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FEDERAL RESERVE SECOND MONETARY
POLICY REPORT FOR 1979

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING, AND UEBAN AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

ON
OVERSIGHT ON MONETARY POLICY REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 95-523

JULY 23 AND 24, 1979

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
49-5960




WASHINGTON : 1979

COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
WILLIAM PROXMIRE, Wisconsin, Chairman
HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., New Jersey
JAKE GARN, Utah
ALAN CRANSTON, California
JOHN TOWER, Texas
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois
JOHN HEINZ, Pennsylvania
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina
WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan
NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, Kansas
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
DONALD W. STEWART, Alabama
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
KENNETH A. MCLEAN, Staff Director
M. DANNY WALL, Minority Staff Director
STEVEN M. ROBERTS, Chief Economist
ANTHONY T. CLUFF, Assistant Minority Staff Director




CONTENTS
Page

Opening statement of Chairman Proxmire
Statement of:
Benjamin M. Friedman, Department of Economics, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass
Henry Kaufman, partner and member, executive committee, Salomon
Bros., New York, N.Y
Lawrence Klein, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pa
Allan Meltzer, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, CarnegieMellon University, Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, Pa
Henry C. Wallich, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System

1
2
61
77
88
126

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS AND DATA
Briefing materials from the Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service:
Listing of tables and graphs:
I. Economic forecasts and economic goals:
1979 economic forecasts and administration goals (table)
1980 economic forecasts and administration goals (table)
January 1979 summary of administration's goals consistent
with the objectives of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act,
1979-1983 (table)
July 1979 summary of administration's long-range economic
goals and alternative economic assumptions, 1981-84
(tables)
II. Monetary measures and Federal Reserve System targets:
Monetary and credit aggregates—actual levels from fourth
quarter 1976, and Federal Reserve projected growth ranges
from fourth quarter 1978 to fourth quarter 1979:
Ml (graph)
M2 (graph)
M3 (graph)
Bank credit (graph)
Money supply growth rates between quarters, fourth quarter
1974 through second quarter 1979:
Ml (table)
;.
M2 (table)
III. Federal budget data:
Federal budget receipts and outlays, fiscal years 1975-1980
(table)
Federal sector expenditures as a percent of GNP (table)
IV. Selected economic developments:
Gross national product, quarterly percentage changes in current dollars and 1972 dollars, 1973 through first quarter
1979 (graph)
Selected components of gross national product in current and
constant dollars, 1968 through first quarter 1979 (table)
Gross national product, percentage changes in current and
constant dollars, 1973 through first quarter 1979 (table)
Changes in selected price indexes, 1973 to date:
Graph
Table




(ill)

7
8
9
10

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24

IV

Briefing materials from the Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service—Continued
Listing of tables and graphs—Continued
IV. Selected economic developments—Continued
Selected employment and unemployment data, 1973 to date
(table)
Selected personal income data, 1973 through first quarter 1979
(table)
Selected personal income data, percentage changes in current
dollars and 1972 dollars, 1973 through first quarter 1979
(table)
Changes in productivity and related data, 1973 to date (table)
Industrial production and capacity utilization, 1972 to date
(table)
Capacity utilization for materials industries, 1973 to date
(table)
New private housing and vacancy rates, 1971 to date (table)...
Exports, imports, trade balance and trade-weighted exchange
value of the U.S. dollar, 1975 to date (table)
Financial sector: Growth rates for selected reserve, monetary,
and credit aggregates, 1975 through second quarter 1979
(table)
Income velocity of money, percent change from same quarter,
previous year, 1973 to first quarter 1979:
Ml (graph)
M2 (graph)
Interest rates: rates on Federal funds, 6 month Treasury bills
and new home mortgages, 1973 to date (graph)
Selected interest rates, 1973-79 (table)
Funds raised in U.S. credit markets, 1975 to first quarter 1979
(table)
Tables accompanying statement of Professor Friedman:
Recent trends in U.S. price inflation
Six post-war U.S. recessions
Aggregate measures of U.S. monetary policy
Charts accompanying statement of Professor Meltzer:
A recession
A supply shock
Charts accompanying statement of Governor Wallich:
RealGNP
Real GNP and major sectors
Changes in real personal consumption expenditures and real disposable
income
Savings rate
Household debt repayment relative to disposable personal income
Private housing starts
New home prices and CPI
Monthly carrying costs and personal income
Manufacturing and trade inventories
Change in business inventories
Ratio of business inventories to sales
Real business fixed income
Nonresidential structures
Federal Government purchases of goods and services
State and local government purchases of goods and services
Weighted average exchange value of the U.S. dollar
U.S. merchandise trade and current account balances
OPEC crude oil: Average official sales price
Nonfarm payroll employment
Unemployment rate
Manufacturing employment
Consumer prices:
Total
Food
Energy
Total excluding food and energy
Unit cost indicators
Interest rates




Pa e

s

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
48
50
55
91
92
134
134
134
136
136
138
138
138
141
141
141
143
143
145
145
147
147
149
151
151
151
153
153
153
153
155
158

V

Money supply growth
Funds raised by nonfinancial sectors
Household borrowing
State and local government borrowing
Nonfinancial business
Borrowing by nonfinancial business
Growth ranges and actual Mi
Growth ranges and actual M2
Growth ranges and actual Ma
Nominal GNP
RealGNP
GNP implicit price deflator
Unemployment rate
Additional information:
Letter from Governor Wallich concerning turnover on the Federal Reserve
Board
Federal Reserve staff analysis of the credit measures as targets of monetary policy
"A New Version of TIP," by Henry C. Wallich
Statement on credit policy and inflation by Peter Konijn and Michael K.
Ulan




Page

160
163
165
165
165
165
172
173
174
177
178
179
180
186
190
206
216

FEDERAL RESERVE SECOND MONETARY
POLICY REPORT FOR 1979
MONDAY, JULY 23, 1979

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met at 10 a.m. in room 5302, Dirksen Senate
Office Building, Senator William Proxmire (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Proxmire and Sarbanes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Today we begin 2 days of hearings on the conduct of the monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. These hearings are being held
pursuant to the requirements of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act which
also requires that the Banking Committee submit its views and
recommendations with regard to the Federal Reserve's announced
policies to the Senate.
In order to aid the committee in understanding the monetary
policies of the Federal Reserve, we have invited a panel of four
well-known economists to give us their views on the current economic outlook and on monetary policy's role over the next year
and a half. Our panel consists of Prof. Ben Friedman of Harvard
University; Mr. Henry Kaufman, a partner and member of the
executive committee of Salomon Brothers; Prof. Lawrence Klein of
the University of Pennsylvania; and Prof. Allan Meltzer of Carnegie-Mellon University.
Our economy is faced with a very difficult set of economic conditions. The rate of inflation has accelerated to double digit levels
over the first half of the year, and the outlook has been worsened
by the recent increases in OPEC oil prices and the recent shortage
of gasoline. We are embarking on the consideration of a mammoth
energy program which will doubtless put additional pressure on
prices in the months and years ahead. We have also experienced a
very sharp decline of real output during the second quarter, with
real GNP dropping at an annual rate of —3.3 percent.
Almost all economists are predicting a recession this year. The
economy has definitely been slowed by oil shortages as evidenced
by the recent drop in real GNP. However, not all signs confirm
that we are in a recession. Unemployment actually declined last
month to 5.6 percent, the lowest rate since 1974. Moreover, housing
starts increased in June by 6 percent to 1,953,000 units which is a
very high level. I would also note that the monetary aggregates
have virtually exploded during the past 13 weeks which might be
(l)




expected to feed inflation and stem recession over the next 9
months, but maybe not. This is another indication that the outlook
for the period ahead may be a little less certain than almost
everyone thinks.
If there is one thing we should have learned about economic
forecasts during the past several years is that they are not very
accurate. It would be foolish for us to take precipitous action to
offset a recession on the basis of recent economic forecasts. The
Federal Reserve must act very carefully in managing monetary
policy so as not to allow the recent rapid increases in the monetary
aggregates to continue for very long or to allow the explosion in
the business credit area to continue unchecked. Congress should
not rush into any tax reductions or spending sprees. If inflation is
to be stopped, we must continue to pursue policies that will ease
inflationary pressures.
I would like to make one comment on growth in the monetary
and credit aggregates. The target ranges that the Fed announced
in February were for the entire calendar year 1979. For the entire
first half of the year the Fed was successful in keeping money
growth within the bounds they selected. With another 6 months
left, they have considerable latitude in meeting their targets. They
should, in my view, have narrower constraints on their money
growth targets during the next 6 months. It is also important to
note that the Fed has exceeded the target range adopted for growth
in bank credit by a significant margin and, in my view, have not
paid enough attention to that target variable.
On the other hand, Mi and M2 aggregates may, as Mr. Kaufman
points out, no longer be the best indicators of monetary policy.
We are faced, gentlemen, with a situation that is dramatically
different now than it has been for some time in the past. As we all
know, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve will become the Secretary of the Treasury. We will have another member of the Board
appear before this committee tomorrow. I'm concerned about the
independence of the Federal Reserve Board and I would like you,
after you finish your remarks when we get into the question
period—I want to ask your views on this: How important the
independence of the Federal Reserve is; whether in your view that
Independence is jeopardized by several developments: No. 1, the
move of the present Chairman of the Fed to the Treasury Department; No. 2, the abbreviated service of members of the Fed and the
turnover of membership and the obvious sensitivity of short-time
membership and Presidential influence? Also, of course, and this is
the most important part of it, certainly the persistent force and
danger of inflation and the importance of the Fed as the key
agency in fighting inflation, require that it be insulated against
short-term political interests. The Fed must be able to take a longterm view and therefore a dispassionate and professional handling
of monetary policy might be more desirable.
I'm also interested in whatever views you may have on whether
the rapid turnover at the Fed might be reduced I suppose by
higher salaries. It's always hard to persuade the public to accept
that from anybody in public life, but I think if Members of Congress were not increasing our own salaries it might be a little
easier to secure. I think we ought to think in terms as far reaching




and radical as possibly lifetime appointments for members of the
Fed. It obviously helps the Supreme Court's independence and
maybe it would help overcome this tremendous turnover tendency
we have and any other suggestions you have.
I might point out that the present Fed membership has averaged
about 3 years and is going to be less than that, of course, when the
new Chairman is appointed. It's been about 3 years on the average
for length of service for some time now. In view of the fact that we
have a 14-year term, the purpose of that was to permit people to
develop experience on the Board, but also above all to provide that
they should be independent of any administration, that of course
has been destroyed.
President Carter, with the Schultz appointment, has now appointed four members of the Federal Reserve Board. In January,
when Governor Coldwell's term expires, he will appoint his fifth
member. He has control of the Board now and without any reflections on the President, who I think is a fine man doing the best he
can, whether any President should have that kind of power with
respect to this independent Board is something that I think should
concern all of us.
At any rate, we welcome you. I apologize for this lengthy initial
statement, but I think it is an unusual kind of situation and I
wanted to set the stage as well as I could.
[Briefing papers prepared for the committee by the Library of
Congress Research Service follow:]




THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service
BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR MID-YEAR 1979 MONETARY POLICY OVERSIGHT
by
F. Jean Wells
Roger S. White
Specialists in Money and Banking
William Jackson
Carol A. Leisenring
Analysts in Money and Banking

Economics Division
This briefing document has been prepared to assist the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in monetary policy
oversight conducted pursuant to P.L. 95-523.

It includes selected

indicators for the economic setting in which monetary policy operates
as well as presenting indicators of the direction of monetary policy
itself.

Assistance in preparing this report was obtained from Laura

A. Layman, Economic Analyst; Barry Molefsky, Analyst in Econometrics;
and Frances C. Klapthor, Editorial Assistant.

Listing of tables and graphs

Page

Economic forecasts and economic goals:
1979 economic forecasts and Administration goals
(table)

1

1980 economic forecasts and Administration goals
(table)

2

January 1979 summary of Administration's goals
consistent with the objectives of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act, 1979-1983 (table)

3

July 1979 summary of Administration1s long-range
economic goals and alternative economic
assumptions, 1981-1984 (tables)

4




Listing of tables and graphs (cont.)
II.

Page

Monetary measures and Federal Reserve
System targets:
Monetary and credit aggregates — actual levels
from fourth quarter 1976, and Federal Reserve
projected growth ranges from fourth quarter 1978
to fourth quarter 1979:
Ml (graph)
M2 (graph)
M3 (graph)
Bank credit (graph)

6
7
8
9

Money supply growth rates between quarters, fourth
quarter 1974 through second quarter 1979:
Ml (table)
M2 (table)
III.

10
11

f
Federal budget data:
Federal budget receipts and outlays, fiscal years
1975-1980 (table)
Federal sector expenditures as a percent of GNP
(table)

IV.

12

13

Selected economic developments:
Gross national product, quarterly percentage changes
in current dollars and 1972 dollars, 1973 through
first quarter 1979 (graph)

14

Selected components of gross national product in
current and constant dollars, 1968 through first
quarter 1979 (table)

15

Gross national product, percentage changes in
current and constant dollars, 1973 through first
quarter 1979 (table)

16

Changes in selepted price indexes, 1973 to date:
(graph)
(table)

17
18

Selected employment and unemployment data, 1973 to
date (table)

19




Selected personal income data, 1973 through first
quarter 1979 (table)
Selected personal income data, percentage changes
in current dollars and 1972 dollars, 1973 through
first quarter 1979 (table)

2.1

Changes in productivity and related data, 1973 to
date (table)

22

Industrial production and capacity utilization, 1972
to date (table)

23

Capacity utilization for materials industries, 1973
to date (table)

24

New private housing and vacancy rates, 1971 to
date (table)

25

Exports, imports, trade balance and trade-weighted
exchange value of* the U.S. Dollar, 1975 to date
(table)
V.

20

26

Financial sector:
Growth rates for selected reserve, monetary, and
credit aggregates, 1975 through second quarter 1979
(table)

27

Income velocity of money, percent change from same
quarter, previous year, 1973 to first quarter 1979:
Ml (graph)
M2 (graph)

28
29

Interest rates: rates on Federal funds, 6 month
Treasury bills and new home mortgages, 1973 to
date (graph)

30

Selected interest rates, 1973-1979 (table)

31

Funds raised in U.S. credit markets, 1975 to
first quarter 1979 (table )

32




1979 ECONOMIC FORECASTS AND ADMINISTRATION GOALS
January 1 9 7 9 J u l y 1 9 7 9 C B f f C u r r e n t C u r r e n t C u r r e n t C u r r e n t
Administration
Administration Policy
Chase
DRI
Wharton
Goal Forecast
Forecast
Forecast 2/
Forecast
Forecast
Forecast
Humphrey-Hawkins
Act Goals
Level, fourth quarter 1979
Employment
(millions)

96.2

Unemployment
rate (percent)

96.6

6.8

6.6

96.7

6.9

Percent change, fourth quarter 1978 to fourth quarter 1979
Consumer
prices

10.6

Real gross
national product

2.2

Real disposable
income

2.8

Productivity
total economy 4/

0.4

private nonfarm

12.7

-

-0.5

-1.3

0.3

•-1.2
-2.2

Monetary Policy
Variables
Money supply

(Ml)

3.5

2.1

4.5

Money supply

(M2)

6.4

4.7

6,9

Y§" 79

-

Federal funds
rate (percent)
91 Day Treasury
'All Rate (percent)

_!_/

These forecasts are based on different systems, different models, and different
policy assumptions; therefore, their comparability is limited.

2J

Mid-point of forecast range.

kj

Based on total re"al GNP per hour worked.

_3/

Percent change, December over December.

_5/

Average rate for new issues,, 1979.

SOURCE:

U.S. Council of Economic Advisers. Economic Report of the President.
Washington,
U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1979, p. 109. Mid-Session Review of the 1980 Budget,
Office of Management and Budget, July 12, 1979, p. 4. CBO Current Policy Forecast
in statement by Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Congressional Budget Office, before the
Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, July 12, 1979, p. 7. Chase Econometric
Associates, Inc., Standard Forecast of June 21, 1979.
Data Resources Incorporated,
Control Forecast of June 28, 1979.
Wharton Economic Forecasting Associates, Inc.,
Control Forecast of June 28, 1979




CRS-1

1980 ECONOMIC FORECASTS AND ADMINISTRATION
January 1979
Administration

COALS

July 1979
Adrainistra
Forecast 2/

Forecast

Current
DRI
Forecast

Current
Wharton
Forecast

Humphrey-Hawkins
Act Goals
Level, fourth quarter

1980

Employment
(millions)
Unemployment
rate (percent)
Percent change, fourth quarter 1979 to fourth quarter 1980

Real disposable
income
Productivity
total economy kj
private business

2.3

1.1
2.6
1.6

Monetary Policy
Variables
Money supply (Ml)
Money supply

(M2)

Level, fourth quarter 1980
Federal funds rate
(percent)
91 Day Treasury
Bill Rate (percent)

\J

Thes
poll

_2/

Mid-point of forecast range

bility is limited.

SOURCE:

See preceding table.




kj

Based on total real GNP per hour worked.

_5/

Average rate for new issuer,, 1980.

SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION'S ECONOMIC COALS CONSISTENT WITH

y

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE HUMPHREY-HAWKINS

ACT

Goal Requir

Level, fourth quarter

Employment (millions)
Unemployment

(percent)

97.5
6.2

99.5
6.2

102.6
5.4

105.5
4.6

Percent change, fourth quarter to fourth quarter
Consumer prices

7.5

6.4

5.2

4.1

3.0~

Real gross national product

2.2

3.2

4.6

4.6

4.2

Real disposable income

2.8

2.3

4.4

4.4

4.0

.4

1.1

1.8

2.0

2.0

21
Productivity

"The short-term goals for 1979 and 1980 represent a forecast of how the economy
will respond over the next 2 years not only to the budgetary policies proposed
by the President for fiscal 1979 and 1980 but to the anti-inflation program
announced on October 24. The medium-term goals for 1981 to 1983 are not foreto reach the 1983 unemployment and inflation goals specified in the act."
1979 Economic Report of the President. p. 108-109.







JULY 1979 SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATION'S LONG-RANGE
II

ECONOMIC GOALS AND ALTERNATIVE ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS

Table 10. — L O N G - R A N G E ECONOMIC GOALS, 1981-1984
(calendar years; dollar amounts in b i l l i o n s )

M a j o r Economic I n d i c a t o r s
'
1
9
8
Gross n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t , ( p e r c e n t c h a n g e , 4 t h q u a r t e r o v e r
4th quarter):
Current dollars
Constant (1972) dollars
%
GNP d e f l a t o r ( p e r c e n t c h a n g e , 4 t h q u a r t e r over 4 t h q u a r t e r ) —
C o n s u m e r P r i c e I n d e x ( p e r c e n t c h a n g e , December over D e c e m b e r ) .
Unemployment rate (percent, 4th q u a r t e r )

Assumed for
Budget Projections
1
1982
1983
1984
U.7
5.3
6.1
6.0
6.0

10.2
5.5
4.5
4.5
4.8

7.6
4.4
3.0
3.0
4.0

6.1
3.0
3.0
3.0
4.0

Table 2 8 . — A L T E R N A T I V E LONG-RANGE ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS, 1981-1984
(calendar years; dollar amounts in b i l l i o n s )

M a j o r Economic I n d i c a t o r s
G r o s s n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t , ( p e r c e n t c h a n g e , 4 t h q u a r t e r over
4th quarter):
Current dollars
Constant (1972) dollars
GNP d e f l a t o r ( p e r c e n t c h a n g e , 4 t h q u a r t e r over 4 t h q u a r t e r ) . . .
C o n s u m e r P r i c e I n d e x ( p e r c e n t c h a n g e , December over D e c e m b e r ) .
Unemployment rate (percent, 4th q u a r t e r )
y

Assumed f o r A l t e r n a t i v e
Budget Projectigjij
1981
1982
1983
1984
11.4
4.0
7.1
6.8
6.3

10.3
3.5
6.6
6.5
6.0

9.8
3.5
6.1
6.0
5.7

As noted on pages 54 and 58 of the Mid-Session Review of the 1980 Budget:
"The long-range economic assumptions d i f f e r in n a t u r e from the short-range economic f o r e cast presented e a r l i e r . These assumptions are not f o r e c a s t s of economic events, but p r o j e c t i o n s
t h a t assume progress in moving toward lower unemployment r a t e s and greater price s t a b i l i t y .
(Continued on page 5 .)

9.3
3.5
5.6
5.5
5.5




(Continued from page 4.)
"Two sets of longer-range economic assumptions, and budget projections corresponding to each,
are shown. One set, discussed in this section, assumes the achievement of the medium-term goals
specified in the Full-Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act).
[Table 18]. These goals are highly ambitious and may be difficult to achieve. The other set of
assumptions, discussed in a later section, are less ambitious."
"[Table 28] presents an alternative set of economic assumptions and a corresponding set of
budget projections."
"Under the alternative assumtions presented here, the economy is assumed to grow in real
terms by an average of 3.6% a year for the entire 1981-1984 period. The rate of unemployment
corresponding to Lh-is growth projection is 5 1/2% at the end of calendar year 1984.
The rate of
inflation is assumed to drop by about half a percentage point a year after 1980, reaching 5 1/2%
a year in 1984.
These more conservative assumptions may be more appropriate for budget planning
purposes than those of the preceding sections."

Source:

Mid-Session Review of the 1980 Budget, Office of Management and Budget, July 12, 1979.
pp. 60, 72.




MONEY SUPPLY (M1)
Actual Levels from Fourth Quarter 1976 and Federal Reserve
Projected Growth Range from Fourth Quarter 1978 to Fourth Quarter 1979
$ Billions

420 Upper bound of projected
growth range: 4.5% *

400

6.3%'
Growth rate range for
the period IIQ 1979
to IVQ 1979 consistent
with the 1.5% to 4.5%
one-year growth range
announced Feb. 1979.

-1977-

-1978-

-1979-

* Growth rates are seasonally adjusted compound annual rates.
Data Source: Quarterly observations and growth rates are calculated from seasonally adjusted data series of the
of the Federal Reserve System as revised in May 1979.

-1980-




MONEY SUPPLY (M2)
Actual Levels from Fourth Quarter 1976 and Federal Reserve
Projected Growth Range from Fourth Quarter 1978 to Fourth Quarter 1979

$ Billions

1050
Upper bound of projected
growth range: 8.0%*

Growth rate range for
the period IIQ 1979
to IVQ 1979 consistent
with the 5.0% to 8.0%
one-year growth range
announced Feb. 1979.

1Q

1976N

-1977-

-1978-

1979-

* Growth rates are seasonally adjusted compound annual rates.
Data Source: Quarterly observations and growth rates are calculated from seasonally adjusted data series of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as revised in May 1979.

-1980




MONEY SUPPLY (M3)
Actual Levels from Fourth Quarter 1976 and Federal Reserve
Projected Growth Range from Fourth Quarter 1978 to Fourth Quarter 1979
$ Billions
Upper bound of projected
growth range: 9.0%*

1700 -

11.6%'
Growth rate range for
the period IIQ 1979
to IVQ 1979 consistent '
with the 6.0% to 9.0%
one-year growth range
announced Feb. 1979.

1600

1500

1400 -

1300

IQ

IQ

1976^

-1977-

-1978-

-1979-

* Growth rates are seasonally adjusted compound annual rates.
Data Source: Quarterly observations and growth rates are calculated from seasonally adjusted data series of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as revised in May 1979.

-1980-




BANK CREDIT
Actual Levels from Fourth Quarter 1976 and Federal Reserve
Projected Growth Range from Fourth Quarter 1978 to Fourth Quarter 1979
$ Billions

1100

8.1%'

Upper bound of projected
growth range: 10.5% *

1

Growth rate range for
the period IIQ 1979
to IVQ 1979 consistent
with the 7.5% to 10.5%
one-year growth range
announced Feb. 1979.

1050

1000

950

)i
i

900
850
800
J
1976

N

L

IQ

-1977

-1978-

-1979-

* Growth rates are seasonally adjusted compound annual rates.
Data Source: Quarterly observations and growth rates are calculated from seasonally adjusted data series of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System as revised in May 1979.




Money (Ml)
Growth Rates Between Quarters
Fourth Quarter 1974 through Second Quarter 1979
(Compound Annual Growth Rate, Seasonally Adjusted)

PROM:
Money (Ml)
($ bllUons)

Source:

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
of Data Resources, Inc.

Accessed from data files




Money (M2)
Growth Rates Between Quarters
Fourth Quarter 1974 through Second Quarter 1979
(Compound Annual Growth Rate, Seasonally Adjusted)

FROM;
Money (M2) ^,4.4
($ billions)

Source:

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
of Data Resources, Inc.

Accessed from data files

18
FEDERAL BUDGET RECEIPTS AND OUTLAYS
(In billions of dollars) I/

Budget
receipts

Budget
outlays

281.0

326 .2

-45 .2

300.0

4
366 .

-66 .4

81.8

94 .7

-13 .0

1977

357.8

402 .7

-45 .0

1978

402.0

450 .8

-48 .8

Third Concurrent Resolution, May 1979

461.0

494 .5

-33 .5

I/
Mid-session review, July 1979

466.5

496 .2

-29 .7

509.0

532 .0

-23 .0

513.8

4
542 .

-28

Fiscal year or period
1975
1976
Transition quarter

Budget
surplus or
deficit

1979(estimates)

1980(estimates)
First Concurrent Resolution, May 1979
I/

Cumulative totals first 8 months:
Fiscal year 1978

247.5

297 .2

-49 .7

Fiscal year 1979

292.1

328 .1

-36 .0

\j

Unified budget basis.

2/

Third Concurrent Resolution on the Budget —

J3/

Estimates from Mid-Session Review of the 1980 Budget, Office of Management
and Budget, July 12, 1979.

47

First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget —

Source:

Fiscal Year 1979, May 24, 1979.

Fiscal Year 1980, May 24, 1979.

Economic Indicators, June 1979, and Mid-Session Review of the 1980
Budget, Office of Management and Budget, July 12, 1979.




19
FEDERAL SECTOR EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF GNP

1948-50
average
actual

teoipta)

Defense purchases
Nondefense purchases
Domestic transfer payments
Foreign transfer payments
Grants-in-aid to State and local governments
Net interest paid
Subsidies less current surplus of Government enterprises
Total expenditures

Source:

-

1958-60

w

1968-70
average
actual

1978-80
££

4.5
2.3
36
1.5
.8
16
.3

96
1.7
41
.4
1.3
13
.5

2.4
54
.2
2.2
13
.5

4.7
26
87
2
3.4
18
' .4

14.6

18.8

20.5

218

8.4

i
!

Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 1980.
p. 51.




CRS-13




GROSS NRTIONRL PRODUCT
QURRTERLY CHRNGES OF CURRENT (LINE)
RNO CONSTRNT (DOT) OOLLRR GNP
SERSONRLLY ROJUSTEO RNNURL RRTES

25-

-25

20—
15—
o

z
.

? S

M

UJ
Q_

15

10—

-f-io

QC

*•

-h20

5—

5

-5--

—-5

-10-

t
1973

1974

t
1975

—10

1
17
96

1977

1978

1979

7/10/79
mfi. er catcecc* BUSERU BF CCBNSHIC fmm.rszs
BY CE«g£S£Ififm R£SCRBCH KSVICE. UKHSIY BT

21
SELECTED COMPONENTS OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
IN CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS

Personal

ports

868. 5 535.9
935. 5 579. 7
982.4 618.8
1,063.4 668.2
1. 171. 1 733.0
1, 306. 6 809.9
1, 412. 9 889.6
1, 528. 8 979. 1
1,700. 1 1,090.2
1,887.2 1, 206. 5
2, 107. 6 1, 340. 1

131. 5
146. 2
140.8
160. 0
188.3
220.0
214.6
190.9
243.0
297.8
345.6

1977: III.. 1,916.8 1, 214. 5
IV... 1, 958. 1 1, 255. 2

Perkxi

suinp-

Government purchases of goods and
services

Exports and imports of
goods and services

Gross
private
domestic
investment

1 Cross
i nai tionnl
prod-

Federal
Net

National
defense

State
and
loc.nl

2S

Exports

Imports

Total

2. 3
1.8
3.9
1. 6
-3. 3
7. 1
6. 0
20.4
7.4
-11. 1
-12.0

49. 9
54. 7
62. 5
65. 0
72. 7
101. 6
137.9
147. 3
163.2
175.5
204.8

47.7
52.9
58.5
64.0
75.9
94.4
131.9
126.9
155.7
186.6
216.8

198. 7
207.9
218.9
233.7
253. 1
269. 5
302.7
338.4
359.5
394.0
433.9

98. 0
97. 5
95.6
96.2
102. 1
102.2
111. 1
123. 1
129.9
145. 1
153. 8

76. 9
76.3
73.5
70 2
73.5
73. 5
77.0
83.7
86.8
94.3
99.5

21.2
21.2
22. 1
26.0
28.6
28.7
34.1
39.4
43. 1
50.8
54.3

100.7
110.4
123.2
137.5
151. 0
167.3
191.5
215.4
229.6
248.9
280.2

860.8
926.2
978.6
1, 057. 1
1, 161.7
1, 288. 6
1, 404. 0
1, 539. 6
1, 689. 9
1,871. 6
2, 091. 6

309. 7
313.5

-7.0
-23.2

180.8
172. 1

187.8
195.2

399.5
412. 5

146. 8
152.2

94.4
97. 1

52.4
55. 1

252.7
260.3

1, 894. 9
1,945.0

1, 992. 0 1. 276. 7
1978:1
II.. .2,087. 5! 1,322.91
III.. 2, 136. 11,356. 9j
IV.... 2,214.81,403.9

322.7
345.4
350.1
364.0

-24. 1
-5.5
-/10. 7
-7.6

181.7
205.4
210. 1
221.9

205.8
210.9
220.8
229. 5

416. 7
424.7
439. 8
454. 5

151. 5
147.2
154.0
162. 5

97.9
98.6
99.6
102. 1

53.6
48.0
54.5
60.4

265.2
277.6
285. 8
292.0

1,
2,
2,
2,

2, 267. 3|1, 442. 2J

370. 4

-3.7

235.0

238.7

458. 4

164. 5

103.9

60. (3

293.9

2, 252. 0

Ul't

I

i
1

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976-.1977
1978 . -

1979: I

expenditures

Total

Nondefense

975. 3
067. 4
122. 5
201. 3

[Billions of 1972 dollars; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Period

Personal
Gross
connational sumpproduct
tion
expenditures

Gross private domestic
investment

Exports of goods
and services

Nonresidential
fixed

Residential
fixed

Change
in business inventories

Net
exports

Exports Imports

Government purchases of
goods and services

Total

1, 051. 8
1. 078. 8
1, 075. 3
1, 107. 5
1, 171. 1
1, 235. 0
1, 217. 8
1, 202. 3
1, 271. 0
1, 332. 7
1, 385. 7

633.4
655.4
668.9
691.9
733.0
767.7
760.7
774. 6
819. 4
857.7
891.7

108.0
114. 3
110.0
108.0
116.8
131.0
130.6
113.6
118.9
129.8
140.2

42.8
43.2
40.4
52.2
62.0
59.7
45. 0
38.8
47. 8
57.7
59.8

8.7
10.6
4.3
6.6
9. 4
16. 5
8. 0
-9.8
6.7
8.9
10.6

-0.4
-1. 3
1.4
-.6
-3.3
7.6
15. 9
22. 6
15.4
9. 5
8.4

58.5
62.2
67. 1
67.9
72.7
87. 4
93. 0
90. 0
95.9
98.2
107.0

58.9
63.5
65.7
68.5
75.9
79.9
77.1
67.5
80. 5
88. 7
98.6

259.2
256.7
250.2
249.4
253.1
252.5
257. 7
262.6
262.8
269.2
275.0

1977:III__ 1, 343. 9
IV... 1, 354. 5

858.0
876. 6

130.8
132.5

58.8
60. 3

12. 2
7. 5

12.5
3. 1

100.8
96.0

88.2
92.9

1 354. 2
1978- I
II... 1, 382. 6
III... 1, 391. 4
IV— 1, 414. 7

873 5
886.3
895.1
911.8

133. 8
140.5
141.7
144.9

59. 5
59.9
59.7
60.3

12. 3
12. 7
9.0
8.2

2 9
11.3
9.2
10. 2

99. 1
108.4
109.0
111.7

96 2
97! 1
99.7
101.5

1979: I— .. 1, 417. 6

913.5

146.7

58.0

10.6

12.5

115.2

102.8

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

SOURCE:

Economic Indicators, June 1979.




pp. 1-2.

CRS-15

Federal

State
and
local

Final
sales

128.3
121.8
110.7
103.9
102. 1
96.6
95.8
96.5
96. 6
101. 6
100.3

130.9
134.9
139. 5
145. 5
151.0
155.9
161.8
166. 1
166.2
167.6
174.7

1, 043. 1
1, 068. 2
1, 071. 0
1, 100. 9
1, 161. 7
1,218.5
1, 209. 9
1,212. 1
1, 264. 4
1, 323. 8
1, 375. 2

271.7
274, 5

102. 9
103. 6

168. 8
170.9

1, 331. 7
1, 347. 1

272. 1
27L 9
276.7
279.4

101. 2
97! 1
100.4
102.5

170 8
1748
176. 3
176.9

1 341 8
I , 369.' 9
1, 382. 4
1, 406. 5

276.4

102.0

174.4

1, 407. 0

22
I/
CHANGES IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
[Percent Change: Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rates]

In Current Dollars

In 1972 Dollars

3.4

1973

11.1

1974

7.2

1975

10.0

2.4

1976

9.5

4.6

1977

11.9

5.5

1978

13.1

4.4

7.1

-0.1

II

20.6

8.7

III

9.6

2.6

IV

15.6

6.9

I

9.8

0.8

1978:

1979:

JY

I'

-3.5

Fourth quarter of prior year to fourth quarter of year indicated
percentage change or quarter-to-quarter percentage change.

Source:

Annual percentage changes computed from data accessed from
the files of Data Resources, Inc.; quarterly changes at
compound annual rates from Economic Indicators, June 1979.
p. 3.




CSR-16




QURRTERLY PERCENTRGE CHRNGES (SRRR),
IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLRTOR (LINE)
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (DOT)
PRODUCERS PRICE INDEX (DflSHAOOT )
35

3D
f

30-

25-

-

;.< »
/i

15-

o(

-5

1973

0Y

i

-

» ,
V
,..._ i...
1
1974

.

x
/

5-

o

tti
LU
O.

-20

-^**^1\

10Ul

-25

i

20-

1—

-30

i

1975

^^^*S>^^

jA^

-10

?*~T

\/

-5

\'

i
1

i
1
1976

If

-o
i
1

1977

-15

i
1
1978

,

1979

I/
CHANGES IN SELECTED PRICE INDICES

1978

Jan

Feb

1979
Mar
Apr

May

June

1973
Consumer
Price Index
Producer
Price Index
(finished goods)
GNP Implicit
Price Deflator

1974

1975

1976

3&1977

8.3

12.2

7.3

5.0

6.7

9. a

12.5

15.6

13.5

14.0

13.2

NA

11.6

18.7

7.1

2.6

6.8

8.8

16.5

14.3

10.3

11.5

4.6

6.4

7.5

11.0

7.5

4.7

6.1

8.3 .

—

2/
8.9 —

—

NA

\J

Fourth quarter to fourth quarter yearly increase or month-to-monlh increase at seasonally
iuljurito.il compound uutuuil riitos.

2/

Fourth quarter 1978 to first quarter 1979 increase at seasonally adjusted compound rate.

Sources:




Computed from data accessed from the files of Data Resources, Inc.; Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis, National Economic Trends, May 31, 1979.
pp. 4, 14.




SELECTED EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT DATA
1973

Total Civilian Unemployment (Millions)
15 Weeks and Over

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

84.4

Total Civilian Employment (Millions)

" 85.9

84.8

87.5

90.5

94.4

4.3
0.8

5.1
0.9

7.8
2.5

7.3
2.3

6.9
1.9

6.0
1.4

4.9
3.2
4.8
4.3
8.9
3.3

5.6
3.8
5.5
5.0
9.9
3.3

8.5
6.7
8.0
7.8
T3.9
5.8

7.7
5.9
7.4
7.0
13.1
5.1

7.0
5.2
7.0
6.2
13.1
4.5

6.0
4.2
6.0
5.2
11.9
3.7

Unemployment Rates (Percent)
Total Civilian
Men 20 and Over
Women 20 and Over
White
Black and Other
Household Heads

Ju ly
Total Civilian Employment (Millions)
94 .4
Total Civilian Unemployment (Millions)
6 .2
15 Weeks & Over
(Millions)
1 .3

Aug.

Sept.

94.7

95.0

1978
Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

95.2

95.8

95.9

96.3

96.7

1979
Apr.

96.8

May

June

96.3

96.7

C71
96.2

5.9

6.0

5.8

5.9

6.0

5.9

5.9

5.9

5.9

5.9

5.8

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.1

6 .1

5.9

5.9

5.8

5.8

5.9

5.8

5.7

5.7

5.8

5.8

5.6

6 .4
5 2
12 .3
3

5.9

5.9

5.6

5.8

5.8

5.7

5.7

5.7

5.7

5.8

5.8

52
11.5

5?
11.3

51
11.3

50
11.7

52
11.5

51
11.2

49
11.9

^ 0
11.2

4°
11.8

~°
11.6

11.3

Unemployment Rates (Percent)
Total Civilian

0 Q
J . 7

Women 20 and Over
Wh i t e
Black
Household Heads

I/
Source:

Data are seasonally adjusted, covering persons 16 and over.
Economic Indicators, June 1979. pp. 11-12; U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics.




SELECTED PERSONAL INCOME DATA

__

1973_

Disposable personal income
(Billions of dollars):
in current dollars
in 1972 dollars

Personal saving as a
percent of disposable
personal income

g
i
o

__________

—

Disposable personal income
(Billions of dollars): j./
in current dollars
in 1972 dollars

Personal saving as a
percent of disposable
personal income \J

_!_/

1974 _

1975_

1976 _

1977

_

1978

t
901.7

984.6

1,086.7

1,184.4

1,303.0

1,451.8

854.5

842.0

859.7

890.1

926.2

966.1

7.8

7.3

7.7

5.7

1978: I

1978: II

1978: III

5.1

5.3

1978: IV_

1979: I

1,513.9

1,563.3

•
1,391.6
952.1

5.9

1,433.3

1,468.4

960.3

968.7

983.2

940.1

5.2

4.8

5.3

5.3

Seasonally adjusted annual rates.

Source:

Computed from data accessed from the files of Data Resources, Inc.; Economic Indicators,
June 1979. p. 5.

SELECTED PERSONAL INCOME DATA, PERCENTAGE CHANGES

1978
III

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

I

12.0

8.4

10.8

8.5

11.3

11.3

9.8

12.5

4.2

-3.1

4.4

3.3

5.4

3.5

1.1

3.5

II

IV

1979
I

10.2

13.0

13.7

3.5

6.1

2.8

Disposable
I/
personal income:
in current dollars
in 1972 dollars

o

s
N)

M

JY

Fourth quarter to fourth quarter yearly increase or quarter--to-quarter increase at seasonally
adjusted compound rates.

Source:




Annual percentage changes computed from data accessed from the files of Data Resources, Inc.;
quarterly changes at compound annual rates from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,
National Economic Trends, May 31, 1979, p. 4.

