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H a n d lin g o f
R ail D is p u te s
U n d e r th e
R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t,
1 9 5 0 -6 9
Bulletin 1753
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Bureau of Labor Statistics
1972
P u M c L ib ra ry
JAN i 6 1973
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Bulletin 1753
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
J. D. Hodgson, Secretary
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS
Geoffrey H. Moore, Commissioner
1972
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $1.25
Stock Number 2901-0936
Preface
This bulletin provides a descriptive and statistical account of the industrial
relations, mediation, work stoppages, and emergency dispute experience of die
railroad industry under the Railway Labor Act. Published and unpublished rec
ords, particularly those of the National Mediation Board, were utilized to prepare
this report.
The definition of this m ajor industry group (railroad transportation) covered
by the Railway Labor Act conforms to m ajor group 40 in the Standard Indus
trial Classification M anual, 1967 edition, issued by the Office of Management
and Budget, formerly the Bureau of the Budget.
This bulletin was prepared in the Bureau’s Division of Industrial Relations,
Office of Wages and Industrial Relations, by Michael H. Cimini under the super
vision of A lbert A. Belman. The cooperation of the National Mediation Board,
particularly Mrs. Vivian Yancey and M r. Thomas Tracy, in the preparation
of chapters IV and V I is gratefully acknowledged.
iii
Contents
Page
C hapter I. Background of Railway Labor A c t ____________________________________________________
S um m ary___________________________________________________________________________________
Introduction ________________________________________________________________________________
Financial c o n d itio n __________________________________________________________________________
Government re g u la tio n _______________________________________________________________________
M ergers and other m ajor unifications_________________________________________________________
Technology and unem ploym ent_______________________________________________________________
Collective bargaining unit and jurisdictional d isp u te s___________________________________________
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
6
C hapter II. Legal framework of the Railway Labor A c t __________________________________________
Procedural aspects of the a c t _________________________________________________________________
History of railroad legislation_________________________________________________________________
8
8
8
C hapter III. R ailroad mediation c a s e s ___________________________________________________________ 11
Role of the National Mediation B o a r d ________________________________________________________ 11
Operating and nonoperating g ro u p s ___________________________________________________________ 11
Issues ______________________________________________________________________________________12
Disposition of mediation c a s e s ________________________________________________________________ 12
C hapter IV. Appointm ent of railroad emergency b o a r d s __________________________________________ 14
Intent of the a c t ____________________________________________________________________________ 14
Factors affecting the appointment of b o a r d s ___________________________________________________ 15
M o ra to riu m s___________________________________________________________________________ 15
National m o v em en ts____________________________________________________________________ 15
Economic tr e n d s ________________________________________________________________________ 16
Strike t h r e a t s __________________________________________________________________________ 16
Role of the p a r tie s _____________________________________________________________________ 16
“Proliferation” of emergency b o a r d s _____________________________________________________ 16
Ineffective collective b arg ain in g __________________________________________________________ 17
National c a s e s _______________________________________________________________________________ 18
Grievance b o a r d s ___________________________________________________________________________ 18
Chapter V. The Role of G o v ern m en t____________________________________________________________ 20
A d hoc legislation___________________________________________________________________________ 20
Presidential railroad com m issions------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22
Presidential s e iz u re s_________________________________________________________________________ 23
O ther forms of in terv e n tio n __________________________________________________________________ 23
M ajor interru p tions__________________________________________________________________________ 23
Identical issues on separate c a rrie r s ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------23
C hapter V I. Characteristics of emergency boards, 1950-69 ________________________________________25
P a rtic ip a tio n ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 25
S iz e ________________________________________________________________________________________ 25
Issues _____________________________________________________________________________________ 27
D u r a tio n ___________________________________________________________________________________ 27
IV
Contents—Continued
Page
M ajor issues and g ro u p s_________________________________________________________________ 29
National c a s e s _______________________________________________________________________________29
Reasons for the long d u ra tio n ________________________________________________________________30
M ediation s p a n _________________________________________________________________________ 30
Agency s p a n ___________________________________________________________________________ 31
The p a r tie s ____________________________________________________________________________ 32
A rb itra tio n _________________________________________________________________________________ 33
Emergency board r e p o rts ____________________________________________________________________ 33
M ethods of se ttle m e n t______________________________________________________________________ 35
Disposition _________________________________________________________________________________ 36
Chapter V II. Railroad work sto p p ag es___________________________________________________________ 39
Size o f sto p p ag es___________________________________________________________________________ 39
D u ra tio n ___________________________________________________________________________________ 41
Operating vs. nonoperating personnel sto p p ag es---------------------------------------------------------------------- 42
Issues _____________________________________________________________________________________ 42
Tables:
1. Unions representing railway employees, as of June 30, 1969 ___________________________
6
2. M ediation cases disposed of, by occupational group, selected periods, 1950-69 _____________ 12
3. Number of mediation agreements and percent of total cases disposed of, selected periods,
1 9 5 5 -6 9 _____________________________________________________________________________ 12
4. Railroad emergency boards, by size and m ajor group, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________ 25
5. National railroad emergency boards, by m ajor issue and group, selected periods,
1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 26
6. Railroad emergency boards, by detailed issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 __________ 27
7. Duration of railroad emergency boards, by m ajor work group and spans, selected
periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 28
8. D uration of railroad emergency boards (in calendar days), by m ajor issue and group, selected
periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 29
9. Railroad emergency board spans (in calendar days), by m ajor group, selected periods,
1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 29
10. National and nonnational emergency board spans,selected periods, 1950-69 ________________ 30
11. M ethods of settlement in railroad boards, by major issue and group, selected periods,
1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 36
12. Num ber and percentage of agreements resolved through arbitration, mediation, and
direct n eg o tiatio n s____________________________________________________________________ 36
13. Railroad emergency board work stoppages, by m ajor issue and group, 1950-69 __________ 37
14. W orkers involved and man-days idle, by m ajor group, 1950-69 __________________________ 38
15. Num ber of railroad work stoppages, workers involved,and man-days idle, 1950-69 _________39
16. Num ber and percent of railroad work stoppages, by size, selected periods, 1950-69 _________40
17. R ailroad work stoppages involving 10,000 workers or more, 1950-69 _____________________ 41
18. Duration of railroad stoppage by m ajor issues,1950-69 ___________________________________ 42
Chart:
1. Collective bargaining procedures, and “status quo” periods, under the Railway Labor
A c t ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
v
9
C o n te n ts — C o n tin u e d
Page
Appendixes:
A - l . Selected railroad financial and economic statistics, 1950-69 __________________________ 44
A -2 . Railroads’ involvement in R L A procedures, fiscal years 1950-69 ______________________ 45
A -3 . Railroad mediation cases disposed of by the National M ediation Board, by m ajor
occupational group,fiscal years 1950-69 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 46
A -4 . Railroad emergency boards, 1950-69 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48
A -5 . Chronology of railroad R L A — emergency boards, fiscal years 1950-69 _________________52
A -6 . R ailroad work stoppages, by duration and size of unit and group of workers, cal
endar years 1950-69 ______________________________________________________________ 58
A -7 . M ajor issues involved in railroad work stoppages, calendar years 1950-69 _____________ 59
A -8 . Railroad work stoppages, by duration and major group, selected periods, calendar
years 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 60
A -9 . D uration of railroad stoppages, by m ajor issue, selected periods, calendar years
1950-69 _________________________________________________________________________ 62
A -10. Railroad work stoppages, by m ajor issue and group, selected periods, calendar years
1950-69 _________________________________________________________________________ 64
Selected B ib lio g rap h y ____________________________________________________________________________66
vi
Chapter 1. Background of the Railway Labor Act1
S u m m ary
This study presents the first complete examination
of basic data on the state of labor relations in the
railroad industry in the 1950’s and 1960’s. It is
based on records of railroad mediation cases, work
stoppages, and emergency boards appointed under
the provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), to
gether with the circumstances that led to government
intervention. A number of significant findings fol
lowed from this inquiry.
In a vast majority of cases, negotiations have been
concluded successfully on the local properties with
out government intervention, active assistance of the
National Mediation Board (NMB), or interruptions
of work. However, when impasses have been
reached, the conflicts have required the mediatory
services of the Board. Mediation has performed
successfully as a tool to compose unadjusted collec
tive bargaining disputes; nearly 98 percent of dock
eted railroad mediation cases have been resolved
without resort to an emergency board.
After the exhaustion of unsuccessful mediatory ef
forts, emergency boards, some involving more than
one mediation case, were created when, in the opin
ion of the President, the disptue “threatened sub
stantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a de
gree such as to deprive any section of the country of
essential transportation services.” Of the 71 emer
gency panels, only 23 were appointed to consider
nationwide disputes, and 18 were convened to hear
cases involving only a single railroad carrier and a
single union.
1 T h e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t, w h ic h b o re th e jo in t ap p roval
o f th e m a jo r ra ilw a y carriers an d u n io n s, w a s p a ssed in
1 926. Its co v era g e, w h ic h o r ig in a lly e x ten d ed o n ly to rail
roads, w a s en la rg ed to in clu d e airlin e carriers in 1936.
T h is stu d y w a s co n d u cted fo r fiscal yea rs 1 9 5 0 -6 9 . A
fisca l y ea r refers to th e tim e p erio d Ju ly 1 o f th e p reviou s
y ea r to Jun e 3 0 o f th at year, i.e., fiscal y e a r 1 9 5 0 exten d ed
fr o m J u ly 1, 1 9 4 9 to Jun e 30 , 19 5 0 . (S o m e m aterial relat
in g to ev en ts o ccu rrin g in 1 9 7 0 o r 1971 h as b e e n in clu d ed
in ch a p ter V fo r illu stra tive reason s.)
Although this emergency procedure was conceived
as a type of adjustment machinery to resolve labormanagement conflicts involving terms and conditions
of employment, grievance disputes have been
brought before boards on eight occasions.
The duration of the R L A emergency dispute pro
cedure has been lengthy, averaging 670 calendar
days. Average duration increased substantially be
tween the 1950’s and the 1960’s, in part because of
12 prolonged panels (the majority of which involved
rule issues) that occurred during the later period.
Of the cases in which responses were ascertained,
both parties initially accepted the boards’ reports
only on six occasions. Railroad carriers generally ac
cepted “adverse” as well as “favorable” reports,
while railroad unions usually rejected “adverse” rec
ommendations.
The parties most frequently relied on negotiations,
rather than mediation or arbitration, to effect settle
ments. Eight emergency board disputes were settled
either before a board was appointed or a formal re
port was issued. Of the remaining panels, settlements
were reached without work stoppages in the majority
of instances.
Since presidents and Congress have viewed na
tionwide railroad work stoppages as being detrimen
tal to the public welfare, other forms of government
intervention outside the scope of the act have played
an integral part in the settlement of railroad emer
gency disputes. Presidential commissions, the offices
of the White House or the Labor Department, ad
hoc legislation, and seizures have been utilized in sit
uations in which the Executive or Legislative
branches felt that collective bargaining could not
peacefully settle railroad disputes. In addition, presi
dential intervention was evident in 12 emergency
board cases, and the mediatory services of the Labor
Department were used in numerous instances.
Finally, President Trum an seized railroad carriers
twice in 1950.
During the 1950-69 period, the railroad industry
sustained 316 work stoppages involving 1.4 million
workers and 8.4 million man-days idle. Compared
1
with the average annual level of 23.4 calendar days
for the total economy, the average duration of all
railroad strikes was much shorter, 13.0 days. Of the
316 stoppages, 75 percent extended less than 1 week
and only 3 percent, or eight cases, lasted longer than
90 days.
In tro d u ctio n
F or many years there has been general concern
with the vitality and effectiveness of the law that gov
erns railroad industrial relations, the Railway Labor
Act, and its procedures have been criticized by many
practitioners and students of collective bargaining.
A t various times, these experts have argued that the
act, as implemented by the National Mediation
Board— the agency charged with its administration
— has encouraged labor and management to bargain
in a perfunctory manner, to relinquish their rights
and duties to resolve disputes on their own, to en
gage in dilatory strategy at every stage of their nego
tiations, and to depend on government intervention
for the solution of disputes. Some critics have alledged also that the Executive Branch, acting under
political pressures, has at times intervened needlessly
in railroad disputes.2
Contributing to these concerns, however, are cir
cumstances peculiar to the economic nature of the
industry that impinge on the parties’ collective bar
gaining relationship and contribute to its instability.
One source is the large num ber of specialized craft
unions, often competitive, that exist in the railroad
industry.3 Throughout the years, each craft union has
adhered rigidly to its own work rules and jurisdic
2 B en jam in A a ro n , “E m erg en cy D isp u te S ettlem en t,” La
bor Law Developm ents, 1967.
J acob J. K a u fm a n , “E m e rg e n c y B oard s U n d e r th e R a il
w a y L a b o r A c t,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 9, N o . 12, D e
cem b er 1 958.
“T h e R a ilro a d L a b o r D isp u te: A M a ra th o n o f M a n eu ver
an d Im p ro v isa tio n ,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
V o l. 18, Janu ary 1 9 6 5 .
D a v id L ev in so n , “T h e L o c o m o tiv e F ir em e n ’s D isp u te ,”
Labor Law Journal, V o l. 17, N o . 11, N o v e m b e r 19 6 6 .
E d w ard B . S h ils, “In d u strial U n r e st in th e N a tio n ’s R ail
In d u stry,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 15, N o . 2 , F eb ru ary
19 6 4 .
A rth u r M . W iseh art, “T ran sp ortation Strike C o n trol
L e g isla tio n ,” Michigan Law R eview , V o l. 6 6 , June 1968.
3 A recen t d e v e lo p m en t w h ic h m a y in d ica te th at th e u n io n
tional claims, has prom oted its own set of “job
rights,” and has often been reluctant to accept tech
nological changes.
Besides this “union fractionalism,” other factors
have operated to create an atmosphere of “emer
gency bargaining.” Actual and anticipated introduc
tion of innovations (which may obscure lines of de
marcation between crafts) and consolidations of rail
facilities have engendered fears of job losses. Rein
forcing these pressures have been the secular trends
of declining employment of nonsupervisory workers
because of introductions of laborsaving devices and
because of a reduction in the railroads’ share of the
transportation market.
Still another source of bargaining instability, regu
latory agencies (which control competition, rates,
routes, and subsidies) have also been cited as tend
ing “to supply a negative influence on labor-manage
ment harmony and stability.” 4 N or have other
forms of government intervention always proven to
be stabilizing forces.
F in an cial co n d itio n
In 1969, the U.S. R ailroad System consisted of
721 carriers, operating 222,164 miles of track and
employing 623,326 workers. These railroads earned
$12.0 billion in operating income and incurred $9.5
billion in operating expenses. Net revenues from
railway operations in 1969 amounted to $2.5 billion,
of which $555.0 million in dividends were declared.5
(See appendix table A - l .)
Under the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) classification system, the industry is composed
of five main groupings.6 This analysis is largely con
fined to the three largest and most im portant groups:
Class I, class II, and switching and terminal carriers.
Of the 721 railroads operating in 1969, 73 were
class I carriers. These larger railways employed 93
percent of the industry’s work force and operated 80
percent of its mileage.
A t the time of the act’s passage, railroads hauled
77 percent of the Nation’s intercity freight traffic
ton-miles and 76 percent of nonautomobile passen
ger traffic. In 1969 by contrast, the railroads trans4 S h ils, op. cit., p. 81.
rivalry p ro b lem w ill d e c lin e in th e y ears to c o m e h as b een
th e m erg in g o f v a rio u s railroad u n io n s. In 1 9 6 9 , fo u r su ch
5 Eighty-Third Annual R eport on Transport Statistics in
the United States for the Year Ended D ec . 31, 1969 (U .S .
In terstate C o m m erce C o m m issio n ), pp . 3, 19, 2 3 , 4 8 , 4 9 .
(L ater cited as 83rd Annual R eport on Transport Statistics).
c o n so lid a tio n s, a ffectin g 2 6 3 ,0 0 0 railroad u n io n m em b ers,
o ccu rred .
6 T h e five m a jo r ca teg o r ie s are c la ss I, c la ss II, sw itch in g
an d term in al, p rop rietary, an d u n official.
2
ported only 41 percent of intercity freight ton-miles
and 1 percent of intercity passenger miles.
A m ajor cause of the railroads’ long-term declin
ing share of intercity freight and passenger service
was their inability to compete economically with
newer forms of transportation. As far back as the
1920’s, motor vehicles had begun making inroads
into the railroads’ passenger operations. Following
World W ar II, commercial aviation, pipelines, truck
ing, and buses began to pose ever-increasing compe
tition. Even the railroads’ steady fare, transportation
of higher value commodities (such as fresh fruits and
vegetables, livestock, dairy products, and other highrate goods) had been adversely affected.7
Besides difficulty in competing economically with
newer forms of transportation, railroads have been
adversely affected by levels of national economic
activity8 and by internal developments. One result
has been the unfavorable rate of increase in operat
ing costs compared with revenues— 29.1 percent and
21.6 percent, respectively, between 1950-69— de
spite a precipitous drop in employment. Another
manifestation of the various problems besetting the
industry has been the num ber of insolvencies. Be
tween 1894 and 1942, there were more than 840
railroad bankruptcies. During the early 1950’s
(1950-54) a large num ber of carriers (approxi
mately 40) were in bankruptcy; but by 1957, the
num ber of bankruptcies had declined to six and
has not since been greater than eight in any year.9
Since World W ar II, there have been only eight
m ajor (class I) bankruptcies, three occurring in
1970. A significant num ber of railroad companies
have also incurred deficits over the years (approxi
mately 17 annually), and many more have experi
enced liquidity problems.10
G o v ern m en t re g u la tio n
M erg ers a n d o th e r m a jo r u n ificatio n s
According to some industry spokesmen and trans7 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 109
(U .S . N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard , M a rch 2 5 , 1 9 55), pp.
2 7 -2 8 .
Eighty-Third Annual R eport on Transport Statistics , op.
cit., pp. 4 8 - 4 9 . In terstate C o m m erce C o m m issio n data.
8 M orris A . H o ro w itz, “L ab or’s R o le in th e D e c lin in g
R a ilro a d In d u stry,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 9, N o . 5,
M a y 19 5 8 , p. 4 7 3 .
9 R eport of the Presidential Railroad Commission (W ash
ington: U .S . G o v er n m e n t P rin tin g O ffice, F eb .
1 9 63), p.
7 9 . IC C data.
10 Labor, O ct. 3, 1 9 7 0, p. 8.; N ew Y ork Times , Sept. 2 ,
1 9 7 0 , p. 53 an d A u g . 2 , 1970, p. F - 1 0 ; IC C data.
portation and labor experts, government regulation
has intensified the financial problems of the industry.
Public policy, or its lack, has also had an impact on
collective bargaining. Various problems have been
noted, including deficits incurred from passenger
service, the uncertain role of railroads in metropoli
tan transportation systems, the inadequate recogni
tion of severe competition facing railroads, subsidi
zation of competitive forms of transportation, and
insufficient coordination of various forms of trans
portation. According to one report, “a large part of
the growing difficulties of the parties in collective
bargaining reflects a failure to develop adequate na
tional policies for the railroads and for a coordinated
transportation system.” 11 A nother critic has even
claimed that regulation has “stifled innovation, dis
couraged industry, driven many of the capable and
imaginative men out of it (the industry), and pro
vided a convenient excuse for inaction on the part
of less capable men who have come and stayed.” 12
Chairman of Illinois Central Industries, William
B. Johnson, noting the disparity between the dy
namic nature of inflation and the more static nature
of regulation, has asserted that rigidity and incessant
delays in regulation would impede future develop
ments in the industry. (During periods of inflation,
the argument goes, demands for substantial wage in
creases, coupled with lagging productivity, result in
pressures on profit margins. Wage raises can be met
by infusions of capital expenditures, or growth of the
industry, or increased prices— a combination of all
three being optimal. Railroad capital expenditures
have been characterized as being “too little, too
late;” the industry as “declining” ; and the proce
dures for raising rates as “archaic,” “tedious,” and
“stifling.”) 13
Besides setting rates and determining routes, gov
ernment regulates the unification of railroad prop
erties. Mergers and other consolidations of railroad
properties usually are predicated on increasing the
carriers’ m arket share or achieving operating econ
omies and decreasing costs. A t the same time, since
these activities constitute a persistent threat to job
security, they usually result in proposed contract
11 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 130
(U .S . N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard , Ju n e 8, 1 9 60), pp . 3 - 4 .
n N .Y . Times , Jan. 10, 19 7 1 , p . 10.
13 N ew York Times, A u g . 2 , 197 0 , p . 4 7 .
3
provisions for improving employment and income
protection. Actual and anticipated mergers com
monly generate fears and anxieties which lead to
labor hostility and attempts to thwart managements’
plans. For instance, the Brotherhood of Maintenance
of Way Employees (BMWE) and the Railway
Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA) filed a suit
against the ICC in 1960 to halt the Erie-Lackawana
merger and claimed that the agency did not prescribe
adequate employee protection measures.
During fiscal years 1950-60, the ICC approved 50
merger applications14 under section 5 (2) of the In
terstate Commerce Act, as well as 470 other unifica
tions (including ownerships of stock, purchases,
modifications of track rights, trackage rights, modi
fied leases, joint uses, leases, and various combina
tions of the above consolidations). Other m ajor uni
fications authorized from 1961 to 1970 included 40
mergers, 27 control agreements, 15 purchase agree
ments, and 3 lease agreements.15 Approximately
one-third of the industry’s trackage currently is in
volved in pending proceedings before the Commis
sion. As with previous consolidations, the Commis
sion will authorize or dismiss the applications, but
will not pursue the unifications to a conclusion.
However, it will receive testimony on the classes or
crafts of employees involved— who usually oppose
the transaction— and will prescribe conditions in the
agreements to protect employees who are affected
adversely.16
T ech n o lo g y a n d u n em p lo y m en t
Another economic condition intimately affecting
workers’ security is the extent and pace of techno
logical developments, as indicated by productivity
changes. Expressed as an average annual rate, out
put per m an-hour (productivity) in the railroad in
dustry increased 5.3 percent between 1947 and 1969
and 6.2 percent between 1957 and 1969, compared
with only 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively,
for the private economy.17 Among these technological
developments which influenced productivity levels
were electronically operated classification yards,
modernization of equipment for right-of-way mainte
nance, processing and computer equipment, and
many other innovations. As in other industries, rail
road collective bargaining agreements embody many
provisions relating to the implementation of techno
logical innovations. Technological developments also
frequently lead to numerous proposals for changes in
labor agreements, some of which result in labor
strife. In fact, technological change probably places
the single greatest strain on collective bargaining re
lationships of any factor in the industry.
M anagement has claimed consistently that im
proved technology is necessary to compete effec
tively with other modes of transportation and to de
fray increased costs, including wages. Unions have
pointed to the dislocations and resultant loss of
workers’ job opportunities and income caused by
fundamental industrial changes. Initially, they usu
ally have attempted to impede changes or, at least,
abate the pace of implementation while carriers usu
ally have pressed for quick institution of operational
and technological changes. A t times, the parties have
indicated a mutual desire to arrange simultaneously
for protection schemes (such as severance pay, re
training, etc.) to cushion the effect of technological
developments, without at the same time instituting
protective measures which would lapse into restric
tive work rules. On several occasions, a conflict of
interest has resulted and neutral parties have had to
decide how fast and far, at whose expense, and to
whose profit technological developments should be
instituted.18
As early as the 1950’s,19 warnings were regularly
issued that a breakdown in railroad collective bar
gaining was imminent; the prim ary cause cited was
technology:
W e h a v e n o t rea ch ed th e en d o f th e se ch a n g es.
T e c h n o l o g y c o n t in u e s t o a d v a n c e . M a n y r a ilr o a d s
h a v e n o t y e t a d o p t e d t e c h n o l o g ic a l c h a n g e s w h ic h
o th e r s h a v e
n ic a l
sh o w n
d e v e lo p m e n t s
to
are
be
s u c c e s s f u l.
in
th e
N ew
m a k in g .
te ch
So
fa r ,
c o ll e c t i v e b a r g a in in g h a s n o t r e s p o n d e d t o t h e s e
c h a lle n g e s w it h s u ffic ie n t v ig o r o r im a g in a t io n t o
c o p e w it h t h e p r o b le m s t h a t l o o m o v e r t h e in d u s tr y
a n d its la b o r r e la tio n s . C o l l e c t iv e b a r g a in in g h a s
f u n c t i o n e d in t h e s e q u e n c e o f c h a lle n g e a n d r e
14 In clu d in g m erg ers c o u p le d w ith oth er u n ification plan s.
15 In clu d es tw o m ergers an d
gran ted in th e fo r m e r period .
o n e c o n tro l a u th orization
s p o n s e ; a n d t h e r e s p o n s e h a s a t t im e s b e e n l o n g
d e la y e d .
It h a s n o t
a n t ic ip a t io n
a n t ic ip a t e d
is n e c e s s a r y t o
in
cope
a tim e w h e n
w it h
p r o b le m s
16 U n p u b lish e d IC C data.
17 Indexes of Output Per Man-Hour, Selected Industries,
1 9 3 9 an d 1 9 4 7 - 6 9 (B L S B u lletin 16 8 0 , 1970), p. 104. Hand
book of Labor Statistics, 1970 (B L S B u lletin 1 6 6 6 , 1970),
p. 159.
4
18 R eport to
(U .S . N a tio n a l
19 R eport to
(U .S . N a tio n a l
the President by Emergency Board N o. 86
M ed ia tio n B oard , J u ly 6, 19 5 0 ), p . 6.
the President by Emergency Board N o. 97
M ed ia tio n B oard , Jan. 2 5 , 19 5 2 ), p. 9 7 .
which become even more difficult to resolve once
their full impact is felt.2
0
On several occasions, the carriers have alleged
that railroad unions attempted to assume manage
m ent’s prerogatives, by insisting on a veto power
over consolidation or discontinuance of jobs, sta
tions, and other rail facilities. A t other times, accord
ing to carrier representatives, railway unions have
attempted to retard technological change and mod
ernization and to impede the elimination of inefficient
work rules and duplication of services by strict ob
servance of exclusive jurisdictional claims, excessive
severance demands, job freezes, and other proposals
designed to inflate the cost of technologies’ imple
mentation to the carriers. F o r example, the Telegra
phers (ORT) served notice on the Chicago and
N orth Western Railway and requested that “No po
sition in existence on December 3, 1957, will be
abolished or discontinued,” except by m utual agree
ment between the parties. After negotiations and
mediation were unsuccessful and arbitration was re
jected, the unadjusted dispute resulted in the ap
pointment of Emergency Board No. 147. Eventually
the controversy was settled, but not before a 30-day
strike ensued.
Because of operating economies (consolidations,
abandonments of main and branch lines, mergers),
technological developments, and secular trends in
the competitiveness of railroads, railway employment
has decreased in successive years. (See appendix
table A - l.) In 1950, the class I railroads, accounting
for 95 percent of the railroad industry’s mileage and
employment, provided 1,220,784 jobs. Twenty years
later, railway carriers employed about one-half this
number, 578,277 persons. With one exception, the
seven major occupations,21 as classified by the Inter
state Commerce Commission, also experienced
declining job opportunities of varying degrees.
Employment of nonoperating employees decreased
precipitiously compared with that of operating
classes, despite “diesilization” and other innovations
affecting operating crafts.22* Only the num ber of
2 Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 145
0
(U.S. National Mediation Board, May 3, 1962), p. 64.
2 Executives, officials, and staff assistants; professional,
1
clerical, and general; maintenance of way and structure;
m
aintenance of equipm
ent and stores; transportation (other
than train, engine, and yard); yardmasters, sw
itch tenders,
and hostlers; train and engine service.
2 Operating employees are “those workers engaged di
2
rectly in the movement of trains, such as locomotive en-
executives, officials, and staff assistants increased
over the two decades (6.4 percent), a phenomenon
frequently stressed by railway unions.
Anticipated or actual losses in employment have
always been a real substantive issue in the railroad in
dustry. Over the years, various railroad unions have
cited declining employment opportunities and resul
tant hardships faced by their members. In 1954, the
Firemen (BLFE), appearing before Emergency
Board No. 110, testified that 21,000 firemen and
hostlers’ positions had been eliminated in the rail
road industry during the preceding 6 years.28 The Te
legraphers (ORT), who were involved in hearings
before Emergency Board No. 138, noted that their
craft’s employment had been reduced 36.8 percent
from 1955 through I960.24 Average employment for
Pullman conductors (ORCB), who participated in
Emergency Board No. 139, declined almost threefourths in 14 years (from 2,683 in 1946 to 729 in
I960).25
However, the magnitude of the problem cannot be
expressed solely by statistics detailing declining em
ployment levels. O ther characteristics of the railroad
labor force— such as age distribution and length of
service— reinforced the hum an aspects of working in
a declining industry. The median age of shopcraft
employees as of 1967 was 49 years, 10 years greater
than the median age of all male nonagricultural
workers. Moreover, 49 percent of these employees
had worked 20 years or more in the railroad indus
try, and 26 percent more had 10 to 19 years of
service.26 “Once a railroad worker loses his job, his
chances of finding another one are small, conse
quently railroad labor tends to be hostile to any
technological change.” 27
gineers, locomotive firem
en, road conductors, road train
men, and yardm
en.*’ Nonoperating employees “are those not”
directly involved in the movement of trains, such as shopcrafts, maintenance-of-way, and signal forces, clerical and
communication employees.” Thirty-Second A nnual Report
o f the N a tion al M ediation Board, F o r the Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 1966 (U.S. Mediation Board, 1967), p. 10.
2 Report to the President by Emergency Board N o, 110,
3
(U.S. National Mediation Board, July 30, 1955), p. 12.
2 Report to the President by Emergency B oard N o, 138,
4
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Sept. 15, 1961), p. 6.
2 Report to the President by Emergency Board N o , 139,
5
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Dec. 11, 1961), p. 13.
2 R ailroad Shopcraft F act-Finding Study (U.S. Depart
6
m of Labor, 1968), pp. 20-21.
ent
2 Ann F. Friedlander, The D ilem m a o f F reight Transport
7
Regulation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969),
p. 97.
5
Collective bargaining unit and Jurisdictional
disputes
Table 1 indicates another prom inent problem con
fronting the industry, “fractionalized” unionism.
Railway carriers must negotiate with a large number
of unions, some of which represent m ore than one
class or craft of employees. Besides the 10 marine
unions and the various small or local independent or
ganizations, railroad companies may negotiate with
20 national unions or more, the vast majority affili
ated with the A F L -C IO . This situation stems from
the historic development of the industry’s collective
bargaining experience, as well as judicial and admin
istrative interpretations of what constitutes the col
lective bargaining unit.
