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: L ) 3 H a n d lin g o f R ail D is p u te s U n d e r th e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t, 1 9 5 0 -6 9 Bulletin 1753 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Bureau of Labor Statistics 1972 P u M c L ib ra ry JAN i 6 1973 I H R a n d l i n g a i l U R a i l w D i s p u t e s n d e r a y o f L t h a b e o r A c t , 1 9 5 0 -6 9 Bulletin 1753 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR J. D. Hodgson, Secretary BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Geoffrey H. Moore, Commissioner 1972 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $1.25 Stock Number 2901-0936 Preface This bulletin provides a descriptive and statistical account of the industrial relations, mediation, work stoppages, and emergency dispute experience of die railroad industry under the Railway Labor Act. Published and unpublished rec ords, particularly those of the National Mediation Board, were utilized to prepare this report. The definition of this m ajor industry group (railroad transportation) covered by the Railway Labor Act conforms to m ajor group 40 in the Standard Indus trial Classification M anual, 1967 edition, issued by the Office of Management and Budget, formerly the Bureau of the Budget. This bulletin was prepared in the Bureau’s Division of Industrial Relations, Office of Wages and Industrial Relations, by Michael H. Cimini under the super vision of A lbert A. Belman. The cooperation of the National Mediation Board, particularly Mrs. Vivian Yancey and M r. Thomas Tracy, in the preparation of chapters IV and V I is gratefully acknowledged. iii Contents Page C hapter I. Background of Railway Labor A c t ____________________________________________________ S um m ary___________________________________________________________________________________ Introduction ________________________________________________________________________________ Financial c o n d itio n __________________________________________________________________________ Government re g u la tio n _______________________________________________________________________ M ergers and other m ajor unifications_________________________________________________________ Technology and unem ploym ent_______________________________________________________________ Collective bargaining unit and jurisdictional d isp u te s___________________________________________ 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 6 C hapter II. Legal framework of the Railway Labor A c t __________________________________________ Procedural aspects of the a c t _________________________________________________________________ History of railroad legislation_________________________________________________________________ 8 8 8 C hapter III. R ailroad mediation c a s e s ___________________________________________________________ 11 Role of the National Mediation B o a r d ________________________________________________________ 11 Operating and nonoperating g ro u p s ___________________________________________________________ 11 Issues ______________________________________________________________________________________12 Disposition of mediation c a s e s ________________________________________________________________ 12 C hapter IV. Appointm ent of railroad emergency b o a r d s __________________________________________ 14 Intent of the a c t ____________________________________________________________________________ 14 Factors affecting the appointment of b o a r d s ___________________________________________________ 15 M o ra to riu m s___________________________________________________________________________ 15 National m o v em en ts____________________________________________________________________ 15 Economic tr e n d s ________________________________________________________________________ 16 Strike t h r e a t s __________________________________________________________________________ 16 Role of the p a r tie s _____________________________________________________________________ 16 “Proliferation” of emergency b o a r d s _____________________________________________________ 16 Ineffective collective b arg ain in g __________________________________________________________ 17 National c a s e s _______________________________________________________________________________ 18 Grievance b o a r d s ___________________________________________________________________________ 18 Chapter V. The Role of G o v ern m en t____________________________________________________________ 20 A d hoc legislation___________________________________________________________________________ 20 Presidential railroad com m issions------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22 Presidential s e iz u re s_________________________________________________________________________ 23 O ther forms of in terv e n tio n __________________________________________________________________ 23 M ajor interru p tions__________________________________________________________________________ 23 Identical issues on separate c a rrie r s ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------23 C hapter V I. Characteristics of emergency boards, 1950-69 ________________________________________25 P a rtic ip a tio n ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 25 S iz e ________________________________________________________________________________________ 25 Issues _____________________________________________________________________________________ 27 D u r a tio n ___________________________________________________________________________________ 27 IV Contents—Continued Page M ajor issues and g ro u p s_________________________________________________________________ 29 National c a s e s _______________________________________________________________________________29 Reasons for the long d u ra tio n ________________________________________________________________30 M ediation s p a n _________________________________________________________________________ 30 Agency s p a n ___________________________________________________________________________ 31 The p a r tie s ____________________________________________________________________________ 32 A rb itra tio n _________________________________________________________________________________ 33 Emergency board r e p o rts ____________________________________________________________________ 33 M ethods of se ttle m e n t______________________________________________________________________ 35 Disposition _________________________________________________________________________________ 36 Chapter V II. Railroad work sto p p ag es___________________________________________________________ 39 Size o f sto p p ag es___________________________________________________________________________ 39 D u ra tio n ___________________________________________________________________________________ 41 Operating vs. nonoperating personnel sto p p ag es---------------------------------------------------------------------- 42 Issues _____________________________________________________________________________________ 42 Tables: 1. Unions representing railway employees, as of June 30, 1969 ___________________________ 6 2. M ediation cases disposed of, by occupational group, selected periods, 1950-69 _____________ 12 3. Number of mediation agreements and percent of total cases disposed of, selected periods, 1 9 5 5 -6 9 _____________________________________________________________________________ 12 4. Railroad emergency boards, by size and m ajor group, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________ 25 5. National railroad emergency boards, by m ajor issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 26 6. Railroad emergency boards, by detailed issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 __________ 27 7. Duration of railroad emergency boards, by m ajor work group and spans, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 28 8. D uration of railroad emergency boards (in calendar days), by m ajor issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 29 9. Railroad emergency board spans (in calendar days), by m ajor group, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 29 10. National and nonnational emergency board spans,selected periods, 1950-69 ________________ 30 11. M ethods of settlement in railroad boards, by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________________ 36 12. Num ber and percentage of agreements resolved through arbitration, mediation, and direct n eg o tiatio n s____________________________________________________________________ 36 13. Railroad emergency board work stoppages, by m ajor issue and group, 1950-69 __________ 37 14. W orkers involved and man-days idle, by m ajor group, 1950-69 __________________________ 38 15. Num ber of railroad work stoppages, workers involved,and man-days idle, 1950-69 _________39 16. Num ber and percent of railroad work stoppages, by size, selected periods, 1950-69 _________40 17. R ailroad work stoppages involving 10,000 workers or more, 1950-69 _____________________ 41 18. Duration of railroad stoppage by m ajor issues,1950-69 ___________________________________ 42 Chart: 1. Collective bargaining procedures, and “status quo” periods, under the Railway Labor A c t --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- v 9 C o n te n ts — C o n tin u e d Page Appendixes: A - l . Selected railroad financial and economic statistics, 1950-69 __________________________ 44 A -2 . Railroads’ involvement in R L A procedures, fiscal years 1950-69 ______________________ 45 A -3 . Railroad mediation cases disposed of by the National M ediation Board, by m ajor occupational group,fiscal years 1950-69 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 46 A -4 . Railroad emergency boards, 1950-69 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48 A -5 . Chronology of railroad R L A — emergency boards, fiscal years 1950-69 _________________52 A -6 . R ailroad work stoppages, by duration and size of unit and group of workers, cal endar years 1950-69 ______________________________________________________________ 58 A -7 . M ajor issues involved in railroad work stoppages, calendar years 1950-69 _____________ 59 A -8 . Railroad work stoppages, by duration and major group, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69 ____________________________________________________________________ 60 A -9 . D uration of railroad stoppages, by m ajor issue, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69 _________________________________________________________________________ 62 A -10. Railroad work stoppages, by m ajor issue and group, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69 _________________________________________________________________________ 64 Selected B ib lio g rap h y ____________________________________________________________________________66 vi Chapter 1. Background of the Railway Labor Act1 S u m m ary This study presents the first complete examination of basic data on the state of labor relations in the railroad industry in the 1950’s and 1960’s. It is based on records of railroad mediation cases, work stoppages, and emergency boards appointed under the provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), to gether with the circumstances that led to government intervention. A number of significant findings fol lowed from this inquiry. In a vast majority of cases, negotiations have been concluded successfully on the local properties with out government intervention, active assistance of the National Mediation Board (NMB), or interruptions of work. However, when impasses have been reached, the conflicts have required the mediatory services of the Board. Mediation has performed successfully as a tool to compose unadjusted collec tive bargaining disputes; nearly 98 percent of dock eted railroad mediation cases have been resolved without resort to an emergency board. After the exhaustion of unsuccessful mediatory ef forts, emergency boards, some involving more than one mediation case, were created when, in the opin ion of the President, the disptue “threatened sub stantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a de gree such as to deprive any section of the country of essential transportation services.” Of the 71 emer gency panels, only 23 were appointed to consider nationwide disputes, and 18 were convened to hear cases involving only a single railroad carrier and a single union. 1 T h e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t, w h ic h b o re th e jo in t ap p roval o f th e m a jo r ra ilw a y carriers an d u n io n s, w a s p a ssed in 1 926. Its co v era g e, w h ic h o r ig in a lly e x ten d ed o n ly to rail roads, w a s en la rg ed to in clu d e airlin e carriers in 1936. T h is stu d y w a s co n d u cted fo r fiscal yea rs 1 9 5 0 -6 9 . A fisca l y ea r refers to th e tim e p erio d Ju ly 1 o f th e p reviou s y ea r to Jun e 3 0 o f th at year, i.e., fiscal y e a r 1 9 5 0 exten d ed fr o m J u ly 1, 1 9 4 9 to Jun e 30 , 19 5 0 . (S o m e m aterial relat in g to ev en ts o ccu rrin g in 1 9 7 0 o r 1971 h as b e e n in clu d ed in ch a p ter V fo r illu stra tive reason s.) Although this emergency procedure was conceived as a type of adjustment machinery to resolve labormanagement conflicts involving terms and conditions of employment, grievance disputes have been brought before boards on eight occasions. The duration of the R L A emergency dispute pro cedure has been lengthy, averaging 670 calendar days. Average duration increased substantially be tween the 1950’s and the 1960’s, in part because of 12 prolonged panels (the majority of which involved rule issues) that occurred during the later period. Of the cases in which responses were ascertained, both parties initially accepted the boards’ reports only on six occasions. Railroad carriers generally ac cepted “adverse” as well as “favorable” reports, while railroad unions usually rejected “adverse” rec ommendations. The parties most frequently relied on negotiations, rather than mediation or arbitration, to effect settle ments. Eight emergency board disputes were settled either before a board was appointed or a formal re port was issued. Of the remaining panels, settlements were reached without work stoppages in the majority of instances. Since presidents and Congress have viewed na tionwide railroad work stoppages as being detrimen tal to the public welfare, other forms of government intervention outside the scope of the act have played an integral part in the settlement of railroad emer gency disputes. Presidential commissions, the offices of the White House or the Labor Department, ad hoc legislation, and seizures have been utilized in sit uations in which the Executive or Legislative branches felt that collective bargaining could not peacefully settle railroad disputes. In addition, presi dential intervention was evident in 12 emergency board cases, and the mediatory services of the Labor Department were used in numerous instances. Finally, President Trum an seized railroad carriers twice in 1950. During the 1950-69 period, the railroad industry sustained 316 work stoppages involving 1.4 million workers and 8.4 million man-days idle. Compared 1 with the average annual level of 23.4 calendar days for the total economy, the average duration of all railroad strikes was much shorter, 13.0 days. Of the 316 stoppages, 75 percent extended less than 1 week and only 3 percent, or eight cases, lasted longer than 90 days. In tro d u ctio n F or many years there has been general concern with the vitality and effectiveness of the law that gov erns railroad industrial relations, the Railway Labor Act, and its procedures have been criticized by many practitioners and students of collective bargaining. A t various times, these experts have argued that the act, as implemented by the National Mediation Board— the agency charged with its administration — has encouraged labor and management to bargain in a perfunctory manner, to relinquish their rights and duties to resolve disputes on their own, to en gage in dilatory strategy at every stage of their nego tiations, and to depend on government intervention for the solution of disputes. Some critics have alledged also that the Executive Branch, acting under political pressures, has at times intervened needlessly in railroad disputes.2 Contributing to these concerns, however, are cir cumstances peculiar to the economic nature of the industry that impinge on the parties’ collective bar gaining relationship and contribute to its instability. One source is the large num ber of specialized craft unions, often competitive, that exist in the railroad industry.3 Throughout the years, each craft union has adhered rigidly to its own work rules and jurisdic 2 B en jam in A a ro n , “E m erg en cy D isp u te S ettlem en t,” La bor Law Developm ents, 1967. J acob J. K a u fm a n , “E m e rg e n c y B oard s U n d e r th e R a il w a y L a b o r A c t,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 9, N o . 12, D e cem b er 1 958. “T h e R a ilro a d L a b o r D isp u te: A M a ra th o n o f M a n eu ver an d Im p ro v isa tio n ,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, V o l. 18, Janu ary 1 9 6 5 . D a v id L ev in so n , “T h e L o c o m o tiv e F ir em e n ’s D isp u te ,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 17, N o . 11, N o v e m b e r 19 6 6 . E d w ard B . S h ils, “In d u strial U n r e st in th e N a tio n ’s R ail In d u stry,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 15, N o . 2 , F eb ru ary 19 6 4 . A rth u r M . W iseh art, “T ran sp ortation Strike C o n trol L e g isla tio n ,” Michigan Law R eview , V o l. 6 6 , June 1968. 3 A recen t d e v e lo p m en t w h ic h m a y in d ica te th at th e u n io n tional claims, has prom oted its own set of “job rights,” and has often been reluctant to accept tech nological changes. Besides this “union fractionalism,” other factors have operated to create an atmosphere of “emer gency bargaining.” Actual and anticipated introduc tion of innovations (which may obscure lines of de marcation between crafts) and consolidations of rail facilities have engendered fears of job losses. Rein forcing these pressures have been the secular trends of declining employment of nonsupervisory workers because of introductions of laborsaving devices and because of a reduction in the railroads’ share of the transportation market. Still another source of bargaining instability, regu latory agencies (which control competition, rates, routes, and subsidies) have also been cited as tend ing “to supply a negative influence on labor-manage ment harmony and stability.” 4 N or have other forms of government intervention always proven to be stabilizing forces. F in an cial co n d itio n In 1969, the U.S. R ailroad System consisted of 721 carriers, operating 222,164 miles of track and employing 623,326 workers. These railroads earned $12.0 billion in operating income and incurred $9.5 billion in operating expenses. Net revenues from railway operations in 1969 amounted to $2.5 billion, of which $555.0 million in dividends were declared.5 (See appendix table A - l .) Under the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) classification system, the industry is composed of five main groupings.6 This analysis is largely con fined to the three largest and most im portant groups: Class I, class II, and switching and terminal carriers. Of the 721 railroads operating in 1969, 73 were class I carriers. These larger railways employed 93 percent of the industry’s work force and operated 80 percent of its mileage. A t the time of the act’s passage, railroads hauled 77 percent of the Nation’s intercity freight traffic ton-miles and 76 percent of nonautomobile passen ger traffic. In 1969 by contrast, the railroads trans4 S h ils, op. cit., p. 81. rivalry p ro b lem w ill d e c lin e in th e y ears to c o m e h as b een th e m erg in g o f v a rio u s railroad u n io n s. In 1 9 6 9 , fo u r su ch 5 Eighty-Third Annual R eport on Transport Statistics in the United States for the Year Ended D ec . 31, 1969 (U .S . In terstate C o m m erce C o m m issio n ), pp . 3, 19, 2 3 , 4 8 , 4 9 . (L ater cited as 83rd Annual R eport on Transport Statistics). c o n so lid a tio n s, a ffectin g 2 6 3 ,0 0 0 railroad u n io n m em b ers, o ccu rred . 6 T h e five m a jo r ca teg o r ie s are c la ss I, c la ss II, sw itch in g an d term in al, p rop rietary, an d u n official. 2 ported only 41 percent of intercity freight ton-miles and 1 percent of intercity passenger miles. A m ajor cause of the railroads’ long-term declin ing share of intercity freight and passenger service was their inability to compete economically with newer forms of transportation. As far back as the 1920’s, motor vehicles had begun making inroads into the railroads’ passenger operations. Following World W ar II, commercial aviation, pipelines, truck ing, and buses began to pose ever-increasing compe tition. Even the railroads’ steady fare, transportation of higher value commodities (such as fresh fruits and vegetables, livestock, dairy products, and other highrate goods) had been adversely affected.7 Besides difficulty in competing economically with newer forms of transportation, railroads have been adversely affected by levels of national economic activity8 and by internal developments. One result has been the unfavorable rate of increase in operat ing costs compared with revenues— 29.1 percent and 21.6 percent, respectively, between 1950-69— de spite a precipitous drop in employment. Another manifestation of the various problems besetting the industry has been the num ber of insolvencies. Be tween 1894 and 1942, there were more than 840 railroad bankruptcies. During the early 1950’s (1950-54) a large num ber of carriers (approxi mately 40) were in bankruptcy; but by 1957, the num ber of bankruptcies had declined to six and has not since been greater than eight in any year.9 Since World W ar II, there have been only eight m ajor (class I) bankruptcies, three occurring in 1970. A significant num ber of railroad companies have also incurred deficits over the years (approxi mately 17 annually), and many more have experi enced liquidity problems.10 G o v ern m en t re g u la tio n M erg ers a n d o th e r m a jo r u n ificatio n s According to some industry spokesmen and trans7 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 109 (U .S . N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard , M a rch 2 5 , 1 9 55), pp. 2 7 -2 8 . Eighty-Third Annual R eport on Transport Statistics , op. cit., pp. 4 8 - 4 9 . In terstate C o m m erce C o m m issio n data. 8 M orris A . H o ro w itz, “L ab or’s R o le in th e D e c lin in g R a ilro a d In d u stry,” Labor Law Journal, V o l. 9, N o . 5, M a y 19 5 8 , p. 4 7 3 . 9 R eport of the Presidential Railroad Commission (W ash ington: U .S . G o v er n m e n t P rin tin g O ffice, F eb . 1 9 63), p. 7 9 . IC C data. 10 Labor, O ct. 3, 1 9 7 0, p. 8.; N ew Y ork Times , Sept. 2 , 1 9 7 0 , p. 53 an d A u g . 2 , 1970, p. F - 1 0 ; IC C data. portation and labor experts, government regulation has intensified the financial problems of the industry. Public policy, or its lack, has also had an impact on collective bargaining. Various problems have been noted, including deficits incurred from passenger service, the uncertain role of railroads in metropoli tan transportation systems, the inadequate recogni tion of severe competition facing railroads, subsidi zation of competitive forms of transportation, and insufficient coordination of various forms of trans portation. According to one report, “a large part of the growing difficulties of the parties in collective bargaining reflects a failure to develop adequate na tional policies for the railroads and for a coordinated transportation system.” 11 A nother critic has even claimed that regulation has “stifled innovation, dis couraged industry, driven many of the capable and imaginative men out of it (the industry), and pro vided a convenient excuse for inaction on the part of less capable men who have come and stayed.” 12 Chairman of Illinois Central Industries, William B. Johnson, noting the disparity between the dy namic nature of inflation and the more static nature of regulation, has asserted that rigidity and incessant delays in regulation would impede future develop ments in the industry. (During periods of inflation, the argument goes, demands for substantial wage in creases, coupled with lagging productivity, result in pressures on profit margins. Wage raises can be met by infusions of capital expenditures, or growth of the industry, or increased prices— a combination of all three being optimal. Railroad capital expenditures have been characterized as being “too little, too late;” the industry as “declining” ; and the proce dures for raising rates as “archaic,” “tedious,” and “stifling.”) 13 Besides setting rates and determining routes, gov ernment regulates the unification of railroad prop erties. Mergers and other consolidations of railroad properties usually are predicated on increasing the carriers’ m arket share or achieving operating econ omies and decreasing costs. A t the same time, since these activities constitute a persistent threat to job security, they usually result in proposed contract 11 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 130 (U .S . N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard , Ju n e 8, 1 9 60), pp . 3 - 4 . n N .Y . Times , Jan. 10, 19 7 1 , p . 10. 13 N ew York Times, A u g . 2 , 197 0 , p . 4 7 . 