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STATE COLLEGE LIBRARY
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MAURICE J. TOBIN, Secretary
WOMEN’S BUREAU
FRIEDA S. MILLER, Director
The Legal Status of Women in the
United States of America
January 1, 1948
REPORT FOR
ILLINOIS
Individual State material, constituting part of a
compilation to show the present legal status of
women in the United States of America
Bulletin of the Women’s Bureau, No.
157-12 (Revised)
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON • 1949
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.
Price 10 cents
5T
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA
In response to continuing domestic and international needs, the
Women’s Bureau has prepared a revised edition of its 1938 report on
the legal status of women in the United States of America.
The revised report is based on an examination of the Constitutions,
official statutes, and significant decisions of courts of last resort of
the Federal Government and the several States, as well as pertinent
law texts of recognized authority.
This pamphlet presents a digest of the material compiled for a
single State, which has been incorporated in the complete report.
n
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
United States Department op Labor,
Women’s Bureau,
Washington, November 23, 1948.
I have the honor to transmit to you a revised report on the
legal status of women in Illinois. This is one of 54 separate reports con
stituting a survey of the laws of the 48 States, the District of Columbia,
the territories of Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Eico, and the United
States possessions, the Canal Zone and Virgin Islands.
The original report for each jurisdiction represents a thorough
search of statutes and decisions of appellate courts construing its
statutes or establishing its judicial policy. Revision covers important
changes by legislative action.
The study was made by Sara Louise Buchanan. Attorney on the
Women’s Bureau staff, member of the bars of the Supreme Court of
the United States and of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Valuable
assistance was given in the preparation of the report by Mary Lorretta Sullivan, Associate Economist, and Elizabeth Batson, Editorial
Assistant, both of the Bureau staff.
Respectfully submitted.
.
Frieda S. Miller,
Director.
Hon. Maurice J. Tobin,
Secretary of Labor.
Sir:
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CONTENTS
A.—CIVIL RIGHTS
I.—CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY
1. Age of Majority.
2. Contractual Powers of Minors.
3. Property Exemptions from Seizure for Debt—Respective Rights
of Men and Women.
4. Property of Married Woman Owned at Marriage—Ownership
After Marriage.
5. Contractual Powers of Married Women.
6. Separate Earnings of Married Woman—Ownership and Control.
7. Liability of Married Woman for Family Necessaries.
8. Formal Procedure Required for a Married Woman to Engage in
a Separate Business.
9. Married Woman’s Separate Property—Control During Mar
riage—Liability for Husband’s Debts.
10. Property Acquired After Marriage Through Cooperative Efforts
of Spouses—Ownership and Control.
11. Damages Recovered for Injury by Strangers to a Married Woman’s
Person, Property, or Character—Ownership and Control.
12. Action to Recover Damages for Willful or Negligent Injuries to
the Person or Property of One Spouse by the Other—Respective
Rights of Husband and Wife.
13. Competency of Spouses to Testify For or Against Each Other.
14. Disposition of Separate Property by Will—Extent of Married
Woman’s Right.
15. Estate of Deceased Husband or Wife—Share of Surviving Spouse.
16. Provision for the Surviving Spouse During Administration of the
Estate.
17. Disinheritance of Husband or Wife by Will of Deceased Spouse—
Survivor’s Alternative.
II.—MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
18. Age of Consent to Marriage—Men and Women.
19. Validity of Common-Law Marriage.
20. Health Certificate Requisites Prior to Issuance of Marriage
License—Men and Women.
21. Interstate Cooperation in Marriage Law Enforcement.
22. Grounds for Marriage Annulment—Respective Availability to
Man or Woman.
23. Grounds for Divorce—Respective Availability to Spouses.
VI
CONTENTS
III.—PARENTS AND CHILDREN
24. Services and Earnings of Minor Children—Parents’ Respective
Rights.
25. Guardianship of Minor Children—Parents’ Respective Rights.
26. Appointment of Testamentary Guardian for Minor Children—
Parents’ Respective Rights.
27. Inheritance from an Intestate Child—Parents’ Respective Rights.
28. Support of Children Born Out of Wedlock—Parents’ Respective
Responsibility.