28
CRS - 22

JY
CHANGES IN PRODUCTIVITY AND RELATED DATA
[Percent Change: Quarterly Data at Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate]

Private Business Sector
Output
Compensation
Per Hour
Per Hour

Unit Labor
Costs

2/

1978:
1978:
1978:
1978:
1979:

2.1
1.9

4.6
6.2

12.1

17.4

1.2
3.5
1.7

8.1
10.4

8.7

6.8
6.7
6.8

-4.6

I
II
III
IV
I p

2.1
3.5
1.6
.3

6.8
8.2
9.1
9.9
8.7
8.1
9.2

-4.5

1965-1973 (average)
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

11.1

16.4

-3.0

Non-farm Business Sector
'
Output
Compensation
Per Hour
Per Hour

12.5

7.7
5.0
6,4
9.0

Unit Labor
Costs

2/

1978:
1978:
1978:
1978:
1979:

1.8
1.7

4.7
6.0

12.2

15.7

1.7
2.3
1.9

8.2
9.6
9.1

6.4
7.1
7.0

-4.3

I
II
III
IV
I p

1.9
3.5
1.3
.5

6.6
7.8
9.1
9.9
8.4
8.1
9.3

-3.1

1965-1973 (average)
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

10.2

15.2

-3.1

12.6

7.8
4.7
6.7
8.8

\J

Output per hour or labor productivity measures the volume of goods and
services produced per hour. Compensation per hour includes wages and
salaries of employees plus employers' contributions for social insurance
and private benefit plans. Unit labor costs measure the labor compensation cost required to produce one unit of output and are derived by
dividing compensation per honr by output per hour.

_2/

Calculated from a least squares trend calculated from the logarithms of
the numbers.

Sources:

Economic Indicators, June 1979.
Labor, Bureau of Statistics.




CRS-22

p. 16; U.S. Department of

29
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION

(Seasonally adjusted]
Industry production ind exes, 1967 = 100
Manufacturing

Total industrial
production

i

Per-

Period

Index,
1967 =
100

1967 proportion
100 00
1972
119. 7
1973
... 129.8
1974
. 129. 3
1975
117. 8
1976.__ .
129. 8
1977
137. 1
145.2
1978.
1978' May
143.9
June
144.9
July
146. 1
147. 1
147.8
Sept
Oct
148.7
Nov
149.6
150.9
Dec
150.9
1979' Jan
Feb.- ..
151. 2

Mar
April
May
June

Source:

152.3
150.0

151.8
151.4

cent
change
from
year
earlier

9.2
8. 4
-. 4
8 9
10.2
5. 6
5.8
5. 0
5.2
5.3
6.5
6. 7
7. 1
7.4
8.0
8.7
8. 0

Total

Durable

87. 95
118.9
129. 8
129.4
116. 3
129. 5
137. 1
145.7
144. 3
145. 5
146.7
147. 6
148. 7
149.5
150.4
151.8
151.9
152. 2

61. 98
113.7
127. 1
125. 7
109. 3
121. 7
129. 5
139.3
137.6
139.0
141. 1
142. 2
142.8
144. 0
144. 8
146.4
146.0
146- 2

8.1] 53.4

4 . 7 ] 50.8
5 . 5 ] 53.0
4 . 5 1 52.5

Nondurable

i

!
':
1
i
i
!

j

Mining

Utilities

55.97
126. 5
133.8
134. 6
126. 4
140. 9
148. 1
154. 8
154. 0
154.9
155.0
155. 6
157. 1
157.4
158. 5
159.6
160.4
IfiO. 7

6.36
113. 1
114. 7
115. 3
112. 8
114. 2
117. 8
124.2
126. 7
128.0
127. 1
126. 0
124. 1
127.6
128. 1
127.6
124.0
121 »

5. 69
139. 4
145. 4
143. 7
146.0
151. 0
156. 5
161.0
157. 0
158. 6
159. 9
160.8
162. 3
162.4
162.9
164. 3
16(5.8
169. 0

161.7
147.5
143.9 160.8
147.0 161.9
146.3 161.5

Economic Indicators, June 1979.
Reserve System.




123.4
166.9
123.6 166.0
124.0 166.6
124.8 166.9

rate, percent *
Federal Reserve
series
ComTotal
merce
manuMateseries '
facturrials
ing
83. 1
87. 5
84. 2
73.6
80. 2
82. 4
84.2
83.9
84.3
84.7
85.0
85. 3
85.5
85.8
86.3
86.0
85.9

86.3
84.6
85.5
85.0

83
86
83
77
81
83
84

91. 5

83

<)3. 0

84

84

87.8
93. 1
90. 5
80.0
86. 1
88. f>
91.8

84

88. 0
92.4
87.7
73.6
80. 4
81. 9
84.9
84.5
85. 1
85.7
85.9
86.3
87. 1
87.6
88. 1
87.4
87. 1

87.6
86.4
86.8
86.6

Wharton
series 3

94. 0

94.1

p. 17; Board of Governors of the Federal

CRS-23

30
CAPACITY U T I L I Z A T I O N RATES FOR MATERIALS I N D U S T R I E S
(In Percent )
Materials
Nondurab le Goods Material
r and ch
terials
tile
licals

Durable Goods
Basic Metal
ials
1973:

Ql
Q2
Q3
Q4

1974:

Ql
Q2
Q3
Q4

1975: Ql

Q2
Q3
Q4
1976: Ql

Q2
Q3
Q4
1977:

Ql
Q2
Q3
Q4

1978:

Ql
Q2
Q3
Q4

1979:

Ql
Q2

Energy
Mat eria

92.1
92.5
92.9
92.1

90,
.6
91,.6
92,.3
91,,4

95.6
97. 2
97. 5
96.8

93.9
93.6
93.4
93.7

94.1
93.7
93.9
93.7

92 .8
92 .7
93 .4
93 .9

98
99 .5
98 .8
98 .2

93. 2
92.4
92. 5
4
92 .

93.8
93.4

90.4
89.6
89.1
81.7

88,
.5
.4
87,
87,
.7
79,
.9

94. 7
93.9
92.0
86.0

93.7
93.0
91.4
81.4

93.8
93.2
91.9
81.0

79 .4
89 .6
84 . 5
69 .3

97 .9
98 .4
97 .0
89 .9

92. 5
92. 7
92. 7
82. 1

90.5
90.3
89.4
87.0

71.5
70.7
74.9
77.1

66,
.9
64,
.6
69 .0
70,
.6

75.2
67.0 /
70. 1
69.4

69.9
72.4
79.8
84.3

67.8
70.3
78.2
83.8

60 .1
70 .5
8i .5
86 . 2

78 .3
73 .5
81 .2
86 .4

67. 2
69.4
76. 5
82. 3

79.3
80.7
81.2
80.3

73 .8
76,
.7
78,
.4
76,
.5

74. 1
79. 3
81. 7
74.4

85.6
85.9
84.8
84.4

85.1
85.2
83.7
83.2

84 .3
83 .8
82 .4
79 .7

89 .8
90 .6
89 < 2
88 .1

84.0
84.0
82. 6
83. 0

85.6
84.1
83.8
84.8

80.4
82.6
82.3
82.2

76,
.5
.4
79,
79,
.2
79..7

75.0

80. 2
75. 3
75.2

85.1
87.2
86.3
85.9

83.8
86.3
85.1
84.5

78 .7
78 .1
78 .8
82 .4

88 .4
89 .5
89 .3
86 .7

84.0
87. 7
85. 7
84. 5

84.5
84.8
85.0
83.7

81.7
84.5
86.0
87.6

79,
.3
82,
.2
85,
.3
87,
.5

75.8
80.4
85. 1
88. 1

86.7
88.5
87.5
88.5

85.5
86.8
86.2
87.2

80 .3
81 .2
81 .0
82 .2

88 .9
90 .3
86 .5
87 .4

86.0
87. 5
87. 5
88. 5

80.9
84.9
85.6
86.4

87.3
86.5

87,
.0
85,
.9

84. 5
NA

88. a
88.0

87.6

80 .8
A

87 .0
NA

89. 6
NA

85.9
84.9

Board of Governors of the F e d e r a l
f i l e s of Dat;a R e s o u r c e s , I n c .




NA

Reserve S y s t e m ; d a t a accessed from da

94.1
92.0

86.8

8 5 . 1'.
84.6

85.::




INCOME VELOCITY OF MONEY (HI)
PERCENT CHflNGE FROM SflME QUflRTER. PREVIOUS YEflR

•10

8—

--8

6—

6

UJ

o
CK
UJ
Q-

4—

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979
7/10/79

£CuaC£Gi ESSHfl BT E0VEBX8SS W THE rCDEBHL BC5EHVE SYSTEM
BCPT. 0f COMCRCC* BU8EHU Bf CCBN8MXC (WHLY3I5

8V ceweassrawm. ecscmiCH SERVICE. LiaaraY er CBKERCSS




MONETARY AND CREDIT AGGREGATES
(Seasonally adjusted compound annual rates)

l_l
1975

l_l
1976

1978

JJ
II

1978
~2?
III

10.6

8.8

11.5

\]
1977

If

1979
2J

2/
IV

I

12.2

9.2

Federal Reserve
targets: 4th
2J quarter 1978 to
II
4.th quarter 1979

Monetary aggregates:
Ml

4.6

5.8

M2

8.4

10.9

M3

11.1

12.7

11.7

Deposits at nonbank thrift
institutions
4/
Bank credit

15.7

15.6

14.5

7.0

NA

4.1

8.1

11.2

12.5

15.9

12.3

11.5

13.8

12.0

Adjusted monetary
base
7.6
(St. Louis F.R. Bank)

8.4

8.8

9.6

8.3

9.7

10.0

5.9

6.5

I/

7.5 to 10.5

From fourth quarter of previous year to fourth quarter of year indicated.

2j

From previous quarter.

_3_/

Federal Reserve projections as announced in Monetary Report to Congress Pursuant
to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978, February 20, 1979.

4V

Total loans and investments at commercial banks; revised May,

Sources:

CO
W

'

1979.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis. Accessed from data files of Data Resources, Inc.

NA




EXPORTS, IMPORTS, TRADE BALANCE

AND TRADE-WEIGHTED EXCHANGE
2/
VALUE OF THE U.S. DOLLAR
1978

1975

1976

1977

1978

I

II

1979

III

IV

I?

II

(in billions of dollars ; quarterly data seasonally adjusted)
114.7

120. 8

141.9

30 .8 „

35.3

36.5

39.3

41.4

NA

98.0

Exports

124.0

151. 7

176.0

42 .7

43.2

44.5

45.7

47.4

NA

9.0

-9.4

-30.9

-34.2

-11.9

-7.9

-8.0

-6.4

-6.1

NA

107.1

Imports

Trade balance

##***#*#*********#**********^^
Index of the
weighted-average
98.34
exchange value
of the U.S. dollar

105.57

103.30

92.39

GO

95.90

95.20

90.65

87.81

88.14

ij

Merchandise, excluding military, on balance of payments basis (adjusted from Census
data for differences in timing and coverage).

"Ij

Index of weighted average exchange value of U.S. dollar against currencies of other
G-10 countries (Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Netherlands,
Belgium, Sweden) and Switzerland. March 1973=100. Weights are 1972-1976 global
trade of each of the 10 countries.

Sources:

Exports, imports, and trade balance - Economic Indicators, June 1979.
Trade-weighted exchange value of the U.S. Dollar - Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System.

89.79

31
NEW PRIVATE HOUSING AND VACANCY RATKS
[Thousands of units or homes, except as noted]

!

New private homes

New private housing units
Units started, by type of structure
| Units
!
2_4
5 or more
. 5r~ completed
1 unit
Total
units
units i ued
•'

Period

2, 052. 2
2, 356. 6
2, 045. 3
1, 337. 7
I, 160. 4
1, 537. 5
1,987.1
2, 020. 3

1971
. ...
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976. .
1977
1978...

1. 151. 0
1, 309. 2
1, 132. 0
888. 1
892. 2
1. 162. 4
1.450.9
1. 433. 3

120. 3
141.3
118. 3
68. 1
64. 0
85. 9 :
121.7
125. 0

Vacancy

Homes for
sold
656
718
634
519
549
646
819
816

1, 924. 6
1, 706. 1
780.9
906.2
2, 218. 9
2. 003. 9
2, 100. 5
795. 0
, 819. 5
, 074. 4 i , 728. 5
381. 6
204. 3
939. 2 1
, 317. 2
289. 2
, 296. 2 ; , 377. 2
414.4 ; .690.0 ! .657. 1
462. 0
, 800. 5 i , 867. 5

rental

end of
period '

(percent)'

287
409
418
346
313
353
401
413

5. 4
5.6
5. 3
6. 2
6. 0
5. 6
5.2

Q u a r t e r l y average2S at s e a s o n a l l y a d j u s t e d annual r a t e s

1978:

1979:

I
II
III
IV

1,721.3
2,114.3
2,044.0
2,078.3
P

I
Apr'
May

P

1,229.3
1,470.3
1,439.3
1,492.3

1,615.3 1,119.3
1,735.0 1,273.0
1 , 8 2 7 . 0 1,195.0

102.0 1

390.0 1 , 5 6 9 . 0
1,719.3
1,773.0
1,817.0

126.3 517.6
127.7
477.0
134.7 451.3
105.3
113.0
126.0

1,758.7
1,895.7
1,925.3
1,885.3

390.7 1,496.0 1,888.7
349.0 1,517.0 1 , 9 9 7 . 0
NA
506.0 1,591.0

793.3
834.7
835.0

417
413

751.7

4243

732.0

426
NA

5.0
5.1
5.0
5.0

404
419

801.0

NA

1

Seasonally

2

Quarterly data are entered in the last month of the quarter.

3

4 .8

NA
|

New series beginning March, 1979.

Source:




adjusted.

Economic Indicators, June 1979. p. 19; Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census.

NA




INCOME VELOCITY OF MONEY ( M2)
PERCENT CHflNGE FROM SflME QURRTER. PREVIOUS YEflR

6
4—
Ui

o
CK
ui
OL

00

1

-2-1
1973

1
1974

1
1975

1
1976

--2
1977

1978

1979
7/10/79

seuaccsi team §r savowow or THE renew, flcscavc
KPT. er camcRce* BUKCHU ar CCBNBHIC
PB0WC0 BV CCM&ZCfifiZBNRL HtfiEflHCH 6EWXCC. LZB0MY BT CBHSSESS




INTEREST RRTES
FEDERRL FUNDS RRTE (LINE)
RVERflGE YIELD ON 6 MONTH TRERSURY BILLS (DOT)
EFFECTIVE YIELD ON NEH HOME MORTGRGES (DRSH)
14
12

8

12

10

10

e

8

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

7/12/79
BOTflD Sr &flV£HNEW5 0F THC FEDEBP1 RESERVE SYSTEM
B£PT, Of THE TRCRSURY RNO THC TCDCRRL HOME LEflN
PflEPWED BV CBNfiaCSSIBNRL RE5ERRCH SERVICE. LIBRRRV BF C0N&8CSS

CO




SELECTED INTEREST RATES, 1973-1979

*

1st half
1979

1973

1975

1976

1977

1978 •

3-mo. treasury bills
(new issues)

7.03

7.87

5.82

4.99

5.26

7.22

9.37

10-yr. treasury securities
(constant maturity)

6.84

7.56

7.99

" 7.61

7.42

8.41

9.11

Corporate Aaa bonds
(Moody's)
w
i

1974

7.44

8.57

8.83

8.43

8.02

8.73

9.34

Prime commercial paper,
4-6 mos

8.15

9.84

6.32

5.35

5.60

7.99

9.98

Prime rate charged by
banks

8.02

10.80

7.86

6.84

6.82

9.06

11.75

Effective conventional
mortgage rate, new homes,
combined lenders

7.95

8.92

9.01

8.99

9.01

9.54

10.50

Federal Reserve discount
rate (N.Y. F.R. Bank)

6.44

7.83

6.25

5.50

5.52

7.52

9.50

Federal funds
rate

8.73

10.50

5.82

5.05

5.54

7.93

10,13

LJ

Sources:

'

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and
Moody's Investors Service. Accessed from data files of Data Resources, Inc.




FUNDS RAISED IN U.S. CREDIT MARKETS
[In billions of dollars; quarterly data are seasonally adjusted at annual rates]

1975

Investment company

shares

Other corporate equities

1977

1978

1978
(II)

1978
(III)

1978
(IV)

1979
(I)

219.8

Total funds raised,
by instrument:

1976

301 .7

399.4

490. 8

474.4

483.6

518 .5

472.4

-.1

-1 .0

-1.0

-1. 1

— Q

-1.9

9

-1.3

10.8

12 .9

4.8

6
" 3.

4.1

5.0

3 .5

2.8

471.2

480.5

516 .3

470.9

-1

209.1

289 .8

395.6

488. 2

U.S. Government securities

98.2

88 .1

84.3

95.2

95.8

96.3

83 .7

70.6

State and local obligations

15.6

19 .0

29.2

30. 1

36.6

38.7

24 .6

19.4

Corporate and foreign bonds

36.4

37 .2

36.1

31.5

35.8

33.8

27 .8

25.5

Mortgages

57.2

87 .1

134.0

149. 2

145.9

154.8

161 .5

142.5

9.4

23 .6

35.0

49.9

56.4

48.5

52 .8

49.8

6 .4

32.2

53.0

32.1

56.7

59 .5

35.2

-2.4

13 .3

19.8

42.5

36.9

20.4

61 .6

94.2

8.7

15 .3

25.1

36.9

31.7

31.3

44 .8

33.7

Debt instruments:

Consumer credit
Bank loans, n.e.c.
Open market paper
and repurchase agreements
Other loans

Source:

-13.9

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

1979(1) based on incomplete data.

oo

39

The CHAIRMAN. Our first witness this morning will be Professor
Friedman, go ahead, sir.
STATEMENT OF PROF. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, DEPARTMENT
OF ECONOMICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Professor FRIEDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I feel very honored to be here and to have the opportunity to
present my views before this committee. I have submitted a full
statement and in the interest of time I will simply summarize the
parts of my statement that I think are of particular relevance.
The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate that and the full statement will
be printed in the record.
Professor FRIEDMAN. Thank you, sir.
In my statement I address four issues. The first two probably are
not very controversial, and therefore I will skip over them very
quickly.
First is the question of the outlook for the U.S. economy over the
next 18 months. Having a view about the outlook is essential to
what follows, but I think that my views here differ very little from
what most other economists now believe. The business cycle is now
headed into a downturn. Unfortunately, price inflation has prospects that are more inflationary rather than less, both in the near
term and even over the longer term, making progress against price
inflation will be a slow matter. This view is a precursor to what I
will say next, but I do not think that that is very controversial.
Next, on the role of demand management policy, the key question that policy has to face at this juncture is whether or not to let
the business cycle run its course. One view would be that we
should shift policy now in order to combat the developing recession.
I disagree with that and, instead I agree with what you said at the
outset of these hearings, Mr. Chairman: namely, that at this point
we should avoid precipitous movements toward either tax action or
an easing of monetary policy. At least for the present we should let
the business cycle run its course in the interest of returning our
economy toward a path of price stability. If it appears that the
recession is going to be more severe than now seems likely, then
we can reconsider this choice; but I would urge that neither fiscal
policy nor monetary policy be eased at this time.
The third issue that I take up in my statement—and I think this
also speaks to one of the issues that you raised, Mr. Chairman—is
the current stance of policy.
I believe that characterizing fiscal policy at this time is relatively
straightforward. Fiscal policy is conservative in this country just
now. The Federal deficit has shrunk from $60 billion per annum to
less than $20 billion per annum in a year and a half, while the
unemployment rate basically has remained unchanged. State and
local governmental units continue to run about a $30 billion per
annum surplus, with no sign of abating. The current account of our
balance of payments is likely to be deteriorating in the near future,
and, a current account deficit is in many ways analogous to a
Government surplus. Adding together the Federal, the State and
local, and the current account, I conclude that fiscal policy is quite
conservative at this time.




40

Characterizing monetary policy, however, is a different matter.
There are some indicators which one could cite which would suggest that monetary policy is rather tight. For example, nominal
interest rates are high. One can question, however, whether nominal interest rates at 10 percent for commercial paper, for example,
are really very high when business inventories are inflating at 10
to 15 percent. Similarly, until the last several months, monetary
growth as measured by Mi and M2 was extremely low. We have
increasingly learned, however, that the monetary aggregates as
measured do not have the close relationship to economic growth
that once was claimed for them by some people. The monetary base
has also grown somewhat slowly, although not nearly as slowly as
has the money stock, so that it offers evidence suggesting that
policy is more expansionary. Finally, I would cite exactly the indicator that you, Mr. Chairman, pointed to: namely, bank credit.
If I may refer to table 3 of my prepared remarks, I have set out
here the recent growth rates of several aggregates, first for the 3
years 1976, 1977, and 1978, then broken down for the four quarters
of 1978, and then also for the two quarters of 1979 thus far. The
table presents data for a variety of measures of monetary policy
measured from quantitative aggregates. The very slow growth of
the money stock, either for Mi or M2, shows up very clearly. The
monetary base has not grown all that rapidly, but nevertheless
more rapidly than money stock until recently. The aggregates that
I would like to emphasize, however, are instead credit aggregates
regardless of whether we look at bank credit, or the part of bank
credit which is in the form of loans rather than investments, or
even the part of bank loans that go primarily to commercial and
industrial concerns, the credit side of the banking system's activity
has been proceeding at an extremely rapid rate with no evidence
yet of a slowing.
The CHAIRMAN. Commercial and industrial loans. Does that include commercial paper or not?
Professor FRIEDMAN. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Then it's even greater?
Professor FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. If we added to commercial and
industrial loans the commercial paper issues by commercial and
industrial concerns, we would get an even greater growth rate. The
figure in the table represents just the loans extended by the banking system per se.
One can now ask the following question: What does it mean to
have the banking system rapidly lending and extending credit,
without having a comparable increase in the money stock, and
without even having all that great an increase in the monetary
base? I think that there are two fairly straightforward answers.
One, which we have known for a long time, is that, because the
monetary aggregates as defined do not include all bank liabilities—
they typically exclude large CD's, for example, and they also exclude Eurodollar borrowings—it is entirely possible for the banking
system to extend a great amount of credit without having to increase money at all. In fact, that is just what the banks have
recently been doing. This possibility is well known, and it is a
typical reason for not wanting to place exclusive reliance on the
money stock in measuring monetary policy. Next, how about the




41

monetary base? The monetary base consists of currency plus bank
reserves. An interesting development in the past year is that Eurodollar borrowings, which are one liability that banks can use to
finance bank credit expansion, now have zero—repeat, zero—reserve requirements. By using Eurodollar borrowings to finance
credit expansion, therefore, a bank can not only expand credit
without having to create money but, in addition, expand credit
without even increasing its required reserves.
For these reasons, my judgment is that we must look not just at
the liability side of the banking system's balance sheet but also at
the asset side. The asset side tells us that there is no credit restraint from the U.S. banking system that we can find today. On
the basis of this and other evidence which I mention in my statement, my conclusion is that, in contrast to fiscal policy which I
believe is quite conservative now, I believe that monetary conservativeness is fully accommodating the growth of the economy.
What should be done? A primary conclusion that I would draw is
that it is too early to ease monetary policy. Monetary policy is not
particularly tight, and therefore it should not be eased. If it turns
out some months from now that the recession looks as if it will
develop to be more severe than we now anticipate, then we can
seek some easing. At least on the basis of evidence to date, however, I believe that monetary policy should not be eased. On balance,
the prospect for monetary policy the next year and into 1980, as
contained in the report submitted by Chairman Miller to Congress
last week, is about right.
I also want to make three brief remarks about that report before
finishing.
First, while I applaud the action of the Federal Reserve in the
past year or so in reducing the amount of attention it places on the
monetary aggregates per se, I believe—as was implicit in your
remarks, Mr. Chairman—that the Fed has not placed sufficient
attention on the credit side of the banking system's activity. They
have moved toward greater attention to activities and developments in the nonfinancial economy, but they have not yet shown
any sign that they take the projection of the credit aggregate
targets as seriously as the monetary aggregate targets. The evidence that you cited at the outset of this hearing is exactly what I
have in mind.
Second, the Federal Reserve has announced a proposal for redefining the monetary aggregates. If that proposal is adopted, the
case for placing more reliance on explicit credit targets will be all
the greater. In brief, the reason is that the current M2 measure is
at least loosely connected to bank credit in a way that the proposed
new definition for M2 will not be. Especially if the Federal Reserve
adopts the new proposed definitions, I then in particular urge
greater explicit attention to bank credit.
Finally, on numerous occasions in the past, including before this
committee, I have urged that the Federal Reserve disclose its forecast for the nonfinancial economy in addition to its forecast and
targets for the monetary aggregates, and that the Federal Reserve
relate its forecast for the nonfinancial economy to the objectives
specified by the administration. I want to take this opportunity to




42

applaud the Federal Reserve for doing exactly that, for the first
time, in the report submitted last week.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present my
views to the committee.
[Complete statement of Professor Friedman follows:]




43
July 23, 1979

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING S URBAN AFFAIRS

Benjamin M. Friedman
Associate Professor of Economics
Harvard University

Mr. Chairman:

I am honored to have the opportunity to present my views to this Committee
on the occasion of its review of the midyear monetary policy report submitted
to Congress by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant to the Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978.
Economic policy in general, including monetary policy in particular, is
especially important at this critical point for the American economy.

Several

strong and disparate forces have contributed to the current atmosphere of
jeopardy to the economic well-being of the United States.

Among these are an

imminent business cycle peak, ongoing virulent inflation, and the recent sharp
increase of prices by the international oil cartel.

There is probably no way

for U.S. economic policy to avoid at least some real losses to the American
economy, since important aspects of the current economic threat to the United
States are not readily subject to near-term solution.

The increased transfer

of wealth from Americans to foreign oil producers, for example, will continue
until such time as energy policy either reduces American dependence on imported
oil or somehow breaks the price-setting power of their cartel.

Similarly, U.S.

price inflation has now been accelerating for over a decade, and, while progress
is possible, it would be optimistic to expect a sharp deceleration in the very
short run.

Nevertheless, at this critical juncture policy can exert an

49-596 O - 79 - 4




44
important impact, for better or ill, on near-term developments in our economy.
For this reason the attention of this Committee to both monetary policy and
fiscal policy is rightly an object of high priority.
In my testimony this morning I will briefly address four successive
questions:

First, what are the most likely prospects for the U.S. economy

during the next twelve to eighteen months?

Second, in light of this economic

outlook, what is the appropriate role for demand management policy, including
both monetary and fiscal policy?

Third, how can we characterize the respective

current stances of monetary and fiscal policy?

Fourth, what are appropriate

guidelines for the conduct of monetary policy in particular during the coming
critical months?

In addressing this final question, I will also briefly refer to

several specific issues, including the coordination of monetary and fiscal
policy and the implications of the change in the definitions of the monetary
aggregates recently proposed by the staff of the Federal Reserve Board.

1. The Economic Outlook in the Near-Term
To begin, I agree with the current consensus among both private and
government economists that the expansion which the American economy has been
experiencing since the spring of 1975 is about to end.
For several reasons, the expansion would have ended soon even without
the recent negative "supply shocks" from the energy sphere.

As the expansion

entered its fifth year, a number of strains were already beginning to develop.
The decline in the personal saving rate, which had propelled consumption
spending more rapidly than growth in disposable income and therefore had
provided a major impetus to economic growth, had finally halted as consumers
came to face record high debt burdens associated with borrowing on both




45
consumer credit and home mortgages.

Simultaneously, the increasing cost and

reduced availability of mortgage market funds had already led to a downturn
in new residential construction; at best, the homebuilding industry could have
expected only flat prospects.

In addition, since mid 1978 government purchases

of goods and services have shown no increase at all after adjustment for
inflation, at either the federal or the state and local level.

Indeed, the

sole area of apparent strength in the outlook for our economy's near-term
growth was business investment in fixed plant and equipment, which had in fact
begun its own recovery only some time after the overall expansion began in 1975.
In sum, about the best real performance that the U.S. economy could have
achieved in the coming year, even in the absence of adverse energy developments,
would have been an overall standstill.

Perhaps more likely would have been a

small dip in real business activity, so that the growth rate on average during
the second half of 1979 and the first half of 1980 would have been about in
the range of 0 to - 1% per annum.
The recent price increase by the OPEC cartel and the loss of some OPEC
production, however, have now added at least two new dimensions to this picture.
One is the now familiar drain on U.S. purchasing power, and hence reduction of
U.S. spending, associated with the transfer of real income from households and
businesses in the American economy to foreign nationals.

A straightforward

calculation based on oil imports of 8 million barrels per day and an effective
price increase of $7 per barrel indicates that the loss of purchasing power in
the first year after the new oil price becomes fully effective will be
approximately $20 billion dollars, or about 1 per cent of the nation's gross
national product.

After allowing for further effects on spending —

due to the

fact that the loss of income and wealth to some people reduces their spending,




46
and that reduced spending in turn further erodes the income and wealth of
other people, and so on— the effect of the oil price increase will probably
reduce the U.S. gross national product approximately 2 per cent during the
coming year.

Combining this effect with a cyclical posture that already implied

a 0 to -1% real growth suggests a likely outcome for the coming twelve months
of a decline of real gross national product of the order of 2 to 3 per cent.
A second, potential, effect associated with the recent oil situation
stems not from the increase in the price of oil but rather from the reduction
in the availability of certain oil products, especially gasoline.

We have no

firm basis for assessing the effects of sustained gasoline shortages,
represented by long lines at filling stations or a scarcity of filling stations
open on weekends, during a period of seasonal high activity for automobilerelated consumption activities.

It is therefore impossible to gauge with any

precision how sharp a drop in major consumption components would occur if serious
gasoline shortages were to continue through the summer and into the autumn

—

or, even if there were no shortages, if people nevertheless believed or even
feared that there were.

We have already seen a sharp drop in tourism in some

parts of the country, and sales of automobiles are now down by far more than can
be explained by the relatively small increase to date in the price of gasoline.
In addition, just in the past month we have seen a sharp decline in homebuilding
and home buying activity in specific areas requiring lengthy automobile commutes
to logical work places.
A major downside risk associated with the near-term economic outlook,
therefore, is the possibility that the public would sharply change its consuming
habits as a result of real or suspected inability to purchase gasoline.

For

this reason, I believe that a 2 to 3 per cent decline in real gross national




47
product now probably represents the single best estimate of the near-term
economic outlook, but also that, especially if gasoline shortages were to
persist, an even more severe decline would then be more likely to occur.
I also agree with the pessimistic prognosis for continuing price
inflation that private economists have been suggesting for some time, and that
government economists have only recently begun to echo.

A major reduction in

inflation within the next twelve to eighteen months seems unlikely.

Most

quantative estimates of the short-run sensitivity of inflation to economic
activity suggest that even a fairly major recession would at its inception have
only a minor slowing effect on price inflation.

Moreover, we have not yet

experienced even the initial impact on oil product prices associated with the
OPEC cartel's price increase, or with the phased price deregulation program
recently authorized by the President —

not to speak of the much higher prices

that would be associated with any kind of synthetic fuel program.

As these

higher fuel costs feed through the economy, they will only raise overall price
levels yet further in the short run.
Even recently, the improved producer price statistics that we have
enjoyed (see Table 1) have almost entirely represented a reversal in agricultural
prices, which rose at extraordinarily rapid rates during the winter only to
begin falling absolutely in April.

Producer prices for finished goods other

than food have on balance shown no deceleration in April and May, after the
sharp acceleration earlier this year.

The inflation of consumer prices, which

also accelerated earlier this year, has also shown no abatement.
In sum, therefore, the American economy is headed into a pattern that nay
have been atypical some years ago but that is now distressingly familiar.
Specifically, it is about to begin a cyclical downturn while price inflation







TABLE 1

RECENT TRENDS IN U.S. PRICE INFLATION

Consumer Prices

Producer Prices
Other
consumer
goods

Total
finished
goods

Consumer
foods

1976

3.3%

- 2.5%

4.9%

1977

6.6

6.6

6.1

1978

9.1

11.9

1978:
July-Dec

10.8

1979: Jan

Feb

Capital
equipment

All
items

Food

6.4%

4.8%

0.6%

5.1%

7.3%

7.2

6.8

8.0

4.9

7.9

8.3

8.0

9.0

11.8

7.7

9.3

12.1

10.2

9.6

9.6

6.4

9.8

11.0

15.6

21.6

14.4

12.0

10.-8

16.8

10.8

6.0

12.0

18.0

10.8

10.8

14.4

19.2

12.0

13.2

March

12.0

14.4

13.2

7.2

12.0

13.2

13.2

10.8

April

10.8

- 3.6

16.8

13.2

13.2

12.0

15.6

10.8

May

4.8

-15.6

15.6

8.4

13.2

8.4

13.2

15.6

Notes:

All percentages at annual rates seasonally adjusted.
Data from Department of Labor.

Other
commodities

Services

00

•

49
is still on the increase.

Moreover, the prospects are that, at least during

the early part of the cyclical downturn, there will be little fundamental
improvement in inflation.

2. The Role for Demand Management Policy
How should economic policy approach this unfortunate combination of
stagflation together with a perverse supply shock from the recent OPEC actions?
To be sure, demand management policy is not the only government policy that is
relevant both to economic activity and to price inflation, especially at the
current time.

The energy policy now under debate will be of crucial importance.

In addition, policies that either provide or impede incentives to financial
saving and physical capital formation, as well as to job training and other
investment in a more productive labor force, are also of high priority.

These

policies, however, exert their effects on the economy primarily over a longer
time perspective.

For the immediate future, the course of the 1979-80 recession

(if it comes to be labeled so) will depend more on demand management policies,
including monetary and fiscal policy, than on longer-range initiatives in the
form of capital formation incentives or energy policies.
One way to begin in assessing the role for demand management policy in
the current circumstance is to compare the likely 2 to 3 per cent drop in real
gross national product (without allowing for the highly uncertain

gasoline

shortage effects) with the magnitude of the six previous post-war recessions.
As is clear from Table 2, a recession that lowered the nation's output by 2 to
3 per cent within the course of a year or so would be about comparable to the
recessions that our economy experienced in 1953-54 and 1957-58.

A recession

of this magnitude would be more severe than the recessions of 1948-49, 1960 and




50
TABLE 2

SIX POST-WAR U.S. RECESSIONS

Peak Quarter

Trough Quarter

1948: Q4

1949 : Q2

1953: Q2

1954 : Q2

3.3

1957: Q3

1958 : Ql

3.2

1960: Ql

1960 : Q4

1.2

1969: Q3

1970 : Q4

1.1

1973: Q4

1975 : Ql

5.7

Note:




Decline in Real GNP

Data from Department of Commerce.

1.4%

51
1969-70; but it would be far milder than the extremely severe recession of
1973-75.
Should economic policy turn deliberately expansionary in order to prevent
a recession of this magnitude?

My judgment is that at this time it should not.

The American economy has operated at what one can properly regard as "macroeconomic full employment" for quite some time.

There are now approximately

5 million people in the labor force without jobs, but both repeated experience
and substantial quantitative economic research have shown that stimulating the
overall economy is not likely to produce substantial benefits in the form of
jobs for many of those who are now unemployed.

Major further stimulus of

the economy is more likely only to increase competition for the services of
people who already have jobs, and therefore to spur inflation further.

The best

way to alleviate the serious plight of those currently unemployed is, instead,
to pursue more specific targeted programs of training, placement and other
assistance.
It is important to realize that it has taken approximately a decade and
a half for the U.S. inflation rate to accelerate from 2% to 10%.

A large part

of the story of this secular acceleration must be associated with operating
our economy, on average, too close to its capacity.

That is not to assert

that there have been frequent periods of widespread out-and-out shortages
(there have not), nor is it to deny that specific external factors like the oil
cartel and the explosion of food prices in 1974 have played a major role as well
(they have).

Nevertheless, on balance, the American economy has operated too

close to the margin of full utilization of its factors of production, including
both labor and capital, for the last decade and a half.

Operating on average

at a lower rate relative to potential production in the future, and specifically




52
beginning now with a business-cycle

recession of moderate size and duration at

this point, would probably be the best way to place our economy on the road
toward

price stability.
As a result, while monetary and fiscal policy should certainly not permit

what now looks like an average recession to develop into a more severe setback,
nor should they attempt to prevent the business cycle from running its course
at the current time.

3. The Current Stance of Fiscal and Monetary Policies
How can we characterize monetary and fiscal policy at this time?
I believe that the current direction of fiscal policy is easier to discern
than that of monetary policy.

Whether by direction or not, U.S. fiscal policy

is rapidly becoming contractionary.

From the fourth quarter of 1977 to the

first quarter of 1979, the Federal Government's deficit (on a national income
accounts basis) declined from an annual rate of $59 billion to an annual rate
of only $19 billion, while the unemployment rate remained essentially unchanged.
Part of this reduction in the deficit has reflected the recently legislated
Social Security tax increases, but even more has been due to the interaction
of price inflation with the progressive personal income tax system.

Indeed,

this tax bracket effect is just what the "built-in stabilizers" are supposed to
achieve in these circumstances; when accelerating inflation indicates the need
to slow the economy's growth, taxes rise in relation to personal income and
therefore retard spending.

Regardless of the reason, however, it remains

clear that the Federal Government's budget deficit has been shrinking for some
time and is likely to remain small unless the recession becomes so severe as
to reduce economic activity enough to offset the added revenue gain due to




53
inflation —

or unless Congress switches to an expansionary policy and enacts

a tax cut.
At the same time that the Federal Government's budget deficit has been
declining, state and local governments in the aggregate have been continuing
to run a large budget surplus.

In the wake of Proposition 13, there was a

small drop in the state and local government surplus from an annual rate of
$30 billion in the second quarter of 1978 to an annual rate of $23 billion in
the next quarter.

By the first quarter of 1979, however, state and local

governments collectively were again running a budget surplus of $27 billion
per annum.

In addition, the likely increase in the U.S. net export deficit

will further reinforce the declining Federal deficit, since the effect on
economic activity due to a current account deficit is in many respects directly
analogous to the effect due to a government surplus.
In view of all three of these elements —

the sharply declining Federal

Government deficit, the persistently large state and local government surplus,
and the likely increasing U.S. current account deficit —

the prospect is that

the net depressant fiscal effect has already begun to grow and will become
larger in the future.

One can only characterize fiscal policy as conservative

at this time.
By contrast, characterizing monetary policy is now much more difficult.
The last year or so has been a time of extraordinary confusion among "Fed
watchers," especially in light of the increasingly bizarre behavior of the
monetary aggregates.

Interest rates have risen, and the monetary aggregates

have grown slowly, but these movements are not necessarily signs of monetary
policy tightness except to old-fashioned Keynesians or strict monetarists,
respectively.




Nominal interest rates rose substantially during 1978 and early

54
1979 —

in May and June they declined, but now they are rising again — but

price inflation has also accelerated.

A 10% commercial paper rate may exert

little depressing effect on borrowing or economic activity when business
inventories are inflating at 12 - 15%. Similarly, although the monetary
aggregates were showing little or no growth during much of this past winter
(see Table 3), students of banking and portfolio behavior have suggested that
institutional changes like arrangements for repurchase agreements and federal
funds transactions may well have severed, at least temporarily, any reliable
relationship between income growth and the public's holding of money balances.
Still another familiar indicator of monetary policy is the relation between
nominal interest rates on short-term market investment instruments and the
Regulation Q interest rate ceilings on deposits at thrift institutions.

Under

normal circumstances market interest rates at today's level would probably
lead to extreme disintermediation, and consequent disappearance of mortgage
credit.

Because of the phenomenal success of the money market certificates

introduced approximately a year ago, however, savings inflows in total have
held up moderately well, and thrift institutions are continuing to advance
funds for home mortgages.

Yet another way of assessing monetary policy is to

look backward from the money held by the public to the raw material from which
that money is created —
plus bank reserves.

namely, the monetary base, which consists of currency

The behavior of the money stock and the monetary base has

hardly been identical during the past year (see again Table 3), and on the
whole the monetary base has suggested an easier stance of monetary policy than
has the money stock.
Finally, one further ^Indicator of monetary policy is the growth of bank
credit, and in particular bank lending.