3 provisions for improving employment and income protection. Actual and anticipated mergers com monly generate fears and anxieties which lead to labor hostility and attempts to thwart managements’ plans. For instance, the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE) and the Railway Labor Executives’ Association (RLEA) filed a suit against the ICC in 1960 to halt the Erie-Lackawana merger and claimed that the agency did not prescribe adequate employee protection measures. During fiscal years 1950-60, the ICC approved 50 merger applications14 under section 5 (2) of the In terstate Commerce Act, as well as 470 other unifica tions (including ownerships of stock, purchases, modifications of track rights, trackage rights, modi fied leases, joint uses, leases, and various combina tions of the above consolidations). Other m ajor uni fications authorized from 1961 to 1970 included 40 mergers, 27 control agreements, 15 purchase agree ments, and 3 lease agreements.15 Approximately one-third of the industry’s trackage currently is in volved in pending proceedings before the Commis sion. As with previous consolidations, the Commis sion will authorize or dismiss the applications, but will not pursue the unifications to a conclusion. However, it will receive testimony on the classes or crafts of employees involved— who usually oppose the transaction— and will prescribe conditions in the agreements to protect employees who are affected adversely.16 T ech n o lo g y a n d u n em p lo y m en t Another economic condition intimately affecting workers’ security is the extent and pace of techno logical developments, as indicated by productivity changes. Expressed as an average annual rate, out put per m an-hour (productivity) in the railroad in dustry increased 5.3 percent between 1947 and 1969 and 6.2 percent between 1957 and 1969, compared with only 3.2 percent and 3.3 percent, respectively, for the private economy.17 Among these technological developments which influenced productivity levels were electronically operated classification yards, modernization of equipment for right-of-way mainte nance, processing and computer equipment, and many other innovations. As in other industries, rail road collective bargaining agreements embody many provisions relating to the implementation of techno logical innovations. Technological developments also frequently lead to numerous proposals for changes in labor agreements, some of which result in labor strife. In fact, technological change probably places the single greatest strain on collective bargaining re lationships of any factor in the industry. M anagement has claimed consistently that im proved technology is necessary to compete effec tively with other modes of transportation and to de fray increased costs, including wages. Unions have pointed to the dislocations and resultant loss of workers’ job opportunities and income caused by fundamental industrial changes. Initially, they usu ally have attempted to impede changes or, at least, abate the pace of implementation while carriers usu ally have pressed for quick institution of operational and technological changes. A t times, the parties have indicated a mutual desire to arrange simultaneously for protection schemes (such as severance pay, re training, etc.) to cushion the effect of technological developments, without at the same time instituting protective measures which would lapse into restric tive work rules. On several occasions, a conflict of interest has resulted and neutral parties have had to decide how fast and far, at whose expense, and to whose profit technological developments should be instituted.18 As early as the 1950’s,19 warnings were regularly issued that a breakdown in railroad collective bar gaining was imminent; the prim ary cause cited was technology: W e h a v e n o t rea ch ed th e en d o f th e se ch a n g es. T e c h n o l o g y c o n t in u e s t o a d v a n c e . M a n y r a ilr o a d s h a v e n o t y e t a d o p t e d t e c h n o l o g ic a l c h a n g e s w h ic h o th e r s h a v e n ic a l sh o w n d e v e lo p m e n t s to are be s u c c e s s f u l. in th e N ew m a k in g . te ch So fa r , c o ll e c t i v e b a r g a in in g h a s n o t r e s p o n d e d t o t h e s e c h a lle n g e s w it h s u ffic ie n t v ig o r o r im a g in a t io n t o c o p e w it h t h e p r o b le m s t h a t l o o m o v e r t h e in d u s tr y a n d its la b o r r e la tio n s . C o l l e c t iv e b a r g a in in g h a s f u n c t i o n e d in t h e s e q u e n c e o f c h a lle n g e a n d r e 14 In clu d in g m erg ers c o u p le d w ith oth er u n ification plan s. 15 In clu d es tw o m ergers an d gran ted in th e fo r m e r period . o n e c o n tro l a u th orization s p o n s e ; a n d t h e r e s p o n s e h a s a t t im e s b e e n l o n g d e la y e d . It h a s n o t a n t ic ip a t io n a n t ic ip a t e d is n e c e s s a r y t o in cope a tim e w h e n w it h p r o b le m s 16 U n p u b lish e d IC C data. 17 Indexes of Output Per Man-Hour, Selected Industries, 1 9 3 9 an d 1 9 4 7 - 6 9 (B L S B u lletin 16 8 0 , 1970), p. 104. Hand book of Labor Statistics, 1970 (B L S B u lletin 1 6 6 6 , 1970), p. 159. 4 18 R eport to (U .S . N a tio n a l 19 R eport to (U .S . N a tio n a l the President by Emergency Board N o. 86 M ed ia tio n B oard , J u ly 6, 19 5 0 ), p . 6. the President by Emergency Board N o. 97 M ed ia tio n B oard , Jan. 2 5 , 19 5 2 ), p. 9 7 . which become even more difficult to resolve once their full impact is felt.2 0 On several occasions, the carriers have alleged that railroad unions attempted to assume manage m ent’s prerogatives, by insisting on a veto power over consolidation or discontinuance of jobs, sta tions, and other rail facilities. A t other times, accord ing to carrier representatives, railway unions have attempted to retard technological change and mod ernization and to impede the elimination of inefficient work rules and duplication of services by strict ob servance of exclusive jurisdictional claims, excessive severance demands, job freezes, and other proposals designed to inflate the cost of technologies’ imple mentation to the carriers. F o r example, the Telegra phers (ORT) served notice on the Chicago and N orth Western Railway and requested that “No po sition in existence on December 3, 1957, will be abolished or discontinued,” except by m utual agree ment between the parties. After negotiations and mediation were unsuccessful and arbitration was re jected, the unadjusted dispute resulted in the ap pointment of Emergency Board No. 147. Eventually the controversy was settled, but not before a 30-day strike ensued. Because of operating economies (consolidations, abandonments of main and branch lines, mergers), technological developments, and secular trends in the competitiveness of railroads, railway employment has decreased in successive years. (See appendix table A - l.) In 1950, the class I railroads, accounting for 95 percent of the railroad industry’s mileage and employment, provided 1,220,784 jobs. Twenty years later, railway carriers employed about one-half this number, 578,277 persons. With one exception, the seven major occupations,21 as classified by the Inter state Commerce Commission, also experienced declining job opportunities of varying degrees. Employment of nonoperating employees decreased precipitiously compared with that of operating classes, despite “diesilization” and other innovations affecting operating crafts.22* Only the num ber of 2 Report to the President by Emergency Board No, 145 0 (U.S. National Mediation Board, May 3, 1962), p. 64. 2 Executives, officials, and staff assistants; professional, 1 clerical, and general; maintenance of way and structure; m aintenance of equipm ent and stores; transportation (other than train, engine, and yard); yardmasters, sw itch tenders, and hostlers; train and engine service. 2 Operating employees are “those workers engaged di 2 rectly in the movement of trains, such as locomotive en- executives, officials, and staff assistants increased over the two decades (6.4 percent), a phenomenon frequently stressed by railway unions. Anticipated or actual losses in employment have always been a real substantive issue in the railroad in dustry. Over the years, various railroad unions have cited declining employment opportunities and resul tant hardships faced by their members. In 1954, the Firemen (BLFE), appearing before Emergency Board No. 110, testified that 21,000 firemen and hostlers’ positions had been eliminated in the rail road industry during the preceding 6 years.28 The Te legraphers (ORT), who were involved in hearings before Emergency Board No. 138, noted that their craft’s employment had been reduced 36.8 percent from 1955 through I960.24 Average employment for Pullman conductors (ORCB), who participated in Emergency Board No. 139, declined almost threefourths in 14 years (from 2,683 in 1946 to 729 in I960).25 However, the magnitude of the problem cannot be expressed solely by statistics detailing declining em ployment levels. O ther characteristics of the railroad labor force— such as age distribution and length of service— reinforced the hum an aspects of working in a declining industry. The median age of shopcraft employees as of 1967 was 49 years, 10 years greater than the median age of all male nonagricultural workers. Moreover, 49 percent of these employees had worked 20 years or more in the railroad indus try, and 26 percent more had 10 to 19 years of service.26 “Once a railroad worker loses his job, his chances of finding another one are small, conse quently railroad labor tends to be hostile to any technological change.” 27 gineers, locomotive firem en, road conductors, road train men, and yardm en.*’ Nonoperating employees “are those not” directly involved in the movement of trains, such as shopcrafts, maintenance-of-way, and signal forces, clerical and communication employees.” Thirty-Second A nnual Report o f the N a tion al M ediation Board, F o r the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1966 (U.S. Mediation Board, 1967), p. 10. 2 Report to the President by Emergency Board N o, 110, 3 (U.S. National Mediation Board, July 30, 1955), p. 12. 2 Report to the President by Emergency B oard N o, 138, 4 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Sept. 15, 1961), p. 6. 2 Report to the President by Emergency Board N o , 139, 5 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Dec. 11, 1961), p. 13. 2 R ailroad Shopcraft F act-Finding Study (U.S. Depart 6 m of Labor, 1968), pp. 20-21. ent 2 Ann F. Friedlander, The D ilem m a o f F reight Transport 7 Regulation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 97. 5 Collective bargaining unit and Jurisdictional disputes Table 1 indicates another prom inent problem con fronting the industry, “fractionalized” unionism. Railway carriers must negotiate with a large number of unions, some of which represent m ore than one class or craft of employees. Besides the 10 marine unions and the various small or local independent or ganizations, railroad companies may negotiate with 20 national unions or more, the vast majority affili ated with the A F L -C IO . This situation stems from the historic development of the industry’s collective bargaining experience, as well as judicial and admin istrative interpretations of what constitutes the col lective bargaining unit. Regardless of the geographic extent of a carrier’s operations, the collective bargaining unit under the R L A is the “craft or class,” which is undefined by the act. Throughout its history, the NM B has en- Table 1. Unions representing railway employees as of June 30, 19701 Number of members Estimated Total number in railroad industry Nam es Initials O E A IN U IO S PRT G N N BE L UU T FR CE Brotherhood of Locom otive Engineers (Ind.) ____________________________ United Transportation Union2 ____________________________ _____ _____ Federated Council of Railway Em ployees (Ind.)4 ______________ ___ ________ 32,900 3242,600 375 32,900 3242,600 375 6,203 3,193 (® ) 2,000 3,193 (8 ) 130,770 103,994 3,000 72,200 252,737 788,800 11,980 1,616 434,136 820,126 864,652 46,000 144,336 46,200 11,980 1,616 3,250 17,621 11,600 15,000 1,759,502 (8 ) 5,171 88,384 1,059,325 2,000 (8 ) (8) (8 ) 5,171 5,400 3,500 (® ) C 5 ) N N P R T G U IO S O O E A IN N N AS RA AT DA AS M B (F) B BW ME B AC RS BC R BS R (B P )SC HE RU 1 M(and A ) A W IB W E IBF0 IB T MF DA RA Y SW ) M (IA UA S US TE WS RA American Railway and Supervisors Association ------------------------------------------American Train Dispatchers Association -------------------------------------------------Association of M echanical Supervisors (Ind.) ______________ ___ __________ International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers ________________________________________ ____ _ Brotherhood of Maintenance of W Employees ___________________________ ay Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees6 ___________ ________________________________ Brotherhood of Railway Carm of Am en erica and Canada ______________________ Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen ___________________________________ Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters ___________________________________ Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union_____________ International Association of Machinist and Aerospace W orkers __________ _____ International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers___________________________ International Brotherhood of Firemen and Oilers __________________________ International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, W arehousemen and Helpers of America (Ind.) __ ______ ____ _________________________________ M echanical Department Foremen's Association (Ind.) ___ ____________________ Railroad Yardmasters of America8 _________ ____ ____________ ______ Sheet M W etal orkers' International Association ___________________________ United Steelworkers of Am erica ___________________ _______ ________ United Transport Service Employees ____________ ______________________ W estern Railway Supervisors Association (Ind.) ___________________________ N N P R T G M R E U IO S O O E A IN A IN N N GL LO IL A IU 0E IU P MP M NE MB SIU TU W District 50 NU M Great Lakes Licensed Officers Organization (Ind.) _________________________ international Longshoremen's Association _______________________________ international U nion of Operating Engineers _______________ ___ __________ Inlandboatmen's U nion of the Pacific ......................... __............................ .......... International Organization of Masters, M ates, and Pilots ___________ _________ National M arine Engineers Beneficial Association .................................................... Seafarers International U nion of North Am erica ________________ __________ Transport W orkers U nion of America .............. .................... ............................... International U nion of District 50, Allied and Technical W orkers of the U and .S. Canada (Ind.) _____________________ _______ ____ ______________ National M aritime U nion of Am erica .............. ....................................................... iaT figures for total union membership are 1970 levels and those he for the railroad industry are current levels. 2A union created on Jan. 1, 1969, by the merger of the Trainmen (B T the Firemen and Engineers (B FE the Switchmen (SU A and the R ), L ), N ), Conductors (0R B C ). 3 Includes approximately 2,000 busmen organized by the union. 4M erged with the U U in 1970. T 5Not available. •The Clerks (B A C were involved in mergers twice in 1969: with the RS) 2,500 member Railway Patrolmen's International U nion on Jan. 1, 1969; 6 61 741,000 366,343 • 3,697 10,980] 10,317 > 64,389 J 7 149,789 210,000 41,000 < •) (* ) (8 ) (8 ) 1,900 14,000 250 500 and the 45,000 member Transportation-Communication Employees U nion (formerly the Order of Railway Telegraphers) on Feb. 20, 1969. 7 Estimate. •The Railroad Yardmasters of North Am erica (Ind.) merged into the Railroad Yardmasters of America on July 1, 1969. •An affiliate of SIU . N T : The unions are affiliated with the A 10 except where they OE FL-C are noted as independent (Ind.). SO R E National M UC: ediation Board; Bureau of Labor Statistics; In dividual unions. deavored to honor past practices of railroad workers in organizing for representation purposes and of the carriers in making collective bargaining agreements with such representatives.28 Coupled with the m ajor ity rule (the majority of eligible employees must par ticipate and cast valid ballots) “fractionalized” rep resentation— a large num ber of specialized unions — became inevitable and led to competitiveness be tween railroad unions for membership and for job rights.29 With the exception of the Teamsters (IBT), rail road unions have adhered rigidly to their traditional jurisdictional claims to jobs on a craft basis, even though technological changes have blurred lines of demarcation between the original crafts. As early as 1950, the NMB noted that “the close cohesion be tween the powerful (operating) brotherhoods . . . has been affected by differences arising between them as to representation, mileage limitations, pro motional rights, and similar differences which are in the realm of jurisdictional disputes.” 30 N or have the nonoperating crafts been free of jurisdictional dis putes over work assignments.31 A recent and well publicized instance of union ri valry which demonstrates the dimension and intens ity of the problem was one facet of the dispute re 2 A dm inistra tion o f the R ailw ay L a b o r A c t by the N a 8 tion al M ediation Board 1934-1970 (U.S. National Mediation Board, 1971), p. 73. 29Shils, op. cit., pp. 81-84. 3 Sixteenth A nn ua l R eport o f the N a tio n a l M ediation 0 Board, F o r the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1950 (U.S. Na tional Mediation Board, 1951), p. 7. 3 Twentieth A nn ua l R eport o f the N a tio n a l M ediation 1 Board, F o r the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1954 (U.S. Na tional Mediation Board, 1955), p. 23. suiting in the appointment of Emergency Board No. 178. After protracted bargaining and a nationwide trucking stoppage in April and May 1970, the Team sters negotiated a wage boost of $1.85, or 45 per cent, over a 39-m onth period. Meanwhile in the rail road industry, the Clerks (BRASC), who represent workers in various transportation industries, were pressing wage and rule demands on the Nation’s car riers represented by the National Railway Labor Conference (NRLC). Large wage increases won by other unions, partic ularly the Teamsters (who compete vigorously with the Clerks for membership in both the airline and railroad industries), created high wage expectations among the Clerks’ members and difficult negotiating goals for the Clerks’ union leaders. After negotia tions and mediation were unsuccessful in reaching an accord and arbitration was refused, an emergency board was appointed to consider the dispute. On N o vember 9, 1970, the Board released a report in which it suggested a 32.5 percent wage adjustment. Assailing the wage recommendation, the Clerks’ president claimed that his union could not “live with that (wage increase) in the transportation industry when the Government okays a higher increase for the Teamsters.” 32 The union rejected the Board’s re port, and conducted a nationwide strike on Decem ber 10, 1970, which was terminated by ad hoc legis lation. Under the terms of the eventual settlement, which was reached in the following February, the clerks received a 44.0 percent wage adjustment over 42 months. 3 W all Street Journal, Nov. 10, 1970, p. 3. 2 7 Chapter II. Legal Framework of the Railway Labor Act Procedural aspects of the act The Railway Labor A c t33 requires the parties to follow a step-by-step procedure, from the initial no tice of intention to change the terms of an agreement to the last step, which leaves the union free to strike or the employer free to lock out his workers. (See chart 1.) The procedure is set in motion when a “Section 6” notice— a declaration of intention to change the collective bargaining agreement— is served. A “status quo” period prohibits changes in the terms and conditions of employment until the parties reach agreement, or all the required proce dures of the act have been exhausted, or a period of 10 days has passed since the termination of discus sions without either party’s request for or an offer of the National M ediation Board (NM B’s) assist ance. The parties are expected to negotiate until an agreement is reached or an impasse develops. If, however, the parties cannot reach agreement in such direct negotiations, one or both of the parties may request the mediatory assistance of the Board; or, should the facts w arrant it, the NMB may offer its assistance. W hen mediation is unsuccessful, the NMB as one of its last formal obligations, may request the parties to submit their dispute to binding arbitration. If ei ther party refuses arbitration, the Board is required to formally notify both parties of its failure to recon cile their differences. Again, a “status quo” period is instituted, and neither party can alter the terms of the collective bargaining agreement for 30 days from the date of the NM B’s notice unless, in the interim, arbitration is agreed on, or an agreement is reached by the parties. If, however, these measures fail, and emergency board may be established under Section 10 of the act. Action under this section is taken if, in the opinion of the Board, an actual or imminent strike arising out of an unresolved dispute “threatens to substantially interrupt interstate commerce.” The Board so notifies the President, who, as a last resort under the act, may establish an emergency board to examine the nature of the issues and to make recom mendations concerning the dispute. History of railroad legislation Like some other provisions of the act, inclusion of the emergency boards proceeded from 38 years of experience gleaned in previous railroad legislation. 18 88 : First endeavor made by Congress to eliminate or minimize serious railroad disputes; instituted the use of voluntary arbitration and temporary investigating panels created by the President to investigate and report the underlying causes of disputes. Erdman Act passed; for the first time the Federal Government utilized the procedure of vol untary mediation, which was conducted jointly under the auspices of the Commissioner of Labor and the Chairman of the Interstate Commerce Commission; “status quo” period adopted during course of arbitration; investigation feature of 1888 act abandoned. 18 98 : 19 13 : Previous procedures adopted by Newlands Act; more formal provisions for voluntary arbitra tion instituted; primary reliance on mediation to solve disputes; permanent board of mediation and conciliation created. 1 9 1 7 :M Federal Director General assumed con trol of railroads on December 28, 1917; instituted national handling of wage proposals and signed national agreements with unions; more standardi zation of work rules and working conditions achieved; bipartisan adjustment boards developed. 19 20 : Transportation Act of 1920 passed; media- 3 4 In 1916, the Adamson Act was passed in an attem pt 3 Congress of the United States. In U.S. 44 Stats., 557 to compose (settle) a dispute concerning the basic 8-hour 3 day by direct Congressional intervention. The author ch. 347, 69th Cong. (1926), as am ended Congress of the assum this extralegal m es easure m be the precedent for ust United States. In U.S. 48 Stats. 1185, ch. 691 73d Cong. ad hoc legislation passed since 1963. (1934). 8 Chart 1 R a ilw a y c o lle c tiv e b a r g a in in g p r o c e d u r e s a n d "s t a t u s q u o " p e r io d s u n d e r th e R a ilw a y L a b o r A c t . PROCEDURES GOVERNMENT CARRIER(S) AND UNION(S) rv lO D A O i t r\iv UlorUo ITi1 i ON ''STATUS QUO" (IN ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT) FROM NOTICE UNLESS 10 DAYS ELAPSE FOLLOWING TERMINATION OF CONFERENCES WITHOUT REQUEST FOR OR PROFFER OF MEDIATION TO 30 DAYS FOLLOWING NM B NOTICE TO PARTIES THAT MEDIATION HAS FAILED AND ARBITRATION W REFUSED AS FROM CREATION OF BOARD TO 30 DAYS FOLLOWING EMERGENCY BOARD REPORT 9 t io n d is c a r d e d ; p r im a r y r e lia n c e p la c e d o n c o l l e c t iv e b a r g a in in g ; v o lu n ta r y a r b itr a tio n a d o p t e d a s s e c o n d a r y lin e o f d e f e n s e ; tr ip a r tite tr ib u n a l ( N a t io n a l R a ilr o a d L a b o r B o a r d ) c r e a t e d b y T i t le I I o f a c t t o “in v e s t ig a t e ” a n d “d e c id e ” d is p u te s o f a ll ty p e s ; B o a r d m a n d a t e d t o is s u e r e c o m m e n d a t io n s w h ic h w e r e n o t s p e c if ic a lly e n f o r c e a b le c o n c e r n in g s e t t le m e n t o f t h e d is p u te ; r e lia n c e w a s p la c e d o n p u b lic o p i n io n t o f o r c e r e c a lc itr a n t p a r ty t o a c c e p t r e c o m m e n d a t io n s . Within a relatively short period of time, it became evident that the Transportation Act of 1920 had be come ineffective, that the Railroad Labor Board had 10 become practically powerless, and that the parties had become dissatisfied with the provisions and im plementation of the act. After holding conferences, the Nation’s railroads and labor organizations jointly drafted and sponsored a bill which eventually was accepted by Congress and approved by President Coolidge; this was the first time in labor history that the interested parties wrote a labor act. With the passage of this law, mediation was reinstituted as the principal means of settling railroad disputes and was to be supplemented by voluntary arbitration and emergency factfinding boards. Chapter III. Railroad Mediation Cases8 5 R ole of th e N ational M ediation B oard Under the provisions of the act, two prim ary du ties, relating to two types of disputes, are delegated to the NMB: (1) the mediation of disputes which involve proposals to change wages, rules, or working conditions (major disputes); and (2) the determina tion and certification of the representative of any craft or class of employees after secret-ballot elec tions (representation disputes). This chapter briefly describes the railroads’ experience with major dis putes, some of which have required the appointment of emergency boards. Contrary to widely held beliefs, mediation often has been used effectively by the NMB to peacefully conclude settlements in the railroad industry. Over the two decades following 1950, the board disposed of 3,984 railroad mediation cases, 1,900 since I9 6 0 .3 (See appendix table A -2 .) W hether the 36 5 slightly smaller number of mediation cases occurring in the 1960’s, as against the 1950’s, indicated that collective bargaining was more effective or that fewer proposals for changes in the terms and condi tions of employment were processed in the former period was not ascertainable. Ranging from a high of 306 in 1969 to a low of 133 in 1963, the distribution of railroad mediation cases successfully mediated, withdrawn by the parties, or dismissed by the Board differed signifi cantly among adjacent years; however, large num bers of cases tended to cluster, especially in the years 1951-53, 1955-58, and 1968-69. In the early 1950’s, the standard railway unions, with the excep tion of operating organizations whose proposals dealt with the manning of diesel locomotives and the es tablishment of the 40-hour workweek, were con 35 A ll data, e x ce p t fo r w ork stop p age figures, in th is an d in the fo llo w in g sectio n s are b a sed o n th e fiscal y e a r (en d in g J u n e 30). 36 B eca u se o f a lim ita tio n in d ata, th e a n alysis p ro ceed s o n th e b asis o f m ed ia tio n c a se s d isp o sed o f (settled b y o n e m ea n s o r a n oth er) rather th an m ed ia tio n c a ses d ock eted in a n y p articu la r fiscal year. cerned mainly with nonwage issues. Prom inent among these issues were grievances, time claims, jurisdictional disputes, union shop, and other rules dealing with operational matters. Excluding the large num ber of mediation cases dealing with rates of pay in 1956, the NMB was concerned primarily in the second half of the decade with jurisdictional dis putes, time claims, and rules demands, particularly those dealing with health and welfare, vacations, hol idays, and cost-of-living provisions. However, toward the end of the decade (1958) a significant change took place. Actual or anticipated introduction of la borsaving devices and changes in operational meth ods generated pressures which resulted in the proc essing of “Section 6” notices relating to job security provisions. Throughout the 1960’s, anticipated or actual dis placements of railroad workers or reductions in their earning capacity because of (1) accelerations in planned or actual consolidation of carriers or facili ties and (2) introductions of laborsaving equipment or new methods of work performance affecting m an power utilization resulted in numerous proposals dealing with job security, employment stability, sev erance pay and related matters. Because of the rising cost-of-living during fiscal year 1969, disputes deal ing with wages and other economic issues became progressively more prevalent. O p e ratin g a n d n o n o p e ra tin g g ro u p s Of the mediation cases disposed of between 1950 and 1969 that could be classified by m ajor occupa tional group, 2,312 (61 percent) involved operating employees and 1,503 (39 percent) nonoperating employees. (See appendix table A - 3 .) 