma—greenbackism, populism—all these inflation ideas will prevail as they have in the past. They are the
legitimate offspring of gold monometallism. They never existed in the United States when the grand old Democratic party
controlled and guided the destinies of this country for over haif
a century and maintained the true bimetallic system. We never
heard of a Greenback party nor of a Populist party nor of an increase of the currency party.
W h a t will follow? Substitutes for metallic money must come
in. Your bank checks, your drafts, your clearing-house certificates, your stock gambling, your financial bulls and bears, and
panics, and crises, and revulsions and depressions of property and
of prices, losses in the value of securities, and the depreciation
of the prices of all the products of human labor. We see them
almost e ve ry year. It is es timated now that the shrinkage in the
value of stock on the stock market amounts to hundreds of millions of dollars. I saw one estimate given, I think in the New
York World, which estimated the depreciation of the selling
price of stocks at over $500,000,000—not money enough to sustain it and confidence gone.
But it is said that we can not maintain any mor* s i l v e r dollars
on a parity with gold, that we can not keep every dollar as good
as any other dollar. Once for all I want to say that I am in favor

of a dollar just as good as any other dollar. Those who are advocating this bill are not the only men who are in favor of an
honest and stable dollar. The President in his message seems
to think that there is somebody here who does not want an honest and stable dollar. If that is intended as a reflection upon
those who advocate the coinage of the staudapd silver dollar I
repudiate it unhesitatingly. I am just as honestly in favor of an
honest and stable dollar as the President and I am not trying to
imrose upon this country any dishonest or unstable dollar.
But, Mr. President, from the foundation of the Government
until to day not one solitary silver coin that the United States
has coined, whether full legal tender or subsidiary, has ever been
redeemable in gold; I challenge any man to point to one law of
the United States that has ever made silver coin full legal tender or a limited legal tender, redeemable in gold. Silver coin of
the United States has been irredeemable, whether it was of the
full legal tender or the limited legal tender, and I say it is not
for this Democratic Administration or any Democratic administration to undertake to force upon this country the principle that
silver coin shall be redeemed in gold.
Mr. President, this is not Democracy. I do not believe the
Administration is attempting to do it. The resolution that we
have passed has not been answered; but if we are to be told that
the Administration is redeeming our silver dollars in gold I say,
halt! the people of the United States are not ready for that.
That issue has never been presented to them. They will never
sanction it—never. If they do that, they trample under their
feet the glorious record of the Democratic party from the foundation of the Government. They trample under their feet every
true principle of Democracy. If, therefore, it is meant that we
must maintain the silver dollar at a parity with gold by making
it redeemable in gold I say no, gold wants no redeemer, nor does
the standard silver dollar.
Such an interpretation destroys the silver dollar as money—
coined money. Metallic money is absolute and irredeemable in
any other money, is without price. There can be in true coined
metallic money no money value. Gold and silver as mere
metals may have their market value, but as coined money at the
ratio established by law they are equal—each money absolute
and irredeemable. That is the law, That is Democracy. Value
is a relation—a ratio established by law—and can not be measured. Length and capacity are positive properties of things
while value is not a property of anything and arises out of the
relations existing between things. We measure the length of a
thing by laying alongside it some other thing whose length is
known. We measure the capacity of a thing by filling it with
something else whose quantity is known.
" Valiles are not determined by any such bringing of one thing
to another."
" Labor once spent has no influence on the future value of the
article produced." Value is the purchasing power—power in
exchange. While price is the money value of commodities—the
power any commodity has to exchange for money.
The demand for money depends upon the amount and character of the trade, commerce, and business of a country, and the
number of tim^s such articles are sold and resold, while the
supply'of money depends upon the quantity in actual circulation
and the numbsr of times each piece changes hands in business

matters. The amount of money required by the people of different nations to meet their demands and supply will vary according
to the conditions of the country and their business.
A country small in area and densely populated requires far
less money than a country with a larger area and a more widely
dispersed population.
The larger the area and the more sparsely or thinly peopled
the greater the amount of money required. Our country and
people require a much larger amount of money per capita than
any nation of Europe, save probably Russia.
Our silver dollars to-day" are at a parity with gold dollars.
Why? Because the law makes them absolute money, irredeemable and the equal of gold, a full legal tender in the payment of
debts. The value of money as a medium of exchange depends
upon the law of the country wherein circulating.
Silver as a metal, a commodity, may vary in its value in the
market, but coined legal-tender sil ver dollars, in relation to coined
gold, do not vary in value, and will not as long as the law maintains their full legal-tender and their paying and purchasing
power. The law can not fix a value between different commodities ntfr between coin money and any given commodity. I t can
not, therefore, fix a ratio of value or equivalency between coined
gold and silver metal as a commodity.
The sovereign, according to its organic constitution or law,
creates money value. The Constitution gives this express power
to coin mon^y and to regulate its value, to fix the ratio or value
between the coins. Our laws give to coins of silver and gold at
the ratios fixed their value, the legal-tender and debt-paying
Now, I will read a little incident here, or refer to it in regard
to the value given to gold and silver. It is an incident quoted
in the Gold Standard, page 9:
Oil the testimony of Thomas Baring we are assured that it w a s found impossible. during the crisis of 1847 in London, to raise any money whatever
on a sum of £60,000 in silver. But during a similar crisis in Calcutta in 1864
It was equally impossible to raise even a rupee of paper money on £20,000 of
gold. The silver in London was not a legal tender above 40$., while the gold
in Calcutta was not so for any sum whatever.