29. Inheritance From Child Born Out of Wedlock—Mother’s Right.
B.—POLITICAL RIGHTS
30. Domicile of Married Women.
31. Public Office—Eligibility of Women.
32. Jury Service—Eligibility of Women.
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
INTRODUCTION
Any conclusion bearing on woman’s status under the laws of the
United States of America must take into account the common law,
on which the fabric of the Nation’s jurisprudence is woven.
The common-law rules of property sprang from various causes,
notably tradition, military or economic exigency, natural male domi
nance, and the social status of women. Shifts in these have effected
an almost complete overturn in laws governing the property owned
by a woman prior to her marriage and that coming into her indi
vidual ownership after her marriage, by gift, inheritance, will, or
accumulation from her premarital possessions.
In general, it has been the rule that where specific statutes abro
gating common-law principles have not been enacted, the common law
applies. In the century just past, many of the old common-law in
justices to women have been removed by statute. The largest re
maining area to be reformed to the present-day trend lies in the
matter of ownership and control of property acquired by the coop
erative efforts of husband and wife after marriage.
The material considered centers largely around the woman in the
marriage relation, since the legal status of the unmarried woman is
practically identical with that of the unmarried man, with the ex
ception of the discrimination in some States which bars women from
jury duty; or of distinctions, such as variance between men and
women in the statutory age of majority or age of consent to marriage.
1
ILLINOIS
SOURCES
Constitution of Illinois.
Illinois Revised Statutes, 1947 (State Bar Edition).
Illinois Reports.
Illinois Appellate Court Reports.
Northeastern Reporter.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
References to the State Constitution are indicated by parenthetical
insertion of article and section numbers following the abbreviation
Const., as (Const., art. 4, sec. 3), placed after the related subject matter.
Code section references are likewise in parentheses, thus (ch. 68,
sec. 9).
Case citations, definitely construing statutes or declaring judicial
policy in the absence of express statutory provision, are indicated by
numerical footnote references, and appear immediately after the
related paragraphs. Cases showing historical development of a
statute or policy are followed by the abbreviation (Hist.).
Subject headings are preceded by numbers, which remain constant
for their respective topics through the entire State series. Cross
references among topics employ these numbers for brevity, as “See
Number 6,” which refers to the subject heading “Separate Earnings of
Married Woman—Ownership and Control.”
2
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A.—CIVIL RIGHTS
I.—CONTRACTS AND PROPERTY
1. Age of Majority.
Males of the age of 21 and females of the age of 18 years are con
sidered of legal age for all purposes (ch. 3, sec. 283).
2. Contractual Powers of Minors.
Generally, contracts or conveyances made by minors, whether mar
ried or unmarried, are voidable, and are subject to repudiation by
them.1 But where necessaries are sold and delivered to a minor, he
must pay a reasonable price for them. “Necessaries,” as here used,
means goods suitable to the condition in life of the minor, and to his
actual requirements at the time of delivery (ch. 12iy2, sec. 2).
The marriage of a female minor ward discharges her guardian as
to her custody and education, but not as to her property (ch. 3, sec.
466).
1 Swiney y. Womack (1931), 343 111. 278, 287 ; 175 N. E. 419.
3. Property Exemptions from Seizure for Debt—Respective
Rights of Men and Women.
Personal Property.
Personal property exemptions are to “the debtor,” and include nec
essary wearing apparel and other property prescribed in the statute
(ch. 52, sec. 13).
The personal exemptions accrue to the family, when the head of
the family dies, deserts, or does not reside with it (ch. 52, sec. 15).
Homestead.
“Every householder having a family” is entitled to an estate of
homestead not exceeding $1,000 in value, as provided by statute
(ch. 52, sec. I).1 The exemption continues after the householder’s
death for the benefit of the surviving husband or wife, so long as he
or she continues to occupy such homestead, and if either husband or
wife desert his or her family, the exemption continues in favor of the
one occupying the premises as a resident (ch. 52, sec. 2).
The homestead right may not be released except by an express
statement of waiver or release in a deed or other instrument. No
such release by the husband is valid unless the wife also signs it
(ch. 30, sec. 26).
An election by a surviving spouse to take the statutory portion of
the estate awarded upon renunciation of the will, without regard to
815061—49------ 2
o
4
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
the provisions of the will, does not bar the homestead right of such
spouse.2 See Number 15.