37 Operating employees accounted for an inordinately large and growing share of m ediation cases over the years, especially in light of their numbers in relation to total 37 T h e categ o ry o f c o m b in e d railroad w ork ers w a s e lim in ated fr o m th e an a ly sis b e ca u se cla ssifica tio n o f th o se m ed ia tio n ca ses b y m a jo r grou p w a s im p o ssib le. 11 railroad workers. Over the 20-year period, these em ployees constituted slightly less than 25 percent of the total railroad labor force.38 Table 2. Mediation cases disposed of, by occupational group, selected periods, 1950-69 Operating Nonoperating groups groups ber Number Percent Num Percent Num Percent ber 1950-69 3,815 100.0 2,312 60.6 1,503 39.4 473 50.1 471 49.9 1950-54 _____ 944 100.0 396 37.4 663 62.6 1955-59 _____ 1,059 100.0 468 59.4 320 40.6 1960-64 _____ 788 100.0 314 30.7 710 69.3 1965-69 _____ 1,024 100.0 Total Year SO R E National M UC: ediation Board data. Within the operating group, the division of media tion cases involving the three separate classifications of train, engine, and yard employees was not avail able, but a distribution of nonoperating employees by major occupations was made. W ith the addition of the clerical and related class to the operating crafts, these groups participated in approximately 70 percent of all railroad mediation cases, as follows: Train, engine and yard service , clerical and related N um ber 1 9 5 0 -6 9 1 9 5 0 -5 4 1 9 5 5 -5 9 1 9 6 0 -6 4 1 9 6 5 -6 9 Percent 2 ,7 1 2 71.1 589 769 566 788 6 2 .4 7 2 .6 7 1 .8 7 7 .0 SO R E National M UC: ediation Board data. Is s u e s Union demands for changes in an existing agree ment are seldom confined to a single issue. Most fre quently, they include economic as well as noneco nomic proposals. Nevertheless, when an impasse has been reached, generally one broad issue can be iden tified as the impediment to agreement. Although full agreement may not have been reached on all of the provisions which were considered in negotiations, in the data discussed here and in appendix A -2 , media tion cases were classified by the issue considered by the parties and the mediators as primarily responsi ble for the impasse. Because of the unavailability of data for the pre1955 period, the analysis was confined to subsequent years. Of the 2,999 mediation cases disposed of be tween 1955 and 1969, 2,114 were concerned with work rules, 671 with rates of pay, 30 with the nego 38 B a sed o n c la ss I carriers’ e m p lo y m en t figures. 12 tiation of first contracts, and 184 with miscellaneous issues. (See appendix table A -2 .) W ork rules were the principal subject of mediation cases docketed by the Board over the 15-year period (70.5 percent) and also in each of the three subperiods, 1955-59, 1960— and 1965— In fact, this issue accounted 64, 69. for a growing share of total cases between the sub periods. Combined with wages (the second most prominent issue), work rules and rates of pay were involved in 92.9 percent of all railroad mediation cases. New agreements and miscellaneous issues ac counted for a small and declining share (7.1 per cent) of total cases, probably because the negotia tion of first collective bargaining agreements was nearly at an end in the railroad industry by 1950 and because such miscellaneous issues as grievances and time claims were being processed through other ad justment machinery. D isposition of m ed iatio n c a s e s 39 Of the various methods of disposing of these 2,999 cases, mediation agreements constituted the most prevalent method of settlement, far exceeding other categories. Between 1955 and 1969, 1,672 of these agreements, accounting for 55.8 percent of all railroad mediation cases, were consummated. Thus, after direct negotiations had failed, the NMB’s ef forts were effective in assisting the parties to reach agreement. As table 3 indicates, the consummation of media tion agreements varied between the 5— year periods; a decline occurred between the first and the second subperiods, because of an increase in the absolute and relative num ber of dismissals and withdrawals, and an upswing took place in the third period. Although more cases were disposed of by mediation agreements in the first and third subperiods com pared with the second, in relative terms fewer and fewer accords were reached by mediation in each successive subperiod. Table 3. Number of mediation agreements and percent of total cases disposed of, selected periods, 1955-69 Years 1955-69 _______ 1955-59 ___________ 1960-64 ___________ 1965-69 ___________ Num ber 1,672 690 445 537 SO R E National M UC: ediation Board data. A a percent of total s mediation cases disposed of 55.8 62.8 54.7 49.4 " D a t a o n d isp o sitio n o f railroad m e d ia tio n w a s a lso u n a v a ila b le b e fo r e 1 9 5 5 . (S ee a p p en d ix ta b le A - 2 .) Two other categories of disposition, withdrawals and dismissals,40 were significant. Over the 15-year span, they accounted for 923 dispositions (552 and 371, respectively). The num ber of withdrawals and the number of dismissals varied considerably be tween the three 5-year periods, declining between the first and second subperiod and increasing be tween the second and third. In relative terms, the distribution of dismissals plus withdrawals increased significantly between the three subperiods: 23.7 per cent, 28.5 percent, and 39.7 percent, respectively. Arbitration, another method for disposing of me diation cases, was seldom used by the parties. During the 15-year period under consideration, only 32 agreements to arbitrate were reached, an average of slightly over two annually. Since 1955, the parties’ in terest in this procedure has apparently declined in both absolute and relative terms. Perhaps this de cline reflected both labor and management’s refusal to allow third parties to determine the terms and conditions of employment, especially complicated work rules. The following tabulation shows how me diation cases disposed of by arbitration agreements declined between 1955 and 1969. 40 A w ith d raw al refers to th e a ctio n o f th e party w h ic h in itia lly req u ested th e m ed iatory serv ices o f th e B oard w h en th e p arty retracts its a p p lication . A d ism issal refers to th e a ctio n o f the B oard w h en it d ism isses th e req u est fo r its serv ices a cco rd in g to th e co n d itio n s req uired u n d er th e act (R L A ). Years 1 9 5 5 -6 9 1 9 5 5 -5 9 1 9 6 0 -6 4 1 9 6 5 -6 9 N um ber Percent _______ 32 1.1 _______________ _______________ _______________ 17 9 6 1.5 1.1 0 .6 S O U R C E : N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard data. The remaining category of settlement, refusalsto-arbitrate, constituted a significant measure of the Board’s success and its failure in achieving the objec tives of the R L A and the parties’ acceptance of the spirit and intent of the act. Over the 15-year span, one or both parties refused to accept arbitration as a final and binding m ethod to resolve the issues in dis pute on 372 occasions: 105 times by carriers; 229, by unions; and 38, by both. Excluding dismissals and withdrawals, 2,076 cases were resolved by mediation (in 80.5 percent of the cases), arbitration (1.5 percent), and refusals-to-arbitrate (17.9 percent). With the consummation of the first two methods of settlement, the objective of peaceful industrial relations, as envisioned by the act, was achieved. On 372 occasions however, the Board was unsuccessful in persuading the parties to rely on the lower machinery of the act to resolve la bor-management controversies. Because of the 372 refusals, 47 emergency panels (involving 68 media tion cases) were created in the 15-year period. 13 Chapter IV. Appointment of Railroad Emergency Boards In ten t of th e a c t Since the R L A does not fully define the role of emergency boards, an inquiry into the Congressional hearings conducted before the law’s enactment in 1926 should help to clarify the function and goals of this procedure. One witness (counsel for the orga nized railroad employees), testifying at the Senate hearings, asserted that the “primary purpose and use for such a board is clearly a last effort to settle a controversy which threatens to injure public opinion . . . Such . . . (a) board . . . would . . . want to exercise first of all the mediatory power that would rest within its hands.” 41 Beyond the prim ary func tion, the boards were to conduct investigations con cerning the issues in dispute, to prepare impartial recommendations, and to make their reports to the President.424 3 The technique purportedly represented a recogni tion of the public interest by the parties when they were confronted by an impasse in negotiation: T h e m o s t v a lu a b le f e a tu r e o f t h is l a w is t h e f a c t th a t it r e p r e s e n ts t h e a g r e e m e n t o f t h e p a r tie s , th a t t h e y w ill b e u n d e r t h e m o r a l o b lig a t io n t o s e e t h a t th e ir a g r e e m e n t a c c o m p lis h e s its p u r p o s e , a n d t h a t i f ( i t i s ) e n a c t e d in t o la w , t h e y w ill d e sir e t o p r o v e t h e la w a s u c c e s s .48 As such, this tool was clearly an aid to collective bargaining and was to perform the service of prompting continued dialogue and compromise. It was obvious from the Congressional hearings that all parties concerned anticipated that this instru ment of last resort would be infrequently utilized.44 During the R L A ’s early years (1926-40), the act apparently proved successful. On only 17 occasions were Presidents forced to resort to the use of an emergency procedure. Furtherm ore, recommenda tions of the boards were accepted, and labor disputes in the industry were minimal.45 By 1941, however, collective bargaining relations in the industry began to deteriorate noticeably. Pending “m inor disputes” (controversies arising over the meaning or application of an agreement) began to accumulate, especially in the First Division which handles minor disputes involving operating employ ees. Nor were the awards always accepted by m an agement, who purportedly claimed the decisions were too “legalistic o r pro-labor or both.” 46 Unions, on the other hand, purportedly did not bargain con scientiously on grievance issues and “forced” their arbitration in the belief that they would obtain greater concessions from adjustment boards.47 F or major disputes, direct negotiations proved progres sively less successful and the num ber of mediation cases coming before the NMB increased substan tially.48 Between 1941 and 1949, the num ber of ac tual work stoppages (91), as well as imminent dis putes, accelerated rapidly, and 55 railroad emergency panels were appointed. In addition, 51 boards— the vast majority dealing with railroads— were created during World W ar II years (1 9 4 3 -4 7 ) by the N a tional Railway Labor Panel to supplement the “Sec tion 10” procedures of the R LA .49 A distinct new pattern of emergency board imple45 A c co r d in g to th e D e p a r tm en t o f L a b o r’s B u reau o f 41 Railway Labor A ct, H ea rin g s b e fo r e th e C o m m ittee on Interstate C o m m erce, U .S . S en ate, 6 9 th C o n g ., 1st S ess., on S. 2 3 0 6 , P t. 1, p. 8 3 . (later c ite d as 1926 Senate Hearings). A ls o see Railroad Labor Disputes, H ea rin g s b e fo r e th e C o m m ittee o n In terstate and F o r e ig n C o m m erce, U .S . H o u se o f R ep resen ta tiv es, 6 9 th C o n g ., 1st S ess., o n H .R . 7 1 8 0 , pp. 19 an d 118. (later cited as 1926 House Hearings). 42 1926 Senate Hearings, op . cit., p. 3 5 . 1926 House Hear ings, op. cit., p. 18. 431926 House Hearings, op . cit., p. 2 1 . 441926 House Hearings, op . cit., p. 109. 14 L ab or S tatistics, a to ta l o f 11 w o rk sto p p a g es occu rred in th e p erio d 1 9 3 4 -4 0 . 46 Emergency Board R eport N o. 97, op . c it., p. 6 8 . 47 Ib id . 48 B etw een 1935 and 19 3 9 , an a n n u al avera g e o f ap p rox im a tely 110 railroad m e d ia tio n c a se s w e re d isp o sed o f b y th e B oard , th e a verage risin g to 2 0 2 du rin g th e n e x t 5 years ( 1 9 4 0 -4 4 ). 49 Twenty-Ninth Annual R eport o f the National M edia tion Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1963 (U .S . N a tio n a l M ed ia tio n B oard , 1 9 64), p. 7. mentation was becoming perceptible. In 1941, the major railroad unions “progressed” (advanced) na tional wage demands, and management met the un ions proposals with counter demands for rule changes. After an impasse was reached in confer ences between the parties, the mediatory services of the Board were utilized. When mediation proved un successful, arbitration was proffered and rejected by the unions. With an imminent work stoppage in sight, the President appointed an emergency board whose recommendations were rejected by the un ions. In an unexpected and unprecedented strata gem, the President, hoping to keep the roads operating, personally intervened in the dispute and recommended that the Board be reconvened and their report be modified.50 R a ilr o a d e m e r g e n c y b o a r d s , 1 9 5 0 - 6 9 Since 1950, the Board has disposed of 3,984 me diation cases, of which 94 required the final step in the RLA emergency procedures. (See appendix tables A -4 and A -5 .) In total, 71 emergency panels were appointed by the President to investigate and report on these disputes. Occurring mostly in scat tered clusters, the incidence of these boards over time was irregular and depended on various factors, such as the extent and complexity of proposals, eco nomic trends, pattern settlements, moratoriums, the “forcing” of emergency panels’ appointments through strike threats, the partie’s understanding of the tools provided by the act, and court decisions (discussed in a later section). F a c t o r s a f f e c t in g t h e a p p o in t m e n t o f b o a r d s Moratoriums. At least overtly, the prime mover of industrial relations stability is the negotiation of wage and rule moratoriums in labor agreements. Un like those in most other industries, railroad collective bargaining agreements are open-ended, that is, they contain no definite termination date and are subject either to reopenings for negotiation or to termination at any time, on proper notice by either party. Mora torium provisions, on the other hand, specify time spans during which labor and management agree nei ther to initiate nor to process demands for modifica 5 Apparently, there were only three direct Presidential 0 interventions in railroad emergency board disputes before 1950, twice by Franklin D . Roosevelt (in 1941 and in 1943) and once by Truman (in 1946). tions in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. When moratorium provisions are included in rail road labor agreements, the “exposure rate”, or chance of conflict, obviously is diminished exten sively. For instance, the relative calm in the years 1958-1959 can be attributed, to a significant degree, to 3-year wage and rule agreements which were signed by the railroad employees and the major trunk line rail carriers and other ancillary rail facili ties and which contained moratoriums extending until November 1, 1959. National movements. Whether a dispute eventually culminated in a work stoppage or not, the nature of bargaining in the railroad industry—the preponder ance of national wage and rule movements— inher ently carried with it the potential of a national emergency. In the processing of these movements, the experience was generally satisfactory when the de mands involved relatively uniform wage proposals or few rule changes. When the parties initiated propos als dealing with numerous rule changes or with substantial modifications in existing rules or the revi sion of the entire agreement, the resultant conflicts proved extremely difficult to settle. An example was the set of proposals brought before Emergency Board No. 147, which involved job security and in come protection. Since railroad labor contracts may contain as many as 100 provisions or rules dealing with the terms and conditions of employment, and since the proposed modification of a single rule often produces many issues between the parties, the likeli hood of protracted disputes in rules cases was sub stantial. When the national wage and rule disputes were settled, the accords usually created patterns for the railroad industry, extending to practically all the major railroads. Other carriers or ancillary railroad facilities which did not participate in these industry wide negotiations generally settled on identical or similar terms. Therefore, if the initial national move ment resulted in an agreement without resort to economic “self-help” (a strike or lockout), the nego tiations of hundreds of similar settlements on the var ious carriers in the industry became unnecessary. For example, on March 2, 1959, the Conductors (ORCB) served the Nation’s carriers with wage proposals which were met by counter demands for cancellation of cost-of-living provisions and for a reduction in wages and allowances. After an impasse was reached in direct negotiations, the dispute was settled by mediation of June 4, 1960. 15 On the other hand, some of the industrywide ne gotiations were not settled peacefully and resulted in transportation crises which at times had adverse ef fects on the economy. For example, on November 2, 1959, the Nation’s major carriers, associated with the National Railway Labor Conference, served “Section 6” notices dealing with rule changes on all five operating unions. After exhausting all provisions of the act, including use of an emergency board, a Presidential Commission was appointed to consider the dispute. Even though the National Mediation Board, an emergency board, the President of the United States, the U.S. Department of Labor, and a Presidential Commission (among others) intervened in this dispute, three work stoppages ensued, includ ing one terminated by Congressional ad hoc legisla tion (Public Law 88-108). Economic trends. Economic trends have also played a substantive role in determining the incidence of emergency situations. In periods of rising national employment, output, and prices, pressures which were transmitted to the industry led the union leadership (and rank-and-file) to seek substantial wage increases and management to issue counter pro posals dealing with rule changes. Secular trends in the competitiveness of the railroad industry with other modes of transportation, as well as the intro duction of new technology, have induced manage ment to adopt alterations in work methods, resulting in union proposals for rule changes, employment sta b iliza tio n , an d in c o m e p r o te c tio n b en efits. Strike threats. Creation of emergency situations through strike threats also has precipitated the Board’s proffer of mediation under section 5 of the act and, at times, its notification to the President of an imminent work stoppage that threatened to sub stantially interrupt interstate commerce. The Board has stated many times that its efforts were more suc cessful in reconciling the parties’ divergent interests when the dispute was not complicated by a strike threat. When strike threats were issued, the procedures of the act often had not been exhausted, either in the adjustment process for “minor” disputes or in collec tive bargaining, mediation, and arbitration for the handling of major disputes. For instance, Emergency Board No. 86 chastised the Trainmen, who were confronted with the introduction of Budd Diesel cars, for not inaugurating proceedings before an ad justment board or under “section 6” of the act. “In 16 preference to either of these alternatives, it invoked mediation; and when it failed to achieve its objec tives, it voted to strike. This procedure caused the controversy to come before an Emergency Board without the basic issues ever having been considered in conference between the parties, and without (the basic issues) having been presented to this (Emergency) Board.” 51 Moreover, unions sometimes issued strike threats in the belief that this action would result in greater concessions than would otherwise be obtainable. Thus, both parties tended to refrain from granting concessions until after the emergency board’s report had been released. Role of the parties. Ultimately, the factor determin ing the incidence of emergency board appointments is the parties themselves. The act is based on the principles of freedom of contract and maximum self-determination, rather than on government coer cion. Under this system, the principals must decide the merit of their proposals and negotiate “liveable” collective bargaining agreements which will provide adequately for the public interest. To aid the parties in this pursuit, the act provides for various settle ment procedures. These procedures, in themselves, obviously cannot guarantee industrial relations sta bility and the absence of work stoppages. If labor and management genuinely accept the spirit and in tent of the act and attempt to understand its proce dures and to utilize the tools available to them, the appointment of an emergency board should be a rare occasion. “Proliferation” of emergency boards. In the past 20 years, the “Section 10” procedure has been depicted as being overused and labor-management negotia tions in emergency disputes as being dominated by the Government, contrary to the original intent of the act. Critics have frequently charged that the NMB has pursued a policy of automatically notifying the President of almost any dispute which was unset tled after it had intervened, the only criterion being whether a work stoppage threatened interstate com merce. Since the railroad unions have routinely set strike dates when impasses were reached in negotia tions or in mediation conducted by the Board, the occurrence of these “imminent work stoppages” has been extremely high. Consequently, it has appeared that the effectiveness of the emergency board proce5 Emergency Board R eport N o. 86, op. cit., p. 6. 1 dures as an instrument of last resort has been reduced and that the parties to the disputes have integrated the procedure into their own collective bargaining strategy. If this lessening of effectiveness has in fact oc curred, its cause may have been in the implementa tion of the act.52 The proponents of the act and Con gress obviously had anticipated that few emergency situations would occur and require the appointment of an emergency board, which was intended to be an instrument of last resort. But by the early 1950’s, “the term ‘emergency’, in the sense of limitation to rare cases, was becoming outmoded.” 53 As the NMB observed in one of its annual reports: At times however, the machinery of collective bargaining, for the reasons cited in the following sec tions, may break down, and this failure can result in a national emergency. On union leader intimately in volved in many railroad disputes has characterized the cause of emergencies in the industry in these terms: “Those who charge that the RLA has broken down either fail to understand it (the act) or refuse to do so. The act has succeeded. It is collective bar gaining that has failed.” 55 According to the members of Board No. 169, per functory bargaining occurred in most disputes that culminated in the use of the act’s emergency machin ery: T he three (earlier) steps (negotiations, m ediation and arbitration) should operate to hold to a m ini m um the necessity for the use o f E m ergency Board procedure (s ic ) . Such procedure w as not designed as a substitute for collective bargaining or to provide a catchall fo r all disputes or a tem porary refuge from the problem s that should be faced and resolved by sincere and conscientious collective bargaining efforts, but w as intended for use only in extrem e situations w here w ork stop pages on im portant transportation facilities w ould result in substantial disruption to business and w ould im pose extrem e hardships on the traveling public in peacetim e or retard or im pede defense efforts in tim e o f w ar or national em ergency.5 4 It becam e apparent that n o real bargaining has actually taken place betw een the parties (prior to ) their appearance before the Board. W e believe this is generally the case in proceedings b efore E m ergency Boards . . . T h e parties begin to n e gotiate on ly after an E m ergency Board has been appointed, and often on ly after a report has been subm itted to the President. W e b elieve that co n tinuation o f this practice w ill defeat other at tem pts to im prove labor relations in the railroad industry.5 6 Ineffective collective bargaining. Collective bargain ing on the local properties constitutes the first step in reaching an agreement between the parties. In the vast majority of cases, negotiations are concluded on these properties without government intervention or active assistance of the Board. Although there are no accurate statistics on the number of peaceful settle ments at this level, the NMB receives on the aver age, annually, well over 1,000 amendments or revi sions of labor agreements. This statistic understates the number of “Section 6” notices served by the parties on each other, since many revisions or amendments, especially those dealing exclusively with local issues, are never filed with the Board. 8 The avowed efficacy and acceptance of the act, even by 2 late 1949, can be exemplified by this quote from one labor leader: “The splendid record which the railroad industry has developed generally in the peaceful settlement o f differences which have arisen is ample and eloquent testimony o f the high regard in which this Act is held.” (Trainmen N ews, Oct. 3, 1949, p. 3.) 5 Emergency Board R eport N o. 97, op. cit., p. 68. 8 5 Twenty ^Fourth Annual R eport of the National M edia4 tion Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1958 (U.S. National Mediation Board, 1959), p. 7. Observing a similar tendency, the members of Emer gency Board No. 154 noted, “there has been an un fortunate tendency in this industry to postpone real collective bargaining until the final hour.” 57 One manifestation of this inclination was the ac tual number of days the parties faced each other across the bargaining table in negotiations.58 The principals involved in Emergency Board No. 147 (1958) failed to reach an accord in their only con ference conducted before invoking the mediatory services of the NMB. The parties who participated in the deliberations before Emergency Board No. 145 conferred only four times before requesting govern ment intervention. Similarly, an impasse in direct ne gotiations preceding Board No. 118 was reached al most immediately; and, after the NMB’s proffer of arbitration, the parties negotiated only once. Be tween July and October 1957, the participants in volved in Emergency Board No. 133 (Pennsylvania Railroad and the Transport Workers) conferred for 3 Machinists M onthly Journal, November 1950, p. 329. 5 3 Report to the President by Emergency Board N o. 169 6 (U.S. National Mediation Board, March 10, 1967), p. 4. 5 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 154 7 (U.S. National Mediation Board, May 13, 1963), p. 11. 5 This measure is arbitrary and does not reflect “confer 8 ences” conducted over the telephone, by letters, and by other “informal” means of communications. 17 only 2 days. In many of these emergency situations, the unions claimed that the carriers, assured of gov ernment protection against actual or imminent work stoppages, did not engage in “genuine” bargaining. On the other hand, management asserted that the unions, in the expectation of precipitating an emer gency dispute, did not conduct “good-faith” negotia tions, but awaited the appointment of a board and its report, of which the favorable recommendations would be accepted and the others would be rejected.59* National cases. In connection with national cases, the NMB, as early as 1950, publicly disclosed its concern with the parties’ perfunctory bargaining: T he Board is further disturbed by the apparent reluctance o f both the carriers and the organiza tions in national cases to conduct through co llec tive bargaining; each side apparently feelin g that the responsibility for the disposition o f all such cases should be attached to som e other source. If the R ailw ay Labor A ct is to survive, there m ust be an ever-present consciousness o f and the desire o f the parties to m ake it w ork in the m anner w hich they (th e parties) so strongly advocated w hen it w as placed on the Federal Statute books.