Mr. President, this is not merely; a contest to repeal the Sherman law and stop the purchase of silver bullion.
W h e t h e r intended so or not by the present advocates of this
unconditional repeal bill—and I gladly say that many of its advocates do not so regard it—this is a renewal of the contest to
( establish a single gold standard throughout the world, and to
'make gold the only money and all sil ver coins and paper currency redeemable in gold. It originated in 1863, when our representatives told the monarchical and regal governments of
Europe that we were about to flood t h e world with from $2"0,000,000 to $400,000,000 annually of the precious metals, backed by
the demand of Senator S H E R M A N in 1 8 6 7 for the single gold
standard and refusal to agree to bimetallism with the Latin
Union, the contest has been kept up ever since. One by one the
nations of Europe have been scared and driven to the gold standard in imitation of Great Britain, the so-called mistress of the
If we repeal unconditionally, then no one dare say that our
laws do not recognize the single gold standard established in
1873. Gold will be the only metal admitted to unlimited coinage.

Silver will depreciate in value, refusals to recognize it debase
and humiliate it. It will depreciate in value.
Now, Mr. President, I have quoted some from the distinguished
Senator from Ohio in his finance report, showing what policy
he wanted, but I now have before me his speech of May and
June, 1892, in which he says:
Mr. President, when that law of 1873 was passed the only trouble about It t
was that we were not as wise as the Almighty Ruler of the universe. We
could not see ahead. I have no doubt, however, that if it had been linown
that silver was going to fall as much as it did after that it might have made
a change. But 1 know myself—and I speak for myself only—that while Idid
not know it, did not dream of the fall in the price of silver following that
law. yet I do now s y, in the light of all the circumstances that surrounded
us. that if I had known it I would have kept the silver dollar there and put
It on the same footing as the fractional silver dollar, and no better.

The Senator then quoted approvingly from John Jay Knox,
late Comptroller of the Currency, as follows:
I am happy to agree with the statement that the silver dollar now coined
In this country, if held in England, would be worth a gold dollar, less the
loss of interest and the cost of transportation across the Atlantic. This
statement is true. I hold in my hand the 5-cent nickel coin. If 5100.000 of
these 5-cent nickel coins, which are intrinsically worth 1 cent each in the
bullion market, were offered tor sale in China or in Japan, in England or in
France, to a shrewd broker, they would be worth to him exactly $100,000 of
pold, less the loss of Interest and tho cost of transportation from England or
France, or China or Japan, to this country. What amount that broker
would give for such a large amount of nickel coin or silver dollars is quite
another question.
Why is this?
It in because these coins are redeemable in gold: it is because we are upon
the gold and not upon the silver standard. When free coinage of silver
comes, the promise of this great country, with its great credit unsurpassed
anywhere in the world, is withdrawn and our silver dollar, like the Mexican
doilar, becomes worth its intrinsic value only at home and abroad.

The Senator from Ohio said in the same speech:
All our money is at par with gold. How is that maintained? We have a careful series of guards and laws which practically make now in the United
States grid coin the standard of value, not the legal standard in the sen^e
that the Senator speaks of as the ratio, because whenever that ratio diverges
from the market value the ratio ought to be changed always.

In referring to the provisions of law for purchasing silver bullion, be said:
If it had been seigniorage levied upon the people, it would have been the
most outrageous seigniorage ever inflicted upon a people by any government in the world; but it was not in the nature of seigniorage, but boueht
at its market value, and we Issued money for it at its coinage value. We
have behind it all the silver we bought, and we have that very surplus of
silver called the profit fund in our Treasury now, which amounts to $75,000,000. We have treated it as an ordinary income, but that is not the proper
way it should be treated. If the time shall come when it will be necessary,
the people of the United States can without loss restore this large sum of
f7«.0u0,000 for the redemption of the silver coin or for the maintenance of it
at the standard of gold.
The careful measures which I have mentioned, by which we have sustained and maintained the gold standard, are now to be swept away by one
fell stroke, the free coinage of silver. All the safeguards which experience
has shown, not only to our own country but to other nations, to prevent the
depreciation of our coin and our currency, are about to be abandoned, a new
standard Is about to be proposed, and all our money is to be brought down
t o that standard.







If there was but one standard of money, then, as a matter of course, the
silver standard might be made the basis of our transactions, but we have
gold for our standard; we have an equal amount of gold in the Treasury
and in circulation: the precise quantity is shown bvthe table and is over
|60a00;).000. This is to be demonetized or left for the use of the rich, who
stipulate for gold payments.