On the other hand, if a decedent’s will specifically devises home
stead premises to a surviving spouse, and such spouse accepts the will,
he or she cannot claim the statutory homestead.3
Neither husband nor wife can remove the other or their children
from their homestead without the consent of the other, unless the
owner of the property, in good faith, provides another homestead
suitable to the condition in life of the family (ch. 68, sec. 16).
1 Johnson v. Muntz (1936). 364 111. 482. 485: 4 N .E. (2d) 826.
2 Canavan v. McNulty (1927), 328 111. 38S, 394 : 159 N. E. 782.
2 Stubblefield v. Howard (1932), 348 111. 20, 25 ; 180 N. E. 410.
4. Property of Married Woman Owned at Marriage—Ownership
After Marriage.
The present statute provides that: “A married woman may own,
in her own right, real and personal property obtained by descent,
gift, or purchase, and manage, sell, and convey the same to the same
extent and in the same manner that the husband can property be
longing to him.” A proviso adds that any valid transfer or convey
ance of goods and chattels between the spouses, living together as
such, must be by written instrument in legal form placed of record
(ch. 68, sec. 9).
[The original statute designated as the separate estate of a mar
ried woman property owned by her at the time of her marriage (1861,
p. 143).]
_
.
The inference is that the present statute, which revised the old law
and “went much further” m freeing the wife from disabilities,1 by
its terms refers to property owned by a woman prior to her marriage
as well as that afterward acquired in the manner designated in the
law. However, no specific interpretation to this effect has been
found.
1 Clark v. Clark (1892), 49 App. 163, 165.
5. Contractual Powers of Married Women.
Contracts may be made and liabilities incurred by a wife, and the
same enforced against her, to the same extent and in the same man
ner as if she were unmarried (ch. 68, sec. 6) 4
A married woman may own, in her own right, real and personal
property obtained by descent, gift, or purchase, and manage, sell, and
convey it to the same extent and in the same manner that the hus
band can property belonging to him. But any transfer of goods
and chattels between spouses living together must be by written in
strument, acknowledged and recorded, if such transfer is to be valid
against the rights of a third person (ch. 68, sec. 9).
The provision of the Married Woman’s Act contained in chapter
68, section 9, removes the necessity of the husband’s joinder in the
wife’s conveyance of her real property, and places her “upon a per
fect equality with her husband, insofar as the conveyance of her
lands was concerned.” 2
But his signature is necessary to release his dower right (ch. 41,
sec. I).3
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5
A married woman is liable on her own account for all civil in
juries committed by her, and her husband is not responsible for them
unless he would be jointly responsible if the marriage did not exist
(eh. 68, sec. 4).
...
A married woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued without join
ing her husband with her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried,
and an attachment or judgment may be enforced by or against her as
if she were a single woman (ch. 68, sec. 1).
If husband and wife are sued together, the wife may defend for
her own right, and if either neglect to defend, the other may de
fend for such one also (ch. 68, sec. 2).
If either spouse abandons the other, being absent from the State
for 1 year without making provision for family support, or is im
prisoned in the penitentiary, the abandoned spouse may, upon proper
evidence, be authorized by a court of record in the county of his or
her residence to take control of the property of the spouse at fault,
for family support or payment of obligations (ch. 68, sec. 11).
Either spouse may appoint the other as his or her attorney in fact,
to control and dispose of his or her property for their mutual ben
efit or otherwise, and may revoke this power in the same manner as
other persons (ch. 68, sec. 14).
When either spouse is insane continuously for not less than a 1-year
period, the other may obtain authorization from a court having proper
jurisdiction, to mortgage or convey real property for the insane spouse,
and relinquish his or her right of curtesy, dower, or homestead therein
(ch. 68, sec. 17). But the rights of the insane spouse in the property
are protected by express provisions of the law (ch. 68, secs. 18-21).
Both spouses must join in any release, waiver, or conveyance of the
property held as a family homestead except where either conveys to the
other (ch. 52, sec. 4).
1 Bea v. People (1902), 101 App. 132, 134.
2 Edwards v. Schoeneman (1882), 104 111. 278, 284.
8 Oradle v. Warner (1892), 140 111. 123 ; 29 N. E. 1118.
6. Separate Earnings of Married Woman—Ownership and Con
trol.