Regardless of the geographic extent of a carrier’s
operations, the collective bargaining unit under the
R L A is the “craft or class,” which is undefined by
the act. Throughout its history, the NM B has en-
Table 1. Unions representing railway employees as of June 30, 19701
Number of members
Estimated
Total
number in
railroad
industry
Nam
es
Initials
O E A IN U IO S
PRT G N N
BE
L
UU
T
FR
CE
Brotherhood of Locom
otive Engineers (Ind.) ____________________________
United Transportation Union2 ____________________________ _____ _____
Federated Council of Railway Em
ployees (Ind.)4 ______________ ___ ________
32,900
3242,600
375
32,900
3242,600
375
6,203
3,193
(®
)
2,000
3,193
(8
)
130,770
103,994
3,000
72,200
252,737
788,800
11,980
1,616
434,136
820,126
864,652
46,000
144,336
46,200
11,980
1,616
3,250
17,621
11,600
15,000
1,759,502
(8
)
5,171
88,384
1,059,325
2,000
(8
)
(8)
(8
)
5,171
5,400
3,500
(®
)
C
5
)
N N P R T G U IO S
O O E A IN N N
AS
RA
AT
DA
AS
M
B (F)
B
BW
ME
B AC
RS
BC
R
BS
R
(B P
)SC
HE
RU
1 M(and A )
A
W
IB W
E
IBF0
IB
T
MF
DA
RA
Y
SW )
M (IA
UA
S
US
TE
WS
RA
American Railway and Supervisors Association ------------------------------------------American Train Dispatchers Association -------------------------------------------------Association of M
echanical Supervisors (Ind.) ______________ ___ __________
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and
Helpers ________________________________________
____ _
Brotherhood of Maintenance of W Employees ___________________________
ay
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and
Station Employees6 ___________ ________________________________
Brotherhood of Railway Carm of Am
en
erica and Canada ______________________
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen ___________________________________
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters ___________________________________
Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union_____________
International Association of Machinist and Aerospace W
orkers __________ _____
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers___________________________
International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers __________________________
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, W
arehousemen and Helpers of
America (Ind.) __ ______ ____ _________________________________
M
echanical Department Foremen's Association (Ind.) ___ ____________________
Railroad Yardmasters of America8 _________ ____ ____________ ______
Sheet M W
etal orkers' International Association ___________________________
United Steelworkers of Am
erica ___________________ _______ ________
United Transport Service Employees ____________ ______________________
W
estern Railway Supervisors Association (Ind.) ___________________________
N N P R T G M R E U IO S
O O E A IN A IN N N
GL
LO
IL
A
IU
0E
IU
P
MP
M
NE
MB
SIU
TU
W
District 50
NU
M
Great Lakes Licensed Officers Organization (Ind.) _________________________
international Longshoremen's Association _______________________________
international U
nion of Operating Engineers _______________ ___ __________
Inlandboatmen's U
nion of the Pacific ......................... __............................ ..........
International Organization of Masters, M
ates, and Pilots ___________ _________
National M
arine Engineers Beneficial Association ....................................................
Seafarers International U
nion of North Am
erica ________________ __________
Transport W
orkers U
nion of America .............. .................... ...............................
International U
nion of District 50, Allied and Technical W
orkers of the U and
.S.
Canada (Ind.) _____________________ _______ ____ ______________
National M
aritime U
nion of Am
erica .............. .......................................................
iaT figures for total union membership are 1970 levels and those
he
for the railroad industry are current levels.
2A union created on Jan. 1, 1969, by the merger of the Trainmen
(B T the Firemen and Engineers (B FE the Switchmen (SU A and the
R ),
L ),
N ),
Conductors (0R B
C ).
3 Includes approximately 2,000 busmen organized by the union.
4M
erged with the U U in 1970.
T
5Not available.
•The Clerks (B A C were involved in mergers twice in 1969: with the
RS)
2,500 member Railway Patrolmen's International U
nion on Jan. 1, 1969;
6
61
741,000
366,343
• 3,697
10,980]
10,317 >
64,389 J
7 149,789
210,000
41,000
<
•)
(*
)
(8
)
(8
)
1,900
14,000
250
500
and the 45,000 member Transportation-Communication Employees U
nion
(formerly the Order of Railway Telegraphers) on Feb. 20, 1969.
7 Estimate.
•The Railroad Yardmasters of North Am
erica (Ind.) merged into the
Railroad Yardmasters of America on July 1, 1969.
•An affiliate of SIU
.
N T : The unions are affiliated with the A 10 except where they
OE
FL-C
are noted as independent (Ind.).
SO R E National M
UC:
ediation Board; Bureau of Labor Statistics; In
dividual unions.
deavored to honor past practices of railroad workers
in organizing for representation purposes and of the
carriers in making collective bargaining agreements
with such representatives.28 Coupled with the m ajor
ity rule (the majority of eligible employees must par
ticipate and cast valid ballots) “fractionalized” rep
resentation— a large num ber of specialized unions
— became inevitable and led to competitiveness be
tween railroad unions for membership and for job
rights.29
With the exception of the Teamsters (IBT), rail
road unions have adhered rigidly to their traditional
jurisdictional claims to jobs on a craft basis, even
though technological changes have blurred lines of
demarcation between the original crafts. As early as
1950, the NMB noted that “the close cohesion be
tween the powerful (operating) brotherhoods . . .
has been affected by differences arising between
them as to representation, mileage limitations, pro
motional rights, and similar differences which are in
the realm of jurisdictional disputes.” 30 N or have the
nonoperating crafts been free of jurisdictional dis
putes over work assignments.31
A recent and well publicized instance of union ri
valry which demonstrates the dimension and intens
ity of the problem was one facet of the dispute re
2 A dm inistra tion o f the R ailw ay L a b o r A c t by the N a
8
tion al M ediation Board 1934-1970 (U.S. National Mediation
Board, 1971), p. 73.
29Shils, op. cit., pp. 81-84.
3 Sixteenth A nn ua l R eport o f the N a tio n a l M ediation
0
Board, F o r the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1950 (U.S. Na
tional Mediation Board, 1951), p. 7.
3 Twentieth A nn ua l R eport o f the N a tio n a l M ediation
1
Board, F o r the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1954 (U.S. Na
tional Mediation Board, 1955), p. 23.
suiting in the appointment of Emergency Board No.
178. After protracted bargaining and a nationwide
trucking stoppage in April and May 1970, the Team
sters negotiated a wage boost of $1.85, or 45 per
cent, over a 39-m onth period. Meanwhile in the rail
road industry, the Clerks (BRASC), who represent
workers in various transportation industries, were
pressing wage and rule demands on the Nation’s car
riers represented by the National Railway Labor
Conference (NRLC).
Large wage increases won by other unions, partic
ularly the Teamsters (who compete vigorously with
the Clerks for membership in both the airline and
railroad industries), created high wage expectations
among the Clerks’ members and difficult negotiating
goals for the Clerks’ union leaders. After negotia
tions and mediation were unsuccessful in reaching an
accord and arbitration was refused, an emergency
board was appointed to consider the dispute. On N o
vember 9, 1970, the Board released a report in
which it suggested a 32.5 percent wage adjustment.
Assailing the wage recommendation, the Clerks’
president claimed that his union could not “live with
that (wage increase) in the transportation industry
when the Government okays a higher increase for
the Teamsters.” 32 The union rejected the Board’s re
port, and conducted a nationwide strike on Decem
ber 10, 1970, which was terminated by ad hoc legis
lation. Under the terms of the eventual settlement,
which was reached in the following February, the
clerks received a 44.0 percent wage adjustment over
42 months.
3 W all Street Journal, Nov. 10, 1970, p. 3.
2
7
Chapter II. Legal Framework of the Railway
Labor Act
Procedural aspects of the act
The Railway Labor A c t33 requires the parties to
follow a step-by-step procedure, from the initial no
tice of intention to change the terms of an agreement
to the last step, which leaves the union free to strike
or the employer free to lock out his workers. (See
chart 1.) The procedure is set in motion when a
“Section 6” notice— a declaration of intention to
change the collective bargaining agreement— is
served. A “status quo” period prohibits changes in
the terms and conditions of employment until the
parties reach agreement, or all the required proce
dures of the act have been exhausted, or a period of
10 days has passed since the termination of discus
sions without either party’s request for or an offer
of the National M ediation Board (NM B’s) assist
ance. The parties are expected to negotiate until an
agreement is reached or an impasse develops. If,
however, the parties cannot reach agreement in such
direct negotiations, one or both of the parties may
request the mediatory assistance of the Board; or,
should the facts w arrant it, the NMB may offer its
assistance.
W hen mediation is unsuccessful, the NMB as one
of its last formal obligations, may request the parties
to submit their dispute to binding arbitration. If ei
ther party refuses arbitration, the Board is required
to formally notify both parties of its failure to recon
cile their differences. Again, a “status quo” period is
instituted, and neither party can alter the terms of
the collective bargaining agreement for 30 days from
the date of the NM B’s notice unless, in the interim,
arbitration is agreed on, or an agreement is reached
by the parties. If, however, these measures fail, and
emergency board may be established under Section
10 of the act. Action under this section is taken if, in
the opinion of the Board, an actual or imminent
strike arising out of an unresolved dispute “threatens
to substantially interrupt interstate commerce.” The
Board so notifies the President, who, as a last resort
under the act, may establish an emergency board to
examine the nature of the issues and to make recom
mendations concerning the dispute.
History of railroad legislation
Like some other provisions of the act, inclusion of
the emergency boards proceeded from 38 years of
experience gleaned in previous railroad legislation.
18 88 : First endeavor made by Congress to
eliminate or minimize serious railroad disputes;
instituted the use of voluntary arbitration and
temporary investigating panels created by the
President to investigate and report the underlying
causes of disputes.
Erdman Act passed; for the first time the
Federal Government utilized the procedure of vol
untary mediation, which was conducted jointly
under the auspices of the Commissioner of Labor
and the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce
Commission; “status quo” period adopted during
course of arbitration; investigation feature of 1888
act abandoned.
18 98 :
19 13 : Previous procedures adopted by Newlands
Act; more formal provisions for voluntary arbitra
tion instituted; primary reliance on mediation to
solve disputes; permanent board of mediation and
conciliation created.
1 9 1 7 :M Federal Director General assumed con
trol of railroads on December 28, 1917; instituted
national handling of wage proposals and signed
national agreements with unions; more standardi
zation of work rules and working conditions
achieved; bipartisan adjustment boards developed.
19 20 :
Transportation Act of 1920 passed; media-
3
4 In 1916, the Adamson Act was passed in an attem
pt
3 Congress of the United States. In U.S. 44 Stats., 557 to compose (settle) a dispute concerning the basic 8-hour
3
day by direct Congressional intervention. The author
ch. 347, 69th Cong. (1926), as am
ended Congress of the
assum this extralegal m
es
easure m be the precedent for
ust
United States. In U.S. 48 Stats. 1185, ch. 691 73d Cong.
ad hoc legislation passed since 1963.
(1934).
8
Chart 1
R a ilw a y c o lle c tiv e b a r g a in in g p r o c e d u r e s a n d "s t a t u s q u o " p e r io d s
u n d e r th e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t .
PROCEDURES
GOVERNMENT
CARRIER(S) AND UNION(S)
rv lO D A O i t r\iv
UlorUo ITi1 i
ON
''STATUS QUO"
(IN ABSENCE OF
AGREEMENT)
FROM
NOTICE
UNLESS 10
DAYS ELAPSE
FOLLOWING
TERMINATION
OF
CONFERENCES
WITHOUT
REQUEST FOR
OR PROFFER
OF
MEDIATION
TO
30 DAYS
FOLLOWING
NM
B
NOTICE TO
PARTIES THAT
MEDIATION
HAS
FAILED AND
ARBITRATION
W REFUSED
AS
FROM
CREATION
OF BOARD
TO
30 DAYS
FOLLOWING
EMERGENCY
BOARD
REPORT
9
t io n d is c a r d e d ; p r im a r y r e lia n c e p la c e d o n c o l l e c
t iv e b a r g a in in g ; v o lu n ta r y a r b itr a tio n a d o p t e d a s
s e c o n d a r y lin e o f d e f e n s e ; tr ip a r tite tr ib u n a l ( N a
t io n a l R a ilr o a d L a b o r B o a r d ) c r e a t e d b y T i t le I I
o f a c t t o “in v e s t ig a t e ” a n d “d e c id e ” d is p u te s o f
a ll ty p e s ; B o a r d m a n d a t e d t o is s u e r e c o m m e n d a
t io n s w h ic h w e r e n o t s p e c if ic a lly e n f o r c e a b le c o n
c e r n in g s e t t le m e n t o f t h e d is p u te ; r e lia n c e w a s
p la c e d o n p u b lic o p i n io n t o f o r c e r e c a lc itr a n t
p a r ty t o a c c e p t r e c o m m e n d a t io n s .
Within a relatively short period of time, it became
evident that the Transportation Act of 1920 had be
come ineffective, that the Railroad Labor Board had
10
become practically powerless, and that the parties
had become dissatisfied with the provisions and im
plementation of the act. After holding conferences,
the Nation’s railroads and labor organizations jointly
drafted and sponsored a bill which eventually was
accepted by Congress and approved by President
Coolidge; this was the first time in labor history that
the interested parties wrote a labor act. With the
passage of this law, mediation was reinstituted as the
principal means of settling railroad disputes and was
to be supplemented by voluntary arbitration and
emergency factfinding boards.
Chapter III. Railroad Mediation Cases8
5
R ole of th e N ational M ediation B oard
Under the provisions of the act, two prim ary du
ties, relating to two types of disputes, are delegated
to the NMB: (1) the mediation of disputes which
involve proposals to change wages, rules, or working
conditions (major disputes); and (2) the determina
tion and certification of the representative of any
craft or class of employees after secret-ballot elec
tions (representation disputes). This chapter briefly
describes the railroads’ experience with major dis
putes, some of which have required the appointment
of emergency boards.
Contrary to widely held beliefs, mediation often
has been used effectively by the NMB to peacefully
conclude settlements in the railroad industry. Over
the two decades following 1950, the board disposed
of 3,984 railroad mediation cases, 1,900 since
I9 6 0 .3 (See appendix table A -2 .) W hether the
36
5
slightly smaller number of mediation cases occurring
in the 1960’s, as against the 1950’s, indicated that
collective bargaining was more effective or that
fewer proposals for changes in the terms and condi
tions of employment were processed in the former
period was not ascertainable.
Ranging from a high of 306 in 1969 to a low of
133 in 1963, the distribution of railroad mediation
cases successfully mediated, withdrawn by the
parties, or dismissed by the Board differed signifi
cantly among adjacent years; however, large num
bers of cases tended to cluster, especially in the years
1951-53, 1955-58, and 1968-69. In the early
1950’s, the standard railway unions, with the excep
tion of operating organizations whose proposals dealt
with the manning of diesel locomotives and the es
tablishment of the 40-hour workweek, were con
35 A ll data, e x ce p t fo r w ork stop p age figures, in th is an d
in the fo llo w in g sectio n s are b a sed o n th e fiscal y e a r (en d
in g J u n e 30).
36 B eca u se o f a lim ita tio n in d ata, th e a n alysis p ro ceed s
o n th e b asis o f m ed ia tio n c a se s d isp o sed o f (settled b y o n e
m ea n s o r a n oth er) rather th an m ed ia tio n c a ses d ock eted in
a n y p articu la r fiscal year.
cerned mainly with nonwage issues. Prom inent
among these issues were grievances, time claims,
jurisdictional disputes, union shop, and other rules
dealing with operational matters. Excluding the large
num ber of mediation cases dealing with rates of pay
in 1956, the NMB was concerned primarily in the
second half of the decade with jurisdictional dis
putes, time claims, and rules demands, particularly
those dealing with health and welfare, vacations, hol
idays, and cost-of-living provisions. However, toward
the end of the decade (1958) a significant change
took place. Actual or anticipated introduction of la
borsaving devices and changes in operational meth
ods generated pressures which resulted in the proc
essing of “Section 6” notices relating to job security
provisions.
Throughout the 1960’s, anticipated or actual dis
placements of railroad workers or reductions in their
earning capacity because of (1) accelerations in
planned or actual consolidation of carriers or facili
ties and (2) introductions of laborsaving equipment
or new methods of work performance affecting m an
power utilization resulted in numerous proposals
dealing with job security, employment stability, sev
erance pay and related matters. Because of the rising
cost-of-living during fiscal year 1969, disputes deal
ing with wages and other economic issues became
progressively more prevalent.
O p e ratin g a n d n o n o p e ra tin g g ro u p s
Of the mediation cases disposed of between 1950
and 1969 that could be classified by m ajor occupa
tional group, 2,312 (61 percent) involved operating
employees and 1,503 (39 percent) nonoperating
employees. (See appendix table A - 3 .) 37 Operating
employees accounted for an inordinately large and
growing share of m ediation cases over the years,
especially in light of their numbers in relation to total
37
T h e categ o ry o f c o m b in e d railroad w ork ers w a s e lim
in ated fr o m th e an a ly sis b e ca u se cla ssifica tio n o f th o se
m ed ia tio n ca ses b y m a jo r grou p w a s im p o ssib le.
11
railroad workers. Over the 20-year period, these em
ployees constituted slightly less than 25 percent of
the total railroad labor force.38
Table 2. Mediation cases disposed of, by occupational
group, selected periods, 1950-69
Operating
Nonoperating
groups
groups
ber
Number Percent Num Percent Num Percent
ber
1950-69
3,815 100.0 2,312 60.6 1,503 39.4
473 50.1
471 49.9
1950-54 _____ 944 100.0
396 37.4
663 62.6
1955-59 _____ 1,059 100.0
468 59.4
320 40.6
1960-64 _____
788 100.0
314 30.7
710 69.3
1965-69 _____ 1,024 100.0
Total
Year
SO R E National M
UC:
ediation Board data.
Within the operating group, the division of media
tion cases involving the three separate classifications
of train, engine, and yard employees was not avail
able, but a distribution of nonoperating employees
by major occupations was made. W ith the addition
of the clerical and related class to the operating
crafts, these groups participated in approximately
70 percent of all railroad mediation cases, as follows:
Train, engine and
yard service ,
clerical and related
N um ber
1 9 5 0 -6 9
1 9 5 0 -5 4
1 9 5 5 -5 9
1 9 6 0 -6 4
1 9 6 5 -6 9
Percent
2 ,7 1 2
71.1
589
769
566
788
6 2 .4
7 2 .6
7 1 .8
7 7 .0
SO R E National M
UC:
ediation Board data.
Is s u e s
Union demands for changes in an existing agree
ment are seldom confined to a single issue. Most fre
quently, they include economic as well as noneco
nomic proposals. Nevertheless, when an impasse has
been reached, generally one broad issue can be iden
tified as the impediment to agreement. Although full
agreement may not have been reached on all of the
provisions which were considered in negotiations, in
the data discussed here and in appendix A -2 , media
tion cases were classified by the issue considered by
the parties and the mediators as primarily responsi
ble for the impasse.
Because of the unavailability of data for the pre1955 period, the analysis was confined to subsequent
years. Of the 2,999 mediation cases disposed of be
tween 1955 and 1969, 2,114 were concerned with
work rules, 671 with rates of pay, 30 with the nego
38 B a sed o n c la ss I carriers’ e m p lo y m en t figures.
12
tiation of first contracts, and 184 with miscellaneous
issues. (See appendix table A -2 .) W ork rules were
the principal subject of mediation cases docketed by
the Board over the 15-year period (70.5 percent)
and also in each of the three subperiods, 1955-59,
1960— and 1965— In fact, this issue accounted
64,
69.
for a growing share of total cases between the sub
periods. Combined with wages (the second most
prominent issue), work rules and rates of pay were
involved in 92.9 percent of all railroad mediation
cases. New agreements and miscellaneous issues ac
counted for a small and declining share (7.1 per
cent) of total cases, probably because the negotia
tion of first collective bargaining agreements was
nearly at an end in the railroad industry by 1950 and
because such miscellaneous issues as grievances and
time claims were being processed through other ad
justment machinery.
D isposition of m ed iatio n c a s e s 39
Of the various methods of disposing of these
2,999 cases, mediation agreements constituted the
most prevalent method of settlement, far exceeding
other categories. Between 1955 and 1969, 1,672 of
these agreements, accounting for 55.8 percent of all
railroad mediation cases, were consummated. Thus,
after direct negotiations had failed, the NMB’s ef
forts were effective in assisting the parties to reach
agreement.
As table 3 indicates, the consummation of media
tion agreements varied between the 5—
year periods; a
decline occurred between the first and the second
subperiods, because of an increase in the absolute
and relative num ber of dismissals and withdrawals,
and an upswing took place in the third period.
Although more cases were disposed of by mediation
agreements in the first and third subperiods com
pared with the second, in relative terms fewer and
fewer accords were reached by mediation in each
successive subperiod.
Table 3. Number of mediation agreements and percent
of total cases disposed of, selected periods, 1955-69
Years
1955-69 _______
1955-59 ___________
1960-64 ___________
1965-69 ___________
Num
ber
1,672
690
445
537
SO R E National M
UC:
ediation Board data.
A a percent of total
s
mediation cases
disposed of
55.8
62.8
54.7
49.4
" D a t a o n d isp o sitio n o f railroad m e d ia tio n w a s a lso u n
a v a ila b le b e fo r e 1 9 5 5 . (S ee a p p en d ix ta b le A - 2 .)
Two other categories of disposition, withdrawals
and dismissals,40 were significant. Over the 15-year
span, they accounted for 923 dispositions (552 and
371, respectively). The num ber of withdrawals and
the number of dismissals varied considerably be
tween the three 5-year periods, declining between
the first and second subperiod and increasing be
tween the second and third. In relative terms, the
distribution of dismissals plus withdrawals increased
significantly between the three subperiods: 23.7 per
cent, 28.5 percent, and 39.7 percent, respectively.
Arbitration, another method for disposing of me
diation cases, was seldom used by the parties. During
the 15-year period under consideration, only 32
agreements to arbitrate were reached, an average of
slightly over two annually. Since 1955, the parties’ in
terest in this procedure has apparently declined in
both absolute and relative terms. Perhaps this de
cline reflected both labor and management’s refusal
to allow third parties to determine the terms and
conditions of employment, especially complicated
work rules. The following tabulation shows how me
diation cases disposed of by arbitration agreements
declined between 1955 and 1969.
40
A w ith d raw al refers to th e a ctio n o f th e party w h ic h
in itia lly req u ested th e m ed iatory serv ices o f th e B oard w h en
th e p arty retracts its a p p lication . A d ism issal refers to th e
a ctio n o f the B oard w h en it d ism isses th e req u est fo r its
serv ices a cco rd in g to th e co n d itio n s req uired u n d er th e
act (R L A ).
Years
1 9 5 5 -6 9
1 9 5 5 -5 9
1 9 6 0 -6 4
1 9 6 5 -6 9
N um ber
Percent
_______
32
1.1
_______________
_______________
_______________
17
9
6
1.5
1.1
0 .6
S O U R C E : N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard data.
The remaining category of settlement, refusalsto-arbitrate, constituted a significant measure of the
Board’s success and its failure in achieving the objec
tives of the R L A and the parties’ acceptance of the
spirit and intent of the act. Over the 15-year span,
one or both parties refused to accept arbitration as a
final and binding m ethod to resolve the issues in dis
pute on 372 occasions: 105 times by carriers; 229,
by unions; and 38, by both.
Excluding dismissals and withdrawals, 2,076 cases
were resolved by mediation (in 80.5 percent of the
cases), arbitration (1.5 percent), and refusals-to-arbitrate (17.9 percent). With the consummation of
the first two methods of settlement, the objective of
peaceful industrial relations, as envisioned by the
act, was achieved. On 372 occasions however, the
Board was unsuccessful in persuading the parties to
rely on the lower machinery of the act to resolve la
bor-management controversies. Because of the 372
refusals, 47 emergency panels (involving 68 media
tion cases) were created in the 15-year period.
13
Chapter IV. Appointment of Railroad Emergency Boards
In ten t of th e a c t
Since the R L A does not fully define the role of
emergency boards, an inquiry into the Congressional
hearings conducted before the law’s enactment in
1926 should help to clarify the function and goals of
this procedure. One witness (counsel for the orga
nized railroad employees), testifying at the Senate
hearings, asserted that the “primary purpose and use
for such a board is clearly a last effort to settle a
controversy which threatens to injure public opinion
. . . Such . . . (a) board . . . would . . . want to
exercise first of all the mediatory power that would
rest within its hands.” 41 Beyond the prim ary func
tion, the boards were to conduct investigations con
cerning the issues in dispute, to prepare impartial
recommendations, and to make their reports to the
President.424
3
The technique purportedly represented a recogni
tion of the public interest by the parties when they
were confronted by an impasse in negotiation:
T h e m o s t v a lu a b le f e a tu r e o f t h is l a w is t h e f a c t
th a t it r e p r e s e n ts t h e a g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r tie s ,
th a t t h e y w ill b e u n d e r t h e m o r a l o b lig a t io n t o
s e e t h a t th e ir a g r e e m e n t a c c o m p lis h e s its p u r p o s e ,
a n d t h a t i f ( i t i s ) e n a c t e d in t o la w , t h e y w ill d e
sir e t o p r o v e t h e la w a s u c c e s s .48
As such, this tool was clearly an aid to collective
bargaining and was to perform the service of
prompting continued dialogue and compromise.
It was obvious from the Congressional hearings
that all parties concerned anticipated that this instru
ment of last resort would be infrequently utilized.44
During the R L A ’s early years (1926-40), the act
apparently proved successful. On only 17 occasions
were Presidents forced to resort to the use of an
emergency procedure. Furtherm ore, recommenda
tions of the boards were accepted, and labor disputes
in the industry were minimal.45
By 1941, however, collective bargaining relations
in the industry began to deteriorate noticeably.
Pending “m inor disputes” (controversies arising over
the meaning or application of an agreement) began
to accumulate, especially in the First Division which
handles minor disputes involving operating employ
ees. Nor were the awards always accepted by m an
agement, who purportedly claimed the decisions
were too “legalistic o r pro-labor or both.” 46 Unions,
on the other hand, purportedly did not bargain con
scientiously on grievance issues and “forced” their
arbitration in the belief that they would obtain
greater concessions from adjustment boards.47 F or
major disputes, direct negotiations proved progres
sively less successful and the num ber of mediation
cases coming before the NMB increased substan
tially.48 Between 1941 and 1949, the num ber of ac
tual work stoppages (91), as well as imminent dis
putes, accelerated rapidly, and 55 railroad emergency
panels were appointed. In addition, 51 boards— the
vast majority dealing with railroads— were created
during World W ar II years (1 9 4 3 -4 7 ) by the N a
tional Railway Labor Panel to supplement the “Sec
tion 10” procedures of the R LA .49
A distinct new pattern of emergency board imple45 A c co r d in g to th e D e p a r tm en t o f L a b o r’s B u reau o f
41 Railway Labor A ct, H ea rin g s b e fo r e th e C o m m ittee on
Interstate C o m m erce, U .S . S en ate, 6 9 th C o n g ., 1st S ess., on
S. 2 3 0 6 , P t. 1, p. 8 3 . (later c ite d as 1926 Senate Hearings).
A ls o see Railroad Labor Disputes, H ea rin g s b e fo r e th e C o m
m ittee o n In terstate and F o r e ig n C o m m erce, U .S . H o u se o f
R ep resen ta tiv es, 6 9 th C o n g ., 1st S ess., o n H .R . 7 1 8 0 , pp.
19 an d 118. (later cited as 1926 House Hearings).
42 1926 Senate Hearings, op . cit., p. 3 5 . 1926 House Hear
ings, op. cit., p. 18.
431926 House Hearings, op . cit., p. 2 1 .
441926 House Hearings, op . cit., p. 109.
14
L ab or S tatistics, a to ta l o f 11 w o rk sto p p a g es occu rred in
th e p erio d 1 9 3 4 -4 0 .
46 Emergency Board R eport N o. 97, op . c it., p. 6 8 .
47 Ib id .
48 B etw een 1935 and 19 3 9 , an a n n u al avera g e o f ap p rox
im a tely 110 railroad m e d ia tio n c a se s w e re d isp o sed o f b y
th e B oard , th e a verage risin g to 2 0 2 du rin g th e n e x t 5 years
( 1 9 4 0 -4 4 ).
49 Twenty-Ninth Annual R eport o f the National M edia
tion Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1963 (U .S .
N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard , 1 9 64), p. 7.
mentation was becoming perceptible. In 1941, the
major railroad unions “progressed” (advanced) na
tional wage demands, and management met the un
ions proposals with counter demands for rule
changes. After an impasse was reached in confer
ences between the parties, the mediatory services of
the Board were utilized. When mediation proved un
successful, arbitration was proffered and rejected by
the unions. With an imminent work stoppage in
sight, the President appointed an emergency board
whose recommendations were rejected by the un
ions. In an unexpected and unprecedented strata
gem, the President, hoping to keep the roads
operating, personally intervened in the dispute and
recommended that the Board be reconvened and
their report be modified.50
R a ilr o a d e m e r g e n c y b o a r d s , 1 9 5 0 - 6 9
Since 1950, the Board has disposed of 3,984 me
diation cases, of which 94 required the final step
in the RLA emergency procedures. (See appendix
tables A -4 and A -5 .) In total, 71 emergency panels
were appointed by the President to investigate and
report on these disputes. Occurring mostly in scat
tered clusters, the incidence of these boards over
time was irregular and depended on various factors,
such as the extent and complexity of proposals, eco
nomic trends, pattern settlements, moratoriums, the
“forcing” of emergency panels’ appointments
through strike threats, the partie’s understanding of
the tools provided by the act, and court decisions
(discussed in a later section).
F a c t o r s a f f e c t in g t h e a p p o in t m e n t o f b o a r d s
Moratoriums. At least overtly, the prime mover of
industrial relations stability is the negotiation of
wage and rule moratoriums in labor agreements. Un
like those in most other industries, railroad collective
bargaining agreements are open-ended, that is, they
contain no definite termination date and are subject
either to reopenings for negotiation or to termination
at any time, on proper notice by either party. Mora
torium provisions, on the other hand, specify time
spans during which labor and management agree nei
ther to initiate nor to process demands for modifica
5 Apparently, there were only three direct Presidential
0
interventions in railroad emergency board disputes before
1950, twice by Franklin D . Roosevelt (in 1941 and in 1943)
and once by Truman (in 1946).
tions in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
When moratorium provisions are included in rail
road labor agreements, the “exposure rate”, or
chance of conflict, obviously is diminished exten
sively. For instance, the relative calm in the years
1958-1959 can be attributed, to a significant degree,
to 3-year wage and rule agreements which were
signed by the railroad employees and the major
trunk line rail carriers and other ancillary rail facili
ties and which contained moratoriums extending
until November 1, 1959.
National movements. Whether a dispute eventually
culminated in a work stoppage or not, the nature of
bargaining in the railroad industry—the preponder
ance of national wage and rule movements— inher
ently carried with it the potential of a national
emergency. In the processing of these movements,
the experience was generally satisfactory when the de
mands involved relatively uniform wage proposals or
few rule changes. When the parties initiated propos
als dealing with numerous rule changes or with
substantial modifications in existing rules or the revi
sion of the entire agreement, the resultant conflicts
proved extremely difficult to settle. An example was
the set of proposals brought before Emergency
Board No. 147, which involved job security and in
come protection. Since railroad labor contracts may
contain as many as 100 provisions or rules dealing
with the terms and conditions of employment, and
since the proposed modification of a single rule often
produces many issues between the parties, the likeli
hood of protracted disputes in rules cases was sub
stantial.