The Senator from Ohio, in his speech of August 30. 1893,
quotes approvingly from Hon. E. O. Leech, late Director of the
The closing of the mints of British India to the coinage of silver coins of
full debt-paying power is the most momentous event in the monetary history of the present century. It is the linal and disastrous blow to the use of
silver as a measure of value and as money of full debt-paying power, and the
relegation of it to the position of a subsidiary or token metal. It is the culmination of the evolution from a silver to a gold standard which has been
progressing with startling rapidity in recent years.
For the last quarter of a century civilized countries have combined to dethrone silver as a precious metal and have declared in unmistakable terms
that, by reason of its cumbe Aomeness, the enormous quantity produce t
and the violent fluctuations in its value, silver is not fit to serve as a measure of the value of all other things; that hereafter gold alone shall be the
standard of value, and that the business of the world is to be done with gold
money and an enlarged use of instruments of credit, such as bank notes,
checks, drafts, settlements by transfer, by telegraph, and by clearing house,
which nineteenth-century civilization has provided as substitutes for actual
This modern preference of gold for silver manifested itself first and most
strongly among people of the highest civilization and of the largest commercial pursuits. The reason for it will be found in the immense expansion
of moderft commerce, requiring very large payments in the settlement of
balances and necessitating the use of that metal containing the greatest
value in the least bulk, thus making gold the money of commerce; and i u
the wonderful improvements and developments in modern banking, providing substitutes for money, and avoiding as far as possible the actual handling of cash.
Gold is still the sole standard of value in the United States, both legally and
actually, and the determination and ability of the United States to maintain all its money at a parity with gold is still unabated.
While the road back to safe financial principle^ may be rough and stony it
is still open, and the sooner we enter upon it the surer will be our relief fro^i
the present distressing and threatening business difficulties.

I also refer to the President's message,, page 6:
The people of the United States are entitled to a sound and stable currency
and to money recognized as such on every exchange and in every market
of the world. Their Government has no right to injure them by financial
experiments opposed to the policy and practice of other civilized states, nor
is it justified in permitting an exaggerated and unreasonable reliance on
our national strength and ability to jeopardize the soundness of the people's
This matter rises above the plane of party politics.

I confess I m iy not understand that exactly.
The people of the United States are entitled to a sound and stable currency.

If he means, however, the money recognized as such on every
exchange and in every market in the world, then I say we have
no power nor r i g h t to establish any such money. No nation has
the power to give to its money legal tender or to anything
monetary functions beyond its own territorial domain. "When
it goes beyond that, whatever it is, it goes as a commodity, as
bullion if it is metal, and as a mere promise to pay if it is piper.
I say Congress has nothing to do with providing for the people
of the United States the money to be used in the markets of
Australia or India or any other country. If this means a single
gold standard then I disapprove of the message. I am not in
favor of a single gold standard. That issue has never been submitted to the American people yet. I t was not submitted in
the last campaign—not a bit of it.
As I said, if the purpose is to go to a single gold standard,
then I am unalterably opposed to it. I had hoped before I closed
my spaech, which I shall do now in a few minutes, to have had
a report from the Secretary of the Treasury to ascertain whether

silver dollars have been redeemed on demand in gold. As a
matter of course, the Treasury Department will, for convenience
and accommodation, exchange one kind of money for another:
but if these men have come to the Treasury with silver-coin
certificates or silver dollars and as their right demanded that gold
shall be paid to them, I S3.y it has baen in violation of the law
and every principle that has guided this Government from its
foundation if that demand is yielded to. The Government has
no right to do it. I am not in favor of yielding to the imperious
demands of foreign bankers and brokers in our country. I refer
to what the distinguished senior Senator from Kentucky [Mr.
BLACKBURN] said on October 4. He said:
But I know of another interview, which w a s held hy the representatives
of the Rothschilds in New York, not in the city of New York, but in the city
of Washington, not at the request of the Secretary of the Treasury, but on
the seeking of the New York Wall street bankers, not on the £9th of April,
but on the 26th or 27th of April. I knew then that the demand was made for
the issue of $150,000,000 of bonds. So far f r o m this Administration being a
party to that conspiracy, that demand was peremptorily, flatly, and unconditionally refused.

Think of it, the representative of foreign bankers coming here
and telling us, "You must issue $150,000,000 of gold bonds that we
may as a syndicate have the right to dispose of them and manipulate them." No, Mr. President, i t only shows the arrogant,
brutal demand of these foreign bankers and syndicates who have
determined to force upon the world the single gold standard.
Think of it: $30,000,000,000 of national indebtedness, strike down
silver and make gold the only money, and add to the purchasing
power of that $30,000,000,000 not less than 20 per cent—$6,000,000,000 added to the burdens of the masses of the people of the
The President in his message says:
The maxim, "He gives twice who gives quickly," is directly applicable.

\ In other words, hurry, hurry, haste, haste. That is a very old
maxim, but I want to quote some others equally as old:
" Too swift arrives as tardy as too slow."
Of hasty counsel take good heed,
For haste is very rarely speed.

That is pretty well verified right here. Haste has not been
Speed. " One hates to see men do important things in a hurry."
'' The more haste we make in a wrong direction the further
we are from our journey's end."
This has been in that direction.
" W h a t is done hastily is not done well."
" Who hastens in the beginning seldom goes far."
But, Mr. President, I want to read some authority on this
question of haste. I now quote from John Quincy Adams, who
spent several years in studying the question of "uniformity in
weights, measures, and, incident illy, in coinage: indeed, the
latter can not be separated from the other two. He says:
If there be one conclusion more clear than another, deducible from all the
history of mankind, it is the danger—

The danger—
of hasty and inconsiderate legislation upon weights and measures. From
this conviction, the result of all inquiry is that, while all tbe existing systems of metrology are very imperfect and susceptible of improvements, involving in no small degree the virtue and happiness of future ages: while
the Impression of this truth is profoundly and almost universally felt by the
wise and powerful of the moat enlightened nations of the globe; while the
spirit of improvement is operating with an ardor, perseverance, and zeal!

honorable to the human character, it is yet certain that, for the successful
termination of allthese labors, and the Una! accomplishment of the glorious
object, permanent and universal uniformity, legislation is not alone competent. All trifling and partial attempts at change in our existing system,
it is hoped, will be steadily discountenanced by Congress.