®0 At that time there was a growing tendency for fewer and fewer national movements to be settled in me diation, and, in the early 1950’s, emergency boards became increasingly ineffective in the settle ment of such disputes.61 For example, on March 1, 1951, several unions representing nonoperating em ployees signed their first wage settlement, in 14 years, not disposed of by arbitration or an emer gency board.62 In their next four general wage move ments, three resulted in the appointment of an emer gency board.63 This same problem also was evident in the na tional movements of ancillary rail facilities. Except for a negotiated agreement in 1960, all of the Rail way Express Agency (REA) and the Teamsters’ (IBT) national bargaining movements, which were 5 The parties, themselves, have requested the appointment 9 of boards, e.g., the unions for Emergency Board N os. 81, 95, 173, and others; the carriers for Emergency Board Nos. 129, 154, 157, 172, and others. 00 NMB, Sixteenth Annual R eport, op. cit., p. 7. 6 Eighteenth Annual R eport of the National Mediation 1 Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1952 (U.S. N a tional Mediation Board, 1953), p. 24. 0 M onthly Labor Review, Vol. 72, N o. 4, Apr. 1951, p. 2 451. 0 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 159 3 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Apr. 3, 1964), p. 26. 18 initiated in 1941, resulted in the creation of emer gency boards, 12 in number, the last one appointed in September 1962.64 Grievance boards. Besides ineffective and perfunc tory collective bargaining, another activity which vio lated the spirit and intent of the act and which vitiated the effectiveness of its implementation was evident in the early 1950’s.65 In seven instances, the parties did not comply fully with the adjustment ma chinery that the RLA provided for the settlement of disputes dealing with the interpretation and applica tion of agreements, i.e., grievances or time claims.66 Instead they actively impaired the effectiveness of the act by “forcing” the use of mediation and emer gency boards for the processing of these controver sies, contrary to the intent of the framers of the act: W e com e here w ith the im plication b y our com ing that both parties are com m itted to this (th e act) as a m eans o f preventing interruptions o f trans portation. A nd that every step in it m ust be pur sued before there is an interruption o f transpor tation.6 7 In the early 1950’s, the NMB usually pursued a policy of refusing to docket mediation cases which were properly referable to adjustment boards. When confronted with a strike threat or an imminent work stoppage, the Board, however, proffered its media tory services, as authorized under section 5(b), in an attempt to prevent interruptions of railroad opera tions. In some instances (e.g., Emergency Board No. 86), the parties did not negotiate on the local prop erties prior to bringing the dispute before an emer gency board. Several of the grievances processed by emergency panels were pending before adjustment boards or were previously decided in principle by a prior emergency or adjustment board, e.g., Emer gency Board No. 79. Moreover, the parties, at times, threatened to re sort to “self-help” (economic force) rather than to the normal channels of the RLA’s procedures. One emergency board (No. 91) characterized this prac tice as one pursued “in the hope that it (an emer gency board) will make favorable recommendations concerning contentions about grievances, with no 84 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 153 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Nov. 10, 1962), p. 4. 65 Starting in 1945, operating unions displayed a growing inclination to set strike dates on grievance dockets which were properly referable to an adjustment board, particularly the First Division’s. 66 Emergency Board Nos> 76, 78, 79, 80, 86, 91, and 104. 6 1926 Senate hearings, op. cit., p. 16. 7 binding effect if the reverse recommendation should be made.” 68 On some occasions, the unions claimed that the railroads systematically ignored the stages of negotiations and mediation, and thus, “made the last step the first by hurdling the first two steps . . . into an emergency which need not have existed,” 69 e.g., Emergency Board No. 79. At other times, the unions agreed that the griev ances were within the jurisdiction of an adjustment board, but claimed that the circumvention of normal channels was necessary because of processing delays in these types of disputes and because of the carriers’ refusals to apply precedents, e.g., Emergency Board No. 78. Considerable merit seemed to exist on the matter of delay, as evidenced by this statement of Emergency Board No. 76: T his Board is n ot unm indful o f the fa ct that for som e considerable tim e there has been lo n g and unusual delay in the progressing o f cases through the First D ivision (adjustm ent boards). A num ber o f other E m ergency Boards have taken n ote o f this unfortunate situation and h ave m ad e recom m endations for the elim ination o f these delays. W e believe that substantial progress has recently been m ade in that direction . . . ( W ) e should h ow ever like to point out that i f it is perm issible under the R ailw ay Labor A c t fo r em ployees to circum vent the functioning o f th e A djustm ent Board m erely by creating a situation that calls for the appointm ent o f an E m ergency Board the act has lost its efficacy for m aintaining harm onious and orderly relations in the railroad industry in sofar as operational disputes are concerned.7 0 NMB records also substantiated the union claims. The number of pending minor cases dealing with the interpretation and application of agreements in creased substantially between 1947 and 1952. A vast majority of these docketed and pending cases (77 percent in 1953) were accounted for by the adjust ment boards in the First Division. To relieve the First Division’s burdensome work load, leaders of the five operating organizations and the three carrier conference committees consum mated an agreement creating two supplemental ad justment boards on May 19, 1949. Because of delays in obtaining the necessary funds, the boards did not function effectively until January 1950. During thenext 4 fiscal years, the number of minor cases dis posed of by the First Division, fluctuating substan tially, increased, as shown below: Cases disposed o f 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 _____________________________________ 731 --------------------------------------------------------- 1,438 -----------------------------------------------------------1,110 --------------------------------------------------------- 1,313 --------------------------------------------------------- 2,792 On December 12, 1953, the union leaders represent ing the operating employees advised the carrier con ference committees that they desired to terminate these adjustment boards, the official cessation com ing on March 22, 1954. A landmark decision which effectively eliminated the “necessity” of appointing emergency boards to consider grievance cases was the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. the Chicago River and Indi ana Railroad Co.71 After conducting negotiations dealing with 21 grievances on the local properties, the trainmen set a strike date, and the NMB prof fered mediation. Following the exhaustion of medi ation and the rejection of arbitration, the carrier filed a grievance with an adjustment board. After the union again set a strike date, the carrier transferred the case to the courts. When the case finally was appealed to the Supreme Court, it ruled that once a grievance dispute was brought before an adjustment board the courts could issue an injunction to halt a work stoppage and that the provisions requiring the submission of minor disputes to adjustment boards “were to be considered as compulsory arbitration in this limited field.” 72 " R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o, 91 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Sept. 13, 1950), p. 7. 7 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen vs. Chicago River 1 " L abor, March 4, 1950, p. 1. 7 0 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o, 76 and Indiana Railroad Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). (U.S. National Mediation Board, Aug. 2, 1949), pp. 2 -4 . 7 Ibid., p. 39. 2 1 9 Chapter V. The Role of Government Another contributory factor explaining the “prolif eration” in the number of emergency boards was that these panels were not always instruments of last resort. At various times, one of the principals claimed that the other did not bargain in “good faith” and awaited the appointment of an emergency board. The unions asserted that the carriers acted on the assurance that the government would intervene to settle an imminent or actual national emergency dispute, and the carriers argued that the organiza tions perfunctorily progressed the controversies through the emergency procedures until the “final” step was reached in anticipation of reaping “re wards” beyond those recommended by the boards by utilizing political influence to obtain more favorable terms from Congress or the White House. Under these conditions, labor and management were both inclined to adopt relatively inflexible, doctrinaire bargaining positions and refused to grant conces sions until the boards issued their reports. Faced with impasses in negotiations and pending work stoppages, the Federal Government often ac tively intervened under the stress of pressures and the necessity of protecting the public interests, de spite the fact that direct government intervention, exclusive of the (National) Mediation Boad’s role, was not contemplated by the framers of the law. The counsel for the Firemen and Engineers, testifying be fore the Emergency Board No. 97, asserted that: A nother fault in recent years stem s from the tendency o f the E xecu tive D epartm ents to sub ordinate or disregard the functions o f the N a tional M ediation Board, and to take direct charge o f and to m ake recom m endations for the settle m ent o f disputes. T hen, it appears, after negotia tions have failed, the (em erg en cy ) boards have been appointed by the execu tive’s office for a specific purpose to perhaps report on a prejudged dispute rather than to study the facts im partially and objectively.7 3 Ad h o c leg islatio n In four disputes, all since 1963, Congress inter vened in railroad national emergency disputes and settled them, at least temporarily, by means of ad hoc legislation.74 The first case came about when five operating unions were served “Section 6” notices, which primarily dealt with rule changes, especially manning issues, by the Nation’s major carriers repre sented by the Eastern, Western, and Southwestern Carriers Conference Committees. After national conferences were broken off on May 17, 1962, the unions applied for the mediatory services of the NMB. On June 26, 1962, the Board proffered arbi tration which was declined by the unions. With the approach of a strike deadline, the President created an emergency board on April 3, 1963, and received the board’s report on May 13, 1963. The parties, thereupon, returned to the bargaining table to reach an agreement, but were unsuccessful in their efforts. 7 4 On May 18, 1971, Congress passed emergency legisla tion (Public Law 92-17) ordering a halt to a fifth dispute, a 2-day nationwide railroad strike conducted by the Signal R eport of Emergency Board R eport N o . 97, op. cit., p. men (BRS) against carriers represented by the National Railway Labor Conference. Individuals familiar with the industry have criti7 3 64. cized the Federal Government, particularly the Ex ecutive Branch of placing political expediency before the intent and spirit of the act by offering the “good offices” of the Labor Department or the White House to resolve disputes. Presidents at times have asked for legislation to provide compulsory settle ment of imminent or actual disputes, because they felt that direct negotiations had failed. But, it has been argued, direct negotiations may have failed be cause Presidents at times publicly announced that work stoppages would not be tolerated, thus mitigat ing the parties’ incentive to resolve the disputes on their own. Under these circumstances, it was not sur prising that carriers have petitioned the Federal Government for arbitration and other forms of inter vention and that unions have applied economic pres sures. 20 To provide for the settlement of this labor dispute, Congress, on August 28, 1963, enacted Public Law 88-108 requiring compulsory arbitration to resolve two issues. Under the terms of the law, Arbitration Board No. 282 was created with representatives of all the interested parties, including the public, to in vestigate and to issue a final and binding award on the use of firemen (helpers) and crew consist of train, road, and yard crews. The award was to re main in effect until January 25, 1966. The dispute was revived by demands for rule changes served by the Firemen and Engineers (BLFE) on November 15, 1965, and by the counter proposals issued by the Nation’s carriers on January 31, 1966.75 Under the terms of the union’s “Section 6” notice, it desired to restore a majority of the 18,000 fireman positions eliminated by the provisions of Arbitration Board No. 282. After negotiations and mediation proved unsuccessful in resolving the dispute and after arbi tration was rejected, a strike was conducted by the union on July 17, 1970, and the President was compelled to appoint an emergency board (No. 177) to resolve the dispute. Because of an imminent work stoppage after the rejection of Emergency Board No. 169’s recommen dations, congressional intervention was required for another dispute, one which involved proposals for wage increases, modification of wage differentials, and improvements in fringe benefits for 137,000 workers represented by six shopcraft unions (the Machinists, Boilermakers and Blacksmiths, Sheet Metal Workers, Electricians, Firemen and Oilers, and Carmen). Faced with a strike deadline of April 13, 1967, Congress on April 11, 1967 approved, and the President on the following day signed into law Public Law 90-10, which extended the period of statutory restraint provided in section 10 of the RLA until May 3, 1967. The President, on April 22, 1967, appointed a three-man Special Mediation Panel, which issued a report that included a “paediation solution” to resolve the dispute. The Panel’s report, however, did not produce a settlement; and when an impasse in further negotia tions between the parties was reached, the President, " ’This statement is somewhat misleading since this issue was alive; see Emergency Board Report Nos. 164 (p. 4) and 172 (pp. 2-3). For a brief and informative digest o f the Firemen’s dis pute, see Emergency Board R eport N o. 177, Appendix A, pp. 11-15; and Joseph F. Fulton, The Railway Firemen Manning Dispute: History and Issues, 1959-70, Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, July 31, 1970. on April 28, 1967, again petitioned for a congres sional solution. On May 2, 1967, Public Law 90-13, which provided for an additional 20 days restraint beyond that provided in section 10 of the act, was passed by Congress and signed by the President. Two days later, in a message to Congress, the Presi dent proposed special legislation to dispose of the controversy. Thereupon, the unions agreed to post pone a strike for a “reasonable length of time.” On July 16 and 17, work stoppages were con ducted against various carriers and were terminated on July 17 by Congress through passage of Public Law 90-54, which authorized a five-man Special Board to provide a final settlement of the shopcraft dispute. The Board’s Report and Determination was issued on August 15, 1967. In subsequent negotia tions, the parties accepted the Board’s determina tion. In November 1968, both parties simultaneously served “Section 6” notices. The unions’ demands dealt mainly with wages, and the carriers’ with work rules. Some of the issues involved in Emergency Board No. 169 were revitalized in this dispute and included such questions as whether the pattern of wage increases of other nonoperating employees should apply to shopcraft workers, whether to permit continued narrowing of differentials between jour neymen (and mechanics and helpers) and less skilled workers, and whether to change some basic rules (subcontracting, advance notice of force reduc tions due to emergencies). After an impasse in nego tiations was reached, the parties jointly applied for the NMB’s mediatory services on April 10, 1969. When mediation and arbitration failed to produce a settlement, the President created an emergency board (No. 176) on October 3, 1969. With the issu ance of the Board’s report on November 2, 1969, all provisions of the act were exhausted without settling the dispute. The unions, however, did not walk out; instead, bargaining was resumed with the assistance of the Department of Labor. On December 4, 1969, a tentative agreement was reached, but the accord was not ratified by the Sheet Metal Workers (SMWIA). Because this rejection precipitated an imminent na tional emergency, the President, on March 3, 1970, requested special legislation to deal with the threat ened work stoppage. Public Law 91-203 was ap proved on March 4, 1970, and prohibited a strike or lockout for 37 days. When a final impasse was reached, Public Law 91-226 was passed by Con 21 gress, on April 9, 1970, as anticipated by the mem bers of Emergency Board No. 176.76 In the fourth dispute, congressional intervention was set in motion by the serving of wage and rule proposals in 1969 by four unions— the Clerks, Main tenance of Way Employees, Hotel and Restaurant Employees, and United Transportation Union (the latter a union created by the merger of all operating employees, except those represented by BLE, on January 1, 1969)— on the members of the National Railway Labor Conference (NRLC). After negotia tions were conducted on local and national levels, the parties jointly applied for the mediatory services of the NMB. When mediation failed to resolve the dispute and arbitration was rejected, the President appointed an emergency board (No. 178) on Sep tember 18, 1970, and received the Board’s report on November 9, 1970. After all the steps in the RLA procedure were exhausted, the NMB officially termi nated its mediatory services on August 10, 1970. During September 1970, negotiations were con ducted under the auspices of the NMB and the De partment of Labor. An impasse in bargaining quickly developed, and a selective work stoppage was called against three lines, the Baltimore and Ohio, Louis ville and Nashville, and Southern Pacific railroads. On the issuance of an injunction restraining the un ions from further withdrawing their members’ serv ices, the strike was terminated. Negotiations between the parties resumed once more. Although both wages and rules were in con tention, the main obstacles to settlement for the non operating unions were economic issues and for the UTU, rule issues. On December 10, 1970, the or ganizations again conducted a nationwide work stop page, the fifth since the end of World War II. On the same day, Congress passed legislation (Public Law 91-541) that terminated the strike and provided for a wage increase of 13.5 percent, but no modifica tions in work rules. P re s id e n tia l ra ilro a d co m m issio n s Besides ad hoc legislation, direct government in tervention was evidenced by establishment of three Presidential commissions to investigate and report on critical railroad disputes. The first commission was an outgrowth of the dispute that resulted in the ap pointment of Emergency Board No. 154 and con 7 6 R eport to the President by Emergency Board N o. 176 f^U.S. National Mediation Board, N ov. 2, 1969), p. 5. 22 gressional intervention in the form of ad hoc legisla tion. On October 17, 1960, the five operating unions and the Nation’s railroad carriers agreed to submit their work rules controversy to a Railroad Commis sion established by President Eisenhower on Novem ber 1, 1960. A 15-man Commission, including five representing the public interest, was appointed and reported on February 28, 1962. Because the parties were unable to resolve the dispute on the terms of the report, Public Law 88-108 was passed. The two remaining commissions dealt with rail road marine disputes, both involving the New York Harbor Carriers Conference Committee. In the first, all the procedures of the RLA were exhausted by the carriers and the Pilots (MMP), the Marine Engi neers (NMEB), and the Seamen (SIU), with the is suance of an emergency board’s report on December 10, 1960. After rejecting the board’s recommendations, the unions struck from January 1 to January 23, 1961. On the latter date, the parties settled all issues, ex cept those relating to manning. A decision on this issue was deferred until a railroad commission could be created and its report released. By Executive Order 10929, the President established the Railroad Marine Commission on March 24, 1961. The Com mission released its report on June 11, 1962; the un ions rejected its recommendations. In addition, the Railroad Lighter Captains Com mission was created by Executive Order No. 10948 on June 12, 1961, to decide a controversy between the Longshoremen (ILA) and the New York Har bor Carriers Conference Committee. It, too, proceded from an emergency dispute, one precipi tated on September 31, 1959, by the serving of de mands relating to the manning of lighters. The parties negotiated over a 5-month period, the last conference being held on September 29, 1960. On that day, the carriers invoked mediation. When me diation failed to resolve the controversy and arbitra tion was rejected, the President appointed a panel on January 21, 1961. Shortly after the board 1 1£dv 1 public its recommendations, the parties entered into an agreement on the issues in dispute, but held the issue of the manning of lighters in abeyance pending the report of a lighter captains’ commission pursuant to the recommendations of Emergency Board No. 134. On June 12,1961, the Commission was created by Executive Order 10948. The Commission re leased its report, which was not accepted by the un ions, on July 11, 1962. P re sid e n tia l s e iz u re s To maintain the operation of key industries, be cause of anticipated or actual work stoppages, Presi dential seizures of production and distribution facili ties have occurred at various times in the United States. Only four Presidents (Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Truman) have utilized this form of government intervention. Of this total of 71 seizures, 12 involved railroads, the first occurring at the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad in 1864, and the last at the Newburg and South Shore Rail road (a subsidiary of U.S. Steel) in 1951. During the period under study, President Truman seized the Chicago, Rock Island, and Pacific Railroad on July 8, 1950, when the Switchmen (SUNA) rejected Emergency Board No. 83’s recommendations and struck the above railroad and four other carriers; a temporary injunction was secured to insure continued operation of these carriers. Fifty days later, President Truman seized 194 major railroad carriers involved in Emergency Board No. 81, after the Trainmen (BRT) and the Conductors (ORC) announced that they would withdraw from the services of the rail roads associated with the Eastern, Western, and Southeastern Carriers Conference Committees. On May 23, 1952, when these three organizations reached agreements with the Nation’s major carriers, the President relinquished control over the rail roads.77 O th e r fo rm s of in terv e n tio n Presidents have also intervened in railroad emer gency disputes by offering their “good offices” to help resolve the parties’ divergent interests. Al though a compendium of such activity was not made, Presidential intervention was observed in more than 12 emergency boards. For example, following the seizure on August 27, 1950, of most of the Nation’s carriers involved in the 40-hour week movement of early 1950, conferences between representatives of two operating unions (the Trainmen and Conduc tors), the carriers, the NMB, and the President were held in Washington. On November 2, 1951, the En gineers and Firemen (BLFE) joined the parties in 7 John Blackman, Presidential Seizures in Labor D is 7 putes, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University (1969), pp. 3, 4, 257-8. Because of these seizures, the carriers participating in the deliberations of Emergency Board Nos. 95, 97 and 98 were under Federal control at the time o f the boards* appointments. negotiations conducted at the White House. Seven weeks later a tentative agreement was signed at the White House by the parties, but subsequently the un ions’ general committees rejected the accord. On January 18, 1951, conferences resumed at the White House, were later broken off, and continued again in April 1952. On May 25, 1952, the parties settled all issues in dispute. M ajor in te rru p tio n s The “proliferation” of “Section 10” procedures (establishment of emergency boards) was also ag gravated by the appointment of boards in situations which may not have resulted in major interruptions of interstate commerce. Such excessive use of emer gency procedures was deplored by the NMB in its 1953 Report: It is the feelin g o f th e Board that this procedure (em ergen cy boards) should b e reserved for cases that threaten m ajor interruptions to interstate com m erce, cind that disputes w h ich are o f lesser im portance, or w hich m a y affect interstate co m m erce to a lesser degree, should be disposed o f through the other adjustment procedures in the A ct.7 8 Under section 10, the precondition to establish an emergency board is the existence of a dispute which “threaten(s) substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of essential transportation service . . .” Despite the relatively clear intention of section 10 and the sup porting NMB statement, the NMB has at times rec ommended the establishment of emergenpy panels in cases that were concerned solely with small and lo calized carriers or those that could not possibly threaten commerce to the extent required by law be cause their lines were sufficiently paralleled by other railroads. Id e n tic al is s u e s o n s e p a r a te c a rrie r s Another type of questionable use of the act’s “Section 10” procedure related to the appointment of emergency boards to investigate controversies in volving identical issues on separate railroads. For ex ample, on September 1, 1961, 11 cooperating rail road labor organizations representing nonoperating 7 8 Nineteenth Annual R eport o f the N ational M ediation Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1953 (U.S. N a tional Mediation Board, 1954), p. 23. 