When the national wage and rule disputes were
settled, the accords usually created patterns for the
railroad industry, extending to practically all the
major railroads. Other carriers or ancillary railroad
facilities which did not participate in these industry
wide negotiations generally settled on identical or
similar terms. Therefore, if the initial national move
ment resulted in an agreement without resort to
economic “self-help” (a strike or lockout), the nego
tiations of hundreds of similar settlements on the var
ious carriers in the industry became unnecessary.
For example, on March 2, 1959, the Conductors
(ORCB) served the Nation’s carriers with wage
proposals which were met by counter demands for
cancellation of cost-of-living provisions and for a
reduction in wages and allowances. After an impasse
was reached in direct negotiations, the dispute was
settled by mediation of June 4, 1960.
15
On the other hand, some of the industrywide ne
gotiations were not settled peacefully and resulted in
transportation crises which at times had adverse ef
fects on the economy. For example, on November 2,
1959, the Nation’s major carriers, associated with
the National Railway Labor Conference, served
“Section 6” notices dealing with rule changes on all
five operating unions. After exhausting all provisions
of the act, including use of an emergency board, a
Presidential Commission was appointed to consider
the dispute. Even though the National Mediation
Board, an emergency board, the President of the
United States, the U.S. Department of Labor, and a
Presidential Commission (among others) intervened
in this dispute, three work stoppages ensued, includ
ing one terminated by Congressional ad hoc legisla
tion (Public Law 88-108).
Economic trends. Economic trends have also played
a substantive role in determining the incidence of
emergency situations. In periods of rising national
employment, output, and prices, pressures which
were transmitted to the industry led the union
leadership (and rank-and-file) to seek substantial
wage increases and management to issue counter pro
posals dealing with rule changes. Secular trends in
the competitiveness of the railroad industry with
other modes of transportation, as well as the intro
duction of new technology, have induced manage
ment to adopt alterations in work methods, resulting
in union proposals for rule changes, employment sta
b iliza tio n , an d in c o m e p r o te c tio n b en efits.
Strike threats. Creation of emergency situations
through strike threats also has precipitated the
Board’s proffer of mediation under section 5 of the
act and, at times, its notification to the President of
an imminent work stoppage that threatened to sub
stantially interrupt interstate commerce. The Board
has stated many times that its efforts were more suc
cessful in reconciling the parties’ divergent interests
when the dispute was not complicated by a strike
threat.
When strike threats were issued, the procedures of
the act often had not been exhausted, either in the
adjustment process for “minor” disputes or in collec
tive bargaining, mediation, and arbitration for the
handling of major disputes. For instance, Emergency
Board No. 86 chastised the Trainmen, who were
confronted with the introduction of Budd Diesel
cars, for not inaugurating proceedings before an ad
justment board or under “section 6” of the act. “In
16
preference to either of these alternatives, it invoked
mediation; and when it failed to achieve its objec
tives, it voted to strike. This procedure caused the
controversy to come before an Emergency Board
without the basic issues ever having been considered
in conference between the parties, and without
(the basic issues) having been presented to this
(Emergency) Board.” 51
Moreover, unions sometimes issued strike threats
in the belief that this action would result in greater
concessions than would otherwise be obtainable.
Thus, both parties tended to refrain from granting
concessions until after the emergency board’s report
had been released.
Role of the parties. Ultimately, the factor determin
ing the incidence of emergency board appointments
is the parties themselves. The act is based on the
principles of freedom of contract and maximum
self-determination, rather than on government coer
cion. Under this system, the principals must decide
the merit of their proposals and negotiate “liveable”
collective bargaining agreements which will provide
adequately for the public interest. To aid the parties
in this pursuit, the act provides for various settle
ment procedures. These procedures, in themselves,
obviously cannot guarantee industrial relations sta
bility and the absence of work stoppages. If labor
and management genuinely accept the spirit and in
tent of the act and attempt to understand its proce
dures and to utilize the tools available to them, the
appointment of an emergency board should be a rare
occasion.
“Proliferation” of emergency boards. In the past 20
years, the “Section 10” procedure has been depicted
as being overused and labor-management negotia
tions in emergency disputes as being dominated by
the Government, contrary to the original intent of
the act. Critics have frequently charged that the
NMB has pursued a policy of automatically notifying
the President of almost any dispute which was unset
tled after it had intervened, the only criterion being
whether a work stoppage threatened interstate com
merce. Since the railroad unions have routinely set
strike dates when impasses were reached in negotia
tions or in mediation conducted by the Board, the
occurrence of these “imminent work stoppages” has
been extremely high. Consequently, it has appeared
that the effectiveness of the emergency board proce5 Emergency Board R eport N o. 86, op. cit., p. 6.
1
dures as an instrument of last resort has been reduced
and that the parties to the disputes have integrated
the procedure into their own collective bargaining
strategy.
If this lessening of effectiveness has in fact oc
curred, its cause may have been in the implementa
tion of the act.52 The proponents of the act and Con
gress obviously had anticipated that few emergency
situations would occur and require the appointment
of an emergency board, which was intended to be an
instrument of last resort. But by the early 1950’s,
“the term ‘emergency’, in the sense of limitation to
rare cases, was becoming outmoded.” 53 As the NMB
observed in one of its annual reports:
At times however, the machinery of collective
bargaining, for the reasons cited in the following sec
tions, may break down, and this failure can result in
a national emergency. On union leader intimately in
volved in many railroad disputes has characterized
the cause of emergencies in the industry in these
terms: “Those who charge that the RLA has broken
down either fail to understand it (the act) or refuse
to do so. The act has succeeded. It is collective bar
gaining that has failed.” 55
According to the members of Board No. 169, per
functory bargaining occurred in most disputes that
culminated in the use of the act’s emergency machin
ery:
T he three (earlier) steps (negotiations, m ediation
and arbitration) should operate to hold to a m ini
m um the necessity for the use o f E m ergency
Board procedure (s ic ) . Such procedure w as not
designed as a substitute for collective bargaining
or to provide a catchall fo r all disputes or a tem
porary refuge from the problem s that should be
faced and resolved by sincere and conscientious
collective bargaining efforts, but w as intended for
use only in extrem e situations w here w ork stop
pages on im portant transportation facilities w ould
result in substantial disruption to business and
w ould im pose extrem e hardships on the traveling
public in peacetim e or retard or im pede defense
efforts in tim e o f w ar or national em ergency.5
4
It becam e apparent that n o real bargaining has
actually taken place betw een the parties (prior to )
their appearance before the Board. W e believe
this is generally the case in proceedings b efore
E m ergency Boards . . . T h e parties begin to n e
gotiate on ly after an E m ergency Board has been
appointed, and often on ly after a report has been
subm itted to the President. W e b elieve that co n
tinuation o f this practice w ill defeat other at
tem pts to im prove labor relations in the railroad
industry.5
6
Ineffective collective bargaining. Collective bargain
ing on the local properties constitutes the first step in
reaching an agreement between the parties. In the
vast majority of cases, negotiations are concluded on
these properties without government intervention or
active assistance of the Board. Although there are no
accurate statistics on the number of peaceful settle
ments at this level, the NMB receives on the aver
age, annually, well over 1,000 amendments or revi
sions of labor agreements. This statistic understates
the number of “Section 6” notices served by the
parties on each other, since many revisions or
amendments, especially those dealing exclusively
with local issues, are never filed with the Board.
8 The avowed efficacy and acceptance of the act, even by
2
late 1949, can be exemplified by this quote from one labor
leader: “The splendid record which the railroad industry has
developed generally in the peaceful settlement o f differences
which have arisen is ample and eloquent testimony o f the
high regard in which this Act is held.” (Trainmen N ews, Oct.
3, 1949, p. 3.)
5 Emergency Board R eport N o. 97, op. cit., p. 68.
8
5 Twenty ^Fourth Annual R eport of the National M edia4
tion Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1958 (U.S.
National Mediation Board, 1959), p. 7.
Observing a similar tendency, the members of Emer
gency Board No. 154 noted, “there has been an un
fortunate tendency in this industry to postpone real
collective bargaining until the final hour.” 57
One manifestation of this inclination was the ac
tual number of days the parties faced each other
across the bargaining table in negotiations.58 The
principals involved in Emergency Board No. 147
(1958) failed to reach an accord in their only con
ference conducted before invoking the mediatory
services of the NMB. The parties who participated in
the deliberations before Emergency Board No. 145
conferred only four times before requesting govern
ment intervention. Similarly, an impasse in direct ne
gotiations preceding Board No. 118 was reached al
most immediately; and, after the NMB’s proffer of
arbitration, the parties negotiated only once. Be
tween July and October 1957, the participants in
volved in Emergency Board No. 133 (Pennsylvania
Railroad and the Transport Workers) conferred for
3 Machinists M onthly Journal, November 1950, p. 329.
5
3 Report to the President by Emergency Board N o. 169
6
(U.S. National Mediation Board, March 10, 1967), p. 4.
5 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 154
7
(U.S. National Mediation Board, May 13, 1963), p. 11.
5 This measure is arbitrary and does not reflect “confer
8
ences” conducted over the telephone, by letters, and by
other “informal” means of communications.
17
only 2 days. In many of these emergency situations,
the unions claimed that the carriers, assured of gov
ernment protection against actual or imminent work
stoppages, did not engage in “genuine” bargaining.
On the other hand, management asserted that the
unions, in the expectation of precipitating an emer
gency dispute, did not conduct “good-faith” negotia
tions, but awaited the appointment of a board and its
report, of which the favorable recommendations
would be accepted and the others would be
rejected.59*
National cases. In connection with national cases,
the NMB, as early as 1950, publicly disclosed its
concern with the parties’ perfunctory bargaining:
T he Board is further disturbed by the apparent
reluctance o f both the carriers and the organiza
tions in national cases to conduct through co llec
tive bargaining; each side apparently feelin g that
the responsibility for the disposition o f all such
cases should be attached to som e other source. If
the R ailw ay Labor A ct is to survive, there m ust
be an ever-present consciousness o f and the desire
o f the parties to m ake it w ork in the m anner
w hich they (th e parties) so strongly advocated
w hen it w as placed on the Federal Statute books.®0
At that time there was a growing tendency for fewer
and fewer national movements to be settled in me
diation, and, in the early 1950’s, emergency
boards became increasingly ineffective in the settle
ment of such disputes.61 For example, on March 1,
1951, several unions representing nonoperating em
ployees signed their first wage settlement, in 14
years, not disposed of by arbitration or an emer
gency board.62 In their next four general wage move
ments, three resulted in the appointment of an emer
gency board.63
This same problem also was evident in the na
tional movements of ancillary rail facilities. Except
for a negotiated agreement in 1960, all of the Rail
way Express Agency (REA) and the Teamsters’
(IBT) national bargaining movements, which were
5 The parties, themselves, have requested the appointment
9
of boards, e.g., the unions for Emergency Board N os. 81,
95, 173, and others; the carriers for Emergency Board Nos.
129, 154, 157, 172, and others.
00 NMB, Sixteenth Annual R eport, op. cit., p. 7.
6 Eighteenth Annual R eport of the National Mediation
1
Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1952 (U.S. N a
tional Mediation Board, 1953), p. 24.
0 M onthly Labor Review, Vol. 72, N o. 4, Apr. 1951, p.
2
451.
0 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 159
3
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Apr. 3, 1964), p. 26.
18
initiated in 1941, resulted in the creation of emer
gency boards, 12 in number, the last one appointed
in September 1962.64
Grievance boards. Besides ineffective and perfunc
tory collective bargaining, another activity which vio
lated the spirit and intent of the act and which
vitiated the effectiveness of its implementation was
evident in the early 1950’s.65 In seven instances, the
parties did not comply fully with the adjustment ma
chinery that the RLA provided for the settlement of
disputes dealing with the interpretation and applica
tion of agreements, i.e., grievances or time claims.66
Instead they actively impaired the effectiveness of
the act by “forcing” the use of mediation and emer
gency boards for the processing of these controver
sies, contrary to the intent of the framers of the act:
W e com e here w ith the im plication b y our com ing
that both parties are com m itted to this (th e act)
as a m eans o f preventing interruptions o f trans
portation. A nd that every step in it m ust be pur
sued before there is an interruption o f transpor
tation.6
7
In the early 1950’s, the NMB usually pursued a
policy of refusing to docket mediation cases which
were properly referable to adjustment boards. When
confronted with a strike threat or an imminent work
stoppage, the Board, however, proffered its media
tory services, as authorized under section 5(b), in an
attempt to prevent interruptions of railroad opera
tions. In some instances (e.g., Emergency Board No.
86), the parties did not negotiate on the local prop
erties prior to bringing the dispute before an emer
gency board. Several of the grievances processed by
emergency panels were pending before adjustment
boards or were previously decided in principle by a
prior emergency or adjustment board, e.g., Emer
gency Board No. 79.
Moreover, the parties, at times, threatened to re
sort to “self-help” (economic force) rather than to
the normal channels of the RLA’s procedures. One
emergency board (No. 91) characterized this prac
tice as one pursued “in the hope that it (an emer
gency board) will make favorable recommendations
concerning contentions about grievances, with no
84 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 153
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Nov. 10, 1962), p. 4.
65 Starting in 1945, operating unions displayed a growing
inclination to set strike dates on grievance dockets which
were properly referable to an adjustment board, particularly
the First Division’s.
66 Emergency Board Nos> 76, 78, 79, 80, 86, 91, and 104.
6 1926 Senate hearings, op. cit., p. 16.
7
binding effect if the reverse recommendation should
be made.” 68 On some occasions, the unions claimed
that the railroads systematically ignored the stages of
negotiations and mediation, and thus, “made the last
step the first by hurdling the first two steps . . . into
an emergency which need not have existed,” 69 e.g.,
Emergency Board No. 79.
At other times, the unions agreed that the griev
ances were within the jurisdiction of an adjustment
board, but claimed that the circumvention of normal
channels was necessary because of processing delays
in these types of disputes and because of the carriers’
refusals to apply precedents, e.g., Emergency Board
No. 78. Considerable merit seemed to exist on the
matter of delay, as evidenced by this statement of
Emergency Board No. 76:
T his Board is n ot unm indful o f the fa ct that for
som e considerable tim e there has been lo n g and
unusual delay in the progressing o f cases through
the First D ivision (adjustm ent boards). A num ber
o f other E m ergency Boards have taken n ote o f
this unfortunate situation and h ave m ad e recom
m endations for the elim ination o f these delays. W e
believe that substantial progress has recently been
m ade in that direction . . . ( W ) e should h ow
ever like to point out that i f it is perm issible
under the R ailw ay Labor A c t fo r em ployees to
circum vent the functioning o f th e A djustm ent
Board m erely by creating a situation that calls for
the appointm ent o f an E m ergency Board the act
has lost its efficacy for m aintaining harm onious
and orderly relations in the railroad industry in
sofar as operational disputes are concerned.7
0
NMB records also substantiated the union claims.
The number of pending minor cases dealing with the
interpretation and application of agreements in
creased substantially between 1947 and 1952. A vast
majority of these docketed and pending cases (77
percent in 1953) were accounted for by the adjust
ment boards in the First Division.
To relieve the First Division’s burdensome work
load, leaders of the five operating organizations and
the three carrier conference committees consum
mated an agreement creating two supplemental ad
justment boards on May 19, 1949. Because of delays
in obtaining the necessary funds, the boards did not
function effectively until January 1950. During thenext 4 fiscal years, the number of minor cases dis
posed of by the First Division, fluctuating substan
tially, increased, as shown below:
Cases disposed o f
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
_____________________________________
731
--------------------------------------------------------- 1,438
-----------------------------------------------------------1,110
--------------------------------------------------------- 1,313
--------------------------------------------------------- 2,792
On December 12, 1953, the union leaders represent
ing the operating employees advised the carrier con
ference committees that they desired to terminate
these adjustment boards, the official cessation com
ing on March 22, 1954.
A landmark decision which effectively eliminated
the “necessity” of appointing emergency boards to
consider grievance cases was the Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen vs. the Chicago River and Indi
ana Railroad Co.71 After conducting negotiations
dealing with 21 grievances on the local properties,
the trainmen set a strike date, and the NMB prof
fered mediation. Following the exhaustion of medi
ation and the rejection of arbitration, the carrier filed
a grievance with an adjustment board. After the
union again set a strike date, the carrier transferred
the case to the courts. When the case finally was
appealed to the Supreme Court, it ruled that once a
grievance dispute was brought before an adjustment
board the courts could issue an injunction to halt a
work stoppage and that the provisions requiring the
submission of minor disputes to adjustment boards
“were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in
this limited field.” 72
" R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o, 91
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Sept. 13, 1950), p. 7.
7 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Chicago River
1
" L abor, March 4, 1950, p. 1.
7
0
R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o, 76 and Indiana Railroad Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Aug. 2, 1949), pp. 2 -4 .
7 Ibid., p. 39.
2
1
9
Chapter V. The Role of Government
Another contributory factor explaining the “prolif
eration” in the number of emergency boards was
that these panels were not always instruments of last
resort. At various times, one of the principals
claimed that the other did not bargain in “good
faith” and awaited the appointment of an emergency
board. The unions asserted that the carriers acted on
the assurance that the government would intervene
to settle an imminent or actual national emergency
dispute, and the carriers argued that the organiza
tions perfunctorily progressed the controversies
through the emergency procedures until the “final”
step was reached in anticipation of reaping “re
wards” beyond those recommended by the boards by
utilizing political influence to obtain more favorable
terms from Congress or the White House. Under
these conditions, labor and management were both
inclined to adopt relatively inflexible, doctrinaire
bargaining positions and refused to grant conces
sions until the boards issued their reports.
Faced with impasses in negotiations and pending
work stoppages, the Federal Government often ac
tively intervened under the stress of pressures and
the necessity of protecting the public interests, de
spite the fact that direct government intervention,
exclusive of the (National) Mediation Boad’s role,
was not contemplated by the framers of the law. The
counsel for the Firemen and Engineers, testifying be
fore the Emergency Board No. 97, asserted that:
A nother fault in recent years stem s from the
tendency o f the E xecu tive D epartm ents to sub
ordinate or disregard the functions o f the N a
tional M ediation Board, and to take direct charge
o f and to m ake recom m endations for the settle
m ent o f disputes. T hen, it appears, after negotia
tions have failed, the (em erg en cy ) boards have
been appointed by the execu tive’s office for a
specific purpose to perhaps report on a prejudged
dispute rather than to study the facts im partially
and objectively.7
3
Ad h o c leg islatio n
In four disputes, all since 1963, Congress inter
vened in railroad national emergency disputes and
settled them, at least temporarily, by means of ad
hoc legislation.74 The first case came about when five
operating unions were served “Section 6” notices,
which primarily dealt with rule changes, especially
manning issues, by the Nation’s major carriers repre
sented by the Eastern, Western, and Southwestern
Carriers Conference Committees. After national
conferences were broken off on May 17, 1962, the
unions applied for the mediatory services of the
NMB. On June 26, 1962, the Board proffered arbi
tration which was declined by the unions. With the
approach of a strike deadline, the President created
an emergency board on April 3, 1963, and received
the board’s report on May 13, 1963. The parties,
thereupon, returned to the bargaining table to reach
an agreement, but were unsuccessful in their efforts.
7
4
On May 18, 1971, Congress passed emergency legisla
tion (Public Law 92-17) ordering a halt to a fifth dispute,
a 2-day nationwide railroad strike conducted by the Signal
R eport of Emergency Board R eport N o . 97, op. cit., p. men (BRS) against carriers represented by the National
Railway Labor Conference.
Individuals familiar with the industry have criti7
3
64.
cized the Federal Government, particularly the Ex
ecutive Branch of placing political expediency before
the intent and spirit of the act by offering the “good
offices” of the Labor Department or the White
House to resolve disputes. Presidents at times have
asked for legislation to provide compulsory settle
ment of imminent or actual disputes, because they
felt that direct negotiations had failed. But, it has
been argued, direct negotiations may have failed be
cause Presidents at times publicly announced that
work stoppages would not be tolerated, thus mitigat
ing the parties’ incentive to resolve the disputes on
their own. Under these circumstances, it was not sur
prising that carriers have petitioned the Federal
Government for arbitration and other forms of inter
vention and that unions have applied economic pres
sures.
20
To provide for the settlement of this labor dispute,
Congress, on August 28, 1963, enacted Public Law
88-108 requiring compulsory arbitration to resolve
two issues. Under the terms of the law, Arbitration
Board No. 282 was created with representatives of
all the interested parties, including the public, to in
vestigate and to issue a final and binding award on
the use of firemen (helpers) and crew consist of
train, road, and yard crews. The award was to re
main in effect until January 25, 1966. The dispute
was revived by demands for rule changes served by
the Firemen and Engineers (BLFE) on November
15, 1965, and by the counter proposals issued by
the Nation’s carriers on January 31, 1966.75 Under
the terms of the union’s “Section 6” notice, it desired
to restore a majority of the 18,000 fireman positions
eliminated by the provisions of Arbitration Board
No. 282. After negotiations and mediation proved
unsuccessful in resolving the dispute and after arbi
tration was rejected, a strike was conducted by the
union on July 17, 1970, and the President was
compelled to appoint an emergency board (No.
177) to resolve the dispute.
Because of an imminent work stoppage after the
rejection of Emergency Board No. 169’s recommen
dations, congressional intervention was required for
another dispute, one which involved proposals for
wage increases, modification of wage differentials,
and improvements in fringe benefits for 137,000
workers represented by six shopcraft unions (the
Machinists, Boilermakers and Blacksmiths, Sheet
Metal Workers, Electricians, Firemen and Oilers,
and Carmen). Faced with a strike deadline of April
13, 1967, Congress on April 11, 1967 approved, and
the President on the following day signed into law
Public Law 90-10, which extended the period of
statutory restraint provided in section 10 of the RLA
until May 3, 1967. The President, on April 22,
1967, appointed a three-man Special Mediation
Panel, which issued a report that included a “paediation solution” to resolve the dispute.
The Panel’s report, however, did not produce a
settlement; and when an impasse in further negotia
tions between the parties was reached, the President,
"
’This statement is somewhat misleading since this issue
was alive; see Emergency Board Report Nos. 164 (p. 4)
and 172 (pp. 2-3).
For a brief and informative digest o f the Firemen’s dis
pute, see Emergency Board R eport N o. 177, Appendix A,
pp. 11-15; and Joseph F. Fulton, The Railway Firemen
Manning Dispute: History and Issues, 1959-70, Library of
Congress Legislative Reference Service, July 31, 1970.
on April 28, 1967, again petitioned for a congres
sional solution. On May 2, 1967, Public Law 90-13,
which provided for an additional 20 days restraint
beyond that provided in section 10 of the act, was
passed by Congress and signed by the President.
Two days later, in a message to Congress, the Presi
dent proposed special legislation to dispose of the
controversy. Thereupon, the unions agreed to post
pone a strike for a “reasonable length of time.”
On July 16 and 17, work stoppages were con
ducted against various carriers and were terminated
on July 17 by Congress through passage of Public
Law 90-54, which authorized a five-man Special
Board to provide a final settlement of the shopcraft
dispute. The Board’s Report and Determination was
issued on August 15, 1967. In subsequent negotia
tions, the parties accepted the Board’s determina
tion.
In November 1968, both parties simultaneously
served “Section 6” notices. The unions’ demands
dealt mainly with wages, and the carriers’ with work
rules. Some of the issues involved in Emergency
Board No. 169 were revitalized in this dispute and
included such questions as whether the pattern of
wage increases of other nonoperating employees
should apply to shopcraft workers, whether to permit
continued narrowing of differentials between jour
neymen (and mechanics and helpers) and less
skilled workers, and whether to change some basic
rules (subcontracting, advance notice of force reduc
tions due to emergencies). After an impasse in nego
tiations was reached, the parties jointly applied for
the NMB’s mediatory services on April 10, 1969.
When mediation and arbitration failed to produce a
settlement, the President created an emergency
board (No. 176) on October 3, 1969. With the issu
ance of the Board’s report on November 2, 1969, all
provisions of the act were exhausted without settling
the dispute.
The unions, however, did not walk out; instead,
bargaining was resumed with the assistance of the
Department of Labor. On December 4, 1969, a
tentative agreement was reached, but the accord was
not ratified by the Sheet Metal Workers (SMWIA).
Because this rejection precipitated an imminent na
tional emergency, the President, on March 3, 1970,
requested special legislation to deal with the threat
ened work stoppage. Public Law 91-203 was ap
proved on March 4, 1970, and prohibited a strike or
lockout for 37 days. When a final impasse was
reached, Public Law 91-226 was passed by Con
21
gress, on April 9, 1970, as anticipated by the mem
bers of Emergency Board No. 176.76
In the fourth dispute, congressional intervention
was set in motion by the serving of wage and rule
proposals in 1969 by four unions— the Clerks, Main
tenance of Way Employees, Hotel and Restaurant
Employees, and United Transportation Union (the
latter a union created by the merger of all operating
employees, except those represented by BLE, on
January 1, 1969)— on the members of the National
Railway Labor Conference (NRLC). After negotia
tions were conducted on local and national levels,
the parties jointly applied for the mediatory services
of the NMB. When mediation failed to resolve the
dispute and arbitration was rejected, the President
appointed an emergency board (No. 178) on Sep
tember 18, 1970, and received the Board’s report on
November 9, 1970. After all the steps in the RLA
procedure were exhausted, the NMB officially termi
nated its mediatory services on August 10, 1970.
During September 1970, negotiations were con
ducted under the auspices of the NMB and the De
partment of Labor. An impasse in bargaining quickly
developed, and a selective work stoppage was called
against three lines, the Baltimore and Ohio, Louis
ville and Nashville, and Southern Pacific railroads.
On the issuance of an injunction restraining the un
ions from further withdrawing their members’ serv
ices, the strike was terminated.
Negotiations between the parties resumed once
more. Although both wages and rules were in con
tention, the main obstacles to settlement for the non
operating unions were economic issues and for the
UTU, rule issues. On December 10, 1970, the or
ganizations again conducted a nationwide work stop
page, the fifth since the end of World War II. On the
same day, Congress passed legislation (Public Law
91-541) that terminated the strike and provided for
a wage increase of 13.5 percent, but no modifica
tions in work rules.
P re s id e n tia l ra ilro a d co m m issio n s
Besides ad hoc legislation, direct government in
tervention was evidenced by establishment of three
Presidential commissions to investigate and report on
critical railroad disputes. The first commission was
an outgrowth of the dispute that resulted in the ap
pointment of Emergency Board No. 154 and con
7
6 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 176
f^U.S. National Mediation Board, N ov. 2, 1969), p. 5.
22
gressional intervention in the form of ad hoc legisla
tion. On October 17, 1960, the five operating unions
and the Nation’s railroad carriers agreed to submit
their work rules controversy to a Railroad Commis
sion established by President Eisenhower on Novem
ber 1, 1960. A 15-man Commission, including five
representing the public interest, was appointed and
reported on February 28, 1962. Because the parties
were unable to resolve the dispute on the terms of
the report, Public Law 88-108 was passed.
The two remaining commissions dealt with rail
road marine disputes, both involving the New York
Harbor Carriers Conference Committee. In the first,
all the procedures of the RLA were exhausted by the
carriers and the Pilots (MMP), the Marine Engi
neers (NMEB), and the Seamen (SIU), with the is
suance of an emergency board’s report on December
10, 1960.
After rejecting the board’s recommendations, the
unions struck from January 1 to January 23, 1961.
On the latter date, the parties settled all issues, ex
cept those relating to manning. A decision on this
issue was deferred until a railroad commission could
be created and its report released. By Executive
Order 10929, the President established the Railroad
Marine Commission on March 24, 1961. The Com
mission released its report on June 11, 1962; the un
ions rejected its recommendations.
In addition, the Railroad Lighter Captains Com
mission was created by Executive Order No. 10948
on June 12, 1961, to decide a controversy between
the Longshoremen (ILA) and the New York Har
bor Carriers Conference Committee. It, too,
proceded from an emergency dispute, one precipi
tated on September 31, 1959, by the serving of de
mands relating to the manning of lighters. The
parties negotiated over a 5-month period, the last
conference being held on September 29, 1960. On
that day, the carriers invoked mediation. When me
diation failed to resolve the controversy and arbitra
tion was rejected, the President appointed a panel on
January 21, 1961. Shortly after the board 1 1£dv
1
public its recommendations, the parties entered into
an agreement on the issues in dispute, but held the
issue of the manning of lighters in abeyance pending
the report of a lighter captains’ commission pursuant
to the recommendations of Emergency Board No.
134. On June 12,1961, the Commission was created
by Executive Order 10948. The Commission re
leased its report, which was not accepted by the un
ions, on July 11, 1962.
P re sid e n tia l s e iz u re s
To maintain the operation of key industries, be
cause of anticipated or actual work stoppages, Presi
dential seizures of production and distribution facili
ties have occurred at various times in the United
States. Only four Presidents (Lincoln, Wilson,
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Truman) have utilized
this form of government intervention. Of this total of
71 seizures, 12 involved railroads, the first occurring
at the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad in 1864,
and the last at the Newburg and South Shore Rail
road (a subsidiary of U.S. Steel) in 1951. During
the period under study, President Truman seized the
Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad on July
8, 1950, when the Switchmen (SUNA) rejected
Emergency Board No. 83’s recommendations and
struck the above railroad and four other carriers; a
temporary injunction was secured to insure continued
operation of these carriers. Fifty days later, President
Truman seized 194 major railroad carriers involved
in Emergency Board No. 81, after the Trainmen
(BRT) and the Conductors (ORC) announced that
they would withdraw from the services of the rail
roads associated with the Eastern, Western, and
Southeastern Carriers Conference Committees. On
May 23, 1952, when these three organizations
reached agreements with the Nation’s major carriers,
the President relinquished control over the rail
roads.77
O th e r fo rm s of in terv e n tio n
Presidents have also intervened in railroad emer
gency disputes by offering their “good offices” to
help resolve the parties’ divergent interests. Al
though a compendium of such activity was not made,
Presidential intervention was observed in more than
12 emergency boards. For example, following the
seizure on August 27, 1950, of most of the Nation’s
carriers involved in the 40-hour week movement of
early 1950, conferences between representatives of
two operating unions (the Trainmen and Conduc
tors), the carriers, the NMB, and the President were
held in Washington. On November 2, 1951, the En
gineers and Firemen (BLFE) joined the parties in
7 John Blackman, Presidential Seizures in Labor D is
7
putes, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University (1969), pp.
3, 4, 257-8.
Because of these seizures, the carriers participating in
the deliberations of Emergency Board Nos. 95, 97 and 98
were under Federal control at the time o f the boards*
appointments.
negotiations conducted at the White House. Seven
weeks later a tentative agreement was signed at the
White House by the parties, but subsequently the un
ions’ general committees rejected the accord. On
January 18, 1951, conferences resumed at the White
House, were later broken off, and continued again in
April 1952. On May 25, 1952, the parties settled all
issues in dispute.