Because banks can finance their credit




TABLE 3

AGGREGATIVE MEASURES OF U.S. MONETARY POLICY

Narrow
money
stock (Ml)

Broad
money
stock (M2)

Monetary
base

Bank
credit

Bank
loans

Commercial
and
industrial
loans

12/75-12/76

6.2%

11.4%

6.7%

12/76-12/77

7.9

9.3

8.3

11.0

14.5

12.3

12/77-12/78

6.6

8.2

9.0

12.3

15.9

14.6

12/77- 3/78

4.5

6.8

9.2

10.3

13.3

18.4

3/78- 6/78

9.3

8.8%

8.5%

2.0%

11.4

9.4

19.2

21.2

17.6

9/78

9.6

11.4

10.0

9.0

12.2

10.6

9/78-12/78

0.6

4.8

7.6

11.1

17.4

11.7

12/78- 3/79

- 2.4

1.7

4.3

15.1

16.6

23.7

3/79- 6/79

11.4

11.7

8.0

14.1

14.8

21.0

6/78-

Notes:

All percentages at annual rates seasonally adjusted.
Data from Federal Reserve Board.

56
extensions by issuing liabilities like certificates of deposit, which are not
included in the money stock, they can create credit (at this stage of the
business cycle mostly in loan form) without any corresponding increase in the
money stock.

Indeed, this is exactly the reason why exclusive reliance on

money growth targets as a guide for monetary policy can be so misleading.
Moreover, because the Federal Reserve Board has exempted Eurodollar borrowings
from any reserve requirements at all, banks can create credit not only without
increasing the money stock but without even requiring an increase in the
monetary base, simply by financing their credit creation in the Eurodollar
market.

Since the elimination of Eurodollar reserve requirements last August,

large U.S. banks have rapidly increased their Eurodollar borrowings.

A part of

these borrowings has gone to offset a paydown of domestic certificates of
deposit, which the 2% additional reserve requirement imposed last November
rendered especially unattractive, but banks have used the remainder primarily
to finance expansion of their loan portfolios.
Table 3 summarizes various aggregative measures of U.S. monetary policy,
including two measures of the money stock, the monetary base, total bank credit
(loans and investments), total bank loans, and bank loans to commercial and
industrial borrowers.

While the behavior of the money stock has been

extraordinarily erratic during the last year, and the monetary base somewhat
less so, bank credit expansion has shown an accelerating rather than
a decelerating trend.

Moreover, bank loans to commercial and industrial

borrowers have grown extremely rapidly thus far in 1979.

It is difficult to

believe that monetary policy is very tight when the trend of bank credit
expansion has been consistently upward, and this conclusion is none the less
valid for banks' having financed that credit expansion in large part by issuing




57
liabilities that neither count in the money stock nor bear reserve requirements.

4. Conclusions for the Current Conduct of Monetary Policy
What are the current policy implications of the tentative conclusion that
monetary policy at this time is not particularly tight?
The primary implication, in my judgment, is that the Federal Reserve
should resist the temptation to ease monetary policy» at least until such time
as there is convincing evidence either of substantial credit restraint or of a
cyclical downturn that threatens to become more severe than now seems likely.
It is important in this regard not to be misled by focusing either on the
current high nominal interest rates, which are not so high after allowing for
price inflation, or on slow monetary growth, which has questionable implications
for economic activity.

I find it much more difficult to determine whether or

not monetary policy should, instead, be tightened.

On balance, therefore, I

believe that the Federal Reserve has made about the right decision as reflected
in the midyear report presented to Congress by Chairman Miller last week.
Nevertheless, I find disturbing the Federal Reserve's continued emphasis
on the "money" side of the banking system's activity, to the near exclusion of
attention to the "credit" side.

The formulation and implementation of monetary

policy must depend on a broad range of measures both of the performance of the
nonfinancial economy and of the effect of monetary policy more specifically.
In light of recent shifts in portfolio behavior, narrowly keying on one or two
monetary aggregates would be especially unfortunate at this point.

For this

reason, I applaud the Federal Reserve's apparent close attention to developments
in the nonfinancial economy, but I also urge increased attention to credit
measures in addition to money measures.




58
The point of this recommendation is not that money measures contain no
influence or information relevant to monetary policy, but rather that money
measures and credit measures both bear such relevant influence and information.
The relative importance of the two is an open question, which recent
developments have rendered even less easily resolved than it may once have
appeared.

Economics provides no a priori reason to acknowledge the influence

and information provided by the public's money holdings but not its credit
liabilities.

For a given short-term interest rate, or a given growth in the

monetary base, the behavior of the banking system as well as of the non-bank
public determines the growth of both money and credit, and does so jointly with
the determination of nonfinancial economic activity.

There is no justification

for paying attention to the "money" side of this process while disregarding
the "credit" side.
Moreover, the importance of paying explicit attention to bank credit will
be all the greater if the Federal Reserve adopts the new definitions of the
monetary aggregates proposed earlier this year by the Federal Reserve Board
staff.

In brief, the primary aim of the proposed new definitions is to

eliminate some of the arbitrariness inherent in the current definitions by
emphasizing, within the universe of liabilities of deposit-issuing institutions,
the question "what kind of deposit?" instead of "what kind of institution?"
The primary beneficiary of this change will be the middle measure, M2.

Despite

the attention it has received in recent years as the aggregate with the
stablest "velocity" relation to income, the current M2 has never made sense as
a summary measure of anyone's deposit-holding behavior.

The proposed new M2,

which will add to Ml savings deposits at both banks and thrift institutions, will
avoid the anomaly of arbitrarily distinguishing large quantities of essentially




59
identical consumer-held deposits that are often accessed from similar looking
buildings across the street from one another.

Hence the new measure will

provide an improved guide to the asset-holding behavior of the non-bank public
including both individuals and businesses.
The price that the proposed new definitions will pay for this
rationalization of the representation of the public's asset-holding behavior,
however, will be a sharp loss of ability to represent the public's liabilityissuing behavior.

Fittingly enough, the main winner on the asset-holding

side, M2, will also be the chief loser on the liability-issuing side.
An often troubling question is why the current M2, which is such a
profoundly arbitrary measure of deposit-holding behavior, should exhibit such
a close relationship to aggregate economic activity.

One part of an explanation

is that movements in the current M2, although they are measured from the
liability side of the commercial banking system's balance sheet, in reality
capture much of what is happening on the asset side.

With the subtraction of

some $100 billion of currency and the addition of some $100 billion of negotiable
certificates (plus an adjustment for capital accounts less reserves, and some
other liabilities), M2 is approximately equivalent to bank credit.
historically there

Indeed,

has been a very high correlation between the respective

growth rates of M2 and bank^credit.

It is my impression that this close

relationship between the current M2 measure and bank credit is widely recognized
though seldom explicitly discussed.

Instead, M2 has served as a tacit neutral

ground on which people with divergent views about how monetary policy works can
hold a mutually understandable conversation and even concur on a mutually
agreeable policy.

Using M2 as the monetary growth target to guide monetary

policy, or simply as a variable to relate to income, in effect captures much of

49-596 0 - 7 9 - 5




60
whatever influence or information is associated with bank credit in the complex
process connecting financial and nonfinancial economic activity.
The proposed redefinition of M2, by excluding time deposits at commercial
banks and including savings deposits at non-bank thrift institutions, will
sever the relationship to bank credit.

The historical correlation between bank

credit and the proposed new M2 measure is only about half that between bank
credit and the current M2.

The new definition will therefore achieve an improved

representation of "money" behavior at the expense of the representation of
"credit" behavior.

If the Federal Reserve adopts the proposed redefinitions,

it will therefore be all the more important to rely explicitly on bank credit
measures as well as the monetary aggregates in formulating and implementing
monetary policy.
Finally, I want to note briefly one further feature of the report on
monetary policy presented to Congress by the Federal Reserve Board last week.
On numerous occasions in the past (most recently in testimony before the House
Budget Committee last year), I have urged that the Federal Reserve contribute
to the effective coordination of monetary and fiscal policies by reporting to
Congress not only its monetary targets but also the set of outcomes for the
nonfinancial economy that it believes to be consistent with those targets.

I

therefore applaud the action of the Board in, for the first time, doing exactly
that in its midyear report.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present my views to the
Committee.




61

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Professor Friedman.
Mr. Kaufman.
STATEMENT OF HENRY KAUFMAN, PARTNER AND MEMBER OF
THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, SALOMON BROS., NEW YORK

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate being here again to
present my views. I, too, am going to present a truncated version of
my detailed remarks in order to save some time for discussion.
The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will be printed in full in the
record.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Thank you.
I do believe that we are in an economic and in a financial noman's land which has very few historical parallels and that there
are very few tried and true tested prescriptions for trying to get
out.
[Complete statement follows:]




62
Statement by

Henry Kaufman
Partner and Member of the Executive Committee
Salomon Brothers, New York City
My name is Henry Kaufman.

I am a general partner and member

of the Executive Committee of Salomon Brothers, an investment banking firm headquartered in New York City.

I also serve as the Firm's

chief economist and head of its Research Department.

Thank you

for inviting me to appear before this Committee to present my views
on the economic and financial situation.
difficult time for all of us.

This is an especially

National policy requires both pene-

trating insights and a resolute decisiveness because, today, we are
in an economic and financial no man's land which has few, if any,
historical parallels.

And, perhaps worse, it is a no man's land

with no tried and tested rescue plans for escape.
The economy is tottering, but it is far from clear that a
classic recession is underway.

What we have today is a "mix" of

cyclical and noncyclical constraints on the economy.

Inflation has

stepped up again to double digit levels and shows no sign of abating.
Prices are also rising faster than income, squeezing consumption.
And capacity constraints are also limiting consumption.

Energy

problems have complicated matters by inducing yet another supply
constraint which is restricting economic activity and contributing
to higher inflation.

In addition, the international financial

situation is again uneasy and formidable challenges face the dollar
in the foreign exchange markets in the months ahead.
is bad.

But not all

Housing activity, although having slowed, continues to be

relatively strong for this phase of the cycle.

And business spend-

ing, which was late in expanding, has also remained strong.

It is

not yet faltering either from the slowing in consumption or the
energy shortage.

With gas lines, shortening and the availability of

oil increasing once more, if only temporarily, the economy can




63
fluctuate a while longer in this zone of economic ambivalence which
has neither the full attributes of renewed expansion nor those of
the traditional contraction.
But, a business contraction with classic characteristics will
develop as inflation persists.

With inflation accelerating in the

months ahead, consumers will be immobilized far beyond the energy
shock.

Operating costs will be imbedded into the financial decis-

ions of business.

The enormity and gravity of the inflationary

problem today should be given primacy in policy formulation.

No

sustainable economic recovery can be launched without a successful
frontal attack against the nemesis of inflation.

Cyclical relief

from inflation, because of a slowing of economic activity, won't
do.

It will be recognized by all as only a rearguard holding

action.

I ask you to consider these formidable five dimensions of

inflation today:
The first dimension:

it should not be surprising to know

that inflationary expectations are by many indicators more deeply
entrenched in the United States today than at any other time since
the Second World War.

Almost every cyclical low and high in the

inflation rate has been above the preceding cyclical troughs and
peaks.

The secular rise in U.S. inflation is now perceived not only

by the trained economist but also by the public in general.

This

dismal trend has led many Americans to conclude that only temporary
relief can be expected from governmental policies.
The second dimension-.

the sustaine'd rise of U.S. infla-

tion, combined with the extraordinary skepticism about effective
anti-inflation measures, has compelled Americans to fend'for themselves . Savings as a percent of disposable income are shockingly




64
low.

Acquisitions of tangible inflation hedges are increasing.

Gold, land, houses and so forth —

they all contribute to undermining

the savings and investment processes that have made the U.S. the
envy of the rest of the free world.
The third dimension:

the tenacity of inflation has been

far greater in the recent business swings from boom to contraction
than in the earlier postwar cycles.

In the business cycles of the

'50s and early '60s, the inflation rate fell quickly when the
economy turned from expansion to contraction.

Inflation as measured

by the GNP deflator rose at an annual rate of 3.4% during the final
four quarters of the economic recovery that ended in the summer of
1957 and then slowed to 0.9% during the subsequent recession.
Inflation averaged 1.7% in the last year of the expansion that
ended in April, 1960, and slowed to 0.6% in the recession.

During

the last year of business growth and subsequent recession in the
1969-70 and 1973-74 periods, the pattern changed.

It averaged

5.3% at the close of the boom in 1969 and 5.1% in the recession.
In the final year of the economic expansion in 1973, inflation,
averaging 7.5%, was below the 11% rate that prevailed during the
1974 recession.
The fourth dimension:

while official projections call for

an abatement of inflation next year, the recent cyclical experiences
cannot be dismissed.

Apart from the higher energy costs, there is

no policy currently in place that would hold wage cost increases
below the 8% to 9% range.

Labor bargaining will be firm because

inflation has eroded purchasing power while rapid and large increases
in unemployment, which could temper wage demands, are unlikely.




65
The fifth dimension:

inflation is insidious and goes far

beyond the higher cost of energy.

Its origin and driving force

should not be blamed on only this one sector.

From December, 1977,

to December, 1978, the consumer price index increased by 9%, and
after excluding the food and energy components it rose by 8.5%.
During the first five months of 1979, the overall index rose at an
annual rate of 13% and again excluding food and energy by 10%.
Unless inflation can be checked and then pushed down, a
meaningful economic recovery is beyond reach for financial reasons
alone.

The combination of high inflation and economic weakness

does not permit key sectors in the economy to rehabilitate themselves financially.

On the contrary, the immediate prospects point

to a significant financial deterioration, both for domestic credit
markets and the dollar abroad.

As consumer income growth slows,

consumer debt will surely become more burdensome.

Indeed, the con-

sumers' desire to maintain recently achieved spending patterns,
together with reasonably good access to new funds, will sustain new
borrowings at high levels for a while longer.
Equally important are the rising credit needs of business
corporations in the stagflating period ahead of us.

Already, the

balance sheets of corporations are now top-heavy with short-term
debt.

The ratio of total bond debt to bank loans and commercial

paper is below the postwar low reached in 1974.

From hereon,

internal cash generation will level off and then decline under the
three pressures of a slowing sales volume, rising costs, and the
usual adjustment delays by business to changing conditions.

All

three pressures will be more acute because of the persistence of
inflation.




As a result, external funds required to finance working

66
capital and capital outlays will rise while the funding of liabilities, a key prerequisite for launching another economic expansion,
Will be difficult.
What this means is that the typical large external needs of
business will be competing in the credit markets with consumer and
housing-related demands which are exceptionally large for this
stage of the business cycle.

In order for business liabilities to

be funded and for large deliveries of mortgages to be absorbed by
institutional investors in the presence of high inflation, longterm interest rates will push higher even if short-term interest
rates hold steady or ease somewhat.

Long-term interest rates will

retreat from peak levels only when financial rehabilitation becomes
the overriding priority of the private sector.

This, in turn, can

only be accomplished through a significant reduction in inflation.
In periods of high inflation, it is not correct to assume
that interest rates should reach their peak when economic activity
peaks and then recede quickly with the unfolding of a business
recession.

This correlation was true in the early postwar years,

but not in the cyclical swings from boom to recession in 1969-70
and 1973-74.

In these more recent periods, interest rates, espe-

cially long-term interest rates, continued to rise well into the
recession.

The key factor in this counter-cyclical behavior of

interest rates was an inflation that remained virulent in these
recent recessions while it had slowed quickly in earlier recessions.
The continuance of a high rate of inflation will also add to
the problems of the dollar in the foreign exchange markets.

Unless

inflation recedes quickly during the recession, how can monetary
policy ease without compromising our international objective of




67
maintaining a stable dollar?

The situation is already complicated

by a series of troublesome developments.

Our balance of trade is

not likely to improve much, remaining in substantial deficit of
perhaps around $25-30 billion in 1979 and $20-25 billion next year,
since our oil import bill will jump from $42 billion in 1978 to
$58 billion this year and up again to an estimated $70 billion in
1980.

Other major nations, recognizing the danger of inflation

to them in an energy-tight world and the fact that the payment of
oil is through U.S, dollars, are moving vigorously to hold their
own inflation rates in check.

They are tightening monetary policy.

As a result, interest rate differentials between the U.S. and such
countries as Japan, Germany and Britain have narrowed sharply
since late last year.

Recent history has shown that a strong cur-

rency is a valuable asset when oil prices rise.
Had fiscal and monetary policies performed better, the
U,S. economy and financial markets would not now be at this critical and difficult juncture.
much and for too long.

Fiscal policy has stimulated too

It ignited a consumer spending boom and

thwarted the building of a financial base conducive to business
capital formation.

Federal spending increased annually by 12%

during the economic expansion that began in 1975.

This was far

greater than thf» growth of expenditures in previous periods of
recovery.

When the inflation rate rose to 7.7% in 1978, Federal

expenditures

(including off-budget outlays) were still allowed to

increase by 12.5%, a rate exceeded only 6 times in the past twentyfive years.

The Federal budget deficit was equal to 22.6% of

Gross National Product in the third year of this latest economic




68
expansion, compared with a range of 18 1/2% to 20% in earlier
comparable periods.
"Crowding out" became a much maligned concept when fiscal
expansion was practiced a few years ago.

Then, it was pointed out

frequently that the large borrowings by the Federal Government were
not detrimental because they were occurring when private demands
were slack.

The latter was not true.

During much of 1974-75

private credit demands remained relatively high but only belatedly
did the private sector recoup liquidity.

Moreover, when the pri-

vate sector increased again its credit demands for expansion purposes in 1976, the cash requirements of the Federal Government
continued to be large.
The shortcomings of monetary policy have been of a different
sort.

The Fed eased credit belatedly in 1974-75 and drew some

criticism for its lack of responsiveness.

The Fed, however, was

faced with high inflation and an explosive budget deficit, a mix
of problems and policies that may confront it again in the not too
distant future.

When monetary relaxation was initiated, it was

massive and the Fed interpreted its responsibility through the
formulation of statistical benchmarks —

the growth of the money

supply, a monetary aggregate whose statistical and fundamental
groundings have become increasingly undermined by structural changes.
Only recently has the Fed admitted that there is a problem with
the money supply concept although it still serves, together with the
Federal funds rate, as the principal target of Fed policy.

I believe

that money supply, as currently defined, has serious flaws if used
as the official target of policy simply because of the deterioration in the linkage between money and the economy.




69
Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve did not perceive that
these changes were so significant as to incorporate them into its
policy approach.

The result has been excessive inflation which

manifested itself in the financial markets through a record-shattering growth of debt in the United States in the past few years.
Outstanding credit market debt for all non-financial sectors rose
at an annual rate of 12% from early 1975 to the end of the'first
quarter of 1979.

This increase exceeded the high rate of debt

growth in the 1971-73 business recovery and was nearly twice as
large as those in earlier business expansions.
The failure to slow the high debt formation is due in part
to the narrow focus on a slippery money supply approach and accommodation of an interest rate policy that actually has encouraged
borrowing.

I have illustrated the nature of this promotion of

borrowing in Table 1.

It shows the annual inflation rate (consumer

price index), the Federal funds rate, and the yield on long utility
bonds rated AA, starting with 1960.
several relationships.

The table reveals clearly

From 1960 through 1973, both the Fed funds

rate and the yield on bonds were consistently above the inflation
rate-by 170 basis points for funds and 296 basis points for bonds.
Starting in 1974, however, the inflation rate has exceeded the Federal funds rate (the interest rate target of the Fed) most of the
time while the bond yield has exceeded the inflation rate only by
a small margin and certainly not as consistently as in the earlier
period.

Even if 1974 is excluded from this analysis because of

the erratic and stringent credit development in that year, the relationship of the inflation rate to interest rates shows an extraordinary liberality in monetary policy and inducement to debt creation.




70
In reviewing the events since 1974, several other policy
aspects stand out that are instructive.

The fiscal and monetary

authorities thought mistakenly that they had considerable leeway
in policy formulation.

They overlooked the intransigent inflation

and the blooming energy problem and responded as though traditional
policies dealing with a recession-recovery period were warranted.
After embarking on this course, there was also no meaningful midcourse correction to remove the policy stimulants.
correction period was somewhere in 1976 and 1977.

The critical
Both fiscal and

monetary policies, in addition to their earlier errors, were reacting to rather than anticipating events.

The size of the Federal

budget deficit was slowed through inflation taxation and not through
initiatives.

Monetary policy actions were equally belated.

Last

year, when inflation escalated and the dollar was under acute pressure, the Fed raised the discount rate only after crisis conditions.
National policy missed its timing.

When timing is missed, whether

by Government or by the private sector, a penalty cannot be avoided.
What should we do now when the economy is sliding into recession, when inflation is roaring along, and when the availability of
energy is highly uncertain?

As an overall approach, I strongly urge

policies of gradualism not be adopted in resolving our economic and
financial difficulties.

While this approach is highly seductive,

it has no performance record.

It will have no credibility with

Americans because it has been preached too often but it has not
successfully performed.

For some time, official advocates have

stressed gradualism as a solution to inflation but instead of slowing step by step, inflation has been accelerating..




71
j.r policies of gradualism are approved in combatting today's
problems, then what the U.S. will also be getting is above average
rates of inflation for some time, subnormal economic growth, low
productivity gains, and continued problems in eliminating our balance of payments deficits.

In the financial markets, compromising

policies, which require a 5 to 7-year time span to reduce inflation,
will result in a financial structure that we may not be able to
bring into balance.

For example, if policies could be so designed

as to diminish inflation from 10-11% at present to 5-6% in 5 year's
time when real growth annually would be around 2%, several adverse
consequences would ensue.

Credit market debt, which at the end of

the past year totalled $3.3 trillion compared with $1.3 trillion in
1970, would reach about $5.5 trillion.

As a result, many more

economic participants would have a vested interest in perpetuating
inflation.

Financial leverage would be excessive in all sectors

making it more difficult to encourage new equity investments.

This

would lead to even more mergers and consolidations which would
increase the concentration of economic power.

In the end, another

failure of gradualism would benefit no one and hurt all.
With this in mind, I can only offer a few proposals.

The

Government should launch policies that will encourage large capital
commitments for energy development, for research and technology
improvements and for other programs that would foster higher productivity.

I say this for two reasons.

One, we must react to our

regrettable role as an energy host&ge.

Otherwise, we abrogate our

position as a world leader and limit our national destiny.

Second,

large capital investment outlays are the only course open to us to
effect a new economic expansion that is meaningful and productive.




72
By sometime next year, the current cyclical increase in capital
spending will come to an end in reaction to the slower sales volume,
high business costs and large dependence on external financing by
business.

A massive revival in consumer spending is unlikely.

While it is true that this happened the last time around, let us
recall the extraordinary fiscal stimulation that was required and
let us note that the consumer is today heavily in debt, which was
not the case in 1974-75.

Now, the consumer's financial position

can only be repaired gradually and sustained for a long period if
capital outlays are more in the forefront of economic revival than
they have been before.

Consequently, tax reductions are in order.

They should be weighted in favor of stimulating a stronger industrial and technological base.

Investment tax credits, accelerated

depreciation and lower profit and payroll taxes would also cushion
the near term cost squeeze, thereby alleviating some of the inflation
pressure that forces corporations to throttle down sharply capital
outlay programs.

These tax measures should be supplemented with

incentives to save and invest and with inducements to support new
ventures.

In addition, the tax structure should also be designed

to have the management of large firms experience more directly the
risks and rewards of entrepreneurship which is lacking in many
management arrangements today.
Regarding monetary policy, I continue to believe that the
Fed should abandon its slippery money supply approach and in its
stead adopt new long-term and interim targets.

The long-term target

should be the "Debt Proxy" which is the sum of credit market instruments, deposits and currency held by private domestic nonfinancial
investors.




These holdings include U.S. Governments and Federal

73
agencies, state and local issues, corporate and foreign bonds, open
market paper, demand deposits, currency, time and savings deposits
and large CDs.

Preliminary data for the debt proxy are available

quarterly and therefore are timely for a long-term target.
The interim target should be either liquid assets or M7.
Liquid assets include currency and demand and time deposits held
by the domestic nonfinancial sectors at commercial banks and at
nonbank financial institutions.
liquid assets.

M7 differs only slightly from

It includes all of the same instruments as liquid

assets but it differs in that it includes holdings of all deposits
by nonbank financial companies and foreigners.

Data for liquid

assets and M7 are available monthly and would serve as a reasonable
bridge to the long-term target.
The relationships between nominal gross national product
and the debt proxy, liquid assets, and M7 are remarkably good.
First, outstanding levels come close to nominal gross
national product as illustrated by the data for the fourth quarter
of 1978.

In contrast, money stock (Ml) outstanding totalled only

$361 billion.
$ Billions
Liquid Assets
M7
Debt Proxy
GNP

1, 754
1,753
2,223
2,215

Second, over a long period, the statistical fit has been
very close.

Nominal GNP and the debt proxy are virtually indistin-

guishable from each other over the past 25 years.

The relationship

between GNP and M7 was very close until the mid 1960s when GNP
started to increase more rapidly than M7.




74
Third, the percentage changes in nominal gross national product are in close alignment with those for the debt proxy and
liquid assets and/or M7.

As shown in Table 2 which covers the

five-year intervals between 1953 and 1978, the differences between
the percentage changes in GNP and the debt proxy were 0.1%, 0.2%,
0.7%, and 0.4%, respectively.

During the same period, however,

the differences between GNP and Ml were 3.0%, 3.0%, 2.5% and 4%.
I should also like to urge you to speed the process of
reforming the international financial structure.

While the dollar

is still the key reserve currency and, therefore, an essential
currency, it has diminished in value unlike other essentials such
as oil.

Unfortunately, we have never used the essentiality of

the dollar in bargaining with either oil producers or with other
key industrial nations.

Without the American credit markets as

a source of funds either here or abroad in the Eurodollar market
and without the dollar as a payment vehicle, the rapidly escalating
price of oil since 1973 could not have been validated.
In the current situation, the dollar is virtually in a no win
position.

As we continue to finance the huge oil purchases and

other transactions abroad, the supply of dollars internationally
will continue to burgeon, providing a bigger target for exchange
pressures to develop as long as the supply of other currencies increases only moderately.

Unless our inflation rate is reduced

quickly, the attack on.the dollar will intensify in the months
ahead.

As noted'earlier, other key countries fully understand

the beneficial value of having a strong currency when oil prices
are rising.

Without freeing the dollar from some of its interna-

tional responsibilities, we run the risk of partially immobilizing




75
monetary policy during the recession and relying too heavily on
fiscal stimulation to pull us out.

In this connection, the need

is for other key industrial nations to substantially enlarge their
role in international finance.

This can be facilitated with their

cooperation or by U.S. action alone.
In conclusion, it is dismaying for me to have to tell you
that the way out of the economic and financial no man's land which
we are now in is not easy and not clear.

Our deeply imbedded

inflation and the new energy constraints are dimensions that cannot
be dealt with through typical anti-recession measures.

Even a

classical period of transition from boom to recession to recovery/
it must be remembered, has periods of pain and consternation.
The struggle for survival in an economic and financial
no man's land can take a variety of forms.

Old relief battalions

such as classical anti-cyclical remedies may be thrown into the
fray to provide a temporary lifting of the siege.

Perhaps, the

urgency and unusual nature of the struggle today will be recognized
and inspire us to attack vigorously the forces that threaten to
imprison us all.

However, there are already too many hostages.

Monetary policy has become a hostage of an elusive money supply
target.

The dollar is a hostage of oil and the foreign exchange

markets.

Both will continue to immobilize the responsiveness of

Federal Reserve policy when it should be free.

Unfortunately,

once again, this leaves fiscal policy with the main responsibilities
of leading the charge with an arsenal of perhaps misdirected
firing power.

The charge out of today's economic and financial

no man's land must be well orchestrated and powerful.

We cannot

risk a long siege as some official policymakers now advocate.

49-596 O - 79 - 6




76
Salomon Brothers
INFLATION AND INTEREST PATES, 1960-79
(%)
Consumer
Prices

Years
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979 1H

1.6
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.7
2.9
2.9
4.2
5.4
5.9
4.3
3.3
6.2
11.0
9.1
5.8
6.5
7.7
12.4

Federal
Funds

New Long
AA Util. Bds.

3.22
1.96
2.68
3.18
3.50
4.07
5.11
4.22
5.66
8.21
7.18
4.66
4.43
8.73
10.50
5.82
5.05
5.54
7.93
10.12

4.73
4.52
4.36
4.33
4.46
4.57
5.45
5.87
6.61
7.75
8.83
7.74
7.45
7.74
9.27
9.51
8.69
8.28
9.06
9.78

Fed Funds Less
Inflation Rate

Bond Yield
Less Inflation Rate

1.62
0.96
1.58
1.98
2.20
2.37
2.21
1.32
1.46
2.81
1.28
0.36
1.13
2.53
-0.50
-3.28
-0.75
-0.96
0.23
-2.28

3.13
3.52
3.26
3.13
3.16
2.87
2.55
2.97
2.41
2.35
2.93
3.44
4.15
1.54
-1.73
0.41
2.89
1.78
1.36
-2.62

TABLE 2
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN GNP AND VARIOUS MEASURES OF MONEY AND CREDIT

Years
1953-59
1960-69
1970-73
1974-78
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

Debt
Proxy

4.99%
6.76
8.75
10.04
8.1
8.2
11.2
11.0
11.7




Liquid
Assets

5.07%
6.60
9.45
10.40
10.0

GNP

4.97%
6.87
9.78
10.30
10.4

8.7

7.9

10.5
11.0
11.8

10.7
11.0
11.5

Ml

M2

1.99%
3.72
6.30
6.06

3.50%
5.73
8.98
9.06

5.5
4.4
5.3
7.3
7.8

8.5
7.7
9.9

DIFFERENCES IN ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES BETWEEN GNP
AND VARIOUS MONEY AND CREDIT MEASURES

Years

Debt
Proxy

Liquid
Assets

Ml

M2

1953-59
1960-69
1970-73
1974-78
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978

0.1
0.2
0.7
0.4
1.9
0.5
0.7
0.0
0.1

0.0
0.1
1.0
0.3
2.3
0.3
0.5
0.0
0.2

3.0
3.0
2.5
4.0
2.6
3.8
5.9
3.7
3.9

1.5
1.0
0.2
1.0
0.4
0.5
1.3
0.4
3.1

10.6
8.6

77

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kaufman.
Professor Klein.
STATEMENT OF PROF. LAWRENCE KLEIN, DEPARTMENT OF
ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Professor KLEIN. I think the statement given by Chairman Miller
on July 17 is an excellent perception of the present state of the
economy and I think that it's very difficult, at least for me, to take
issue with the main points that he's making, but I want to emphasize some issues that probably are not going to be emphasized as
much by the other witnesses this morning which I think are important to understanding the situation. They deal with food prices, the
agricultural
The CHAIRMAN. Let me just interrupt to say, Professor Klein,
that as I said to the two other witnesses, your statement will be
printed in full in the record.
Professor KLEIN. Yes. They deal with food prices, the agricultural
situation, energy prices, and some aspects of the international
economy. I think that we are, of course, discussing monetary policy
and the role of money in the economy, yet it was remarked that
there must be a full appreciation of what's going on in the rest of
the economy in order to take up monetary policy appropriately,
and there isn't any doubt that three of the outstanding components
of the CPI that are giving us trouble in the inflationary situation
recently have been interest costs, food costs, and fuel costs. I think
we have definite restrictions as far as monetary policy and interest
costs are concerned, but there is reason to hope that food prices
will look better next year. The indications are that the big runup
in livestock prices is just about over. Grain markets have been in a
flurry of speculative increase in the last month or so, but the
American harvest looks very promising for this year and more
than enough to overcome what seems to be a shortfall in some
parts of the outside world.
Therefore, one could expect to see basic grain prices coming to
some kind of plateau, meaning $4 wheat and $3 corn and cattle
prices on the downside, and although one would have hoped for a
7- or 8-percent inflation rate in food in the CPI next year, at least
we ought to be able to get below the double digit range, to around 9
percent.
Now as far as energy is concerned, there isn't terribly much to
hope for in the short term. There we can look only for more
inflation and, indeed, the strategy of the energy supplying nations
appears to be, with one or two exceptions, to conserve output,
restrict output, and I think that means we are in for a sequence of
energy price increases and not the sort of step-like jumps that we
have had since 1973. The diagram in Chairman Miller's presentation is a series of straight lines, showing steps in the curve, and
even a receding of oil prices in the 1978 period. That's unlikely to
happen in this new situation.
The previous speakers have mentioned deterioration of the
American external accounts. I think that that is not quite a correct
perception of the situation. In fact, we did achieve current account
balance in the first quarter of this year, which was a very remarkable achievement considering how bad it was last year. It is true




78

that we face increasing energy costs as far as trade is concerned,
but as the American economy goes into a recession our import bill
will tend to go down for nonenergy imports. The invisibles have
been very strong and a good part of the strength in the invisibles
have been multinational oil company earnings. As oil prices go up
we get some kind of return flow in the invisible sector of the
payments accounts.
I would say that there is a good chance that for 1979, as a whole,
we will be almost in current account balance, although it won't
necessarily be as good as it was in the first quarter.
There is a danger, however, in the international economy and,
that is, that while this year we are getting a mixed business cycle
experience with some countries picking up while America slows
down, all indications now point to 1980 as a very difficult year in
which the rate of growth of many of our partner countries will
slow down again. The danger is one of a synchronized growth
recession—not a synchronized real recession in the world markets,
but a synchronized recession in rates of growth. That is something
we should take into account.
Now as I make projections into 1980, my signals are that if we
don't do anything by way of policy intervention, 1980 is going to
look terrible, with very strongly rising unemployment in a very
poor economy. Consequently, in most of the projections we have
been making in recent months we have been anticipating fiscal
stimulus. I think that there are very few options as far as monetary policy is concerned next year, also in view of the international
position and the situation of the dollar, particularly in view of the
interest rate increase that we have seen in United Kingdom,
Japan, Germany, Canada, and other countries.
Therefore, it will have to be from fiscal policy that any kind of
help for the recession will come. The most important aspect of
fiscal stimulus in 1980 is to change the nature of the stimulus
away from the kind that we have been accustomed to in the last
few years I think this would probably emphasize some of the points
Henry Kaufman made, that the disaster for our economy has been
low or declining rate of productivity growth, a low rate of capital
formation in the sense of not having a full recovery from the last
recession. This leads me to believe that any kind of fiscal relief for
next year ought to twist the proportions significantly and have a
much greater business tax relief and have it very strongly targeted
to capital formation, either in depreciation rules tax offsets for
investment, or tax credits, and only moderate personal tax relief.
The second aspect is that, to the extent possible, any fiscal relief
ought to aim at measures that are counter-inflationary or antiinflationary. By that, I mean that indirect tax relief is better than
direct tax relief. We have batted around at various times the
possibility of reducing sales taxes—indirect taxes of various sorts.
It's complicated because the States having control over such taxes
but I think a formula could be worked out.
My reason for emphasizing indirect tax relief is that those numbers feed directly into the CPI. To the extent to which we can cut
the indirect taxes, compared with direct taxes, we get a direct
reduction in the CPI. In a similar vein, any kind of tax relief on
payroll taxes would be advantageous in fighting inflation because




79

it would reduce the cost base on which most pricing formulas are
computed.
I think that we could do a great deal in having a constructive
fiscal policy, one that would be of an anti-inflationary, counterinflationary, variety. An interesting point to me is that these hearings are part of what was written into the Humphrey-Hawkins bill.
My interpretation of that bill is that it starts out by saying that
macropolicy or aggregatire policies of the conventional sort don't
really give us the full answer and certainly don't provide a way of
reaching the targets, the very ambitious targets, of that bill by the
early 1980's. Consequently, what I'm suggesting here are directions
in policy that are very badly needed for next year, and the years
after, that are structural rather than simply macropolicies. In addition to the things I have already mentioned, such as the tilting of
the mix in any kind of tax cut in 1980 or 1981 or emphasizing
indirect taxes or payroll taxes, I would say that policy ought to be
directed toward such things as minimum wage legislation rolling it
back, holding it back, establishing a youth differential, or whatever—in order to attack the structural aspects of the unemployment problem. I think that would be fully in the spirit of the
Humphrey-Hawkins legislation as it finally emerged.
The other kinds of policies of a structural sort that I think are
called for next year deal with energy as an all-important issue for
this economy. In that respect, any encouragement on the supply
side is very important, support of R. & D., support of new forms of
energy delivery, and even to some extent, substituting public expenditures in that area as a substitute for tax relief is very good.
Finally, I think we should follow Henry Kaufman's suggestion
for not being gradual, but to provide in another way. That is really
to have a jolt, a very sudden jolt on energy prices. I think that
we're not going to make a significant dent in energy consumption
for the kind of conservation that's needed unless we swallow one
piece of inflationary upward thrust in prices, that we haven't been
willing to swallow yet. That is, immediately to go to much higher
prices for final end products in the energy field. Thank you.
[Complete statement follows:]




80
THE STATE OF THE ECONOMY
AND DIRECTIONS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
Testimony of L. R. Klein
• before the Senate Banking Committee, July 23, 1979

The statement of G. William Miller, July 17, 1979, correctly
perceives the ills of the present time and asks for an appropriate
policy response.

I find it difficult to take issue with his well-

reasoned presentation, but want mainly to emphasize certain points,
approaching them from an external point of view, and to try to
lend added weight to some recommendations.

I also want to intro-

duce a few structural policy considerations not specifically
addressed in his statement.
The State of the Economy;

To say that the United States

economy is in a recession is to make a forecast, because the
recessionary phase will probably be dated from last March (or
possibly a month or two sooner), and will need some more months
to run its course before it becomes "official" or is terminated.
The Wharton Forecast projects a shallow recession consisting
of a drop of only about 2.0 percent in real output from peak to
trough, with a protracted recovery, that does not rise above trend
values in 1980 or 1981 and is accompanied by a steadily rising
rate of unemployment, exceeding 8.0%.

Inflation is expected to

remain in double figures until mid 1980, and then recede only
gradually.
There should be a decline in capacity utilization for more
than one year, continuing poor productivity growth, a widening




81
domestic deficit, a weak curve of profits, falling interest
rates, and some moderation in wage rate growth.
More slowly rising food prices and some reduced interest
cost, will be offset by rising energy prices.

Also, food price

relief is already being limited by tendencies for grain and soybean prices to rise again, undoubtedly in response to increased
foreign needs, as well as speculation.

Nevertheless, the price

picture should show some improvement, although very slowly.
There are significant downside risks for a more severe
recession than we, at Wharton, have already depicted.

These

risks are:
a major auto strike after contract renewal time has
passed without a renewal;
OPEC resolve to increase oil prices again in the near
future.
At the same time, some parts of the economy look strong,
enough so that a minority of students of business cycles believe
that there is still a chance to avoid recession.

The areas of

strength are:




business fixed investment;
housing starts - the June figure was up from May's total.
It is falling, but more hesitantly than in the past
recession of 1973-75;
foreign trade - net exports should get back to near
balance before turning negative again.

82
some government spending is counter-cyclical and
some is make-up work from last winter's severe
storms;
U.S. farm output should be strong, regardless of
harvest conditions elsewhere;
inventories are not overly large/as most distributors
and

fabricators planned for this recession well

in advance.
The economy was not so mixed in 1973-75 with a number of
strong sectors, together with the weak ones.

In addition, there

was an amplification factor caused by world wide synchronization
on that occasion.

In the present situation, most industrial

countries are out of synchronization with the United States in
1979.

It is another story for 1980.

Wharton projections for the

world economy point to a synchronized slowdown in growthr not of
recession proportions, but quite significant.
Some Policy Options:

Turning first to conventional macro

policies, what policies are called for to improve the economic
situation at this time?

Monetary policy was used in 1974-75, very

restrictively, to fight the inflation brought about by the OPEC
price rises and related external pressures, but this policy did
not serve us well at that time and is not likely to do so now.
Could monetary policy be much less restrictive than it now is in
order to dampen the recession?
In my opinion, there are severe limitations on the use of
monetary policy now.




It might be made slightly easierr but in

83
confrontation with restrictive policies and rising interest
rates in some of our main partner countries, it is not appropriate for the United States to go against the tide.

That would

induce short term capital to move abroad and weaken the dollar
again.

Our high underlying rate of inflation and world competition

keep us from relying very heavily on monetary policy now.