23 employees issued “Section 6” notices, dealing pri marily with wage demands, on the Nation’s major carriers, who quickly served identical counter pro posals on the unions. After negotiations and media tion (which was requested by the unions on October 10, 1961) proved unsuccessful, arbitration was prof fered by the Board on February 2, 1962, and was declined by the unions. The NMB notified the Presi dent on February 27, 1962, that an imminent na tional emergency dispute existed, and he, in turn, created an emergency board on March 3, 1962, to consider the controversy. Meanwhile, the Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) informed the organizations on February 9, 1962, that it was no longer actively participating in the national movement. After the FEC refused to be a signatory to the national agreement, which was signed on June 5, 1962, the unions requested the mediatory services of the NMB (on July 20, 1962). An impasse in mediation, which was initiated on Au gust 15, 1962, was quickly reached. On September 25, 1962, the Board proffered arbitration, which was declined by both parties. In November, FEC requested that die NMB no tify the President of an imminent emergency dispute. The Board, in turn, formally notified the carrier: . . . T he issues in this dispute are th e sam e as 24 w ere fu lly and adequately heard b y Presidential E m ergency Board N o . 145 . . . T h e R ailw ay Labor A c t never contem plated that . . . Boards w ould be created to consider identical issues aris ing on separate railroads. T o proceed in that m an ner w ould w eaken or destroy d ie effectiveness o f the A c t.” On the same day the unions conducted a work stoppage, and FEC began to hire permanent replace ments which enabled the carrier to restore the major portion of its freight operations by late summer of 1963. The President, nevertheless, ordered an anquiry to determine the possible effects of the work stoppage on defense and space programs After con ducting hearings, the Board of Inquiry claimed that “this labor dispute is currently and potentially detri mental to our Nation’s defense and space efforts.” 80 When negotiations, mediation, and arbitration again proved unsuccessful, the NMB notified the President on November 4, 1963, that the dispute remained un adjusted and threatened to deprive a section of the country of essential transportation services. Five days later, the President appointed a board to inves tigate and report on the controversy. '"'Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 157 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Dec. 23, 1963), n 3 “ Ibid., p. 5. C h a p t e r V I. C h a r a c t e r is t ic s o f E m e r g e n c y B o a r d s , 1950-69 Participation The incidence of emergency board participation by operating and nonoperating groups was quite dis tinct; both groups were the sole principals in 35 in stances each and they were involved jointly in one case. (See table 4 and appendix table A -4 ) . In the 1950’s, the operating unions participated in 22 pan els— 15 of these between 1950 and 1952— many dealing with either grievances or the introduction of and conversion to the 4 0 -h o u r week. In this same decade, the nonoperating groups were involved in 14 boards; five were appointed between September 1955 and August 1957, the remaining nine scattered throughout this decade. On the other hand, nonoper ating groups were involved in 22 boards in the 1960’s, 18 of which were established between M ay 1960 and August 1964. During the same decade, the operating crafts participated in 14 emergency dis putes and were active in all the boards created be tween September 1964 and January 1969 which were concerned with crew size and job security. Unlike the incidence of participation by m ajor groups, the involvement of various national unions was quite irregular and depended on the crafts the unions represented and the type(s) of bargaining they conducted (e.g., on their own o r allied with oth ers). Some unions, particularly those representing operating employees and shopcraft workers, partici pated frequently. The other nonoperating unions generally were involved more infrequently. Size Under the provisions of the act, an emergency board may be appointed if, in the opinion of die President, a dispute “threaten(s) to substantially in terrupt interstate commerce.” By definition then, the establishment of these panels inherently depends on the size and routes of the carriers, the size and essen tiality of the crafts involved in the dispute, and the effects of a work stoppage, the last being the decisive factor. One indication of size, and thus potential im pact of a strike or lockout, is the num ber of princi pals involved in any dispute. Only 30 emergency disputes involved single-units, that is, controversies between only one carrier and one union. (See table 4 .) O f the 30 panels, 18 were convened to hear and decide cases involving operat ing employees and 12 for nonoperating workers. Table 4. Railroad emergency boards, by size and major group, selected periods, 1950-69 Single-unit boards Period 1950-69 ____ 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 _________ _________ _________ _________ Total multi unit boards Multi-union boards 1 Multicarrier boards1 “ Pure” multi unit boards12 * All boards Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees 71 18 12 818 824 88 8 15 14 21 4 12 24 12 23 12 9 3 4 2 4 3 5 7 3 3 85 4 3 11 86 5 3 1 6 85 4 3 3 4 4 3 9 5 2 3 1 4 4 — 1 Double counting enters here, i.e., the number of multiunion boards includes those panels which involved a single carrier and more than one union and panels in which both more than one union and more than one carrier participated; similarly for multicarrier boards. Obviously, then, only six multiunit boards were characterized as having only more than one union; and 19, as having only more than one carrier. — 1 82 Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees — 1 1 Nonoper ating em ployees 8 Both operating and nonoperating employees were involved in Emer gency Board No. 170. NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. SOURCE: National Mediation Board data. s “ Pure” multiunit boards refer to those involving both more than one carrier and more than one union. 25 Perhaps this differing rate of participation reflected the operating crafts’ commanding position when withdrawing their labor services. N ot surprisingly, the unions whose members’ skills were more essential to the continued operation of railways and auxiliary facilities were active parties in most of the single-unit panels. Employees repre sented by the Trainm en (BRT) were associated with nine of these emergency disputes; the Conductors’ (ORCB) members on five occasions; the Engineers’ (BLE), four times; and the Clerks’ (BRASC), twice. Similarly, railroads involved in the “Section 10” procedures were more often than not carriers with extensive passenger operations (e.g., the Long Island Railroad’s participation in Emergency Board Nos.129 and 173), with routes that are not exten sively paralleled by m any other carriers (e.g., Atchi son, Topeka and Sante F e Railroad’s involvement in Emergency Board Nos. 126 and 165), or with unu sual operations necessary, but somewhat adjunctive, to the operations of the Nation’s rail facilities (e.g., R E A ’s participation in Emergency Board Nos. 93, 105, 111, 117 and 153 and the Pullm an Co.’s in Emergency Board Nos. 89, 96 and 107). Another prom inent finding was that over time fewer and fewer boards were appointed, in relative terms, to investigate and report single-unit emergency disputes. (See table 4.) During the 1950’s, 19 such panels were convened, 13 in the first half of the dec ade. Of these 19 boards, 12 were appointed to consi der emergency disputes involving operating crafts. Presidents intervened 11 times to adjust emergency rail disputes in the 1960’s, only twice in the 1965-69 period. Of the 11 panels, six were convened to de cide cases in which operating employees partici pated. On the other hand, Presidents intervened in mul tiunit disputes (i.e., those involving m ore than one union or more than one carrier) on 41 occasions, 22 in which more than one union participated, 35 in which m ore than one carrier was involved, and 16 in which more than one union and more than one rail way participated (“pure” multiunit panels), as shown in table 4.81 Interestingly nonoperating groups participated in 12 “pure” m ultiunit cases, pri marily because some of the unions representing non operating employees “progressed” (conducted) wage and rule movements jointly. A division of pan els by m ajor groups revealed that operating crafts participated in 18 m ultiunit boards and nonoperating crafts in 24, one of which (Emergency Board No. 170) involved both m ajor groups. Because of the predominance of industrywide movements, the nature of bargaining apparently ex plained the higher incidence of nonoperating em ployees’ unions in the m ultiunit boards. Throughout most of the two decades under study— until 1964— 11 railroad organizations representing the vast ma jority of nonoperating employees jointly initiated and progressed uniform industrywide wage and rule movements.82 O n the other hand, the five operating unions generally dealt with wage and rule move ments in the same manner, but separately. 8 Double counting enters here, i.e., the number of multi 1 union boards includes those panels which involved a single carrier and more than one union and panels in which both more than one union and more than one carrier participated, similarly for multicarrier boards. Obviously, then, only six multiunit boards were characterized as only having mote than one union; and 19, as only having more than one carrier. KThe 11 included the shop craft, maintenance of way, signal, clerical, and communications employees’ unions. Table 5. National railroad emergency boards, by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 National emergency boards Major issue Period All emergency Total boards national Wages, rules, and working conditions Rules Wages Wages and rules Operat ing em ployees 1950-69 ______________ 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 ___________________ ______ ______ ______ ___________________ __________________ NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. 26 71 23 24 12 23 12 5 4 6 8 Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees 3 5 1 2 1 1 4 6 1 — — 2 — — 2 1 1 1 3 — — — 2 — 1 —• 3 2 — 1 — 1 — 1 — — 1 — — SOURCE: National Mediation Board data. — Of the disputes between one or more unions and the vast majority of class I line haul and switching and terminal companies (associated with the East ern, W estern and Southeastern Carriers Conference Committees before 1963 and the National Railway L abor Conference since 1963), 23 were national in scope. (See table 5.) O f these 23 boards, 14 were convened to decide cases that involved nonoperating employees, often involving wages (five times) or wage and rule proposals (six tim es). Similarly, of the nine operating employees’ national emergency cases, seven dealt primarily with demands for changes in wages (three times) or wages and rules (four times), as shown in table 5. During the 1960’s, 14 boards, eight since 1964, were appointed to consider unsettled mediation dis putes that were national in scope; the remaining nine panels were created between 1950 and 1959. This and previously mentioned observations indicated that the “Section 10” procedure has been reserved princi pally in recent years for disputes that threatened m ajor interruptions to interstate commerce and that controversies of lesser im portance were relegated to other adjustment machinery provided by the act. Al though the nature of the controversy and structure of bargaining were undoubtedly im portant factors, it appeared that the NM B became more selective in certifying an unadjusted dispute as a “national emer gency.” Issues M ajor issues were almost evenly divided between rules (16 cases) and wages (18), both issues jointly (wages and rules) coming before emergency boards 23 times. (See tabel 6.) Considering the prime is sues in dispute, the operating crafts were more con cerned with rules (10 cases) and wages and rules (11), while nonoperating employees’ cases were more inclined toward wages (12) and wages and rules (13). All eight boards dealing with grievances or time claims) were processed by operating em ployees’ associations. Duration A nother im portant characteristic of the emergency board procedure was the disparity in duration, de fined as the time span from the serving of a “Section 6” notice to 30 days after the release of an emer gency board’s report. (See appendix table A -5 .) With an array ranging from 170 days (Emergency Board No. 105, which dealt with adjusting wages) to 3,314 days (Emergency Board No. 165, which in volved rule changes), the average duration of all emergency boards was 670 days. (See table 7.) A n appreciable upward trend over time in the average duration of the four subperiods was observable. This phenomenon was explained by the num ber of prolonged emergency board procedures, those whose duration exceeded 1,000 calendar days. Twelve in number, all the boards experiencing extended dura tion were confined to the 1960’s (nine of them be tween 1960 and 1964) and to the issues of rules (8 times), wages and rules (3 times), and rules and working conditions (once). Of these 12 panels, the operating employees accounted for seven, all dealing with rules (four cases) and rules and wages (three cases); nonoperating employees were involved in the remaining boards, four of which concerned rules and one of which dealt with rules and wages. Table 6. Railroad emergency boards, by detailed Issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 1955-59 1950-54 Issue Totals .............. Grievances ..................... Rules ............................. Wages ....... ................... Wages and rules --------Wages, rules, and working conditions ___ Rules and working conditions ____ _____ Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees 16 8 6 8 3 2 3 2 2 1 — — 3 __ 1 1 3 — — — 1 Includes one wage and rule beard In which both major groups par ticipated. Operat Nonoper ing em ating em ployees ployees 6 __ 1 3 3 — 1965-69 1960-64 Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees 7 Nonoper ating em ployees 16 17 — 5 7 3 _ 2 1 M — 2 »4 _ _. 3 1 3 _ _ — Operat ing em ployees 1 — *6 — Total, 1950-69 Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees All crafts 136 *36 71 8 10 6 *11 _ 6 12 *13 8 16 18 23 1 4 5 1 1 — NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. SOURCE: National Mediation Board data. 27 Table 7. Duration of railroad emergency boards, by major work group and spans,1 selected periods, 1950-69 Emergency board spans in calendar days Nonop erating crafts, average duration Num ber of days Period Operat ing crafts, average duration Num Num ber of ber of days days All crafts Total duration 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 _______ ____ ________________ ______________________ _____ ___________________________ ______ ___________ ____ _____ Average— 1950-69: All crafts________ ____ __________ Operating ________________________ Nonoperating _____________________ Negotiation 1 Mediation Recognition Per cent Nwiber Per cent Num ber Per cent Num ber Per cent Agency Num ber Negotiation II Per cent Num ber Per cent 441 460 951 1,113 418 384 822 518 429 422 861 874 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 228 212 351 291 53.1 50.2 40.8 33.3 75 89 254 275 17.5 21.1 29.5 31.5 37 41 148 229 8.6 9.7 17.2 26.2 89 81 106 84 20.7 19.2 12.2 9.6 158 55 116 60 (? ) (? ) (? ) (? ) O ') (? ) (? ) (? ) 670 741 609 100.0 100.0 100.0 278 318 252 41.5 42.9 41.4 184 189 174 27.5 25.5 28.6 115 141 92 17.2 19.0 15.1 93 93 92 13.9 12.6 15.1 99 130 71 (? ) (? ) (? ) (? ) 09 1Average number of calendar days of the total procedure or any span; each board is given equal weight regardless of size. 2 Not included in duration figure for the total procedure. NOTE: Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. SOURCE: National Mediation Board data. 2 Not applicable. Since the overall averages m ask the movements occurring within the various segments of the total procedure, the RLA-emergency procedure was di vided into five segments or spans as follows: negotia tion I span, the time period between the issuance of a “Section 6” notice and the request for or proffer of the mediatory assistance of the Board (NMB); me diation span, the period after the request for or prof fer o f mediation to the proffer of arbitration; recog nition span, the time period following the proffer of arbitration to the creation of an emergency board; agency span, the period from the establishment of a emergency panel to 30 days after the rendering of its report; negotiation I I span, the time period be tween the board’s report and agreement between the parties.83 (See tables 7 and 9 .) Counting calendar days, the negotiation I span in absolute terms has increased significantly over time, the mediation span has risen substantially, as has the recognition span, while the agency and negotiation II spans have fluctuated considerably. Comparing the particular spans to total duration in the four time pe riods, the negotiation I span has decreased signifi cantly in relative terms; the mediation span has risen appreciably, while the recognition span has increased substantially, and the agency and negotiation spans have decreased substantially. (See table 7.) W hat do the figures suggest? In absolute terms, ” Date of settlement can refer to the date of either tenta tive settlement, ratification, or award of arbitration. 28 the procedures generally became more time-consum ing over the years, especially in the first 3 steps of the 5-step process— the duration of the last 2 steps decreasing in the second and fourth subperiods of time from the first and third, respectively. The in crease in total duration suggests that the parties were integrating the emergency board procedure into their collective bargaining strategy and that government was taking a more direct and active role in these dis putes. One contributory factor in the increased total duration— the growing length in the recognition pe riod— may be a sign that the NMB was m ore closely scrutinizing “imminent work stoppages” rather than routinely notifying the President of “imminent work stoppages.” For the two decades, duration of the various parts of the entire procedure was arranged in both abso lute and relative terms in the same sequence as the chronological order of the steps in the procedure, i.e., negotiation I span was the longest, followed in descending order by mediation, recognition, and agency spans. One interesting comparison between periods was the difference between negotiation I (278 days) and negotiation II spans (99). This may have indicated that genuine collective bargaining in these emergency disputes occurred only after the boards released their reports. Although this compari son is not proof positive, the implication is clear, especially in light of the small num ber of days in which the parties actually conferred across the bar gaining table. in which these operating crafts participated.84 Like wise, the various steps in the emergency procedure for the operating unions were m ore prolonged than for the nonoperating associations; and the duration of these various spans in both groups* procedure was ordered in the same direction as the chronological sequence of the steps in the procedure. M ajor issues and groups. A nother prom inent charac teristic of duration was its variation according to m ajor issues. Cases involving rule issues were on the average much longer in duration than those dealing with rates of pay or wages and rules, 1,046 days compared with 480 days and 594 days, respectively. Although there were some exceptions, duration by m ajor issue generally increased over time, as shown in table 8. Analyzing major issues by m ajor group, rules cases and wage cases of nonoperating unions extended for longer periods on the average than those of operating unions. O n the other hand, com bined wage and rule boards were substantially more prolonged on the average for operating, workers than for nonoperating employees. F or the entire period 1950-69 and all subperiods, emergency boards appointed to consider operating unions’ disputes were considerably longer than those for nonoperating organizations, 741 days vs. 609 days. (See table 9.) The 132-day difference proba bly reflected the large num ber of operating em ployees’ rule boards, and wage and rule boards, rela tive to the total num ber of “Section 10” procedures National cases An im portant question concerning duration was the effect of national cases upon the various meas urements. A priori, the expectation was that nation wide disputes, because of the numerous and complex issues and the large num ber of participants, would probably have significantly inflated the average length of emergency boards. However, actual investi gation generally revealed the opposite to be true, as shown in table 10. Apparently, the national boards’ average duration 8 Eight grievance cases were excluded because some of 4 the steps in the emergency procedures were skipped. Table 8. Number and average duration off railroad emergency boards (in calendar days), by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 Period Wages, rules, and wonting conditions Wages and rules Rules Wages Number 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 Average duration Number Average duration Number Average duration 5 2 8 3 302 498 585 484 4 2 8 2 368 580 1,199 2,258 6 4 6 7 583 296 745 645 18 6 12 480 463 488 16 10 6 1,046 986 1,148 23 *11 113 594 698 492 , ___________________________ ____________________________ ____________________________ ____ ________________________ 1950-69: All crafts ----------------------------------Operating --------------------------------N o n o p e ra tin g _____________________________ 1 Both major groups participated in Emergency Board No. 170. Number Average duration 1 4 389 432 — — — — 5 1 4 423 425 423 SOURCE: National Mediation Board data. NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. Table 9. Railroad emergency spans, (in calendar days), by major group, selected periods, 1950-69 Average total duration Period Operat ing em ployees 1950-69 1950-54 1955-59 1960-65 1965-69 ___ ___ ___ ___ Nonoper ating em ployees Average duration of spans Negotiations 1 Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Mediation Recognition Negotiaiton II1 Agency Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees 741 609 318 252 189 174 141 92 93 92 130 441 460 951 1,113 418 384 822 518 195 231 533 316 261 194 271 249 97 90 222 344 54 88 269 169 63 51 69 379 10 32 182 18 86 191 *10 *81 92 72 103 82 180 46 243 2 43 1 Not included in duration figure for total procedure. 2 Because this table excludes a few agency spans in this period, the sums of individual spans do not equal the total. 2 Because this table excludes a few negotiation II spans in this period, the sums of individual spans do not equal the total. Nonoper ating em ployees 71 126 67 57 74 SOURCE: National Mediation Board data. 29 for the negotiation I and II spans did not seemingly reflect the inherent bargaining nature of industrywide cases. It was anticipated that in national cases the negotiation I span would be significantly longer than in nonnational cases, because bargaining would commence on local properties and be followed by the creation of national committees to negotiate in dustrywide contracts. In a similar vein, it was ex pected that the national boards’ average duration for the negotiation II span (compared with the nonna tionals’) would be appreciably shorter, mirroring im mediate and strong pressures to conclude settlements of unadjusted controversies that could possibly halt the operations of the N ation’s railroad system. On the other hand, the anticipation of the direc tion and volume of some spans was substantiated. The longer agency span was probably a consequence of the large num ber of witnesses and voluminous statements and exhibits introduced into the record; the shorter recognition span apparently demon strated that the unadjusted disputes em anating from national wage and rule movements were easier to de termine and to certify as imminent national emer gency disputes. From the information available, it was not possible to ascertain or to hypothesize on the significantly smaller mediation span. R e a s o n s fo r th e long d u ra tio n The long average duration of the railroad boards was primarily the result of three factors. Mediation spans. First, under die provisions of the act, no time limitations were placed on mediation. Defined as the time span between the request for or proffer of mediation and the proffer of arbitration,85 the average duration of mediation activities was 184 days, the longest period covering 1118 calendar days. F or example, the Telegraphers (ORT), whose ^ This is somewhat of an arbitrary definition since hear ings are often intermittently held, sometimes informal in nature (for example, over the telephone), and often extend beyond the formal period as defined in the act. Table 10. National and nonnational emergency board spans, selected periods, 1950-69 D uration in days for Total Negotia M edia R ecog N egotia tion 1 tion nition A gency tion It A cases .. 670 ll 278 184 115 93 99 National ______ 595 263 153 80 101 99 N onnational ____ 714 287 99 204 136 88 Size S U C : National M ORE ediation Board data. 30 dispute was heard by Emergency Board No. 148, re quested the m ediatory assistance of the NMB on June 2, 1958, to aid in adjusting a rules dispute with the New Y ork Central R ailroad; mediation began 8 1 /2 months later. On January 25, 1962, arbitra tion was proffered by the Board. In the second part of that dispute, which involved the Pittsburg and Lake Erie Railroad, the organization petitioned the NMB on August 7, 1959; mediation sessions com menced on December 8, 1959; and the Board proffered arbitration on January 25, 1962. A t various times, the parties, especially the un ions, have castigated the Board for what they consid ered to be “unnecessary” and “arbitrary” delays in the mediation proceedings. O n June 1, 1962, die Teamsters even resorted to filing a civil action com plaint (No. 1747-62) for declaratory judgement and a m andatory injunction against the B oard asserting that the “Plaintiffs (Teamsters) are adversely af fected and aggrieved by the unnecessary delay on the part of the NMB and have been adversely affected by the Board’s arbitrary and capricious refusal to mediate the . . . dispute . . . By recessing cases A -6671 and A -6 6 9 6 . . . (the Board) has failed to use its best efforts, by mediation, to being the parties to agreement, as required by the R L A .” W hat the union did not publicly acknowledge though was that “there (was) no question that in this dispute the parties m ade no more than nominal efforts to com pose their differences.” 86 N or did the unions ac knowledge that only one collective bargaining dis pute in the two decades preceding this controversy was settled without exhausting all the steps in the RLA-emergency procedures, a situation th at raised “the fundamental question whether the parties . . . (were) negotiating their differences in accordance with traditional free collective bargaining principles or in the m anner or spirit contemplated in the Rail way Labor Act.” 87 Beside the B oard’s problem of coordinating its available manpower resources with its needs, the parties to the disputes were also often unable to syn chronize the accessibility of each of their bargaining representatives. This problem of m anpower coordi nation was especially evident in national cases in which representatives of the three Carriers Confer ence Committees (or the National Railway Labor Conference) and representatives of the national (or international) unions had jointly to decide on hear ing dates, when both labor and m anagement might 8 Emergency Board Report No. 153, op. cit., p. 4. 