M ajor in te rru p tio n s
The “proliferation” of “Section 10” procedures
(establishment of emergency boards) was also ag
gravated by the appointment of boards in situations
which may not have resulted in major interruptions
of interstate commerce. Such excessive use of emer
gency procedures was deplored by the NMB in its
1953 Report:
It is the feelin g o f th e Board that this procedure
(em ergen cy boards) should b e reserved for cases
that threaten m ajor interruptions to interstate
com m erce, cind that disputes w h ich are o f lesser
im portance, or w hich m a y affect interstate co m
m erce to a lesser degree, should be disposed o f
through the other adjustment procedures in the
A ct.7
8
Under section 10, the precondition to establish an
emergency board is the existence of a dispute which
“threaten(s) substantially to interrupt interstate
commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section
of essential transportation service . . .” Despite the
relatively clear intention of section 10 and the sup
porting NMB statement, the NMB has at times rec
ommended the establishment of emergenpy panels in
cases that were concerned solely with small and lo
calized carriers or those that could not possibly
threaten commerce to the extent required by law be
cause their lines were sufficiently paralleled by other
railroads.
Id e n tic al is s u e s o n s e p a r a te c a rrie r s
Another type of questionable use of the act’s
“Section 10” procedure related to the appointment
of emergency boards to investigate controversies in
volving identical issues on separate railroads. For ex
ample, on September 1, 1961, 11 cooperating rail
road labor organizations representing nonoperating
7
8
Nineteenth Annual R eport o f the N ational M ediation
Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1953 (U.S. N a
tional Mediation Board, 1954), p. 23.
23
employees issued “Section 6” notices, dealing pri
marily with wage demands, on the Nation’s major
carriers, who quickly served identical counter pro
posals on the unions. After negotiations and media
tion (which was requested by the unions on October
10, 1961) proved unsuccessful, arbitration was prof
fered by the Board on February 2, 1962, and was
declined by the unions. The NMB notified the Presi
dent on February 27, 1962, that an imminent na
tional emergency dispute existed, and he, in turn,
created an emergency board on March 3, 1962, to
consider the controversy.
Meanwhile, the Florida East Coast Railway
(FEC) informed the organizations on February 9,
1962, that it was no longer actively participating in
the national movement. After the FEC refused to be
a signatory to the national agreement, which was
signed on June 5, 1962, the unions requested the
mediatory services of the NMB (on July 20, 1962).
An impasse in mediation, which was initiated on Au
gust 15, 1962, was quickly reached. On September
25, 1962, the Board proffered arbitration, which was
declined by both parties.
In November, FEC requested that die NMB no
tify the President of an imminent emergency dispute.
The Board, in turn, formally notified the carrier:
. . . T he issues in this dispute are th e sam e as
24
w ere fu lly and adequately heard b y Presidential
E m ergency Board N o . 145 . . . T h e R ailw ay
Labor A c t never contem plated that . . . Boards
w ould be created to consider identical issues aris
ing on separate railroads. T o proceed in that m an
ner w ould w eaken or destroy d ie effectiveness o f
the A c t.”
On the same day the unions conducted a work
stoppage, and FEC began to hire permanent replace
ments which enabled the carrier to restore the major
portion of its freight operations by late summer of
1963. The President, nevertheless, ordered an anquiry to determine the possible effects of the work
stoppage on defense and space programs After con
ducting hearings, the Board of Inquiry claimed that
“this labor dispute is currently and potentially detri
mental to our Nation’s defense and space efforts.” 80
When negotiations, mediation, and arbitration again
proved unsuccessful, the NMB notified the President
on November 4, 1963, that the dispute remained un
adjusted and threatened to deprive a section of the
country of essential transportation services. Five
days later, the President appointed a board to inves
tigate and report on the controversy.
'"'Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 157
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Dec. 23, 1963), n 3
“ Ibid., p. 5.
C h a p t e r
V I.
C h a r a c t e r is t ic s
o f
E m e r g e n c y
B o a r d s ,
1950-69
Participation
The incidence of emergency board participation
by operating and nonoperating groups was quite dis
tinct; both groups were the sole principals in 35 in
stances each and they were involved jointly in one
case. (See table 4 and appendix table A -4 ) . In the
1950’s, the operating unions participated in 22 pan
els— 15 of these between 1950 and 1952— many
dealing with either grievances or the introduction of
and conversion to the 4 0 -h o u r week. In this same
decade, the nonoperating groups were involved in 14
boards; five were appointed between September
1955 and August 1957, the remaining nine scattered
throughout this decade. On the other hand, nonoper
ating groups were involved in 22 boards in the
1960’s, 18 of which were established between M ay
1960 and August 1964. During the same decade, the
operating crafts participated in 14 emergency dis
putes and were active in all the boards created be
tween September 1964 and January 1969 which
were concerned with crew size and job security.
Unlike the incidence of participation by m ajor
groups, the involvement of various national unions
was quite irregular and depended on the crafts the
unions represented and the type(s) of bargaining
they conducted (e.g., on their own o r allied with oth
ers). Some unions, particularly those representing
operating employees and shopcraft workers, partici
pated frequently. The other nonoperating unions
generally were involved more infrequently.
Size
Under the provisions of the act, an emergency
board may be appointed if, in the opinion of die
President, a dispute “threaten(s) to substantially in
terrupt interstate commerce.” By definition then, the
establishment of these panels inherently depends on
the size and routes of the carriers, the size and essen
tiality of the crafts involved in the dispute, and the
effects of a work stoppage, the last being the decisive
factor. One indication of size, and thus potential im
pact of a strike or lockout, is the num ber of princi
pals involved in any dispute.
Only 30 emergency disputes involved single-units,
that is, controversies between only one carrier and
one union. (See table 4 .) O f the 30 panels, 18 were
convened to hear and decide cases involving operat
ing employees and 12 for nonoperating workers.
Table 4. Railroad emergency boards, by size and major group, selected periods, 1950-69
Single-unit
boards
Period
1950-69 ____
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
_________
_________
_________
_________
Total multi
unit boards
Multi-union
boards 1
Multicarrier
boards1
“ Pure” multi
unit boards12
*
All boards
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
71
18
12
818
824
88
8 15
14
21
4
12
24
12
23
12
9
3
4
2
4
3
5
7
3
3
85
4
3
11
86
5
3
1
6
85
4
3
3
4
4
3
9
5
2
3
1
4
4
—
1 Double counting enters here, i.e., the number of multiunion boards
includes those panels which involved a single carrier and more than one
union and panels in which both more than one union and more than
one carrier participated; similarly for multicarrier boards. Obviously, then,
only six multiunit boards were characterized as having only more than one
union; and 19, as having only more than one carrier.
—
1
82
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
—
1
1
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
8 Both operating and nonoperating employees were involved in Emer
gency Board No. 170.
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.
s “ Pure” multiunit boards refer to those involving both more than one
carrier and more than one union.
25
Perhaps this differing rate of participation reflected
the operating crafts’ commanding position when
withdrawing their labor services.
N ot surprisingly, the unions whose members’ skills
were more essential to the continued operation of
railways and auxiliary facilities were active parties
in most of the single-unit panels. Employees repre
sented by the Trainm en (BRT) were associated with
nine of these emergency disputes; the Conductors’
(ORCB) members on five occasions; the Engineers’
(BLE), four times; and the Clerks’ (BRASC),
twice. Similarly, railroads involved in the “Section
10” procedures were more often than not carriers
with extensive passenger operations (e.g., the Long
Island Railroad’s participation in Emergency Board
Nos.129 and 173), with routes that are not exten
sively paralleled by m any other carriers (e.g., Atchi
son, Topeka and Sante F e Railroad’s involvement in
Emergency Board Nos. 126 and 165), or with unu
sual operations necessary, but somewhat adjunctive,
to the operations of the Nation’s rail facilities (e.g.,
R E A ’s participation in Emergency Board Nos. 93,
105, 111, 117 and 153 and the Pullm an Co.’s in
Emergency Board Nos. 89, 96 and 107).
Another prom inent finding was that over time
fewer and fewer boards were appointed, in relative
terms, to investigate and report single-unit emergency
disputes. (See table 4.) During the 1950’s, 19 such
panels were convened, 13 in the first half of the dec
ade. Of these 19 boards, 12 were appointed to consi
der emergency disputes involving operating crafts.
Presidents intervened 11 times to adjust emergency
rail disputes in the 1960’s, only twice in the 1965-69
period. Of the 11 panels, six were convened to de
cide cases in which operating employees partici
pated.
On the other hand, Presidents intervened in mul
tiunit disputes (i.e., those involving m ore than one
union or more than one carrier) on 41 occasions, 22
in which more than one union participated, 35 in
which m ore than one carrier was involved, and 16 in
which more than one union and more than one rail
way participated (“pure” multiunit panels), as
shown in table 4.81 Interestingly nonoperating
groups participated in 12 “pure” m ultiunit cases, pri
marily because some of the unions representing non
operating employees “progressed” (conducted)
wage and rule movements jointly. A division of pan
els by m ajor groups revealed that operating crafts
participated in 18 m ultiunit boards and nonoperating
crafts in 24, one of which (Emergency Board No.
170) involved both m ajor groups.
Because of the predominance of industrywide
movements, the nature of bargaining apparently ex
plained the higher incidence of nonoperating em
ployees’ unions in the m ultiunit boards. Throughout
most of the two decades under study— until 1964—
11 railroad organizations representing the vast ma
jority of nonoperating employees jointly initiated and
progressed uniform industrywide wage and rule
movements.82 O n the other hand, the five operating
unions generally dealt with wage and rule move
ments in the same manner, but separately.
8 Double counting enters here, i.e., the number of multi
1
union boards includes those panels which involved a single
carrier and more than one union and panels in which both
more than one union and more than one carrier participated,
similarly for multicarrier boards. Obviously, then, only six
multiunit boards were characterized as only having mote
than one union; and 19, as only having more than one
carrier.
KThe 11 included the shop craft, maintenance of way,
signal, clerical, and communications employees’ unions.
Table 5. National railroad emergency boards, by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69
National emergency boards
Major issue
Period
All emergency Total
boards
national
Wages, rules, and
working conditions
Rules
Wages
Wages and rules
Operat
ing em
ployees
1950-69 ______________
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
___________________
______ ______ ______
___________________
__________________
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
26
71
23
24
12
23
12
5
4
6
8
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
3
5
1
2
1
1
4
6
1
—
—
2
—
—
2
1
1
1
3
—
—
—
2
—
1
—•
3
2
—
1
—
1
—
1
—
—
1
—
—
SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.
—
Of the disputes between one or more unions and
the vast majority of class I line haul and switching
and terminal companies (associated with the East
ern, W estern and Southeastern Carriers Conference
Committees before 1963 and the National Railway
L abor Conference since 1963), 23 were national in
scope. (See table 5.) O f these 23 boards, 14 were
convened to decide cases that involved nonoperating
employees, often involving wages (five times) or
wage and rule proposals (six tim es). Similarly, of the
nine operating employees’ national emergency cases,
seven dealt primarily with demands for changes in
wages (three times) or wages and rules (four
times), as shown in table 5.
During the 1960’s, 14 boards, eight since 1964,
were appointed to consider unsettled mediation dis
putes that were national in scope; the remaining nine
panels were created between 1950 and 1959. This
and previously mentioned observations indicated that
the “Section 10” procedure has been reserved princi
pally in recent years for disputes that threatened
m ajor interruptions to interstate commerce and that
controversies of lesser im portance were relegated to
other adjustment machinery provided by the act. Al
though the nature of the controversy and structure of
bargaining were undoubtedly im portant factors, it
appeared that the NM B became more selective in
certifying an unadjusted dispute as a “national emer
gency.”
Issues
M ajor issues were almost evenly divided between
rules (16 cases) and wages (18), both issues jointly
(wages and rules) coming before emergency boards
23 times. (See tabel 6.) Considering the prime is
sues in dispute, the operating crafts were more con
cerned with rules (10 cases) and wages and rules
(11), while nonoperating employees’ cases were
more inclined toward wages (12) and wages and
rules (13). All eight boards dealing with grievances
or time claims) were processed by operating em
ployees’ associations.
Duration
A nother im portant characteristic of the emergency
board procedure was the disparity in duration, de
fined as the time span from the serving of a “Section
6” notice to 30 days after the release of an emer
gency board’s report. (See appendix table A -5 .)
With an array ranging from 170 days (Emergency
Board No. 105, which dealt with adjusting wages) to
3,314 days (Emergency Board No. 165, which in
volved rule changes), the average duration of all
emergency boards was 670 days. (See table 7.) A n
appreciable upward trend over time in the average
duration of the four subperiods was observable.
This phenomenon was explained by the num ber of
prolonged emergency board procedures, those whose
duration exceeded 1,000 calendar days. Twelve in
number, all the boards experiencing extended dura
tion were confined to the 1960’s (nine of them be
tween 1960 and 1964) and to the issues of rules (8
times), wages and rules (3 times), and rules and
working conditions (once). Of these 12 panels, the
operating employees accounted for seven, all dealing
with rules (four cases) and rules and wages (three
cases); nonoperating employees were involved in the
remaining boards, four of which concerned rules and
one of which dealt with rules and wages.
Table 6. Railroad emergency boards, by detailed Issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69
1955-59
1950-54
Issue
Totals
..............
Grievances .....................
Rules .............................
Wages ....... ...................
Wages and rules --------Wages, rules, and
working conditions ___
Rules and working
conditions ____ _____
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
16
8
6
8
3
2
3
2
2
1
—
—
3
__
1
1
3
—
—
—
1 Includes one wage and rule beard In which both major groups par
ticipated.
Operat Nonoper
ing em ating em
ployees ployees
6
__
1
3
3
—
1965-69
1960-64
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
7
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
16
17
—
5
7
3
_
2
1
M
—
2
»4
_
_.
3
1
3
_
_
—
Operat
ing em
ployees
1
—
*6
—
Total, 1950-69
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
All
crafts
136
*36
71
8
10
6
*11
_
6
12
*13
8
16
18
23
1
4
5
1
1
—
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.
27
Table 7. Duration of railroad emergency boards, by major work group and spans,1 selected periods, 1950-69
Emergency board spans in calendar days
Nonop
erating
crafts,
average
duration
Num
ber of
days
Period
Operat
ing
crafts,
average
duration
Num Num
ber of ber of
days days
All crafts
Total duration
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
_______ ____ ________________
______________________ _____
___________________________
______ ___________ ____ _____
Average— 1950-69:
All crafts________ ____ __________
Operating ________________________
Nonoperating _____________________
Negotiation 1
Mediation
Recognition
Per
cent
Nwiber
Per
cent
Num
ber
Per
cent
Num
ber
Per
cent
Agency
Num
ber
Negotiation II
Per
cent
Num
ber
Per
cent
441
460
951
1,113
418
384
822
518
429
422
861
874
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
228
212
351
291
53.1
50.2
40.8
33.3
75
89
254
275
17.5
21.1
29.5
31.5
37
41
148
229
8.6
9.7
17.2
26.2
89
81
106
84
20.7
19.2
12.2
9.6
158
55
116
60
(?
)
(?
)
(?
)
(?
)
O
')
(?
)
(?
)
(?
)
670
741
609
100.0
100.0
100.0
278
318
252
41.5
42.9
41.4
184
189
174
27.5
25.5
28.6
115
141
92
17.2
19.0
15.1
93
93
92
13.9
12.6
15.1
99
130
71
(?
)
(?
)
(?
)
(?
)
09
1Average number of calendar days of the total procedure or any span;
each board is given equal weight regardless of size.
2 Not included in duration figure for the total procedure.
NOTE: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal
totals.
SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.
2 Not applicable.
Since the overall averages m ask the movements
occurring within the various segments of the total
procedure, the RLA-emergency procedure was di
vided into five segments or spans as follows: negotia
tion I span, the time period between the issuance of
a “Section 6” notice and the request for or proffer of
the mediatory assistance of the Board (NMB); me
diation span, the period after the request for or prof
fer o f mediation to the proffer of arbitration; recog
nition span, the time period following the proffer
of arbitration to the creation of an emergency board;
agency span, the period from the establishment of a
emergency panel to 30 days after the rendering of
its report; negotiation I I span, the time period be
tween the board’s report and agreement between the
parties.83 (See tables 7 and 9 .)
Counting calendar days, the negotiation I span in
absolute terms has increased significantly over time,
the mediation span has risen substantially, as has the
recognition span, while the agency and negotiation II
spans have fluctuated considerably. Comparing the
particular spans to total duration in the four time pe
riods, the negotiation I span has decreased signifi
cantly in relative terms; the mediation span has risen
appreciably, while the recognition span has increased
substantially, and the agency and negotiation spans
have decreased substantially. (See table 7.)
W hat do the figures suggest? In absolute terms,
” Date of settlement can refer to the date of either tenta
tive settlement, ratification, or award of arbitration.
28
the procedures generally became more time-consum
ing over the years, especially in the first 3 steps of
the 5-step process— the duration of the last 2 steps
decreasing in the second and fourth subperiods of
time from the first and third, respectively. The in
crease in total duration suggests that the parties were
integrating the emergency board procedure into their
collective bargaining strategy and that government
was taking a more direct and active role in these dis
putes. One contributory factor in the increased total
duration— the growing length in the recognition pe
riod— may be a sign that the NMB was m ore closely
scrutinizing “imminent work stoppages” rather than
routinely notifying the President of “imminent work
stoppages.”
For the two decades, duration of the various parts
of the entire procedure was arranged in both abso
lute and relative terms in the same sequence as the
chronological order of the steps in the procedure,
i.e., negotiation I span was the longest, followed in
descending order by mediation, recognition, and
agency spans. One interesting comparison between
periods was the difference between negotiation I
(278 days) and negotiation II spans (99). This may
have indicated that genuine collective bargaining in
these emergency disputes occurred only after the
boards released their reports. Although this compari
son is not proof positive, the implication is clear,
especially in light of the small num ber of days in
which the parties actually conferred across the bar
gaining table.
in which these operating crafts participated.84 Like
wise, the various steps in the emergency procedure
for the operating unions were m ore prolonged than
for the nonoperating associations; and the duration
of these various spans in both groups* procedure was
ordered in the same direction as the chronological
sequence of the steps in the procedure.
M ajor issues and groups. A nother prom inent charac
teristic of duration was its variation according to
m ajor issues. Cases involving rule issues were on the
average much longer in duration than those dealing
with rates of pay or wages and rules, 1,046 days
compared with 480 days and 594 days, respectively.
Although there were some exceptions, duration by
m ajor issue generally increased over time, as shown
in table 8. Analyzing major issues by m ajor group,
rules cases and wage cases of nonoperating unions
extended for longer periods on the average than
those of operating unions. O n the other hand, com
bined wage and rule boards were substantially more
prolonged on the average for operating, workers than
for nonoperating employees.
F or the entire period 1950-69 and all subperiods,
emergency boards appointed to consider operating
unions’ disputes were considerably longer than those
for nonoperating organizations, 741 days vs. 609
days. (See table 9.) The 132-day difference proba
bly reflected the large num ber of operating em
ployees’ rule boards, and wage and rule boards, rela
tive to the total num ber of “Section 10” procedures
National cases
An im portant question concerning duration was
the effect of national cases upon the various meas
urements. A priori, the expectation was that nation
wide disputes, because of the numerous and complex
issues and the large num ber of participants, would
probably have significantly inflated the average
length of emergency boards. However, actual investi
gation generally revealed the opposite to be true, as
shown in table 10.
Apparently, the national boards’ average duration
8 Eight grievance cases were excluded because some of
4
the steps in the emergency procedures were skipped.
Table 8. Number and average duration off railroad emergency boards (in calendar days), by major issue and group,
selected periods, 1950-69
Period
Wages, rules, and
wonting conditions
Wages and rules
Rules
Wages
Number
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
Average
duration
Number
Average
duration
Number
Average
duration
5
2
8
3
302
498
585
484
4
2
8
2
368
580
1,199
2,258
6
4
6
7
583
296
745
645
18
6
12
480
463
488
16
10
6
1,046
986
1,148
23
*11
113
594
698
492
, ___________________________
____________________________
____________________________
____ ________________________
1950-69:
All crafts ----------------------------------Operating --------------------------------N o n o p e ra tin g
_____________________________
1 Both major groups participated in Emergency Board No. 170.
Number
Average
duration
1
4
389
432
—
—
—
—
5
1
4
423
425
423
SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
Table 9. Railroad emergency spans, (in calendar days), by major group, selected periods, 1950-69
Average
total duration
Period
Operat
ing em
ployees
1950-69
1950-54
1955-59
1960-65
1965-69
___
___
___
___
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Average duration of spans
Negotiations 1
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Mediation
Recognition
Negotiaiton II1
Agency
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
741
609
318
252
189
174
141
92
93
92
130
441
460
951
1,113
418
384
822
518
195
231
533
316
261
194
271
249
97
90
222
344
54
88
269
169
63
51
69
379
10
32
182
18
86
191
*10
*81
92
72
103
82
180
46
243 2
43
1 Not included in duration figure for total procedure.
2 Because this table excludes a few agency spans in this period, the
sums of individual spans do not equal the total.
2 Because this table excludes a few negotiation II spans in this period,
the sums of individual spans do not equal the total.
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
71
126
67
57
74
SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.
29
for the negotiation I and II spans did not seemingly
reflect the inherent bargaining nature of industrywide
cases. It was anticipated that in national cases the
negotiation I span would be significantly longer than
in nonnational cases, because bargaining would
commence on local properties and be followed by
the creation of national committees to negotiate in
dustrywide contracts. In a similar vein, it was ex
pected that the national boards’ average duration for
the negotiation II span (compared with the nonna
tionals’) would be appreciably shorter, mirroring im
mediate and strong pressures to conclude settlements
of unadjusted controversies that could possibly halt
the operations of the N ation’s railroad system.
On the other hand, the anticipation of the direc
tion and volume of some spans was substantiated.
The longer agency span was probably a consequence
of the large num ber of witnesses and voluminous
statements and exhibits introduced into the record;
the shorter recognition span apparently demon
strated that the unadjusted disputes em anating from
national wage and rule movements were easier to de
termine and to certify as imminent national emer
gency disputes. From the information available, it
was not possible to ascertain or to hypothesize on the
significantly smaller mediation span.
R e a s o n s fo r th e long d u ra tio n
The long average duration of the railroad boards
was primarily the result of three factors.
Mediation spans. First, under die provisions of the
act, no time limitations were placed on mediation.
Defined as the time span between the request for or
proffer of mediation and the proffer of arbitration,85
the average duration of mediation activities was 184
days, the longest period covering 1118 calendar
days. F or example, the Telegraphers (ORT), whose
^ This is somewhat of an arbitrary definition since hear
ings are often intermittently held, sometimes informal in
nature (for example, over the telephone), and often extend
beyond the formal period as defined in the act.
Table 10. National and nonnational emergency board
spans, selected periods, 1950-69
D
uration in days for
Total Negotia M
edia R
ecog
N
egotia
tion 1 tion nition A
gency tion It
A cases .. 670
ll
278
184
115
93
99
National ______ 595
263
153
80
101
99
N
onnational ____ 714
287
99
204
136
88
Size
S U C : National M
ORE
ediation Board data.
30
dispute was heard by Emergency Board No. 148, re
quested the m ediatory assistance of the NMB on
June 2, 1958, to aid in adjusting a rules dispute with
the New Y ork Central R ailroad; mediation began
8 1 /2 months later. On January 25, 1962, arbitra
tion was proffered by the Board. In the second part
of that dispute, which involved the Pittsburg and
Lake Erie Railroad, the organization petitioned the
NMB on August 7, 1959; mediation sessions com
menced on December 8, 1959; and the Board
proffered arbitration on January 25, 1962.
A t various times, the parties, especially the un
ions, have castigated the Board for what they consid
ered to be “unnecessary” and “arbitrary” delays in
the mediation proceedings. O n June 1, 1962, die
Teamsters even resorted to filing a civil action com
plaint (No. 1747-62) for declaratory judgement and
a m andatory injunction against the B oard asserting
that the “Plaintiffs (Teamsters) are adversely af
fected and aggrieved by the unnecessary delay on the
part of the NMB and have been adversely affected
by the Board’s arbitrary and capricious refusal to
mediate the . . . dispute . . . By recessing cases
A -6671 and A -6 6 9 6 . . . (the Board) has failed to
use its best efforts, by mediation, to being the parties
to agreement, as required by the R L A .” W hat the
union did not publicly acknowledge though was that
“there (was) no question that in this dispute the
parties m ade no more than nominal efforts to com
pose their differences.” 86 N or did the unions ac
knowledge that only one collective bargaining dis
pute in the two decades preceding this controversy
was settled without exhausting all the steps in the
RLA-emergency procedures, a situation th at raised
“the fundamental question whether the parties . . .
(were) negotiating their differences in accordance
with traditional free collective bargaining principles
or in the m anner or spirit contemplated in the Rail
way Labor Act.” 87
Beside the B oard’s problem of coordinating its
available manpower resources with its needs, the
parties to the disputes were also often unable to syn
chronize the accessibility of each of their bargaining
representatives. This problem of m anpower coordi
nation was especially evident in national cases in
which representatives of the three Carriers Confer
ence Committees (or the National Railway Labor
Conference) and representatives of the national (or
international) unions had jointly to decide on hear
ing dates, when both labor and m anagement might
8 Emergency Board Report No. 153, op. cit., p. 4.
8
8 Ibid.
1
Agency span. Second, although section 10 of the
act established a time limit for the emergency board
procedure (30 days from the date of the board’s
creation to the date of its report), with the consent
of both parties the Board can notify the President
that an extension is necessary which he, in turn, is
authorized to grant. As measured by the time span
between the establishment of the emergency board
and the rendering of its report, the average duration
of railroad emergency board hearings 88 was 63 days,
the longest 1,154 days in Emergency Board No. 126,
which was precipitated by the Engineers’ (BLE)
serving requests for wage and rule changes on the
Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railroad. Of the 23
prolonged board hearings (those requiring more
than 60 days), nine were appointed to hear operat
ing employees’ disputes and 14 to decide those of
nonoperating workers. The majority of these panels
were concerned with wages and rules (nine cases),
rules (seven), and wages (five).
Under the provisions of the bill as originally
drafted, emergency panels were to investigate and
make their reports within 30 days, regardless of the
nature of the dispute.89 Counsel for the railway un
ions, Donald R. Richberg, explained that the fixed
time limit would compel the party that was more in
terested than the other in preserving the status quo,
the party who was engaging in delaying action, to
confine its testimony and evidence to an “ accepta
ble” level. One prom inent carrier representative,
echoing the desires of both parties, said that the
“board is not going into a meticulous examination of
the question; it is undoubtedly intended to reach its
considerations on large questions (i.e., broad is
sues). Those matters do not require the summoning
of witnesses and the taking of great volumes of
testimony.” 90
Although early experience with the emergency
board investigations and reports was favorable, most
hearings and the writing of recommendations for the
post-1949 panels were not completed in the 30 days
stipulated in the original executive orders creating
the boards. Excluding the eight emergency disputes
for which no formal reports were issued, only 15
post-1949 boards (10 of which were appointed be
tween 1950-54) concluded their hearings and issued
their recommendations without extensions of time.
Actually both “parties have long shown a prefer
ence for lengthy, rather formal hearings, of a quasi
judicial nature, in which most witnesses read their
testimony and in which mountains of exhibits con
taining data, some of current value and some of his
toric significance only are filed.” 91 Counting actual
hearing days, Emergency Board No. 154 extended
for 96 days during which 15,306 pages of testimony
and 20,319 pages of exhibits were introduced. Al
most as “prolific” was Emergency Board No. 81,
which exhausted 49 hearing days, in which 8,385
pages of testimony (49 volumes) and 143 exhibits
were entered into the records. Besides boards being
presented with numerous studies, charts, statements,
and statistics, other factors contributed to the pro
longation and thus extension of board hearings.
Among these factors were the seriousness of the dis
putes and complexities of the issues, the utilization
of the board’s services in a mediation capacity, the
preoccupation of the board with other disputes, the
request for continuances or delay in the initiation of
hearings, and other discontinuations in hearings.92
In an attempt to ease the hearings’ problems,
boards have at times instituted procedural rules. For
example, Emergency Board Nos. 161-3 barred the
'* The duration of emergency board hearings plus 30 days,
by definition, is identical with the agency span.
Eight boards (No. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165 and
171) were not included because formal emergency board
reports were not issued.
* Enactors of the law, however, provided for more flexi
bility in the procedures, one more suitable to the nature of
railroad disputes on a case-by-case basis.
901926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 154.
9 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 160
1
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Aug. 7, 1964), p. 2. Also
see Locomotive Firemen and Engineers Magazine, Aug.
1955, p. 89. Conductor & Brakeman, Sept. 1955, p. 252.
9 Emergency Board Nos. 84, 97, 134, 141, 147, 150, 155,
2
157, 160-63, and 173. See Emergency Board Nos. 129 (p.
2), 161-3 (p. 3), 138 (p. 1) and 139 (p. 1).
have conflicts because of bargaining commitments
with other parties.
With all these impediments, actual mediation days
were usually a small proportion of the total media
tion span. Over the 20-year period ending 1969, the
average mediation span was 184 days; yet only 23
days, on the average, were devoted to mediatory ac
tivities. Significant differences were evident in the av
erage num ber of actual mediation hearing days dur
ing the four subperiods; in chronological order they
were 16, 30, 29, and 16 days. But more importantly,
the relative time actually consumed by mediation
hearings (the num ber of actual hearing days relative
to the total mediation span) declined significantly
over time: 23 percent, 34 percent, 11 percent, and 6
percent, chronologically.
31
actual reading of testimony and exhibits by wit
nesses. Emergency Board No. 160 limited each party
to seven days for presenting briefs and rebuttals
(one day for oral arguments), stipulated that time
expended in cross-examination was to be charged to
the party cross-examining, encouraged the parties to
“submit background or other noncontroversial evi
dence in exhibit form,” and required 6 hours of
hearings daily.
One other problem, lack of cooperation in hear
ings, was of sufficient significance to merit comment.
During the Congressional hearings in 1926, the fra
mers of the act felt that “it was absolutely inconceiv
able that either party would hesitate to furnish the
Board all the information within its power that
would help the presentation of its point of view.” 98
In the event that either party failed to fulfill its re
sponsibilities at once public opinion (w ould) con
demn that party and a public opinion (would) be
created in the right direction by that very refusal.” 94
Yet union officials involved in six emergency boards
refused to present evidence or to formally participate
in board hearings.95 One, in fact, “issued an anticipa
tory declaration critical of the Board’s forthcoming
findings of fact and recommendations, before either
have been conceived or published.” 96
The parties. Third, as previously mentioned, the
parties often contributed to the problem of duration
by bringing issues before the NMB on which they
had spent little time bargaining. Two auxiliary
points, the first relating to the degree of skill and
time needed by neutrals to digest rule proposals and
the second to the ratification of tentative agreements
by general committees and the rank-and-file, merit
further attention.
As the NMB has publicly stated, “Expert knowl
edge and experience is required for proper consider
ation of proposals to change rules relating to work
performance, and the most satisfactory results are
obtained if the parties directly concerned, who are
familiar with the technical aspects of the operation
and elements of the dispute, work out settlements
which they can understand and translate into every
day practice for the efficient operation of the particu
lar facility involved.” 97 Emergency boards, when
presented with numerous technical and complicated
031926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 85.