That

policy should be one of steadiness at this time.
On the fiscal side, there could be expenditure increases and
tax reduction.

A main argument against expenditure increases is

that they are slow in being approved and cumbersome in countercyclical applications.

Major energy expenditures for R & D, pilot

plants for delivery alternatives to oil, and direct outlays for
scientific-engineering research on energy applications would be
preferable to overall tax reduction, but this policy would probably not be able to bring
years, perhaps 3 to 5 years.

improved conditions for some few
There is a great deal of merit in

energy related expenditures and these avenues should be thoroughly
investigated,but this kind of policy cannot be relied upon alone.
A more straight forward fiscal approach would be to have
another tax cut, effective from January 1, 1980,.

This kind of

measure would compensate for the burden of inflation from our progressive tax structures and the series of statutory social security
increases.

These latter increases will be more serious in 1981

than in 1980; nevertheless, compensation is needed as early as
1980.

Reductions or roll backs in social security taxes have the

added merit that they lower the cost base on which business pricing




84
decisions are made and may be particularly effective in restraining inflation.
Reductions in indirect taxes are particularly desirable
because they enter directly into the pricing system, not only
the official indexes, but also business costs that are presumed
to be the bases for pricing decisions.

The difficult aspect of

working through indirect taxes is that they are so diverse.

The

great bulk of these are administered through the individual states.
It would be possible to develop an equitable formula, state by
state, but would be complicated and require a great deal of
cooperation.
Our history of fiscal stimuli has generally been one of
working through the federal income tax system at both the personal
and corporate level.

Recent tax reductions have aimed at even-

handedness or even bias towards personal tax, rather than business
tax reduction.

There is much to be said in favor of biasing a

reduction in 1980 significantly in favor of the business side
because tax cuts here can be structured to encourage additional
capital formation, a much needed process for the recovery of productivity growth.

New business investment now may bring about

productivity gains in 3 to 5 years, but not immediately.

It would

be wrong, however, to keep postponing needed action in this sector
in order to focus on short term gains.

It is more fundamental to

a joint attack on inflation and recession to raise productivity,
even if it is time consuming, than to concentrate on measures that
have an immediate impact.




Personal tax cuts can be defended on

85
grounds of equity to the consumer but do little for the overriding problem of inflation.
Business tax cuts should not be general; i.e., simple
reductions in overall rates; they should be tailored to the
stimulation of capital formation.

This can be done through con-

cessions in the tax treatment of capital cost recovery (depreciation),
or fixed investment credits.

The two can be combined in various

mixtures.
A tax reduction of some $20 billion, two-thirds of which are
associated directly with business investment and the remainder
with social security roll-backs, would do much to lessen inflationary pressures, as well as stimulate the economy in a period of
recession from which recovery is expected to be moderate.
One of the significant advances in the legislation known as
the Humphrey-Hawkins Bill is the recognition that macro policies
alone will be inadequate for dealing with present problems of
stagflation and in reaching the ambitious targets of that Bill on
schedule.

There must be a structural approach to economic policy

formation that takes full account of the technologicalf demographicf
and institutional changes that have been going on in this economy.
Overall tax cuts, expenditure increases, and control of monetary
aggregates are seriously inadequate in the present environment.
The wage-price guidelines and the monitoring of the regulatory
mechanism are admirable structural policies that have been working
on the inflation problem.




They should be kept in place but are

86
not adequate to the whole task.

Other structural policies are

needed to deal with
productivity slowdown,
age-race inequities in the unemployment situation,
changing nature of the money stock,
shortfall in petroleum for energy,
deterioration of the environment.
I have already indicated how fiscal policy may be used to
try to enhance productivity growth and have argued for an unchanging
monetary policy in view of international constraints.

But to deal

with these other structural issues, we need particular economic
policies.
Restraint, or roll-back of minimum wage levels, particularly
if differentiated for youths, would help reduce the serious rates
of unemployment at the bottom end of the age scale.

Additional

differentiation by labor market area would serve to refine the
structure of this policy.

Structural changes in minimum wage legis-

lation is anti-inflationary and also supportive of total employment
levels.

This kind of policy is even more effective if coupled with

training grants, particularly in private sector employment.

In

this way, additional productivity gains may be realized, but again
it is not a policy

with an immediate pay-off in inflation restraint

but one that is fundamental for the medium term.
The energy program announced by the President is a structural
policy.

In the quest for the increased supply of energy alternatives

to displace oil imports, it goes far, but lacks resolve on the side




87
of conservation.

At the present time, it seems that there are

few alternatives to opening up the market to rationing by price.
In the short run, this would be inflationary,but there could be
strong secondary effects of dollar support that would, in fact,
be anti-inflationary.

It is unnatural, however, to have a two--

tier system of prices throughout the world in which the U.S. price
for end products is significantly lower than that of most other
oil importing industrial nations.

Oh a temporary basis, differ-

entials in two-tier systems can be maintained without much difficulty,
but that is unnatural for the longer run.
Measures to support the dollar through maintenance of a steady
monetary policy and resolve in the matter of energy pricing are
not the totality of what might be done to improve our external
accounts.

Export promotion deserves high priority.

Encouragement

and support of policies that would orient our production

efforts

more towards exporting are structural policies that would eventually
improve our current account balance, especially in the face of
mounting costs of energy imports.
Economic policy should be balanced and steady.

What I am

recommending in this statement is a whole series of combined macro
and structural policies to give better tone to the economy on both
the demand and supply sides, in both the short and medium term.




The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Professor Klein.
Professor Meltzer.
STATEMENT OF PROF. ALLAN MELTZER, GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF INDUSTRIAL ADMINISTRATION, CARNEGIE-MELLON, UNIVERSITY

Professor MELTZER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to
appear before you and I welcome the opportunity to present my
views.
[Complete statement follows:]




89
Economic Policy After the 1979 Oil Shock

Statement of Allan H. Meltzer
Allan H. Meltzer
Maurice Falk Professor of Economics and Social Science
Carnegie-Mellon University
If the President and the press accurately reflect current
opinion, we are about to make another in the long series of mistakes in
economic policy that have produced high inflation, slow growth and low
investment.

The press interprets every statistic as support for its view

that we are in a recession.

The President, and the Congressional Budget

Office, agree that we are on the verge of recession.

The public guessing

game has now shifted from whether and when the recession will strike to
how long and how deep the recession will be.
It is a mistake to describe our current or near-term future position
as a recession.

Che consequences of the mistake will be serious and long-

lasting if the prognosis of recession is followed by expansive policies to
rid the economy of the symptoms of recession.

Such policies are not

required and are, I believe, counterproductive.
There are some desirable changes in policy that should be taken to
reduce the burden of the recent oil shock and to speed the adjustment of
employment and real income to the shock.

The principal policy change that

I recommend in response is a reduction in the real value of government
spending and a reduction in tax rates for households and business.

Other

desirable policy changes include an end to oil price controls and federal
oil allocation schemes, a gradual, pre-announced series of reductions in
the growth rate of money, and an end to the disruptive controls on interest
rates on savings, time and demand deposits.

These latter policies were

desirable before the 1979 oil shock and remain desirable after the shock.
The reduction in the real value of government spending and




tax rates

90
may have been desirable before the oil shock also.

If so, the case for

reductions in taxes and spending has been strengthened.

To understand

why, we must distinguish between recession and the oil shock.
Oil Shocks Are Not Recessions
A large permanent increase in the price of oil, or any other imported
commodity, permanently reduces the real incomes of residents in the oil
importing countries and increases the real incomes of residents of the
oil exporting countries.

The consumers of oil are forced to transfer a

portion of their real incomes to the producers and, if the oil price increase
is permanent, there is no way that the transfer of income can be avoided
or recovered.

It is the inability either to avoid or to recover the loss

in real income that distinguishes the oil shock from a recession.
In a recession, real income declines.

Sooner or later the economy

recovers and real income returns to the level it would have reached
if the recession had not occurred.

The speed with which the economy

recovers from recession depends on the policies that the government pursues
and on the incentives it permits.

The level of real income to which we

return after the recession can be regarded as independent of the policies
in a particular recession, even though the level of real income will be
affected by the repeated use of policies that crowd out private capital
or change incentives to work or to invest.

We can, in short, think of the

economy as growing at a trend rate of growth of real income, like line A
in Figure 1.

The recession causes the economy to deviate from the trend

line, as shown by the broken line.

During the recovery, real income rises

until the economy again reaches the long-run trend line.




91
Real
Income

, Time

FIGURE 1
A Recession

Suppose that the Federal Reserve increase the growth rate of money
during the recession and that the higher growth rate speeds the recovery.
The degree to which higher money growth speeds the recovery will depend
on a number of factors including the effect on anticipations and the extent
to which the timing and magnitude of the change in money growth is
unanticipated.

Increased money growth will be followed, sooner or

later, by a permanently higher rate of inflation if the rate of growth
of money remains permanently at the higher level.

Or, if the increase in

money growth is temporary, there will be a bulge in the rate of inflation,
perhaps followed by a renewed recession as the effects of variable money

49-59- 0 -

79-7




92
growth, and other stop-go policies, work their way through the economy.
We are now familiar with this sequence.

We have suffered the effects of

stop-go policies for fifteen years and can readily observe their lasting
effects -- the higher average rate of inflation after each cycle and che
reduced growth of long-term investment.
Supply shocks, like the 1974 and 1979 increase in oil prices, reduce
domestic income permanently.

Once adjustment to the shocks is complete,

real income rises again along its new growth path.

In Figure 2, the trend

growth path before the oil shock is again marked A; the trend growth path
after the shock is marked B.

The transfer of real income from U.S.

citizens to oil producers is measured by the distance between A and B when




Real
Income

A
.B

Time

FIGURE 2
A Supply Shock

93
the shock occurs.

As long as the cartel keeps the real price of oil at

its present level, we must export more of our real output to pay for our
imports of oil.

The additional payment of present or future exports is

a measure of the real cost to us of the cartel.
The dotted line in Figure 2 shows one hypothetical adjustment.
income does not move from A to B in a day or a month.

Real

Adjustment takes time

because there is substantial uncertainty about the future.

Will the cartel

maintain the current real price by increasing the future market price of
oil at the world rate of inflation?

Or, will the oil shock be followed by

slower growth of incomes, an excess supply of oil and a reduction in the real
price of oil as in 1975-77?

Will the U.S. government continue price controls

and the loss of allocative efficiency caused by misguided energy policy?
Or, will the latest increase in oil prices be followed by more rational
energy policies than those we have followed?

Answers to these, and many

other questions, are neither obvious nor readily available.
the future delays adjustment.
prices accelerate.

Uncertainty about

During the delay unemployment increases and

Inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies can increase

the burden by inducing a recession.

In 1974, a sudden shift in monetary

policy from excessive expansion to contraction increased the burden of
adjustment by pushing the economy below B.
The reduction in real income, and the rise in unemployment during
the adjustment from A to B has many similarities to a recession.

The key

difference is that the economy does not return to the trend growth
marked A.
Suppose that the Federal Reserve, believing we are in a recession, responds
to increased unemployment by increasing the growth rate of money.

The higher

growth rate, if unanticipated, may stimulate some additional employment.




94
Ultimately the effect of higher money growth will be a higher rate of
domestic inflation, a further decline in the value of the dollar, a further
increase in the prices of the goods and services we import, including the
market price of oil.
Money does not create oil, and monetary policy cannot replace the
real income we pay the oil cartel.

Monetary policy can add to the current

uncertainty by mixing the effects of higher money growth with the effects
of higher prices for energy.
The basic fact is this:

This is a disservice to all of us.
We are poorer as a result of the oil shock,

and we must adjust to our reduced affluence.
restored at a lower level of real income.

Full employment can only be

Monetary policy can raise or

lower the cost of adjusting to the lower level of real income, but it
cannot prevent the adjustment.

Appropriate Monetary Policy
The Federal Reserve should announce, and carry out, a medium-term policy
to reduce the rate of inflation.

Gradual, sustained, pre-announced

reductions in the growth rate of money is the policy recommended by the
Shadow Open Market Committee for several years and by the unanimous vote
of the House Committee on Barking, Currency and Urban Affairs earlier this
year.

That policy remains appropriate.

Until recently, it was possible to sustain a different view.

Inflation

could be viewed as a means of reducing the real cost of oil to everyone.
The reason is that the price of oil is stated in dollars, and after the
1974 increase of 30070, oil prices rose less than the prices of other
commodities.




The real price of oil, the price of oil relative to all consumer

95
prices, declined by 10 to 15% between 1974 and early 1979.

The rise in

oil prices on July 1 increased the real price of oil above the 1974 level.
We now know that we cannot inflate our way out of the problem.
Many observers believe that it is impossible to end inflation.
believe that the costs of ending inflation are too high.

Others

I believe these

views are mistaken and that a proper reading of our recent past does not
support these pessimistic views.
The average rate of increase in consumer prices for the six months
ending September 1973, before the first increase in oil prices, was 9.470.
The six month average reached a peak of 12.2% in September 1974.

Thereafter,

the rate of inflation fell, and little more than a year later, the average
rate of inflation was 4.5% or less -- below the levels achieved in the late
1960's.

The economy recovered during this period of declining inflation.

Unemployment fell from a peak rate of 9% to 7.5%; interest rates on longand short-term securities fell, and the economy began to throw off the
heritage of a decade of rising inflation.
The benefits of the policy of slower money growth were abandoned in
1976, and the mistaken policies continued in 1977 and 1978.

Within a

few months of the change, the average rate of price increase rose, and
we entered another period of rising interest rates, rising rates of
inflation and depreciating currency which is too fresh in our memories to
recount.
I urge the committee to adopt a resolution expressing the sense of
Congress that gradual, sustained reductions in money growth are to be
achieved by the Federal

Reserve until the rate of money growth returns

to the non-inflationary path of the early 1960's.




This resolution, if it

96
is to be effective, must be accompanied by action that removes interest
rate ceilings and other impediments to monetary policy.
A resolution directing the Federal Reserve to produce gradual,
sustained reductions in money growth is not a policy of inaction.

It

is an announcement to the world that at least one part of government
has the vision to look beyond current problems.

The resolution would make

clear chat the Congress wants the Federal Reserve to give up the myopic
concern with problems that it cannot solve to concentrate on the problem
of inflation which will not be solved until the Federal Reserve develops
a medium-term strategy and adopts procedures capable of achieving its
targets.
Appropriate Fiscal Policy
The income we transfer to the oil producers cannot be restored by
changing taxes and government spending -- by fiscal policy -- -anymore
than by monetary policy.

But fiscal policy can be used to shift the

burden from one sector of the economy to another.

If tax rates and govern-

ment spending are unchanged, the loss of real income will fall on private
spending for consumption and investment.

The decline in consumption

is a measure of the loss borne by consumers now; the decline in investment
is a measure of the loss that falls on future income and consumption.
There is no reason to believe that all of the loss of affluence should
be taken from private spending and none from government spending.

To share

the burden between the public and private spending, we must cut the real
value of government spending and tax collections.

The reduction in the

real value of government spending assures that we have not




used the

97
unforseen loss of real income, resulting from the cartel's action, to
increase the relative size of the public sector.
Cutting taxes, without reducing government spending, does not distribute
the burden between the private and public sectors.

A tax cut, unaccompanied

by a reduction in spending, changes current tax rates relative to future
tax rates.

The main effect of a tax cut is to redistribute the loss of

real income between consumption and investment.
The decline in income cannot be avoided, but the decline does not have
to be followed by a decline in the future growth of income.

Two decisions

of Congress that affect the growth rate are the decision to share the loss
of real income between the private and public sectors by reducing government
spending and the decision to shift the burden of taxes between consumption
and investment.
The rise in oil prices falls most heavily on those individuals,
industries and countries that depend most

on oil.

Countries and industries

that produce with more oil using capital and less labor lose relative to
those that use less capital and more labor.

This is one reason that we

have seen, in the years since the 1974 oil shock, relatively faster growth
of investment and output in countries like Malaysia, Korea, Brazil and
Taiwan and relatively slower growth of investment and real output in the
industrialized countries.

The recent oil shock will have similar effects

unless offset by a reduction in taxes on capital.

A reduction in taxes

on capital stimulates investment by raising the after-tax return to capital
but places more of the burden of adjustment to the oil shock on current
consumption.




98
The decision about how the loss of real income is to be shared should
not be left to chance.

If the current or prospective decline in real income

is mistakenly regarded as a recession and tax cuts are used to stimulate
current spending, more of the loss will be shifted to capital, to future
consumption and to our children.

I do not recommend that course0

Conclusion
The 1979 oil shock presents a problem, albeit a much smaller problem
for us and for the world than the 1973-74 oil shock.

We have shown that

energy policy and economic policy can make a small problem large and can
make a problem into a crisis.

We misinterpreted the effects of the 1974

shock and seem determined to repeat, or compound, our error.
Events that have already occurred assure that we will experience a
decline in real income.

Government policies -- fiscal and monetary -- will

determine how the loss is borne.

Monetary policy will decide whether we

move toward higher or lower inflation.

Fiscal policy will determine how the

loss is distributed between private and public sectors and between consumption
and investment.

If we misinterpret our current circumstances as a recession,

and regard the loss of real income as a gap to be filled, we will assure that
investment will remain low.

With that error repeated, we will continue to

grow slowly and will experience higher inflation and very little increase
in income in the early eighties.




99

The CHAIRMAN. Well thank you, Professor Meltzer, and I want to
thank all you gentlemen for excellent statements.
Let's get first to the question of the independence of the Federal
Reserve. You weren't asked to address yourselves to that question.
That's a little beside the point, but I think it's overwhelming and
important and we need advice from thoughtful and able economists
as you all are.
There's been a general division of opinion in the Congress and
perhaps to some extent in the country about how important the
independence of the Federal Reserve really is. As you know, for a
long time there was a feeling the Fed ought to be less independent
and more cooperative in its policies, that it ought to work more
closely with the President. People have argued, for example, in
most other countries the central bank is pretty much a part of the
Government and there isn't the kind of separation, independence,
and distinction we have in this country. Others argue that the
independence of the Federal Reserve has been established for some
time, that it's been very important, that it's succeeded to some
extent—it's been erratic, but to some extent, in giving a degree of
insulation from short-term political pressures from the President.
And now we're faced with a situation where, as I pointed out, the
average term of service of members of the Fed as I calculate it, at
least next January when Governor Caldwell's term expires and in
view of the new appointments, will average less than 2 years. It's
supposed to be a 14-year term. The average ought to be 7 years.
Obviously the concepts of those who formulated the Federal Reserve Act back in 1913 certainly aren't being met in that people
have long terms of service.
So let's start off with Mr. Kaufman and give me your views first
on how important the independence of the Federal Reserve is.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, Senator, I'm one who believes that a quasiautonomous central bank is very important to the United States. It
does allow people to operate in a reasonably nonpolitical environment. They are not subject to some of the immediate pressures that
others are. There is a greater need in central banking to address
intermediate issues. I believe the Fed ought to be nonpolitical.
Therefore, the length of time served, the way people are appointed, is highly important.
Nevertheless, in our history a President does have an influence
on the central bank. The term of office of the individual governors
is so structured that if a President serves for two terms, 8 years, he
does have the opportunity to influence the composition of the
Board over a period of time and perhaps there's nothing wrong
with that.
I think the dilemma is what you just point out, and that is, there
are people that are coming on the Board that do not serve a full
term. I believe that is probably due to several reasons.
First, the length of term that is provided, 14 years, is extraordinarily long for any individual to make that kind of commitment.
We are asking people to become members of the Board perhaps in
midstream of life when an important career is being carved out.
This career may be ended because by the time the individual has
served 14 years most of his working life is over.




100

Second, it would seem to me, as you indicated before, we are
asking people to make a substantial sacrifice, financial sacrifice.
People who serve on the Federal Reserve Board probably have not
only a distinctive role to play, an extraordinary role, a very powerful role, perhaps one of the most important financial roles in the
United States. Therefore, there should be at least some financial
compensation far beyond anything that we have today. After all,
you're asking them to preside over the commercial banking system
and the financial system of the United States. The current compensation I believe is not in keeping with attracting the very individuals that perhaps ought to serve on the Board.
Now finally, I don't want to belabor the point, there is an aspect
to the current monetary situation that is quite unique. The President has appointed a new Secretary of the Treasury, which is his
right, but this is the first time that a Secretary of the Treasury has
been appointed who had previously been Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board. In that sense, that is extraordinary and I think it's
unprecedented.
Perhaps this hasn't come up before because of personalities, but
perhaps it hasn't come up before because of some very fundamental considerations. After all, official American policy, financial
policy, is promulgated by the Treasury of the United States and by
the Federal Reserve Board. The Treasury is the direct political arm
of the administration, while the Federal Reserve is intended to be
quasi-autonomous, and the Fed is expected really to withstand
immediate political pressures. Perhaps this has some folklore attached to it and perhaps some of it is real, but in the future I think
we may ask "Will the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, having the
opportunity now to serve as the Secretary of the Treasury, become
somewhat more politicized in his particular actions as Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board?"
Now, to some extent, in the current situation this perhaps can be
alleviated, depending on who the President will appoint to the
position of the chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board. Presumably, in order to indicate that the quasi-autonomous position of
the Federal Reserve is maintained, that new Chairman will have to
be an individual who is somewhat independent in views, forthright,
and doesn't have direct political ties.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for a very helpful response.
Professor Friedman.
Professor FRIEDMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I can be brief because
in the first instance I agree with what Henry Kaufman said. I
believe that there are advantages to having a quasi-independent
Federal Reserve and that those advantages are as you and he both
outlined. I support that proposition.
I find curious that when people talk about the independence of
the Federal Reserve, it is rarely specified independent of what? The
usual presumption of such discussions is that the Federal Reserve
may be too dependent on the Executive—that is, that it is apparently the Executive which has the greatest potential control over
the Federal Reserve.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, there's also a constitutional element here.
As you know, the money power is a congressional power. It's not an




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Executive power. It's very distinctly constitutional. We delegate
that power to a considerable extent to the Federal Reserve Board
and that constitutional separation of the money power from the
Executive is one that's persisted throughout our history. Paul
Douglas used to say—he told William McChesney Martin, "I want
you to write on your mirror when you shave so you see it every
morning 'I am a creature of the Congress.' " That isn't exactly a
prescription for the independence of the Federal Reserve Board,
but it's the independence of the Executive which by and large has
been pushed by Members of the Congress, but the arguments—the
statement by Mr. Kaufman was a very reasonable statement and I
think the implication there is that there's an independence of both,
as he says, a quasi-autonymous
Professor FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir, the Constitution's giving the
money power to the Congress is exactly what I had in mind, Both
in the Constitution and in the Federal Reserve Act, it is made very
clear that the Federal Reserve is not supposed to be independent.
It is supposed to report to Congress. That is why I find it curious
that the discussion of this matter always concerns whether the
Federal Reserve is sufficiently independent of the Executive. The
Executive has a great deal of power over the Federal Reserve from
the appointments process, and people forget that in reality it
should be the Congress, not the Executive, that is directly supervising the Federal Reserve.
The CHAIRMAN. From a practical standpoint, I can say this as
one who's served on this committee now for almost 22 years, ever
since I came to the Senate, it is extremely difficult—extremely
difficult, in spite of Professor Meltzer's advice to us, really to have
any influence on the Federal Reserve.
In the first place, you've got 15 members of this committee who
have differing views. It's a bipartisan committee and consequently
it's very hard to focus—you can see this morning that we ought to
have 15 Senators here and we have 1. It's very hard to focus the
attention of the committee on this issue. Monetary policy is complicated, difficult, sometimes doesn't seem to be very closely related to
immediate problems. So it's very hard to get any concerted action
by the committee on the Federal Reserve and much harder to get
concerted action by the Senate and getting the Senate and the
House together is even more difficult.
So the Federal Reserve is really independent if it's independent
of the Executive because when you have 535 masters it's almost
like being a Senator from New York where you have 17 million
superiors, all your constituents, so you don't have any really. Well,
you have some accountability, but you have an enormous amount
of independence when you're an elected official from a State and
that kind of independence I think the Federal Reserve has because
they are counteracting views here in the Congress and, as I say,
there's an overwhelming amount of, if not indifference, of just
feeling that it's a little too complicated to get involved in.
Professor FRIEDMAN. Let me just add a few remarks to focus on
the question that you raised about the length of terms.
There are two reasons why we should not be very surprised that
the actual length of time served in these positions is less than the
formal length of term. One has to do with Henry Kaufman's point




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about the kind of people who are typically asked to come to the
Federal Reserve and the stage of their personal careers at which
they are usually asked. The second is the question of whether there
is a genuine role for seven Governors of the Federal Reserve. If we
think about the various responsibilities that the Federal Reserve
bears, it is not clear that we need a Board of seven people to carry
them out. Rather than trying to find a way of selecting seven
people who will stay for 14 years apiece, with responsibility shared
among the seven, perhaps a different approach would be to shrink
the number of Governors from seven to some lower number. If
there were a smaller number, perhaps there would be a greater
incentive for any one person to stay the 14 years, and there would
also be fewer such people to try to find.
Finally, to my mind the most important things that the Federal
Reserve does are not done by the Board but by the Open Market
Committee, which has been for years a 12-person committee. The
committee's turnover has to do not just with the Board members but
also with the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve banks. An
issue that is important to assess is whether the presence on the Open
Market Committee of the presidents of the regional Federal Reserve
banks enhances or detracts from the independence of the Federal
Reserve. On balance, my belief is that the presence of the presidents
of the banks enhances the independence of the Federal Reserve.
The CHAIRMAN. They have a greater degree of independence, the
five outside members who serve. More than the Presidential
appointees.
Professor FRIEDMAN. I agree; and to the extent that is true,
perhaps another way of bolstering the independence of the Federal
Reserve would be to reassess the appropriate balance between
Board members and regional Federal Reserve bank presidents in
making up the Open Market Committee. It is now a 12-person
committee consisting of 7 Governors and 5 Federal Reserve bank
presidents, but there is no particular reason why that composition
could not be restructured.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Meltzer.
Professor MELTZER. I have two sets of comments on your question:
First, when Congress originally set up the Board, the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency were on the
Board. They remained on the Board until 1933.
At the time the Federal Reserve was regarded as an independent
agency. It was believed useful to have the Secretary of the Treasury fully participate in the meetings, and he often did. I'm not sure
that the issue is essentially a question of whether the Federal
Reserve
The CHAIRMAN. That's quite a different situation than having
the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board made the Secretary of
the Treasury which, as Mr. Kaufman properly pointed out, is
unique, because the Chairman is not necessarily a dominant figure,
but a very powerful figure on the Board.
That precedent is somewhat disturbing.




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Professor MELTZER. Yes, I would agree it is different. I would
point out, however, that the active involvement of the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve in Government policy is not a new thing.
For example, whereas Mr. Martin may have been somewhat
aloof from the administration. His predecessor, Chairman Eccles,
was anything but aloof. He was involved in White House activities,
and took a major part in the legislative program at various times
during the Roosevelt administration.
I think that the Federal Reserve does not have a history of street
independence from the administration.
In my opinion, the crucial part of independence is not the administrative question about who reports to whom, although that may
be important for some purposes. Independence has may dimensions. One of the critical dimensions of independence involves the
freedom of the Federal Reserve not to finance the Government's
deficit. Can the Federal Reserve proceed in a way that doesn't
finance the Government deficit?
The most critical questions about Federal Reserve policy in relation to the administration, have to be the questions of how much
money the Federal produces and the rates of interest and inflation
we get at a result of their policies.
If the Federal Reserve pursues a narrow, short-term interest
strategy, as it has done for a very long period of time, it ends up
financing the deficit. Financing deficits by preventing money
apart—or independent of the administrative arrangements.
So I think a very important step in assuring the Federal Reserve
its independence would be to give them—in fact, require them to
announce to you the monetary policy that they intend to pursue
over a period of much more than a week or a month or 3 weeks.
If the Congress would get them to announce medium-term goals,
and would then hold their feet to the fire, and see that they
achieved them, I believe the Federal Reserve would not only have
more independence, it would have a stiffer backbone about financing the Government's deficit.
The CHAIRMAN. I can't resist from asking two questions:
When they give us a range that is as broad as a barn door, how
significant, really, are those?
Professor MELTZER. Those numbers are not significant. Their
procedure of using a shifting base, of announcing very broad
ranges for several series does not restrict them. If they make the
range broad enough, they will always be inside the range. It's
really surprising that the credit range isn't wide enough to incorporate the recent explosion of
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the second question is how do we hold
their feet to the fire? What do we do?
Professor MELTZER. You get them to produce meaningful numbers about longer term targets, and you try to get—and you instruct the Chairman to achieve these targets. Congress, I think,
can do better.
The CHAIRMAN. How do we instruct them?
Professor MELTZER. You instruct them legislatively.
The CHAIRMAN. Pass a resolution?
Professor MELTZER. That says that whatever target you think is
appropriate in an environment in which there are no interest rate




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controls so we don't get confusions or meaningless numbers reported as money, but get correct reporting of the numbers of what is
going on under these various rubrics. The Congress should announce what it wants the Federal Reserve to do, and should enact
legislation requiring it.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think Congress has the competence to do
that?
Professor MELTZER. I believe the Congress is the only agency
which has the competence to do it.
The CHAIRMAN. The competence, c-o-m-p-e-t. Do we know enough
about it? Do we really know enough about it? Can you get 535
Members of Congress to agree on anything except they want interest rates lower?
Professor MELTZER. We have to get them to understand, as I
think many of them now begin to understand, that the only way to
get interest rates lower is to pursue a policy which gradually
persistently reduces monetary growth.
The CHAIRMAN. Well
Professor MELTZER. We could attain money growth at something
close to the average growth of rate of output. There's nothing else
that's going to bring lower interest rates for us. And the record
over the past 10 years is extraordinarily clear on that.
Look at the interest rates that one observes in Switzerland and
Germany. Compare them to the interest rates that we observe in
the United States. It was not always thus.
The CHAIRMAN. But, you see, unfortunately, we have a short
horizon in the Congress. Members of the House are elected every 2
years, and as the year goes on, you get closer and closer to that
election period.
Professor MELTZER. Right.
The CHAIRMAN. Members of the Senate are elected, as you know,
a third of them, every 2 years. So that it's very hard to persuade
Congress to focus on the long-term picture. And the one element
that people can understand most clearly, that hits them directly, is
the level of interest rates, and there's always overwhelming sentiment to get it as low as you can.
So that for Congress to pass a resolution that would achieve
lower interest rates over a period of, say, 10 years, is absolutely
right, we should do that. But whether or not we could persuade the
Congress to adopt a policy that might have a more restrained
monetary policy for the time, therefore higher interest rates, perhaps, over the period of the next 9 months or a year or so, in order
to meet inflation and lower interest rates in the long run, that's
the problem.
Professor MELTZER. If I may respond to that, Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate the problems that the Congress faces, and I think it is
in many ways appropriate that the Congress is responsive to the
demands of its constituents that produce these pressures for intervention and for monetary expansion and so on.
But I don't believe they will get an administrative arrangement
under circumstances which is going to change the basic broad
nature of the policies. I don't think that anyone is going to find in
the record whether the chairman, for example, or the members of
the committee, remained 8 to 10 years, or whether they remain on




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average 3 years, that the record of monetary policy very much
depends on that.
What it depends upon is the short-term pressure to monetize the
debt, and that pressure comes from the fact that the Fed seeks to
control interest rates, the Congress is concerned about interest
rates. The administration gets concerned about interest rates, and
that means that when there is a big deficit, the Fed ends up
monetizing a sizable portion of it, and we get a large rate of
increase in the money stock.
I want to go on and add one other brief comment on your
question. At the moment, of course, monetary policy is not independent, not very independent. Policy to a considerable extent is
being made in Frankfurt and not in Washington. The Federal
Reserve is, properly or improperly, worried about the effects of a
capital outflow following any effort that it would take to lower
interest rates. Therefore it seems under pressure to raise interest
rates, because the Germans have decided to raise interest rates. We
are faced with the problem of a fixed exchange rate system, and
some of the problems that arise under it.
That also limits the independence of the Federal Reserve, and
what I am trying to say is I believe those two definitions of independence, how much it monetizes the deficit and what it does
about the international aspects of monetary policy, are far more
important about the outcomes than whether we have short-term
members or long-term members.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Klein.
Professor KLEIN. This last exchange indicates that the term "independence'' has different meanings. Surely everybody is restricted
to do the right thing for running the economy. We are not speaking about independence in that sense.
We are speaking about independence in the sense of being able
to make decisions freely, not whether you're sensible and take
account of what's going on in the world when you make your
decisions; but whether or not you are free to make the decisions.
Now, in my opinion, the President and the executive branch
need a harmonious monetary team, together with the rest of the
Cabinet, and I think it is appropriate that the President had power
to appoint members of the Board and appoint the Chairman, but
that's about as far as the infringement on independence should go,
and once people are appointed, then they ought to be freely independent to carry out the decision process as they like.
I think that is the present situation, and I would interpret the
switch of the Chairman to become Secretary of the Treasury as
purely a personal matter. He may be the man for the job. That's a
matter between two individuals, and I would hate to see legislation
written that would limit the freedom of choice of occupation of
individuals.
If the Chairman wants to become Secretary of the Treasury, then
that's no infringement on freedom or independence. And it is important that monetary policy be harmonious, and for that reason
we've limited the term of the Chairman to 4 years. Not quite
synchronous with the Presidential term, but nearly so.




106

That, I think, is appropriate. So I see nothing in the present
situation to restrict the independence of the decisionmaking and
thinking of the Federal Reserve.
But let me comment on one other point that Mr. Meltzer made
about trying to get independence by restricting the range for the
monetary aggregates. I would regard that as highly unscientific.
The monetary aggregates are what we would call noisy magnitudes. We can't measure them accurately; we sometimes see them
revised by $5 to $10 billion at the stroke of a pen; they aren't what
we said they were, but they're something else because of the way of
counting and then enumerating that total.
It would be highly unscientific, against all that we know, which
is, of course, too little in economics, to narrow the range beyond
our ability to compute target values in certain intervals.
If we can't even measure it with precision, and if it's a product of
the economic process, we can't control it with precision. It would be
just as bad to narrow those ranges by law as it is to make a
constitutional amendment on the balanced budget. You cannot
legislate the endogenous economic process. That is a matter of the
outcome of the workings of the economic system, and it cannot be
fixed by law.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kaufman, in your statement you reject gradualism. That's almost like rejecting mother, apple pie, and baseball. As you know, everybody is for gradualism just like everybody
is against inflation or deflation. So I think it's refreshing to have
you make the kind of statement you make, and indicate that you
think, as you say, it has a poor performance record. It certainly
has.
But you also call for a tax cut to stimulate capital investment
.and savings.
Now, last spring, I followed the Kaufman prescription by introducing an amendment to the budget resolution to cut spending by
$28 billion, and bring spending down to the level of revenues,
balance the budget in the year beginning the next October 1. I got
23 votes for it. Five out of six Democrats voted against me; two out
of three Republicans voted against me.
So it didn't seem to be a very realistic process.
We face, as you know, a colossal amount of spending in the
energy area. We have a commitment by the President which is
strongly supported by most Members of Congress to increase military spending substantially. We have uncontrollable spending in
many domestic programs, so there doesn't seem to be any practical
way that you could have a departure from gradualism, at least a
departure which would balance the budget sharply and cut taxes.
What's your answer?
Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, sir, there are several reasons why I am
proposing tax reductions for capital spending. I did not propose, as
you know, increases in Federal expenditures. The last time around,
we had tax reductions, meaning 1974, 1975, 1976 period, tax reductions and substantial increases in Federal expenditures. And the
tax reductions were heavily oriented toward encouraging consumption.
The CHAIRMAN. Say that again.




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Mr. KAUFMAN. The tax reductions were heavily oriented toward
increasing consumption.
Now we cannot afford that kind of a policy the next time around.
Already the consumer is heavily indebted, and the impact we are
going to have on him to bring him out of that indebtedness will be
short lived, if we encourage it through tax reductions and consumer-oriented Federal expenditures.
As we are going on here over the next 4, 5, or 6 years, the need
is to increase our productivity. The need is to have a kind of a new
strength in the American economy, and to have a strength that
will sustain the consumer. And that strength will have to come
from the capital investment side.
Now I'm not proposing massive tax reductions, I think they
ought to begin some time in the early part of next year, of moderate proportions, oriented toward capital investments.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us figures? There's been a proposal
for a $30 billion tax cut for 1980.
Mr. KAUFMAN. No; I would not go that high. I would cut that in
half, Senator.
Second, I think it's also important to recognize that you have
sitting on top of you a terrible international constraint, and that is
the fact that the dollar plays this key role and the tendency will be
there to rely overly on massive tax reductions oriented toward the
consumer, and freeing monetary policy.
I would say to you I'm not in favor of that. I would urge you to
consider ways to free monetary policy as we go into 1980. I think
that will be very difficult to do. It will be very difficult to do
because foreign interest rates will be high, our inflation rate may
come down only gradually, and we will be a hostage of international interest rates and the oil situation, therefore.
I think we cannot do what we did, for example, in 1971. In 1971
we pursued monetary policy for domestic reasons, lowered the 3month Treasury bill rate in January of that year to 3 percent, in
August we abandoned the gold backing for the dollar, and we freed
ourselves.
Now we can't abandon the gold backing; we did already. But this
time around our liabilities internationally are very high. We really
have to find a way that will induce foreigners to play a bigger role
in international finance. And this foreigners are reluctant to do
because they realize as their currency proliferates internationally,
they cannot have a stronger currency.
So I think it is a combined policy that you have to approach,
moderate tax inducements oriented toward the capital side, and
working very hard to induce foreigners to open their capital markets, whether it is Japan, United Kingdom, and Germany.
That would be part of the way out.
My fear is, if I may again express this, that official policies of
gradualism really is an acquiescence to a persistence of the high
rate of inflation. And if you look at this just from a financial
viewpoint, in 5 to 7 years from now, we will have built a financial
system that is heavily leveraged, that will have more participants
that have a vested interest in maintaining inflation and accelerating the rate of inflation, than participants who will argue very
heartily to throttle it down.

49-596 O - 79 -




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Professor MELTZER. Senator, may I respond as a proponent of
gradualism, briefly?
The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.
Professor MELTZER. I will not take the liberty of responding to
Mr. Klein, because that's an academic debate. But I would like to
say that if you look at the charts on the right wall, you'll find very
little evidence of gradualism in any of those numbers. And if we
had charts of fiscal policy, you would not see any sign of gradualism in fiscal policy.
To say that gradualism has been tried and failed seems to me to
be something of an overstatement. Gradualism has been talked
about a great deal, but the rhetoric has not been matched by any
kind of action.
Where gradualism has been tried, it has succeeded. Those are
countries—Switzerland and Germany would be the countries that I
would point to.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Let me respond to this. If we could put into place
an effective policy of gradualism. I think we would all be in favor of
it. But as you already point out, Senator, to establish this by an act of
Congress is very difficult to do.
Second, if we look at financial innovation and financial technology, it has run rings around what we call the money supply concept.
As we have defined Mi and M2 to include currency demand
deposits and time deposits, the private sector really does not look
any more at the classical definition of money.
Credit is money. An unused line of credit for which a corporation
pays a legal standby fee, and has a contractual arrangement, in the
eyes of that corporation that is perceived as money, even though it
is usage of credit.
The ability to issue commercial paper in vast amounts is perceived as access to money, even though it is use of credit.
The ability of an individual to take a credit card and exercise it,
that individual perceives it as the use of money, even though it is
the use of credit.
So we come down to what is it we want to define as a growth
path for the establishment of a monetary target? I believe we can't
do it any more through classically defined money. We have to find
a way to cut into limiting the growth of credit, and this is what the
central bank does not yet want to do, because then it becomes a
very hard choice, because the growth of credit can be throttled
down.
You can set a target for a credit market not growing any more in
1 year than 7 or 8 percent and bringing it down, but the central
bank doesn't want that onerous and difficult task, because you can
set ranges here which you can stay within.
The CHAIRMAN. So if we took all the instruments, as you suggest,
with M7, as the measure, No. 1, that would give us a notion of just
how monetary policy was operating. It would be much more realistic. Is that right?