Hasten to do this patchwork, to take a step in the wrong- direction, by repealing this act, and do nothing more and nothing
else, is the demand.
We have ample time now. Just think of it; there is no election coming on this fall; there is no election coming on until
iiextfall. We are all here; we are all bimetatlists; we have laid
aside politics apparently. The Administration is led by the distinguished Senators from Ohio PMr. SHERMAN] and from Rhode
Island [Mr. ALDRICH] on the one side, and from New Jersey [Mr.
M C P H E R S O N ] and from Indiana [Mr. VOORHEES] on the other.
A glorious spectacle. We are just in condition, if we are wise,
to devise a financial subs.itute, a financial policy, a financial
measure, not a makeshift.
The panic is over. I had forgotten to talk about that. I t has
been over so long that everybody has about forgotten about it.
I have read just for the edification of the public generally the
circular of Henry Clews about the panic, which stated that it
was the most senseless panic that had ever occurred in this
country. A regular Bull Run panic, emphatically a Bull Run
panic. Now it is over.
Mr. GEORGE. W h a t firm was that?
Mr. COCKRELL. I t was Henry Clews. Now the panic ia
over, we are all pacified. I believe there is only one Senator
who has ever attributed the present condition to the Sherman
law. or claimed that it caused the panic. It is all over now; we
have ample time. Remember we were called together expressly
for the purpose of considering the financial question. Remember, further, in the campaign it came as if from headquarters
that the silver or financial question must be relegated to the
rear and the tariff must be placed in front, ^ f e did it. I t was
done in the campaign, and we expected, and I believe the people
of the country expected, that the tariff would be pressed to the
front. I think they had a right to expect it.
But, Mr. President, the financial question has been brought
to the front. It is not the fault of Congress. The President
had the right to call Congress together for whatever purpose he
desired. He exercised that right, and he called us together
upon the financial question, and when he convened us he had
gone to the end of his Executive power. The responsibility
now rests with us as to what we shall do. The responsibility
rests upon him for having Congress here. We did not call ourselves into existence here. He brought us here. He is responsible for that and we are responsible for what we do. W h y
should we bow to England? If we are going to adopt a financial
policy why not adopt that/bf France, the country that stood by
us in the dark days of the Revolution and helped us achieve our
independence and to-day is a sister Republic? Why shall we
bow the knee to England? Are we not old enough to establish
a financial system? We are-one hundred years old. That is a
great age. Can you find any other nation on earth that has not
established its own policy?
Mr McPHERSON. May I ask the Senator from Missouri a
Mr. COCKRELL. Certainly,

Mr. McPHERSON. Is the Senator from Missouri quite ready
to adopt the system of Prance—that is, to close our mints against
silver, as France has done, to stop the purchase of silver as
France has done, and to hold in our reserves $250,000,000 of gold
to redeem $700,000,000 of silver, as France has done?
Mr. COCKRELL. Not at all. Not a dollar of it is redeemed
in silver. I deny it in toto.
Mr. McPHERSON. Gold with which silver may be redeemed.
Mr. COCKRELL. No; it may not be redeemed in gold. I t is
not redeemable in that way. It can not be done.
Mr. McPHERSON. Standing there, then, as an evidence that
the French people, the Bank of France, the French Government
have an abundance of gold to maintain all their silver on a parity.
Mr. COCKRELL. No, sir; they have not one dollar of gold
to maintain silver. I say to-day (and I challenge anyone to show
to the contrary) that there is no nation, kindred, or tongue on
earth that has given full legal tender to silver coin and redeemed
it in anything else. Metallic money is irredeemable. I read today from the Indian currency commission report. They tell
you that the silver in France is irredeemable. Every writer
tells you that. Look at the law itself. There it is. The silver
there is irredeemable. They comment upon the great spectacle
of France, Belgium, and those nations maintaining a large amount
of silver coin at the ratio of 15i to 1 a t a perfect parity with gold,
while it is irredeemable in gold.
Mr. McPHERSON. Why did they close their mints?
Mr. COCKRELL. Simply because' they were afraid they were
going to be deluged, principally with the silver from Germany,
and then with the exaggerated, falsely reported sums that were
to come from the ,United States—$200,000,000 or $100,000,000 a
Mr. McPHERSON. If the silver is irredeemable, the silver
being irredeemable, not a menace to anything, requiring no gold
to maintain its parity and its circulation with gold, why would
they be afraid of a deluge of silver? If silver is such a good
thing why not take the silver of Germany?
Mr. COCKRELL. The Senator knows perfectly well the existing condition between France and Germany. Germany adopted
the single silver standard in 1857, and had a great fierce war
with-France, the two nations with adjoining territory. France
had been overrun and prostrated at the foot of Germany. Germany had demanded $1,000,000,000 of indemnity from prostrate
France, and France had raised the money and paid it; and as
soon as it was done, having- largely paid it in gold, then Germany commenced to discard her silver standard and shipped her
money across the border in order to get French gold and try to
bankrupt France. That is the reason for it, and a good reason,
when your neighbor is trying to cut your throat, to take away
from him the instrument he uses.
Now. Mr. President, what shall our system be? I want to
quote here (for I do not want to consume the time of the Senate
much longer) from our distinguished bimetallic gold monometallism Senator. SHERMAN, in his speech of 1892. I will have his
proposal inserted. It is as follows:
Mr. President, the policy of bimetallism, as understood by me, has always
been tbe policy since the Government was founded. -We never had in the
true sense of the word.the free coinage of silver, strange to say, because,
as I stated early in my remarks. Jefferson a n i Hamilton made a slight mistake in the ratio. Jefferson within twelve years afterwards stopped the