941926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 154.
9 Emergency Board Nos. 83, 93, 97, 110, 129 and 174.
5
M
Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 31.
9 NMB, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, op. cit., p. 4.
7
32
rule proposals and testimony which more often than
not appear to confuse the issues, have reached the
same conclusion. “No one has ever entertained even
a captious doubt but that ‘Railroad Rules’ and ‘Rail
road Rules Changes’ constitute one of the most tech
nical, involved, and highly complex subjects in the
entire baffling welter of industrial relations problems
which from time to time are thrown into the lap of
Emergency Boards for solutions.” 98 Moreover, sev
eral boards have declined to decide on various tech
nical rule proposals or counterdemands and have as
serted that the issues may better be resolved by the
parties directly.99
Union leaders involved in emergency boards have
expressed doubts concerning the ability of the emer
gency board members to understand the complexities
of pay, rules, and working conditions on the individ
ual properties.100 “I believe much of the failure of
emergency board procedures over the past 5 years
(1960-65) can be attributed to the personnel of
those boards and not to the procedures as such . . .
M en of experience should be chosen not people who
have sat on just one or two emergency boards in the
past 5 years, but men of long experience and great
understanding of railway problems. Above all, they
should have the time to discharge fully their
obligations.” 101 Some labor leaders also have casti
gated board members for “sidestepping” issues for
which the boards recommended their removal be
cause of the issues’ technical nature.102 Other union
officials have based their rejections of boards’ reports
on the grounds that board members lack sufficient
knowledge of the industry.108
According to the NMB, the parties themselves ap
pear to have contributed to the impairment of the
act’s implementation by not granting their bargaining
representatives sufficient authority to accept final
contract terms a situation not unique to the railroad
industry.104 F or example, after exhausting all the
provisions of the RLA , the Switchmen (SUNA) and
9 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 31.
8
9 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 89
9
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Nov. 3, 1950), pp. 8-9.
10L. W. Homing, Vice President of Personnel, New York
0
Central Railroad, on Sept. 22, 1955.
11Eli L. Oliver “Procedures Under the Railway Labor
0
Act”, Discussion, Eighteenth Annual Meeting of National
Academy of Arbitrators, 1965, pp. 51-52.
13 Labor, Nov. 25, 1950, p. 3.
0
13Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 64.
0
14Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the National Media
0
tion Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968 (U.S.
National Mediation Board, 1969), pp. 23-24.
the Western Carriers Conference Committee in Sep
tember 1960 tentatively reached an accord disposing
of all issues in dispute (on terms recommended by
Emergency Board No. 131), subject to ratification
by the union’s rank-and-file. U nder the terms of the
union’s by-laws, if the majority of the membership
rejected the recommendations of an emergency
board, the International President was required to
set a strike date. The NMB claimed that these “re
strictions . . . placed on the representatives of the
employees . . . (w ere) inconsistent with the provi
sions of the Railway Labor Act, defeat (ed ) the pur
pose of the Act, and (m ade) its administration cum
bersome and ineffective.” 105 Ultimately, the dispute
was settled without a stoppage, but the terms were
in excess of the board’s recommendations.
A rbitration
As noted earlier, the act gives the NMB the option
to suggest to the parties that they submit their dis
pute to arbitration, the next-to-last step available to
agree to settle m ajor disputes. As with other features
of the law, the parties are not compelled to accept
the proffer of arbitration; however, the law places a
moral obligation on the parties to consider this
m ethod of resolving disputes after previous steps in
the act have failed.
Between 1955 and 1969 (the only period for
which detailed information was available), 2,999
railroad mediation cases were docketed and disposed
of, 2,595 by means of mediation, by withdrawals, or
by dismissals.106 Of the 404 remaining cases, the
parties refused to arbitrate 372 disputes, and agreed
to do so in 32. During the period under study,
(1950-69), mediation cases which eventually re
quired the appointment of emergency boards were
closed when carriers rejected arbitration in one case
(1 percent of the total), unions in 53 (78 percent),
and both parties in 14 (21 percent). In no case did
both parties simultaneously agree to submit the dis
pute to arbitration. As early as 1941, a formal cen
sure of the parties’ tendency to decline proffers of
arbitration was recorded by the NMB and was reiter
15Letter from E. C. Thompson, Executive—Secretary of
0
the National Mediation Board to William Rogers, Attorney
General, on Sept. 14, 1960.
16A withdrawal refers to the action of the party which
0
initially requested the mediatory service of the Board when
the party retracts its application. A dismissal refers to the
action of the Board when it dismisses the request for its
service according to the conditions required under the
act (RLA).
ated almost every year since then in the Board’s A n
nual R eport.
It was apparent from witnesses’ testimony during
the 1926 House hearings on the proposed railroad
legislation that if disputes were not resolved in me
diation the parties would be persuaded to settle them
by means of arbitration and if disputes were assigned
to emergency panels the party who declined the
Board’s proffer of arbitration would have “to make
good before the emergency board.” 107 A t various
times, the recalcitrant parties offered reasons for re
jecting arbitration. F or instance, unions involved in
Emergency Board No. 81 deliberations claimed, “We
do not believe that arbitration should be substituted
for bonafide collective bargaining in a case such as
this.” 108 A high union official of the Engineers
(BLE) explained their rejection of arbitration,
“Most of the 282 cases are based on fundamental
rules which are not arbitrable under our contract, for
to arbitrate would in effect change certain rules with
out carrying out the provisions of the R L A .” 109
E m erg en cy b o a rd re p o rts
The Railway Labor Act does not compel the
parties to reach an accord; rather it places maximum
reliance on self -determination by labor and manage
ment. While recognition of the right to strike is an
integral part of this public policy, the parties are re
quired to adhere to a step-by-step process during
which the nature of the dispute and the merits of the
opposing claims would be made public. The assump
tion in the law was that this type of disclosure would
generate public pressures that would contribute to
just and equitable settlements.110
On eight occasions, the NMB or the emergency
boards functioned in a mediatory capacity and
effected settlements between the parties without issu
ing formal reports.111 In the vast majority of in
stances, however, recommendations for the resolu
tion of the disputes were made by the boards. The
framers of the act anticipated that both parties would
be extremely reluctant to reject a report, unless it
was “so inequitable as to be almost beyond the limits
of human endurance.” 112 However, actual results
1071926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 102-3.
18Labor , Feb. 18, 1950, p. 1.
0
19Trainmen N ew s , Oct. 3, 1949, p. 3.
0
10See 1926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 18-19. Also see
1
1926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 14-15, 25.
11Emergency Board Nos. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165,
1
and 171.
1 2 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 65.
1
33
did not bear out these hopes. Of the 60 emergency
board reports for which the parties’ responses were
ascertainable, the vast majority were rejected by one
or both parties.113 In fact, labor and management
initially accepted the boards’ specific recommenda
tions only on six occasions, four times in the
1950’s . 114 Of the six, four affirmative responses were
registered by operating groups involved twice in
wage and rule cases (Emergency Board Nos. 107
and 126) and once each in a wage case (Emergency
Board No. 82) and in a rule case (Emergency Board
No. 172). The only two nonoperating groups’ ac
ceptances involved the R EA , once in a wage dispute
(Emergency Board No. 105) and once in a wage
and rule controversy (Emergency Board No. 107).
Although the carriers generally accepted “ad
verse” as well as favorable reports, the unions con
sistently rejected “adverse” recommendations. N a
tional M ediation Board and other official records in
dicated that on 48 occasions railroad unions partially
or totally repudiated the boards’ reports. Operating
employees’ organizations accounted for 22 negative
responses and nonoperating workers’ for 27.115 In
four instances, all involving nonoperating crafts, rail
way carriers responded negatively. Of the four
boards, three were convened between 1950 and
1954 to consider cases national in scope. On two oc
casions, one involving the Firem en and Engineers
(BLFE) in a wage case with the N ation’s railroads
and the other involving the Telegraphers (ORT) in
a rules’ case with Southern Pacific, both parties de
clined to accept boards recommendations.
Thus, the pressure of public opinion was not ade
quate to force the parties to accept the boards’ rec
ommendations, nor was voluntary compliance
common. As early as 1951, the NMB recognized
the increasing predisposition of unions to reject
emergency board recommendations. To explain this
tendency, the NMB argued that the complicated
and technical issues precipitating these disputes were
given little publicity, and beyond that, they were
somewhat incomprehensible to the public.118
Some extenuating circumstances relating to the
boards’ directions and approaches may also have
contributed to this high rejection rate. Some union
leaders have adopted the position that this “final”
step in the emergency process is just an administra
tive action to delay the application of economic
power, that “the report is not final and binding”
(and thus is not a “m atter of acceptance or
rejection”) 117
U nder the original conception of the bill, a board’s
direction and tone was to be mediatory, rather than
legalistic:
. . . We are seeking to avoid what we regard as
the fundamental error in the creation of the Railway
Labor Board, and that was creating a public body
which thinks its duty is to sit behind the table and
hear the parties as witnesses in court and thereby
continue the intensity of the controversy. We want
this emergency board to take the power of a final
board of mediation and try to bring an agreement.
We do not want a dispute presented to the public in
order that public opinion may castigate one party or
the other, if we can get an agreement.118 N or did
the framers of the act anticipate that the boards
would formally adjudicate disputes and issue intri
cate and detailed recommendations. It was expected
that the panels would be lay boards and would not
have the “capacity to decide a great dispute. If it is a
problem of simple elements, they may be able to
work it out, or else, if not simple, work out a method
of solution for a complicated problem.” 119
Very early experience during the two decades
under study was more favorable to the release of re
ports in which methods rather than detailed terms of
settlement were suggested, especially in grievance
cases. F or instance, Emergency Board No. 79 con
cluded “that the issues here involved m ay be and
should be resolved within the provisions of the Rail
way Labor Act.” 120 In its report to the President on
July 6, 1950, Emergency Board No. 86 recom
mended that the issues in the dispute be processed
through the normal channels of the act, either the
grievance machinery or the issuance of a “Section 6”
notice.
Overall though, boards primarily have devoted
their energy and time to fact-finding, not mediation,
and have attempted to adjudicate disputes by pro
mulgating detailed recommendations, rather than
118The 111 for which responses were not ascertained
boards included the 8 mentioned in footnote 111 plus
Emergency Board Nos. 77, 86, 93.
114Emergency Board Nos. 82, 105, 107, 111, 126, and 172.
15One case (Board No. 170) involved both major groups.
1
16Seventeenth Annual Report of the National Mediation
1
Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1951 (U.S. Na
tional Mediation Board, 1952), p. 33.
17 Letter from Mr. Val Simons, General Chairman of the
1
ORCB, to Mr. L. W. Homing, Vice-President, Personnel,
of the New York Central Railroad, on Sept. 22, 1955.
1181926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 135 Also see pp. 8384.
1191926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 101-02.
10Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 79
2
(U.S. National Mediation Board, Feb. 28, 1950), p. 8.
34
suggesting methods of settlement. F or example, the
members of Emergency Board No. 175 recom
mended a wage increase of 3 1 /2 percent effective
July 1, 1968, 2 percent effective January 1, 1969, 3
percent effective July 1, 1969, a differential of 20
cents an hour for skilled employees, and the with
drawal of the employees’ cost-of-living proposals and
all other demands not treated in the recommenda
tions. In its report to the President filed on Novem
ber 5, 1964, Emergency Board No. 164 suggested a
9 cent an hour increase for firemen retroactive to
January 15, 1964; an additional 9 cents effective
January 1, 1965; $1.75 increase retroactive to June
1, 1964 for engineers; a fourth week of vacation
after 20 years; moratoriums on wages until January
1, 1966; and the withdrawal of all other demands
not treated in the recommendations.
Although the majority of boards have not hesi
tated to produce specific recommendations, some
emergency boards, on the other hand, have recog
nized that direct party solutions are preferable to
third party solutions and that suggesting methods of
resolving disputes are preferable to issuing detailed
terms of settlement.121 Notwithstanding, labor fre
quently has criticized boards for their purported le
galistic approach and predisposition to recommend
detailed terms of settlement:
The ineffectiveness of Emergency Board proce
dure does not stem from a stubborn determination
on the part of labor leaders to consistently and
arrogantly reject Board recommendations. In the
past the leaders of labor have hopefully looked to
Emergency Boards to provide them with a solution
of their problems. That their hopes have not been
fulfilled is not the fault of this side of the table.
The fault we believe lies in large part with the
detached attitude of Boards from the practicalities
of the necessity to settle cases, from a determina
tion to sit in the role of judge and law-giver to
decide categorically whether a particular party is
right or wrong, and in inability or unwillingness
to seek a means of settlement of the dispute be
fore them which would do justice to both sides
and serve the public interest.12
2
In no case did the parties completely repudiate the
emergency boards’ recommendations in negotiations
or reach settlements entirely outside of those sugges
ted. A t various times, the boards’ recommendations
served as a basis for eventual agreements without in121 Emergency Board R eport N o. 169 , op. cit., p. 5 (Also
see Emergency Board R eport N o. 130, p. 2). This board did
however recommend specific wage terms.
m Emergency Board R eport N o. 97, op. cit. p. 64.
terruptions of service. In the majority of cases, how
ever, the boards’ reports served as a floor from
which to bargain for more favorable terms, usually
after strike threats or executive intervention.
A t other times, the parties materially changed the
recommendations in their final agreements, such as
in the settlement between the Teamsters (IBT) and
the REA, in which the parties substituted increased
wages and health and welfare benefits, as well as ef
fective dates of the various improvements, for the
board’s recommendations.
Even when the boards were unsuccessful in com
pletely reconciling the parties’ differences, they did
narrow the scope of the dispute, so that the parties
were able to effect a settlement in lesss time and with
less interruption of railroad services. F or instance, in
hearings before Emergency Board No. 173, more
than seven issues were withdrawn by the parties.
Similarly, in hearings before Emergency Board No.
I l l , certain proposals of Team ster Locals 459 and
808 were withdrawn.
Methods of Settlement13
2
Over the 20-year period, few emergency board re
ports have served as a basis for quick settlement of
railroad disputes. Fearing this very phenomenon, the
counsel for the railway organizations warned:
They the employees) have felt that the machin
ery of this act for conferences, for adjustment,
for mediation, for arbitration, should provide for
the orderly and peaceful adjustment of all differ
ences that might arise in the railroads. They
know that as long as additional machinery is held
out, as long as another avenue of escape is open,
stubborn negotiators are likely to hold out.14
2
Even after the emergency board’s issuance of its
report, the National Mediation Board generally has
reentered the case, ready to assist the parties to
reach a settlement by mediation or arbitration.
The principal m ethod of settlement was ascertain
able for 65 emergency board cases. Of these, 25 ac
cords were reached by mediation agreements
(M.A.) two by arbitration agreements (A.A.), and
41 by the parties themselves (party agreements in
m It is assumed that a negotiated agreement was the
principal method of settlement when there was no indica
tion that either a mediation agreement or an arbitration
agreement was consummated. In boards involving more than
one carrier or union, the method of disposition was de
termined by the author’s knowledge of the prevalent means
of settlement used by the parties.
1241926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 17.
35
Table 11. Methods of settlement in railroad boards, by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69
1950-54
Methods
Arbitration agreements:
Rules ---------------------------Wages -------------------------Mediation agreements:
Grievances ----- -------------Rules ------------------------Wages __________________
Wages and rules__________
Wages, rules, and
working conditions ---------Rules and working conditions _-.
Party agreements:
Grievances --------------------Rules -------------- -----------Wages __________________
Wages and rules--------------Wages, rules, and
working conditions _______
Operat
ing em
ployees
1955-59
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
—
—
—
—
—
—
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Operat
ing em
ployees
—
1
1
—
—
1
3
2
4
—
—
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
2
—
—
—
1
1
—
1
—
3
1
1
—
1
—
2
—
—
—
1
—
—
1
—
—
—
1
—
2
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
2
5
2
—
1
1
2
—
2
—
1
1
2
2
—
—
—
—
1
—
4
1
1
3
—
—
1
3
^
2
1
—
1
—
direct negotiations) (P .A .)125 Operating workers or
ganizations accounted for one of the arbitration
agreements, which concerned rules. Of the 41 party
agreements, 19 were signed by operating unions (12
dealing with rules and wages and rules) and 22 by
nonoperating organizations (16 dealing with wages
and wages and rules). All the party agreements deal
ing with grievances were reached by operating crafts,
but the vast majority (75 percent) of the 12 wage
agreements were signed by nonoperating crafts and
11 by operating employees, as shown in table 11. Al
though, as noted, m ost emergency board disputes
were settled in direct negotiations, the parties in
creasingly turned to m ediation and arbitration (in
the 1960’s), as shown in table 12.
Disposition
Of the 71 emergency board cases, eight were dis
posed of by the parties, with or without the aid of
the Board, either before board members were ap
pointed or before a formal report was issued.126 E x
cept for one (Emergency B oard No. 141), these
m Disputes leading to three emergency boards were settled
by more than one principal method, a P.A. and M.A. in
the first and second instances (Nos. 118 and 174) and a
P.A. and A.A. in the third (No. 169).
Emergency Board Nos. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165,
and 171.
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
Total,
1950-69
1965-69
—
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
36
1960-64
—
—
1
3
—
Nonoper
ating em
ployees
1
3
2
6
1
2
1
—
4
4
3
8
1
1
—
3
9
7
—
—
3
SOURCES: National Mediation Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
Presidential emergency board reports.
boards involved only operating employees, concerned
mainly with noneconomic demands (grievances,
three times; rules and wages and rules, both twice).
Five of these emergency disputes127 were settled
without a work stoppage, two with the mediatory as
sistance of the Board. Of the three remaining panels
in which strikes occurred, all involved operating em
ployees; Engineers (B L E ) members twice, once in
a 6-day stoppage before Emergency Board No. 115
17Emergency Board Nos. 80, 104, 141, 165, and 171.
2
Table 12. Number and percentage of agreements resolved
through arbitration, mediation, and direct negotiations,
1950-69
Type of agreement
Number, total ---------Arbitration agreements______
Mediation agreements ______
Party agreements ............ .......
Percent, total____
Arbitration agreements _____
Mediation agreements_______
Party agreements _________
196569
195069
22
14
68
1
8
13
*1
27
M6
2
25
41
195054
195559
196064
19
13
—
—
3
16
27
26
100.0 100.0
—
—
15.8
53.8
84.2
46.2
100.0
4.5
36.4
59.1
100.0
7.1
50.0
42.9
100.0
2.9
36.8
60.3
10ne case in which both a party agreement and an arbitration agree
ment were the principal methods of settlement.
2 One case in which both a party agreement and a mediation agree
ment were the principal methods of settlement.
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
SOURCE: National Mediation Board data.
was convened and once in a 1-day stoppage before
Emergency Board No. 150 was appointed and
Trainmen (BRT) once, in a 2 -d ay strike over griev
ances heard by Emergency Board No. 85.
The remaining 63 emergency board disputes, 29
of which involved operating employees, were settled
after a formal emergency board report. Of these 63
boards, appoximately one-third were concerned with
wages and rules, one-fourth with wages, one-fifth
with rules, and the remainder with miscellaneous is
sues. Following the boards’ reports, 16 of the above
63 post-emergency board settlements were preceded
by work stoppages. Also one stoppage began before
a board was appointed and continued after the board
released its report (No. 157). Twenty-one strikes
were called by railroad employees participating in
these 17 emergency boards (two each in Emergency
Board Nos. 154 and 172 and three in Emergency
Board No. 8 1 ). Eight additional work stoppages,128
five conducted by nonoperating employees, oc
curred before the creation of an emergency board, a
legal course of action once a 3 0 -day status quo pe
riod has been observed following the NM B’s notice
to the parties that mediation has failed and arbitra
tion has been refused. Of the issues that were re
ported to be the cause of these 28 stoppages, wages
and rules was the principal subject in dispute (10
tim es), followed by rules (eight), wages (fo u r),
grievances (tw o ), wages, rules, and working condi
tions (tw o), and rules and working conditions (tw o).
(See table 13)
In total, 31 disruptions of railroad services, 18
conducted by operating employees, were associated
with 24 emergency boards. Combined, the 31 work
stoppages entailed 7,054,095 man-days lost by
m Includes the one conducted by the parties participating
in the hearings before Emergency Board No. 157.
950,231 railroad employees. This represented 83.8
percent of all railroad man-days idle during 1950-69
and 66.5 percent of all railroad workers involved in
strikes during the same period. As table 14 indicates,
nonoperating crafts accounted for a substantial share
of these losses (approximately 69.7 percent of the
workers involved and 67.2 percent of the man-days
idle). This was true largely because of four strikes,
including a 999 day stoppage conducted between
January 1963 and December 1965 which involved
2,023 workers and 1,371,900 man-days and another
stoppage lasting 58 days in 1955 at the Louisville
and Nashville R ailroad which involved 23,870
workers and 1,002,540 man-days.
F or the entire period 1950-69, average duration
of these 31 emergency board work stoppages was 57
calendar days and the median was 19 calendar days.
For the 31 stoppages, duration ranged from a high of
999 days to a low of 1 day. Excluding the 999-day
labor-management conflict, extending both before
and after institution of the “Section 10” procedure,
the mean duration was 26 calendar days, and the
median was 14 calendar days. Again excluding the
999-day stoppage, for those interruptions of work
beginning before the appointm ent of a emergency
panel, the average duration was 36 days, and the
median was 19 days. In contrast, strikes occurring
after the boards’ reports extended on the average for
26 calendar days, with a m edian of 14 calendar days.
Only five emergency boards that were national in
scope experienced work stoppages. In total, nine
strikes were conducted (three each identified with
Emergency Board Nos. 81 and 154 and one-each as
sociated with Emergency Board Nos. 97, 106, and
169) and involved 631,621 workers and 2,281,245
Table 13. Railroad emergency board work stoppages, by major issue and group, 195U-69
Occurred in disputes characterized by post
emergency board settlements
Occurred in disputes
for which no formal
report was issued Before boards' reports After boards’ reports
Total
Issues
Total _____ ____ _________ _____
Grievances ____ _______ _______ _____
Rules _____________________________
Rules and working conditions .......................
Wages, rules, and working conditions _____
Wages and rules ____________________
Wages--------------- -----------------------
All
crafts
31
3
9
2
2
11
4
Operating Nonoperating
Nonoperat
Nonoperat
employees employees Operating
ing
Operating
ing
Operating
employees employees employees employees employees
18
3
8
—
—
7
—
* Includes Emergency Board No. 157 that extended both before the
board was created and after it released its report.
13
_
1
2
2
4
4
3
1
1
—
—
1
—
—
_
_
—
—
—
—
3
_
3
—
—
—
—
*5
_
—
1
—
1
*3
12
2
4
—
—
6
—
Nonoperat
ing
employees
29
—
1
1
2
3
12
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
SOURCES: National Mediation Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
37
Table 14. Workers Involved and man-days idle, by major
group, 1950-69
Workers involved
Number
(in thousands) Percent
Item
Total, all
railroad
stoppages
Operating employees .
Nonoperating
employees ______
SOURCE:
Percent
100.0
8,418.6
100.0
950.2
100.0
7,054.1
100.0
288.2
30.3
2,310.9
32.8
662.0
69.7
4,743.1
67.2
. _ 1,429.8
Total, all
emergency
board
disputes ___
Man-days idle
Number
(in thousands)
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
38
man-days of idleness.129 Of the nine stoppages, only
one was nationwide, a 2 -d ay interruption of work
conducted by six shopcraft unions over wage de
mands. The average duration for all nine work stop
pages was 20 calendar days, and the median was 6
calendar days.
19Does not include workers and man-days in “two”
2
strikes as catalogued by the NMB; BLS, on the other hand,
counted the “three” strikes associated with this board as one.
Thus, no reliable figures were available for the “two”
stoppages.
C h a p te r V II.
R a ilr o a d
Among the general purposes of the R L A was
avoidance of interruptions to interstate commerce.
Frequency and intensity of work stoppages is un
doubtedly the most visible gauge to use in measuring
the act’s effectiveness, although not necessarily the
most reliable. Between 1950-1969, the railroads ex
perienced 316 work stoppages that involved
1,429,819 workers and 8,418,552 man-days of idle
ness. (See appendix tables A -5 and A -6 and table
15.)
Almost all measures of strike activity were higher
in the 1960’s than in the 1950’s, even without a
substantially large difference in the num ber of strikes
and man-days idle. Although average num ber of
man-days per stoppage decreased slightly (1.9 per
cent) between the decades, the average number of
workers per stoppage increased significantly, from
3,157 in the 1950’s to 5,793 in the 1960’s. The rise
in these measures of strike idleness occurred despite
a 52.6 percent decline in railroad employment over
the two decades.130 Estim ated working-time lost, the
most relevant and accurate guage of strike activity,
increased significantly, from 0.15 percent in the
1950’s to 0.26 percent in the 1960’s.
In 12 years there were 14 individual strikes each
in which over 100,000 man-days were lost. W ith only
three exceptions, each of these 12 years was asso
ciated with one o r more m ajor work stoppages (those
involving 10,000 or more w orkers). In the 1960’s,
there were 8 stoppages, each involving 100,000 mandays or more, which combined entailed 2.7 million
man-days of idleness, and in the 1950’s there were
W o rk
S to p p a g e s
six stoppages of 100,000 or more man-days each,
which combined resulted in 3.3 million man-days of
idleness.
Size of stoppages
When coupled with duration, one commonly used
variable— size— indicated the direct and immediate
impact of work stoppages. Of the 316 total stop
pages, one-quarter involved groups of less than 100
employees, and three-fifths dealt with groups of less
than 500 workers. (See appendix A -6 and table
16.) A significant num ber of stoppages (6 9 ) dealt
with fairly large groups of employees (1,000 and
under 10,000), and only 17 strikes idled 10,000 or
more workers each. In the 1960’s, the relative num
ber of these major stoppages increased substantially.
Approximately 600,000 nonoperating employees
participated in five m ajor strikes, and 230,000 oper
ating workers were involved in seven such stoppages
during this period. The num ber of stoppages involv
ing 500-999 employees decreased significantly, from
25 in the 1950’s to 19 in the 1960’s.
Another prom inent characteristic of these work
stoppages was the num ber of companies and unions
participating in the disputes. Contrary to the implica
tion of coordinated bargaining, single-unit work
stoppages were most common, accounting for almost
10The 1950-54 period did, however, experience a large
3
number of stoppages and workers idle and the largest num
ber of man-days lost in any subperiod.
Table 15. Number of railroad work stoppages, workers involved, and man-days idle, 1950-69
Stoppages
Years
Workers involved
Man-days idle
Average
per
stoppage
Number
Average
per stoppage
Estimated
working
time lost
Number
Average
per period
___________________
___________________
___________________
___________________
82
70
64
100
16.4
14.0
12.8
20.0
404,797
75,049
189,908
760,065
4,937
1,072
2,967
7,601
2,416,907
1,673,519
2,405,628
1,922,498
29,474
23,907
37,907
19,225
0.16
.14
.27
.25
1950-69 _____________ ____
1950-59 ________________
1960-69 ___ _____ ____
316
152
164
15.8
15.2
16.4
1,429,819
479,846
949,973
4,525
3,157
5,793
8,418,552
4,090,426
4,328,126
26,641
26,911
26,391
.19
.15
.26
1950-54
1955-59
1960-64
1965-69
Number
SOURCE: Bureau o1 Labor Statistics.
39
80 percent of all strikes. In the 1960’s, this type of
dispute constituted 83.5 percent of all stoppages.
Only 66 strikes— 39 of them in the 1950’s— were
multiunit in nature: 49 (15.5 percent) involving a
single carrier and two or more unions; 11 (3.5 per
cent) in which one union and two or more carriers
participated; and six involving more than one carrier
and more than one union. Only one of these 66 mul
tiunit stoppages was nationwide, a shopcraft dispute
in 1967. Operating employees participated in these
multiunit disputes on 36 occasions; nonoperating, 19
times; both groups on 11 occasions.
M ajor strikes, stoppages involving 10,000 workers
or more each, were even more infrequent then mul
tiunit disputes. (See table 17.) Over the two dec
ades, 17 m ajor strikes occurred in the railroad indus
try, 12 after 1960. F or the comparable period, the
total economy sustained 418 m ajor strikes, or 0.5
percent of all stoppages. By contrast, the 17 major
strikes conducted in the railroad industry constituted
5.4 percent of all railroad stoppages, a level that can
be traced to the prevalence of coordinated bargain
ing and observance of picket lines. These m ajor rail
road stoppages accounted for the bulk of man-days
idle (61.4 percent) and workers involved (83.7 per
cent) in all railroad stoppages, 1950-69. Although
fewer workers were involved in m ajor railway strikes
in the 1950’s (368,616) than in the 1960’s
(828,288), man-days idle attributable to strikes in
the former decade (2,853,451) exceeded the level
of the latter decade (2,315,735).
Because they are normally chronicled by the vari
Table 16.
ous forms of mass communications, larger stoppages
receive more public attention, particularly if they are
associated with emergency boards cases. Twelve
m ajor stoppages followed the release of reports by
emergency boards (11 appointed between 1950-69)
and one* other m ajor stoppage preceded the appoint
ment of a board. (See table 17.) F our m ajor strikes
were not directly associated with an emergency dis
pute; however, two of these four stoppages were
related to A rbitration Award No. 282 which “termi
nated” the dispute resulting in the establishment of
Emergency Board No. 154.
Of the 17 m ajor stoppages, only five involved a
single carrier and a single union, all occurring in the
1960’s. In the remaining 12 m ajor stoppages, m ore
than one union or more than one carrier were parties
to the disputes.
Although involved in only six major stoppages
(five of them in the 1960’s) nonoperating emr
ployees’ unions accounted for 52 percent of the
workers involved and 51 percent of the man-days
idle associated with these larger strikes. The average
duration of these nonoperating stoppages was 19.5
calendar days, compared with 5.2 days for the 11
major stoppages (7 in the 1960’s) in which operat
ing employees participated.