8 8 Ibid. 1 Agency span. Second, although section 10 of the act established a time limit for the emergency board procedure (30 days from the date of the board’s creation to the date of its report), with the consent of both parties the Board can notify the President that an extension is necessary which he, in turn, is authorized to grant. As measured by the time span between the establishment of the emergency board and the rendering of its report, the average duration of railroad emergency board hearings 88 was 63 days, the longest 1,154 days in Emergency Board No. 126, which was precipitated by the Engineers’ (BLE) serving requests for wage and rule changes on the Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railroad. Of the 23 prolonged board hearings (those requiring more than 60 days), nine were appointed to hear operat ing employees’ disputes and 14 to decide those of nonoperating workers. The majority of these panels were concerned with wages and rules (nine cases), rules (seven), and wages (five). Under the provisions of the bill as originally drafted, emergency panels were to investigate and make their reports within 30 days, regardless of the nature of the dispute.89 Counsel for the railway un ions, Donald R. Richberg, explained that the fixed time limit would compel the party that was more in terested than the other in preserving the status quo, the party who was engaging in delaying action, to confine its testimony and evidence to an “ accepta ble” level. One prom inent carrier representative, echoing the desires of both parties, said that the “board is not going into a meticulous examination of the question; it is undoubtedly intended to reach its considerations on large questions (i.e., broad is sues). Those matters do not require the summoning of witnesses and the taking of great volumes of testimony.” 90 Although early experience with the emergency board investigations and reports was favorable, most hearings and the writing of recommendations for the post-1949 panels were not completed in the 30 days stipulated in the original executive orders creating the boards. Excluding the eight emergency disputes for which no formal reports were issued, only 15 post-1949 boards (10 of which were appointed be tween 1950-54) concluded their hearings and issued their recommendations without extensions of time. Actually both “parties have long shown a prefer ence for lengthy, rather formal hearings, of a quasi judicial nature, in which most witnesses read their testimony and in which mountains of exhibits con taining data, some of current value and some of his toric significance only are filed.” 91 Counting actual hearing days, Emergency Board No. 154 extended for 96 days during which 15,306 pages of testimony and 20,319 pages of exhibits were introduced. Al most as “prolific” was Emergency Board No. 81, which exhausted 49 hearing days, in which 8,385 pages of testimony (49 volumes) and 143 exhibits were entered into the records. Besides boards being presented with numerous studies, charts, statements, and statistics, other factors contributed to the pro longation and thus extension of board hearings. Among these factors were the seriousness of the dis putes and complexities of the issues, the utilization of the board’s services in a mediation capacity, the preoccupation of the board with other disputes, the request for continuances or delay in the initiation of hearings, and other discontinuations in hearings.92 In an attempt to ease the hearings’ problems, boards have at times instituted procedural rules. For example, Emergency Board Nos. 161-3 barred the '* The duration of emergency board hearings plus 30 days, by definition, is identical with the agency span. Eight boards (No. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165 and 171) were not included because formal emergency board reports were not issued. * Enactors of the law, however, provided for more flexi bility in the procedures, one more suitable to the nature of railroad disputes on a case-by-case basis. 901926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 154. 9 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 160 1 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Aug. 7, 1964), p. 2. Also see Locomotive Firemen and Engineers Magazine, Aug. 1955, p. 89. Conductor & Brakeman, Sept. 1955, p. 252. 9 Emergency Board Nos. 84, 97, 134, 141, 147, 150, 155, 2 157, 160-63, and 173. See Emergency Board Nos. 129 (p. 2), 161-3 (p. 3), 138 (p. 1) and 139 (p. 1). have conflicts because of bargaining commitments with other parties. With all these impediments, actual mediation days were usually a small proportion of the total media tion span. Over the 20-year period ending 1969, the average mediation span was 184 days; yet only 23 days, on the average, were devoted to mediatory ac tivities. Significant differences were evident in the av erage num ber of actual mediation hearing days dur ing the four subperiods; in chronological order they were 16, 30, 29, and 16 days. But more importantly, the relative time actually consumed by mediation hearings (the num ber of actual hearing days relative to the total mediation span) declined significantly over time: 23 percent, 34 percent, 11 percent, and 6 percent, chronologically. 31 actual reading of testimony and exhibits by wit nesses. Emergency Board No. 160 limited each party to seven days for presenting briefs and rebuttals (one day for oral arguments), stipulated that time expended in cross-examination was to be charged to the party cross-examining, encouraged the parties to “submit background or other noncontroversial evi dence in exhibit form,” and required 6 hours of hearings daily. One other problem, lack of cooperation in hear ings, was of sufficient significance to merit comment. During the Congressional hearings in 1926, the fra mers of the act felt that “it was absolutely inconceiv able that either party would hesitate to furnish the Board all the information within its power that would help the presentation of its point of view.” 98 In the event that either party failed to fulfill its re sponsibilities at once public opinion (w ould) con demn that party and a public opinion (would) be created in the right direction by that very refusal.” 94 Yet union officials involved in six emergency boards refused to present evidence or to formally participate in board hearings.95 One, in fact, “issued an anticipa tory declaration critical of the Board’s forthcoming findings of fact and recommendations, before either have been conceived or published.” 96 The parties. Third, as previously mentioned, the parties often contributed to the problem of duration by bringing issues before the NMB on which they had spent little time bargaining. Two auxiliary points, the first relating to the degree of skill and time needed by neutrals to digest rule proposals and the second to the ratification of tentative agreements by general committees and the rank-and-file, merit further attention. As the NMB has publicly stated, “Expert knowl edge and experience is required for proper consider ation of proposals to change rules relating to work performance, and the most satisfactory results are obtained if the parties directly concerned, who are familiar with the technical aspects of the operation and elements of the dispute, work out settlements which they can understand and translate into every day practice for the efficient operation of the particu lar facility involved.” 97 Emergency boards, when presented with numerous technical and complicated 031926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 85. 941926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 154. 9 Emergency Board Nos. 83, 93, 97, 110, 129 and 174. 5 M Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 31. 9 NMB, Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, op. cit., p. 4. 7 32 rule proposals and testimony which more often than not appear to confuse the issues, have reached the same conclusion. “No one has ever entertained even a captious doubt but that ‘Railroad Rules’ and ‘Rail road Rules Changes’ constitute one of the most tech nical, involved, and highly complex subjects in the entire baffling welter of industrial relations problems which from time to time are thrown into the lap of Emergency Boards for solutions.” 98 Moreover, sev eral boards have declined to decide on various tech nical rule proposals or counterdemands and have as serted that the issues may better be resolved by the parties directly.99 Union leaders involved in emergency boards have expressed doubts concerning the ability of the emer gency board members to understand the complexities of pay, rules, and working conditions on the individ ual properties.100 “I believe much of the failure of emergency board procedures over the past 5 years (1960-65) can be attributed to the personnel of those boards and not to the procedures as such . . . M en of experience should be chosen not people who have sat on just one or two emergency boards in the past 5 years, but men of long experience and great understanding of railway problems. Above all, they should have the time to discharge fully their obligations.” 101 Some labor leaders also have casti gated board members for “sidestepping” issues for which the boards recommended their removal be cause of the issues’ technical nature.102 Other union officials have based their rejections of boards’ reports on the grounds that board members lack sufficient knowledge of the industry.108 According to the NMB, the parties themselves ap pear to have contributed to the impairment of the act’s implementation by not granting their bargaining representatives sufficient authority to accept final contract terms a situation not unique to the railroad industry.104 F or example, after exhausting all the provisions of the RLA , the Switchmen (SUNA) and 9 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 31. 8 9 Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 89 9 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Nov. 3, 1950), pp. 8-9. 10L. W. Homing, Vice President of Personnel, New York 0 Central Railroad, on Sept. 22, 1955. 11Eli L. Oliver “Procedures Under the Railway Labor 0 Act”, Discussion, Eighteenth Annual Meeting of National Academy of Arbitrators, 1965, pp. 51-52. 13 Labor, Nov. 25, 1950, p. 3. 0 13Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 64. 0 14Thirty-Fourth Annual Report of the National Media 0 tion Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1968 (U.S. National Mediation Board, 1969), pp. 23-24. the Western Carriers Conference Committee in Sep tember 1960 tentatively reached an accord disposing of all issues in dispute (on terms recommended by Emergency Board No. 131), subject to ratification by the union’s rank-and-file. U nder the terms of the union’s by-laws, if the majority of the membership rejected the recommendations of an emergency board, the International President was required to set a strike date. The NMB claimed that these “re strictions . . . placed on the representatives of the employees . . . (w ere) inconsistent with the provi sions of the Railway Labor Act, defeat (ed ) the pur pose of the Act, and (m ade) its administration cum bersome and ineffective.” 105 Ultimately, the dispute was settled without a stoppage, but the terms were in excess of the board’s recommendations. A rbitration As noted earlier, the act gives the NMB the option to suggest to the parties that they submit their dis pute to arbitration, the next-to-last step available to agree to settle m ajor disputes. As with other features of the law, the parties are not compelled to accept the proffer of arbitration; however, the law places a moral obligation on the parties to consider this m ethod of resolving disputes after previous steps in the act have failed. Between 1955 and 1969 (the only period for which detailed information was available), 2,999 railroad mediation cases were docketed and disposed of, 2,595 by means of mediation, by withdrawals, or by dismissals.106 Of the 404 remaining cases, the parties refused to arbitrate 372 disputes, and agreed to do so in 32. During the period under study, (1950-69), mediation cases which eventually re quired the appointment of emergency boards were closed when carriers rejected arbitration in one case (1 percent of the total), unions in 53 (78 percent), and both parties in 14 (21 percent). In no case did both parties simultaneously agree to submit the dis pute to arbitration. As early as 1941, a formal cen sure of the parties’ tendency to decline proffers of arbitration was recorded by the NMB and was reiter 15Letter from E. C. Thompson, Executive—Secretary of 0 the National Mediation Board to William Rogers, Attorney General, on Sept. 14, 1960. 16A withdrawal refers to the action of the party which 0 initially requested the mediatory service of the Board when the party retracts its application. A dismissal refers to the action of the Board when it dismisses the request for its service according to the conditions required under the act (RLA). ated almost every year since then in the Board’s A n nual R eport. It was apparent from witnesses’ testimony during the 1926 House hearings on the proposed railroad legislation that if disputes were not resolved in me diation the parties would be persuaded to settle them by means of arbitration and if disputes were assigned to emergency panels the party who declined the Board’s proffer of arbitration would have “to make good before the emergency board.” 107 A t various times, the recalcitrant parties offered reasons for re jecting arbitration. F or instance, unions involved in Emergency Board No. 81 deliberations claimed, “We do not believe that arbitration should be substituted for bonafide collective bargaining in a case such as this.” 108 A high union official of the Engineers (BLE) explained their rejection of arbitration, “Most of the 282 cases are based on fundamental rules which are not arbitrable under our contract, for to arbitrate would in effect change certain rules with out carrying out the provisions of the R L A .” 109 E m erg en cy b o a rd re p o rts The Railway Labor Act does not compel the parties to reach an accord; rather it places maximum reliance on self -determination by labor and manage ment. While recognition of the right to strike is an integral part of this public policy, the parties are re quired to adhere to a step-by-step process during which the nature of the dispute and the merits of the opposing claims would be made public. The assump tion in the law was that this type of disclosure would generate public pressures that would contribute to just and equitable settlements.110 On eight occasions, the NMB or the emergency boards functioned in a mediatory capacity and effected settlements between the parties without issu ing formal reports.111 In the vast majority of in stances, however, recommendations for the resolu tion of the disputes were made by the boards. The framers of the act anticipated that both parties would be extremely reluctant to reject a report, unless it was “so inequitable as to be almost beyond the limits of human endurance.” 112 However, actual results 1071926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 102-3. 18Labor , Feb. 18, 1950, p. 1. 0 19Trainmen N ew s , Oct. 3, 1949, p. 3. 0 10See 1926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 18-19. Also see 1 1926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., pp. 14-15, 25. 11Emergency Board Nos. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165, 1 and 171. 1 2 Emergency Board Report No. 97, op. cit., p. 65. 1 33 did not bear out these hopes. Of the 60 emergency board reports for which the parties’ responses were ascertainable, the vast majority were rejected by one or both parties.113 In fact, labor and management initially accepted the boards’ specific recommenda tions only on six occasions, four times in the 1950’s . 114 Of the six, four affirmative responses were registered by operating groups involved twice in wage and rule cases (Emergency Board Nos. 107 and 126) and once each in a wage case (Emergency Board No. 82) and in a rule case (Emergency Board No. 172). The only two nonoperating groups’ ac ceptances involved the R EA , once in a wage dispute (Emergency Board No. 105) and once in a wage and rule controversy (Emergency Board No. 107). Although the carriers generally accepted “ad verse” as well as favorable reports, the unions con sistently rejected “adverse” recommendations. N a tional M ediation Board and other official records in dicated that on 48 occasions railroad unions partially or totally repudiated the boards’ reports. Operating employees’ organizations accounted for 22 negative responses and nonoperating workers’ for 27.115 In four instances, all involving nonoperating crafts, rail way carriers responded negatively. Of the four boards, three were convened between 1950 and 1954 to consider cases national in scope. On two oc casions, one involving the Firem en and Engineers (BLFE) in a wage case with the N ation’s railroads and the other involving the Telegraphers (ORT) in a rules’ case with Southern Pacific, both parties de clined to accept boards recommendations. Thus, the pressure of public opinion was not ade quate to force the parties to accept the boards’ rec ommendations, nor was voluntary compliance common. As early as 1951, the NMB recognized the increasing predisposition of unions to reject emergency board recommendations. To explain this tendency, the NMB argued that the complicated and technical issues precipitating these disputes were given little publicity, and beyond that, they were somewhat incomprehensible to the public.118 Some extenuating circumstances relating to the boards’ directions and approaches may also have contributed to this high rejection rate. Some union leaders have adopted the position that this “final” step in the emergency process is just an administra tive action to delay the application of economic power, that “the report is not final and binding” (and thus is not a “m atter of acceptance or rejection”) 117 U nder the original conception of the bill, a board’s direction and tone was to be mediatory, rather than legalistic: . . . We are seeking to avoid what we regard as the fundamental error in the creation of the Railway Labor Board, and that was creating a public body which thinks its duty is to sit behind the table and hear the parties as witnesses in court and thereby continue the intensity of the controversy. We want this emergency board to take the power of a final board of mediation and try to bring an agreement. We do not want a dispute presented to the public in order that public opinion may castigate one party or the other, if we can get an agreement.118 N or did the framers of the act anticipate that the boards would formally adjudicate disputes and issue intri cate and detailed recommendations. It was expected that the panels would be lay boards and would not have the “capacity to decide a great dispute. If it is a problem of simple elements, they may be able to work it out, or else, if not simple, work out a method of solution for a complicated problem.” 119 Very early experience during the two decades under study was more favorable to the release of re ports in which methods rather than detailed terms of settlement were suggested, especially in grievance cases. F or instance, Emergency Board No. 79 con cluded “that the issues here involved m ay be and should be resolved within the provisions of the Rail way Labor Act.” 120 In its report to the President on July 6, 1950, Emergency Board No. 86 recom mended that the issues in the dispute be processed through the normal channels of the act, either the grievance machinery or the issuance of a “Section 6” notice. Overall though, boards primarily have devoted their energy and time to fact-finding, not mediation, and have attempted to adjudicate disputes by pro mulgating detailed recommendations, rather than 118The 111 for which responses were not ascertained boards included the 8 mentioned in footnote 111 plus Emergency Board Nos. 77, 86, 93. 114Emergency Board Nos. 82, 105, 107, 111, 126, and 172. 15One case (Board No. 170) involved both major groups. 1 16Seventeenth Annual Report of the National Mediation 1 Board, For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1951 (U.S. Na tional Mediation Board, 1952), p. 33. 17 Letter from Mr. Val Simons, General Chairman of the 1 ORCB, to Mr. L. W. Homing, Vice-President, Personnel, of the New York Central Railroad, on Sept. 22, 1955. 1181926 Senate Hearings, op. cit., p. 135 Also see pp. 8384. 1191926 House Hearings, op. cit., pp. 101-02. 10Report to the President by Emergency Board No. 79 2 (U.S. National Mediation Board, Feb. 28, 1950), p. 8. 34 suggesting methods of settlement. F or example, the members of Emergency Board No. 175 recom mended a wage increase of 3 1 /2 percent effective July 1, 1968, 2 percent effective January 1, 1969, 3 percent effective July 1, 1969, a differential of 20 cents an hour for skilled employees, and the with drawal of the employees’ cost-of-living proposals and all other demands not treated in the recommenda tions. In its report to the President filed on Novem ber 5, 1964, Emergency Board No. 164 suggested a 9 cent an hour increase for firemen retroactive to January 15, 1964; an additional 9 cents effective January 1, 1965; $1.75 increase retroactive to June 1, 1964 for engineers; a fourth week of vacation after 20 years; moratoriums on wages until January 1, 1966; and the withdrawal of all other demands not treated in the recommendations. Although the majority of boards have not hesi tated to produce specific recommendations, some emergency boards, on the other hand, have recog nized that direct party solutions are preferable to third party solutions and that suggesting methods of resolving disputes are preferable to issuing detailed terms of settlement.121 Notwithstanding, labor fre quently has criticized boards for their purported le galistic approach and predisposition to recommend detailed terms of settlement: The ineffectiveness of Emergency Board proce dure does not stem from a stubborn determination on the part of labor leaders to consistently and arrogantly reject Board recommendations. In the past the leaders of labor have hopefully looked to Emergency Boards to provide them with a solution of their problems. That their hopes have not been fulfilled is not the fault of this side of the table. The fault we believe lies in large part with the detached attitude of Boards from the practicalities of the necessity to settle cases, from a determina tion to sit in the role of judge and law-giver to decide categorically whether a particular party is right or wrong, and in inability or unwillingness to seek a means of settlement of the dispute be fore them which would do justice to both sides and serve the public interest.12 2 In no case did the parties completely repudiate the emergency boards’ recommendations in negotiations or reach settlements entirely outside of those sugges ted. A t various times, the boards’ recommendations served as a basis for eventual agreements without in121 Emergency Board R eport N o. 169 , op. cit., p. 5 (Also see Emergency Board R eport N o. 130, p. 2). This board did however recommend specific wage terms. m Emergency Board R eport N o. 97, op. cit. p. 64. terruptions of service. In the majority of cases, how ever, the boards’ reports served as a floor from which to bargain for more favorable terms, usually after strike threats or executive intervention. A t other times, the parties materially changed the recommendations in their final agreements, such as in the settlement between the Teamsters (IBT) and the REA, in which the parties substituted increased wages and health and welfare benefits, as well as ef fective dates of the various improvements, for the board’s recommendations. Even when the boards were unsuccessful in com pletely reconciling the parties’ differences, they did narrow the scope of the dispute, so that the parties were able to effect a settlement in lesss time and with less interruption of railroad services. F or instance, in hearings before Emergency Board No. 173, more than seven issues were withdrawn by the parties. Similarly, in hearings before Emergency Board No. I l l , certain proposals of Team ster Locals 459 and 808 were withdrawn. Methods of Settlement13 2 Over the 20-year period, few emergency board re ports have served as a basis for quick settlement of railroad disputes. Fearing this very phenomenon, the counsel for the railway organizations warned: They the employees) have felt that the machin ery of this act for conferences, for adjustment, for mediation, for arbitration, should provide for the orderly and peaceful adjustment of all differ ences that might arise in the railroads. They know that as long as additional machinery is held out, as long as another avenue of escape is open, stubborn negotiators are likely to hold out.14 2 Even after the emergency board’s issuance of its report, the National Mediation Board generally has reentered the case, ready to assist the parties to reach a settlement by mediation or arbitration. The principal m ethod of settlement was ascertain able for 65 emergency board cases. Of these, 25 ac cords were reached by mediation agreements (M.A.) two by arbitration agreements (A.A.), and 41 by the parties themselves (party agreements in m It is assumed that a negotiated agreement was the principal method of settlement when there was no indica tion that either a mediation agreement or an arbitration agreement was consummated. In boards involving more than one carrier or union, the method of disposition was de termined by the author’s knowledge of the prevalent means of settlement used by the parties. 1241926 House Hearings, op. cit., p. 17. 35 Table 11. Methods of settlement in railroad boards, by major issue and group, selected periods, 1950-69 1950-54 Methods Arbitration agreements: Rules ---------------------------Wages -------------------------Mediation agreements: Grievances ----- -------------Rules ------------------------Wages __________________ Wages and rules__________ Wages, rules, and working conditions ---------Rules and working conditions _-. Party agreements: Grievances --------------------Rules -------------- -----------Wages __________________ Wages and rules--------------Wages, rules, and working conditions _______ Operat ing em ployees 1955-59 Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees Operat ing em ployees Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees — — — — — — Nonoper ating em ployees Operat ing em ployees — 1 1 — — 1 3 2 4 — — — 1 — — — — — — — — 1 2 — — — 1 1 — 1 — 3 1 1 — 1 — 2 — — — 1 — — 1 — — — 1 — 2 — — — — 1 — — — — — 1 — — 2 5 2 — 1 1 2 — 2 — 1 1 2 2 — — — — 1 — 4 1 1 3 — — 1 3 ^ 2 1 — 1 — direct negotiations) (P .A .)125 Operating workers or ganizations accounted for one of the arbitration agreements, which concerned rules. Of the 41 party agreements, 19 were signed by operating unions (12 dealing with rules and wages and rules) and 22 by nonoperating organizations (16 dealing with wages and wages and rules). All the party agreements deal ing with grievances were reached by operating crafts, but the vast majority (75 percent) of the 12 wage agreements were signed by nonoperating crafts and 11 by operating employees, as shown in table 11. Al though, as noted, m ost emergency board disputes were settled in direct negotiations, the parties in creasingly turned to m ediation and arbitration (in the 1960’s), as shown in table 12. Disposition Of the 71 emergency board cases, eight were dis posed of by the parties, with or without the aid of the Board, either before board members were ap pointed or before a formal report was issued.126 E x cept for one (Emergency B oard No. 141), these m Disputes leading to three emergency boards were settled by more than one principal method, a P.A. and M.A. in the first and second instances (Nos. 118 and 174) and a P.A. and A.A. in the third (No. 169). Emergency Board Nos. 80, 85, 104, 115, 141, 150, 165, and 171. Nonoper ating em ployees Total, 1950-69 1965-69 — NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. 