coinage of sliver, and only a little of It liad been used. So we never had lu
actual practice the free coinage of silver, but we had what is called by scientists the alternative standard, the cheaper standard, that is, whenever one
of the two metals fell below the ratio that metal alone became the standard
of value, and when the scale changed back again and the other metal became
lower, that again became the standard of value, and it so happened that
that occurred three or four tim es in our brief financial history.
When Mr. Jefferson stopped the coinage of silver dollars because they
were exported, American silver coin disappeared entirely and our people
depended upon abraded Mexican or Spanish coin for change. In 1831, in the
time of Gen. Jackson, the Secretary of the Treasury of that day first proposed a change of the ratio. He said that under the existing ratio silver
went abroad, and sometimes all the gold went abroad. Two years after that,
after full deliberation, Congress did change the ratio. It became 16 to t, and
the result was that silver was undervalued, because 1 ounce of gold was not
equal in value to 16 ounces of silver.







Mr. SHERMAN. The result was that silver was undervalued, because 16
ounces of silver were worth more than an ounce of gold, and the result was
that silver disappeared. Then ten years afterwaids, again under Democratic Administration. Congress passed alaw in order to avoid this difficulty,
and my memory goes back a little to that time. There was no change here
to be had, and in the West we ha J what were called shinplasters, issued by
banks and sometimes by private persons. Senators may have seen some of
them. We had no change because silver had gone away. It was demonetized; not legally in the sense of demonetization, but it had gone out of the
country; and therefore in order to provide for a currency that would not
run away at every change in value, in good Democratic times, in 1854, Congress passed a law reducing the amount of silver in minor coins, 50 cents
and quarters and all minor coins, 8 per cent, and then made them only a
legal tender for $5, so that they would answer the purposes of change but
could not be made the instrument of injustice as a depreciated coin.
Now, that is the law and that has always been the law. The Government
of the United States has always adhered to that, and maintained its money
always at the same standard. Most of this, it so happened, was in Democratic times. That very silver coin provided for by Mr. Hunter and his associates was adopted in the act for the resumption of specie payment. We provided for this minor coinage, the subsidiary coinage, as it is called in the
law. to take the place of the fractional currency. It is the policy we are now
acting upon, and the policy I advocate is the policy of our fathers from the
beginning of the Government to this time.

W h y does the Senator conceal apparently the actual facts,
that during all the times to which he refers our mints were open
to unlimited coinage'of standard silver dollars and gold upon
exactly equal terms. Knowing these facts, he opposes opening
our mints to unliminted coinage of silver, and yet claims to favor
our system from 1792 to 1873, the true bimetallic system, when
our mints were so open.
And also I quote from the speech of Senator S H E R M A N of 1893:
There-is no doubt that the act of 1890 is made the imaginary pretext for
many evils it did not produce. It is made to bear the results of wild speculation, of fears well or ill founded as to future legislation, of failures and
disturbances with which it has no connection. It is made the scapegoat for
extravagance and folly.







Let us not deceive our people as to the reasons for this repeal; for when
the purchasing clause is repealed you will still have to deal with the real
causes of the prevailing stringency and distrust. I do not vote for this repeal with any expectation that it will in any considerable degree relieve us
from the industrial stagnation that has fallen upon all kinds of business and
production, and that has thrown out of employment hundreds of thousands
of laboring men and women. They care little about the kind of money that
isfcaidthem, provided that it is equal in purchasing power to any other
money, and is backed by the United States. They do not study the question
of ratio, or the difference between silver and gold, and, if left to choice, prefer the notes of the United States to either coin.







Now, I wish to make a few observations in regard to what ought to be
done for the future. If the purchasing clause is repealed, what then? I
do not want to advise either this Congress or the Administration. I have

no right at all to he weighed in their council, hut I take it that whether w©
are Democrats or Republicans we are all Americans, and t h a t every American would desire to do that which is best for all interests and all parties.
I think there are certain urgent duties resting upon the Democratic party
at this time, and although I am not their adviser, I have the right as an
American citizen to give them my opinion, and I will briefly do it.

The Senator then recommends—
1. Strengthening- the reserve in the Treasury hy issuing bonds
or Treasury notes bearing interest, to be sold for gold, to maintain the parity of all our money.
2. In event of deficiency in revenues the Treasury Department should have power to meet and provide for it.
3. Coining the seigniorage in the Treasury and using it in
the ordinary operations of the Government.
He then says:
I heartily and truly believe that the best thing we can now do is to suspend
for a time, at least, the purchase of silver bullion. We should then turn our
attention to measures that are demanded immediately to meet the difficulties of the hour. Let this be done promptly and completely. I t involves a
trust to your officers and great powers over the public funds. I am willing
to trust them. If you are not, it is a strange attitude in political affairs. I
would give them power to protect the credit of the Government against-all
enemies at home and abroad.
If tbe fight m u s t be for the possession of "gold, we will use our cotton and
o u r corn, our wheat and other productions, against all the productions of
mankind. We, with our resources, can then enter into a financial competition. We do not want to do it now. We prefer t o wait awhile until the skies
are clear and see what will be the effect of the Indian policy, and what arrangements may be made for conducting another international conference.