In a vast majority of these 17 major strikes, the
principal subjects in dispute were wages (7 cases)
and job security (6). Plant administration was an
issue three times (all in the 1968-69 period) and
supplementary benefits, once. Four-fifths of the
m ajor disputes occurring in the 1950’s were attribut-
Number and percent of railroad work stoppages, by size, selected periods, 1950-69
T o ta l s to p p a g e s
Type o f
e m p lo y e e
U n d e r 10 0
e m p lo y e e s
100 and u n d e r
5 0 0 e m p lo y e e s
500 and under
1 ,0 0 0 e m p lo y e e s
N um
ber
P e r
cent
1 9 5 0 - 6 9 ___________________
O p e ra tin g w o rk e rs
N o n o p e ra tin g
w o rk e rs ---------------B oth _______________
316
192
1 0 0 .0
1 9 5 0 - 5 4 ___________________________
O p e ra tin g w o rk e rs ---------------N o n o p e ra tin g w o r k e r s ________
B oth __________________________
82
50
24
8
1 0 0 .0
24
15
7
2
2 9 .3
24
16
6
2
2 9 .3
12
5
5
2
1 4 .6
18
10
6
2
2 2 .0
1 9 5 5 -5 9
_____ _________________
O p e ra tin g w o r k e r s ____________
N o n o p e ra tin g w o rk e rs ______
B oth ---------------------------------------
70
43
20
7
1 0 0 .0
12
9
3
—
1 7 .1
30
20
8
2
4 2 .9
13
7
3
3
1 8 .6
14
7
5
2
2 0 .0
1 9 6 0 - 6 4 ___________________________
O p e ra tin g w o r k e r s ______ __
N o n o p e ra tin g w o rk e rs _______
B oth __________________________
64
40
21
3
1 0 0 .0
21
12
8
1
3 2 .8
21
13
7
1
3 2 .8
6
4
1
1
9 .4
11
8
3
—
1 7 .2
5
3
2
—
7 .8
1 9 6 5 - 6 9 ___________________________
O p e ra tin g w o rk e rs - - ________
N o n o p e ra tin g w o rk e rs _______
B oth __________________ ______ _
100
59
41
—
1 0 0 .0
22
14
8
■
—
2 2 .0
32
18
14
—
3 2 .0
13
7
6
—
1 3 .0
26
15
11
—
2 6 .0
7
5
2
—
7 .0
40
P e r
cent
N um
ber
79
50
2 5 .0
107
67
26
3
106
18
P e r
cent
1 0 ,0 0 0 a n d o v e r
e m p lo y e e s
Num
ber
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
N um
ber
1 .0 0 0 a n d u n d e r
1 0 .0 0 0 e m p lo y e e s
3 3 .9
35
5
44
23
.
P er
cent
N um
ber
1 3 .9
69
40
15
6
P er
cent
2 1 .8
25
4
Num
ber
17
12
P er
cent
5 .4
5
—
4
4
—
4 .9
—
1
__
1 .4
1
—
T ab le 17. R ailro ad w ork stoppages, involving 10,000 o r m ore w orkers, 1 9 5 0 -6 9
P a r ti e s in v o lv e d
B e g in
n in g
d a te
Y ear
(in
days)
U nion(s)
C a rrie rs )
5 8 ,6 9 5
1 7 4 ,7 6 9
5 3 3 ,6 7 9
7 7 2 ,0 2 2
BRT
BLE
BLFE
ORC
7 0 ,2 8 5
4 0 ,9 9 7
4 1 9 ,7 1 7
1 2 5 ,4 9 3
L o u isv ille & N a s h v ille
10 N ono p e r a tin g
u n io n s.2*
4
*
2 3 ,8 7 0
1 ,0 0 2 ,5 4 0
12
P e n n s y lv a n ia
14
N ew York H a rb o r C a r rie rs
C o n fe re n c e C o m m itte e .8
C h ic a g o a n d N o rth W e s te rn
TWU, BB,
SWMIA, 1AM.
SIU, MMP,
NMEB.
ORT
14
7
..
1 -3 0 -5 1
3 -0 9 -5 2
12
4
19531 9 9 4 -----1 9 5 5 _______
3 -1 4 -5 5
58
1 9 6 0 _______
9 -0 1 -6 0
1 9 6 1 ______
1 -1 0 -6 1
19 6 2 .
..
8 -3 0 -6 2
30
1QCO } ---------l9 D i
1 9 6 4 _______
4 -8 -6 4
2
Illin o is C e n tra l
6 -1 5 -6 4
1
1 1 -1 8 -6 5
3 -3 1 -6 6
1
4
M isso u ri-K a n sa s-T e x a s;
M is s o u ri-P a c ific ; T e x a s
M e x ic a n ; S o u th e rn P a c ific ;
T e x a s & P a c if ic ; P o r t
T e rm in a l A s s o c ia tio n o f
H o u sto n .
A tc h is o n , T o p e k a & S a n te Fe
E ig h t c a r r ie r s 8
7 -1 6 -6 7
2 -5 -6 8
2
5
1 1 -6 -6 8
_____
1951
1952 . .
M andays
id le
SUNA
BLFE
V a rio u s W e s te rn r a i l r o a d s 1
P e n n s y lv a n ia ; S o u th e rn ; N ew
Y ork C e n tra l; S a n te Fe.
V a rio u s c a r r i e r s 8
N ew Y ork C e n tra l; T e rm in a l
R a ilro a d A s s o c ia tio n o f
S t. L o u is.
6 -2 5 -5 0
5 -1 0 -5 0
1950
N um ber
of
w o rk e rs
in v o lv ed
D ura-
M ajo r
is s u e
No
e m e r
gency
b o a rd
c re a te d
S to p p a g e
p r io r
S to p p a g e
to th e
fo llo w in g
c r e a tio n ( s e c tio n 1 0)
of a
' ’s t a t u s q u o "
b o a rd
p e rio d
W a g es
Jo b s e
c u rity .
W a g es
W a g es
X
(*)
X
X
S u p p le
m e n ta ry
b e n e f i ts .
X
Jo b s e
c u rity .
W a g es
X
Jo b s e
c u rity .
X
X
1956-
_____
19 6 7 ______
1968
1 9 6 9 ...........
5 0 4 ,0 0 0
1 3 6 ,5 4 4
1 5 ,2 7 0
3 2 0 ,6 7 0
2 0 ,4 1 5
4 0 ,8 3 0
W a g es
1 2 ,7 6 8
1 2 ,7 6 8
J o b -s e
c u rity .
X
BRSC
BLFE
2 9 ,0 2 0
1 1 5 ,2 9 4
2 9 ,0 2 0
3 4 6 ,1 7 7
W a g es
Job s e
c u rity .
X
O
R a ilro a d in d u s tr y
M is s o u ri-P a c ific ; S e a b o a rd
C o a s t; T e x a s & P a c ific .
6 sh o p c ra ft8
BRT
4 5 9 ,0 8 8
3 9 ,3 6 9
6 4 5 ,1 1 2
1 7 6 ,9 2 6
2
L o u isv ille & N a s h v ille
BRT
1 2 ,9 9 4
2 5 ,9 8 8
1 -1 3 -6 9
1
L o u isv ille & N a sh v ille
UTU (BRT)
1 2 ,9 0 0
1 2 ,9 0 0
4 -8 -6 9
1965
196 6
7 2 ,0 0 0
2 2 ,9 7 0
5
Illin o is C e n tra l
UTU (BRT)
1 6 ,2 0 0
6 4 ,8 0 0
W a g es
P la n t
a d m in i
s tr a ti o n .
Job s e
c u rity .
P la n t
a d m in i
s tr a ti o n .
P la n t
a d m in i
s tr a ti o n .
X
flAIIA
BLFE, BLE,
ORCB, BRT.
BRT
1 C h ic a g o , R ock I s la n d & P a c if ic ; G re a t N o rth e rn ; C h ic a g o
W e s te rn ; D e n v e r & Rio G ra n d e W e s te rn ; W e s te rn P a c ific .
2
F ollow ed t h e r e p o r t o f a P r e s id e n tia l
c r e a t e d b e fo r e f is c a l y e a r 1 9 5 0 .
e m e rg e n cy
b o a rd
G re a t
w h ic h
w as
* Various carriers involved in Emergency Board No. 81.
« 1AM, BB, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO, BMWE, BRS, ORT, BRSC.
* B a ltim o re & O hio; B rooklyn E a s te r n D is tr ic t T e rm in a l; B u sh T e rm in a l;
C e n tra l R a ilro a d o f N ew J e r s e y ; E rie -L a c k a w a n n a ; L eh ig h V a lle y ;. N ew
Y ork C e n tra l; N ew Y ork D ock; N ew Y ork, N ew H av en & H a rtfo rd ; P e n n s y l
v a n ia ; a n d R e a d in g .
O r d u r in g
e m e r
gency
b o a rd .
X
(*)
X
X
X
• P e n n s y lv a n ia ; C e n tra l o f G e o rg ia ; I llin o is C e n tra l; G ran d T ru n k ; Bosto n & M ain e; M isso u ri P a c ific ; U nion P a c if ic ; a n d S e a b o a rd .
7 T h e r a ilr o a d s in v o lv e d in t h i s s to p p a g e c la im e d t h a t t h e
la te d to t h e r u le s a n d p r a c t ic e s in e f f e c t u p o n t h e e x p ir a tio n
tio n A w ard 2 8 2 . A r b itra tio n B o a rd No. 2 8 2 w a s c r e a t e d b y PL
d is p o s e o f tw o i s s u e s in d is p u te b e tw e e n t h e c a r r i e r s a n d
v o lv e d in E m e rg e n c y B o a rd No. 1 5 4 .
s tr ik e re
o f A rb itra
8 8 - 1 0 8 to
u n io n s in
8 1AM, BB, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, a n d IBFO.
9 T h e d i s p u t e r e l a t e s t o t h e r e d u c tio n
i n s ta n c e s , a s a r e s u l t o f A.B. N o. 2 8 2 .
of
" c re w
s iz e s "
in
c e r t a in
SOURCES: N a tio n a l M e d ia tio n B o a rd d a ta , B u re a u o f L a b o r S t a ti s t i c s .
able to economic issues, while noneconomic issues
predominated the m ajor stoppages in the 1960’s (8
cases). M ajor strikes involving economic issues ex
tended, on the average, almost twice as long as those
resulting from noneconomic issues (13.4 calendar
days com pared with 7.4 days). Combined, the 17
major strikes’ duration, ranging from 1 to 58 days,
averaged 10.2 calendar days, with a m edian of 5.0
days. The majority of these larger strikes were termi
nated quickly, 10 within 1 week. Only two extended
beyond 15 calendar days.
Duration
In comparison to m ajor strikes, the average dura
tion of all railroad stoppages over the two decades
was 13.0 calendar days, 14.6 days in the 1950’s and
11.2 days in the 1960’s. During the same period, the
average annual duration of all strikes experienced in
the total economy was 21.7 calendar days, 20.0 days
in the 1950’s and 23.5 days in the 1960’s.
Approximately 75 percent of the railroad disputes
extended 6 days or less, and over 91 percent lasted
41
for fewer than 30 days. (See appendix table A—
8
and table A -1 0 .) Only eight railroad stoppages—
four in each decade under study— extended for more
than 90 days. Three-fourths of these prolonged stop
pages were concerned primarily with wages. In con
trast to the even distribution of prolonged strikes in
the two decades, there was a significant decrease in
relative number of medium-length strikes (15 to 29
days and 30 to 59 days) in the 1960’s and a substan
tial increase in shorter stoppages, particularly those
extending for only 1 day.
Almost one-half of all workers involved in rail
road stoppages participated in strikes which ex
tended 3 days or less, and over nine-tenths of
workers involved were associated with stoppages less
than 15 days in duration. Stoppages extending for 2
weeks or less were responsible for one-half of all
idleness, and strikes lasting less than 60 days ac
counted for three-fourths. Although prolonged stop
pages involved less than 1 percent of all workers,
they incurred more than one-fifth of all idleness.
Operating and nonoperating personnel
stoppages
Another pattern in the railroad work stoppages
was the different degree of involvement of m ajor oc
cupational groups. Between 1950 and 1969, operat
ing employees participated in 192 work stoppages;
nonoperating workers in 106 stoppages; and both
groups jointly in 18 strikes. Even though nonoperat
ing employees called fewer strikes in both decades
than operating employees, the former increased their
strike rate in the 1960’s, as shown in table 16. Al
though nonoperating employees were involved in
fewer strikes and accounted for a smaller num ber of
workers involved, they nevertheless were responsible
for 54 percent of all man-days lost over the two dec
ades and accounted for the vast majority of man-days
in the 1955-59 and 1960-64 periods. (See ap
pendix table A -8 .) Average duration for nonoperat
ing crafts’ stoppages was 16.6 days, compared with
10.0 for the operating crafts.
A nother im portant difference between operating
and nonoperating personnel strikes was the incidence
of issues involved in their disputes. (See appendix
table A -9 .) Although operating employees partici
pated in more stoppages generated by either eco
nomic o r noneconomic issues, both m ajor groups’
disputes were dominated by noneconomic issues,
particularly by plant administration and job security
matters (in 2 out of 3 cases). Only one m ajor issue,
42
intraunion or interunion matters, was predominated
by a m ajor group, nonoperating employees in this
case.
Issues
Within the 20 years studied, the incidence of
m ajor issues in the railroad industry varied, but some
patterns did emerge. (See appendix table A -7 and
table A -1 0 .) These issues were classified into those
involving economic matters, such as wages, supple
m entary benefits, and wage adjustments; and those
concerned with workers’ security, i.e., union organi
zation and security, job security, plant administra
tion, interunion or intraunion matters, other working
conditions, and other contractual matters.
Of the issues reported to be the causes of signifi
cant numbers of stoppages, plant administration was
by far the principal subject in dispute over the 2 0 year span and in every subperiod, except 1950-54.
(See appendix tables A -7 and 9.) Although the re
sults were not completely consistent in all periods,
wages was the next most troublesome issue, followed
by job security and interunion or intraunion matters,
respectively.
Economic issues (including supplementary bene
fits) engendered longer periods of disputes on the
average (27.8 calendar days) than survival issues,
including union organization and security, other
working conditions, and other contractual m atters
(5.0 days). Within these two m ajor categories, two
economic issues, wages and wage adjustments, had
the longest durations on the average (38.1 and 9.5
calendar days, respectively), followed by plant ad
ministration (5.8), job security (3.2), and intra
union or interunion matters (2.5).
Table 18, which shows duration by m ajor issue, il
lustrates another im portant aspect of railroad stop
pages. Wages predominated in the longer strikes
Table 18.
1950-69
Duration of railroad stoppages by major issue,
D u ra tio n o f d is p u te
30 days and over
60 days and over
90 days and over
N um ber
N um ber
N um ber
Issu e
W a g e s _________
P la n t a d m in
is t r a t i o n _____
W age a d ju s t
m e n t _________
Jo b s e c u r i t y ____
P e rce n t
P e rce n t
P e rce n t
16
6 6 .7
6
6 0 .0
5
8 3 .3
4
1 6 .7
3
3 0 .0
1
1 6 .7
3
1
1 2 .5
4 .2
NOTE; Dashes denote zeros.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics
1
—
1 0 .0
—
__
,__
—
*
—
(those extending 30 days or longer), followed by
plant administration, wage adjustment, and job se
curity.
In terms of num ber of man-days idle and workers
involved, economic issues generated substantially
greater losses than did noneconomic issues, primarily
because of 70 wage disputes which accounted for 54
percent of all workers and all man-days idle. Com
bined, the 111 strikes dealing with economic issues
were responsible for 69 percent of man-days idle and
58 percent of workers involved in all stoppages.
Within the two m ajor categories, wages was the pri
mary issue, accounting for 54 percent of all workers
and all man-days idle; and job security disputes con
stituted 30 percent of all workers and 24 percent of
all man-days.
43
Appendix A
T ab le A -1 .
S elected ra ilro a d fin a n c ia l and econom ic statistics, 1 9 5 0 -6 9
Rilro d ’ s a o Crrie in
a a s h re f a rs
ak p y
in rc traffic1 b n ru tc 2
te ity
L b rc s
a o o ts
In e
dx
Nme o Oe tin Oe tin
u b r l p ra g p ra g
o
f
Nt
e
Rv
ee
Rteo in e tmn c rrie re e u s e p n e 3 p rc n o E p y
a f v s e t a rs v n e 3 x e s s e e t f mlo o tp t fs
uu
Rv n e n e
ee u u
rn
pr
e
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er
et
o s n s o s n s ilwy m n4
ig t a s n
M s (ptue 4 (th u a d )4 in u g (th u a d ) (th u a d ) ra a
ile rerc n o s n s c rrin
e p ye 28
mlo e
o e tin
p ra g
d fic 4
e its
to 3 g r Nm o rod e t)
n
e
u f a
mn o r6 §8
ahu
epne5
xe ss
m s m 3 b r o nd
ile
iles e we
(p rc n (P r
e e t) e
cn
e t)
, 0,7
72.8 4 1
7
.7 122 84
8 ,0 0 7 3 ,0 5 65
1 5 - 5 .1
90
.39 4
67 6
.A
N.
.A
1
6 t 9,5 7 0 $ ,1 5 5
2 1 ,4 0 N .
27
15
9 1 5 .6
5 3 6.14 4
25
6
2 1 ,4 5 4.16 $ ,6 8 0
22 7 ,0 0 1
6
2 ,5 1 6
5.9 12 6 0
, 7 ,0 0 77.1 4 2
1 ,5 1 1
0 1 ,6 2 8,1 2 2
1 5 - 5 .4
92
48 51 4
.6
0 1 ,2 6 4.54
22
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6.5 12 6,6
1 ,7 2 7
0 0 ,8 7 8,1 4 1
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, 2 63 77.2 454
15
9 3 5 .0
1 1 4.92 3
9 1 ,2 5 4.55
28
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2 ,3 0 0
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1 ,7 7 9
0 8 ,8 1 8,2 8,2
, 0 ,3 2 77.7 4 8
4
1 23 65.8 12 6 1
15
9 4 49.5
6 4.38 3
06
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7 1 ,9 6 3
24,8 3 0
9 ,1 0 2
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, 4,7
8
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95
1 ,9 9 4.54
05
7
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4
4
, 5 ,2 6 89.4 4 1
1 ,2 9 0
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2 96 6 .9 10 8 1
5
15
9 6 48.40 3.81 1
2
25,5 7 0
1 ,8 0 1
16
,5 4 4.19
3
, 2,6
2
9 ,7 2 67.2 104 64
93
.7 4 2
1 ,6 6 9
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15
97 4
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.51
6
16
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26,1 3 0
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99
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8
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85 7
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8
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,3 8 2 1
.2
26,39 00 2
6,7
7
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91 _
.59
7
9
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4
1 .2 3 7
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9,3 9,6
0 96 7,3 1,7
6 51 67.5
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15
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1 6 .. 43.18 2.05
94
5
18
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66 34 1 2
5,0
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9,9 5 8
8 ,1 7 7,83 68 65
8
.0
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.9
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14
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4
25,7 3 0
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0 2 52 8,0 2 8
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69 6
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.7
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94 64.8
6 .2 3 5
7
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0 8 ,4 7 8,277,2
60 9
3 ,8 5 1 9
16
9 7 41.4
3 10
.5
6
28
,0 8 2.48
27,2 2 0
4 ,0 0 2
0
5 ,3 9 6 .1
60 9
1 .1 1 1 3
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5
7
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16
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4
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8
26,9 3 0
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9
3,6
5
50 3
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6
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1 6 ,9 2 8,72 64 6 .1
1 6 - 41.09 1 9
99
4
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45 2
8
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27,5 6 0
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1
6
1 ,6 8 2
1 5 ,5 5 9,2 9 3
0 ,1 7 64.4
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7 ,2 7
8 .8 3 1
1T e ra a s s a o in rc to m s (p b a d p a ) fo
h ilro d ’ h re f te ity n ile u lic n riv te r
• Uin 1957-59 = 1 0.
sg
0
fre h a d in rc p s e g r m s (p b a d p a ) fo p s e g rs
ig t n te ity a s n e ile u lic n riv te r a s n e .
7P lim a .
re in ry
2In lu e a h u e ra a s in re e e h s o tru te s ip .
c d s ll a l-lin ilro d
c iv rs ip r s e h s
N T : N . d n te n t a a b .
OE .A e o s o v ila le
8F r c s I a d II lin -h u ra a so ly
o la s n
e a l ilro d n .
S UCS IC d ta As c tio o A e a Rilro d d ta
ORE: C a , s o ia n f mric n a a s a ,
4 F r c s I lin -h u ra a s o ly
o la s e a l ilro d n
0 Lb r c s in lu e wgs a d s la s w lfa c s , a d p y ll Lb r S tis sd ta
a o o ts c d a e n a rie , e re o ts n a ro a o ta tic a .
ta e .
xs
Rtioo
a f
o e tin
p ra g
e pne
x e ss
to
re e u
vne
(p rc n
e e t)
74.4
2
7 .2
77
7 .0
61
7
6.18
7 .6
86
7 .5
51
7 .7
63
7 .3
82
7
8.78
78.3
2
7
9.42
7 .0
98
7 .5
81
77.8
8
7 .4
82
7
6.76
7 .0
67
7 .0
90
7 .6
86
7 .9
89
Bre u o
ua f
45
Os
Railroads’ involvement in Railway Labor Act procedures, fiscal years 1950-691
D p s no md tio
is o itio f e ia n
c s sb :2
ae y
W d wls
ith ra a
A itra n
rb tio
a re mn
g e e ts
D m s ls
is is a
A r
fte
md tio
e ia n
Bfo
e re
md tio
e ia n
C rrie
a r
E p yr
mloe
Bth
o
24
1
14
8
17
,6 2
3
2
31
7
22
8
20
7
15
0
29
2
3
8
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
6
4
9
7
7
3
5
1
2
0
4
0
4
3
3
3
4
2
5
2
3
8
3
5
2
5
5
1
7
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)
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)
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)
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)
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)
19
4
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5
19
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6
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19
1
9
1
16
4
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15
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28
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)
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)
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16
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9
6
9
9
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1
7
2
10
3
12
2
(4
)
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)
(4
)
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)
(4
)
4
3
6
3
1
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
2
1
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
1
6
1
6
1
3
1
2
1
6
1
3
1
6
1
0
7
1
6
2
1
3
9
1
0
3
7
19
2
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
2
2
2
4
2
1
2
3
1
7
2
8
1
8
1
8
1
7
2
6
2
9
1
1
1
8
7
3
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
7
2
5
8
3
6
4
1
2
1
5
4
9
2
3
2
1
1
2
4
1
1
5
3
8
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
1
7
1
0
1
1
3
8
8
3
7
5
8
2
1
0
2
1
0
1
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
1
7
1
2
8
2
0
7
1
3
2
4
1
0
2
3
1
3
1
0
1
1
3
6
1
2
1
3
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
5
6
2
6
4
4
1
1
3
1
5
2
1
Ya
er
Md tio
e ia n
a re mn
g e e ts
61
7
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
(4
)
1
8
2
7
8
1
Nme o
u br f
e e ec
mrg n y
b a s2
o rd
M c lla e u
is e n o s
3
0
7 .0
96
7 .4
56
7 .6
33
7 .7
56
6 .4
80
7 .2
74
8 .2
05
7 .9
75
7 .7
45
6 .5
63
6 .7
70
7 .2
79
7 .1
45
6 .8
63
7 .5
87
7 .6
96
8 .7
45
7 .7
49
7 .6
45
8 .2
91
Rle
us
Rfu a to
e s ls
a itra b:
rb te y
Rte o
as f
py
a
S le te to ls ________ 5,227 1243 3,984
e c d ta
5,092 2 1 4,851 95.27 2 4 4
4
3
9 15
8
5,102 2 4 4,858 95.22 2 9 6
4
6
6 23
0
5,118 2 4 4,864 95.04 2 3 7 2 1
5
7
2 0
53
,1 7 2 9 4,878 94.96 2 7 7 2 5
5
9
2
2
5,1 7 2 0 4,887 94.76 2 0 7
5
7
5
9 11
7
5,180 2 5 4,905 94.69 3 2 7 2 1
7
1
1
4
5,190 2 7 4,913 94.66 3 4 6
7
2
4 20
6
5,196 2 0 4,916 94.6
8
1 23 5
6
8 25
0
5,205 2 0 4,925 94.62 3 5 7
8
0
7 28
2
5,215 2 2 4,933 94.59 2 8 8
8
4
3 15
6
5,218 2 4 4,934 94.56 2 6 7
8
3 13
2
5
8
5,220 2 5 4,935 94.54 2 9 5
2
2 17
7
5
,221 2 6 4,935 94.52 2 5 5
8
0
3 12
5
5,226 2 6 4,940 94.53 1 9 6
8
9
6 13
3
5,228 2 7 4,941 94.51 2 2 5
8
5
4 18
9
5,230 2 8 4,942 94.49 2 6 4
8
3
8 18
8
5,235 2 0 4,945 94.46 2 6 3
9
3
6 20
0
5,275 3 8 4,947 93.97 2 2 6
1
4
1 11
8
5,285 324 4,961 93.87 2 4 7
8
2 22
1
5,404 35
4 5,050 93.45 3 3 3
4
7 36
0
P rc n
e et
A e
irlin s
Rilro d
a as
T ta
ol
P rc n o
e et f
to l
ta
Nme
u br
A e
irlin s
Md tio Cs s
e ia n ae
Mjo is u s in o e
a r s e v lv d
inra a
ilro d
md tio c s s
e ia n a e
Nw
e
a re mn
g e e ts
1 .
950
1 _
951
19 —
52
1953—
1 —
954
1 —
955
1 —
956
1 5 --.
97
1958—
1 59
9 —
1 —
960
1961—
1 —
962
1 _
963
1964_
1 —
965
1966—
1 _
967
19 _
68
1 _
969
T ta
ol
Ya
er
C lle tiv b rg in g
o c e a a in
a re mn 2
g e e ts
Rilro d
a as
Nme
u br
________ J
Table A -2.
7
1
1
1
6
4
1
2
3
4
4
1
6
3
6
4
4
4
1
3
4
-..1950
-..1951
--.1952
-.1953
—1 5
94
—1 5
95
—1 5
96
--.1957
-.1958
-.-1959
- .I90
6
--.1961
--.1962
—1 6
93
--’.1964
_1 6
95
_1 6
96
---1967
--.1968
.--1969
—
—
*T e d fin n o th in u try c n rm to in u try c s ific tio 40 in th S n a
h e itio f e d s o fo s
d s la s a n
e ta d rd to a itra , a re id a o th to l n me o md tio c s s d p s d o a d th n me o
rb te
s u l f e ta u b r f e ia n a e is o e f n e u br f
In u tria C s ific tio Mn a 1 67 e itio .
d s l la s a n a u l, 9 d n
md tio a d a itra n a re mn , w d wls a d d m s ls
e ia n n rb tio g e e ts ith ra a , n is is a .
a hs e o fo a n a n v ila le r a r s e n e o s f is o itio
2 Rp s n c lle tiv b rg in g a re mn o file w th Ntio a Md tio B a , a d 4Ds e d n te in rmtio ws u a a b fo mjo is u s a d mth d o d p s n
e re e ts o c e a a in g e e ts n
ith e a n l e ia n o rd n
md tio c s sd p s do inafis a y a e d gJ n 30.
e ia n a e is o e f
c l e r, n in ue
o ra a md tio c s s b fo 19 5
f ilro d e ia n a e e re 5 .
2T e n me o e e e c b a s a p in d is d c re te to th n me o re s ls
h u b r f mrg n y o rd p o te
ire tly la d
e u b r f fu a
S UC: Ntio a Md tio Ba d ta
ORE a n l e ia n ord a .
Table A -3. Railroad mediation cases disposed of by the National Mediation Board, by major occupational group,
fiscal year, 1950-69
9 5
3,984 1 9 2 1
6 ,3 2 2 1 7
------- 0
15
8
6 13
5
6
15
90
-----------------0
0 3
3 1
4
1951..........- ---- ------------ 2 3 1 8
4
7
2 1
0
15
92
-- --- ---------------- 2 1 8 7
9 19
1
2
2
0
2
15
93
-........... 2 5
7
0
15
94
-- ------- 1 1 8 1 2 — 6
2 1 1 17
4
3 4
1 1
3
15
95
.......
6 10
5
1 1
0
20
6
15
96
____ ___
— 1
1
0
1 1
15
97
--------- 2 5 1 1 7
5
28
2
4 13
5
2
15
98
-- ____________
6
15
6
6 9
2 4
1 5 . -- ___ ___ ___
99
4 7 — 2
8
13
5
1 6 __________________
90
7
7 17 — 3
0
1 6 _________________ 1 7
91
1 5
5
12
5
4 8
1 6 __________________
92
3
3 7 — 7
1
1 6 _________________ 1 3
93
7 17 — 9
2
18
9
1 6 __________________
94
1 1
0
18 1 9
8
6
4
1 6 __________________
95
11
1
1 1
9
0
0
_
1 6 ______ _ _________ 2 0 1
96
1 2
11 1 19
8
3 2
1 6 _______ __________
97
2
3 4
4
1
1 6 __________________ 2 2 1 1 7
98
3 —
1 2
0
1 6 __________________ 3 6 1 2 9
99
1Md tio c s s in wic mre th n o e ra a c ft ws in o e .
e ia n a e
h h o a n ilro d ra a v lv d
2T is mjo o c p tio a g u c n titu s a th o e tin c fts th
h a r c u a n l ro p o s te ll e p ra g ra ; e
re a in o c p tio a g u s c mris th n n p ra g c fts
min g c u a n l ro p o p e e o o e tin ra .
1950-69 -----
40
0
1
1
1
6
3
5
2
8
2
8
2
4
2
3
1
9
1
9
2
1
3
1
1
5
2
2
1
2
1
8
1
7
1
4
1
1
1
0
2
6
9 15
1 7
8
3
0
2 2
2
4 1
5 1
2
3
4
9
4
3
1
6 1
6 1
1
3
8 1
4
7
4 1
0
1
6
7
7
9
7
7
2
9
9
1
5
3
1
8
1
4
1
4
1
5 12 2
0
1
5 10 15
_
6
7 _ 1
2
3
1 8 2
2
1 8
2
— 1 2 — 5 3
0
1
7 — 1
4
1
j io
5
8 — 2
1
— 2 1 — 5 3
3
— 3 1 — 7 —
3
— 2 8 2 3 —
— 7 5 — 2
1
2
9
1 — 3
1
— 1
1
0
1 3
1
— 1
0
1 — 4 —
2
4 — — 1 —
— 3 — — 7 1
— 7 — 1 1 1
— 1
1
3 — 3 —
— 2 — — 8
1
1
— — 1 — 3 —
— 4 3 — 4
1
— 8 1 — 7 1
N T : Ds e d n te z ro .
OE ahs e o e s
S UC: Ntio a Md tio Ba d ta
ORE a n l e ia n ord a .
M c lla e u ra a
is e n o s ilro d
wrk rs
oe
Mrin s rv e e
a e e ic mn
T c n a e g e rs
e h ic l n in e ,
a h c , d ftmn
rc ite ts ra e ,
e.
tc
D in c r e p y e
in g a mloe s
a d tra a d p llmn
n in n u a
p rte
o rs
Ptro e a d
a lmn n
s e ia o e
p c l ffic rs
T in d p tc e
ra is a h rs
S b rd a o ia in
u o in te ffic ls
min n n eo wy
a te a c f a
Ae ts te g p e
g n , le ra h r,
a d to e mn
n wr e
| Min n n e o wya d
a te a c f a n
j s n l wrk rs
ig a o e
Yrd a te
a ms rs
C ric l, o e s tio ,
le a ffic , ta n
a d s re o s wrk rs
n to h u e o e
Mc a ic l fo mn
e h n a re a
Min n n e o
a te a c f
e u mn wrk rs
q ip e t o e
Cmind g u s ra
o b e ro p, il
rod1
a
T in e g e a dy rd
ra , n in , n a
s rv e w rk rs
e ic o e 2
Ya
er
A o c p tio s
ll c u a n
Mjo o c p tio a g u s
a r c u a n l ro p
14 19
4
1
8
7
1
0
3
6
4
6 1
0
1 3
4
3
1
3
5
1
0
5
5
4
5
4
— 8
1
2 1
1
7
7
7
6
8 1
0
9
6
1 8
9
8
9
6
1
4
1
47
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T ab le A -5 .