A married woman may receive, use, and possess her own earnings,
and sue for them in her own name, free from the interference of her
husband or his creditors (ch. 68, sees. 5,7).
But neither spouse may recover any compensation for any labor per
formed or services rendered for the other, whether in the management
of property or otherwise (ch. 68, sec. 8).
7. Liability of Married Woman for Family Necessaries.
The expenses of the family and of the education of the children are
chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or of either
of them, in favor of creditors therefor, and in relation thereto they
may be sued jointly or separately (ch. 68, sec. 15).
The refusal of either parent to provide for the support and mainte
nance of his or her child under the age of 18 years in destitute or neces
sitous circumstances constitutes a statutory misdemeanor (ch. 68, sec.
24).
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
6
“* * * since the wife has become emancipated and now possesses
the full enjoyment of her property and earnings there is no longer any
reason why she should not be held legally responsible for the support
of her minor children equally with her husband.”1
1 Purity Baking Co. v. Industrial Commission (1929), 334 111. 586, 588 ; 166 N. E. 33.
8. Formal Procedure Required for a Married Woman to Engage
in a Separate Business.
Under the provisions of the Married Woman's Act relating to her
power to contract, to acquire property, and retain her own earnings,
the court holds that a wife is unrestricted in her right and freedom to
engage in business and enjoy the profits therefrom as if she were
unmarried.1 Also, that she alone is liable for her contracts in connec
tion with her separate business.2
1 Haight v. McVeagh (1873), 09 111. 624, 628.
2 Nispel v. Laparle (1874). 74 111. 306. 308.
9. Married Woman’s Separate Property—Control During Mar
riage—Liability for Husband’s Debts.
A married woman may own and control her own separate property
as if she were unmarried, and for this purpose she may make all con
tracts in relation to it, and may avail herself of the services of her
husband, as agent and manager of her business, without subjecting her
property or the profits arising from his management to the payment of
his debts.1 Neither spouse is liable for the premarital debts of the
other, and, generally, neither has any liability, either personally or
as to liis or her separate property, for the separate debts of the other
(ch. 68, sec. 5).
_
_
_
Estates by the entirety are no longer recognized in the State. Since
the adoption of the Married Woman’s Act, the court holds that the
statute has declared, in effect, husband and wife to be two independ
ent persons, and that property acquired by a deed to both spouses
is held by them as tenants in common, and that the husband has no
more immediate interest in or control over her property than any
other person.2 3
1 Gibson v. Kimmit (1904), 113 App. 611, G12.
2 Cooper v. Cooper (1875), 70 111. 57. 64.
3 Mittcl V. Karl (1890), 133 111. 65, 68 ; 24 N. E. 5i)3.
10. Property Acquired After Marriage Through Cooperative Ef
forts of Spouses—Ownership and Control.
The common-law rule applies, that cooperatively acquired property
is owned and controlled by the husband in the absence of valid private
contracts or arrangements, such as joint deeds or joint bank accounts.11
11. Damages Recovered for Injury by Strangers to a Married
Woman’s Person, Property, or Character—Ownership and
Control.
A married woman may, in all cases, sue without joining her hus
band with her, as if she were unmarried (ch. 68, sec. 1).
The husband has his separate right to sue for loss of services and
consortium of his wife.1 But the wife does not have a similar right
to recover for loss of services of her husband.2
1 Blair v. Bloom & "Normal By. E. t€ H. Co. (1906), 130 App. 400, 403.
2 Patelski v. Snyder (1913), 179 App. 24, 28.
ILLINOIS
7
12. Action to Recover Damages for Willful or Negligent Injuries
to the Person or Property of One Spouse by the Other—Re
spective Rights of Husband and Wife.
The statute does not authorize a suit by one spouse against the other
ior a tort committed upon his or her person by the other.12
But either spouse has a right of action to recover his or her prop
erty unlawfully obtained, held, or controlled by the other, either before
or after marriage (ch. 68, sec. 10).