109

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is right. I think most Americans would also
understand it better. If you speak to Americans in terms of money,
it has become really a concept for a trained economist.
If you speak to Americans in terms of the growth of debt, mortgage debt, corporate debt, consumer debt, it is an understandable
concept. And the totality is understandable.
Money supply is not something that is readily understood by
Americans.
The CHAIRMAN. Does the Fed have the tools to control that
massive debt?
Mr. KAUFMAN. I believe it does. Now there may be some who say
that's very difficult, in terms of a debt proxy, and then trying to
control M7. And we may have to, from time to time, cut into the
credit-generating process, for example, as was suggested, to put
pressure on limiting the growth of bank credit. That's easily done,
because bank credit is a large chunk of total debt growth each
year.
This year total debt will grow perhaps by $400 billion net, and of
that $400 billion, bank credit is probably going to be at least $130
billion.
So you have a substantial portion just sitting in the commercial
banking system.
Now, of course, some will say then other intermediaries will play
a bigger role. Not that quickly. It takes time for other intermediaries to assume a bigger role.
In some ways I believe the role of the central bank has to be
always to build an improved mousetrap. There is no permanence to
any particular technique, but there is a need to innovate with
techniques, and this is where the central bank has been lacking.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Friedman, on Friday the Federal Reserve raised the discount from 9x/2 to 10 percent to help stabilize
the value of the dollar in international exchange markets. The
discount rate is still below the Federal funds rate, which is the key
short-term rate set by the open market DISC.
Some observers have questioned the wisdom of this increase,
because they forecast a recession. Others say it should not have
any lasting effect on the economy, and is a useful signal in respect
to the dollar.
Was the increase necessary, and what effect will it have domestically?
Professor FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe the discount rate in
itself is not a very important tool of monetary policy. The amount
of the banking system's activity that is financed at the discount
window is typically small, and
The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it a signal that is of some value?
Professor FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. I was about to go on to say that I
think that the discount rate has same importance as a signal, and
that it is essential to distinguish between the use of the discount
rate as a device in and of itself and as a signaling device. I believe
that the actual effects associated with the discount rate per se are
really very minor. Moreover, since the discount rate has recently
been below the Federal funds rate, that even further erodes the
importance of an increase. The more important rate is the funds
rate, so that, if the discount rate had been pushed above the




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Federal funds rate, that move could have been perceived as a
signal that monetary policy was about to tighten further, and that
an increase in the Federal funds rate would be coming in the near
term. The current increase was not that kind of signal. Rather, it
was an adjustment of the 1discount rate to catch up with the
market reality of a 101A to 10 /2 percent Federal funds rate.
Hence we are left with the fact that the Federal Reserve gave a
minor signal by increasing the discount rate in the direction of the
funds rate. To that extent, I would say that this was a positive
development, In light of the argument that I offered before, I do
not believe that monetary policy has been particularly tight, and I
would not want to see that monetary policy eased at the current
time. Continuing to leave the discount rate below the Federal
funds rate may have led some market participants, and perhaps
especially participants in foreign exchange markets, to expect that
the Federal Reserve was about to ease policy soon. To the extent
that this action had some signaling value, I therefore believe that
the signal went in the right direction. It is important, though, not
to place too much emphasis on the discount rate itself. An interesting result which an academic researcher showed several years ago
is that, despite all the discussion of signaling by the discount rate,
there is in fact an astonishingly small amount of new information
contained in discount rate movements. It is possible to explain
something like 99 percent of all of the monthly variations in the
discount rate simply by relating it to the last 2 months' movements
of the Federal funds rate.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the discount rate should be set
above the Federal funds rate?
Professor FRIEDMAN. No, sir. If I were running the discount
mechanism, I think that a discount rate that simply tracked the
open market rate on Federal funds would be about the right way to
do it. I see no reason to subsidize banks' borrowing at the discount
window by having a discount rate below the Federal funds rate;
but once the two rates are in alinement so that banks have no
incentive to go to the discount window rather than to borrow in the
Federal funds market, then there is just the margin of banks that
do come in to the discount window for one reason or another.
Typically that margin will be very small, and I see no reason to
exert a penalty on it.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Klein, Chairman Miller has told the
Congress frequently that fiscal policy must remain tight, 4nd that
if a recession develops, we ought to use monetary policy to provide
some stimulus for growth.
Given the current outlook, including inflation, energy, and the
value of the dollar, do you agree that the mix of fiscal and monetary policies favored by Chairman Miller, and that it's realistic and
practical to try to do that?
Professor KLEIN. Well, I think that the only generalization one
could make is that it's faster to manipulate monetary policy than
fiscal policy. You know the fiscal policy process, and you know how
long it takes to achieve national action on tax, expenditure, and
budgetary changes. There's a certain degree of inflexibility.
Nevertheless




Ill
The CHAIRMAN. It's always a great temptation, come the election,
to cut the taxes.
Professor KLEIN. Yes, but we find that when it goes
The CHAIRMAN. It's hard to find an election year when we didn't
cut taxes, especially when we
Professor KLEIN. That's right, but do we get what we want?
There's a lot of horsetrading in the process, and we may not get
what we actually set out to get in the end.
However, in the present circumstances, I would say that monetary policy is severely restricted. It is much better to let monetary
policy
The CHAIRMAN. You say monetary policy is severely restricted?
Professor KLEIN. Restricted.
And it's an
The CHAIRMAN. You say that in view of what's happened over
the past 13 weeks or so?
Professor KLEIN. It's been restricted ever since the American
current account got into terrible trouble, and the dollar got into
terrible trouble.
The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon. I misunderstood you. I think
just the last two letters of your word. You said restricted, not
restrictive.
Professor KLEIN. That's right.
The CHAIRMAN. OK.
Professor KLEIN. Yes, yes. That's exactly
The CHAIRMAN. OK.
Professor KLEIN. It's constrained by the international situation,
the position of the dollar, and our trade accounts. At the present
time, we simply ought to maintain a very steady monetary policy
or to give some signal as occurred last week—not because the
economic situation necessarily warranted it, but because the political deterioration and the political uncertainty required some kind
of voice of intervention.
Given that kind of exception, I would say let us keep monetary
policy very steady at the present time, and concentrate on fiscal
policy and structural policies. Export policy would be very important. Many other kinds of policies would be very important in getting
the economy turned around.
The CHAIRMAN. Keep it very steady in what way? A steady
increase, making—continuing to make credit available?
Professor KLEIN. Well, I would side very much with Henry Kaufman's views, that M7 or a higher subscripted M is the thing that
we ought to be looking at and
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Kaufman's view, as I understand it, is
that we ought to have a more—a bolder policy on that.
Professor KLEIN. He had two views. One is
The CHAIRMAN. Keep biting down on credit availability if we can
do anything about inflation.
Professor KLEIN. We ought to look at M7, or we ought to look at
total credit. I think that's a sensible view.
The other aspect is should it be more restrictive
The CHAIRMAN. He didn't just want to look at it, he wanted to be
done.
Professor KLEIN. Well, I said keep it steady.




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The CHAIRMAN. That's what I understood him to say.
Professor KLEIN. No, no, I'm simply saying that M7 growth
should remain steady at the present time. At the present time
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the present time, as was pointed out, I
don't know by whom, perhaps by Professor Friedman or Professor
Meltzer, at the present time they argue that there's no real restriction on credit. Anybody who wants to borrow money to buy a house
or to buy—buoy his business, buy a car, it's available. And in the
past, it has not been available, for instance, in 1967, and various
other periods that we've had a credit crunch where if you wanted
to borrow money on a mortgage, you couldn't get it.
Professor KLEIN. I'm not asking for a credit crunch now. I don't
think
The CHAIRMAN. You're saying it should be—we should follow a
policy of continuing to provide whatever credit people wanted, but
at a somewhat higher price?
Professor KLEIN. At a price, yes. And at the price
The CHAIRMAN. Is that your view, Mr. Kaufman?
Mr. KAUFMAN. Pardon rne?
The CHAIRMAN. Is that your view?
Mr. KAUFMAN. I don't believe that should be the approach. I
believe that total credit growth should be, first of all, not only
monitored more closely, but definite targets should be established
for the growth of debt in the United States, and those targets
should be considerably below the growth of debt that we have had
in the last 4 or 5 years in the United States.
I've also pointed out here that
The CHAIRMAN. What kind of instruments should be used to
limit that debt availability?
Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, the ultimate way to limit the availability of
debt, there are two techniques:
One is through the interest rate mechanism. So far in this economic expansion, the interest rate mechanism has encouraged the
growth of debt because interest rates have been significantly below
the inflation rate, particularly when you relate the inflation rate to
the Federal funds rate, which is controlled at the central bank, and
which is the target in terms of interest rates of the central bank.
The other technique related to this is to cut into specific sectors
of the credit market, such as was suggested here, into the commercial banking system, and sharply limit the expansion of bank
credit, which in turn will throttle down total debt creation.
You do that by raising the reserve requirements. For example,
following a more aggressive policy at the discount window, sending
out a letter of moral suasion to the commercial banking system, to
slow down their excessive credit creation in the banking system
itself.
I don't believe this is a time where we ought to advertise readily
the availability of consumer credit on very liberal credit terms.
There are times for that, but that's not the present.
The CHAIRMAN. More economists are now saying we will not only
have a recession in 1979, but a recession has already begun. I'm a
skeptic when it comes to economic forecasts, as I indicated in my
opening remarks.




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I also think that the recent economic signals are mixed, although
they do seem on a whole to be indicating slowdown.
But my question is this: Are we in a recession? If not, do you
expect us to be in one before the fall? And how long will the
economy experience negative or low growth with rising unemployment?
Til start with Professor Klein.
Professor KLEIN. Yes, I believe we are in a recession now, and
when the economic historians make the dates, it will probably be
March of 1979, as the last peak point, and that's the problem about
a recession. The peak point was the last time you had a positive
growth.
The CHAIRMAN. Last time what?
Professor KLEIN. Positive growth, some time in the quarterly
range. We're now seeing the first of the negatives. It is not an
infallible prediction, in any sense. That is, the third quarter could
surprise us. But we have some very difficult things to come
through.
We still haven't finished the bargaining calendar this year. If
there is any doubt about a recession, and if there is a UAW strike,
then that insures a recession, as it often has in the past. In 1970,
and in every period of significant auto strike, we had very perverse
or adverse movements of total production.
Although we make it up later, there's a very big impact at the
time. We are still not through with our rounds of energy price
increases, both foreign and domestic. There are other kinds of
uncertainties.
So far, I'd say the harvest looks good this year, but we could
have surprises. I would say that we've in any event had a very slow
economy, we are very vulnerable to any kind of disturbance.
It seems highly improbable that we can get through this period
without a recession, but my own projection would be that in early
1980, first or second quarter, we should begin to see some small
positive movement in total production.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Meltzer.
Professor MELTZER. I believe it's a mistake to describe what we
have as a standard recession. A recession is a broad based decline
in aggregate spending which spreads through the economy.
What we have is a loss of real income, coupled with some special
factors due to strikes in March and April of the truckers and an
anticipated strike of the UAW in September. This can give us two
quarters of negative real growth. But it's a mistake to call that a
recession, because it has not been broad based, and does not result
from a change in demand.
As you correctly point out, it's very limited in its effect. The loss
of income in June is related to the uncertainty about the allocation
of oil and to the fact that people were afraid to use up the gasoline
they had accumulated to go to work. They did not drive to the
shopping centers.
I do not call that a recession. I believe it's a mistake to think
about it for policy purposes as a recession. That's quite apart from
the problem of whether unemployment is going to increase or
whether real income is going to decline.




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Both of those events will occur. But I think it's very important to
understand that we cannot do anything to prevent decline in real
income. That's the result, principally, of what the oil cartel has
done to us.
The effects of a strike, of course, will produce some ripples in the
economy. But those are things which are quickly made up in the
subsequent quarters, as they have been in the past.
The principal event that we face is the loss of real income
resulting from the transfer of a large part or a significant part of
our real income—not a large part, a significant part of our real
income—to the OPEC cartel. And there's nothing that monetary
policy or fiscal policy can do to restore that. And it would be a
mistake to think about it as a recession to be dealt with by antirecessionary policies.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Friedman.
Professor FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we are in a
recession, and that it began some time this spring. In my judgment,
we would have had an economic growth rate this year in the
neighborhood of zero to minus 1 percent, after inflation, even without the oil problem. I think that the oil problem has taken another
2 percent off of that, so that we now must look for a real growth of
about minus 2 to minus 3 percent, after adjustment for inflation.
Now certainly it is true, as Allan Meltzer emphasizes, that a
major part of that story of having a minus 2 to minus 3 percent
growth rate this year is the oil shock; but I believe that it is not
correct to say that there is no essential weakness elsewhere in the
economy. My reading is that, even in the absence of the oil shock,
there would have been no strength in the economy except in the
business fixed investment sector. Consumption is off, housing is off,
Government purchases have for a year been flat in real terms.
Hence my judgment is we are indeed in a recession, but one in
which the oil shock is an important aspect.
You asked also about the length of the recession. I think it is
easier to assess the severity than the length. Again my guess is
that we will experience about a 3-percent drop in the gross national product. That drop could be distributed over about a year, but it
may take a shorter period of time, and conceivably it may be
longer. If the reported growth rate of real gross national product
for the second quarter persists—that is, something in excess of a 3percent per annum decline—then we would have perhaps no more
than three quarters of negative growth, so that very early in 1980
the economy would be recovering. Alternatively, if the growth rate
is a soft negative, or even flat for a while, then I think that the
recession will last longer in that it will take a longer period of time
to lose the same amount of the GNP.
Finally, you asked about the pattern of the unemployment rate. I
believe that unemployment will continue to rise after real GNP
has begun its recovery. If, optimistically, we would expect the first
quarter of 1980 to mark the rebounding of real GNP, it might be
well into the summer or fall of 1980 before the unemployment rate
stops rising. If the recession lasts longer, then we could easily see
unemployment on the increase throughout 1980.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kaufman.




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Mr. KAUFMAN. Senator, I believe we are not in a typical economic contraction. We are, as I said in my testimony, in a zone of
economic ambivalence, which has been heavily influenced by the
oil shock.
At the present time for this stage of the economic cycle, housing
is relatively strong. The latest figures were a million nine, and
permits were up during the month of June. Business spending,
which always lags, is still quite good.
We do have very good availability of credit at the present time,
which did not prevail in those previous comparable periods.
However, having said that, it would seem to me that if there is
an auto strike in the fall, this period which we have entered into
now, will probably be classified a recession.
My dilemma is that as I view 1980 and beyond, I find it very
difficult to envision what will bring us dramatically out of this
zone of economic ambivalence with the consumer heavily indebted
at the present time. With some time next year business spending
having topped out and slowing quite significantly, with monetary
policy being hamstrung, as we go into next year, by international
events, it would seem to me that the lack of productivity in the
system, which will not go away very quickly, all of which would
suggest to me that the next economic recovery, when it does come,
will be very gradual.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, would you look at the charts over
here on the right. I'd like to ask you a question on that, because we
are going to have Dr. Wallach in tomorrow for the Fed, and he's
going to give us an accounting of what they have done in the past
few months and what they expect to do.
As you know, the Fed now sets its monetary and aggregate
targets for a full calendar year. One-half of the current year is
past, and the Fed has managed to keep the average growth rates
for the aggregates within the ranges they set last February.
They now have considerable latitude over the last half of the
year.
My question is this: Should they attempt to have money growth
near the top, in the middle, or near the bottom of the ranges for
the last half of the year? Or should it even go below the ranges?
Should they change the ranges?
I'll start with Professor Friedman.
Professor FRIEDMAN. Mr. Chairman, I find your question somewhat difficult to address because I do not believe that the rate of
growth of money per se should be the central focus of monetary
policy. In my statement I emphasized bank credit, because that is
the part most easily affected by the Federal Reserve, but I am very
sympathetic to the notion that broader credit measures should be
used as well.
If credit extensions in the economy are continuing at their current pace, then, even if the rate of growth of the monetary aggregates falls below the bottom of those ranges, because the banks are
financing that credit out of liabilities not counted in the money
stock, I still would not suggest that policy is too restrictive. Similarly, if credit should abate, but because of changes in interest rate
differentials the banks suddenly shift to financing a great deal of
the credit out of liabilities that are in the money stock, so that




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while credit is abating the monetary aggregates rise above those
ranges, I would not on that account say that policy is too expansive. I believe that, by and large, the ranges set for money growth
are about right; but more important than whether they hit the top
or the bottom of the individual money ranges is to look across to
the other side of the balance sheet and pick up the credit side of
activity
The CHAIRMAN. We have bank credit as one of the categories on
that chart.
Professor FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. There I think that the evidence is
quite clear. Credit has been expanding far outside the range of
anything indicated here. Instead of 2 to 8 percent, the credit numbers are more in the range of 15.
The CHAIRMAN. They're already over the top of their range.
They're over 12.
Professor FRIEDMAN. Yes, sir. I believe that the thing to do is to
get the credit expansion down within the range. I believe that, if I
were to choose a number for credit expansion, I would probably
choose something closer to the 8 than to the 2; but the choice of
whether credit growth should be a little above the middle of the
range or a little below the middle of the range for credit is less
important than getting from the 15, where it now is, down into the
approximate 2-to-8 range.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kaufman.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Senator, my own biases would favor focusing, if I
had the pick of these four charts, the two that are on the left, M3
and bank credit.
M3, of course, comprises roughly $1.6 trillion of credit, and the
bank credit comprises about $1 trillion. And it's therefore a larger
magnitude generally than you have either at Mi or M2.
I would propose that the bank credit target certainly be lowered
significantly from the growth rate that we've seen in 1977 and
1978, and thus far as we go into 1979.
I would say bank credit expansion should be set somewhere in
the 7-percent range, and I would lower the range for M3.
In any event, I would have to conclude that on the bank credit
side, one other item has not yet occurred, and that is that loans are
increasing and for most banks security holdings are still
increasing.
Currently, there is no sign of tight money. Commercial banks
can add to their loans, all types of loans, and at the same time are
increasing their security holdings of U.S. Governments and of taxexempts.
In that sense, the measure of monetary tightness or credit creation control has not yet been achieved.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Meltzer.
Professor MELTZER. I would like to say that unlike my colleagues—or some of them—I believe the growth rate of money is
important, and that it should be controlled. Unfortunately, no one
can be very certain what it means at the present time, but that's
not because of any inherent difficulties with money or any problems about innovation that are peculiar.
The problems we face arise because we have regulation Q, the
nonpayment of interest on demand time and savings deposits, and




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the nonpayment of interest on required reserves. That causes all of
these anomalies like zero-based reserve requirements.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, that's very true, but then why isn't Mr.
Kaufman right when he argues that under those circumstances,
look at something broader like bank credit or
Professor MELTZER. As soon as you set out to control bank
credit—I'm sorry, I didn't meant to cut you off.
The CHAIRMAN. Bank credit or M7.
Professor MELTZER. As soon as you set out to control M7, there
will be an argument about which elements of credit ought to be
included. As soon as you begin to control some types of bank credit,
I think you'll recognize that, just as banks have been able to find
zero-based reserve requirements for time deposits, they are going to
find, new credit arrangements. The opportunity to keep balances in
London, denominated in pounds, is one example. Perhaps there
will be an exchange guarantee. The credit won't show up in the
figures when you take the accounting figures, but the credit will be
available during the day for people who want to use dollars.
In the current exchange rate regime, you have many different
opportunities to keep your balances in different monetary
units
The CHAIRMAN. Well, in 1974, 1969, and 1967, they weren't able
to find a
Professor MELTZER. The interest rates were not as high as they
now are, and the opportunities to innovate had not become as
important. I believe with a zero reserve—the zero payment of
interest and reserve requirements on demand deposits and the low
rates on time and savings deposits, it becomes very attractive, both
to the lender and the borrower, to innovate.
The CHAIRMAN. Then you're saying the Federal Reserve is pretty
impotent and helpless?
Professor MELTZER. The only thing the Federal Reserve can control now is the monetary base, and that is by no means an ideal
number. I believe it gives us the best representation of what is
going on in the financial market. It is not perfect, because as I
believe many people would point out, it is possible to hold deposits
without having to hold required reserves, or to hold what are akin
to deposits without holding required reserves. Therefore there is
some shift in the demand for base money, which means that the
growth rates of the monetary base which were reported by the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis somewhat understate what is
actually going on.
But I would like to see our control focused on the monetary base
for two reasons:
One is that it is something which the Federal Reserve can, and
indeed must, control. It is the amount the Federal Reserve puts
into its portfolio. Ninety percent of the base is just acquisition of
Government securities by the Federal Reserve, and consequently
there is nothing that they can do except control it.
Every action they take that's meaningful is going to affect that
rate of growth of the base. Therefore, they should control the base.
And the arguments which say that it just represents reserves,
and reserves are changing, I think miss the point.




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One side of the coin is what the Federal Reserve adds to its
portfolio, and the rate at which it adds to its portfolio, how fast its
portfolio of Government securities grows, that's the principal determinant of what the Federal Reserve does to the monetary base and
to the financial system.
So that's the thing which I think they should control. I reluctantly come to that conclusion, because I think in a better monetary
system in which there was payment of interest on demand on time
and savings deposits, and there was payment of interest on bank
required reserves, we would be able to control the money stock,
and that would be a better thing to control.
However, at the moment, we can only control the base, and we
do that imperfectly. The Shadow Committee in March recommended that the base grow at a rate of approximately 8 percent in the
year from last September to this September. Although the growth
rate moves around quite a bit, it has been growing at approximately the rate we recommended.
I would now like to see the rate of growth of the base come down
from 8 percent to 7 percent, and then to 6 percent in the next 2
years. That, I believe, is the policy which will gradually bring us to
the goals that we all agree are goals to pursue.
At the moment, the annual rate of growth of the base has gone—
pardon me, the short-term rate of growth of the base has gone very
much above its long-term rate. If it were to continue at the current
quarterly rate, we would, I believe, face the same kind of situation
this year that we faced in October—in late October of last year;
namely, another outflow of capital from the United States because
the Europeans are raising their interest rates, and we are reluctant to raise ours. We have maintained very high rates of growth
in the base for a sustained period. These rates will pull us above
the annual rate of 8 percent, if they continue very much longer.
I would like to see us go back to 8 percent and announce a policy
of cutting the growth rate of the base in September from 8 to 7,
and ultimately to 6.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Klein.
Professor KLEIN. Well, as far as Mi, M2 and M3 are concerned,
there's a certain cosmetic aspect, very much like the moves of last
week given as a signal to the international currency markets, that
everything isn't going to pot in this city.
I would say that growth at the median point of those ranges or
below would be in order for these cosmetic reasons.
As far as bank credit is concerned, there my position would be a
steady policy on the part of the Federal Reserve.
The CHAIRMAN. I'd like to ask very quickly—I realize the hour is
getting late and you gentlemen have been extremely patient—let
me start with Professor Klein and go right down the panel, and
perhaps you can answer it rather quickly on this.
The Congress, the administration, involved in a process of discussion and consultation on adding inflation measures that we might
take, we've had a number of meetings with Fred Kahn and with
others, some of whom aren't here any more in the administration,
on anti-inflation policy, and I'd like your own views on how effective these can be.




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Let me just give you three, and you tell me which of these three
you think might be useful:
First, wage and price guidelines.
Second, regulatory reform.
Third, tax reductions to decrease inflation and spur productivity
and capital formation, including TIP, the wage insurance program
by providing a refund if workers stay within the guideline.
Professor KLEIN. There is some indication in many quarters that
the guidelines are doing some good. Surely they've been broken,
surely they will have to be revised toward realism, but I think
there is a great sense in the business community among certain
trade unions and some external independent observers that we
would have had more serious wage increases this year than we
have had as a consequence of the guidelines.
Guidelines are doing some good, but obviously they are a weak
approach to the problem.
The principal contribution of this administration toward fighting
inflation has been to attach an inflation monitoring component to
the regulatory system. I think it has been beneficial. We have one
anomaly in the sense that deregulation in energy means higher
prices, but most of the other forms of deregulation, or monitoring
over regulatory systems, have been in the direction of holding
down prices. I think that that is an important contribution of this
administration, and that they should go much further in that
direction.
I would add, though, that when it comes to giving up tariff
concessions to special interest groups, when it comes to acreage setasides, when it comes to sugar prices and so on, the record on
fighting inflation isn't good.
So what it really means is that we need to be able to say no more
often to special interest groups, if you really mean business about
inflation.
Now as far as tax reductions, to stimulate capital formulation
and productivity are concerned, I think that that really is the best
route. I don't think that we will see an impact on the inflation rate
until the early part of the 1980's, but I do think it would show up
in significant measure well before 1985. I think that that is the
most fundamental thing that can be done in this country at the
present time to fight inflation, to get capital formation and productivity in better line and in better historical perspective.
Now, as for TIP's, I think it has a lot of merit, but not on a halfhearted basis. Either one goes all out for a guideline with teeth and
a TIP's program, or not at all.
I think that to introduce it on a piecemeal basis as was attempted last year with a real wage insurance, or to tie it to some tax
concessions this year, would not be desirable. There have been
suggestions that business taxes for depreciation accounting be liberalized, if the corporations stick to the guidelines. I think that's a
bad approach. I think that it's a piecemeal approach, a fragmentary approach. It is very difficult to define who gets and who
doesn't get the carrot or the stick.
I would say that if you work at a really well-rounded TIP's
program integrated into the system, then that's fine; otherwise I
would be against introducing it on a piecemeal basis.




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The CHAIRMAN. Professor Meltzer.
Professor MELTZER. The wage and price guidelines have their
effect, only if at all on visible wage and prices, and in my opinion
have very little effect on the economy, other than through their
effect on strikes.
Wage and price guidelines produce strikes, and I would hazard a
guess they will be a principal factor in the General Motors strike.
The CHAIRMAN. What effect do they have on strikes?
Professor MELTZER. They increase the number of strikes.
All price and wage controls, I believe, have the effect of increasing strikes. Certainly these
The CHAIRMAN. You think they have no effect on the strike
settlement in holding wages down?
Professor MELTZER. I believe it takes a strike, at best, to convince
people even in the visible area to convince people that the wage
and price guidelines are going to apply to them. I think the General Motors negotiation is an example, where you have the chairman
of General Motors, a very avid proponent of wage and price guidelines, writing to all of his suppliers and telling them they should
adhere to the guidelines. The head of the union indicates that he
doesn't believe wage and price guidelines apply to his union. That's
a situation that is likely to produce a strike. I believe that one
would have to guess that it will produce a strike.
The CHAIRMAN. It's a tactic in making sure that the strike is
aimed at Ford instead of General Motors. [Laughter.]
Professor MELTZER. Well, I won't hazard a guess about that, but I
will stand on my prediction that there will be a strike. And I
believe that most observers agree to that, and I believe that the
guidelines—it's a clear case in which the guidelines encourage a
strike.
In the case of regulatory reform, I certainly think regulatory
reform is desirable, but not principally for its anti-inflationary
effect. It's desirable because it encourages efficiency. One of the
reforms that I would most like would be the removal of Regulation
Q, and I know that's a view which you share with me. But I
certainly think that that would be
The CHAIRMAN. I have introduced a bill to do that.
Professor MELTZER. Yes, I know.
The CHAIRMAN. Much too gradual, but it would do it.
Professor MELTZER. But at least it would remove the ceilings, so
that we would be free of them at some point. I agree that it takes
too long, but it is better to do it in 10 years, if that's required, than
not to do it at all.
It would, of course, be still better to remove them more quickly.
As far as tax reductions and TIP plans are concerned, I believe
that they are an expensive way that accomplishes very little. It's
very difficult to design a TIP plan which would be effective and
workable. One reason is, that in an inflationary environment, to
take one example in the case of wages, where wages are rising, you
have to design a TIP which recognizes that the wage base would
have been higher. A worker who gets a 7-percent wage increase is
not in the same position as a worker who got a 7-percent tax
reduction, because when the next time bargaining comes, the wage




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base will be higher in one case, and not in the other. Somehow the
TIP plan must take account of that.
I think that's a very difficult thing to do. It is difficult also to
make the TIP plan consistent with efficiency. I believe that's two
reasons why TIP plans—but not the only reason why TIP plans
will not work, but I don't believe that anyone has come up with a
workable TIP plan that gets around these objections and many
other objections.
But I won't take a lot of your time to go into those objections.
In the case of stimulating capital formation and productivity, I
certainly think that that's something that we ought to do. But let's
try to put it in perspective.
Suppose we have 8 to 9 percent growth in money, and we are
able by stimulating capital investment and productivity to raise
the real growth of output from say an average of 2 percent to an
average of 3 percent.
Well, the most we are going to expect from that is a slight
reduction of 1 percentage point in the long-term rate of inflation.
We are not going to accomplish a great deal as far as the antiinflationary aspects of that program are concerned. Growth and
productivity should not be sold principally as an anti-inflation
device. They should be sold as a means for raising real incomes—
our own and our children's real incomes—and repairing some of
the damage that has been done by the slow recovery in the rate of
investment during this expansion
As an anti-inflationary device, it's laudable like regulatory
reform. But its main benefit will not come from the way in which
it has been sold.
The CHAIRMAN. Professor Friedman.
Professor Friedman. Mr. Chairman, among the various methods
of fighting inflation that you suggested, I think that some seem
very worth pursuing, and some do not.
I will take them in the order in which you suggested. First, I am
not persuaded that there is evidence that wage and price guidelines, or even wage and price controls, have had or would have any
lasting improving effects on the inflation process. I am sensitive to
what Professor Klein said, that one of the good things that wage
and price guidelines have done is to focus Government's attention
more on the cost of meeting some of the regulatory actions that it
takes. I would question, however, whether it is necessary to interfere, or at least appear to interfere, so much in private wage and
price setting actions simply in order to get the Government regulatory agencies to be aware of the inflationary effect of their own
actions. Hence on wage and price guidelines I would adopt a negative view.
Second, regulatory reform: If by this we mean not only actions of
the regulatory agencies but also such items as Davis-Bacon, minimum wage, agricultural price supports, steel trigger pricing and
other tariff actions, I would echo what Professor Klein and Professor Meltzer have already said. I believe that a great deal of our
inflation has come, and continues to come, from built-in pricerising actions in these forms. The more of them we can get rid of,
the better.




122

The third area you mentioned was tax incentives to capital formation for the purpose of raising productivity. I believe that that is
an important objective in its own right, and I also believe that it is
important from the perspective of increasing or reducing our inflation problem. I think that getting our productivity growth up is
more relevant to reducing inflation than Professor Meltzer suggested. It is not limited to the effect of a 1-percent increase in productivity lowering the inflation rate by 1 percent, if the rate of money
growth is held constant. We have to ask what are the political and
social forces in the country that have led us to have a very rapid
rate of growth of the monetary and credit aggregates in recent
years. My perception is that, in large part, the rapid rate of growth
of money and credit in recent years, which has contributed so
much to the rapid rate of price inflation, has emerged as a result of
repeated efforts by the Federal Reserve to offset what has otherwise been a deteriorating trend in the growth of real income of
Americans.
Some of that deterioration in Americans' real income has come
about through things like the action of the OPEC cartel which
transfers incomes from us to them; but part of it also has to do
with the deterioration of our productivity performance, which
means that there is less real income to spread around, regardless of
who gets it. If we can get our productivity growth back on an
upward trend, then some of the political pressures that have led to
excess money and credit creation, and therefore have led to increased acceleration of price inflation, may abate.
Finally, on the TIP plan, I am somewhat skeptical of TIP; and, if
I thought there were any very powerful shortrun measures available by which we could get inflation down, I would therefore be
reluctant to embark on a TIP program. Nevertheless, inflation is a
severe enough problem, and new approaches are warranted to such
an extent, that it is probably worth trying a TIP proposal to see
whether we can get some advantage out of it. Having put it that
way, though, I think that there is a strong case to be made for
distinguishing between the two kinds of TIP proposals that have
been offered. The proposal offered by Henry Wallich and Sidney
Weintraub offers TIP in the form of additional taxes put onto
businesses which do not comply, whereas the proposal offered by
Arthur Okun is in the form of tax reductions given to businesses
which do comply.
If we embark on TIP as an experimental device, we want to be
sure to adopt it in a form in which we will be able to get rid of it in
a few years if it proves not to be productive. I think it would be
almost impossible to get rid of it if we adopted it in the Okun form
of giving tax benefits to companies that comply, rather than the
other way around. I would therefore urge that, if we embark on a
TIP, it should come in the tax penalty form rather than the tax
benefit form, because otherwise we would never get rid of it. Since
we would be embarking on it only as an experiment, we would
have to be able to get rid of it if it proved not to be productive.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kaufman.
Mr. KAUFMAN. To be very brief, Senator, I believe that the wage
and price guidelines have had very marginal impact in terms of
holding down the rate of inflation.




123

However, I think they ought to be recognized as to the value that
they do have, and this is that it is an exhortation device. It keeps
the problem of inflation certainly in the headlines, and to the
extent which prices and wages are going up above a benchmark
that is set by the Government, the public has to be aware of it, it's
more knowledgeable about it, and eventually presumably will bring
greater pressure on elected officials to persist in the fight against
inflation.
That is a very marginal value, but it is of some value.
I do support regulatory reform, because in the final analysis,
regulatory reform should improve productivity in the United
States.
Third, I believe tax reductions, as I said earlier, should be legislated on the side of capital investment, as a way of improving
productivity.
I had been an advocate or supported the TIP plans. It ought to be
tried. We haven't tried it. They're very cumbersome, there are
many problems involved in it, but I would agree with Professor
Friedman, it ought to be adopted on a trial basis, and in some ways
I would lean in favor of the Wallich proposal, rather than the
OPEC proposal.
The CHAIRMAN. I just have one more question, and this one is for
Mr. Kaufman.
Mr. Kaufman, the dollar is the key international currency, and
therefore it must bear the brunt of instability in the international
exchange market.
How important is it that the dollar be the key currency? What
effect would there be on the economy if the dollar were not the key
currency, and instead we relied, say, on special drawing rights or
some other currency?
Mr. KAUFMAN. I don't think that we have the ongoing right to
have the dollar as the key currency. You play a key currency role
because your economy
The CHAIRMAN. You say we don't have the right, but what about
the duty? Do we have the duty under the present circumstances?
Mr. KAUFMAN. We don't have the duty, either. It would seem to
me over the past decade or so, a variety of countries have grown
much more than the United States, their economic strength is
better, their financial strength has improved, the world has been
rehabilitated significantly in the postwar period and consequently
that should be reflected in the international monetary structure.
We have held onto the role of the dollar as a key reserve currency for a variety of reasons, but I think it is detrimental to the
American economy and to the American financial system to persist
with that role.
We have not encouraged Japan, Germany, even the United Kingdom, to open up its credit markets, with the same disciplines and
the same forces that prevail in the United States.
It would seem to me that as we go over into the next year or so,
we will again have burgeoning demands on the dollar to finance oil
transactions in the world financial markets. That will increase the
supply of dollars.
49-596 O - 79 -




9

124

No. 2, it would also seem to me that as the supplies of dollars
increase, and our inflation problem is not rectified very quickly,
this will be a terrible restraint on monetary policy.
No. 3, it would be far better in bargaining with foreign countries
and with oil-producing nations to make them aware of the critical
and crucial role of the dollar and the essentiality of the dollar.
We have never brought that power to bear. We have never told
oil-producing nations without the dollar as a transaction mechanism, as a store value, the entire transfer of wealth would have
been difficult to achieve.
We have never held our associates, meaning Japan, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, we have never told them that they
should play a larger role in this, and if they would have been asked
to play a larger role and induced to play a larger role, they would
have cooperated with us much earlier in a coordinated policy to
slow oil consumption, which was not the case in 1974 or 1975.
In 1973, 1974, when the oil price quadrupled, we did not bring
home to bear, either on the industrial nations, or the oil-producing
nations, that it could not have been accomplished without the
dollar. We never traded on the strength of the dollar.
I think we ought to begin to do that. Now we can do that, as I
said in my statement, in two ways:
One, through the cooperation of the leading industrial nations
and tell them to open up their credit markets, ease the burden on
the dollar; or we may at some point in time have to restrict access
to the dollar as a financing vehicle by foreigners.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Kaufman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for a most helpful and thoughtful, and I
think just a brilliant exposition of your views. This has been an
outstanding panel. You've made a fine record, and we are certainly
in your debt.
Thank you very much.
The committee will stand in recess until tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Tuesday, July 24, 1979.]




FEDERAL RESERVE SECOND MONETARY
POLICY REPORT FOR 1979
TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1979

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS,
Washington, RC.
The committee met at 9:55 a.m. in room 5302, Dirksen Senate
Office Building, Senator William Proxmire (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Proxmire and Riegle.
STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PROXMIRE

The CHAIRMAN. We're a little early, but I understand Governor
Wallich has an appointment he would like to keep so we'll start a
little earlier than usual and I'm going to ask Governor Wallich to
come forward.
The committee is meeting today to consider the conduct of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve pursuant to the requirements of
the Humphrey-Hawkins Act. We are also required to issue a report
containing our views and recommendations to the policy plans and
objectives announced by the Fed.
Our witness today is Governor Wallich of the Federal Reserve.
We all know the Chairman of the Federal Reserve has been nominated by the President to be Secretary of the Treasury and we
thought it more appropriate to have another Governor come before
us under the circumstances.
Governor Wallich, our economy faces a series of difficult problems. We have an energy crisis which is going to put great pressure
on the Federal Reserve and our capital markets in coming years
with an enormous commitment of funds that the President has
called for, which I'm sure the Congress will provide in great measure at least. We have a deep-rooted inflation problem that will not
go away quickly. We have a recession at the same time that some
people think we are already in, perhaps the majority do, and it's
only a difference of opinion as to how long it's likely to be and how
deep it's likely to be. At the same time, we have a very serious
problem with the dollar and our international responsibilities because of the dollar.
Now Federal Reserve policy seems to be trapped between the
economic outlook for slower growth and the rising unemployment
on the one hand, and continuing inflation and the exchange value
of the dollar on the other. As you may know, we had four distinguished economists who testified before the committee yesterday
and gave a little advance advice to the Fed on what they thought
you should be doing over the next several months.




(125)

126

Professor Klein, however, said at one point that monetary policy
was being made in Bonn, Germany, and Henry Kaufman said the
dollar is a hostage of the foreign exchange markets. The Federal
Reserve has kept within its monetary aggregate target ranges over
the first half of the year. That wasn't very hard because the ranges
were so wide that it would be hard to see how you could have
exceeded them in either direction, and the Fed indicated earlier
they wanted to follow a conservative policy with respect to the
availability of the money supply.
The availability of bank credit seems to have grown very rapidly
and is an indication of an ease of monetary policy that many argue
is inflationary. Over the next 6 months the Fed has a great deal of
flexibility with the monetary aggregates. Also, if the Fed is to be
successful in meeting the bank credit target, it would mean putting
a lid on credit expansion. We have some of those factors spelled
out, as you may have noticed, on the charts at the side of the room.
I'm looking forward to your testimony, Governor Wallich, and you
may proceed as you wish.
Do you have a specific time when you feel you would have to
leave if you're going to keep your appointment?
Mr. WALLICH. That's very kind of you, Mr. Chairman, but I have
postponed my trip so I will get there hopefully 2 hours before the
meeting begins and I have plenty of time now.
The CHAIRMAN. Fine.
STATEMENT OF HENRY C. WALLICH, GOVERNOR, FEDERAL
RESERVE BOARD

Mr. WALLICH. If it is agreeable to you, I will summarize the
report. If this becomes too lengthy in terms of enumerating data I
hope you will tell me so, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All right. We'll have your statement printed in
full in the record. Go right ahead.
[Complete statement follows:]




127

Letter of Transmittal

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Washington, D.C., July 17, 1979
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
The Board of Governors is pleased to submit its Midyear Monetary Policy Report to the Congress pursuant
to the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978.
Sincerely,
G. William Miller, Chairman




128
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Letter of Transmittal
Introduction
Chapter 1.