C hronology of ra ilro a d RLA— Em ergency B oard fisc a l years 1 9 5 0 -6 9 — C ontinued
—
Dte
a
Dtemd q e
a eiatiost
Dteof
a
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1
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1
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1
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1
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2
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3
18
3
19
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A 30
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4
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4
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A 79
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A 89
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A 03
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A 60
-6 9
18
4
10
5
To d , L ra ad Fa o
le o o in n irp rt
Dock_________1
To d , L k fro t Dock----f
le o a e n
C ve n S ve o Co._J
le lad te dre
Gnra MngrsA c of
ee l aae sso,
NwYork2 ______
e
2
A h n To ea adSn
tc iso , pk n ata
Fe__________
NwYorkCentral-------e
L n Island-------- ---og
UW
M
[
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MP
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BE
L
OC
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1c o r
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kn n ae n e
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WCC
ag
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n s2
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Pc Wste Crrie
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CnC )________ S N
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f o thrn aific
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h ao ilwue, t. al RB 1
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WCC
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n s2
\ h ao n o wste _ R
J Cic g ad Nrth e rn _j* O T
NwYo Central____ \ R
e rk
P u h ad Lk E _ _ OT
ittsb rg n ae rie _ j
Blt Railway______ BE
e
L
54
]
1 -3 -5 J Dc '5
0 0 6 e. 6
1 -1 -5
246
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560 560
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1- 1 9
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449
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5- 5 8
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1 -2 -5 1 1 7 8j- 1 7 8
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1 -1 -5 J -1 -5 -1 -5
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Proffer of
arbitration
Initiation
of
mediation
session
Rejected
by
Date
Disposition of emergency board dispute
Date of
National
Mediation
Board
notification
to President
518-55)
6- 6-55 r Union
3-11-55^ Union
}
8- 1-55 \
Union
j.
10- 5-55
10-27-55
10- 2-56
4- 20-55
5- 25-55
1-24-55
2- 3-55
6-27-55 V
Date
board
created
8- 1-55
8-13-55J
9-14-55
8— 55
25—
9- 1-55
10-26-55^ Union
Unions
11- 3-55
11- 7-55
12-12-55
10- 9-56
Union
12- 3-56
12- 5-56
10- 3-56
12-10-56
Union
12-20-56
10- 4-56
12-17-56
Union
3-15-57
3- 7-57
4-
j4- 5-57
15-57
Union
5-13-57
6-27-57
Union
8- 5-57
2- 8-60
10-22-58
2-17-60
2-11-60
1- 4-60
3-11-60
Union
Both
Union
2-11-60
2-26-60
4-12-60
Union
1
10-26-59 i
Unions
j
J
} 2-24-59
11-19-57
w
10-19-55
^ 1- 5-56
Unions
Negotiation
12-21-55
(8)
(5)
Negotiation
1-10-57
12-22-56
3-15-57
Union
1-25-57
3-21-57
Union
Mediation
(Arbitration)
Mediation
4- 5-57
3-20-58
7-22-57
5- 7-57 j
5- 9-57
6- 7-57 j- Union
Negotiation
Mediation
(4)
7- 7-57
9-13-57
(4)
8- 6-57
9-20-57
Union
Mediation
2-12-60
2-29-60
4-18-60
7-15-60
6-20-60
5-18-60
Union
Union
Negotiation
Mediation
Mediation
8- 7-61
1-27-61
8-10-60
> Negotiation
l 8-19-60
1
>
J
4-22-57
to
7-18-57
7- 7-57
to
9-13-57
7to
8 - 4-60
1
4-19-60 l
4-22-60 i
6—8— l
60
Unions
5-23-60
7- 8-60
Union
Negotiation
10- 1-60
5-20-60
6-24-60 !
Unions
Mediation
(Arbitration)
9-12-60
8-31-61
5-18-60
1
J
J
5- 9-60
8-24-60
Unions
9-19-60
9-28-60
12-10-60
Union
Mediation
12- 6-60
Union
1- 5-61
1-21-61
3- 6-61
Union
Negotiation
7-10-61
Union
Mediation
5-16-60 ) 9- 1-60
> to
5-19-60 9-12-60
j
1-10-61
to
1-23-61
3-14-61
5-19-61
1
j
1-23-61
10-31-60
9-27-61
8-29-60
3-16-61
Union
3-14-61)
Both
3-15-61
V
7-19-61
Union
J
Union
8-28-61
1-30-62
2- 2-62
12- 6-60
12- 8-60
11- 4-59
5- 2-61
6- 1-61
|
12- 1-56
to
12- 6-56
10-22-57
5-11-60
L
5- 5-60
}
V Negotiation
J
► 3-28-60 l
10-25-59
Mediation
1-14-57
j-
Before emer
gency board After emer
created or gency board
during emer report issued
gency board
y Negotiation
Union
'I
1-25-60
Date2
of
agreement
Type
of
agreement
Rejected
by
Dated
7- 1-55 }
7- 1- 55}
8-11-55
With a strike
mergency board reported
5-22-58
3-16-59
12- 8-59
5- 3-62
1
V
J
r
y
5-27-58 > Both
|
1-25-62^
]
J
7-20-61
8- 30-61 y
VBoth
J
" Union
I
12- 11-61 y
^10-29-61
J 12 7-63
4- 9-62
C
5
)
Negotiation
11- 2-61
Negotiation
6- 5-62
Mediation
(Arbitration)
9-28-62
10- 8-62
9-15-61
-
1
y Mediation
)
)
y Negotiation
9- 1-61 >
■
|
10-11-61
12- 5-61
2-27-62
' Union |
Union
7-17-61
10-11-61
Unions
|
6-21-62
5-16-61
i
)
]
y
3- 3-62
5- 3-62
4-18-62 -
4-23-62
J
6- 5-62
8- 2-62
>
> 6- 8-62
8- 6-62J
>
Unions
1 Union
■
'j
8-30-62J Union
3- 4-63
()
5
6-14-62
8- 30-62
to
9- 28-62
\
r Negotiation 112-10-62
Negotiation
J
2-16-63
5- 2-62
to
5- 3-62
55
10-60
T able A -5 .
gency
board
number
Chronology of railroad RLA— Em ergency Boards fiscal years 1 9 5 0 -6 9 — Continued
National
Mediation
Board
Southern Pacific--------------
A-6617
153
A-6671 \
A-6696 j
A-6700
155
157
Date
of
“Section
6”
notice
Union(s)
number
151
154
Emer-
Carriers)
BRSC
REA ___________________|
IBT
EW
SCCC ________________
BLFE, SUNA,
BLE, BRT,
ORCB
Pullman ------------------ ..." |
Chicago, Rock Island and
Pacific ___________
New York Central________
Soo Line ----------------Florida East Coast ___ _
A-6794
A-6795
A-6796
A-6797
A-6627,
Sub. 1
159
160
A-6967
A-7030
28 161
28162
A-7107
A-7127
A-7128
164
11 cooperating
nonoper
ating
unions236
7
BRS
EWSCCC_______ _____ _
National Railway Labor
Conference (NRLC)______
NRLC __________________
NRLC __________________
28 163
j*
11- 1-61 |
1- 9-62
(i°)
3- 8-621
1-10-62J
5-17-62
y
J
)
(1°)
2- 1-63
(0
1)
1-24-64
1-28-64
12- 2-63
3-17-641
8
3-31-64
4-10-64
9-28-56 10-26-56
(i°)
5-17-66
8-12-60
July ’66
7-15-66
4- 6-66
5-23-66
(4)
6-20-66
1-23-67
9-28-66
10- 6-66
3- 2-59
(4)
7-13-66 11-14-66
(4)
11-15-66
9-24-59
11-16-66
(4)
12-30-65
(4)
1- 7-66
(4)
1-21-66
1- 4-66
9-27-68
7-30-65
1- 6-66
8-19-65
1-14-66
8-12-65
1-26-66
8-12-65
1-13-66
A-6318
169
A-7949
Atchison, Topeka and Santa
F e ___________________
NRLC, EW
SCCC _________
BRT
RED2
7
170
E-322
A-7970
BRT
IBEW
1A
M
ORCB
172
173
174
r
8-24-60
2- 1-67
9-24-59
11-16-66
Belt __________________ s
Illinois Central _
1
BRT
'
Long Island .
BRT (UTU)
A-8458 "
1
A-8478,
.. . .. _______ 1
sub.
y NRLC . ________________j i- ORCB
EW
SCCC
32 1-7
i
A-8448
BLE
NRLC, EWSCCC__________
A-8433
BRS
7- 2-68
j>
J
1 Date that one of the parties first requested the mediatory services
of the National Mediation Board.
2 Date (1) agreement was reached by the parties, (2) agreement was
ratified, or (3) arbitration award was rendered.
2 Parties settled directly; no evidence to indicate mediation or arbitra*
tion was utilized to reach an agreement.
4 No data available.
5 No report or no formal recommendations issued.
6 Mediation agreement.
7 Related disputes that were handled concurrently or separately by the
same board members.
8 Arbitration agreement.
9 Chicago, Great Western; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific; Davenport,
Rock Island, and Northwestern; Denver and Rio Grande Western; Minne
56
(4)
1
y 12-30-65 y
J
(4) /
1
7- 6-65 > 1- 7-66 \
«
'
12-23-65 V
J
(4)
>
Louisville and Nashville
J
175
5- 6-53
5-31-63
165
L
7-20-62
1-10-64
BLFE
_ .j
9- 4-62
(1 )
0
NRLC __________________
...
3- 9-62
5-21-62
6-28-63
1-15-64
1-16-64
A-7173
NRLC ..
0°)
Carrier(s)
Date of
proffer
of
mediation
1-18-62
Nov. ’62
(1°)
RED39
A-6285 ^
A-7981 f
A-7521, J
& Sub. 1
A-7538,
& Sub. 1
A-7566,
& Sub. 1 1
A-7567, f
& Sub. l j
E-346
Union(s)
(0
1)
(0
1)
NRLC .
171
6-12-62"|
8-24-62
7- 6-62 y
4- 3-62
J
(20)
9- 1-61 ^ 9-26-61
1
J
(2°)
9- 1-61
10-15-62
5-31-63
5-31-63
Long Island
Date of request
for mediation
1-17-62
RED2 9
7
RED27
RED29
)
Y
J
Ending
date
(1
4)
*
2
11- 2-59
1
_J
_
Beginning
date
9-22-58
1
bscp
Direct negotiations
9- 1-67
9-15-67
4 - 1-68
9- 1-67
4-30-68
3- 1-68
1- 4-66
8- 1-68
(0
!)
(4)
(4)
(0
1
)
9-18-68
10-13-67
9-13-68
8-16-68
9-30-68
9-19-68
12- 6-67
8-16-68
9— 68
18—
8— 68
16—
apolis and St. Louis; Railway Transfer Co.; Northern Pacific Terminal Co.
of Oregon; St. Paul Union Depot Co.; Sioux City Terminal Railway Co.;
Western Pacific; Great Northern.
10 Negotiations on local properties commenced and/or ended on various
dates.
11 See footnote 7.
1 IBBDF, IBBISB, BRC(A), IBEW 1A , SMW IBFO, BRSC, BM E, ORT,
2
, M
IA,
W
BRS, MMP, NMEB, ILA HREU, RY .
,
A
13 Apparently steps skipped because of a work stoppage.
14 National conferences.
»IAM, IBBDF, IBBISB, SMW IBEW BRC(A), IBFO, BRSC, BM E, ORT,
IA,
,
W
BRS, MMP, NMEB, ILA HREU, A A RY .
,
TD , A
16
Agreement signed with various carriers associated with the Eastern
Carriers Conference Committee.
Disposition of emergency board dispute
Proffer of
arbitration
Initiation
of
mediation
session
Rejected
by
Date
1-29-62
Union
4-13-62
5- 9-62
6- 28-62 j5-23-62
Date of
National
Mediation
Board
notification
to President
8- l - 6 2 \ Both
6-26-62J
Unions
Date
emergency
board
created
8- 8-62
}
Emergency boar d reported
9-11-62
}
4- 2-63
Rejected
by
Dated
8-10-62
\
9-14-62 y
Type
of
agreement
12-31-62
Union
Negotiation
(Arbitration)
Union
j ' Negotiation
-n
11- 10-62 y
2
Date
of
agreement
5-13-63J
Unions
11- 2-63 i
Union
3-16-63
X
1-17-63
Arbitration J 11-26-63
(Negotiation)
6-25-64
y
L
12-17-63
J
None to date
8- 1-63 1
!
11- 4-63
Both
10-25-63
6-25-63
Both
1-17-63
11-19-62
8-15-62
•12-20-63
1- 3-64
4- 3-64
Union
Negotiation
1
[
[
8- 7-64
10-20-64
10-20-64
Unions
Unions
Unions
Mediation
Mediation
Mediation
Mediation
Mediation
Mediation
Negotiation
Negotiation
Mediation
Mediation
Arbitration
Negotiation
2-21-65
9-25-64
11-21-64
11-21-64
2- 4-65
2- 4-65
2- 7-65
12- 2-64
8-13-64
10-31-61
9-25-65
9-15-67
9-27-67
J
12-23-63
J Carrier J
1-30-64
8- 5-64
8- 5-64
Unions
Unions
Unions
3- 10-64
8-13-64
8-13-64
3-10-64
8- 5-64
Unions
8-
13-64
i
10-20-64
Unions
7-
8-19-64
30-64
Union
9-
16-64
\
11- 5-64
Union
11-
18-608-15-62
Union
9-11-65
5
()
6
(5
)
1- 6-67
Unions
1-19-67
7
3-10-67
Unions
3-
3-671
Unions
4- 6-67
7V
5-12-67
10—1—
62*1
3-23-67
Both3
1
5- 23-67
10-19-66
|
1- 30-67
Aug. *62
1 2 - 1 -6 6
5-28-68
12-30-65
2- 23-66
12- 23-66
1-23-63 to
5- 1-64
l
10-22-63
3-10-64
3-10-64
1-18-68
1-18-68
1- 8-64
to
4- 7-64
7- 3-63
to
8-28-63
Negotiation
Union
8 - 8 -6 6
4- 5-63
to
5- 7-63
"J
3 - 7-63
11- 6-62
2- 7-67
With a strike
Before emer
gency board After emer
created or gency board
during emer report issued
gency board
7
}
6- 3-68
}
7-29-68
4- 7-66
8- 5-68
17-66 7-66
48—5—
68
Union
}
V
1 1 - 6 -6 8 >
\
7
/
8f
1 1 - 6 -6 8
1 2 -2 0 -6 8
8
12-27-68
Unions
1-10-69
9
1-13-69
Union
1- 2-69
1 0 -2 2 -6 8
1 1 -2 0 -6 8
Union
10— 68
31—
11-26-68
10-15-68
9-24-68
11- 25-68
1 2 - 2 -6 8 '
I
1
I
|
J
9
1-13-69
w
^
!
Unions
(®
)
12-13-68 > Union
4-21-69
Union
1 Negotiation
>
J Negotiation
T (Arbitration)
r
► Negotiation
Mediation
(Arbitration)
5-29-67
6-14-67
7- 1-67
7-25-67
4- 4-69
^ 4-13-69
I 2- 8-69
r May’69
7-29-68
to
11- 6-68
11- 6-68
to
11- 7-68
4- 8-69
to
4-12-69
1-13-69
7- 3-69
3-11-70
l
l
]\ Unions J Mediation J 3-19-69
3-10-69
Negotiation
3-11-69
Negotiation
J Union
4-21-69
Mediation
3- 7-69
2-12-69
17 1A , IBBISB, IBBDF, SMWIA, IBEW M
M
, MP, NMEB, HREU, BRC(A), IBFO,
BRSC, BM E, ORT, BRS, ILA
W
.
18 On national basis.
13 1A , IBBIS, SM IA, IBEW BRC(A), IBFO, BRSC, BM , ORT, BRS, NM
M
W
,
W
EB,
ILA
.
20 Did not appear to have bargained.
21 Impasse reached almost immediately.
22 New York Central; New Haven and Hartford; Brooklyn East District
Terminal; Jay Street Connecting Railroad; New York Dock Railway; Bush
Terminal; Baltimore and Ohio; Pennsylvania; Erie; Reading; Delaware,
Lackawanna and Western; Central Railroad of New Jersey.
23 Six shopcraft (1A , BB, SW IA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO) plus BRSC, BM E,
M
M
W
ORT, BRS, and HREU.
24 1A , BB, SM IA.
M
W
25 Baltimore and Ohio; Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal; Bush Termi
nal; Central Railroad of New Jersey; Erie-Lackawanna; Lehigh Valley; New
y
7-16-67
to
7-17-67
York Central; New York Dock Railway; New York, New Haven and Hart
ford; Pennsylvania; and Reading.
28 MMP, NMEB, SIU.
27 Six shopcraft.
28 See footnote 7.
23 Six shopcraft, BRSC, BM E, ORT, BRS, HREU.
W
33 BRS, BM E, ORT, HREU, BRS (except wages).
W
31 The carrier in the first case, and the union in the second.
3 Only case A-8478 Sub. 1 used.
2
NOTE: FEC and union representatives terminated the dispute precipi
tating Emergency Board No. 157 on Dec. 19, 1971, under a plan pre
liminarily approved by a Federal judge.
SOURCES: National Mediation Board case files, National Mediation Board
Annual Reports, Presidential emergency board reports, and Bureau of
Labor Statistics data.
57
Table A -6 . Railroad w ork stoppages, by duration and size of unit and group of workers, calendar years 1 9 5 0 -6 9
W orkers and m an-days in thousands
Size of unit and group of workers
Number
of work
stoppages
Year
1950-691
1950 _________ ___
1951 _____________
1952 ____________
1953 _____________
1954 _____________
1955 _____________
1956 _____________
1957 _____________
1958 ____________
1959 _____ . ____
1960 - ________
1961__________
1962 ______ _____
1963 _____________
1964 _____________
1965 ____________ H
1966 ____________ ^
1967 ____________ -j
1968 ____________ u
1969 _____________
Number
of workers
involved
316
17
17
15
23
10
20
14
15
11
10
16
9
4
8
27
19
23
28
19
11
1,429.8
260.9
75.9
48.5
15.6
3.9
40.2
7.2
16.6
3.3
7.8
100.9
24.3
15.7
3.0
46.0
46.8
130.0
481.1
63.9
38.3
Under 100 workers
Man-days
idle
Operating
employees
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1950-69 1 . . .
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
.......................
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
Operating
employees
8,418.6
1,450.3
466.7
265.1
197.8
37.0
1,059.2
47.2
494.1
3.6
69.4
759.4
169.0
391.3
481.7
604.4
428.2
371.5
686.7
318.7
117.4
500 and under 1,000 workers
Nonoper
ating
employees
Both
23
3
1
—
1
—
2
—
2
1
2
1
—
—
—
3
1
2
—
2
2
15
—
1
—
1
3
1
1
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
4
1
1
6
1
—
—
1
—
1
1
—
—
1
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
50
2
5
2
3
3
4
1
2
1
1
1
3
1
2
5
5
4
2
2
1
26
1
1
2
2
1
1
_
1
1
2
1
—
1
4
—
1
5
2
100 and under 500 workers
Both
Operating
employees
3
—
2
_
__
_
—
Nonoper
ating
employees
Both
35
1
2
1
2
5
—
—
2
67
4
1
3
6
2
3
4
6
5
2
2
2
1
1
7
2
7
3
4
2
—
__
—
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
__
—
1,000 and under 10,000 workers
1
4
2
1
3
1
—
3
—
3
3
6
2
10,000 workers and over
Operating
employees
Nonoper
ating
employees
Both
Operating
employees
Nonoper
ating
employees
Both
40
2
2
2
3
1
4
1
—
1
1
5
—
—
—
3
7
3
3
1
1
25
1
—
1
4
—
1
1
2
—
1
1
—
—
1
1
—
2
4
3
2
4
—
1
1
—
—
1
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
12
2
1
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
—
2
—
1
—
2
2
5
—
—
__
—
—
1
_
—
—
—
1
1
—
—
—
1
—
1
—
—
_
—
—
_
_
—
—
_
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
_
_
—
—
1 Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals.
2 Figures are simple averages; each stoppage is given equal weight
regardless of size.
3 Includes one 392-day stoppage.
58
Nonoper
ating
employees
4 Includes one 999-day stoppage.
NOTE: Dashes denote zeros,
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
__
_
1
_
1
_
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
_
—
Mean23
duration
(in calendar
days)
13.0
4.8
11.2
23.0
13.4
6.5
10.8
11.4
12.1
1.5
14.5
9.3
848.7
11.0
4 128.1
5.0
1.9
5.1
8.6
8.1
5.5
Table A -7 . M ajo r issues involved in railroad w ork stoppages, calendar years 1 9 5 0 -6 9
[Workers and man-days of idleness in thousands]
General wage changes
Year
Num Num
ber of ber of
stop workers
pages involved
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1950-691 _____ 70
8
______________
______________
9
5
______________
5
_____________
______________
7
______________
3
______________
5
______________
______________
1
______________
______________
5
3
______________
_ ________
______________
1
_____________
4
4
. . . __________
______________
1
5
______________
1
______________
______________
3
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1950-69 1
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
___________
Mandays
idle
Supplementary benefits
Num Num
ber of ber of
stop workers
pages involved
778.0
83.2
72.4
42.5
3.2
4,572.1
672.3
445.6
208.1
96.2
2.6
1.1
13.5
15.6
22.5
490.6
0.6
11.7
23.5
47.6
193.2
237.6
2.0
23.7
32.0
1,371.9
57.1
33.7
—
659.4
1.2
19.5
_
—
«
461.1
1.2
3.7
C
O
4
1
—
_
_
_
1
_
__
_
—
_
—
2
—
_
Jnion organization and security
4
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
—
2.9
0.3
—
1.4
—
—
—
—
—
1.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.2
—
50.7
0.3
—
48.8
—
—
—
—
—
1.0
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
0.6
—
27.6
0.7
—
_
_
_
23.9
Mandays
idle
1,008.3
2.8
_
1,002.5
_
__
_
_
_
_
—
—
3.0
—
—
—
3.0
—
_
_
_
—
27.6
co
1.0
0.4
4.7
1.5
3.2
3.5
0.1
0.8
6.0
188.8
C
O
7.3
2.9
77.0
31.6
11.6
12.0
0.2
0.1
0.8
35.5
—
1
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
—
0.2
—
4.1
0.9
1.2
—
3.2
—
4.1
0.9
1.7
—
2
1
4
_
—
Plant administration
116
2
4
3
9
2
5
5
6
1
4
4
4
2
4
8
9
11
16
11
6
153.2
0.4
2.4
2.3
7.1
1.1
8.5
1.0
1.7
0.2
2.4
10.6
0.6
0.4
0.6
3.6
11.3
4.1
13.3
47.6
33.8
Num Num
Man- ber of ber of Mandays stop workers days
idle pages involved idle
37
1
4
3
7
2
4
3
1
1
1
2
—
1 Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals.
2 Less than 50.
Wage adjustments | Other contractual matters 1
Num Num
ber of ber of
stop workers
pages involved
C
O
1
0.8
— —
— —
___ _
_
_
_
__
_
_
_
0.8
—
—
_
_
_
_ _
_ _
_ __
_ _
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
__
_
—
—
—
—
_
1
—
—
—
—
_
0.8
—
—
—
—
—
0.8
Interunion or intraunion matters
546.8
0.5
14.4
4.2
18.0
2.4
27.5
10.6
2.1
0.2
6.6
23.4
1.3
0.4
1.8
9.6
11.8
12.6
17.9
288.6
93.0
14
—
—
2
—
1
—
—
—
7.4
—
—
1.8
—
0.6
—
—
—
12.5
—
—
2.0
—
1.9
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
1
—
1
—
3
—
3
2
—
—
0.6
(2)
—
0.1
—
0.7
—
1.9
1.7
—
—
1.1
C
O
—
0.2
—
0.7
—
3.4
3.0
—
—
Job security
Num Num
ber of ber of
stop workers
pages involved
65
4
—
1
2
5
3
2
3
8
3
4
2
1
3
11
3
5
3
1
1
430.7
176.6
—
0.1
0.6
0.7
2.0
1.5
1.4
2.0
3.4
72.6
0.1
15.3
0.4
17.8
0.5
119.0
3.6
13.0
0.6
Mandays
idle
2,035.7
774.3
—
0.3
4.9
1.1
2.0
1.7
1.4
2.2
16.0
504.6
0.1
320.7
0.4
19.8
1.1
349.9
4.7
26.0
4.6
Other working conditions
4
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
1
1
—
1
1.4
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
C
O
0.7
0.4
—
0.2
2.5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
C
O
1.5
0.8
—
0.2
NOTE: Dashes denotes zeros.
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
59
Table A-8. Railroad work stoppages, by duration and major group of workers, selected periods, calendar years
1950-69
All
s to p p a g e s
P e rio d a n d m a jo r g ro u p
o f w o rk e rs
N um ber
D u ra tio n o f s to p p a g e s
1
day
2 to 3
days
4 to 6
days
7 to 14
days
15 to 2 9
days
3 0 to 5 9
days
6 0 to 8 9
days
90 days
A v e ra g e
a n d o v e r p e r s to p p a g e
N u m b e r o f S to p p a g e s
1 9 5 0 -5 4
82
50
24
8
17
12
5
19
11
6
2
15
10
3
2
14
9
3
2
9
5
3
1
4
2
2
1
1
70
43
20
7
24
19
5
22
14
5
3
7
4
3
5
2
2
1
4
1
3
6
3
1
2
1
64
40
21
3
33
18
14
1
11
9
2
1
9
6
2
1
3
2
1
10 0
59
41
All s to p p a g e s . --------------------- -------O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . _ _____
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . -------B o t h _____________________________
54
35
19
24
12
12
11
6
5
5
2
2
5
316
19 2
10 6
18
128
84
43
1
76
46
25
5
34
20
12
2
33
17
12
4
3
* 2 1 .1
2
1
1 9 5 5 -5 9
All s t o p p a g e s ---------- -------------------_ _
_
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _ . .
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _____
B o t h '____
1
U 0 .3
1
1
1 9 6 0 -9 4
All s to p p a g e s ----------------------..
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
...
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _____ .
B o t h _____________________________
1
5
4
0
1
2
1
1
* 2 8 .0
2
2
2
2
* 6 .1
4
3
1
8
3
3
2
USX)
U O .O
1 1 6 .6
1 2 3 .3
1 9 6 5 -6 9
All s to p p a g e s ___________ - O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s B o t h '_____ _______________________
1 9 5 0 -6 9
All s to p p a g e s - . ________
O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ___________
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s .
.
.
B o t h _____________________________
18
10
7
1
15
9
3
3
W o rk e rs in v o lv e d [in th o u s a n d s ]
1 9 5 0 -5 4
All w o r k e r s ________________
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ____
B o t h _____________
__________
5 .5
3 .9
1 .5
1 9 .4
15 .1
4 .0
.3
5 3 .9
5 2 .5
.7
.7
3 0 7 .9
3 0 6 .5
.7
.7
1 0 .5
1 .9
7 .2
1 .4
3 .5
2 .9
.6
.
4 0 4 .8
3 8 2 .9
1 7 .4
4 .5
All w o rk e rs _____ ___________
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . ________
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . .
.
B oth .................. ..
....
_____
7 5 .0
2 5 .1
4 5 .7
4 .3
10.1
7 .6
2 .5
6 .7
4 .6
1 .2
.9
1 0 .3
6 .4
3 .9
1 3 .2
5 .5
6 .6
1 .0
.9
.3
.6
2 6 .2
.6
2 3 .9
1 .7
1 8 9 .9
7 8 .1
1 1 0 .9
.8
2 4 .9
2 1 .0
3 .3
.6
2 3 .8
2 3 .1
.8
9 .8
1 0 3 .4
8 .4
9 5 .0
6 .3
6 .2
.1
7 6 0 .1
2 4 0 .6
5 1 9 .4
3 9 .6
4 9 .5
4 0 .0
4 3 4 .5
1 6 .0
4 6 8 .4
1 7 5 .3
1 7 2 .9
2 .6
8 .4
1 ,4 2 9 .8
7 2 6 .7
6 9 3 .5
9 .6
1 3 0 .0
8 2 .1
4 7 .4
.6
5 3 4 .4
5 8 .7
4 7 4 .4
1 .2
2 4 9 .5
2 3 1 .9
1 6 .9
.8
4 3 2 .9
3 2 0 .4
1 1 0 .7
1 .8
4 .1
(*)
(■>
8 4 .9
2 .7
1 .4
1 9 5 5 -5 9
7 .2
.6
8 1.1
7 .2
.6
1 9 6 0 -6 4
All w o r k e r s _____ ..
. ...
O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _________ .
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
... .
B o t h _____________________________
9 .8
2 .4
.4
2 .0
8 3 .0
.2
.2
1 .3
1 .3
8 7 .6
4 9 .0
2 2 .6
2 4 .5
1 .9
7 .4
.3
7 .2
8 .3
1 .6
4 .7
2 .0
8 4 .5
8 3 .8
8 6 .5
8 .5
9 3 .9
7 1 .8
2 2 .1
2 .4
2 .4
2 0 0 .9
4 2 9 .5
1 9 .3
1 9 .1
.2
(?)
1 9 6 5 -6 9
All w o r k e r s ................ .....
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . ____
.
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
...........
B o t h _____________________________
8 .4
.7
.7
1 9 5 0 -6 9
All w o rk e rs . . _______________________
O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ____________
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ................
B o t h _____________________________
1 8 .3
9 .1
7 .9
1 .4
M an -d ay s o f i d le n e s s [in th o u s a n d s ]
1 9 5 0 -5 4
All m a n - d a y s ____ __
.
_______ __
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . .
. .