Mr. President, we have tried all these makeshifts which the
opponents of the unlimited coinage of silver have forced us to
adopt or leave their single gold standard of 1873 still in full force.
We have tried them all. Now why not let the true friends of
silver once try their policy? We have tried all the expedients
that you gentlemen have forced us to take towards the rehabilitation of silver, and now why not let our proposition be tried for
a while? Is there any reason for it? Why not let the friends
of silver try their policies a while? TJhev were tried in the
United States for nearly a century, and they proved satisfactory. They have been tested by time and approved, and now
why not let them be tried again?
You ask me what would be my policy. I ought to answer that
by asking you what your policy is. W h a t do you gentlemen propose to do when you get the act repealed, if you ever do? W e
would like to know something about it. We have a right to
As a great and growing nation increasing in population more
rapidly than any nation, and also in wealth and the development
of our manifold resources, this Congress and this Administration
owe it to the sovereign people, the great masses whose servant
and representatives we all are, to devise and establish by just and
wise laws a safe and permanent financial system.
If I had the power to declare and enforce a monetary system
for our great country I would open our mints to the unlimited
coinage of gold, with full legal tender, and to the unlimited
coinage of silver at the present ratio or 15£ to 1, and receive all
the silver bullion offered to the mints at its market value and
issue in exchange therefor standard silver dollars with full legal
tender, and silver coin certificates payable in silver dollars, until
412£ grains of standard silver metal were equal to a coined dollar
and then give free as well as unlimited coinage to the silver dollar,

and coin all the silver so offered as rapidly as possible into standard dollars; retire the national-bank circulation as rapidly a3
practicable, and with the increase of the silver dollars, if the
currency of the country increased more rapidly than the increase
of population and the demands of commerce, I would extinguish
the bonded debt as rapidly as possible and retire the noninterestbearing legal-tender notes gradually, until we, as a nation, owed
no man, woman, or child a dollar of debt.
That is the system I would adopt, and I would enforce it by the
imperious demand of Andrew Jackson. I want to wipe out the
bonded debt, and now, since this fierce contest has come, I want
to wipe out every paper obligation of the Government. I do not
want any pretext made that this Government is hereafter to
keep a gold reserve. Wipe out your bonds and then your greenbacks and have nothing that the Government is compelled to redeem in gold or in silver for that matter.
We want no reserve held in the Treasury of the UnitedStates.
We want no redemption fund ther e. We want the money of the
United States to be in circulation in the hands of the people,
and we do not want our finances to be in such a condition that a
few foreign bankers and syndicates can form a ring upon us and
draw out our reserves. That is the only reason on earth why I
would retire the greenbacks. That is what our country wants
as a great country, a permanent financial system. We do not
want to be driven around by a parcel of foreign syndicates and
bankers. VVe want to be above their power, above their influence, above their reach.
Then our money would be gold and silver coins of equal legaltender paying and purchasing power, and our only paper currency
the certificates for the deposited coins held in the Treasury for
their redemption on presentation, and I would make these certificates call only for dollars in coin, and would pay such kind of
coin, silver or gold, as the stock of each on hand might justify.
If the prophecies of the opponents of silver should by any possible means be fulfilled, then when we had a sufficiency of silver
dollars, together with the gold, I would suspend such coinage.
If this plan be impossible of securing, the next best plan would
be opening our mints to the unlimited coinage of gold and the
silver produced from our own mines, exchanging for the silver at
its market price silver dollars or silver coin certificates, as before stated.
According to the figures I have given, the reasonable probabilities are that we would receive of our own mine product for
coinage each year, only about $60,000,000, not $1 per capita.
Certainly there could be no danger in this.
Suppose we found there was some danger, is Congress impotent to save the country from danger? Not at all. It is in
danger now. W h a t we are trying to Save the country from is
real danger, but the friends who propose the unconditional repeal are trying to save the country from an imaginary danger,
a midr^ght dream, a nightmare without foundation. It has already disappeared and is dissipated. We are trying to save the
country from real danger, from gold monometallism, and the
evils that have resulted to the, world from it.
No one more strongly favors true bimetallism, the perfect
equality of gold, and silver as bullion or metal, and as coin, than
I do, and no one labors more earnestly and consistently to secure
such bimetallism than I do. The discriminating legislation of