36 1960-64 — — 1 3 — Nonoper ating em ployees 1 3 2 6 1 2 1 — 4 4 3 8 1 1 — 3 9 7 — — 3 SOURCES: National Mediation Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Presidential emergency board reports. boards involved only operating employees, concerned mainly with noneconomic demands (grievances, three times; rules and wages and rules, both twice). Five of these emergency disputes127 were settled without a work stoppage, two with the mediatory as sistance of the Board. Of the three remaining panels in which strikes occurred, all involved operating em ployees; Engineers (B L E ) members twice, once in a 6-day stoppage before Emergency Board No. 115 17Emergency Board Nos. 80, 104, 141, 165, and 171. 2 Table 12. Number and percentage of agreements resolved through arbitration, mediation, and direct negotiations, 1950-69 Type of agreement Number, total ---------Arbitration agreements______ Mediation agreements ______ Party agreements ............ ....... Percent, total____ Arbitration agreements _____ Mediation agreements_______ Party agreements _________ 196569 195069 22 14 68 1 8 13 *1 27 M6 2 25 41 195054 195559 196064 19 13 — — 3 16 27 26 100.0 100.0 — — 15.8 53.8 84.2 46.2 100.0 4.5 36.4 59.1 100.0 7.1 50.0 42.9 100.0 2.9 36.8 60.3 10ne case in which both a party agreement and an arbitration agree ment were the principal methods of settlement. 2 One case in which both a party agreement and a mediation agree ment were the principal methods of settlement. NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. SOURCE: National Mediation Board data. was convened and once in a 1-day stoppage before Emergency Board No. 150 was appointed and Trainmen (BRT) once, in a 2 -d ay strike over griev ances heard by Emergency Board No. 85. The remaining 63 emergency board disputes, 29 of which involved operating employees, were settled after a formal emergency board report. Of these 63 boards, appoximately one-third were concerned with wages and rules, one-fourth with wages, one-fifth with rules, and the remainder with miscellaneous is sues. Following the boards’ reports, 16 of the above 63 post-emergency board settlements were preceded by work stoppages. Also one stoppage began before a board was appointed and continued after the board released its report (No. 157). Twenty-one strikes were called by railroad employees participating in these 17 emergency boards (two each in Emergency Board Nos. 154 and 172 and three in Emergency Board No. 8 1 ). Eight additional work stoppages,128 five conducted by nonoperating employees, oc curred before the creation of an emergency board, a legal course of action once a 3 0 -day status quo pe riod has been observed following the NM B’s notice to the parties that mediation has failed and arbitra tion has been refused. Of the issues that were re ported to be the cause of these 28 stoppages, wages and rules was the principal subject in dispute (10 tim es), followed by rules (eight), wages (fo u r), grievances (tw o ), wages, rules, and working condi tions (tw o), and rules and working conditions (tw o). (See table 13) In total, 31 disruptions of railroad services, 18 conducted by operating employees, were associated with 24 emergency boards. Combined, the 31 work stoppages entailed 7,054,095 man-days lost by m Includes the one conducted by the parties participating in the hearings before Emergency Board No. 157. 950,231 railroad employees. This represented 83.8 percent of all railroad man-days idle during 1950-69 and 66.5 percent of all railroad workers involved in strikes during the same period. As table 14 indicates, nonoperating crafts accounted for a substantial share of these losses (approximately 69.7 percent of the workers involved and 67.2 percent of the man-days idle). This was true largely because of four strikes, including a 999 day stoppage conducted between January 1963 and December 1965 which involved 2,023 workers and 1,371,900 man-days and another stoppage lasting 58 days in 1955 at the Louisville and Nashville R ailroad which involved 23,870 workers and 1,002,540 man-days. F or the entire period 1950-69, average duration of these 31 emergency board work stoppages was 57 calendar days and the median was 19 calendar days. For the 31 stoppages, duration ranged from a high of 999 days to a low of 1 day. Excluding the 999-day labor-management conflict, extending both before and after institution of the “Section 10” procedure, the mean duration was 26 calendar days, and the median was 14 calendar days. Again excluding the 999-day stoppage, for those interruptions of work beginning before the appointm ent of a emergency panel, the average duration was 36 days, and the median was 19 days. In contrast, strikes occurring after the boards’ reports extended on the average for 26 calendar days, with a m edian of 14 calendar days. Only five emergency boards that were national in scope experienced work stoppages. In total, nine strikes were conducted (three each identified with Emergency Board Nos. 81 and 154 and one-each as sociated with Emergency Board Nos. 97, 106, and 169) and involved 631,621 workers and 2,281,245 Table 13. Railroad emergency board work stoppages, by major issue and group, 195U-69 Occurred in disputes characterized by post emergency board settlements Occurred in disputes for which no formal report was issued Before boards' reports After boards’ reports Total Issues Total _____ ____ _________ _____ Grievances ____ _______ _______ _____ Rules _____________________________ Rules and working conditions ....................... Wages, rules, and working conditions _____ Wages and rules ____________________ Wages--------------- ----------------------- All crafts 31 3 9 2 2 11 4 Operating Nonoperating Nonoperat Nonoperat employees employees Operating ing Operating ing Operating employees employees employees employees employees 18 3 8 — — 7 — * Includes Emergency Board No. 157 that extended both before the board was created and after it released its report. 13 _ 1 2 2 4 4 3 1 1 — — 1 — — _ _ — — — — 3 _ 3 — — — — *5 _ — 1 — 1 *3 12 2 4 — — 6 — Nonoperat ing employees 29 — 1 1 2 3 12 NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. SOURCES: National Mediation Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 37 Table 14. Workers Involved and man-days idle, by major group, 1950-69 Workers involved Number (in thousands) Percent Item Total, all railroad stoppages Operating employees . Nonoperating employees ______ SOURCE: Percent 100.0 8,418.6 100.0 950.2 100.0 7,054.1 100.0 288.2 30.3 2,310.9 32.8 662.0 69.7 4,743.1 67.2 . _ 1,429.8 Total, all emergency board disputes ___ Man-days idle Number (in thousands) Bureau of Labor Statistics. 38 man-days of idleness.129 Of the nine stoppages, only one was nationwide, a 2 -d ay interruption of work conducted by six shopcraft unions over wage de mands. The average duration for all nine work stop pages was 20 calendar days, and the median was 6 calendar days. 19Does not include workers and man-days in “two” 2 strikes as catalogued by the NMB; BLS, on the other hand, counted the “three” strikes associated with this board as one. Thus, no reliable figures were available for the “two” stoppages. C h a p te r V II. R a ilr o a d Among the general purposes of the R L A was avoidance of interruptions to interstate commerce. Frequency and intensity of work stoppages is un doubtedly the most visible gauge to use in measuring the act’s effectiveness, although not necessarily the most reliable. Between 1950-1969, the railroads ex perienced 316 work stoppages that involved 1,429,819 workers and 8,418,552 man-days of idle ness. (See appendix tables A -5 and A -6 and table 15.) Almost all measures of strike activity were higher in the 1960’s than in the 1950’s, even without a substantially large difference in the num ber of strikes and man-days idle. Although average num ber of man-days per stoppage decreased slightly (1.9 per cent) between the decades, the average number of workers per stoppage increased significantly, from 3,157 in the 1950’s to 5,793 in the 1960’s. The rise in these measures of strike idleness occurred despite a 52.6 percent decline in railroad employment over the two decades.130 Estim ated working-time lost, the most relevant and accurate guage of strike activity, increased significantly, from 0.15 percent in the 1950’s to 0.26 percent in the 1960’s. In 12 years there were 14 individual strikes each in which over 100,000 man-days were lost. W ith only three exceptions, each of these 12 years was asso ciated with one o r more m ajor work stoppages (those involving 10,000 or more w orkers). In the 1960’s, there were 8 stoppages, each involving 100,000 mandays or more, which combined entailed 2.7 million man-days of idleness, and in the 1950’s there were W o rk S to p p a g e s six stoppages of 100,000 or more man-days each, which combined resulted in 3.3 million man-days of idleness. Size of stoppages When coupled with duration, one commonly used variable— size— indicated the direct and immediate impact of work stoppages. Of the 316 total stop pages, one-quarter involved groups of less than 100 employees, and three-fifths dealt with groups of less than 500 workers. (See appendix A -6 and table 16.) A significant num ber of stoppages (6 9 ) dealt with fairly large groups of employees (1,000 and under 10,000), and only 17 strikes idled 10,000 or more workers each. In the 1960’s, the relative num ber of these major stoppages increased substantially. Approximately 600,000 nonoperating employees participated in five m ajor strikes, and 230,000 oper ating workers were involved in seven such stoppages during this period. The num ber of stoppages involv ing 500-999 employees decreased significantly, from 25 in the 1950’s to 19 in the 1960’s. Another prom inent characteristic of these work stoppages was the num ber of companies and unions participating in the disputes. Contrary to the implica tion of coordinated bargaining, single-unit work stoppages were most common, accounting for almost 10The 1950-54 period did, however, experience a large 3 number of stoppages and workers idle and the largest num ber of man-days lost in any subperiod. Table 15. Number of railroad work stoppages, workers involved, and man-days idle, 1950-69 Stoppages Years Workers involved Man-days idle Average per stoppage Number Average per stoppage Estimated working time lost Number Average per period ___________________ ___________________ ___________________ ___________________ 82 70 64 100 16.4 14.0 12.8 20.0 404,797 75,049 189,908 760,065 4,937 1,072 2,967 7,601 2,416,907 1,673,519 2,405,628 1,922,498 29,474 23,907 37,907 19,225 0.16 .14 .27 .25 1950-69 _____________ ____ 1950-59 ________________ 1960-69 ___ _____ ____ 316 152 164 15.8 15.2 16.4 1,429,819 479,846 949,973 4,525 3,157 5,793 8,418,552 4,090,426 4,328,126 26,641 26,911 26,391 .19 .15 .26 1950-54 1955-59 1960-64 1965-69 Number SOURCE: Bureau o1 Labor Statistics. 39 80 percent of all strikes. In the 1960’s, this type of dispute constituted 83.5 percent of all stoppages. Only 66 strikes— 39 of them in the 1950’s— were multiunit in nature: 49 (15.5 percent) involving a single carrier and two or more unions; 11 (3.5 per cent) in which one union and two or more carriers participated; and six involving more than one carrier and more than one union. Only one of these 66 mul tiunit stoppages was nationwide, a shopcraft dispute in 1967. Operating employees participated in these multiunit disputes on 36 occasions; nonoperating, 19 times; both groups on 11 occasions. M ajor strikes, stoppages involving 10,000 workers or more each, were even more infrequent then mul tiunit disputes. (See table 17.) Over the two dec ades, 17 m ajor strikes occurred in the railroad indus try, 12 after 1960. F or the comparable period, the total economy sustained 418 m ajor strikes, or 0.5 percent of all stoppages. By contrast, the 17 major strikes conducted in the railroad industry constituted 5.4 percent of all railroad stoppages, a level that can be traced to the prevalence of coordinated bargain ing and observance of picket lines. These m ajor rail road stoppages accounted for the bulk of man-days idle (61.4 percent) and workers involved (83.7 per cent) in all railroad stoppages, 1950-69. Although fewer workers were involved in m ajor railway strikes in the 1950’s (368,616) than in the 1960’s (828,288), man-days idle attributable to strikes in the former decade (2,853,451) exceeded the level of the latter decade (2,315,735). Because they are normally chronicled by the vari Table 16. ous forms of mass communications, larger stoppages receive more public attention, particularly if they are associated with emergency boards cases. Twelve m ajor stoppages followed the release of reports by emergency boards (11 appointed between 1950-69) and one* other m ajor stoppage preceded the appoint ment of a board. (See table 17.) F our m ajor strikes were not directly associated with an emergency dis pute; however, two of these four stoppages were related to A rbitration Award No. 282 which “termi nated” the dispute resulting in the establishment of Emergency Board No. 154. Of the 17 m ajor stoppages, only five involved a single carrier and a single union, all occurring in the 1960’s. In the remaining 12 m ajor stoppages, m ore than one union or more than one carrier were parties to the disputes. Although involved in only six major stoppages (five of them in the 1960’s) nonoperating emr ployees’ unions accounted for 52 percent of the workers involved and 51 percent of the man-days idle associated with these larger strikes. The average duration of these nonoperating stoppages was 19.5 calendar days, compared with 5.2 days for the 11 major stoppages (7 in the 1960’s) in which operat ing employees participated. In a vast majority of these 17 major strikes, the principal subjects in dispute were wages (7 cases) and job security (6). Plant administration was an issue three times (all in the 1968-69 period) and supplementary benefits, once. Four-fifths of the m ajor disputes occurring in the 1950’s were attribut- Number and percent of railroad work stoppages, by size, selected periods, 1950-69 T o ta l s to p p a g e s Type o f e m p lo y e e U n d e r 10 0 e m p lo y e e s 100 and u n d e r 5 0 0 e m p lo y e e s 500 and under 1 ,0 0 0 e m p lo y e e s N um ber P e r cent 1 9 5 0 - 6 9 ___________________ O p e ra tin g w o rk e rs N o n o p e ra tin g w o rk e rs ---------------B oth _______________ 316 192 1 0 0 .0 1 9 5 0 - 5 4 ___________________________ O p e ra tin g w o rk e rs ---------------N o n o p e ra tin g w o r k e r s ________ B oth __________________________ 82 50 24 8 1 0 0 .0 24 15 7 2 2 9 .3 24 16 6 2 2 9 .3 12 5 5 2 1 4 .6 18 10 6 2 2 2 .0 1 9 5 5 -5 9 _____ _________________ O p e ra tin g w o r k e r s ____________ N o n o p e ra tin g w o rk e rs ______ B oth --------------------------------------- 70 43 20 7 1 0 0 .0 12 9 3 — 1 7 .1 30 20 8 2 4 2 .9 13 7 3 3 1 8 .6 14 7 5 2 2 0 .0 1 9 6 0 - 6 4 ___________________________ O p e ra tin g w o r k e r s ______ __ N o n o p e ra tin g w o rk e rs _______ B oth __________________________ 64 40 21 3 1 0 0 .0 21 12 8 1 3 2 .8 21 13 7 1 3 2 .8 6 4 1 1 9 .4 11 8 3 — 1 7 .2 5 3 2 — 7 .8 1 9 6 5 - 6 9 ___________________________ O p e ra tin g w o rk e rs - - ________ N o n o p e ra tin g w o rk e rs _______ B oth __________________ ______ _ 100 59 41 — 1 0 0 .0 22 14 8 ■ — 2 2 .0 32 18 14 — 3 2 .0 13 7 6 — 1 3 .0 26 15 11 — 2 6 .0 7 5 2 — 7 .0 40 P e r cent N um ber 79 50 2 5 .0 107 67 26 3 106 18 P e r cent 1 0 ,0 0 0 a n d o v e r e m p lo y e e s Num ber NOTE: Dashes denote zeros. SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics. N um ber 1 .0 0 0 a n d u n d e r 1 0 .0 0 0 e m p lo y e e s 3 3 .9 35 5 44 23 . P er cent N um ber 1 3 .9 69 40 15 6 P er cent 2 1 .8 25 4 Num ber 17 12 P er cent 5 .4 5 — 4 4 — 4 .9 — 1 __ 1 .4 1 — T ab le 17. R ailro ad w ork stoppages, involving 10,000 o r m ore w orkers, 1 9 5 0 -6 9 P a r ti e s in v o lv e d B e g in n in g d a te Y ear (in days) U nion(s) C a rrie rs ) 5 8 ,6 9 5 1 7 4 ,7 6 9 5 3 3 ,6 7 9 7 7 2 ,0 2 2 BRT BLE BLFE ORC 7 0 ,2 8 5 4 0 ,9 9 7 4 1 9 ,7 1 7 1 2 5 ,4 9 3 L o u isv ille & N a s h v ille 10 N ono p e r a tin g u n io n s.2* 4 * 2 3 ,8 7 0 1 ,0 0 2 ,5 4 0 12 P e n n s y lv a n ia 14 N ew York H a rb o r C a r rie rs C o n fe re n c e C o m m itte e .8 C h ic a g o a n d N o rth W e s te rn TWU, BB, SWMIA, 1AM. SIU, MMP, NMEB. ORT 14 7 .. 1 -3 0 -5 1 3 -0 9 -5 2 12 4 19531 9 9 4 -----1 9 5 5 _______ 3 -1 4 -5 5 58 1 9 6 0 _______ 9 -0 1 -6 0 1 9 6 1 ______ 1 -1 0 -6 1 19 6 2 . .. 8 -3 0 -6 2 30 1QCO } ---------l9 D i 1 9 6 4 _______ 4 -8 -6 4 2 Illin o is C e n tra l 6 -1 5 -6 4 1 1 1 -1 8 -6 5 3 -3 1 -6 6 1 4 M isso u ri-K a n sa s-T e x a s; M is s o u ri-P a c ific ; T e x a s M e x ic a n ; S o u th e rn P a c ific ; T e x a s & P a c if ic ; P o r t T e rm in a l A s s o c ia tio n o f H o u sto n . A tc h is o n , T o p e k a & S a n te Fe E ig h t c a r r ie r s 8 7 -1 6 -6 7 2 -5 -6 8 2 5 1 1 -6 -6 8 _____ 1951 1952 . . M andays id le SUNA BLFE V a rio u s W e s te rn r a i l r o a d s 1 P e n n s y lv a n ia ; S o u th e rn ; N ew Y ork C e n tra l; S a n te Fe. V a rio u s c a r r i e r s 8 N ew Y ork C e n tra l; T e rm in a l R a ilro a d A s s o c ia tio n o f S t. L o u is. 6 -2 5 -5 0 5 -1 0 -5 0 1950 N um ber of w o rk e rs in v o lv ed D ura- M ajo r is s u e No e m e r gency b o a rd c re a te d S to p p a g e p r io r S to p p a g e to th e fo llo w in g c r e a tio n ( s e c tio n 1 0) of a ' ’s t a t u s q u o " b o a rd p e rio d W a g es Jo b s e c u rity . W a g es W a g es X (*) X X S u p p le m e n ta ry b e n e f i ts . X Jo b s e c u rity . W a g es X Jo b s e c u rity . X X 1956- _____ 19 6 7 ______ 1968 1 9 6 9 ........... 5 0 4 ,0 0 0 1 3 6 ,5 4 4 1 5 ,2 7 0 3 2 0 ,6 7 0 2 0 ,4 1 5 4 0 ,8 3 0 W a g es 1 2 ,7 6 8 1 2 ,7 6 8 J o b -s e c u rity . X BRSC BLFE 2 9 ,0 2 0 1 1 5 ,2 9 4 2 9 ,0 2 0 3 4 6 ,1 7 7 W a g es Job s e c u rity . X O R a ilro a d in d u s tr y M is s o u ri-P a c ific ; S e a b o a rd C o a s t; T e x a s & P a c ific . 6 sh o p c ra ft8 BRT 4 5 9 ,0 8 8 3 9 ,3 6 9 6 4 5 ,1 1 2 1 7 6 ,9 2 6 2 L o u isv ille & N a s h v ille BRT 1 2 ,9 9 4 2 5 ,9 8 8 1 -1 3 -6 9 1 L o u isv ille & N a sh v ille UTU (BRT) 1 2 ,9 0 0 1 2 ,9 0 0 4 -8 -6 9 1965 196 6 7 2 ,0 0 0 2 2 ,9 7 0 5 Illin o is C e n tra l UTU (BRT) 1 6 ,2 0 0 6 4 ,8 0 0 W a g es P la n t a d m in i s tr a ti o n . Job s e c u rity . P la n t a d m in i s tr a ti o n . P la n t a d m in i s tr a ti o n . X flAIIA BLFE, BLE, ORCB, BRT. BRT 1 C h ic a g o , R ock I s la n d & P a c if ic ; G re a t N o rth e rn ; C h ic a g o W e s te rn ; D e n v e r & Rio G ra n d e W e s te rn ; W e s te rn P a c ific . 2 F ollow ed t h e r e p o r t o f a P r e s id e n tia l c r e a t e d b e fo r e f is c a l y e a r 1 9 5 0 . e m e rg e n cy b o a rd G re a t w h ic h w as * Various carriers involved in Emergency Board No. 81. « 1AM, BB, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO, BMWE, BRS, ORT, BRSC. * B a ltim o re & O hio; B rooklyn E a s te r n D is tr ic t T e rm in a l; B u sh T e rm in a l; C e n tra l R a ilro a d o f N ew J e r s e y ; E rie -L a c k a w a n n a ; L eh ig h V a lle y ;. N ew Y ork C e n tra l; N ew Y ork D ock; N ew Y ork, N ew H av en & H a rtfo rd ; P e n n s y l v a n ia ; a n d R e a d in g . O r d u r in g e m e r gency b o a rd . X (*) X X X • P e n n s y lv a n ia ; C e n tra l o f G e o rg ia ; I llin o is C e n tra l; G ran d T ru n k ; Bosto n & M ain e; M isso u ri P a c ific ; U nion P a c if ic ; a n d S e a b o a rd . 7 T h e r a ilr o a d s in v o lv e d in t h i s s to p p a g e c la im e d t h a t t h e la te d to t h e r u le s a n d p r a c t ic e s in e f f e c t u p o n t h e e x p ir a tio n tio n A w ard 2 8 2 . A r b itra tio n B o a rd No. 2 8 2 w a s c r e a t e d b y PL d is p o s e o f tw o i s s u e s in d is p u te b e tw e e n t h e c a r r i e r s a n d v o lv e d in E m e rg e n c y B o a rd No. 1 5 4 . s tr ik e re o f A rb itra 8 8 - 1 0 8 to u n io n s in 8 1AM, BB, SMWIA, IBEW, BRCA, a n d IBFO. 9 T h e d i s p u t e r e l a t e s t o t h e r e d u c tio n i n s ta n c e s , a s a r e s u l t o f A.B. N o. 2 8 2 . of " c re w s iz e s " in c e r t a in SOURCES: N a tio n a l M e d ia tio n B o a rd d a ta , B u re a u o f L a b o r S t a ti s t i c s . able to economic issues, while noneconomic issues predominated the m ajor stoppages in the 1960’s (8 cases). M ajor strikes involving economic issues ex tended, on the average, almost twice as long as those resulting from noneconomic issues (13.4 calendar days com pared with 7.4 days). Combined, the 17 major strikes’ duration, ranging from 1 to 58 days, averaged 10.2 calendar days, with a m edian of 5.0 days. The majority of these larger strikes were termi nated quickly, 10 within 1 week. Only two extended beyond 15 calendar days. Duration In comparison to m ajor strikes, the average dura tion of all railroad stoppages over the two decades was 13.0 calendar days, 14.6 days in the 1950’s and 11.2 days in the 1960’s. During the same period, the average annual duration of all strikes experienced in the total economy was 21.7 calendar days, 20.0 days in the 1950’s and 23.5 days in the 1960’s. Approximately 75 percent of the railroad disputes extended 6 days or less, and over 91 percent lasted 41 for fewer than 30 days. (See appendix table A— 8 and table A -1 0 .) Only eight railroad stoppages— four in each decade under study— extended for more than 90 days. Three-fourths of these prolonged stop pages were concerned primarily with wages. In con trast to the even distribution of prolonged strikes in the two decades, there was a significant decrease in relative number of medium-length strikes (15 to 29 days and 30 to 59 days) in the 1960’s and a substan tial increase in shorter stoppages, particularly those extending for only 1 day. Almost one-half of all workers involved in rail road stoppages participated in strikes which ex tended 3 days or less, and over nine-tenths of workers involved were associated with stoppages less than 15 days in duration. Stoppages extending for 2 weeks or less were responsible for one-half of all idleness, and strikes lasting less than 60 days ac counted for three-fourths. Although prolonged stop pages involved less than 1 percent of all workers, they incurred more than one-fifth of all idleness. Operating and nonoperating personnel stoppages Another pattern in the railroad work stoppages was the different degree of involvement of m ajor oc cupational groups. Between 1950 and 1969, operat ing employees participated in 192 work stoppages; nonoperating workers in 106 stoppages; and both groups jointly in 18 strikes. Even though nonoperat ing employees called fewer strikes in both decades than operating employees, the former increased their strike rate in the 1960’s, as shown in table 16. Al though nonoperating employees were involved in fewer strikes and accounted for a smaller num ber of workers involved, they nevertheless were responsible for 54 percent of all man-days lost over the two dec ades and accounted for the vast majority of man-days in the 1955-59 and 1960-64 periods. (See ap pendix table A -8 .) Average duration for nonoperat ing crafts’ stoppages was 16.6 days, compared with 10.0 for the operating crafts. A nother im portant difference between operating and nonoperating personnel strikes was the incidence of issues involved in their disputes. (See appendix table A -9 .) Although operating employees partici pated in more stoppages generated by either eco nomic o r noneconomic issues, both m ajor groups’ disputes were dominated by noneconomic issues, particularly by plant administration and job security matters (in 2 out of 3 cases). Only one m ajor issue, 42 intraunion or interunion matters, was predominated by a m ajor group, nonoperating employees in this case. Issues Within the 20 years studied, the incidence of m ajor issues in the railroad industry varied, but some patterns did emerge. (See appendix table A -7 and table A -1 0 .) These issues were classified into those involving economic matters, such as wages, supple m entary benefits, and wage adjustments; and those concerned with workers’ security, i.e., union organi zation and security, job security, plant administra tion, interunion or intraunion matters, other working conditions, and other contractual matters. Of the issues reported to be the causes of signifi cant numbers of stoppages, plant administration was by far the principal subject in dispute over the 2 0 year span and in every subperiod, except 1950-54. (See appendix tables A -7 and 9.) Although the re sults were not completely consistent in all periods, wages was the next most troublesome issue, followed by job security and interunion or intraunion matters, respectively. Economic issues (including supplementary bene fits) engendered longer periods of disputes on the average (27.8 calendar days) than survival issues, including union organization and security, other working conditions, and other contractual m atters (5.0 days). Within these two m ajor categories, two economic issues, wages and wage adjustments, had the longest durations on the average (38.1 and 9.5 calendar days, respectively), followed by plant ad ministration (5.8), job security (3.2), and intra union or interunion matters (2.5). Table 18, which shows duration by m ajor issue, il lustrates another im portant aspect of railroad stop pages. Wages predominated in the longer strikes Table 18. 1950-69 Duration of railroad stoppages by major issue, D u ra tio n o f d is p u te 30 days and over 60 days and over 90 days and over N um ber N um ber N um ber Issu e W a g e s _________ P la n t a d m in is t r a t i o n _____ W age a d ju s t m e n t _________ Jo b s e c u r i t y ____ P e rce n t P e rce n t P e rce n t 16 6 6 .7 6 6 0 .0 5 8 3 .3 4 1 6 .7 3 3 0 .0 1 1 6 .7 3 1 1 2 .5 4 .2 NOTE; Dashes denote zeros. SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics 1 — 1 0 .0 — __ ,__ — * — (those extending 30 days or longer), followed by plant administration, wage adjustment, and job se curity. In terms of num ber of man-days idle and workers involved, economic issues generated substantially greater losses than did noneconomic issues, primarily because of 70 wage disputes which accounted for 54 percent of all workers and all man-days idle. Com bined, the 111 strikes dealing with economic issues were responsible for 69 percent of man-days idle and 58 percent of workers involved in all stoppages. Within the two m ajor categories, wages was the pri mary issue, accounting for 54 percent of all workers and all man-days idle; and job security disputes con stituted 30 percent of all workers and 24 percent of all man-days. 43 Appendix A T ab le A -1 . S elected ra ilro a d fin a n c ia l and econom ic statistics, 1 9 5 0 -6 9 Rilro d ’ s a o Crrie in a a s h re f a rs ak p y in rc traffic1 b n ru tc 2 te ity L b rc s a o o ts In e dx Nme o Oe tin Oe tin u b r l p ra g p ra g o f Nt e Rv ee Rteo in e tmn c rrie re e u s e p n e 3 p rc n o E p y a f v s e t a rs v n e 3 x e s s e e t f mlo o tp t fs uu Rv n e n e ee u u rn pr e Y a fre h p s e er et o s n s o s n s ilwy m n4 ig t a s n M s (ptue 4 (th u a d )4 in u g (th u a d ) (th u a d ) ra a ile rerc n o s n s c rrin e p ye 28 mlo e o e tin p ra g d fic 4 e its to 3 g r Nm o rod e t) n e u f a mn o r6 §8 ahu epne5 xe ss m s m 3 b r o nd ile iles e we (p rc n (P r e e t) e cn e t) , 0,7 72.8 4 1 7 .7 122 84 8 ,0 0 7 3 ,0 5 65 1 5 - 5 .1 90 .39 4 67 6 .A N. .A 1 6 t 9,5 7 0 $ ,1 5 5 2 1 ,4 0 N . 