1 Main V. Main (1892), 46 App. 106. 108
2 Chestnut v. Chestnut (1875), 77 111. 346, 350.
13. Competency of Spouses to Testify For or Against Each Other.
Either spouse may testify for or against the other in both civil and
criminal cases, provided that neither may testify as to any communi
cation or admission made by either of them to the other, or as to any
conversation between them during marriage, unless the action is be
tween husband and wife, or relates directly to the interests of their
child or children, or touches matters in which either has acted as
agent of the other (ch. 51, sec. 5; ch. 38, sec. 734).
14. Disposition of Separate Property by Will—Extent of Married
Woman’s Right.
Eveiy person who is 18 years of age, if mentally competent, has
power to dispose of his or her real and personal property by will (ch. 3,
Neither husband nor wife can disinherit the other as to the portion
provided by law for a surviving spouse in the estate of a deceased
spouse (ch. 3, secs. 168,169,172).
Subsequent marriage revokes any existing will of a testator (ch. 3,
sec. 19 ().
1
’
15. Estate of Deceased Husband or Wife—Share of Surviving
Spouse.
A surviving spouse on the death of the other, whether testate or
intestate, is endowed of the third part of all lands owned by the dece
dent at any time during the marriage, unless the dower has been
released or barred. There is no estate of curtesy (ch. 3, sec, 170).
Decedent Testate.
„ When the decedent dies testate, and issue survive, the living spouse
is entitled to leceive, in addition to dower, a one-third portion outright
of the personal estate and one-third of each parcel of real estate
owned by decedent at the date of death in which the surviving spouse
does not claim dowser; if no issue survive, the spouse’s portion is
one-half of the personal estate and one-half of each parcel of real
estate in which he or she does not claim dower.
Any will bars the right of dower in the real estate unless the will
shows the testator s intention otherwise, or the surviving spouse
renounces the will, whether or not it makes provision for the surviving1
spouse.•
• F§°u renunciation,the surviving spouse is entitled to dower as pro
vided by statute, or he or she may take instead an absolute share of
THE LEGAL STATUS OP WOMEN
8
one-third of the personal estate and one-third of the real estate owned
by decedent at death, remaining after payment of estate debts and
claims.
_
When the surviving spouse elects to take the statutory portion of
the estate outright as a substitute for dower, the amount of this statu
tory interest depends upon whether the decedent leaves issue. If no
issue survive, the living spouse takes absolutely one-half of all real
and personal estate remaining after payment of estate debts and
claims. If issue survive, the statutory share is one-third absolutely
of the net real and personal estate (cli. 3, secs. 168-175).
Decedent Intestate.
When the deceased spouse dies intestate, the surviving spouse shares
in the estate remaining after payment of debts and claims against it,in the following manner:
1. If issue survive the decedent, the living spouse takes absolutely
one-third of the decedent’s personal estate; also, as a substitute for
dower, an absolute estate of one-third of each parcel of real estate
owned by decedent at death and in which the surviving husband or
wife has waived the right of dower (ch. 3, sec. 162) .
_
The spouse entitled to dower is required, within the time pre
scribed by law, to elect between the right to take dower in the real
estate and the right to receive outright one-third of the real estate of
which the intestate spouse died owner. This choice may be indicated
in either of two ways: Expressly, by filing a written waiver of dower,,
or impliedly, by failing to file an election to take dower in the real
estate.
The waiver of the right of dower is a condition precedent to theright of the spouse to claim one-third of the real estate in fee. 1 2
2. If there is no descendant of the deceased, but a surviving parent,
brother, sister, or descendant of a brother or sister of the decedent,,
one-half of the real estate and all of the personal estate descends
absolutely to the living spouse. The remaining half of the real estate
is taken by the decedent’s parents, brothers and sisters and their
descendants, in equal parts among them, allowing to each of theparents a child’s part, or if one be dead, the survivor takes a double
portion. The remainder then goes to the brothers and sisters and their
descendants (ch. 3, sec. 162).
When a spouse inherits as heir the one-half of real estate after
payment of debts, he or she has also dower right as to the other half
of such real estate.3
3. If there is no descendant of the deceased, and no parent, brother,
or sister or descendant of a brother or sister of the decedent, the entire
net estate descends outright to the surviving spouse (ch. 3, sec. 162).
1 Stelling v. Stelling (1928). 330 111. 155 ; 161 N. E. 477.
2 Steinhagen v. Trull (1926), 320 111. 382; 151 N. E. 250.
3 Blankenship v. Hall (1908), 233 111. 116 ; 84 N. E. 192.
16. Provision for the Surviving Spouse During Administration of
the Estate.