1
Recent Economic and Financial Developments
Section 1.

Economic Activity During the First
Half of 1979

5

Section 2.

22

Section 3.

Wages, Productivity, and Prices

24

Section 4.

Chapter 2.

Employment and Unemployment

Financial Developments

29

Objectives and Plans of the Federal Reserve
Section 1.




41

Section 2.

Chapter 3.

Outlook for Monetary Growth
Outlook for the Economy

47

The Relationship of the Federal Reserve's
Plans to the Administration's Goals
Section 1.

Section 2.

The Administration's Short-Term
Goals

54

The Administration's Goals and the
Federal Reserve's Plans for Monetary
Growth

55

129
INTRODUCTION

The Problem Posed by Accelerated Inflation

The performance of the economy this year has been distinctly
unsatisfactory.

Starting from a base of rapid inflation and the lagged

effects of the 1977-78 dollar depreciation, a series of unexpected
events this year has disrupted economic activity and intensified inflationary pressures.

These events have included labor disputes, severe

weather, and adverse agricultural supply conditions, but the most
disturbing development, in terms of its implications for future economic
performance, has been an enormous increase in the price of imported oil.
The adjustment to this oil price shock poses major problems for governmental policy and represents a serious setback to progress toward the
longer-range goals enunciated by the Full Employment and Balanced Growth
Act.
Increased energy costs have greatly aggravated our inflation
problem.

In February, when the Board submitted its first report to the

Congress under the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, it was anticipated that oil
prices would rise moderately this year, entailing some small upward
pressure on the general level of prices.

However, the developments

since then—including the effects of the Iranian revolution and the
latest OPEC decisions—are generating major increases in the prices of
imported oil and, consequently, in the prices of other energy sources
as well.
The inflationary effects of the energy price increases could,
in principle, be offset if other prices on average declined or at least
rose less than they otherwise would have.




There will be some tendency

130
in this direction as the diversion of a larger share of spendable income
to energy results in a reduction in demand for other goods and services.
In recent years, however, nominal wages and prices have not generally
exhibited much flexibility in a downward direction; rather, relative price
adjustments typically have occurred in the context of an overall rise iD
the average level of prices as economic units attempted to avoid losses
of real income.
It also must be recognized that the rise in the relative price
of imported oil involves a transfer of real income and wealth from the
U.S. public to foreign oil producers.

This loss will, in turn, have at

least temporarily depressing effects on domestic economic activity as
the demand by foreign countries for U.S. exports expands only with a
lag.
Thus, over the next year or two, it appears that exogenous
forces will be causing both intensified inflationary pressures and downward adjustments in the demand for goods and services.

Clearly, the

problems confronting monetary policy, and macroeconomic policy generally,
have been made much more difficult.

If monetary policy encourages a

more rapid expansion of money and credit in an attempt to strengthen
aggregate demand, it risks building even greater inflation into the
economic system through the aggravation of the price-wage-price spiral*
On the other hand, if no account is taken of added upward price pressures in the formulation of policy, the risks are increased of deepening
or lengthening the transitional downward adjustments in real economic
activity that now appear in train.




2

131
The Federal Reserve remains firmly resolved to direct its
policies toward a reduction in the rate of inflation.

But in the

current circumstances, a combination of added inflationary pressures,
a slowing of economic activity, and a probable increase in unemployment may delay progress toward price stability.

This problem high-

lights the need to solve some of the major structural defects in our
economy.

It is important that we begin to break down the barriers,

both private and governmental, that inhibit innovation and competition
and thereby contribute to the inflationary bias of the economy.

We must

ensure that our system of taxation does not discourage the saving and
capital investment necessary to reverse the deterioration of productivity
performance observed in recent years.
And it is absolutely essential that this nation develop an
energy program that reduces its reliance on foreign sources of energy.




3

132
CHAPTER 1

"a review and analysis of recent developments
affecting economic trends in the nation"




Section 108(a) Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978

133
SECTION 1.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1979

Official Commerce Department data for the second quarter of this
year have yet to become available, but it appears likely that they will
indicate that real gross national product declined somewhat after advancing
only marginally in the first quarter.

The sluggishness of overall economic

activity thus far in 1979 stands in marked contrast to the 4-1/4 percent
gain in real GNP registered in 1978.

Although the events of the first

half do not in themselves compel a conclusion that the economy has entered
a recession, the pause in growth does represent a significant interruption
of the relatively long cyclical upswing that began early in 1975.
The sluggishness of economic activity since the beginning of the
year is partly a consequence of the rising inflationary pressures of 1978
but is also traceable in considerable measure to special exogenous
factors—as distinguished from such problems as widespread inventory overhangs or other fundamental imbalances or distortions, which have characterized the terminal stages of previous cyclical expansions.

During January

and February, production in many parts of the country was disrupted by
unusually inclement weather; the construction industries were especially
hard hit, but other sectors also were affected.

In the early spring, labor

contract disputes in the trucking! airline, and rubber industries interfered
with activity in many areas of the economy.

However, a more pervasive—and

less transitory—influence on the course of the economy this year has been
the sharp rise in energy and food prices.

The resultant acceleration of

inflation has had a serious impact on real disposable personal income and
has had a broadly adverse effect on consumer spending attitudes.




5

134
Change from previous period,
annual rate, percent

REAL GNP

-2MT

1975

1976

1977

REAL GNP
AND MAJOR SECTORS

1978

1979H1

Change from '78Q4 to '79Q2,
annual rate, percent

First half of 1979

Business
Fixed
Investment
JUliiilii
GNP
Personal
iil
lll
Consumption
Gov't
Expenditures Purchases

t2
Residential
Structures

Data for th« fUrt h«M of 1979 arv partMy mthiwtttd.




135
Personal Consumption Expenditures
Personal consumption expenditures account for almost two-thirds
of GNP, and their weakness during the past two quarters has been an important
element in the flatness of overall economic activity.

Some softness in

consumer demand was not unexpected following the surge in spending during
the final months of 1978.

However, retail sales in real terms exhibited a

clear downward trend through the first six months, of this year, with the
June level sharply depressed by a drop in auto sales.

Rising gasoline

prices and uncertainty about gas supplies initially had a mixed impact
on auto sales: sales of large, fuel-inefficient cars plunged, while sales
of smaller domestic and foreign cars recorded an offsetting increase.
Most recently, however, the weakness in auto sales has broadened; this
may in part reflect supply constraints as domestic makers shift facilities
to the manufacture of small cars, but there appears to have been a general
falloff in demand during June.
The weakness in consumer spending has extended beyond the market
for motor vehicles, and it appears symptomatic of broader pressures on
household finances.

The personal savings rate reached historically low

levels last year, so that a further rise in the spending propensities
of households seemed unlikely.

Moreover, the record indebtedness and

debt repayment burdens of the household sector suggested that consumers
might manifest, on the whole, a more cautious spending behavior.

These

influences have been substantially reinforced this year by the effects of
accelerated inflation on the real disposable income of households.

The

budgets of many families have been squeezed by the upsurge in the prices
of food, fuel, and other basic necessities.

This has increased their

uneasiness about their personal financial positions and contributed to a
noticeable deterioration in consumer sentiment, as measured by most surveys.




7

136
REAL PERSONAL
CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES
REAL DISPOSABLE
Change
PERSONAL INCOME

from previous period,
annual rate, percent

I I
I I
I I
I

H1

1975

1976

1977

1978

SAVINGS RATE

1975

1976

H2

1979
Percent

1977

1978

HOUSEHOLD DEBT REPAYMENT RELATIVE TO
DISPOSABLE PERSONAL INCOME

Percent

23

22
21
20

1975

1976

1977

Data for the first half of 1979 are partially estimated.




1978

1979

137
Residential Construction
As noted above, adverse weather depressed building activity during
the opening months of 1979.

Private housing starts, which had consistently

run at an annual rate of just over 2 million units since a similar weatherrelated disruption the previous winter, fell to a 1-1/2 million rate in
January and February.

However, as construction picked up again in subsequent

months, the rate of housing starts remained below the 1978 pace, averaging
about 1-3/4 million units in the March-May period.

Thus, there has been a

moderate, but significant, downturn in residential building since the end
of

1978.
Several fundamental economic and demographic factors have continued

to bolster the demand for housing—especially single-family dwellings and
condominium apartments.

One of these is the widespread view, based in

large part on the actual experience of the past several years, that houses
are a good hedge against inflation and therefore an attractive investment
apart from the shelter services they provide.

Another is the movement of

a large portion of our population into the age group in which the rate of
initial home purchases historically has been relatively high.
Nonetheless, other underlying supply and demand influences have
acted to constrain the construction of new housing units.

The rise in

interest rates and the general tightening of credit markets over the past
year have been particularly important factors.

Homebuilders have found

that lenders are charging substantially higher rates for land development
and construction credit, and that they are showing greater selectivity
in the projects they will finance.

At the same time, potential builders

and homebuyers have been affected by increasingly stringent terms on
mortgage loans and, in some localities, by shortages of mortgage credit




9

138
PRIVATE HOUSING STARTS
Annual rate, millions of units

Total

Multi-Family

I
1972

1970

NEW HOME PRICES
AND CPI

1974

I

I

1976

I
1978

index MONTHLY CARRYING COSTS
|ndex
197601=100 AND PERSONAL INCOME
1976Q1=100

Single Family
Home
Price Index

Monthly
Carrying Costs,
Mortgages on
New Homes

~~

Personal Income

Consumer
Price Index

_L

J_

1976




1977

1979

1978

1979

1976
10

1977

1978

1979

139
caused by usury ceilings.

The combination of inflated house prices and

record mortgage rates implies costs of homeownership that bulk large
relative to the current incomes of many families.

This fact has deterred

some potential homebuyers and caused lending institutions to reject some
credit applications.

It also has given impetus to the development and use

of graduated payment mortgages, which are designed to alleviate the cashflow problems encountered in the early years of the traditional level
payment loan in an inflationary environment; however, these instruments
have not thus far attained an important role in the mortgage market.
In recent months, localized shortages of gasoline and generally
uncertain prospects about future fuel prices and supplies likely have been
another factor deterring home purchase and prompting a reassessment of
building plans.

Still, unit sales of new and existing single-family

houses have declined only moderately this year from the record pace of
1978.

Stocks of unsold single-family units, while perhaps less comfortable

than a few months ago when demand was stronger, do not appear to be a
significant depressant on new building activity.

Nor, in major contrast

to the last—and severe—housing cycle, is there a substantial overhang
of multifamily rental and condominium units for rent or sale.

Business

Investment
Business firms have continued to pursue generally cautious

spending policies, but their investment in inventories and fixed capital
nevertheless appears to have expanded significantly in real terms during
the first half.

Despite this further advance in business spending, there

is little evidence to date of the development of broad imbalances between
stocks or productive capacity and final sales that might seriously impede
the resumption of economic expansion.
11

49-596 0 - 79 - 10




140
The surge in final sales in the last quarter of 1978 drew down
stocks in many lines to the point where it seemed quite likely that some
rebound in inventory investment would occur in ensuing months.

However,

the book value of business inventories increased very rapidly in the early
part of 1979, causing some concern that the unexpected strength of demand
at year-end and the acceleration of inflation migtit have prompted a speculative hoarding of commodities—perhaps reminiscent of 1973-74.

These

concerns abated as it became clear that the accumulation of inventories
was relatively well balanced across sectors and across levels of processing
and that much of the acceleration in the rise of book values reflected
nothing more than the replacement of merchandise bought earlier at lower
prices with stocks acquired at current, inflated prices.

GNP accounts

data for the first quarter in fact indicate that, while there was an
appreciable pickup in real inventory investment, the rate of accumulation
remained moderate.
Inventory data for the second quarter are fragmentary.

Book-

value figures showed exceptionally high rates of accumulation in April—
especially at manufacturing concerns—but this evidently was attributable
in part to delays in shipments caused by the labor dispute in the trucking
industry.
however,

Inventory growth, again on a book-value basis, slowed in May;
it appears likely that real inventory investment for the second

quarter as a whole was considerably above the pace of the first quarter.
Nevertheless, inventories appear generally to have remained in
reasonably comfortable alignment with sales.

There are, of course,

exceptions, the most notable being in the motor vehicle sector.

With the

drop in demand for large cars this spring, dealers' stocks became very
sizable in relation to the current pace of sales.




12

Stocks of smaller

141
MANUFACTURING AND TRADE
INVENTORIES

Annual rate, billions of dollars

Change in Book Value
3-Month Moving Average

1974

1975

1976

1977

CHANGE IN BUSINESS INVENTORIES

1978

1979

Annual rate, billions of 1972 dollars

Quarterly, 1972 Dollars
20

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

RATIO OF BUSINESS INVENTORIES TO SALES

Ratio

Quarterly, 1972 Dollars

1.75

1.65

1974




1975

1976

1977

13

1978

1979

142
cars, in contrast, have been very lean in recent months, and customers
desiring particular models and features sometimes have encountered long
delivery lags.

On balance, the aggregate ratio of real business inven-

tories to real sales in the first quarter was well in line with recent
norms, but there probably was some deterioration in the picture during
the second quarter.
Business spending for new plant and equipment rose strongly
during the first quarter, providing substantial impetus to overall economic
activity; however, available evidence suggests that some decline occurred
during the second quarter.

The first quarter surge reflected a sharp

rise in equipment purchases.

Outlays for transportation equipment—

especially airplanes and automobiles—accounted for a good deal of the
strength.

During the spring, outlays for equipment apparently retraced

their earlier advance, owing in part to delays in shipments caused by the
labor disputes in trucking.

In contrast, spending on nonresidential

structures lagged in the first quarter, as the adverse weather conditions
interfered with building activity, but then snapped back smartly in the
spring.
An important factor bolstering demands for fixed capital has been
the higher rates of industrial capacity utilization that have prevailed
since the latter part of 1978.

Slower growth of industrial production

has resulted in a slight decline in utilization rates, but the rates have
remained at levels that have been associated in the past with periods of
strong investment demand.

Despite deep cutbacks in auto production, capac-

ity utilization in manufacturing last month averaged about 85 percent—only
three percentage points below the peak of 1973 and a fairly high level
historically.




Capacity utilization rates in the materials producing
14

143
REAL BUSINESS FIXED INVESTMENT

' DURABLE

EQUIPMENT

annual rate, percent

1972 Dollars
15

10

10

i
1975

I
1976

1977

NONRESIDENTIAL STRUCTURES

1978

1979H1

Change from previous period,
annual rate, percent

1972 Dollars
15

10

10

1975

1976

1977

Data for the first half of 1979 are partially estimated.




15

1978

1979H1

144
industries are not, on average, as close to the 1973 peaks.

However,

that period was marked by extraordinary pressures on production facilities
caused by a worldwide boom in demand for basic commodities, and by normal
standards operating rates currently are quite high in some materials
sectors.

Government Spending
Budgetary policy at both the federal and state and local levels
of government has continued to be characterized by restraint in spending.
Indeed, government outlays for goods and services declined in real terms
during the first half of 1979.
Federal purchases had fallen slightly, after adjustment for
inflation, during 1978, and declines were recorded in each of the first
two quarters of this year.

Total federal expenditures—including transfer

payments as well as outlays for goods and services—have been running
just a bit higher in nominal terms than had been anticipated in the
administration's budget plans.

However, the impact of inflation on incomes

has resulted in considerably stronger tax receipts than were projected, so
that the budget deficit has been substantially smaller than expected.
At the state and local level, weather-related curtailments of
construction reduced spending in the first quarter.

However, the

subsequent rebound in building activity was sluggish and may be indicative
of a tendency to defer further capital expenditures following a surge last
year.

Moreover, states and localities also have been limiting spending

by holding down employment: the number of workers on their payrolls in June
was about the same as one year earlier.




16

145
Federal Government
Purchases of
Goods and Services

Change from previous period,
annual rate, percent

1972 Dollars

State and Local Government
Purchases of
Goods and Services

Change from previous period,
annual rate, percent

1972 Dollars

1975

1976

1977

Data for the first half of 1979 are partially estimated.




17

1978

1979

146
The growth of the economy after 1975, combined with tax rate
increases enacted earlier, had led to the development of sizable surpluses in the budgets of many states.
past year.

This pattern was reversed in the

Numerous tax cuts were passed in 1978, and as a result per-

sonal tax receipts were 5 percent lower in the first quarter of this year
than in same period last year—even though the tax base had increased
16 percent.

With nominal expenditures therefore rising relative to

receipts, the operating surplus of state and local governments fell to
$3.8 billion, at an annual rate, in the first quarter; it appears that
the operating budgets may have moved into slight deficit in the second
quarter.

International Trade
The large decline in the exchange value of the dollar in 1977
and 1978 has enhanced foreign demands for U.S. exports.

This, along with

a relative strengthening of economic expansion abroad, has brought about
a distinct trend of improvement in the U.S. trade position.

The nation's

merchandise trade deficit—although quite variable from month to month—
has been considerably smaller this year than on average during
Moreover, the current-account

1978.

balance edged into modest surplus in the

first quarter for the first time since 1976 as receipts from overseas
investments remained strong.
Total exports advanced further in real terms during the first
quarter despite a falloff in shipments of agricultural products.

The

impact of the 1977-78 dollar depreciation was also evident in continued
relatively slow growth of non-oil imports.

On the other hand, the volume

of oil imports averaged about 9.3 million barrels per day (MMB/d) during




18

147
WEIGHTED AVERAGE EXCHANGE VALUE
OF THE U.S. DOLLAR*

March 1973=100

*Weighted average against other G-10 countries plus Switzerland
using total 1972-1976 average trade of these countries.

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

U.S. MERCHANDISE TRADE AND
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCES

1979

1978

Seasonally adjusted, annual rate,
billions of dollars

Quarterly Data

Current Account Balance

Trade Balance

I
1973




1974

1975

1976
19

1977

1978

1979

148
the first three months of the year as compared to an average of 8.7 MMB/d
during 1978.

In April and May the trade deficit widened as exports

remained at about their first-quarter level while the value of both oil
and non-oil imports advanced.

A fall in the quantity of oil imported

to 8.7 MMB/d in April and May was more than offset by price changes
that began to reflect the OPEC price increases and surcharges.

The unit

value of imported oil in May was 22 percent above its level in the fourth
quarter of 1978.
The improvement in the U.S. trade and current accounts this
year has helped to bolster the private demand for dollars in foreign
exchange markets.

The dollar rose almost 5 percent, on a trade-weighted

average against other major currencies, during the first five months
of 1979—even while the United States and other governments unwound
the heavy official intervention of late last year.

Over the past month,

however, the dollar has come under downward pressure; despite official
support, it has lost much of the earlier gain.

A relative firming of

money market conditions abroad has been a factor in this recent weakness,
but is not likely in itself a full explanation.

Foreign exchange market

participants seem to have been questioning whether the United States
will be able to deal successfully with its inflation problem, particularly
in light of the recent oil price jolt.




20

149
OPEC CRUDE OIL:
AVERAGE OFFICIAL SALES PRICE

Dollars per barrel
7/1/79 x ' r T

r

Note: Average price includes surcharges.
*Data are quarterly through 1978 and daily for selected dates thereafter.




21

150
SECTION 2.

EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Almost four years of exceptionally rapid growth in employment
had, by the end of 1978, given rise to considerable tautness in labor
markets.

Although businesses reportedly were encountering increasing

difficulty in finding workers with the desired experience and skills at
prevailing wage rates, the overall unemployment rate, at just under 6
percent, was well above past cyclical lows.

This seeming paradox

reflects in part longer-run changes in the composition of the labor
force and in the output mix of the economy; in addition, the increased
availability of unemployment compensation and other income maintenance
programs may have altered the incentives to seek or accept employment.
Despite a leveling off in production during the first quarter
of the year, monthly increases in payroll employment averaged 330,000—
well above the 280,000 per month average gain during 1978.

Gains in the

manufacturing industry were quite large, and the average factory workweek
remained at a high 40-3/4 hours.

Some easing in labor demands has become

perceptible since March, however, with employment gains averaging only
one-third of their first quarter pace.

Manufacturers have been reducing

employment levels by about 35,000 per month—with the auto industry accounting for the bulk of the decline—and the average workweek has dropped
to about 40 hours due to a cutback in overtime.

Outside of manufacturing,

hiring has continued in recent months, albeit at a reduced pace.

Still,

the unemployment rate has changed little since year-end, and such indicators as the average duration of unemployment and labor turnover rates
have remained at levels typical of fairly tight labor markets.




22

151
NONFARM PAYROLL
EMPLOYMENT

Change from previous period,
annual rate, millions

Q1Q2

1975

1976

1977

MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYMENT

1978

1979

Change from previous period,
annual rate, millions

Q1Q2

_L
1975

1976

JL
1977

1978

1979

UNEMPLOYMENT RATE




Percent

I

1975

1976

1977
23

1978

1979

152
SECTION 3;

WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY, AND PRICES

The pace of inflation has accelerated markedly this year.

The

Consumer Price Index rose at an annual rate of 13-1/2 percent through May
compared with the 9 percent increase over the course of 1978.

There has

been a comparable stepup in the advance of prices at the producer level.
Although the relatively high level of resource utilization has been a
factor sustaining the momentum of inflation, supply developments specific
to the food and energy sectors have accounted for much of the acceleration
this year in inflation.
Food prices played a substantial role in the increase in inflation
that occurred last year, and agricultural supply developments have continued
to be unfavorable.

In particular, beef production has remained on a down-

trend, leading to sharp increases in meat prices.

In addition, to rising

farm prices, the rapid increase in costs of nonfarm inputs involved in processing and marketing has contributed to the acceleration of food price
inflation.

The further rise of the federal minimum wage, for example,

was an important ingredient in the faster increase of prices for restaurant
meals in the first half.
Energy prices have risen dramatically this year.

Enormous

increases in the prices charged by the OPEC cartel, occurring against a
backdrop of significant worldwide pressures of demand on available supply,
contributed to a 37 percent annual rate of increase in the energy component
of the Consumer Price Index during the first five months of 1979.

The rise

in petroleum fuel and feedstock prices has in addition intensified cost
pressures across a broad range of U.S.




24

industries.

153
CONSUMER PRICES

Change from previous period,
annual rate, percent

TOTAL

10

FOOD

10

ENERGY
35

25

15

I
TOTAL EXCLUDING FOOD AND ENERGY




10

1975

1976

1977
25

1978

Dec

- 1978—
May 1979

154
The acceleration in the rise of other prices has been less
striking than that for food and energy, but it has been appreciable.
Exclusive of food and energy items, the Consumer Price Index rose at an
annual rate of 10 percent through May, 1-1/2 percentage points faster
than the average pace throughout 1978.

Pressures placed on prices of

final products by rising materials costs have played some role in the
broad pickup in inflation.

Prices of nonferrous metals and of other

actively traded nonfood commodities rose sharply early in the year when
the year-end strength of the economy apparently led to some upward revision
in expectations of future production levels and fears of consequent commodity
shortages.

In subsequent months, however, prices of many basic nonenergy

commodities weakened as the slackening of economic activity became evident.
In addition to materials prices, labor costs have been a source
of pressure on prices this year.

The rise in wage rates generally does

not appear to have accelerated, and surveys conducted by the Council on
Wage and Price Stability indicate broad compliance with its wage standard,
especially among large firms.

However, total labor costs were boosted

by enlarged employer contributions for social security and unemployment
insurance, and compensation per hour (including private fringe benefits)
in the nonfarm business sector rose at a 10-1/4 percent annual rate in
the first quarter of the year.

Meanwhile, output per hour dropped

markedly in the first quarter, so that the unit labor costs of nonfarm
businesses increased at an annual rate of more than 15 percent.

Labor

productivity apparently declined again in the second quarter, and while




26

155
UNIT COST INDICATORS
Nonfarm Business Sector

Change from year earlier,
annual rate, percent

Compensation per Hour

10

— 2

— 2

12

1975

1976

1977
27

49-596 0 - 7 9 - 1 1




1978

1979

156
the rise in unit labor costs likely was not quite so rapid as in the
first three months of the year, it probably was fast enough to raise
the first-half advance to a rate exceeded only in 1974.




28

157
SECTION 4:

FINANCIAL

DEVELOPMENTS

Growth of the monetary aggregates was considerably slower
during the first half of 1979 than in 1978.

At midyears all of the

major monetary measures—M-l, M-2, and M-3—were within the expected
ranges of expansion reported by the Federal Reserve to the Congress in
February.

Commercial bank credit at midyear stood slightly above the

path implied by its projected growth range, but the pace of overall credit
expansion in the economy had moderated appreciably.

Although businesses

stepped up their borrowing somewhat during the first half of the year,
there were more than offsetting declines in borrowing by other nonfinancial
sectors.

Interest Rates
The general level of interest rates on market securities has
changed relatively little since the beginning of the year after rising
markedly during 1978.

The federal funds rate—established in trading of

immediately available funds on an overnight basis—remained around 10
percent until late April when it edged upward about one-quarter percentage
point as the Federal Reserve moved to restrict bank reserve availability
somewhat further in light of a surge in the monetary aggregates.

Despite

the small increase in the federal funds rate, other short-term market
rates generally have declined somewhat on balance since December.

This

apparently is primarily a reflection of changing expectations about future
interest rate movements as economic activity gave evidence of weakening.
In long-term securities markets, bond yields reached new cyclical
highs during the first half, but retraced much of their advance in the latter




29

158
INTEREST RATES
SHORT-TERM

4-6 Month Prime
Commercial Paper

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

1978

1979

LONG-TERM
Home Mortgage
Interest Rate

Aaa Utility Bond
New Issues

1973




1974

1975

1976
30

1977

1978

1979

159
part of the spring as many investors became convinced that the peak in
money market rates had been reached.

Mortgage interest rates have continued

to rise, however, reaching record levels and prompting liberalization of
usury ceilings in many states in order to sustain lending activity.

Monetary Aggregates
After expanding rapidly earlier in 1978, M-l—demand deposits
and currency—leveled off in the fourth quarter and continued virtually
flat through the first quarter of this year.

Growth in this monetary

aggregate resumed in the spring, but the rise over the first half of 1979
was at only a 2.7 percent annual rate—considerably slower than the
7.9 percent and 7.2 percent increases registered in 1977 and 1978,
respectively.

With nominal GNP increasing at about a 9 percent rate thus

far this year, the very moderate expansion of M-l represents a substantial
shortfall from what might have been expected on the basis of historical
relations among money, GNP, and interest rates.
As was noted in the Board's February report to the Congress,
some weakness in the public's demand for M-l was anticipated because of
the introduction last November of automatic transfer services (ATS) nationwide and of NOW accounts in New York State.

The Board staff had projected

that transfers from demand deposits to savings accounts associated with
these innovations might reduce M-l growth by roughly 3 percentage points
over the year ending in the fourth quarter of 1979.

The impact of such

transfers on M-l growth was about that much early in the year, but it
apparently has dropped off in recent months.

Over the past two quarters

it appears that the impact of ATS and NOWs on M-l growth has been about
2-1/A percent, at an annual rate.




31

160
MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH
M-1

Change from previous period, annual rate, percent

12

I

1975

1976

1977

I

I

1978

I

1979H1

M-2

12

I

1975

I

I

1976

I

J_

1977

1978

1979H1

M-3




12

1975

1976

1977
32

1978

1979H1

161
Even after taking account of ATS/NOW effects, the demand for
M-l was unusually weak in the past half year, especially in the first
quarter.

It appears that, again as suggested in the February report,

the high level of interest rates reached in late 1978 prompted greater
than normal efforts to economize on non-interest-earning cash balances.
Individuals evidently have shifted demand balances into a variety of
interest-bearing assets, including small denomination time deposits,
Treasury securities, and shares in money market mutual funds.

The

growth of the money market funds this year has been quite striking:
over the past six months, the total assets of these funds rose from
less than $11 billion to almost $26 billion.

While these funds are an

imperfect substitute for checking accounts for transactional purposes,
they have provided many individuals with a high-yielding liquid asset
that may be purchased in small denominations.
The relatively high level of interest rates this year has also
had an appreciable impact on the interest-bearing component of M-2—that
is, commercial bank time and savings deposits other than large CDs.
Deposits subject to fixed interest rate ceilings have been weak since
last fall.

Inflows to six-month money market certificates (MMCs) provided

an offset to this weakness in the fall and winter.

With a change in

regulations in mid-March that eliminated the one-quarter percentage point
differential between MMC ceilings at thrift institutions and commercial
banks when the six-month Treasury bill rate exceeds 9 percent, MMC growth
at banks accelerated and provided the impetus for a pickup in the expansion of the time and savings deposit component of M-2.

Over the first

half as a whole, this component expanded at a 7 percent annual rate




33

162
and brought M-2 growth to a 5.2 percent rate, substantially below the
8.4 percent average rate of 1978.
Growth of M-3 also has moderated in recent quarters, averaging
6-1/4 percent, at an annual rate, during the first half.

This deceler-

ation was partly a reflection of the slower growth of the narrower monetary aggregates, but reduced deposit inflows at nonbank thrift institutions
also played a role.

The slowing in thrift deposit growth was especially

noticeable after mid-March when a share of the MMC market was lost to
commercial banks, but inflows in the second quarter still exceeded the
very low rates of past periods when high market interest rates caused
serious disintermediation.

Savings and loan associations made increased

use of large-denomination time deposits, which are not subject to regulatory rate ceilings, to offset some of the weakness in other accounts.

Credit Flows
Net funds raised in credit markets by nonfinancial sectors of
the economy during the first half totaled about $355 billion, at an annual
rate, according to preliminary estimates.

This is well below the $393

billion figure for 1978 and reflects the combined impacts of monetary
restraint and a number of other factors.
One of these other factors was the diminished size of the
federal budget deficit.

With a very large year-end 1978 cash balance

further reducing the Treasury's needs for new money during the first half,
federal government borrowing fell off sharply from the 1978 pace.

In

contrast with the pattern in late 1978, when they effectively financed the
Treasury's deficit with the proceeds of dollar-support operations, foreign
central banks sold a large volume of Treasury securities in the first




34

163
FUNDS RAISED BY
NONFINANCIAL SECTORS

Billions of dollars

400

Total

300

Foreign

100

1975

1976

1977

Source: Federal Reserve Flow-of-Funds Accounts.
Data for the first half of 1979 are partially estimated.




35

1978

1979

164
half.

A part of the sizable private capital inflow to the United States

during the first half was channeled through the Eurodollar market to the
U.S. banking system, which acquired a substantial volume of Treasury
securities.

Households were important buyers of Treasury securities, as

they responded to the enlarged gap between rates on such instruments
and those available on deposits subject to regulatory ceilings.
State and local governments have borrowed at a reduced pace in
1979.

This decline reflects the absence of advance refundings since

last August when more restrictive regulations were promulgated by
Internal Revenue Service.

Tax-exempt bond issuance for new capital in

first half was maintained at about the 1978 level, owing largely to a
sharp increase in sales of revenue bonds for mortgage financing purposes;
the pace of such housing-related financing slowed markedly in the second
quarter, however, as a consequence of congressional proposals to curtail
the use of tax-exempt bonds to fund low rate single-family mortgages.
Casualty insurance companies and commercial banks have absorbed the bulk
of tax-exempt bonds sold this year.
Household borrowing in the consumer installment and mortgage
credit markets has leveled off this year.

Although interest rates on

consumer loans have risen during the past year, the moderation in growth
of installment debt appears to be primarily a consequence of other factors
tending to reduce consumer spending.

The flattening in mortgage flows, on

the other hand, does appear more directly a consequence of rising interest
rates and the tightening of mortgage credit supplies.
On the demand side, households have deferred home purchase or
scaled down expenditure or borrowing plans in light of the higher cost
of mortgage credit.




On the supply side, even where usury ceilings have
36

165
HOUSEHOLD BORROWING

Bi,,ions of

STATE AND LOCAL GOV'T.

dollars BORROWING

Other

NONFINANCIAL BUSINESS

—

Billions of BORROWING BY
dollars NONFINANCIAL BUSINESS

Capital
Expenditures y

1975

1977

1979

Source: Federal Reserve Flow-of-Funds Accounts.
Data for the first half of 1979 are partially estimated.




Billions of dollars

166
not been a constraint, depositary institutions have pursued more cautious
loan commitment policies because of concerns about current or prospective
liquidity pressures.

Thrift institutions have reduced their mortgage

lending considerably this year as their deposit flows have diminished;
although the aggregate liquidity ratio of savings and loan associations
has remained well above the regulatory requirement, that liquidity
cushion has shrunk somewhat and the associations have borrowed heavily
from Federal Home Loan Banks and other sources.

Commercial banks, too,

have expanded their residential mortgage portfolios at a slower pace
this year, but there have been partial offsets to reduced depositary
institution lending in the form of credit flows from state and local
governments, life insurance companies, and federally sponsored agencies.
In the nonfinancial business sector, the growth of outlays for
inventories and fixed capital has outstripped that of internally generated
funds, and firms have increased their borrowing substantially.

An increased

share of the credit flow to businesses has been accounted for by commercial
banks, as many bigger firms have preferred—at current interest rates—
short- or intermediate-term bank loans to long-term bond issues with lengthy
call protection.

Commercial mortgage flows have remained large, however,

in reflection of the strength in nonresidential construction activity.

Life

insurance companies have provided a large portion of these mortgage loans
and, with pension funds, absorbed the bulk of a reduced volume of bond issues.
Commercial paper issuance was an increased source of short-term credit for
businesses in the first half, and finance company business loans continued
to grow rapidly

with much of the credit being extended to automobile dealers

to finance inventories.




38

167
Foreigners, who had borrowed in U.S. credit markets when the
dollar was weak in 1978, apparently did not expand their debt during
the first half of 1979.

This change was a significant element in the

overall decline in funds raised by nonfinancial sectors.
Financial sectors increased their borrowing in credit markets
during the first half.

Government-sponsored credit agencies stepped up

security issuance to finance assistance to the residential mortgage market.
Commercial banking firms and finance companies sold substantial volumes of
commercial paper and of bonds, including a number of floating rate issues
that offered investors a hedge against future interest rate fluctuations.
Savings and loan associations, after receiving approval from the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, issued commercial paper for the first time; toward
midyear there were also a number of mortgage-backed bond issues by S&Ls.




39

168

CHAPTER 2

"the objectives and plans of the Board of Governors and the
Federal Open Market Committee with respect to the ranges of
growth or diminution of the monetary and credit aggregates
for the calendar year during which the report is transmitted,
taking account of past and prospective developments in employment, unemployment, production, investment, real income, productivity, international trade and payments, and prices"




Section 108(a) Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978

169
SECTION 1.

OUTLOOK FOR MONETARY GROWTH

In February the Federal Reserve reported to the Congress on the
growth in the monetary aggregates that it expected would occur during the
current calendar year.

Expressed as ranges, and measured from the fourth

quarter of 1978 to the fourth quarter of 1979, the increases indicated were:
for M-l, 1-1/2 to 4-1/2 percent; for M-2, 5 to 8 percent; for M-3, 6 to 9
percent.

The range for M-l reflected an expectation that shifts of funds

from demand deposits to newly authorized ATS and NOW accounts would reduce
M-l growth by about 3 percentage points.

In addition, bank credit was

projected to expand by between 7-1/2 and 10-1/2 percent.
At its most recent meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee
reassessed the ranges for monetary expansion in 1979 and formulated preliminary monetary ranges for 1980.

With respect to 1979, the Committee

decided that it was appropriate to retain the previously established
ranges for the aggregates.

In reaching this decision, particular attention

was focused on the uncertainties surrounding the behavior of M-l.

As

was noted in the preceding chapter, the estimated impact of ATS and NOW
accounts on M-l expansion has been somewhat smaller to date than had
been expected when the range was initially adopted.

However, the future

extent of shifts to these accounts cannot be predicted with precision,
especially in light of the April court decision barring ATS and certain
other payments services as of January 1, 1980.

Thus, while the Committee

retained its original range for M-l, it expected growth to vary in relation
to the range to the extent that the actual ATS/NOW impact deviates from
the 3 percentage point figure projected earlier.




41

170
Even greater uncertainties faced the Committee in its consideration of monetary growth ranges for 1980.

Apart from the question of

possible judicial or legislative action that might affect the menu of
transactions accounts available to the public, the economic circumstances
and financial requirements of a period extending 18 months into the future
obviously cannot be foreseen with much confidence.

The Committee tenta-

tively decided that the ranges for 1980 should be the same as those for
1979, with the understanding that adjustments might be necessary in
response to legal or legislative developments affecting M-l and, more
generally, in light of emerging economic conditions.

In any event, it

was recognized that the current re-examination of the definitions of the
monetary aggregates, which is being undertaken in light of the major
institutional changes that have occurred in the payments system, might
in the near future lead to a new and improved set of money stock measures.
The ranges for the broader monetary aggregates, M-2 and M-3,
allow for continued moderate growth of the interest-bearing components
of those aggregates.

In past periods of high market interest rates,

inflows of deposits subject to regulatory interest rate ceilings weakened
markedly.

Investors "disintermediated," shifting their funds from banks

and thrift institutions into higher yielding market securities.

In the

past year, however, Inflows to such accounts—though smaller than in
1975-77—have been fairly well maintained.

The six-month money market

certificate, with a rate linked to Treasury bill yields, has permitted the depositary institutions to compete successfully for savings
against money market mutual funds and other instruments.
The growth ranges for the broader monetary aggregates imply
that the depositary institutions will experience adequate inflows of




42

171
lendable funds over the remainder of 1979 and in 1980.

The projections

for bank credit reflect an expectation that loan demands at commercial
banks will begin to moderate in the months ahead.

Business loan demands,

in particular, should diminish, with the corporate financing gap likely
narrowing and firms probably desiring to fund short-term debts in longerterm credit markets.
The monetary ranges established by the FOMC are consistent
with a policy of gradual reduction in rates of increase of the monetary
aggregates in order to curb inflation.

As shown in the charts on the

following pages, growth in the aggregates slowed in 1978, and a further
deceleration should occur this year.

A further deceleration in M-l

is likely to develop even in the absence of any shifting of funds from
demand deposits to ATS savings and NOW accounts.

The ranges tentatively

adopted for 1980 would permit continued slowing in monetary expansion.
However, there is considerable variability over time in the behavior
of the monetary aggregates, owing in part to financial innovations and to
changes in the publicfs asset preferences.

Since satisfactory economic

performance remains the basic objective of the Federal Reserve, monetary
policy, from time to time, may have to permit growth rates in the aggregates that temporarily interrupt the downward trend.
43

49-596 0 - 7 9 - 1 2




172
GROWTH RANGES AND ACTUAL M-1
M-1

Billions of dollars

. Actual
. Adopted Range
1978Q4-1979Q4

I

O

N

M-1

1975




D
1978

J

F

M

A

M

J

J

A
1979

I

S

I

O

I

N

D

Billions of dollars

1979

173
GROWTH RANGES AND ACTUAL M-2
M-2

Billions of dollars

- Actual
— — — — -Adopted Range
1978Q4-1979Q4

^-- 5%

O

N

D

J

M

A

M

1978

J

J

A

S

O

N

1979

M-2

Billions of dollars

8.4
10.9

1977
1978

1975




1976

1977
45

1978

9.8
8.4

1979

174
GROWTH RANGES AND ACTUAL M-3
M-3

Billions of dollars

Adopted Range
1978Q4-1979Q4

I

O

N

I

D

I

J

I

F

I

M

I

A

I

M

1978

J

J

A

S

O

N

D

1979

M-3

Billions of dollars
—11650

Percent Change
From Q4 to Q4

1975
1976
1977
1978

1975




1976

1977
46

1978

11.1
12.7
11.7
9.3

1979

175
SECTION 2.

OUTLOOK FOR THE ECONOMY

As noted in the introduction, the economy faces a difficult
adjustment to this year's oil price increases, which are aggravating
inflationary pressures and intensifying forces likely to depress
aggregate demand.