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ________
B o t h _____________________________
60
2 ,4 1 6 .9
2 ,0 5 7 .9
2 8 9 .7
6 9 .3
5 .5
3 .9
1 .5
4 2 .7
3 4 .5
7 .6
.6
1 6 8 .6
1 6 3 .7
2 .0
2 .9
1 ,7 5 2 .1
1 ,7 4 2 .5
2 .8
6 .7
1 5 1 .0
3 9 .1
1 0 1 .5
1 0 .4
1 5 2 .2
4 8 .8
Table A-8. Railroad work stoppages by duration and major group of workers, selected periods, calendar years 195069— Continued
D u ra tio n o f s to p p a g e s
All
s to p p a g e s
P e rio d a n d m a jo r g ro u p
o f w o rk e rs
1
day
2 to 3
days
4 to 6
days
7 to 14
days
15 to 29
N um ber ays
d
3 0 to 5 9
days
6 0 to 8 9
days
90 days
A v erag e
a n d o v e r p e r s to p p a g e
M an -d ay s o f id le n e s s [in th o u s a n d s ] — C o n tin u e d
1 9 5 5 -5 9
8 1 ,6 7 3 .5
7 9 .9
1 ,4 9 8 .6
' 9 7 .6
1 0 .1
7 .6
2 .5
6 2 ,4 0 5 .6
7 4 6 .0
2 ,0 2 9 .2
6 .4
6 7 .8
1 8 .3
3 9 .2
1 0 .3
1 3 .2
4 .4
8 .8
6 8 9 .6
4 8 .8
6 4 0 .5
.3
1 3 6 .4
1 3 5 .2
1 .2
11 .9
8 .4
2 .2
1 .2
4 0 .1
2 3 .2
1 7 .0
2 4 .9
2 1 .0
3 .3
.6
4 8 .5
4 6 .4
2 .1
1 0 .2
7 1 ,9 2 2 .5
7 8 6 .0
7 5 8 .0
8 9 .6
4 9 .5
4 0 .0
6 9 2 .0
3 1 .7
6 6 0 .3
5 9 6 .8
5 9 2 .1
4 .7
5 2 .9
8 .4 1 8 .6
3 ,6 6 9 .8
4 ,5 7 5 .5
1 7 3 .3
All m an -d a y s - - - - - ________
_
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ________
B o th ’ _____ r ____ _________________
1 3 0 .0
8 2 .1
4 7 .4
.6
7 9 5 .1
1 2 1 .1
6 7 2 .2
1 .8
8 1 5 .6
7 7 8 .9
3 3 .8
2 .9
2 ,5 6 2 .4
1 ,8 0 9 .6
7 3 5 .5
1 7 .3
1 ,0 5 9 .1
1 8 .1
1 ,0 0 2 .5
3 8 .5
4 2 6 .3
4 7 .6
4 2 3 .9
4 2 6 .3
4 7 .6
1 9 6 0 -6 4
All m an -d a y s
_________________ . O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . .
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s -. .
B o t h __________ __________________
1 0 .2
1 ,4 6 7 .5
9 5 .5
1 ,3 7 1 .9
4 3 7 .6
1 0 .0
1 0 .0
9 1 .4
9 1 .4
4 1 9 .2
4 3 8 .6
1 2 .4
4 2 6 .3
1 ,8 0 7 .3
1 8 6 .9
1 ,5 2 4 .1
9 6 .3
4 2 6 l6
4 19.1
4 4 3 .2
4 9 .6
4 0 4 .6
3 9 9 .1
5 .5
1 9 6 5 -6 9
All m an -d a y s ______
_____ . .
.
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s - ______ _
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . . .
B o t h _____________________________
1 1 .3
1 1 .3
5 2 .9
1 9 5 0 -6 9
All m a n - d a y s ____ __
_____ . . .
O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s -----------------N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ________
B o t h ________________________ 1 —
1 A verage
2 L e ss
d u ra tio n
th a n
3 A verage
4 A verage
p e rio d .
o f th e
s to p p a g e s
in t h e
p e rio d .
num ber
of
per
m an -d a y s
6
E x c lu d es a c a rry -o v e r
e m p lo y e e s ' w o rk s to p p a g e s .
of
s to p p a g e
of
2 ,5 8 0
in
i d le n e s s
m an -d a y s,
th e
per
a ll
1 ,5 5 7 .6
4 8 9 .0
1 ,0 2 4 .6
4 4 .0
6 I n c lu d e s a c a rry -o v e r o f 2 ,5 8 0 m an -d a y s fro m t h e 1 9 5 5 - 5 9 p e rio d
a n d e x c lu d e s a c a rry -o v e r o f 3 7 8 ,5 6 2 m a n -d a y s in t h e 1 9 6 5 - 6 9 p e rio d .
1 00.
n u m b e r o f w o rk e rs
3 1 1 .9
1 8 9 .9
1 1 1 .6
1 0 .4
p e rio d .
s to p p a g e
due
to
in
th e
o p e ra tin g
of
by
7 In c lu d e s a c a rry -o v e r o f 3 7 8 ,5 6 2 m an -d a y s fro m t h e 1 9 6 0 - 6 4 p e rio d
w h ic h 8 ,0 0 0 w e re lo s t b y o p e r a tin g c r a f t s ’ u n io n s a n d 3 7 0 ,5 6 2
n o n o p e ra tin g c r a f ts .
NOTES: B e c a u s e o f ro u n d in g , s u m s o f in d iv id u a l ite m s m ay n o t e q u a l
t o ta l s . D a sh e s d e n o te z e ro s .
SOURCE: B u re a u o f L ab o r S t a ti s t i c s .
61
Table A-9. Railroad work stoppages,1 by major issue and group of workers, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69
(Workers and man-days idle in thousands)
1 9 5 0 -5 4
S to p p a g e s
iss u e s
W o rk e rs
in v o lv ed
N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t
E co n o m ic is s u e s
W a g es ___________________________
_____ —
-O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _ . -------------- - - -------------N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
- ______________ ____
B o t h _______________________________________________
S u p p le m e n ta ry b e n e f its __ - - - _______ ______ - O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _ -------- ---------------- - - - - N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s -------- --------- ---------------B o t h _______________________________________________
W age a d j u s t m e n t s -----------_____ _ ___________
O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _______
____ _ _ ________
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . .
... _____
...
_____
B o t h . . . . _____ __________
3 2 .9
45
T o ta l e c o n o m ic is s u e s . . .
27
14
10
3
1
—
—
1
17
13
3
1
__
2 0 1 .3
1 9 0 .0
1 0 .6
0 .8
0 .7
—
—
0 .7
7 .7
5 .7
1 .9
.2
4 9 .7
5 4 .9
2 0 9 .7
5 1 .8
__
_
—
—
—
1.7
0 .3
__
1 .2
2 0 .7
1 9 5 5 -5 9
M an -d ay s
idile
0 .2
1 .9
N um ber
S to p p a g e s
W o rk e rs
in volved
M an -d ay s
id le
P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r
1 ,4 2 2 .2
1 ,1 3 9 .4
2 7 6 .1
6 .8
2 .8
—
—
2 .8
1 1 8 .8
1 1 3 .4
5 .1
.3
5 8 .8
16
8
3
5
1
—
1
2 3 .2
4 .9
10
5
5
—
1 4 .5
1 ,5 4 3 .8
6 3 .9
27
3 9 .1
_
—
—
—
4 9 .1
0 .3
_
.__
__
—
—
—
1
1
__
0 .1
1 .4
1 7 .7
2 .0
1 1 .8
3 .9
2 3 .9
—
2 3 .9
—
7 .6
6 .0
1 .6
2 3 .7
5 7 6 .2
2 0 .6
4 5 8 .7
9 7 .0
1 ,0 0 2 .5
—
1 ,0 0 2 .5
.—
2 4 .7
1 9 .2
5 .5
—
3 4 .4
6 5 .7
1 ,6 0 3 .5
9 5 .7
__
__
—
—
.—
1.0
1 .0
I
M
__
3 1 .9
1 0 .1
—
4 9 .2
P ercen t
5 9 .8
1 .5
S e c u rity i s s u e s
O th e r c o n tr a c tu a l m a t t e r s --------------------------------O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ________ _ _____________ - . .
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ------------------------ ---------B o t h _______________________________________________
Union o rg a n iz a tio n a n d s e c u r ity _______ _____________
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s - - - _. ------------------ ---------N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s
._ _
_ _ _ _ _ _ _
B o t h _____________________________________ _______ _
Jo b s e c u r ity
__________ _______ __
__________________
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s — ____
____
______
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _
__________ ____
B o t h _______________________________________________
P la n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ________ ____________ ____________
O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ____ _____ - _ _ ____________
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s __________________ ______
B o t h _______________________________________________
O th e r w o rk in g c o n d i t i o n s ____ _____________ _______ _
O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _____________________ . _ _ _ _
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ------------------------ ---------B o t h _______________________________________________
I n tra u n io n o r in te r u n io n m a t t e r s ________ __________
O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ___ ________ __ __________
N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ___ __________________ i
B o t h _______________________________________________
T otal s e c u r ity is s u e s ___
________________
_
—
— #
—
2
1
__
1
12
9
2
1
20
12
7
1
—
—
2 .4
1 4 .6
2 4 .4
—
1 .4
1 7 7 .7
1 7 6 .9
0 .7
0 .1
1 3 .2
8 .2
3 .6
1 .4
—
—
—
4 3 .9
3 .3
__
—
3
1
2
3 .7
37
4 5 .1
2 .4
1 .8
0 .6
0 .6
1 9 5 .1
4 8 .2
1 E x c lu d es o n e 2 -day s to p p a g e in 195 6 fo r w h ich no m ajo r is s u e w a s
r e p o r te d a n d w h ich in v o lv ed 18 6 w o rk e rs a n d 3 7 2 m an -d a y s o f i d le n e s s .
62
0 .4
4 8 .8
7 8 0 .6
7 7 9 .4
0 .9
0 .3
3 9 .6
2 3 .5
5 .7
1 0 .4
__
—
—
2 .0
3 2 .3
1.6
__
—
19
11
7
1
21
17
4
__
__
—
1 .4
0 .2
8 7 3 .2
3 6 .1
1
1
3 0 .4
__
42
1 0 .2
4 .1
6 .0
0 .2
1 3 .9
1 1 .4
2 .5
__
__
—
6 0 .9
0 .6
0 .6
—
2 5 .7
0 .1
—
1 3 .6
1 8 .6
__
—
1 .4
—
2 L e ss t h a n .0 5 p e rc e n t,
1 .4
—
2 7 .5
—
3 .9
2 .0
1 .9
__
—
—
—
1.0
1 .0
2 3 .2
4 .1
1 8 .9
0 .3
4 6 .9
3 4 .0
1 2 .9
__
__
_
1 .4
2 .8
__
—
0 .7
1 .1
1 .1
0 .1
—
3 4 .3
7 2 .3
4 .3
1 9 6 5 -6 9
1 9 6 0 -6 4
S to p p a g e s
M an-days
id le
W o rk e rs
involved
N um bei P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t
13
9
1
—
—
—
—
3
3
—
2 0 .3
—
4 .7
—
16
0 .2
—
—
—
—
6 .1
6 .1
—
3 2 .1
—
3 .2
2 5 .0
__
6 7 .1
3 5 .3
_
5 .5
—
—
—
—
3 8 .7
3 8 .7
—
6 6 .9
—
1.4
1 ,8 9 8 .5
_
—
_
1 0 6 .2
18.1
8 8 .0
5 5 .9
8 4 5 .5
2 0 .1
8 2 5 .4
3 0 .4
22
14
8
3 4 .4
15.9
4 .6
1 1.2
8 .4
3 6 .5
2 2 .5
14 .0
1.3
—
__
5
—
7 .8
3
2
48
0 .8
—
—
1 2 2 .8
—
0 .4
1.0
00
0 .2
0 .8
6 4 .7
8 8 3 .0
3 1 .7
NOTE: B e c a u s e o f ro u n d in g , s u m s o f in d iv id u a l
t o ta l s .
0 .4
0 .8
7 1 3 .9
4 8 .5
3 6 6 5 .3
—
3 .0
3 .0
—
—
6 .6
4 .3
2 .3
—
4 6 .2
4 6 .9
2 6 .8
0 .2
0 .4
70
38
23
9
4
2
1
1
37
24
12
1
2 2 .2
7 7 8 .0
2 6 0 .7
51
1 ,5 1 0 .32 .4
4 .9
2 7 .6
1 .3
3 .0
2 3 .9
0 .7
1 1 .7
2 7 .6
2 2 .0
5 .4
0 .2
5 4 .4
111
3 5 .2
8 3 3 .2
N um ber
P e rce n t
4 ,5 7 2 .1
1 ,5 5 2 .5
2 ,9 1 0 .4
1 0 9 .3
1 ,0 0 8 .3
3 .0
1 ,0 0 2 .5
2 .8
1 8 8 .8
1 7 5 .6
1 2 .9
0 .3
5 4 .3
5 8 .3
5 ,7 6 9 .3
6 8 .5
1 .9
1 .9
1 2 .0
2 .2
2 3 .0
5 0 7 .2
6 6 .7
7 2 3 .5
1 .0
0 .8
0 .8
0 .1
0 .8
0 .8
(2)
1
1
0 .3
0 .8
0 .8
0 .1
0 .8
0 .8
00
1
1
1.0
0 .2
0 .2
«>
*
0 .6
0 .6
(2
)
4
3
1 .3
2 .9
1 .5
0 .2
5 0 .7
1 .9
0 .6
13
7
6
1 3 .0
1 3 6 .7
1 3 4 .3
2 .4
1 8 .0
3 8 6 .3
3 7 8 .2
8 .1
2 5 .0
53
34
19
5 3 .0
1 1 0 .2
9 0 .6
1 9 .6
1 4 .5
4 2 3 .9
3 7 6 .7
4 7 .2
2 7 .5
4
4 .0
1 .4
1 .4
0 .2
2 .5
2 .5
0 .2
4
4
1 .3
5 .0
3 .6
0 .4
3 .2
0 .5
6 .4
0 .4
6 .0
0 .4
14
3
9
2
4.4
204
6 4 .8
_
—
5
—
—
1
4
—
77
_
—
4
__
0 .2
0 .6
7 5 .0
—
—
6 5 .5
N u m b e r P e r c e n t N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t
M an-days
id le
23
—
—
—
—
—
7 .0
_
3 2 .8
—
—
2 .0
4 9 8 .1
3 4 .8
4 6 3 .2
—
3 .0
3 .0
—
—
6 .2
4 .2
2 .0
—
S to p p a g e s
W o rk e rs
in v o lv ed
1
1
6 8 .3
—
_
—
1 4 .0
—
21
13
8
—
14
7
7
—
2
2
—
—
7
3
4
—
z
—
—
_
—
1 ,8 5 9 .8
3 4 4 .0
M an-days
id le
P e r c e n t N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t
—
—
—
—
6 0 .9
3 3 .9
N u m b er
S to p p a g e s
1 9 5 0 -6 9 1
W o rk e rs
in v o lv ed
—
—
7 7 .0
2 5 2 .9
ite m s m ay n o t e q u a l
—
3 3 .3
8 2 0 .5
5 3 .1
1
65
40
23
2
11 6
77
38
1
2 0 .6
3 6 .8
1 .4
4 3 0 .7
3 3 3 .4
9 7 .0
0 .3
1 5 3 .2
1 1 4 .8
3 7 .0
1 .4
1 .4
1 .4
7 .4
2 .7
3 0 .1
1 0 .7
0.1
2 4 .2
6 .5
00
0 .5
1 2 .5
3 .5
8 .1
0 .8
0.1
4 1 .7
2 ,6 4 8 .9
3 1 .5
4.0
0 .6
5 9 6 .5
4 8 .8
2 ,0 3 5 .7
1 ,1 8 1 .8
8 5 3 .3
0 .6
5 4 6 .9
4 5 6 .7
7 9 .8
1 0 .4
2 .5
2 .5
SOURCE: B u re a u o f L ab o r S t a ti s t i c s ,
63
Table A-10. Duration of railroad work stoppages, by major issue, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69
“
”
'— —
~
—
'
D u ra tio n
in p e rio d
(in c a le n d a r
d a y s)
1 9 5 0 -5 4
M ajo r is s u e
N um ber
of
s to p p a g e s
________________________
82
W a g es
27
S u p p le
m e n ta ry
W age
a d ju s tm e n ts b e n e f its
U nion
O th e r
o rg a n iz a tio n
w o rk in g
and
Job
P la n t
con
s e c u r ity
s e c u r ity a d m in is tr a tio n d itio n s
O th e r
c o n tr a c tu a l
m a tte rs
I n tra u n io n
or
in te r u n io n
m a tte rs
17
1
2
12
20
—
—
3
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
4
3
2
1
2
—
—
—
7
7
3
2
1
—
—
—
__
—
—
—
—
—
—
__
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
17
19
15
14
9
4
1
3
3
5
4
8
3
2
—
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
1
—
__
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
-
*70
16
10
1
1
19
21
—
—
1
1 d a y __________ - ................
2 to 3 _________________________ - . . . .
________
4 to 6 ______________________
7 to 1 4 _____________________________
15 to 2 9 _______________________ ..
3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________
6 0 to 8 9 ________________________ _______
9 0 & o v e r __________________ _________
24
*22
7
5
4
6
1
1
2
4
—
2
1
5
1
1
1
4
4
—
1
—
—
11
7
1
—
—
—
—
__
__
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
__
__
—
—
—
—
9
5
2
3
2
—
—
—
__
—
—
—
—
1
—
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
64
13
3
—
—
21
22
—
—
5
33
11
1
9
3
5
2
3
—
2
1
3
__
__
—
—
—
—
__
—
—
—
—
__
—
—
—
—
4
—
__
1
__
—
11
6
1
2
1
1
__
—
—
—
—
—
16
1
—
3
—
1
—
—
—
2
2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
________________
100
14
7
2
1
13
53
4
1
5
1 d a y ---------------------- ---------- -------------2 to 3 __________________________________
4 to 6 __________________________________
7 to 14 ________________________________
15 t o 2 9 ________________________________
3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________
6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________
9 0 & o v e r _____________________________
54
24
11
5
2
6
3
2
2
—
4
2
1
—
2
—
—
—
1
—
—
1
__
__
__
3
2
__
__
—
—
30
11
5
2
2
2
1
1
__
—
6
4
2
1
—
—
—
—
2
2
__
__
__
_
__
__
__
__
1
—
—
—
—
2
1
—
—
—
*316
70
37
4
4
65
116
4
1
14
128
*76
34
33
18
15
13
15
6
14
5
10
1
6
7
10
8
2
1
—
37
15
5
5
57
29
11
—
—
—
1
__
2
2
1
1
—
__
__
__
1
__
—
—
__
__ ,
__
7
4
1
2
—
1
—
—
1
—
1
__
__
__
—
—
1
—
1
—
—
—
1 d a y ___________ - - -------------------------2 to 3 __________________________________
4 to 6 __________________________________
7 to 14 ________________________________
15 to 2 9 ________________________________
3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________
6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________
9 0 & o v e r _______________ ____________
1 9 5 5 -5 9
1 9 6 0 -6 4
.
_________ ____________
1 d a y -------------------- ----------- --------------------2 to 3 __________________________________
4 to 6 __________________________________
7 to 14 ________________________________
15 to 2 9 ________________________________
3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________
6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________
9 0 & o v e r --------------------------------------1 9 6 5 -6 9
1 9 5 0 -6 9
_
________________________
1 d a y _____________ ___________________
2 to 3 __________________________________
4 to 6 __________________________________
7 to 14 ________________________________
15 to 2 9 ________________________________
3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________
6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________
90 & over _.
_ _ ______
_______
_
1 I n c lu d e s o n e c a s e f o r w h ic h
NOTE: D a s h e s d e n o te s z e ro s .
64
4
8
no m a jo r is s u e
w a s k now n.
1
.—
1
1
—
4
5
2
—
2
9
6
1
SOURCE: B u re a u o f L ab o r S t a ti s t i c s .
1
2
—
—
—
—
2
Appendix B
Selected Bibliography
Aaron, Benjamin. “Emergency Dispute Settlement,” L abor L aw D evelopm ents, 1967.
“National Emergency Disputes: Is There A Final Solution,” W isconsin L aw R e
view, No. 1, 1970.
“Observation on the United States Experience,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 14, No. 8,
August 1963.
American B ar Association. Final R ep o rt of the A d H oc C om m ittee to Study N ational
E m ergency D isputes, 1966.
Association of American Railroads. Y earbook of R ailroad Facts, 1950-66, Washington,
D.C.
Blackman, John. Presidential Seizures in L a b or Disputes, Cambridge, Mass., H arvard Press,
1969.
Burgoon, Beatrice M. “Effects of the Structure of Collective Bargaining in Selected Indus
tries: The Railway Industry,” L a b o r L aw Journal, Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1970.
Cole, David. “U.S. Intervention Kills Collective Bargaining,” N ations Business, M arch
1962.
Cullen, Donald. N ational Em ergency Strikes, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, 1968.
Curtin, William. “National Emergency Disputes Legislation: Its Needs and Its Prospects in
the Transportation Industry,” G eorgetown L aw Journal, Vol. 55, April 1967.
Derber, Milton. C ollective Bargaining in the Quasi-Public Sector, Institute of L abor and
Industrial Relations, University of Illinois, 1970.
Ernest, Dale and R obert Raimon. “M anagement, Unionism and Public Policy on the Rail
roads and the Airlines,” Industrial and L a bor Relations R eview , Vol. 11, No. 4, July
1958.
Federal Legislation to E n d Strikes: A D ocum entary H istory, Vols. 1-2, Washington, D.C.,
Government Printing Office, M ay 1967.
Friedlaender, A nn F. The D ilem m a o f Freight Transport Regulation, Washington, D.C.,
Brookings Institution, 1969.
Fulton, Joseph F. The R ailw ay Firemen M anning Dispute: H istory and Issues, 1 9 5 9 -7 0 ,
Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, Washington, D.C., Government Print
ing Office, 1971.
H arber, William and M ark L. Kahn. “M aintenance of W ay Employment,” M onthly Labor
R eview , Vol. 80, No. 10, October 1957 and Vol. 80, No. 11, November 1957.
Hardm an, J. C. “Cooperation in Collective Bargaining: The Airlines and Railroads Try
65
Novel Approaches,” Q uarterly R eview of E conom ics and Business, Vol. 2, No. 1, Feb
ruary 1962.
Herlong, A. Sidney. “Transportation Strikes: A Proposal F or Corrective Legislation,”
Fordham L aw R eview , Vol. 36, Decem ber 1967.
Horowitz, M orris A. “Labor’s Role in the Declining R ailroad Industry,” L abor L aw Jour
nal, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1958.
Kaufman, Jacob J. “Emergency Boards U nder the Railway Labor Act,” L abor L aw Jour
nal, Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1958.
“Logic and Meaning of W ork Rules on the Railroads,” Industrial R elations R e
search A ssociation Proceedings, Vol. 14, December 1961.
“The R ailroad L abor Dispute: A M arathon of M aneuver and Improvisation,” In
dustrial an d L a b o r R elations R eview , Vol. 18, January 1965.
Krislov, Joseph. “Representation Disputes in the R ailroad and Airline Industries,” Labor
L aw Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1956.
Lecht, Leonard A. Experience U nder R ailw ay L abor Legislation, New York, N .Y ., Co
lumbia University Press, 1955.
Levine, M arvin J. “The R ailroad Crew Size Controversy Revisited,” L abor L aw Journal,
Vol. 20, No. 6, June 1969.
Levine, Morton. “Adjusting to Technology on the Railroads,” M onthly L abor R eview , Vol.
92, No. 11, November 1969.
Levinson, David. “The Locomotive Firem en’s Dispute,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 17, No.
11, November 1966.
“Railway Labor Act— A Record of A Decade,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1,
January 1952.
Leviton, T. S. and P. D. Bazazian. “Strikes-Toward A Total Answer,” Journal o f Urban
Law , Vol. 45, 1967.
Marsh, Michael. Strike C ontrol Proposals in L igh t of R ailroad Industry Experience, Wash
ington, D.C., R LEA , 1967.
M arshall, Anthony P. “New Perspectives on National Emergency Disputes,” L abor L aw
Journal, Vol. 18, No. 8, August 1967.
M urphy, Edward. “Injunctive Prevention of Strikes on Railroads and Airlines,” L abor Law
Journal, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1958.
Northrup, H. R. C om pulsory A rbitration an d G overnm ent Intervention in L abor Disputes,
Washington, D.C., L abor Policy Association, 1966.
Oliver, Eli L. “Labor Problems of the Transportation Industry,” L aw and Contem porary
Problem s, Vol. 25, No. 1, W inter 1960.
R eport o f the Presidential R ailroad Com mission, Washington, D.C., Government Printing
Office, February 1962.
Richardson, Reed. The L ocom otive Engineer, 1 8 6 3 -1 9 6 3 , A nn Arbor, Mich., Bureau of
Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1963.
Riche, M artha F. “R ailroad Unemployment Insurance,” M onthly L abor R eview , Vol. 90,
No. 11, November 1967.
Shils, Edward B. “Industrial Unrest in the N ation’s Rail Industry,” L a b o r L aw Journal, Vol.
15, No. 2, February 1964.
66
Sloane, Arthur. “National Emergency Strikes: The Danger of Extralegal Success,” Busi
ness H orizons, Summer 1967.
Stem, James. “Alternative Dispute Settlement Procedures,” Wisconsin L aw R eview , Vol.
41, Fall 1968.
Troy, Leo. “L abor Representation O n American Railways,” L abor H istory, Vol. 2, No. 3,
Fall 1961.
U.S. Congress, House. R ailw ay L abor D isputes, Hearings before the Committee on Inter
state and Foreign Commerce, U.S. H ouse of Representatives, 69th Congress, 1st Ses
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U.S. Congress, House. R ailroad W ork R u les D ispute, Hearings before the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session,
on H .J. Res. 565, 1963.
U.S. Congress, Senate. R ailw ay L abor A ct, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate
Commerce, U.S. Senate, 69th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 2306, 1926.
U.S. Congress, Senate. R ailroad W o r k R u les Dispute, Hearings before the Committee on
Commerce, Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, on S.J. Res. 102, 1963.
U.S. Congress, Senate. T o Prohibit Strikes an d to Provide for C om pulsory A rbitration in
the R ailroad Industry, Hearings before th e Subcommittee on Railway L abor Act.
Amendments of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Congress, 2nd Ses
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U.S. Departm ent of Labor
A nalysis o f W ork Stoppages, annual bulletins, 1950-69.
E m ploym ent an d Changing O ccupational Patterns in the R ailroad Industry, 1963.
H andbook o f L abor Statistics, 1970.
Index of O utput Per M an-H our, Selected Industries, 19 3 9 and 1 9 4 7 -6 9 , 1970.
P roductivity in the R ailroad Industry, 1970.
R ailroad Shopcraft Fact Finding Study, September 1968.
U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, E ighty-Third Annual R eport on Transport Statis
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Government Printing Office, 1970.
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U.S. National M ediation Board. Annual reports, 1950-70, Washington, D.C., Government
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U.S. National Mediation Board. D eterm ination of Craft or Class of the National M edia
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U.S. National M ediation Board. Presidential emergency board reports, (Nos. 76 -8 9 , 9 1 93, 9 5 -9 8 , 104-107, 109-119, 126-127, 129-134, 137-139, 141, 145, 147-148,
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Wisehart, A rthur M. “Transportation Strike Control Legislation: A Congressional Chal
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ft U G V R MN PR T 6 O F E 1972 0-469-548
.S. O E N E T IN IN F IC :
67
yesterday's facts
don't describe tom orrow 's jo b s . ..
In to d a y 's fa st m oving w orld, y e ste rd a y 's o c c u p a tio n a l inform ation is quickly
o u td a te d . T hat's w hy th e B ureau o f Labor Statistics re g u la rly revises th e O c c u p a
tio n a l O u tlo o k H a n d b o o k , th e s ta n d a rd re fe re n c e tool fo r g u id a n c e a n d v o ca
tio n al counselors, students, v eteran s, a n d o thers seeking au th o rita tiv e c a re e r in
fo rm ation.
The 1972-73 edition of th e H a n d b o o k reflects th e effects o f tech n o lo g ical
a n d econom ic c h a n g e s on th e job outlook fo r 8 0 0 m ajo r o ccu p atio n s a n d 3 0
m ajo r industries.
Each job discussion gives u p -to -d a te facts a b o u t th e n a tu re
o f th e w ork, ea rn in g s, cu rren t em ploym ent, fu tu re em p lo y m en t p ro sp ects, a n d
e d u c a tio n a l a n d train in g requirem ents.
The 1972-73 H a n d b o o k describes m ore th a n 2 0 occu p atio n s not co v ered in
e a rlie r editions. Included a r e m any new , fa st-g ro w in g sub p ro fessio n al jobs such
a s su rgical technician, o ptom etric assistant, social service a id e , a n d fo o d process
ing tech n ician . For th e person with less form al e d u c a tio n , th e new H a n d b o o k
re p o rts on op p o rtu n ities in trucking a n d in la u n d ry a n d d ry c le an in g firms a n d in
jobs such a s p a rk in g a tte n d a n t, g u a rd a n d w a tc h m a n , a n d stock clerk.
The p rice of th e 1972-73 H a n d b o o k , th e b ig g e st— over 8 5 0 p a g e s — a n d
m ost com prehensive in H a n d b o o k history, is $ 6 .2 5 . To o rd e r, use th e form below .
S en d it, with p ay m e n t by check o r m oney o rd e r m a d e p a y a b le to th e S u p erin
te n d e n t of D ocum ents to a n y R egional O ffice o f th e B ureau o f Labor Statistics:
1603 Federal Bldg.
1515 Broadway
1317 Filbert St.
1371 Peachtree St., N.E.
Boston, M 02203
ass.
New York, N . 10036
.Y
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
Atlanta, Ga. 30309
300 South Wacker Dr.
911 Walnut St.
1100 Commerce St. R . 687
m
450 Golden Gate Ave.
Chicago, III. 60606
Kansas City, M 64106
o.
Dallas, Tex. 75202
San Francisco, Calif. 94102
Order Form for 1972-73 Edition of Occupational Outlook Handbook
FO PRO PT SHIPM
R
M
ENT, PL A PRIN OR T P A D ESS ON L B L BELO INCLUDING Y U ZIP CODE
E SE
T
YE D R
AE
W
OR
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
B R A OF LA O STA
UE U
BR
TISTICS
W
ASHINGTON, D.C. 20212
OFFICIAL BU ESS
SIN
Penalty for private use, $300
POSTAGE AND FE S PA
E ID
Name...............
Street Address.
City and State.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
THIRD CLASS MAIL
ZIP Code.
BUREAU OF LABOR S T A T IS T IC S
REG IONAL OFFICES
Region I
1603 JFK Federal Building
Government Center
Boston, Mass. 02203
Phone: 223-6762 (Area Code 617)
Region V
8th Floor, 300 South Wacker Drive
Chicago, III. 60606
Phone: 353-1880 (Area Code 312)
Region II
1515 Broadway
New York, N.Y. 10036
Phone: 971-5405 (Area Code 212)
Region VI
1100 Commerce St., Rm. 6B7
Dallas, Tex. 75202
Phone: 749-3516 (Area Code 214)
Region III
406 Penn Square Building
1317 Filbert St.
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
Phone: 597-7796 (Area Code 215)
Region VII and VIII
Federal Office Building
911 Walnut St., 10th Floor
Kansas City, Mo. 64106
Phone: 374-2481 (Area Code 816)
Region IV
Suite 540
1371 Peachtree St. NE.
Atlanta, Ga. 30309
Phone: 526-5418 (Area Code 404)
Region IX and X
450 Golden Gate Ave.
Box 36017
San Francisco, Calif. 94102
Phone: 556-4678 (Area Code 415)
*»
Regions VII and VIII will be serviced by Kansas City.
Regions IX and X will be serviced by San Francisco.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
BU REAU O F LA B O R S TA TIS TIC S
T H IR D C L A S S M A IL
W A S H IN G T O N , D .C . 2 0 2 1 2
POSTAGE A N D
O F F I C I A L B U S IN E S S
PENALTY
FO R
P R IV A T E
USE, $300
F E E S P A ID
U.S. D E P A R TM E N T O F LAB O R
LAB-441