The widow of a deceased resident whose testate or intestate estate
is administered in the State, is allowed as her own property out of
the estate, the following:
ILLINOIS
9r
1. Family pictures and the wearing apparel, jewels, and ornaments
of herself and her minor children.
2. Money in an amount deemed reasonable by the appraisers for
proper support of herself and the decedent’s minor children for a
period of 9 months after the decedent’s death, in a manner suited to
her condition in life, and to the condition of the estate. But the al
lowance may not be less than $500, together with an additional sum
of not more than $300 for each minor child of the decedent under
18 years of age (ch. 3, sec. 330).
The widow may, at her option, select personal property from the
decedent’s estate at its appraised value instead of the case award (ch.
3, sec. 333).
17. Disinheritance of Husband or Wife by Will of Deceased
Spouse—Survivor’s Alternative.
The surviving spouse of a person dying testate has the right to elect
whether he or she will accept the terms of the will, or take instead
the statutory portion provided for him or her in such cases. If no
election is made, in the maimer and within the time prescribed by
law, the provisions of the will govern (ch. 3, secs. 168, 169).
II.—MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
18. Age of Consent to Marriage—Men and Women.
Males of 21 years or over and females of 18 years or over may
contract marriage without consent of parents. Males between the
ages of 18 and 21 years, and females between the ages of 16 and 18years, may contract a legal marriage 'if the parents, parent, or guardian
of the minor gives consent in writing to the marriage (ch. 89, sec. 3).
In the absence of parental consent to a marriage of a person under
the statutory age, such marriage is not void but voidable.1
1 The People v. Ham (1917), 206 App. 543, 550.
19. Validity of Common-Law Marriage.
The common-law marriage is declared null and void by statute,
“unless after the contracting and entering into of any such commonlaw marriage a license to marry be first obtained '* * * and a
marriage be solemnized” as provided in the statute (ch. 89, sec. 4).
20. Health Certificate Requisites Prior to Issuance of Marriage
License—Men and Women.
Each applicant for license to marry must file a certificate from a
licensed physician showing that an examination of the applicant was
made not more than 15 days prior to the application.
It must appear from the certificate that the applicant is free from
any venereal disease as nearly as can be determined by standard sero
logical and clinical tests made for that purpose.
Exception may be made for cases of pregnancy or the birth of a
child out of wedlock. Also, marriage will be permitted if the disease
is present, but is not in a form which is communicable (ch. 89, sec. 6a).
10
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
21. Interstate Cooperation in Marriage Law Enforcement.
Tiie State has adopted the uniform marriage evasion act. By its
provisions a prohibited marriage of domestic residents contracted in
a foreign State is void (ch. 89, sec. 19); also, a marriage between non
residents which is prohibited in a foreign State is void when con
tracted in this State (ch. 89, sec. 19).
22. Grounds for Marriage Annulment—Respective Availability to
Man or Woman.
A marriage may be annulled on the ground of non-age by either
party before reaching the statutory age of consent to the marriage.1
Marriages are prohibited, and are wholly void, if contracted within
forbidden degrees of kindred (ch. 89, sec. 1),
A marriage in which one of the parties is insane or an idiot is void
for incompetence to contract (ch. 89, sec. 2), and the license clerk
is forbidden to issue a license to such persons or to any person who
at the time of making application is under the influence of any intox
icating liquor or narcotic drug (ch. 89, sec. 6).
The judicial attitude toward annulments is reflected in this obser
vation of the court:
“ * * * The standard of public morals is, in a great measure,
affected by the degree of vigilance exercised to preserve the sanctity
of this sacred institution, and for this reason alone our courts have
adopted the salutary policy of viewing with a jealous eye any attempt
to tear asunder the bonds of matrimony.”2
1Matthes v. Matthes (1910), 198 App. 515, 523.
2 Ibid., 515, 525.
23. Grounds for Divorce—Respective Availability to Spouses.
The injured party to a marriage contract may obtain an absolute
divorce on one of the following grounds: Natural impotence, living
spouse of undissolved prior marriage, adultery committed subse
quent to marriage, willful desertion, or unreasonable absence for
one year, habitual drunkenness for the space of two years, an attempt
on the life of the other by poison or other means showing malice,
extreme and repeated cruelty, conviction of felony or other infamous
crime, or infection of the other with a communicable venereal disease
(ch. 40, sec. 1).