foreign nations and of our coinage act of February 12,1873, and
the very recent action of Austria-Hungary, and especially of
India, have so greatly depreciated the value of silver as a
metal in the market that it seems unfair to the great masses of
our people to permit owners of silver bullion or metal to have the
same coined free in our mints into standard silver dollars—silver
money—endowed by our laws with full legal tender, with all
monetary functions, when unlimited coinage in our mints of silver bullion at its market value in exchange for coined dollars
would just as surely bring us to free coin-ige if our contentions
proved true, and remove every possible ground that we are attempting to enact class legislation for the special benefit of silver-mining States and silver-bullion owners.
Therefore I would prefer unlimited coinage to free coinage as I
have indicated; and the hue and cry that we propose legislation
for silver simply for the benefit of silver miners is false so far
as I am concerned. I have not a dollar of interest, directly or
indirectly, and never expect to have, in any silver mine or in
anybody interested in a silver mine except citizenship in this
country. I am not advocating silver here because my people are
interested in silver mining or in its metallic value. I am advocating silver for monetary purposes and because my people, in
my judgment, demand its use for monetary purposes.
Mr- President, the first step to be taken, however, before we
get any plan, is by way of amendment to the pending bill to r equire the coinage of all the bullion on hand in the Treasury, and
to coin it into standard silver dollars, and with them, or with
silver-coin certificates to retire and cancel every United States
Treasury note issued for the purchase of silver bullion just as
quickly as possible. That ought to be done in thirty-six hours.
Coin certificates ought to be issued for the full amount of these
Treasury notes, based upon the silver in the Treasury; they
ought to bo put in the subtreasuries and the national depositories, a nd every United States Treasury note which is outstanding
ought to be taken in at once.
That is what the country needs; and it needs it quickly. In
my judgment such an amendment ought to be put on the pending
bill immediately or passed in a separate bill, which can be passed
more quickly than this bill will ever get through in any shape,
manner, or form. J would reestablish as quickly as possible tue
old constitutional Democratic bimetallism as nearly as the
changed conditions would permit, with the hope and belief of
finally attaining it in full. I would also increase the silver in
the half and quarter dollars and dimes to the half, one-quarter,
and one-tenth of the standard dollars and have but one currency
for the Government and the people, the laborer and the office
holder, the pensioner and the soldier, the producer and the bondholder, and wipe out any class distinction by law.
We hear some criticisms of those who only speak their sentiments in regard to the message of the President. Mr. Cleveland
is not the Democratic party. The Democratic Senators on this
floor do not make the Democratic party. We as well as the members of the House of Representatives,as Democrats,are the agents,
the servants, and the representatives of the sovereign people
just as Mr. Cleveland is. Mr. Cleveland is at the head of our
Democratic Administration, and he has his constitutional func-,
tions. We as Democratic Senators here have our constitutional
functions, and they are as separate and distinct as the midnight

darkness and the noonday brightness. They go in separate
Why should criticism be had of a Democratic Senator now because he does not bow at once to the unconditional repeal of the
Sherman law? Did anybody ever make such a criticism in 1885?
Mr. Cleveland then demanded—no, not demanded, but recommended—the repeal of the Bland law. He sent his message to
us. He did not call us in extra session; but if he had it would
not have made a particle of difference. He sent his message to
Congress recommending the repeal of the Bland law. Did we
repeal it? No, sir; we did not. We never entertained the proposition. Were we read o*it of the Democratic party? Not a bit
of it.
W e come to 1886, when he again recommended the repeal of
the Bland law, and we paid no attention to it. It was his duty
to recommend it as he honestly believed, and it was our duty as
honestly entertained to pay no attention to it. There was no
reading of us out of the Democratic party. In 1887 the clouds
had been dissipated, the fears and apprehensions had subsided,
everything was going along peacefully and quietly, the country
was on the road to prosperity, and the President did not say
anything about the Bland act in 1887, but in 1883, in the farewell
message of that session, he referred to it incidentally, and indorsed the recommendation of the Secretary of the Treasury.
I see no cause for any criticism. W e have had struggles before, and we were not'ignored or read out of the Democratic
I hold in m y hand a letter dated " Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C., September 25,1893," addressed to Hon. W . J .
Northen, and signed Grover Cleveland.
I have not the time to read all of this letter, but it is about a
safe and stable currency and 'one dollar being as good as another
dollar, ail of which we have to-day. The President says:
I n the present state of the public mind this law can not be built upon n o r
patched m such a way as to relieve the situation.

W e do not want to build on it; we do not want to patch it over;
but we want to wipe it out and pass a proper substitute for it.
That is what we want, and that is just what the President
wants. We stand side by side and shoulder to shoulder. I read,
however, in this letter:
I am astonished by the opposition in the Senate to such prompt action a s
would relieve the present u n f o r t u n a t e situation.

So am I astonished, profoundly astonished that the President
should expect us, who have fought here for years and years for
our honest and sincere convictions in regard to silver, to flee
from the battlefield of silver and fall upon a single gold standard. Not quite yet, Mr. President^ W h a t r i g h t did the President have to expect us to yield because of the panicky apprehensions of Wall street and a few business men? The President
My daily prayer is that the delay occasioned by such opposition m a y n o t
be the cause of plunging the country into deeper depression t h a n it has yet
known, and that the Democratic p a r t y may not be j u s t l y held responsible
for such a catastrophe.

Mr. President, would it be sacriligious in me, would it be improper in me to recommend to the President, when he offers up

his prayers to accompany them with that grand old Presbyterian song:
Godmove3 in a mysterious way
His wonders to perform;
He plants His footsteps in the sea,
And rides upon the storm.


Ye fearful saints, fresh courage take;
The clouds ye so much dread
Are big with mercy, and shall break
In blessings on your head.



Behind a frowning providence
He hides a smiling face.



The bud may have a bitter taste,
But sweet will be the flower.
Blind unbelief is sure to err.
And scan His work in vain;
God is His own interpreter,
And he will make it plain.