It now appears that economic activity may well

decline somewhat over the next few quarters, before turning upward
in

1980.
In the near term, real disposable income is likely to show no

more than modest gains, and consumers probably will spend cautiously.
Business spending may decline in real terms, reflecting the correction
of inventory imbalances—particularly in the auto industry—and a mild
retrenchment in fixed investment occasioned by the sluggishness of
consumer demand.

Housing construction activity can be expected to

decline somewhat further this year in response to the recent tightening
of credit conditions and to the weakness in income flows.

Export demand

should, however, tend to support activity.
During this period, industrial production and employment are
likely to edge downward.

The resulting easing of demands on productive

resources should help to contain inflation.

Pressures on credit markets

may abate and lay the groundwork for an upturn in homebuilding during

1980.
Moderate growth in real GNP should resume next year as the
initial effects of the oil shock abate and consumers begin to expand
their spending.

The completion of the inventory correction should

lead to a resumption in the growth of orders and production.

Employ-

ment growth would pick up in this environment, but it seems probable




47

176
that the pace of hiring will not be strong enough to cut into unemployment.
Inflation should edge lower, though progress may be quite gradual owing
to the strong upward momentum of unit labor costs, the continuing

rela-

tively tight supplies of some agricultural commodities, and the further
adjustment of the system to higher energy costs.
The economic outlook currently is obscured by exceptional
uncertainties, and the range of possible outcomes appears quite wide.
However, in order to improve understanding of the monetary objectives,
an economic projection representing the consensus of the Board members
at this time has been summarized in the table below and in a series
of charts on the next several pages.

Actual
1978

Projections
1979

1980

Change from fourth quarter
to fourth quarter, percent
Nominal GNP

13.1

8 to 10

8-1/2 to 11-1/2

Real GNP

4.4

-2 to -1/2

Implicit price deflator

8.3

9-1/2 to 11

8-1/2 to 10-1/2

5.8

6-1/4 to 7

6-3/4

-1/2 to 2

Average level in fourth
quarter, percent
Unemployment rate




48

to 8-1/4

177
NOMINAL GNP

1970




1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

178
REAL GNP

Ratio scale, billions of 1972 dollars

<di4°°

1979
1980

-2to-'/2

1

- /z to 2
J_

1970




1972

1974

1976
50

1978

I

1980

179
GNP IMPLICIT PRICE DEFLATOR

Ratio scale, index, 1972=100

./=

Percent Change
From Q4 to Q4

1970 5.1
1971 4.7
1972 4.2
1973 7.5
1974 11.0
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

JL
1970




J_
1972

7.5
4.7
6.1
8.3
9Vi to 11
1

8 /2

to 101/2

JL

1974

1976
51

1978

1980

180
UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
Annual
Averages Q4 Levels

JL
1970




1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

181
CHAPTER 3

"the relationship of the [Federal Reserve's] objectives
and plans to the short-term goals set forth in the most
recent Economic Report of the President"




Section 108(a) Full Employment and
Balanced Growth Act of 1978

182
SECTION 1:

THE ADMINISTRATION'S SHORT-TERM GOALS

The administration has recently announced its forecast_

of

key economic variables in association with the midyear budget update.
This forecast, which assumes no major new fiscal initiatives, contains
some significant changes from the figures contained in the January
Economic Report of the President.

In particular, real economic growth

through 1980 has been reduced and inflation has been raised.

The Administration's Forecast

1979

1980

9.2

10.3

Change from fourth quarter
to fourth quarter, percent
Nominal GNP
Real GNP

-0.5

Implicit price deflator

2.0

9.8

8.1

6.6

6.9

Average level in fourth quarter,
percent
Unemployment rate

_!/

The January Economic Report equated the 1979-1980 forecast with
short-run goals.




54

183
SECTION 2.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S GOALS AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S PLANS FOR
MONETARY GROWTH

The monetary ranges set by the Federal Reserve should be adequate
to finance the amount of spending in current dollars projected by the
administration.

However, the administration's forecast does seem to

envision a somewhat more favorable combination of real output and inflation
than that suggested by the Board's consensus projection.

The actual price-

output mix will be determined primarily by supply conditions and by other
structural or behavioral characteristics of the economy.

These relation-

ships are not known with certainty, of course, and thus many different
price-output combinations must be viewed as possible for given rates of
monetary growth.
Monetary growth rates are much more closely related in the
short run to nominal GNP than they are to the division of nominal GNP
between output and prices.

The tradeoff between output and price might

be improved, however, through the use of other policy tools.

Govern-

mental action to eliminate regulatory or market impediments to price
competition could be helpful in tempering inflationary pressures.

So,

too, could a continuing program of voluntary wage-price guidelines,
which may help in restraining the anticipatory actions that have made
the wage-price spiral so intractable.

The nation's ability to avoid an

escalation of inflation over the next year or so—without serious recessionwill depend in considerable degree on whether a means is found to overcome
the tendency for workers and businesses to seek higher wages and prices in
an effort to offset the effects of the income transfer associated with
the rise in oil prices.

Over the longer run, the ability of the nation

to achieve sustained growth of real income will depend importantly on
whether it can solve its energy problem.




55

184

The CHAIRMAN. So you expect in the short run interest rates to
rise, but you would hope that if these other elements develop
appropriately with greater fiscal restraint and so forth that interest rates may begin to moderate some time later on?
Mr. WALLICH. Without being quite that specific, yes, Senator.
The CHAIRMAN. That's not very specific.
Mr. WALLICH. I think in the short run there are stronger sustaining factors for interest rates in general than in the longer run.
With respect to long-term rates, I would expect that if we succeed
in reducing the inflation, long-term interest rates will respond
favorably. But if we do not lower inflation, there is nothing good
ahead for rates.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Governor Wallich.
Governor Wallich, as we all know, the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, Chairman Miller, has been appointed Secretary of the
Treasury. Is Chairman Miller still at the Federal Reserve Board? Is
he still operating out of there?
Mr. WALLICH. I saw him there yesterday.
The CHAIRMAN. Is he presiding? Is he chairing meetings?
Mr. WALLICH. The last meeting we had was chaired by the oldest
surviving member—the most senior member—myself. We have not
had a meeting since then so I really cannot tell you what the
situation is.
The CHAIRMAN. Is he active in any policies of the Board now?
Mr. WALLICH. I really do not know. I did not, other than in
passing him briefly, have much of a chance to talk to him. The
only conversation I had with him was on an unrelated matter, and
so I just do not know what the status is.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know if there's expected to be any Federal Reserve function for Chairman Miller from this time on?
Mr. WALLICH. You mean activity?
The CHAIRMAN. Any activity of any kind? Will he take part in
the Board meetings? Will he advise members of the Board in any
way?
Mr. WALLICH. To my knowledge, this has not been decided upon
or even examined.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would hope that decision is made. My
own view, which is strictly just this one Senator, is that if you're
going to have independence of the Federal Reserve Board, the
Secretary of the Treasury designate should have nothing to say
about it. After all, he's under a discipline, and the discipline is now
much clearer than it's ever been before, of this administration of
the President of the United States. The Fed is supposed to be an
independent agency and it would be peculiarly losing that independence if the Secretary of the Treasury designate has a voice in the
operations of the Federal Reserve Board in any way, shape or
manner it would seem to me. What's your reaction to that?
Mr. WALLICH. If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, I have great
confidence in Bill Miller to handle this situation properly; if he
were to continue to preside over our meetings for a short while, he
would do this in an absolutely proper spirit.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I'm sure he would do it in a proper spirit,
but there's not only appearance it seems to me; there's a breach of
any notion of—some people don't think the independence is very




185

important. Other people think it's critical. But we all know that
the Treasury has a major voice, in fact Secretary Blumenthal as
you know was designated by the President as his principal economic spokesman and to have the Treasury in any way, shape or form
be able to have an influence on the Federal Reserve Board seems
to me to be violative of what many people in this country and the
financial community think is very important.
Let me ask you
Mr. WALLICH. May I just say I very much appreciate your stressing this element of the Federal Reserve's independence, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it's an independence of the executive. It's
not independent of the Congress.
As you know, I feel very strongly that the Fed is a creature of
the Congress and the money power is given to the Congress by the
Constitution, and that it's a power that we have a responsibility to
keep independent of the executive.
In the event that Mr. Miller does, as I would expect him to do,
recognizes the importance as the Secretary of the Treasury designate to take him out of any influence over the Board, who will be
in charge? Who will be running the Board?
Mr. WALLICH. We are all assigned to committees. Board meetings
are chaired by the senior member on the Board—that is I at the
present time—until Vice Chairman Schultz is sworn in.
The CHAIRMAN. When Vice Chairman Schultz is sworn in, he
would be chairing the meetings?
Mr. WALLICH. I expect so.
The CHAIRMAN. As you say, you're the senior member of the
Board now. You have been there 5l/2 years. As we know, the Board
members are supposed to have 14-year terms and 3 years ago I
made a talk on the floor of the Senate and Chairman Burns later
said he agreed with me that the Federal Reserve Board was getting
to be known as the "rookies" because there were so many new
members and their terms of service are so short.
You're the senior member. The average term of service is a little
more than 2 years, which seems to contradict what the Congress
intended when we passed an act providing for a 14-year term. Why
has the turnover of the Board been so great in recent years?
Mr. WALLICH. Without being able to look into the minds of my
former colleagues, all of whom I respect and admire, I think there
are often financial problems: people have children of college age,
which does pose a serious problem.
The CHAIRMAN. So it's in part at least a financial problem. If we
were able to provide more adequate salaries for members of the
Board more in keeping with obviously what they can earn on the
outside, you might get a great degree of stability. Is that true?
Mr. WALLICH. I would think so.
The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that that turnover affects the
independence of the Fed. A person who's been recently appointed
by the President of the United States and isn't expected to stay
very long is less likely it seems to me to be independent than one
who is more likely to go the full term or go most of the full term.
Would that be your view, too?




186

Mr. WALLICH. At least there would be a bias in that direction. I
think the individuals, by virtue of character, can overcome that,
but it is different from what the Congress intended when it set up
these 14-year terms. I fully agree with that.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, any thoughts that you may have on what
we can do, in addition to the salary which I think is a very
legitimate suggestion—anything else that we can do to increase the
stability of the Board and the term of service, I'd be very grateful
to you for suggesting to us so we can do whatever we can do on a
legislative basis to encourage it.
Mr. WALLICH. If I may communicate with you on that I would be
very pleased to do that, Mr. Chairman.
[The following letter was received for the record:]
BOARD OF GOVERNORS,
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
Washington, D.C., August 3, 1979.
Hon. WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR BILL: I am writing in respone to your question, at the hearing on July 24,
concerning turnover on the Federal Reserve Board.
Here are some of the facts. Of the last eight members who left the Board, all
resigned before the end of their term, except Steve Gardner, who passed away, and
George Mitchell, who served out his term at the age of 71, while Arthur Burns
resigned when the chairmanship changed.
The other departures were:
Name
Jeffrey Bucher
John Sheehan
Andrew Brimmer
Robert Holland
Philip Jackson

Years served
3 years 7 months
3 years 5 months
8 years 5 months
2 years 11 months
3 years 4 months

Years uncompleted
10 years
6 years 6 months
5 years 5 months
1 year 8 months
3 years 2 months

The data indicate that, except for the three instances related to death, age, and
the chairmanship, all recent departures from the Board reflect a voluntary decision
not to stay on to the completion of the term.
My information on the reasons for these departures is of a casual sort, but it is
grounded in long and always very friendly contact with the individuals involved. My
colleagues, like most people, probably rarely have taken an important step for only
a single reason. But so far as I am able to judge, the financial factor has played a
role in all of the resignations in the table. This factor probably has taken different
forms. In some cases there was a clear difficulty of making ends meet, especially
with college-age children. In others, there may have been an opportunity to make a
good deal of additional money even though there was no pressing need for it.
No doubt there have been also nonfinancial factors of various sorts. One may
have been a feeling that the public and the press, if not the Congress, view the
Federal Reserve as a one-man operation and give other Board and FOMC members
little recognition. Another may be the increasing volume of detailed consumer
regulatory work unrelated to the monetary and banking sphere in which most
Board Members feel at home.
Under all these circumstances, it is perhaps not surprising that not many people
want to serve out 14 years. If you were to ask for suggestions, I would say that,
aside from such financial improvements as the government might be able to make,
a reduction in the consumer regulation workload and more frequent appearance of
Board Members at hearings might help.
I hope that these purely personal views may be of some use to you, and I very
much appreciate your giving me a chance to put them before you.
Sincerely yours,
HENRY C. WALLICH.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good.




187

Now the Board and the Open Market Committee decided to
maintain the same monetary and credit aggregates for 1979 and to
establish similar targets for 1980; is that correct?
Mr. WALLICH. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I'd like to get your interpretation of what that
means for the remainder of 1979. The growth range for M2 is 5 to 8
percent from the fourth quarter of 1978 to the fourth quarter of
1979. That's a 3-percent point range which I have said is too wide.
In the fourth quarter of 1978 to the second quarter of 1979, actual
growth was at 5.3 percent and in the range specified, but nearer
the lower end. Now according to what staff calculations are, the
Fed can be within its target range for M2 and over the next two
quarters M2 falls between 4.7 and 10.8 percent, a 6-percent spread.
Do you agree with those calculations?
Mr. WALLICH. I am sorry, I cannot do those calculations quite
that quickly in my head. We have ranges with a 3-percent spread.
It is also true that before we went to these ranges we had a
somewhat narrower spread. We have since encountered new uncertainties, especially with the ATS, so that it does not seem unreasonable to look for a little more leeway.
The CHAIRMAN. A little more leeway is one thing, but a spread of
six points—from 4.7 percent, which would be in M2 quite constraining, very constraining, to 10.8 percent which would be very expansive, doesn't seem to provide any discipline at all. What kind of
discipline are we really providing? Aren't we just saying whatever
occurs to you go right ahead and do?
Mr. WALLICH. The range of these aggregates indicates that it is
quite possible to go outside.
The CHAIRMAN. What's the likelihood of that?
Mr. WALLICH. We have been outside them earlier this year and
we have come back inside of them, so the range is not meaningless.
I would say that within the range there is room to maneuver. That
is, given developments that are now uncertain, one could end up
high or low in the range. For instance, if the ATS were to come in
differently than what seems likely, one could make such an adjustment within the ranges.
The CHAIRMAN. Would your preference be to have M2 growth
during the next 2 months closer to 10.8 percent or 4.7?
Mr. WALLICH. I would like to have it somewhat close to the
middle. If it has to differ from the middle, I would rather have it
below than above.
The CHAIRMAN. So you'd prefer to see it around 7 or so, 7.2 or
something like that? Maybe one thing we could do is simply take
the middle and judge you on the basis of how close you are to the
middle rather than a range which seems to me to be almost absurd
it's so broad. Section 2(a) of the Federal Reserve Act as amended by
the Humphrey-Hawkins Act requires the Fed to report its plans
and objectives with regard to growth rate ranges for the monetary
and credit aggregates. It doesn't specify what those aggregates are
to be. That's left to the Board and the Open Market Committee.
You now have four target variables, Mi, M2, M3 and bank credit.
What is the relative importance to each of those variables to the
Board and FOMC? How much attention is focused on Mi versus M3,
for example?

49-596 0 - 7 9 - 1 3




188

Mr. WALLICH. This is a matter of considerable debate not only
among central bankers but among academics. It is less complicated
when there are no great changes such as may result from ATS and
such as I think result to some extent from the workings of the
repurchase agreements and from the Euromarket and from the
money market funds. But this stricture applies to M2 and M4 to
some extent also; The aggregates are all impacted by the development of these money substitutes, and one does not know whether
one should add them to the money supply and account for them
that way, or whether one just says, "here are money substitutes
that allow us to do our business with less money than before." All
the aggregates need to be watched carefully. This leads me to be
somewhat more skeptical of aggregates in general, not just any one
aggregate, and I would look at this time both at bank credit and at
real interest rates as possible guides to policy, in addition to the
aggregates.
As for the discussion by the FOMC, there have been discussions
of how much weight might be given to M2 relative to Mi. Normally,
we give equal weight to the two, which really means giving more
weight to Mi because Mi is included in M2. If one were to give more
weight to M2, one would then really be equalizing the weights of
the two. Now the difficulty I have with M2 is that it does not seem
to be causally related to economic activity. Goods and products are
a consequence of economic activity, not a cause, whereas transactions balances—that is Mi currency demand deposits—can be conceived of as a causal factor. More money comes into existence and
exerts pressure for expenditures, lower interest rates That is why,
conceptually, I prefer Mi, but I must confess that right now I am
treating it with greater caution. I believe that is true of the other
FOMC members, too.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, the difficulty, of course, is that Mi, as you
say, the transaction accounts make Mi much more difficult to
measure. People can keep their liquid funds really in an interest
bearing account and not in the demand deposit and therefore it
escapes Mi. Furthermore, Mi is so much smaller than bank credit,
for instance. It's only about one-third of bank credit. Mi is about $1
billion and bank credits are over a trillion. It would seem to me
that bank credit would be a better measure of money. We got a
very strong indication of that from Henry Kaufman yesterday
when he testified.
In my judgment, he's a brilliant economist and he's been right
very often and his view was that bank credit would be a better
basis under present circumstances than Mi.
Now yesterday both Henry Kaufman and Ben Friedman indicated their strong preference for broader credit aggregates and more
weight to be assigned to credit. Harry Klein agreed with that.
Allan Meltzer, as you might expect, didn't.
Has the Federal Open Market Committee given consideration to
the use of a debt proxy, an M7 as Mr. Kaufman defines them?
Those are his preferences as an alternative to bank credit or credit
aggregate targets.
Mr. WALLICH. At one point in the past we had a variable known
as the bank credit proxy; it was not bank credit itself, but aimed at
representing bank credit. It turned out not to be a useful number




189

and we dropped it. But, personally, I find myself looking more at
credit than I did in the past because I believe that the expansion of
bank credit, in particular, business credit, has had something to do
with the way inflation has been accelerating. However, one has to
bear in mind that bank credit is just a relatively small fraction of
the total amount of credit. There are any number of ways in which
borrowing can shift from the banking system to nonbank sources—
to commercial paper, finance company lending, or to the bond
market, or even abroad. So that credit becomes a very, very
loose
The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't the debt proxy take care of that?
Mr. WALLICH. It depends on what you make it a proxy for. It
might be possible to assemble a batch of nonbank credit items—
commercial paper, finance company lending—and treat those in
combination with bank credit and get something helpful out of it.
The CHAIRMAN. Now total liquid assets is another—I think it
would be very helpful, Dr. Wallich, if you could direct the staff of
the Federal Reserve to come forward and, of course with your
supervision, and give us a view, an up-to-date view, on what—I
don't mean here at the meeting here, but I mean if they could
provide for us over the next couple weeks an up-to-date opinion of
how we should evaluate the various credit aggregates.
Mr. WALLICH. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. I think they have undergone a dynamic change
in the last year or so and we are lagging in our understanding and
information about them and therefore in our assessment of monetary policy, and if the staff and you could provide us with that, I
think it would help our understanding greatly.
Mr. WALLICH. We will be very glad to do that, Mr. Chairman.
[The following information was received for the record:]




190
August 21,

1979

Federal Reserve Staff Analysis of the
Credit Measures as Targets of Monetary Policy

It has been suggested that the Federal Reserve should replace the
monetary aggregates as interim targets of monetary policy with broader measures of credit or debt creation.

This argument has received impetus from

the somewhat erratic behavior of M-l and M-2 relative to movements in income
and interest rates in late 1978 and early 1979, and from related concerns
about defining and interpreting movements in the monetary aggregates in an
environment in which the structure of financial assets and liabilities in
the economy is changing rapidly.

It has been argued that these changes may

have reduced the closeness of the relation between GNP and current measures
of the money stock, and that a closer relationship might exist between GNP
and various credit measures.
The alternative credit measures that have been proposed as targets
range from bank credit, which is a relatively small portion of total credit
outstanding, to very broad measures that would include the total volume of
outstanding credit extended to nonfinancial sectors.
is the "debt proxy" advocated by Henry Kaufman.

One such broad measure

This measure comprises all

credit market instrument, deposits and currency held by the private domestic
nonfinancial sectors, including deposits at banks and thrift institutions,
corporate and foreign bonds, open market paper, and securities issued by the
U.S. Government and agencies, and by State and local governments.

As an

intermediate target, Kaufman suggests using either a flow-of-funds measure
of total liquid assets or M-7 which is closely related to liquid assets but
includes also deposit holdings of nonbank financial companies and foreigners.
The choice among monetary and credit variables for targeting purposes is in part an empirical question.




It is generally recognized that the

191
fundamental criterion in choosing a target variable is whether the variable
can be satisfactorily manipulated to achieve macro-economic
respect to inflation, employment, and real economic growth.

goals with
On one side,

this implies the need for a strong and predictable relationship between the
target variable and aggregate demand.

On the other side, it requires that

the Federal Reserve be able to control or influence the target variable

and,

through changes in the target, to effect changes in aggregate demand.
A key question, therefore, is whether the relationship between
credit measures and GNP appears stronger and more stable than the relationship between money measures and GNP.
conclusive.

Evidence on this issue is far from

It should be emphasized that this question cannot be answered

simply by looking at the magnitudes of financial variables relative to the
level of GNP or by comparing the longer-run trends in velocity (that is,
the ratio of GNP to a particular credit or monetary variable) of alternative
measures.

Thus, for example, it is not relevant that the total value of

claims composing the debt proxy has tended to approximate the dollar value
of GNP, while the money stock is about one-sixth the size.

In addition, the

apparent long-run stability in the ratio of GNP to the debt proxy does not
ensure a close correlation between short-run or cyclical changes in this
variable and changes in GNP.

Stated differently, a variable such as M-l,

whose velocity shows a strong upward trend over time, may still be a useful
target if short-run or cyclical changes in its growth rate generate systematic changes in aggregate demand.

A recent study suggests that the cyclical

variations in the velocity of M-l and velocity of the debt proxy have been
quite similar (see chart) although their longer-run trends are much different.




192
A frequently used method for examining the relation of money and
credit aggregates to GNP is regression analysis.

A number of studies in

the 1970s have compared the correlations that result when current growth
rates in nominal GNP are regressed on current and lagged growth rates of
alternative financial variables.

The results of these studies vary, depend-

ing, among other things, on which credit measures are used, on the particular
time periods covered, and on whether other factors such as strikes and fiscal
policy are taken into account.
Despite these differences, some general conclusions—which are
illustrated by the estimates in the attached table—have emerged from such
analyses.

It appears, for example, that broad credit measures, such as the

debt proxy and M-7, bear roughly the same degree of correlation with changes
in GNP as do the monetary aggregates when viewed over a long period.

Some

studies have shown the aggregates to be slightly better, while others have
marginally favored credit measures.

A few studies have included both monetary

and credit variables in the same equations and generally found that once
monetary measures are taken into account, very little increase in explanatory
power is gained by the addition of credit variables.

In recent studies, the

narrower measure of bank credit has not performed nearly as well as monetary
measures for the period since

1970.

The figures in the table suggest that a noticeable

deterioration

in the relationship between GNP and the monetary aggregate measures has
occurred in recent years.

Although a similar deterioration has occurred in

the relationship between GNP and the various credit measures, it appears
somewhat less severe for M-7 and the debt proxy compared to the money




193
variables.—

Considerably more analysis is needed to determine the nature

of this general deterioration and whether or not it reflects a temporary
phenomenon.

For example, unusual weakness in M-l-and M-2 in late 1978 and

early this year contributed to the reduced correlation coefficients in the
1970s.

But recently it appears that M-l and M-2 have returned to a more

normal relationship with interest rates and income which may reverse some
of the observed deterioration.
Clearly, interpretation of regression results of this type are
fraught with difficulties.
does not imply causality.

In particular, a high degree of correlation
For a financial variable to be a useful target,

it is important that changes in the variable lead to changes in GNP and not
the reverse.

A strong argument against the debt proxy has been made on the

basis that changes in income, through its effects on savings, induce changes
in the financial assets that comprise the debt proxy.

Hence, much of the

observed correlation between GNP and the debt proxy may be due to this incomesaving relationship.

A further problem with these regression analyses is

that the correlation coefficients for M-l and M-2 will be biased downward
if these aggregates have been used as target variables to offset other sources
of change in GNP--for example, if, when GNP was weakening, the Federal Reserve
fostered more rapid growth of money in order to strengthen GNP in the period
ahead.

T 7 A s shown in the table the debt proxy has a higher R for the period of
the 1970s than for the 1960s after adjusting for strike and fiscal variables.
However, this result does not hold up if the regression is confined to the
years since 1972. The sensitivity of these results to the time period of
analysis underlines the need for cautious interpretation.




194
Even if the empirical evidence did indicate a strong

relationship

between GNP and credit variables, the credit aggregates still would be useful as targets only if the Federal Reserve could influence their movements.
For a number of reasons, controlling broad credit measures is likely to present more problems than controlling the monetary aggregates.

The

fundamental

means by which the Federal Reserve implements its policy is through its open
market sales and purchases of securities.

The linkages between Federal

Reserve operations and broad credit measures involving all sectors of the
economy are much more complex and probably less predictable than the linkages between such operations and the monetary aggregates.

In particular

the Federal Reserve may seek, through open market operations, to influence
the Federal funds rate and hence other market interest rates and thereby
alter the public's demand for the particular financial aggregates that it
wants to control.

The success of this approach hinges upon the stability

and predictability of the public's demand for the asset at different levels
of income and interest rates.

Historically, the demand for money has demon-

strated a strong relationship with income and interest rates, although this
relationship has occasionally been less stable than would be desired--particularly since the mid-1970s.

In contrast, attempts to estimate the public's

demand for credit have not revealed a significant correlation between interest rates and income on one side and broad credit measures on the other.
'[he timeliness of data availability for target measures must also
be taken into consideration.

The "debt proxy" and other credit measures

that are derived from the Federal Reserve's flow-of-funds accounts are estimated only on a quarterly basis and typically are not available — even on a
preliminary basis—until several weeks after the end of the period.




Thus,

195
these variables would provide little or no information in the interim with
which to assess how well the Fed was meeting its target objectives.

The

current period correlation between the debt proxy.and GNP has led some to
suggest that this variable is a coincident indicator of GNP.

However, the

debt proxy data are not available any sooner than those for GNP, so one
would do just as well to look at movements in GNP to gauge the long-run
impacts of policy.

Monthly data are available on a more timely basis for

M-7 and the liquid asset measures proposed by Henry Kaufman, so that presumably these measures could be used as interim targets.

The reliability

of preliminary estimates of these measures is questionable, however, as
evidenced by the substantial revisions that frequently occur in subsequent
mon;hs.
Taking into account these various considerations, a compelling
case cannot be made for replacing the monetary aggregates with one or more
broad credit measures.

It is important, however that policy makers monitor

credit flow developments along with the money stock measures—and indeed,
this has been the practice of the Federal Reserve.

In addition to measures

of credit volume, the behavior of interest rates and other terms of credit
availability are watched closely as indicators of developments in financial
markets and the economy.

49-596 0 - 7 9 - 1 4







Regressions of GNP Growth Rate on Current and La[V)ed Growth Rates
of Various Monetary and Credit Aggregates

Variable

Full Period
1960-IV through 1979-1
R^

Early Period
1960-IV through 1970-11
R^

Late Period
1970-11 through 1979-1
R2

Current and four lagged growth rates in financial measures only
M-l
M-2
M-3
M-7
Debt proxy
Bank credit

.28
.29
.28
.29
.27
.12

.30
.38
.36
.32
.30
.42

.06
.01
.03
.11
.05
-.06

Including strike and fiscal variables

M-l
M-2
M-3
M-7
Debt proxy
Bank credit

.44
.41
.40
.42
.42
.32

.38
.40
.34
.33
.29
.47

.25
.19
.23
.29
.35
.15

Regressions relate percentage changes at annual rates in seasonally adjusted quarterly
values of gross national product to current and lagged values of percentage changes at
annual rates in seasonally adjusted quarterly values of the various financial measures.

^
o>

Velocity Growth Rates: M-l and the Debt Proxy
(Percentage changes from four quarters earlier)
Percent

o

a
6

Velocity of M-l

4
2
<£>

\r

0
2

/
i
'Velocity of the deb.t proxy

4

1955

959

963

967

1I ^-* /
Q7

1975

1979

Shaded areas represent periods of recession, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research,
Latest plot is 1979:Q1.
SOURCE: "Broad Credit Measures as Targets for Monetary Policy", Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Quarterly Review, Summer 1979.




198

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Riegle.
Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to commend the Federal Reserve for what I consider to be a frank and forthcoming midyear report. It's the first time
we have received projected target ranges for growth of the monetary aggregates past the current calendar year, and it's also the
first time that we have received an explicit forecast of economic
activity, and I want to congratulate the Fed on its new candor and
openness and I welcome this and I think it's an important step
forward in securing integrated and coordinated economic planning
and policy making.
I want to ask you some questions shortly about your forecasts.
But first—I don't know what the chairman may have said before I
arrived, but as one member of this committee, I find myself very
uneasy about the sudden movement of the Chairman of the Fed
away from that post into the Treasury position and creating what
has to be a discontinuity at the Federal Reserve. It's unclear who
might be named or when or how long it will take to get somebody
else in that position, but I think with our economic situation the
way it is today, that kind of change at that level of policymaking
raises great doubts as to whether or not we can steer a course of
economic strategy that the country needs.
I suppose time will tell how this will work out, but I, for one,
find it very unsettling in terms of where we seem to be right now. I
think the international reactions bear that out, that a lot of people
around the world also have great concern about exactly how we
intend to orchestrate national economic strategy. Who are the
players and the pieces? And the Fed is part of that question.
Hopefully, one of these days, we will have a clearer sense of what
the team looks like and who's in charge.
Presumably, we will have a new chairman designated for the
Fed.
But in the meantime I have a considerable concern about where
we are.
Let me ask you this: for years the Joint Economic Committee has
advised that monetary policy ought not to be used to achieve
international objectives and even though the Federal Reserve
report is silent on the subject, I have the impression that Federal
Reserve policy is very much geared to preventing the dollar from
weakening internationally. This morning's newspapers report
heavy intervention in support of the dollar. It certainly would be
hard to defend a rise in the rediscount rate following all the
sluggishness in the second quarter if the motivation were not to
prevent capital outflows.
I'm wondering then if I'm correct in assuming that the Federal
Reserve has rejected the JEC's advice and is now gearing monetary
policy to international concerns rather than domestic needs. Let
me just ask you to respond to that point first.
Mr. WALLICH. The rise of the discount rate was tied, as you
know, both to the dollar and to the behavior of the aggregates.
Even in domestic terms there was clear justification for monetary
restraint, and in terms of the behavior of inflation there is continued need for monetary restraint.




199

On the international side, this country is no longer what it used
to be 20 years ago when the foreign sector was about 3 percent of
GNP. Today it is going up close to 10 percent and the oil shock
tells us how heavily dependent we have become on the international sector. It is no longer possible to conduct any policy of this
government in complete disregard of the international situation. It
is still true that we are dealing with the dog and the tail, but the
tail has grown very considerably. Our domestic needs must have a
priority, but the international situation affects the domestic in
important ways. Where does this inflation come from? One percent
last year came from the decline of the dollar. We will probably get
another 1 percent from the lagged effects of that move. That is the
strength of these impacts. Meanwhile, the movement of the dollar,
of course, impacts abroad on economic activity and therefore on
demand for U.S. exports and on chances for improving our current
account; again we are potentially adversely affected. So the movement of the dollar hits us both inflation-wise and economic activity-wise and we cannot ignore it.
Senator RIEGLE. Well, my concern is this: weVe got a lot of other
things we have to deal with at the same time. We've got a very
ambitious proposed energy program. The more businessmen I talk
to, the more I hear about capital scarcity and the difficulty of
moving aggressively in capital investment and trying to do something about improving productivity. Yet interest rates keep going
up and it seems to me that as long as we keep as much of our
attention as we seem to be on the foreign factors that we are going
to be caught in a situation where even with a recession developing
and gathering momentum, we may not be in a position to respond
to it very quickly if the view is we've got to continue to be tough on
monetary policy because of international attacks on the dollar.
How do we reconcile these things?
Mr. WALLICH. If we have learned anything in the area of monetary policy and international economics, it is that the U.S. interest
is best served by a strong dollar—that we need a strong dollar.
That was less apparent some years ago, but it is very apparent
now, and our policies have to reflect that. I think that will help us
in all our other pursuits: it will reduce our rate of inflation; it will
strengthen our economy generally. I think we need to accept that
we cannot ignore the external value of our currency.
Senator RIEGLE. Let me just say this, I come from Michigan,
which is a particular kind of industrial State with which you're
familiar. I have been out there on several trips recently and Michigan really has the smell of recession all over it, and it's not just
the automobile industry. We have made fiscal cutbacks to show
fiscal restraint. We have cut into a lot of the domestic programs
and CETA jobs program. And the Chrysler Corp. is in very severe
financial difficulty. And as I watch this recession gathering momentum, and the obvious disarray in the Carter administration,
that to just hold to the view that supporting a strong dollar and
therefore keeping interest rates high is not looking at enough of
the picture at one time. That makes me very uneasy. I would like
to hear your views about how to prevent the recession from worsening, and I'd also like to know what to do about Chrysler. I think
it's about the tenth largest manufacturing company in the world.




200

About 500,000 workers, both direct and indirect, are affected. If
Chrysler were to go into a default any time soon, how would you
view that as a Fed policymaker? How, if at all, would that affect
your judgment about the whole question of interest rate policy and
trying to shore up the dollar?
Mr. WALLICH. Let me begin with your question about the recession outlook. It does seem likely that we are going to have several
quarters of declining real income of a mild sort and that we will
resume speed at a modest rate sometime in 1980. This recession, by
itself, should not be of a sort that could do major damage to a large
company if it were well run and were a sound company. Naturally,
one would be very concerned about something that might happen
to such a company, but monetary policy, I think, cannot be oriented exclusively to that. Credit is amply available. Bank credit has
never been anywhere near a crunch in this movement, in contrast
to some earlier episodes of cyclical peaking.
Senator RIEGLE. That's very interesting. When you say bank
credit is available, do you mean to the large business borrowers; is
that who you're referring to?
Mr. WALLICH. It is very generally available. There have been
some quantitative restraints in some areas for housing credit, but
even that industry has been a great deal better off than it has been
on past occasions because the flows of funds into the thrift institutions have moved through new channels and broader channels,
through new instruments like the money market certificates. Moreover, sources of mortgage credit have broadened through the development of such instruments as GNMA passthrough securities and
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation participation certificates. These have all helped to keep the flow of housing credit at
high levels even during the present difficult period.
Senator RIEGLE. Well, it's interesting to hear you say that. That's
not what I'm hearing from people that I'm talking with. When I
talk to the savings and loan people today they are distressed because the money is flowing out. If you get home mortgage money
today, it's at 11 percent which is the going rate around here. With
the downpayment percentage higher most people have been priced
out of the market and I'm afraid that from what I'm hearing here
and what I'm seeing in the way of policy response that we are
probably going to aggravate the recession with monetary policy.
I realize we're in a tough fix in the world and that's been a long
time in coming, but I'm not sure that the way to deal with that is
simply the strong use of monetary policy. We have tried that
before. We have an ample record that shows that that can be a
very costly way to go.
So I would hope that policy could be reconsidered before we find
ourselves on the downside of this rollercoaster again and by the
time we start making some adjustments the damage is done. One
thing you should take a very careful look at are the fiscal programs that exist right now. The programs of a countercyclical sort
have really been whittled away substantially so we don't have the
same things in place to cushion shocks as we had a few years ago.
If one made the same assumptions that you get the same resiliancy
effects out of certain fiscal programs that were countercyclical, it
would be a bad mistake. Those programs would now have to be




201

reenacted and I'm not sure that the Budget Committee, on which I
serve, is ready to do that yet, and I think you folks may have to
make some monetary adjustments and not be late in doing it.
The CHAIRMAN. Let me follow up what Senator Riegle has been
saying but in a precisely opposite direction. You mentioned that
you looked at real interest as an indicator of monetary policy; real
interest being, of course, the rate of interest minus the rate of
inflation; and you pointed out that the real interest rates over the
last few months have been negative. In other words, interest rates
are lower than the rate of inflation and therefore anybody lending
money is going to get back less than he loaned if he gets the going
interest rate.
Would that mean that the Federal Reserve policy has been too
expansive?
Mr. WALLICH. One cannot be sure on the basis of what I think is
a temporary upsurge in the GPL The real interest rate has to be
viewed in the light of an expected future inflation and I believe
that people think of the future rate of inflation as being much
lower than what we have suffered in the last half year. But,
nevertheless, the situation is that people are being paid to borrow.
They buy a house and the price of the house goes up at a rate that
is higher—typically, not always—than the rate of interest. In addition, they can take this off their tax. The real interest rate after
tax is heavily negative.
The CHAIRMAN. I notice in your forecast on page 54 of your
statement the implicit price deflator is 9.8 percent this year. That
would mean if you had an interest rate of 11 percent the real
interest rate for mortgages would be less than 2 percent. It would
be 1.2 percent, right? So it's not negative. It's positive there, but it
would still be an extraordinarily low rate based on past experience.
Mr. WALLICH. That would be before tax.
The CHAIRMAN. After tax it probably would be negative.
Mr. WALLICH. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. During yesterday's hearings Professor Friedman,
Henry Kaufman, and Professor Klein each told the committee
recession is either upon us or on the way and yet each also recommended with that in mind that monetary policy not ease at this
time. Friedman and Kaufman thought more restraint on Federal
expansion was needed. Klein thought a steady policy was needed
because of the problem of the value of the U.S. dollar internationally.
I've got two questions on that. First, is the majority of the Board
or a majority of the Open Market Committee inclined to have the
Federal Reserve ease its current policy in the near future without
verification of a true cyclical downturn?
Mr. WALLICH. You can only judge by present and past behavior.
During the long period when the aggregates were flat—the last
quarter of 1978 and the first of this year—you might have thought
that, in terms of an effort to keep monetary growth constant, a
reduction of interest rates would have been called for. But it
seemed to us, all things considered, that was not appropriate, and
interest rates were not reduced.
Right now, as you saw, the discount rate was raised by half a
percent. You also observed that the Federal funds rate went up.