III.—PARENTS AND CHILDREN
24. Services and Earnings of Minor Children—Parents’ Respec
tive Rights.
There is no specific statute disposing of the parents’ respective
rights to the services and earnings of their minor children. The law
relating to the custody of a minor provides that the parents, if living,
and in case of the death of either of the parents, the surviving parent,
are entitled to the custody of the minor and the direction of his edu
cation, when the parents respectively are lit persons, and competent
to transact their own business; also, that the parents are to have
equal powers, rights, and duties concerning the minor (ch. 3, sec. 284).
ILLINOIS
11
These powers, rights, and duties are, however, subject to the juris
diction of a court of chancery in a proper case, and, after a decree,
are such as the decree provides.1
1 The People v. Small (1908), 237 111. 169, 172 ; 86 N. E. 733.
25. Guardianship of Minor Children—Parents’ Respective Rights.
The parents of a minor child have equal powers, rights, and duties
concerning such child. They are entitled to the custody of his per
son and the direction of his education, if legally competent. If one
parent is dead, such natural guardianship vests in the surviving
parent (cli. 3, sec. 284).
If the husband abandons the wife, she is entitled to the custody
or the minor children, unless the proper court, upon application,
directs otherwise (ch. 68, sec. 16).
26. Appointment of Testamentary Guardian for Minor Children—
Parents’ Respective Rights.
Either parent of an unmarried minor child may by will designate
a guar dian of the person and of the estate of such child during his
minority, or for a shorter period. But the appointment by will may
not deprive the surviving parent, during his or her lifetime, of the
custody, nurture, tuition and education of the child, or of the right
to designate by his will the guardian of the child’s person (ch 3
sec. 296).
v • >
27. Inheritance From an Intestate Child—Parents’ Respective
Rights.
Surviving parents inherit in equal portions from their child dying
intestate (ch. 3, sec. 162).
28. Support of Children Born Out of Wedlock—Parents’ Respec
tive Responsibility.
When the paternity of a child born out of wedlock has been de
termined by judicial proceedings, the father is ordered by the court
to pay a sum of money not exceeding $200 for the first' year after
the child’s birth, and a sum not exceeding $100 annually for 9 years
thereafter, for the support, maintenance, and education of the child.
Bond is required to secure payment under the court’s decree (ch
17, sec. 8).
29. Inheritance From Child Born Out of Wedlock—Mother’s
Right.
1 U
m,other of a ,child.born out of wedlock may inherit from such
child, when the child dies intestate leaving no surviving widow or
husband, and no child or descendants of a child. In such a case
the mother takes one-half the estate, the other half to be equally
divided between her children and their descendants (ch. 3, sec. 163).
12
THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN
B.—POLITICAL RIGHTS
30. Domicile of Married Women.
There is no statute specifically dealing with the matter of a sepa
rate domicile for married women for purposes of voting, holding
office, and jury service. The policy announced by the courts regard
ing the domicile of a married woman follows the common-law rule,
that so long as the relations between husband and wife are not ad
verse, the wife’s domicile, for legal purposes, is that of her husband.12
1 In the matter of Dunning (1918), 211 App. 633, 639.
2 Blankenship v. Hall (1908), 233 111. 116, 132 ; 84 N. E. 192.
31. Public Office—Eligibility of Women.
Women are eligible for public office on the same terms as men
(Const., art. 4, sec. 3; art. 5, sec. 5; art. 6, secs. 3, 17; art. 7, sec. 6).
32. Jury Service—Eligibility of Women.
Women are eligible for duty as trial or grand jurors under the same
provisions of law that apply to men (ch. 78, secs. 1-33).
The statute admitting women to jury duty does not impair, abridge,
or deny the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by the State Con
stitution, and is valid.1
Women jurors serving in criminal trials may be given separate
quarters under the care of a woman officer of the court when the court
is not in session or when the jury is not deliberating on its verdict
(ch. 38, sec. 745).
'Denny v. Traeger (1939), 372 111. 11; 22 N. E. (2d) 679.
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