The President has had fears that these lowering clouds were
about to swamp this country ever since 1885. There is only one
man in public life who has more unfulfilled predictions on record
than the President, and that is JOHN SHERMAN. [Laughter.]
This is no disrespect to him. He is an honest and a brave
man, and he has the courage to tell us what he thinks. But,
oh, how often he has been mistaken ! [Laughter.] There is no
danger to the Democratic party. When Mr. Cleveland and
every Senator here, and every member of the other House, and
all the members of that grand old party who compose it to-day,
shall have passed to that bourne whence no traveler returns,
the Democratic party will only be in its youthful vigor and manhood.
I t is the only political organization which has survived the
wreck and ravages of time for over a century. It was not organized to die and fade away from this earth. Its principles, crystallized and proclaimed by the immortal Jefferson, became vitalized with immortality, and they will stand as beacon lights
and as monumental landmarks; they will be pillars of cloud by
day and pillars of fire by night to guide the Democratic hosts to
victory when all of us shall have passed away.
No, no, Mr. President, our differences will not destroy the
Democratic party. It will survive us and all our struggles, and
continue to bless the country as it has; and the enforcement of
its principles will bring it to true Democratic bimetallism.
[NOTE.—Since the foregoing speech was delivered, the Secretary of the Treasury, in response to the resolution of the Senate, has reported to the Senate that he has not redeemed silver
certificates issued on the deposit of silver dollars in gold or gold
obligations. I am very glad to be able to make this statement,
which sustains what I stated to be the law and removes from the
Secretary any ground of criticism.]



Gold and sliver coin, the money of the Constitution
Acts for Mint: gold and silver coinage; ratios
Political records of parties—
In Forty-fourth Congress
In Forty-fifth Congress; Bland law
I n Forty-sixth Congress
13,1 i115
I n Forty-seventh, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth Congresses
I n Fiftieth, Fifty-first, and Fifty-second Congresses
Executive action under law of J u l y 14, 1890
Silver coin absolute money; irredeemable
Degradation of silver; efforts for single gold standard
Repeal of act of July 14,1890; condition; effects
Reasons for opposing unconditional repeal, etc
Discriminating legislation of nations, caused by our misrepresentations; depreciated silver and international bimetallism impossible
Monetary s t a t u s of nations in 1860
Misrepresentations of United States officials quoted in Berlin congress
in 1863
Same continued—with efforts for single gold standard
Bimetallism of Latin Union; reasons for it—presented to the United
States; invitation to monetary conference of 1867; preliminary proceedings
Senator Sherman and Mr. Ruggles reject bimetallism, insist on gold
standard, and by misrepresentations Induce monetary conference
of 1867 t o declare for single gold standard
Discriminating legislation of nations; depreciation of silver; report
of British Royal Commission.
Monetary conference of 1878; our misrepresentations, etc
Monetary conference of 1831; position of foreign nations
Reports qf Atkinson, Phelps, McLane, Pendleton, Walker
Brussels conference of 1892; bimetallism impossible
We m u s t do as other nations do, establish our own system
Review of relations of gold and silver; ratios; production; percentage; no overproduction of silver to cause depreciation.
Review of discriminating legislation against silver and the effect „

Predictions of d i s a s t e r from s u c h legislation; S e y d a n d W o l o w s k i :

Beaconsfleld, Goschen, Mees
Their fulfillment; Soetbeer, Germany; Houldswath; Molesworth.97,98,99,100
Sherman law not cause of depression or export of gold; Blackburn;
Rothschild in Brussels conference; failures elsewhere
McCreary and Cannon in Brussels conference; Indian commission
The gold standard disastrous; not gold and silver enough combined;
production; coinage: consumption; p e r c e n t ; per capita
W h y not t r u e bimetallism; President's recommendation; effect of
unconditional repeal; obligations of our Government; howpayable;
honest money
How other nations pay debts; full tender money; Great Britain, India, and other nations; Germany
Why not restore silver money? Predictions of disaster; single gold
standard, with silver redeemable in gold the object; Sherman, Folger, A r t h u r ; Cleveland to W a r n e r and others; his messages; Manning
House resolution to pay Treasury surplus on public debt; vote; discussion; Beck, Hewitt, Gorman; causes of panic then
Manning in 1836; Fairchild, Harrison; Cleveland t o Anderson in
Flood of silver; gold to be driven f r o m country; facts and figures
disprove all predictions; if mistaken then, m a y be now
No danger of flood of silver f r o m silver in plate or in coins in foreign
nations; coinage and conditions in India, China, S t r a i t Settlements, J a p a n . South America, Mexico, Egypt, Turkey. Russia,
Scandinavian Union, Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, Portugal,
Snain, Switzerland. Italy, Belgium, Germany, Great Britain,
Fiance. L a t i n Union
J 129-136



Predictions as to overproduction of silver; product; coinage
F a c t s and figures as to silver coinage in United States, 1792 to d a t e . . 138,139
Senator Sherman on selling silver in Treasury
Pretense t h a t unlimited coinage of silver will make too much money;
demands for money; national debts; receipts and expenditures;
other indebtedness; bank deposits and debts; substitutes; confidence the foundation; crises inevitable; blessings of an increase of
metallic money
Honest money; silver coins not redeemable in gold; laws give the
value; purchasing and paying power; contest is for a gold standard
with silver dollars and all other money redeemable in gold; unconditional repeal leaves the single gold standard; gold only admitted
to m i n t s ; Sherman, Knox, Leech; demand for bonds; Blackburn, 147-151
President's message for haste; dangers; J o h n Quincy Adams; Presi*
dent responsible for this session; finance pressed ahead of tariff;
ample time to devise monetary system
W h a t shall be our system? Sherman's policy; the true policy; gold
and silver full tenders and equal
Criticisms of Democrats and the President; his letter to Governor
Nor then; his prayer; the Democratic p a r t y will survive