202

Those are the indications of how the Board and the FOMC, of
which the Board is a part, think.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you personally think—I'm not sure on the
basis of your analysis here—that we are in a recession or about to
be in a recession?
Mr. WALLICH. It seems likely to me. It takes a strict National
Bureau analysis. Generally a recession means two consecutive
quarters of falling real GNP, and even then the experts may find
something to quibble about.
The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday these very distinguished economists
said it may be technically, but it's not really a recession because of
the level of unemployment and other elements.
Mr. WALLICH. One might end up viewing the historical record
that way. As of now, I would say that quite likely we will have two
or more quarters of declining real income, quite possibly caused by
these exogenous factors such as the OPEC price increase, and that
when the economy starts on the way up again, sometime early next
year, we will see that there were several quarters of declining real
income and call it a recession.
The CHAIRMAN. What set of domestic economic conditions do you
think we have to have in order to permit the Fed to follow policies
that would reduce interest rates without a seriously adverse effect
on the dollar?
Mr. WALLICH. I think the dollar is mainly governed by fundamentals. Interest rates play a role. If the rate of inflation came
down, that would be, I think, the most favorable development. In
the area of energy, enactment of a strong program—and, if the
President were willing to change his mind, decontrol—I think
would be powerful supporting factors.
The CHAIRMAN. Now last week the West Germans, as you know,
raised their discount rate. The Japanese raised their discount rate.
We raised our rate. Yet we seem to have a difference of opinon
between central banks as to the appropriate role in increases in
the discount rate. The foreign central banks raise their rate to
fight inflation at home. The Fed seems to raise their rate in order
to protect the dollar abroad.
How far will the Federal Reserve be willing to continue this
policy of raising domestic interest rates to protect the dollar?
Mr. WALLICH. There is a difference, I think, in the role of the
discount mechanism between the United States, on one side, and
Germany and Japan on the other. In the latter two countries, the
banks get a large part of their reserves through rediscounting
private paper, which I suppose is in some part a reflection of the
way they view the role of the private sector. We get most of our
reserves for the banks through open market purchases of Government securities. That makes the discount rate in Germany and
Japan more directly connected to the domestic situation. If most of
the reserves come via a rediscounting at a price that is the discount rate, the importance of that rate for inflation is probably
somewhat more direct.
The CHAIRMAN. Now Chairman Miller told the Congress that
fiscal policy should remain tight. Of course, he's now going to be as
Secretary of the Treasury in a position to enforce that notion; and




203

that if the situation permits, that monetary policy should be eased
rather than fiscal policy.
Given the current outlook, including inflation, energy, the value
of the dollar, and the very serious budget constraints that Senator
Riegle and I are especially sensitive to at the present time, do you
agree that the mix of fiscal and monetary policy favored by Chairman Miller should be followed?
Mr. WALLICH. The mix of policies is a very important issue. It is
certainly true that in the past the fact that we have had a relatively easy budget and not so easy money has worked against investment. From here on out, it seems to me the first consideration
ought to be that we avoid fine tuning and not try to turn the dials
of the money supply in the hopes of catching a not-very-prolonged
recession. The lag is 6, 9, or 12 months, and we may very well find
the first effects of any action now, either fiscal or monetary, occurring by the time the economy has already turned around.
Second, I would say that if anybody contemplates monetary
policy by asking what is easing and what is tightening, easing, in
my opinion, should never be defined in a situation of inflation as
an acceleration of the monetary aggregates. That would just mean
that a year or two down the road inflation would accelerate. What
an easing may mean is that with monetary aggregates whose rate
of growth is maintained as per our specifications and a slowing of
the economy—especially if there is a decline in the Federal deficit—interest rates would go down reflecting the reduced demands
on the capital markets.
The CHAIRMAN. Now we have a number of people who advocate a
tax reduction. Even the expert witnesses yesterday who favored a
tight fiscal policy somehow were able to square that with a recommended tax reduction. Henry Kaufman recommended a $15 billion
tax cut and others recommended a tax cut of some substantial
proportion.
The Republicans in the Senate are circulating a letter trying to
get a $30 billion tax reduction. They are going to make it an issue
apparently in the coming campaign. And, in general, people say if
we have a tax cut it ought to be a tax cut aimed at combating
inflation by stimulating investment, by stimulating savings, and by
encouraging compliance with the wage-price guidelines or TIP or
something of the kind you and Arthur Oakum have advocated. Do
we need the stimulus of a tax cut and, if not, is there a body of
evidence that suggests that targeted cuts will elicit the desired
behavior of capital formation savings as anti-inflation?
Mr. WALLICH. As of now, and speaking for myself, I see no need
for a tax cut. I see inflation as our main concern. I think the effect
of a tax cut might well come too late in a relatively mild recession.
The CHAIRMAN. It would come a lot quicker than a spending
increase.
Mr. WALLICH. Well, we know even with tax cuts there may be
lags before people begin to raise their expenditures. In any event, if
there were to be a tax cut, I would hope that it would be directed
toward correcting the distortions of inflation on corporate taxes
and corporate accounting. We are collecting far more taxes from
corporations than we intended because of the spurious profits that
are generated under inflation through inventory gains, which are




204

not real gains, and underdepreciation, which is no gain at all. And
if we had money to spare, I think that depreciation practices
should be corrected through investment tax credits or accelerated
depreciation; this is how we should invest those tax resources.
The CHAIRMAN. My time is just about up. Before I yield to
Senator Riegle, let me ask you about whether or not you're still
pressing for—you're famous for many things, Dr. Wallich. One of
them is that you're one of the advocates, as I said, along with Dr.
Okum, of a program to try to encourage holding down prices and
holding down wages through taxes, TIP. Do you feel this is the
time for that kind of action?
Mr. WALLICH. Yes, I do. I have learned through TIP that new
ideas do have to be pushed, and somebody has to do it so I continue
to try. I have a new version of this which, if you will permit, I can
tell you about very briefly. It involves a wage guideline and a twostage process of wage-setting. In the first stage, a moderate wage is
set in accordance with the guideline. The risk to labor here is that
prices may rise and profits may rise more than anticipated. If this
occurs, there is a second stage in which the increased profits that
have come from the limitations on wage increases are distributed
between labor and business. This could be done at the micrplevel,
firm by firm. This has certain advantages. It also has some difficulties. It could be done at the macrolevel by putting an excess profits
tax on that part of the profits that comes from rising prices in the
face of constrained wages and then using the proceeds from that
excess profits tax to reduce income taxes in the lower brackets.
That would give labor some protection against the risks of accepting a guideline.
The CHAIRMAN. Very interesting. If you'd like to give us further
details on that, we'd be happy to have them. It sounds very interesting.
[Governor Wallich subsequently furnished the following information for the record:]




205
BOARD DF G O V E R N O R S

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2 O 5 5 I

HENRY

C. WALLICH

M E M B E R DF THE B O A R D

August 3, 1979

The Honorable William Proxmire
Chairman
Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
Washington, B.C.
20510
Dear Chairman Proxmire:
During my July 24 testimony before the Senate Banking Committee
on the conduct of monetary policy, you made reference to my proposal for
a tax-oriented incomes policy ( I )
TP.
As indicated, I have recently modified my proposal and am happy
to enclose a copy of the new version for your review.
Inasmuch as Senator Riegle also expressed an interest in this
subject, I am also sending him a copy of the revised proposal.
Thank you for your interest in this matter.
Best wishes.
Sincerely yours,

Henry C. Wallich

Enclosure




206
August 2, 1979

"A New Version of TIP"
by

Henry C. Wallich

This note describes very summarily a new approach to the taxoriented incomes policy (TIP) which has been discussed in various forms
and which recently found expression in the administration's proposal for
real-wage insurance.
The most serious obstacle to acceptability of TIP, in the light
of recent experience, seems to be Labor's concern that their acceptance
of a wage guideline might lead to excessive profits on the part of business.
In the light of historical experience, this concern may seem unnecessary.
Prices have tended to follow wages closely except when events like bad
crops or oil price increases have broken the relationship.

Ordinarily,

fixed mark-up pricing ties prices to wages, with profit margins constant.
Nevertheless, labor's concern needs to be met.
My new version of TIP proposes to do this by means of a twostage approach to wage setting.

In the first stage, wages increases

are to be restrained by a guideline.

In the second stage, if, contrary

to expectations, profits have increased abnormally following wage
restraint, there is a secondary wage increase that, in economic terms,
amounts to a form of profit sharing.

This could be accomplished either

at the micro level, by renegotiation of individual wage contracts, or
at the macro level, through an excess profits tax.
If the scheme is carried out at the micro level, a guideline
would have to be set for a "normal" increase in profits.

Firms that

had profit increases in excess of the guideline would renegotiate wages




207
so as to share the "excess" with their employees according to some formula.
If that formula were set during the initial wage negotiation, it would
save negotiating effort later and perhaps create incentives for greater
productivity.

Some nationwide formula for the sharing of the excess is

also conceivable.

The share of profit being distributed to the employees

would, of course, have to be tax deductible to the company.
The advantage of this micro approach is that it adapts itself
easily to individual company circumstances.

A disadvantage is that some

companies may have no above normal profits while others do.

The employees

of both types of companies, on the other hand, would be affected equally
by rising living costs.

Thus protection against rising living costs would

be unequal.
A macro approach would proceed by levying an "excess profits tax"
on above-normal profits.

The proceeds of the tax would be used to reduce

income taxes in the lower brackets, or alternatively to compensate the
employees of the tax-paying companies in proportion to their wage shortfall with respect to profits.

This latter alternative would require a

complex evaluation of the amount of shortfall.
The excess profits tax could be structured in two ways.

It

could take the form of a tax on only the abnormally high part of profits.
This would require a very high tax rate in order to yield revenues that
would compensate for any meaningful reduction in individual tax rates.
The familiar adverse consequences of high excess profits taxes would
ensue.

A definition of "abnormally high" profits would be required.
Alternatively, the corporate tax rate could be raised for all

corporations, whether they had abnormal profits or not.




The increase

208
would be aimed at keeping constant the share of corporate profits in GNP,
or bringing that share closer to some benchmark.

This would involve a

rise in the corporate rate of only a few points, without major disincentive
consequences.

It would, on the other hand, increase the tax burden even on

companies whose profits had remained unchanged or had declined.

A bench-

mark for the appropriate share of corporate profits in GNP would be
required.

The easier way of applying the proceeds of such a broad-based

tax to the compensation of wage earners would be through a reduction in
lower income tax brackets, rather than on the basis of individual wage
experience.
The foregoing alternative versions of TIP have some similarity
with the principle of real wage insurance that has been before the Congress.
They differ, broadly, in avoiding its budgetary burden, by limiting the
compensation paid to employees to a share in abnormal profits or the
proceeds of a tax thereon.
likely to be less.

The amount of compensation, consequently, is

Moreover, particularly where compensation is given

through tax reduction, it is bound to be much more loosely related to the
magnitude of any wage

shortfall.

The proposals also differ from the present system of guidelines
in being limited to a guideline on wages.

The curb on profits comes from

the second-stage wage negotiation or the tax on abnormal profits.

The

proposals resemble present wage guideline principles and the guaranteed
real wage idea in recognizing that, in order to break into the wage-price
spiral, somebody has to move first, but that there will be no loss to the
first mover, unless this move were followed by a redistribution of income
toward profits.




It is in the nature of things that the first mover must

209
be labor and wages, because they constitute the bulk of income.

Making

profit receivers move first, by accepting a freeze of profits, would have
virtually no quantitative significance.

A larger move, such as cutting

profits by some percentage in order to slow down prices, would have
severe repercussions on the economy without necessarily bringing on a
slowing of wages.
The principles underlying the foregoing proposals permit a
great variety of applications, only a few of which are stated here.

My

preference is for a macro version with an "excess profits tax" affecting
all corporations, i.e., designed to bring the share of corporate profits
back to some benchmark level when that share has risen as a result of
acceptance by labor of a wage guideline.




210

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Riegle.
Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, am very interested in the TIP concept and we have been
doing some work on it and, as a matter of fact, putting some
concepts into legislative language to see what we can develop in
the way of a vehicle, so I would very much like to see that latest
refinement you describe here.
In terms of your suggesting that maybe we should find some way
of tax indexing for companies on depreciation and what you see as
an overstatement of profits, why wouldn't exactly the same rationale apply on the personal tax side? Aren't we finding with bracket
creep people in effect paying taxes on incomes that don't represent
real income increases? If we're going to make the adjustment,
shouldn't we make it on both sides?
Mr. WALLICH. It is certainly true that there is a bracket creep
and that people therefore are paying more in taxes than was
intended. The quantitative effect, I think, is much larger on the
corporate side.
I believe that about 25 percent of book profits before tax are now
treated by the Department of Commerce as nonoperating profits, as
profits due to underdepreciation and inventory gains.
Senator RIEGLE. Well, I think we would be very hard pressed to
start adjusting for inflation on the corporate side and not also
make adjustments for individuals. For example, taxing nominal
interest income—I mean the discrepancy between the rate of inflation and what the people are paying tax on in the way of, say, a
51A percent interest rate on a savings account—I don't know how
you can address one and not the other.
Mr. WALLICH. I very much agree with that part of your argument, Senator. We are taxing the inflation premium. With the
inflation premium, the 51A or 5 ¥2 interest rate is not anywhere
near adequate, so that is an area of serious distortion.
Somebody whose pay goes up 10 or 12 percent per year—of which
perhaps only 2 percent is real—also suffers from that distortion.
He does not suffer as grievously. We have fairly routinely engaged
in tax cuts that, broadly speaking, have kept the effective rate of
taxation—that is, the ratio of taxes paid to taxable income—constant. We have not raised that rate. That rate could go up over
time. I think if inflation continues, in time there will be a need to
make such a correction, but I would like to see that done on its
merits and not mixed in with a cyclical situation and with an
attempted fine tuning which I think could be counterproductive.
Senator RIEGLE. Let me ask you this. This is a blunt question,
but I hope you would be as frank as possible in answering it, and
that is:
Being in the Federal Reserve and looking over at the policy
within the administration, and in light of what we've seen and the
acceleration of inflation in the last few months, is it your view that
there really is an anti-inflation program at this point?
There's obviously one in name, but in terms of one in substance,
and any comprehensive way, do we really have an anti-inflation
program working at the moment?
Mr. WALLICH. I think a considerable effort has been made. The
Congress has brought the budget deficit down; the budget process




211

itself is under better control. The Federal Reserve has made an
effort. It has not been enough in the circumstances.
One could say that we have had bad luck. We have been hit by
food price increases; we have been hit by the oil price increase. One
could say that this was not foreseeable, and in any event, not
controllable. But, of course, when an inadequate effort is made, bad
luck becomes worse.
I would argue that we have to strengthen our effort. I do not
think we fully understand how damaging inflation is.
I think the inflation is responsible for a good part of the drop in
productivity gains. In other words, it costs us an enormous amount
over time that can never be made up; more, in my opinion, than
unemployment has cost us. It is in that sense that one could say
that we have not made enough of an effort.
Senator RIEGLE. With the bind that we are in which you've
described very well this morning, if we're going to produce our way
out of this situation, it's obviously going to take major capital
investment and other changes that can improve productivity, and
yet the policy that you are following to fight inflation and presumably shore up the dollar is to have a tighter monetary policy.
You don't foresee a serious recession, you don't see letting up
much on the monetary side, as far as I can judge from what you
said, and I'm not sure how we ever stimulate capital investment
and productivity gains.
Is there another avenue, or are we just going to be caught in this
bind for some period of years?
Mr. WALLICH. We are caught, Senator, in a very bad bind. This
can be eased over time on the tax side, on the regulatory and
through positive stimulation of investment in energy, which we
desperately need.
I do not think that much would be accomplished in attempting to
stimulate business spending by a temporary easing of monetary
policy. People are looking at investments that they are going to
have to make over a period of years. Much of the investment that
will be put in place is not for this year, but for future years; the
level of interest rates during the last part of 1979 is not going to
influence that very much.
Senator RIEGLE. One final thing from me, and that is:
If we find the recession develops faster and is more severe than
we anticipated, and the run of bad luck continues in other forms,
so that we really have a serious recession developing, what course
of action would you suggest for the Fed, if we were to find that
scenario developing?
Mr. WALLICH. I see that scenario as not having a great deal of
likelihood. If it should develop, then we would have to make a new
assessment. In that case, again, we would have to look at the
possibility of a tax cut. We would have to look at monetary policy.
But again I would warn of excessive fine tuning. We have been
lured into error with that every time. We have finally reached a
situation in which both inflation and unemployment are very high
because we always switched from fighting one to fighting the other
to fighting the first again; and we always lagged behind. I think
steadiness is a very good watchword for our policy now.

49-596 0 - 7 9 - 1 5




212

Senator RIEGLE. But if we carry that forward—and I know you
don't anticipate a serious recession, but if one develops and if the
answer of the Fed is, we've got to stay on a steady course and tight
money is the order of the day, and it will be downward-reimforcing
and make the recession worse, I'm wondering is there ever a point
at which the Fed would wake up one day and say, "Maybe this is
not a good policy response"?
Mr. WALLICH. Historically the Fed has always eased up; I think
it has done too much rather than too little. I think you can be
confident that if the circumstances—that you probably do not anticipate but are asking about in a hypothetical sense—arise, there
will be action; but I think it is premature to contemplate that.
Senator RIEGLE. Just one other thing. We're going to have a
Treasury Secretary who has just come from the Fed, and he may
well have a different view on that policy role, because he is not
independent in a sense, as you members of the Fed are. What if he
has one view as to what the Fed policy ought to be and you have
another, and he starts to lean on the Fed? How would you react to
that?
Mr. WALLICH. Relations with the Treasury have been very good,
and I hope they will continue to be very good. We are in close
touch all the time. We never have exactly the same opinion, but
such differences, as they exist, are easily removed. I really do not
see a great problem, particularly under Bill Miller.
Senator RIEGLE. Well, I hope you are right. I fought very hard to
get Miller confirmed here. But it's not just Bill Miller, it's Jimmy
Carter and Hamilton Jordan, and whoever else. Miller has given
up a great deal of his independence, whether he realizes it or not,
because the Treasury Secretary is not the same thing as Chairman
of the Fed, as you well know. And I hope tension don't arise, but
it's conceivable that they might very well arise. The head of the
Treasury, the Secretary, is going to be responding to the initiatives
of the administration, which may or may not coincide with your
judgment or the judgment of the the Fed collectively.
So I would hope if tensions arise, the Fed would continue to be
an independent body.
Mr. WALLICH. Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wallich, yesterday Mr. Kaufman challenged
the notion of gradualism. He said everybody is for gradualism and,
of course, that's kind of like mother and apple pie and Fourth of
July and baseball and Chevrolet, and all those good things that we
like to think are American. We're gradual, we're not extremists,
we just do everything gradually.
He says gradualism has a terrible performance record in monetary policy and fiscal policy, we ought to forget it, and that we
ought to—what we need now is a real attack on inflation, not a
gradual attack, saying over the years we're going to follow policies
that ultimately will get us down to maybe 8 percent, 7 percent, and
so forth.
He said we've been doing something like that, or we think we
have, and it hasn't worked. What's your reaction to that?
Mr. WALLICH. I think there are degrees of gradualism, but I
cannot see anything but a gradual approach. Inflation is not going
to be stopped overnight—I think that is a delusion—not even with




213

TIP, not even with drastic measures. We have to be prepared.
What we have to do is keep inflation at the top of our priorities
and stick to the flight. In that sense, a more massive attack on
inflation seems very desirable to me, but not in the sense that one
could do something drastic now and get it over with in a year.
The CHAIRMAN. But a more massive attack, you wouldn't disagree with that, a more forceful and restrained fiscal policy, and
perhaps even monetary policy? But you'd say what you have to do
is recognize that whatever you do, you're going to have to stick
with it for years in order to succeed?
Mr. WALLICH. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, during the past 13 weeks, we've had quite
an increase in monetary aggregates, better than 11 percent rate
growth in both Mi and M2.
Given the short-term interest rates that are at historic highs and
therefore ought to be restraining the growth in money supply,
what's the explanation for this recent rapid growth?
Mr. WALLICH. In the short run, the behavior of Mi often is very
puzzling. One can always explain some part of these sudden
bulges—a couple of percentage points—by things that have to do
with tax collections, the timing of the Treasury checks
The CHAIRMAN. This is a full quarter, 13 weeks, not just week to
week.
Mr. WALLICH. At some point that just becomes hard to explain,
just as hard to explain as why during the preceding two quarters
Mi was so flat.
One has to assume that there may be shifts in what economists
call the demand function for money, for Mi, and that businesses
and people from time to time take a different attitude with respect
to the amount of money they want to hold relative to their transactions. Perhaps the availability of these money substitutes plays a
role, but we see that the deviations are both on the up side and the
down side.
We have seen, in the past, very substantial deviations on the
down side, below what was expected. One can only say that as soon
as one begins to try to control an economic variable, it ceases to be
as easy a phenomenon as when it is merely observed by economists.
The CHAIRMAN. Last week the House of Representatives took an
action that has put the banking community in a dither. They've
been in a dither about this all along.
They approved the so-called the Fed membership bill by a wide
margin. As passed, the legislation would do the following:
No. 1, would perpetuate the voluntary reserve requirement
system until and unless the ratio of deposits of members as a
percentage of total bank deposits falls below 67% percent.
Second, would make a very large reduction in reserve requirements.
Third, set the reserve requirements on all time and savings
deposits, including large corporate CD's, at zero.
And fourth, cost the Treasury and the American taxpayer over
$300 million net at a minimum, in the beginning, and the cost
would be greater as time goes on.




214

How does the Board view this legislation as it was passed? Favorably or unfavorably?
Mr. WALLICH. The basic membership problem exists, it is well
known. Here is an effort to come to grips with it. It is not ideal.
The question is how far from ideal can it be before one says that it
is not good enough.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, does the board approve or not?
Mr. WALLICH. We have not reached that point yet. We would
have preferred
The CHAIRMAN. How do you feel about it personally?
Mr. WALLICH. I believe it is very important to come to a conclusion on this membership debate, but I have not studied the legislation sufficiently to make any determination, so I would like to keep
my vote open on that. But as of now, I would not say that it is
unacceptable.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, that $300 million bothers me plenty. It's
very hard to justify it at a time when we are holding down spending on all kinds of social programs, and we have to. I favor holding
those down. But then turning around and providing hundreds of
millions of dollars to the bankers—you can understand how that's
a little hard to sell in Oshkosh. Except in the Oshkosh banks.
[Laughter.]
Mr. WALLICH. I have to agree to that.
You are aware, are you not, Mr. Chairman, that because of
inflation bank profits are totally distorted. What happens to the
average bank due to inflation is that it loses something like ll/2
percent of its capital each year in a 10-percent inflation. The other
2l/2 percent is covered by hard assets, buildings and so on. By
deducting from bank earnings this annual attrition of capital from
inflation, only about half or less is left.
The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me if I don't take my handkerchief out
and start sobbing for the banks. [Laughter.]
The Fed is considering placing reserve requirements on repurchase agreements. Chairman Miller has also been in favor of reserve requirements on Eurocurrencies. I'd like to have your opinion
on both of these, and an indication of whether such zero requirements would help monetary controls. First on repurchase agreements.
Mr. WALLICH. The Board has asked for comment on the question
of placing reserve requirements on repurchase agreements. I would
think that one might want to place a restraint on something growing more than 25 percent per year.
It is not only the degree of restraint that comes from reserve
requirements, but also competitive equality. If there are two
sources of credit, and one is burdened with a higher cost than the
other, that is going to cause a distortion. It is going to cause the
untaxed one to expand more rapidly.
I feel the same way about Euromarkets. I do not see reserve
requirements on Euromarkets as acting primarily as a restraint on
the expansion. I see them as acting as a competitive equalizer.
Under H.R. 7, of course, as it now stands, the reserve requirements on time deposits and therefore Euromarket deposits would
not exist. But H.R. 7 also provides that if reserve requirements on




215

Eurodeposits were negotiated, then they could be placed on domestic time deposits.
The CHAIRMAN. As a competitive equalizer, do they—does it help
monetary control?
Mr. WALLICH. Yes, I think very much. And for this reason: at the
present time the Euromarket is expanding much faster than the
domestic. One has to see the two together if one wants to see what
it is that one wants to control, to get to expand at the proper rate.
Now either we ignore the Euromarket—which means we are
probably allowing the domestic market to expand faster than it
should—or we look at them both together and observe that the
component we can control is expanding too fast and is pulling the
combination up. Then we have to work harder—that is restrain
harder—the domestic component in order to bring down the rate of
growth of the combination. That means restraining domestic credit
more severely in order to offset the consequences of overexpansion
in the Euromarket.
If we had equality of competitive conditions, if the Euromarket
did not have a cost advantage, it would not expand any faster, and
it would be under the control of domestic interest rates, to the
same extent as the domestic sector.
The CHAIRMAN. Would you comment on the need for reserves on
time and savings deposits at banks and thrift institutions?
Mr. WALLICH. On transaction balances, I think this is very logical, because we are now moving into a phase
The CHAIRMAN. Can you confine it to time and savings balances?
I'll agree with you on transaction balances.
Mr. WALLICH. Yes. I meant NOW accounts and their equivalent—share drafts, demand deposits at savings banks and so on.
The CHAIRMAN. The question was on the need for reserve requirements on time and savings deposits.
Mr. WALLICH. Yes. I would say there is a need on savings deposits that are subject to ATS or transactions balance.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Wallich, I want to thank you very
much.
You're a splendid economist, and you've made, I think, a very
fine presentation, and were most responsive and helpful, and made
an excellent and helpful record for us, and we are grateful to you.
The committee will stand adjourned, and I also want to apologize
if we've made you tardy for your appointment. I hope you make it.
Mr. WALLICH. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 o'clock a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Additional information received for the record follows:]




216
C re dit P o l i c y a n_d_ _Ijl_O a ^ ion

by

Peter Konijn and Michael

K. Ulan*

For years it has been assumed that c o n t r o l l i n g
the money supply is the key to h a l t i n g i n f l a t i o n .
The Q u a n t i t y Theory of Money links the q u a n t i t y of
m o n e y in c i r c u l a t i o n to the level of p r i c e s in the
economy.
We have e x a m i n e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n
s e v e r a l measures of "money" and the C o n s u m e r Price
Index.
We have f o u n d a "money" which e x p l a i n s more
than 99% of U.S. i n f l a t i o n .
T h e r e f o r e , the key to
c o n t r o l l i n g i n f l a t i o n is to r e g u l a t e the supply of
"money" as we will d e f i n e it.

*Peter Konijn is a Senior E c o n o m i s t working for
Esther P e t e r s o n , S p e c i a l A s s i s t a n t to the P r e s i d e n t
for Consumer A f f a i r s and D i r e c t o r of the U.S. O f f i c e
of Consumer A f f a i r s .
He h o l d s a Ph.D. from the
W h a r t o n School of the University of Pennsylvania.
M i c h a e l K. Ulan is a Senior E c o n o m i s t at the U.S.
D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e .
He h o l d s a Ph.D. from the
University of Pennsylvania.
This a r t i c l e was w r i t t e n by Peter Konijn and M i c h a e l
K. Ulan as p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s .
No o f f i c i a l s u p p o r t or
e n d o r s e m e n t by the U.S. O f f i c e of Consumer A f f a i r s ,
the W h i t e House, H E W , or the D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e
is i n t e n d e d or s h o u l d be i n f e r r e d .
The authors wish to thank R o b e r t E. W e i n t r a u b , S t a f f
D i r e c t o r of the H o u s e S u b c o m m i t t e e on D o m e s t i c M o n e t a r y
Policy, for h e l p f u l g u i d a n c e and L a w r e n c e R. K l e i n ,
Benjamin Franklin P r o f e s s o r of E c o n o m i c s at the Univ e r s i t y of P e n n s y l v a n i a , for his c o m m e n t s on an earlier
draft.




217
The "money" to which we refer is Total C r e d i t
Market Debt or simply, "Credit." The Federal Reserve
Board defines Total Credit Market Debt as the sum of:
U.S. government securities, state and local obliga-tions,
corporate and foreign bonds, m o r t g a g e s , consumer c r e d i t ,
open-market p a p e r , r p f s , and other loans.
We examined the relationship between the price
level and the supply of C r e d i t per dollar of real GNP .
We found that a one-percent change in C r e d i t per unit
of GNP leads to a 0.9-percent change i n ' t h e Consumer
Price Index after three m o n t h s . For e x a m p l e , a 10-percent increase in Credit per unit of GNP will cause a 9percent increase in the Consumer Price Index.
This relationship is highly significant from a
statistical point of view. The q u a r t e r l y d a t a used
in our study covered the period from the beginnning of
1960 to the m i d d l e of 1978.
In addition to the Credit v a r i a b l e , we t e s t e d the
relationship between the Consumer Price Index and the
supply of each of the Federal Reserve Board's five
"M's" per unit of real GNP. Each of the Fed's "M's"
explains less about the cause of inflation than does
the C r e d i t variable.
Policy R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
The results of our investigations i n d i c a t e that
inflation can be controlled by keeping the increase
in the supply of Credit in line with the growth of
real output in the economy.
The supply of Credit can be considered to have a
fiscal and a monetary component. The fiscal c o m p o n e n t
is comprised of f e d e r a l , s t a t e , and local securities.
The fiscal component can be controlled through tight
b u d g e t policies.
The remaining portion of Credit can be c o n s i d e r e d
the monetary component control of which lies with the
F e d e r a l , R e s e r v e Board. By changing the reserve r e q u i r e -




218
merit, the Fed c o n t r o l s the s u p p l y of c r e d i t e x t e n d e d
by banks to i n d i v i d u a l s and b u s i n e s s e s . By c h a n g i n g
the margin r e q u i r m e n t , the Fed controls the supply
of c r e d i t e x t e n d e d to purchasers of securities.
Implications

of Our Policy R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

Our policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n can slow or stop inflation. However, there are some costs to the implementation of a policy of credit restraint:
1.

p e o p l e who buy on c r e d i t will not
enjoy being told t h a t , in order to
fight inflation, they cannot get
so much credit as they might like;
and

2.

the policy may be recessionary.
The extent of the recessionary impact of a credit-restriction policy
may be m i t i g a t e d by tightening credit
gradually. The more g r a d u a l the
slowing of the rate of increase in
the supply of Credit, the shallower
any induced recession will be; however, the more g r a d u a l the process,
the longer the length of time that
would be required to reach the goal
of a Credit supply that is expanding
no faster than the real o u t p u t of
the economy and the longer the
"shallow" recession will last.




219
Appendix

Here we present t a b l e s c o n t a i n i n g r e s u l t s for
the q u a r t e r l y ordinary least squares r e g r e s s i o n s
e s t i m a t e d . We have e s t i m a t e d e q u a t i o n s for e a c h
of the Fed's five "M's" and the Credit v a r i a b l e
which was d e f i n e d previously. An e x p l a n a t i o n of
column h e a d e r s follows:
lag'-

number of quarters that the liquidity
v a r i a b l e is l a g g e d b e h i n d the p r i c e
v a r i a b l e in the regression

cons

estimated constant

x

e s t i m a t e d e l a s t i c i t i e s of the Consumer
Price I n d e x with respect to the l i q u i d i t y
variable

rho

e s t i m a t e s of the c o e f f i c i e n t of a u t o r e g r e s s i o n
from t h e e q u a t i o n

- A + bX + \ u

Y

t

t
R

2

correlation

in the e q u a t i o n

»

+£

t-1

t

coefficient

F

F-ratio -

SEE

s t a n d a r d error of

DW

Durbin W a t s o n s t a t i s t i c

(

)

the n u m b e r s in p a r e n t h e s e s

*
liq

estimate

Cochrane-0rcutt

adjusted equation

liquidity variable, M




are t-ratios

t h r o u g h M , or C r e d i t

220
We e m p l o y e d a C o c h r a n e - O r c u t t p r o c e d u r e t o t r y
to remove a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n from the d i s t u r b a n c e terms.
The procedure removed the serial c o r r e l a t i o n for each
e q u a t i o n involving C r e d i t and one of the e q u a t i o n s
i n v o l v i n g M-^ and one i n v o l v i n g M2 . H o w e v e r , for the
Credit e q u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g m o r e than a o n e - p e r i o d lag
and for the M]^ and M£ e q u a t i o n s m e n t i o n e d above, the
e l a s t i c i t y estimates in the a d j u s t e d e q u a t i o n s were
markedly d i f f e r e n t from those in the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
ordinary least squares equations.
We hypothesize t h a t
the changes in the e l a s t i c i t y e s t i m a t e s , which occur
when the C o c h r a n e - 0 r c u t t - a d j u s t e d d a t a are used, arise
b e c a u s e the i m p a c t c a p t u r e d in the a d j u s t m e n t p r o c e s s
is t h a t of the l i q u i d i t y v a r i a b l e with a lag d i f f e r e n t
from t h a t of the e x p l a n a t o r y v a r i a b l e e x p 1 i c i t l y - s p e c i fied in the e q u a t i o n s .
The v a r i o u s l a g g e d l i q u i d i t y
v a r i a b l e s are h i g h l y - c o 1 1 i n e a r .
In no case is the parti a 1/c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t b e t w e e n any two lag specifications of a l i q u i d i t y v a r i a b l e less than 0.95.
In
view of the c o l l i n e a r i t y among these v a r i a b l e s and the
effect the c o l l i n e a r i t y a p p e a r s to h a v e on the estim a t e d e l a s t i c i t i e s in the M^ and M2 e q u a t i o n s , those
Co ch r an e --0 r c u 1t - a d j u s t e d e q u a t i o n s are not p r e s e n t e d .
An a t t e m p t to r e d u c e the e x t e n t of the c o l l i n e a r i t y
among the regressors t h r o u g h the use of an Almon transf o r m a t i o n of the d a t a was m a d e .
If s u c c e s s f u l , the A l m o n
p r o c e d u r e would have p e r m i t t e d the e s t i m a t i o n of the e l a s ticity of the CPI with r e s p e c t to more than one r e g r e s s o r
in a single e q u a t i o n .
It would also h a v e r e d u c e d or
e l i m i n a t e d serial c o r r e l a t i o n a m o n g the r e s i d u a l s of the
e q u a t i o n s if the a u t o c o r r e l a t i o n were b e i n g caused by
the exclusion of s e g m e n t s of the lag s t r u c t u r e f r o m . t h e
individual equations. However, the Almon t r a n s f o r m a t i o n
failed to r e d u c e p a r t i a l c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f i c i e n t s among
regressors to less than 0.90.
The h y p o t h e s i s that the lag s t r u c t u r e is not fully
s p e c i f i e d is s u p p o r t e d by the f a c t t h a t when long-run
e l a s t i c i t i e s with r e s p e c t to each of the M's and C r e d i t
are e s t i m a t e d for the p e r i o d 1960-1977 using annual
D e c e m b e r d a t a l a g g e d one y e a r , only the M-^ e q u a t i o n
e x h i b i t s serial c o r r e l a t i o n , a n d a l l e q u a t i o n s e x c e p t
that e m p l o y i n g M]_ h a v e R 2 ' s of at least 0.985. These
long run e q u a t i o n s are p r e s e n t e d in the t a b l e e n t i t l e d ,
"Annual Equations."
In the l.ong-run e q u a t i o n s , the M e l a s t i c i t y e x c e e d s
unity by a s t a t i s t i c a 1 l y - s i g n i f i c a n t e x t e n t , a c o n d i t i o n
that is not consistent with a q u a n t i t i y - t h e o r y a p p r o a c h




221
to price-level d e t e r m i n a t i o n unless the v e l o c i t y
of c i r c u l a t i o n is i n c r e a s i n g , a m a t t e r t h a t was
not e x a m i n e d here.
There a p p e a r s not to be much
reason to c h o o s e , among the long-run e q u a t i o n s for
M2 through M^ , or C r e d i t as v e h i c l e s to e x p l a i n
the long-run response of the price level to changes
in the monetary base.
However, in the short run--periods of less than
a year--Credit o u t p e r f o r m s any of the M's as an
"explainer" of the p r i c e level.
The fact t h a t the
e s t i m a t e s of the short-run e l a s t i c i t i e s for C r e d i t
are so close to the e s t i m a t e d long-run e l a s t i c i t y for
that v a r i a b l e i n d i c a t e s that the r e a c t i o n of the
price level to a change in C r e d i t is very much frontl o a d e d ; hence, the s u p e r i o r e x p l a n a t o r y power of C r e d i t
in the short run b e c o m e s c r i t i c a l to p o 1 i c y - makers.







Q u a r t e r l y Tables

cons

rho

RL

_F

SEE

DW

i l
l

1.928
(1762)
0*

X

0. 884
(159)

0 .691
(9.22)

0 .997

25 ,260

0 .00565

0. 498

Credit

1. 931
(735)

0.869
(68)

-0 .046
(-0.38)

0 .999

59 ,633

0 . 00368

2 . 026

Credit

1.930
(1664)

0 .902
(149)

0.728
(9.34)

0 .997

22 ,059

0 .00604

0 .511

Credit

1.933
(599)

0.882
(56)

-0.089
(-0.76)

0 .999

50 ,271

0 .00400

2 . 173

C redi t

1.932
(1473)

0. 921
(130)

0. 806
(12. 17)

0 . 996

16 ,918

0 .00689

0 . 352

C redit

1.935
(1209)

0.937
(105)

0.787
(12.43)

0 .994

11 ,064

0 .00851

0 . 332

Credit

1.937
(1,041)

0.952
(89)

0.830
(13.92)

0 .990

7, 972

0 .0100

0 . 283

Credit

to

K




Quarterly Tables
cons

X

rh o

R2

F

SEE

DW

lig

0

3.543
(60)

2. 134
(25)

0.939
(32)

0. 897

630

0 .0339

0. 064

Ml

1

3.574
(54)

2.174
(23)

0.923
(33)

0. 878

518

0 .0370

0. 064

Ml

2

3.600
(48)

2.207
(20)

0 .922
(36)

0. 852

414

0 .0407

0. 054

Ml

3

3.623
(43)

2.236
(18)

0.937
(37)

. o .826

341

0 .0442

0. 051

Ml

4

3.639
(38)

2 . 256
(17)

0 .934
(37)

0. 793

276

0 .0482

0. 049

Ml

0

2.488
(615)

1.017
(108)

0. 862
(13)

0. 994

11,582

0 . 00832

0. 304

M2

1

2.500
(620)

1.034
(111)

0.837
(12)

0. 994

12 ,259

0 .00809

0. 358

M2

2

2 . 513
(587)

1.055
(107)

0. 844
(12)

0. 994

11,521

0 .00846

0. 337

M2

3

2.526
(541)

1.075
(101)

0 .820
(12)

0. 993

10, 209

0 .00886

0. 372

M2

4

2.540
(489)

' 1.097
(93)

0.809
(12)

0. 992

8 , 731

0 .00958

0. 367

M2

^




Quarterly Tables
rho

0

2.260
(924)

0. 889
(91)

0.866
(17)

0.991

8,193

0.00988

0.193

M3

1

2 .268
(870)

0 .902
(88)

0 .888
(18)

0.995

7,662

0.0102

0.190

M3

2

2 .277
(816)

0 .919
(85)

0 .912
(20)

0.990

7,145

0.0106

0.163

M3

3

2 .285
(753)

0.934
(80)

0.891
(18)

0.989

6,431

0.0111

0.185

M3

4

2. 294
(705)

0.952
(77)

0 .894
(18)

0.988

5,978

0.0116

0.198

M3

0

2. 415
(442)

0.897
(67)

0.942
(21)

0.984

4,445

0.0134

0.143

M4

1

2 . 424
(457)

0 .910
(70)

0.937
(19)

0.986

4,969

0.0127

0.170

M4

2

2.435
(464)

0 .925
(73)

0.945
(18)

0.987

5,344

0.0122

0.182

M4

3

2. 445
(466)

' 0.939
(75)

0.919
(16)

0.987

5,629

0.0119

0.234

M4

4

2.455
(468)

0.954
(77)

0. 893
(14)

0.988

5,900

0.0116

0.272

M4

8




Quarterly Tables
cons

X

rho

R'z

F

SjiE

DW

itSL

0

2.234
(794)

0 . 830
(71)

0 .914
(22)

0 .986

4 ,970

0 .0127

0. 13

M5

1

2.240
(775)

0 .841
(71)

0. 924
(22)

0 .986

4 ,985

0 .0126

0. 13

M5

2

2 .248
(750)

0 . 854
(70)

0. 940
(23)

0 .986

4,936

0 .0127

0. 12

M5

3

2.256
(716)

0. 866
(69)

0 .920
(21)

0 . 985

4 ,743

0 .0129

0. 15

M5

4

2.263
(690)

0 .879
(68)

0. 920
(20)

0 .985

4 ,652

0 .0131

0. 16

M5

lag

C7<




Annual Equations

rho

R2

F_

SEE

DW

1.933
(475)

0.959
(41)

0. 294
(1.28)

0.991

1,717

0.00966

1.33

Credit

3.615
(19)

2 .221
(8)

0.730
(6.36)

0 . 803

65

0 .0460

0.28

Ml

2.536
(227)

1.091
(43)

0.070
(0.26)

0.991

1,847

0 . 00961

1. 86

M2

2 . 294
(336)

0 .956
(37)

0.320
(1.37)

0.988

1,334

0 . 0113

1. 29

M3

2 . 451
(230)

0.946
(37)

-0,050
(-0.19)

0 . 989

1 ,392

0.0110

1.99

M4

2, 262
(331)

0.878
(32)

0.320
(1.50)

0.985

0.0127

1.20

1,045

O

M5


Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, One Federal Reserve Bank Plaza, St. Louis, MO 63102