27 15 9 1 5 .6 5 3 6.14 4 25 6 2 1 ,4 5 4.16 $ ,6 8 0 22 7 ,0 0 1 6 2 ,5 1 6 5.9 12 6 0 , 7 ,0 0 77.1 4 2 1 ,5 1 1 0 1 ,6 2 8,1 2 2 1 5 - 5 .4 92 48 51 4 .6 0 1 ,2 6 4.54 22 4 23,7 5 0 3 ,9 0 1 6.5 12 6,6 1 ,7 2 7 0 0 ,8 7 8,1 4 1 3 ,8 1 6 , 2 63 77.2 454 15 9 3 5 .0 1 1 4.92 3 9 1 ,2 5 4.55 28 5 2 ,3 0 0 4 6 ,7 0 1 1 ,7 7 9 0 8 ,8 1 8,2 8,2 , 0 ,3 2 77.7 4 8 4 1 23 65.8 12 6 1 15 9 4 49.5 6 4.38 3 06 .51 1 7 1 ,9 6 3 24,8 3 0 9 ,1 0 2 4 6 ,5 7 6 6.3 106 05 , 4,7 8 0.9 4 3 9,4 4 1 8 ,0 5 7,4 0 0 1 5 - 49.53 4.01 3 95 1 ,9 9 4.54 05 7 24,8 9 0 4 ,9 0 1 4 4 , 5 ,2 6 89.4 4 1 1 ,2 9 0 0 2 ,6 0 7,7 4,4 2 96 6 .9 10 8 1 5 15 9 6 48.40 3.81 1 2 25,5 7 0 1 ,8 0 1 16 ,5 4 4.19 3 , 2,6 2 9 ,7 2 67.2 104 64 93 .7 4 2 1 ,6 6 9 0 8 ,4 2 8,1 9 9 15 97 4 6.89 3 .51 6 16 ,0 0 3.52 26,1 3 0 9 ,9 0 1 6 9 .1 4 5 5 1 1,5 .1 96 0 8 ,0 1 1 ,6 5 5 0 2 ,4 2 8,32 77 67 15 9 8 45.98 3.1 1 17 ,0 5 2 1 .9 9 7 26,1 0 0 9 ,1 0 1 8 0,5 4 75 99 .9 4 2 9,6 6 8 8 ,2 9 7,6 1 4 3 ,3 1 67.8 1 1 5 - 45.3 99 1 2.93 13 ,1 2 2.8 8 26,2 7 0 4 ,4 0 2 1 5 85 7 1 ,4 4 1 6 0 .1 4 1 1 9 ,8 5 67.6 9,9 4 2 5 ,8 8 7,7 6 3 16 9 0 44.06 2 .75 8 10 ,3 8 2 1 .2 26,39 00 2 6,7 7 5 ,3 9 67.8 78 94 1 0 0,4 1 .4 4 7 0 9,6 1 9 4 ,5 3 7,6 7 2 1 6 _ 43.50 2 91 _ .59 7 9 20 ,2 2 2.04 4 1 .2 3 7 26,3 2 0 7 ,5 0 2 9,3 9,6 0 96 7,3 1,7 6 51 67.5 77 4 1 ,5 3 1 8 16 9 2 43.75 2 7 .4 6 15 ,9 9 2 7 26,1 5 0 8 ,9 0 2 .7 4 9,5 2 9 6 ,9 1 7,5 7,7 2 .9 3 5 70 4 0 ,1 6 1 5 9 0 57 67 .0 1 6 - 43.2 93 7 2.19 5 10 ,6 1 3.07 2 26,2 6 0 6 ,2 0 2 60 3 8 ,0 9 1 3 3 .9 3 5 9 9,6 4 3 8 ,6 6 7,5 2 0 4 ,3 6 65.8 1 6 .. 43.18 2.05 94 5 18 ,5 6 3.22 2 2 ,3 4 0 5 9 ,5 0 2 0,1 66 34 1 2 5,0 4 .5 3 0 9,9 5 8 8 ,1 7 7,83 68 65 8 .0 16 9 5 43.25 1 1 .9 5 14 ,5 2 3.73 4 25,7 3 0 9 ,7 0 1 1 ,4 5,0 0 2 52 8,0 2 8 0 ,6 5 65.2 69 6 3 ,9 1 1 7 5 .5 3 2 7 16 9 6 42.97 1 8 16 ,4 4 3.92 .7 4 26,6 9 0 9 ,5 0 1 3 94 64.8 6 .2 3 5 7 1 ,8 0 6 0 8 ,4 7 8,277,2 60 9 3 ,8 5 1 9 16 9 7 41.4 3 10 .5 6 28 ,0 8 2.48 27,2 2 0 4 ,0 0 2 0 5 ,3 9 6 .1 60 9 1 .1 1 1 3 7 .4 3 0 5 7 1 ,5 1 6 0 8 ,5 0 8,3 9 6 16 9 8 41.16 1 3 .2 4 4 5 2.52 8 26,9 3 0 0 ,0 0 1 9 3,6 5 50 3 9 ,5 6 1 1 8 .0 3 0 6 1 ,0 1 0 1 6 ,9 2 8,72 64 6 .1 1 6 - 41.09 1 9 99 4 .0 45 2 8 .38 27,5 6 0 0 ,7 0 2 1 6 1 ,6 8 2 1 5 ,5 5 9,2 9 3 0 ,1 7 64.4 5 8 7 71 8 7 ,2 7 8 .8 3 1 1T e ra a s s a o in rc to m s (p b a d p a ) fo h ilro d ’ h re f te ity n ile u lic n riv te r • Uin 1957-59 = 1 0. sg 0 fre h a d in rc p s e g r m s (p b a d p a ) fo p s e g rs ig t n te ity a s n e ile u lic n riv te r a s n e . 7P lim a . re in ry 2In lu e a h u e ra a s in re e e h s o tru te s ip . c d s ll a l-lin ilro d c iv rs ip r s e h s N T : N . d n te n t a a b . OE .A e o s o v ila le 8F r c s I a d II lin -h u ra a so ly o la s n e a l ilro d n . S UCS IC d ta As c tio o A e a Rilro d d ta ORE: C a , s o ia n f mric n a a s a , 4 F r c s I lin -h u ra a s o ly o la s e a l ilro d n 0 Lb r c s in lu e wgs a d s la s w lfa c s , a d p y ll Lb r S tis sd ta a o o ts c d a e n a rie , e re o ts n a ro a o ta tic a . ta e . xs Rtioo a f o e tin p ra g e pne x e ss to re e u vne (p rc n e e t) 74.4 2 7 .2 77 7 .0 61 7 6.18 7 .6 86 7 .5 51 7 .7 63 7 .3 82 7 8.78 78.3 2 7 9.42 7 .0 98 7 .5 81 77.8 8 7 .4 82 7 6.76 7 .0 67 7 .0 90 7 .6 86 7 .9 89 Bre u o ua f 45 Os Railroads’ involvement in Railway Labor Act procedures, fiscal years 1950-691 D p s no md tio is o itio f e ia n c s sb :2 ae y W d wls ith ra a A itra n rb tio a re mn g e e ts D m s ls is is a A r fte md tio e ia n Bfo e re md tio e ia n C rrie a r E p yr mloe Bth o 24 1 14 8 17 ,6 2 3 2 31 7 22 8 20 7 15 0 29 2 3 8 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 6 4 9 7 7 3 5 1 2 0 4 0 4 3 3 3 4 2 5 2 3 8 3 5 2 5 5 1 7 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 19 4 7 5 19 0 12 6 18 0 10 0 17 0 19 1 9 1 16 4 10 5 15 6 16 5 19 5 28 4 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 2 7 8 0 2 1 8 2 9 1 2 7 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 18 5 15 6 12 4 19 1 16 0 7 2 9 6 9 9 7 0 18 0 13 0 10 1 7 2 10 3 12 2 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 4 3 6 3 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 2 1 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 1 6 1 6 1 3 1 2 1 6 1 3 1 6 1 0 7 1 6 2 1 3 9 1 0 3 7 19 2 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 2 2 2 4 2 1 2 3 1 7 2 8 1 8 1 8 1 7 2 6 2 9 1 1 1 8 7 3 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 7 2 5 8 3 6 4 1 2 1 5 4 9 2 3 2 1 1 2 4 1 1 5 3 8 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 1 7 1 0 1 1 3 8 8 3 7 5 8 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 1 7 1 2 8 2 0 7 1 3 2 4 1 0 2 3 1 3 1 0 1 1 3 6 1 2 1 3 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 5 6 2 6 4 4 1 1 3 1 5 2 1 Ya er Md tio e ia n a re mn g e e ts 61 7 (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) (4 ) 1 8 2 7 8 1 Nme o u br f e e ec mrg n y b a s2 o rd M c lla e u is e n o s 3 0 7 .0 96 7 .4 56 7 .6 33 7 .7 56 6 .4 80 7 .2 74 8 .2 05 7 .9 75 7 .7 45 6 .5 63 6 .7 70 7 .2 79 7 .1 45 6 .8 63 7 .5 87 7 .6 96 8 .7 45 7 .7 49 7 .6 45 8 .2 91 Rle us Rfu a to e s ls a itra b: rb te y Rte o as f py a S le te to ls ________ 5,227 1243 3,984 e c d ta 5,092 2 1 4,851 95.27 2 4 4 4 3 9 15 8 5,102 2 4 4,858 95.22 2 9 6 4 6 6 23 0 5,118 2 4 4,864 95.04 2 3 7 2 1 5 7 2 0 53 ,1 7 2 9 4,878 94.96 2 7 7 2 5 5 9 2 2 5,1 7 2 0 4,887 94.76 2 0 7 5 7 5 9 11 7 5,180 2 5 4,905 94.69 3 2 7 2 1 7 1 1 4 5,190 2 7 4,913 94.66 3 4 6 7 2 4 20 6 5,196 2 0 4,916 94.6 8 1 23 5 6 8 25 0 5,205 2 0 4,925 94.62 3 5 7 8 0 7 28 2 5,215 2 2 4,933 94.59 2 8 8 8 4 3 15 6 5,218 2 4 4,934 94.56 2 6 7 8 3 13 2 5 8 5,220 2 5 4,935 94.54 2 9 5 2 2 17 7 5 ,221 2 6 4,935 94.52 2 5 5 8 0 3 12 5 5,226 2 6 4,940 94.53 1 9 6 8 9 6 13 3 5,228 2 7 4,941 94.51 2 2 5 8 5 4 18 9 5,230 2 8 4,942 94.49 2 6 4 8 3 8 18 8 5,235 2 0 4,945 94.46 2 6 3 9 3 6 20 0 5,275 3 8 4,947 93.97 2 2 6 1 4 1 11 8 5,285 324 4,961 93.87 2 4 7 8 2 22 1 5,404 35 4 5,050 93.45 3 3 3 4 7 36 0 P rc n e et A e irlin s Rilro d a as T ta ol P rc n o e et f to l ta Nme u br A e irlin s Md tio Cs s e ia n ae Mjo is u s in o e a r s e v lv d inra a ilro d md tio c s s e ia n a e Nw e a re mn g e e ts 1 . 950 1 _ 951 19 — 52 1953— 1 — 954 1 — 955 1 — 956 1 5 --. 97 1958— 1 59 9 — 1 — 960 1961— 1 — 962 1 _ 963 1964_ 1 — 965 1966— 1 _ 967 19 _ 68 1 _ 969 T ta ol Ya er C lle tiv b rg in g o c e a a in a re mn 2 g e e ts Rilro d a as Nme u br ________ J Table A -2. 7 1 1 1 6 4 1 2 3 4 4 1 6 3 6 4 4 4 1 3 4 -..1950 -..1951 --.1952 -.1953 —1 5 94 —1 5 95 —1 5 96 --.1957 -.1958 -.-1959 - .I90 6 --.1961 --.1962 —1 6 93 --’.1964 _1 6 95 _1 6 96 ---1967 --.1968 .--1969 — — *T e d fin n o th in u try c n rm to in u try c s ific tio 40 in th S n a h e itio f e d s o fo s d s la s a n e ta d rd to a itra , a re id a o th to l n me o md tio c s s d p s d o a d th n me o rb te s u l f e ta u b r f e ia n a e is o e f n e u br f In u tria C s ific tio Mn a 1 67 e itio . d s l la s a n a u l, 9 d n md tio a d a itra n a re mn , w d wls a d d m s ls e ia n n rb tio g e e ts ith ra a , n is is a . a hs e o fo a n a n v ila le r a r s e n e o s f is o itio 2 Rp s n c lle tiv b rg in g a re mn o file w th Ntio a Md tio B a , a d 4Ds e d n te in rmtio ws u a a b fo mjo is u s a d mth d o d p s n e re e ts o c e a a in g e e ts n ith e a n l e ia n o rd n md tio c s sd p s do inafis a y a e d gJ n 30. e ia n a e is o e f c l e r, n in ue o ra a md tio c s s b fo 19 5 f ilro d e ia n a e e re 5 . 2T e n me o e e e c b a s a p in d is d c re te to th n me o re s ls h u b r f mrg n y o rd p o te ire tly la d e u b r f fu a S UC: Ntio a Md tio Ba d ta ORE a n l e ia n ord a . Table A -3. Railroad mediation cases disposed of by the National Mediation Board, by major occupational group, fiscal year, 1950-69 9 5 3,984 1 9 2 1 6 ,3 2 2 1 7 ------- 0 15 8 6 13 5 6 15 90 -----------------0 0 3 3 1 4 1951..........- ---- ------------ 2 3 1 8 4 7 2 1 0 15 92 -- --- ---------------- 2 1 8 7 9 19 1 2 2 0 2 15 93 -........... 2 5 7 0 15 94 -- ------- 1 1 8 1 2 — 6 2 1 1 17 4 3 4 1 1 3 15 95 ....... 6 10 5 1 1 0 20 6 15 96 ____ ___ — 1 1 0 1 1 15 97 --------- 2 5 1 1 7 5 28 2 4 13 5 2 15 98 -- ____________ 6 15 6 6 9 2 4 1 5 . -- ___ ___ ___ 99 4 7 — 2 8 13 5 1 6 __________________ 90 7 7 17 — 3 0 1 6 _________________ 1 7 91 1 5 5 12 5 4 8 1 6 __________________ 92 3 3 7 — 7 1 1 6 _________________ 1 3 93 7 17 — 9 2 18 9 1 6 __________________ 94 1 1 0 18 1 9 8 6 4 1 6 __________________ 95 11 1 1 1 9 0 0 _ 1 6 ______ _ _________ 2 0 1 96 1 2 11 1 19 8 3 2 1 6 _______ __________ 97 2 3 4 4 1 1 6 __________________ 2 2 1 1 7 98 3 — 1 2 0 1 6 __________________ 3 6 1 2 9 99 1Md tio c s s in wic mre th n o e ra a c ft ws in o e . e ia n a e h h o a n ilro d ra a v lv d 2T is mjo o c p tio a g u c n titu s a th o e tin c fts th h a r c u a n l ro p o s te ll e p ra g ra ; e re a in o c p tio a g u s c mris th n n p ra g c fts min g c u a n l ro p o p e e o o e tin ra . 1950-69 ----- 40 0 1 1 1 6 3 5 2 8 2 8 2 4 2 3 1 9 1 9 2 1 3 1 1 5 2 2 1 2 1 8 1 7 1 4 1 1 1 0 2 6 9 15 1 7 8 3 0 2 2 2 4 1 5 1 2 3 4 9 4 3 1 6 1 6 1 1 3 8 1 4 7 4 1 0 1 6 7 7 9 7 7 2 9 9 1 5 3 1 8 1 4 1 4 1 5 12 2 0 1 5 10 15 _ 6 7 _ 1 2 3 1 8 2 2 1 8 2 — 1 2 — 5 3 0 1 7 — 1 4 1 j io 5 8 — 2 1 — 2 1 — 5 3 3 — 3 1 — 7 — 3 — 2 8 2 3 — — 7 5 — 2 1 2 9 1 — 3 1 — 1 1 0 1 3 1 — 1 0 1 — 4 — 2 4 — — 1 — — 3 — — 7 1 — 7 — 1 1 1 — 1 1 3 — 3 — — 2 — — 8 1 1 — — 1 — 3 — — 4 3 — 4 1 — 8 1 — 7 1 N T : Ds e d n te z ro . OE ahs e o e s S UC: Ntio a Md tio Ba d ta ORE a n l e ia n ord a . M c lla e u ra a is e n o s ilro d wrk rs oe Mrin s rv e e a e e ic mn T c n a e g e rs e h ic l n in e , a h c , d ftmn rc ite ts ra e , e. tc D in c r e p y e in g a mloe s a d tra a d p llmn n in n u a p rte o rs Ptro e a d a lmn n s e ia o e p c l ffic rs T in d p tc e ra is a h rs S b rd a o ia in u o in te ffic ls min n n eo wy a te a c f a Ae ts te g p e g n , le ra h r, a d to e mn n wr e | Min n n e o wya d a te a c f a n j s n l wrk rs ig a o e Yrd a te a ms rs C ric l, o e s tio , le a ffic , ta n a d s re o s wrk rs n to h u e o e Mc a ic l fo mn e h n a re a Min n n e o a te a c f e u mn wrk rs q ip e t o e Cmind g u s ra o b e ro p, il rod1 a T in e g e a dy rd ra , n in , n a s rv e w rk rs e ic o e 2 Ya er A o c p tio s ll c u a n Mjo o c p tio a g u s a r c u a n l ro p 14 19 4 1 8 7 1 0 3 6 4 6 1 0 1 3 4 3 1 3 5 1 0 5 5 4 5 4 — 8 1 2 1 1 7 7 7 6 8 1 0 9 6 1 8 9 8 9 6 1 4 1 47 T ab le A -4 . R ailro ad em ergency boards, 1 9 5 0 -6 9 Mjo c ft a r ra in o e v lv d Ba ord n me u br 7 6 7 7 7 8 7 9 8 0 8 1 Uio (s nn) BE L, BT R BT R BT R OC R, OC R BT R BF , OC B T L E R, R B T BE BF R, L , LE " j l 8 2 J BE BF L , LE 8 3 8 4 SN UA RA Y 8 5 8 6 8 7 8 8 BT R BT R IL A IL A 8 9 9 1 9 2 9 3 9 5 OC R BE BF , OC BT L , L E R, R 1 C o e tin n n p r 6 o p ra g o o e a g u io s8 tin n n IB T BE L 9 6 9 7 OC R BF LE 9 8 1 C o e tin n n p r 7 o p ra g o o e a gu io s9 tin n n 1 14 0 BT R 15 0 16 0 BS RC 1 C o e tin n n pr 5 o p ra g o o e a g u io s1 tin n n 1 17 0 19 0 OC RB OC RB 10 1 BF LE 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 IB T OC RB TU W 1 C o e tin n n pr 2 o p ra g o o e a g u io s3 tin n n 1 15 1 16 1 BE L BT R 17 1 18 1 IB T UIW N 19 1 MP M 16 2 BE L 48 Mjo is u a r se Oe tin Nn pra g o Oe t Wgs p ra a e in g C rrie ) a rs M s u Pc is o ri a ific Su e Pc o th rn a ific Mn n a e o o ghia Dn e & R G n e e v r io ra d Ws rn e te Tx s & P c ea a ific E s rn Ws rn &S u - " a te , e te o th j e s rnCrrie C n r a te a rs o fe e c C m itte s ne o m e v J T rm a Rilro d As , e in l a a sn o S Lu f t. o is Crta ws rn R ilro d 7 e in e te a a s Es rn Ws rn & S u a te , e te o th e s rn Crrie Cn a te a rs o fe n e Cm itte s re c * o m e Cic g & Illin is M la d h ao o id n Bs n & A a y oto lb n T le o L k fro t Dc C. o d , a e n ok o T le o L ra & F irp rt o d , o in a o Dc C. ok o P llmn u a NwY rk Cn l e o e tra A n & Es Cro a tla tic a t a lin a d2 o e c rrie 9 n 5 th r a rs RA E Dn e & R G n e e v r io ra d Ws rn e te P llmn u a E s rn Ws rn & Su a te , e te o th e s rn Crrie Cn r a te a rs o fe e c C m itte s ne o m e Es rn Ws rn & Su a te , e te o th e s rn C rrie C n r a te a r’s o fe e c C m itte s ne o m e NwY rk Cic g & e o , h ao S Lu t. o is RA E E s rn Ws rn & Su a te , e te o th e s rn Crrie C n r a te a rs o fe e c C m itte s ne o m e P llmn u a Es rn Ws rn & Su a te , e te o th e s rn Crrie Cn r a te a rs o fe e c C m itte s ne o m e Es rn Ws rn & Su a te , e te o th e s rn Crrie Cn r a te a rs o fe e c C m itte s ne o m e RA E NwY rk Cn l e o e tra Pn s lv n e n y a ia Es rn Ws rn & S u a te , e te o th e s rn C rrie C n r a te a rs o fe e c C m itte ne o m e Soa e P rtla d &S a p k n, o n e ttle E s rn Ws rn & S u a te , e te o th e s rn Crrie C n r a te a rs o fe e c C m itte s ne o m e RA E T le o L ra & F irp rt o d , o in a o Dc ; T le o L k fro t ok o d , a e n Dc ; C v la d S v ok le e n te e d re C. o o Gn ra Mn g rs As , o e e l a a e sn f Nw Y rk e o A h o , T pk & tc is n o e a Sn F a ta e X X X X X Wgs ae Wgs ru s Rle a d a e , le u s n Rle a d G v n e a dwrk g w rk g u s n rie a c s n o in o in ru s le c n itio s c n itio s od n od n X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 1X 3 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Wrks p a e o to p g s “Sc n6” e tio n tic oe 9 104 4 _1 _ 9 0 9 0 9 0 9 | | J 3 15-49 1 -22-48 0 9 20-49 4 10-48 - E e e c Ba Rc m e d tio s mrgny ord e o mn a n Oc rre cu d Rs o s so p rtie e p ne f a s S ttle e t d v te fro e mn e ia d m nav v u u io ii Ee mrBfo e re Dra n u tio u dr ne Mn a s b a a -dy ord A r fte gny ec Nme o u br f c a d ba re te ord Ac p db Eo o ic c e te y c n m Jb o ba ord wrk rs oe id le act1 ino e v lv d r re o Uio (s Crrie b thp rtie is us p rt n n ) a rs o a s s e u br (inc le d r a na s c rity2 n me eu (th u a d ) o osns a do e n th r dy ) as (th u a d ) osns d rin is ud u g se ba ord is us se X X 7 6 27.2 816.6 (4 ) ___ m____ 7 7 21 3 (5 ) X X 7 8 0.9 0.9 (4 ) i x X X 7 9 (4 ) ____ « _____ 8 0 0 9 (4 ) r 8 1 X } 23 .1 | f) 11 X 24.4 9.3 J 45 j 8 f X 419.7 70.3 J 1 r r J l J l X X 8 2 56 2 X X 8 3 5 3.7 3 X 58.7 21 1 X X 8 4 76 9 0.2 0.3 7.5 X 0.4 0 9 0 9 1 28-50 1 28-50 - (4 ) (4 ) 16 9 16 9 9 19-49 0 9 4 10-48 - 41 1 (4 ) 83 8 0.4 1 .8 5 6 1-50 1 -20-50 0 15 5 35 3 6.3 88.2 1 -7-50 2 1 - 1-49 1 31 0 86 1 41.0 15 2 .5 2 5-51 - 35 7 0 9 1 - 1-53 0 5 22-53 - (4 ) 10 4 39 5 6 24-54 1 -1-53 0 10 5 51 4 X 7 1-54 - 35 9 X 16 9 52 3 77 1 25 5 (« ____ ) m_____ 8 5 8 5 8 7 8 8 0 9 ------- («)-------- 8 9 9 1 9 2 X X X 2 4-55 1 1-55 4 1-54 1 21-53 8 27-54 4 2-55 - ^ ) i / r 1 X X x X X X X X X l___ X 9 3 9 5 0 9 X X X X — 1 .5 23.9 76.2 1002.5 , X 0 9 X X -------- ------- o ) ------* X X 2.6 1 .6 0 1 - 16-55 2 1 -30-56 1 42 6 10 9 7.2 0.2 426.3 1 .8 2 1 - 20-56 1 35 0 7 2-56 - 17 ,4 5 x X X X 9 8 14 0 15 0 16 0 X 17 0 19 0 X X X 59 6 35 9 9 6 9 7 X X 6 22-55 2 15-56 - { 0 9 0 9 10 1 X X X X ____ (l ) ____ f 0) * X X X X X X X X 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 15 1 16 1 17 1 18 1 19 1 X 16 2 49 T ab le A -4 . 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RC ME R R, RU m s, lu 1 Nelve rkilro dr. nae a ne n 6e t n o tio 2 RC p W R RU R xc p ae sus 2 overTwwYorahrbs eggd in psse g r ad freigh tra sprta n aao 2BS, B ra, OT, HE , BS(e e tfor wg is e). 3 ix ME 1te ; Baofficially dc rdwoestopaeoc rre a th ba ws 7N BdS inic te tw eonstop gs. cu d fter e ord a M Lta d a reoo drk ppg ae SUCS Ntioa Md tio Ba , Breuof L br S tistic ORE: a nl eia n ord u a ao ta s. cad re 5 1 — of railroad RLA— Emergency Boards fiscal years 1950-69 Uio(s nn ) Crrie a r(s) 76 M u Pc ------isso ri aific 77 Su e P c . o thrn aific 78 Mnnae c netin ooghla o nc g DWsten ----G---- .. e er adR rad n rn io ne ve 79 80 *81 82 *83 *84 85 86 1187 1188 89 91 92 93 95 96 97 98 104 105 106 107 109 110 — Te s ad Pc ---- . xa n aific E ste , Wste ad a rn e rn n CSu e ste re ____it ao thCnrn neCm rrie ao fe c o m rs te s (E SC) ____ e WCC Te in l Rilro d A c tio rm a a a ssoia n of S Louis---------t. Crta Wste ra a s9.e in e rn ilro d E SC ............ .... 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E _ Aro , Cn nad k n ato n Yug w o nsto n EWC C S C ____ _ _ Pllmn ............... ua Bltimre ad Oio a o n h E SC _______ WCC EWC C S C ___ __ __ BE BF, L , LE OC BT R, R BT R BT R BT R OC R BT R BE L BF LE BT R 6rC BE L BF LE SN UA RA Y BT R BT R IL A IL A OC R OC BT R, R 1eotin 6cog rap nnpr ooe ag tin un s1 ion 2 IB T Dte a of ire e o tio s “S6” n D ct ng tia n etio c ntic Bgan g Eain o e edte inin ng d dte Dteofd q e1 a e ia form re ust tion Uio(s C rriers) nn) a G vac d u rie ne isp te 1-14-49 | 2-10-49 | 2-17-49 17-49 j G va c d u rie ne isp te i G vac d u rie ne isp te 1-26-49 \ 4-28-49 I I S 4-26-49 G vac d u rie ne isp te (4 ) 3-15-49 | 9-22-49 | 12-14-49 } 10-22-48 11- 8-48 1-26-50 9-20-49 (i°) 2- 2-50 2- 2-50 4-10-48 9-22-49 1-10-50 1-11-50 -----G vac dispute. rie ne I I __ G va c d u . rie ne isp te 1-28-50 2-27-50 1-28-50 <) 4 9-19-49 10-14-49 408 -1 -4 () 4 6- 1 0 7 1 0 -5 -1 -5 4-25-50 3-30-50 6-16-50 12-21-49 (i° ) 12-27-49 7- 3 0 -5 950 -1 -5 BE L OC R BF LE 1 c o e t 7 o pra in g nn o onions» pra g ue tin BT R BS RC 1 -2 -5 1 -3 -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 - 9 0 1 -1 -5 1 -5 1 3 0 -5 1 - 7 0 1- 5 1 2 -5 -5 1- 5 1 1- 8 1 -5 1 -2 -5 040 1 - 1 9 1 - 5-501 1 -4 0 4 () 4 (° i) 531 -2 -5 2- 5 1 -5 (1 0 ) 5cgpra o ino e t nnpr ooe ag tin u T nions1 OC RB OC RB BF LE 523 -2 -5 G vac ;n tim c im d u rie ne ad e la s isp te 1 - 1 3 1 -2 -5 0 -5 1 4 3 1 -2 -5 173 0) ° 1 -1 -5 1 -2 -5 023 003 644 714 -2 -5 -2 -5 8- 6 4 -5 7 - 1 3 1 - 9 3 1 -1 -5 1 -1 -5 0 -5 2 -5 253 253 -5 7- 1 4 1 0 58 5- 3 5 5- 6 5 -5 -1 -5 1 -5 In of n itia tio mssio s e iann d tio se P itra n aro rof rbffetio Dte a 1 6 6 9 y 7- 8 91 Uios 1 -1 -4 -4 " n n y J J -4 1 o j. 5 0 9 | 7- 1 9 Bth | -2 -4 819 -3 -4 9- 7 9 Uio -4 n n 3 1 9 1 -2 -4 Uio -2 -4 1 5 9 nn -1 -4 1 } 5 6 9 } 8 2 9 Uios y -1 -4 nn 1 1 -2 -4 049 2- 8 0J -5 " j l 1 6 0 J- 2 4 0J- Uios L -1 -5 -1 -5 n n J 2- 9 0 -5 3- 8 0 -5 330 -1 -5 4- 6 0 -5 460 -2 -5 440 -2 -5 680 -2 -5 1- 6 0 -5 550 -2 -5 280 -1 -5 300 -1 -5 350 -1 -5 410 -2 -5 5- 3 0 -5 690 -2 -5 7- 1 0 -5 330 -1 -5 8- 4 0 -5 780 -1 -5 7 8 0 Bth -2 -5 o 900 -3 -5 (1) 3 D o nof e e e c ba d u ispsitio mrg ny ord isp te W astrik ith e Dof Bfoybmr A e e a te3 g nreea fter mr e c oe Typ e rd re d e aremn aremn de a eorr renrt isa d g of e t g e e t crintem gpc bsu e ungba eoy ord e g c ord ey 9- 9 9 -4 039 -1 -4 ►-2 -4 7- 8 9L 7 1 9y 8- 2-49 y Uio ^ egotia 3 y 1 -2 -4 -4 n n N tion 1 to 9 03 [ I J -4 j 4 7 8 9►7 0 9| 9- 1 9 () -1 -4 -2 -4 } n } ° 1 to-5 -2 0 1 Ng tia n 1 2 0 e o tio -2 -5 -1 -4 0 -4 n n 9- 8 9 9 5 9 1 - 7 9 Uio -4 120 -2 -5 -5 2- 2 0 2- 4 0 2 8 0 Uio -5 -2 -5 n n () 4 () 4 > Md tio 6 1 3- 8 0 e ia n -5 2- 9 0►2 0 0y 3- 9-50 y -5 -1 -5 1 j Jf \Ng tia n J 8 1to eo tio 1 5 5 1 r 8-2 -5 -2 -5 -2 0 6 rb tio 1 -2 -5 » -1 -5 n n 1^ e itra n ) 5 1 2 2 7 0J- 2 4 0} 6 5 0j- Uios J /(Ao tion*jy 8- 3-5 -1 -5 1-1 to 23 Ng tia 250 U (A itra n -2 -5 rb tio ) { 1 -1 -5 J J j mrgny ord p rt Dte a a Ntioofn Dte E e e c ba re o aia Mdanl bard eord tio oB aen a Rjeyte toP sidn cote eb d ntific tiot rea d Dte c eby d c re a d Rjete Uios nn Uio nn Bth o Uio nn Uio nn Uio nn Uio nn Uio nn Uios nn (1 ) 3 -5 3- 3 0 3 35 4- 1 0 -5 — —0 -1 -5 -2 -5 340 300 480 -1 -5 -1 -5 4- 3 0 4 1 0 6 5 0 -5 -1 -5 -2 -5 -1 -5 450 460 590 -2 -5 -5 -5 6- 2 0 6- 6 0 7- 6 0 -5 -5 -1 -5 6 9 0 7- 3 0 8 1 0 -2 -5 -5 -1 -5 7- 3 0 7- 3 0 8 1 0 -5 -5 1 -5 6 6 0 7- 6 C 1 - 3 0 -2 -5 -5 -1 -5 8- 4 0 8- 4 0 9 3 0 -5 8- 7 0 -5 810 -1 -5 Uio nn Uio nn () 5 () 4 Uio nn Uio nn Uio nn Uios nn Md tio eia n () 4 Uio nn Uio nn Uio nn Crrie a rs Ng tia n e o tio () 4 () 4 Md tio eia n Ng tia n e o tio Ng tia n e o tio () 4 742 -2 -5 532 -2 -5 8 9 21 -2 -5 6 () # Ng tia n e o tio Ng tia n e o tio 463 -2 -5 364 -2 -5 Ng tia n e o tio 814 -2 -5 185 -1 -5 151 -1 -5 3- 2 1 -5 1 -3 -5 000 1- 3 1 0 -5 3 7 1 Bth -2 -5 o 6 2 1 Bth -2 -5 o () 4 () 4 1 -2 -5 Uios 0 6 1 nn 8- 8 1 9- 6 1 9 9 1 -5 -5 -1 -5 8 8 1 9- 6 1 1 - 3 1 -2 -5 -5 0 -5 1- 6 1 1- 6 1 1 5 2 1 -5 1 -5 -2 -5 1 - 7 1 1 -1 -5 2 4 2 1 -5 1 5 1 -1 -5 363 -2 -5 1-7 3 2 -5 3 7 3 () -2 -5 4 1 -1 -5 Bth 263 o 423 443 -2 -5 -2 -5 1 -1 -5 1 -1 -5 263 263 () 6 274 -1 -5 1- 9 3 1 -5 1 -1 -5 Crrie 2 7 3 a rs 1 -2 -5 1 -2 -5 233 283 5 5 4 Crrie -1 -5 a rs 954 -1 -5 114 -1 -5 505 -1 -5 9 4 4 Uio -2 -5 n n 1 -1 -5 Bth 054 o 5 7 5 Uio -2 -5 n n 1 -1-5i 1-1-5i 1 -2 -5 054 064 104 1 -1 -5 1-2 -5 3- 2 5 Uio 184 134 -5 n n 6 3 5 6 7 5 7 0 5 Bth -1 -5 i -1 -5 i -3 -5 o 1to-5 -2 1 9 301 -1 -5 () 4 9 95 Crrie — —0 a rs 1-2 0 1-3 0 1-2 0 0 -5 0 -5 1 -5 -2 -5 Ng tia n 4 0 0 eo tio 650 -2 -5 -2 -5 Ng tia n 9 1 0 e o tio 7-to-5 80 Ng tia n 1 - 2 0 e o tio 1 -5 470 -2 -5 Ng tia n 5 7 0 4 to 0 e o tio -1 -5 -2 -5 9 () 4 () 4 -1 -5 Ng tia n e o tio () ) 6 6 0 4 r 7t0-5 3 Ng tia n eo tio () J -1 0 4 Ng tia n 1 -2 -5 eo tio 2 0 0 () 4 () 4 930 -2 -5 1 -1 -5 0to 0 2 3- 9 2 -5 to-5 322 -1 943 -1 -5 1 -1 -5 2 to 3 7 345 -1 -5 to 505 -1 -5 -5 Ng tia n 1- 3 5 e o tio -2 -5 Md tio eia n 5 6 5 045 Md tio eia n 1 -1 -5 53 T ab le A -5 . C hronology of ra ilro a d RLA— Em ergency B oard fisc a l years 1 9 5 0 -6 9 — C ontinued — Dte a Dtemd q e a eiatiost Dteof a of ire e o tio s for of re un Uio(s ^ 6tio nn) 'Sc n D ctng tia n e C arriers) p of roffer ntic Bgan g Edin o”e edte inin na g Uio(s C rriers) md tio d eia n te nn ) a 2- 4 5 3- 2 5 -5 -5 3- 1 5 3- 3 5 3- 3 5 -5 A 7 9 \ RA __________ \ IB -4 7 -5 -5 T 1- 1 5 1 5 5 -5 -2 -5 A 80 r E -4 6 535 -1 -5 515 -1 -5 OC RB 4- 1 4 4 8 4 -5 -2 -5 e e tra 8 9 4 1 -2 -5 -1 -5 2 1 4 A 7 2 NwYork Cn l ___ -4 1 113 293 -2 -5 -1 -5 3 7-5 1 -2 -5 -3 A 77 P -4 1 TW U 8 7 4 9 4 4 1 -10 4 1 5 5 -2 -5 -2 -5 2 -54 1 9 4 A 87 Y ennsylvania______ j* r-46 -2 -5 lb y Prt D a o istrict A 9 5 J AEnCC _______ 1 c o e t- 4- 2 5 -4 8 (° 2) 2 opra -5 (* WC S 905 -3 -5 ) innpr go e n o ag tin unions1 9 A 2 5 Soae Prtlad ad -5 4 pk n, o n n BE L 996 -1 -5 625 976 -2 -5 -1 -5 Seattle--------996 -1 -5 i) BT R A 2 8 E SC -5 4 WCC 2 5 6 (° -1 -5 996 -1 -5 916 -2 -5 T A 21 REA........... .... - IB -51 1 -1 -5 1 8 6 2 6 5 -1 -5 846 846 846 -1 -5 -1 -5 -1 -5 a a E ey Ntiotio m eo nl gnr- Mdrdn e c Bia a n me nme u br u br 11 1 12 1 13 1 14 1 15 1 16 1 17 1 19 1 16 2 17 2 19 2 A 35 -58 A 36 -5 8 A 43 -5 3 A 45 -5 3 E1 -2 8 A 86 -5 6 E1 -2 3 10 3 A 17 -6 5 A 18 -6 5 18 1 11 3 12 3 13 3 A 02 -6 8 A 99 -5 4 E3 -1 4 A 27 -61 14 3 17 3 18 3 19 3 A 32 -65 A 30 -66 A 94 -5 0 A 03 -6 8 A 30 -68 A 40 -60 11 4 15 4 A 26 -6 4 A 67 -62 17 4 A 66 -5 9 A 79 -5 3 A 89 -50 A 03 -6 6 A 60 -6 9 18 4 10 5 To d , L ra ad Fa o le o o in n irp rt Dock_________1 To d , L k fro t Dock----f le o a e n C ve n S ve o Co._J le lad te dre Gnra MngrsA c of ee l aae sso, NwYork2 ______ e 2 A h n To ea adSn tc iso , pk n ata Fe__________ NwYorkCentral-------e L n Island-------- ---og UW M [ J MP M BE L OC RB BT R 1aoge 1c o r Aro adBrbrto Blt kn n ae n e tinpe oo n E SC ________ S- ntinpr WCC ag u ion 8 n s2 Cic g, Rc Isla d ad h ao ok n , n Pc Wste Crrie aific e rn a rs CnC )________ S N oC re c o m e UA (WfeCne Cm itte Se mne ystetioFd ra l Pn sylva ia ... en n N. 5 2 TWo 2 4 U TW U J NwYorkCrrie Cn re c Rilro d e a rs o fe ne a a Cm itte 2 ---------o m e5 Mrbe ao Hrinr 6 ancil2 C ou NCmrkCrrie _____e ILA eoYoittea.. rs Cn re c w m e o fe n Bltimre ad Oio a o n h EWC C S C ___ _ _ RA Y \ Su e Pc ____ " OT j- R f o thrn aific Pllmn ________ 1 ua Cic g, M ake S Pu > OC h ao ilwue, t. al RB 1 y &Pacific_______J J Reading_______ _ MP _ M Aro ad Brbrto Blt kn n ae n e E SC _______ 1 c o e t WCC 1 o pra in g nnpr ooe ag tin u ion 2 n s2 \ h ao n o wste _ R J Cic g ad Nrth e rn _j* O T NwYo Central____ \ R e rk P u h ad Lk E _ _ OT ittsb rg n ae rie _ j Blt Railway______ BE e L 54 ] 1 -3 -5 J Dc '5 0 0 6 e. 6 1 -1 -5 246 1 -2 -5 Dc '5 1 0 6 e. 6 7- 2 6 1 -2 -5 -5 1 0 9 708 788 -1 -5 -1 -5 1 - 2 9 1 -1 -5 1 -5 1 0 9 5 9-5 > -2 -5 9- 1 9 1 -2 -5 9 139 n n 3- 7 7 -5 257 -2 -5 1 -2 -5 109 8- 7 8 -5 1- 1 9 2 -5 l 147 -2 -5 147 -2 -5 407 -1 -5 397 -2 -5 2- 8 0 -6 1-4 9 2 -5 828 -1 -5 190 -1 -6 190 -1 -6 1 3- 2 9 Mr. '5 -5 a 9 9 4 9 9 4 9 9 4 9 -2 -5 -2 -5 -2 -5 1 1 7 -2 -5 -2 -5 -5 } -5 } -5 6 6 8 1 1)8 } 2- 4 9 2- 4 9 2- 4 9 -2 -5 4 6 6 7 7 6 7 1-8 7 -2 -5 -2(-5 0 -5 1 -2 -5 087 659 709 -2 -5 -3 -5 490 -2 -6 5- 2 0 -6 490 -2 -6 Ot. '5 c 9 (-5 4 6- 4)9 309 -3 -5 319 -3 -5 300 -3 -6 Sp '6 e t. 1 990 -2 -6 1 -1 -6 090 6- 6 8 -5 899 -1 -5 5 6 9} -2 -5 579 -2 -5 J 520 -1 -6 (0 1) 990 -2 -6 1 -2 -6 1 -2 -6 000 000 1 -1 -5 008 859 -2 -5 949 -2 -5 -2 -6 560 560 -2 -6 1 -1 -6 001 1 -3 -5 019 1- 1 9 0 -5 449 -2 -5 5- 5 8 -5 279 -2 -5 3- 3 0 -6 9- 1 1 -6 2- 5 8 -5 1 -2 -5 1 1 7 8j- 1 7 8 237 3-1-5 78 1 -1 -5 J -1 -5 -1 -5 297 4 5 8 8- 7 9 -2 -5 6- 2 8 -5 3 7 8 6- 3)9 -2 -5 4 -5 719 -1 -5 5- 5 9 (-5 -5 5- 2 2 -6 9- 7 9 () -5 4 5- 3 2 -6 Proffer of arbitration Initiation of mediation session Rejected by Date Disposition of emergency board dispute Date of National Mediation Board notification to President 518-55) 6- 6-55 r Union 3-11-55^ Union } 8- 1-55 \ Union j. 10- 5-55 10-27-55 10- 2-56 4- 20-55 5- 25-55 1-24-55 2- 3-55 6-27-55 V Date board created 8- 1-55 8-13-55J 9-14-55 8— 55 25— 9- 1-55 10-26-55^ Union Unions 11- 3-55 11- 7-55 12-12-55 10- 9-56 Union 12- 3-56 12- 5-56 10- 3-56 12-10-56 Union 12-20-56 10- 4-56 12-17-56 Union 3-15-57 3- 7-57 4- j4- 5-57 15-57 Union 5-13-57 6-27-57 Union 8- 5-57 2- 8-60 10-22-58 2-17-60 2-11-60 1- 4-60 3-11-60 Union Both Union 2-11-60 2-26-60 4-12-60 Union 1 10-26-59 i Unions j J } 2-24-59 11-19-57 w 10-19-55 ^ 1- 5-56 Unions Negotiation 12-21-55 (8) (5) Negotiation 1-10-57 12-22-56 3-15-57 Union 1-25-57 3-21-57 Union Mediation (Arbitration) Mediation 4- 5-57 3-20-58 7-22-57 5- 7-57 j 5- 9-57 6- 7-57 j- Union Negotiation Mediation (4) 7- 7-57 9-13-57 (4) 8- 6-57 9-20-57 Union Mediation 2-12-60 2-29-60 4-18-60 7-15-60 6-20-60 5-18-60 Union Union Negotiation Mediation Mediation 8- 7-61 1-27-61 8-10-60 > Negotiation l 8-19-60 1 > J 4-22-57 to 7-18-57 7- 7-57 to 9-13-57 7to 8 - 4-60 1 4-19-60 l 4-22-60 i 6—8— l 60 Unions 5-23-60 7- 8-60 Union Negotiation 10- 1-60 5-20-60 6-24-60 ! Unions Mediation (Arbitration) 9-12-60 8-31-61 5-18-60 1 J J 5- 9-60 8-24-60 Unions 9-19-60 9-28-60 12-10-60 Union Mediation 12- 6-60 Union 1- 5-61 1-21-61 3- 6-61 Union Negotiation 7-10-61 Union Mediation 5-16-60 ) 9- 1-60 > to 5-19-60 9-12-60 j 1-10-61 to 1-23-61 3-14-61 5-19-61 1 j 1-23-61 10-31-60 9-27-61 8-29-60 3-16-61 Union 3-14-61) Both 3-15-61 V 7-19-61 Union J Union 8-28-61 1-30-62 2- 2-62 12- 6-60 12- 8-60 11- 4-59 5- 2-61 6- 1-61 | 12- 1-56 to 12- 6-56 10-22-57 5-11-60 L 5- 5-60 } V Negotiation J ► 3-28-60 l 10-25-59 Mediation 1-14-57 j- Before emer gency board After emer created or gency board during emer report issued gency board y Negotiation Union 'I 1-25-60 Date2 of agreement Type of agreement Rejected by Dated 7- 1-55 } 7- 1- 55} 8-11-55 With a strike mergency board reported 5-22-58 3-16-59 12- 8-59 5- 3-62 1 V J r y 5-27-58 > Both | 1-25-62^ ] J 7-20-61 8- 30-61 y VBoth J " Union I 12- 11-61 y ^10-29-61 J 12 7-63 4- 9-62 C 5 ) Negotiation 11- 2-61 Negotiation 6- 5-62 Mediation (Arbitration) 9-28-62 10- 8-62 9-15-61 - 1 y Mediation ) ) y Negotiation 9- 1-61 > ■ | 10-11-61 12- 5-61 2-27-62 ' Union | Union 7-17-61 10-11-61 Unions | 6-21-62 5-16-61 i ) ] y 3- 3-62 5- 3-62 4-18-62 - 4-23-62 J 6- 5-62 8- 2-62 > > 6- 8-62 8- 6-62J > Unions 1 Union ■ 'j 8-30-62J Union 3- 4-63 () 5 6-14-62 8- 30-62 to 9- 28-62 \ r Negotiation 112-10-62 Negotiation J 2-16-63 5- 2-62 to 5- 3-62 55 10-60 T able A -5 . gency board number Chronology of railroad RLA— Em ergency Boards fiscal years 1 9 5 0 -6 9 — Continued National Mediation Board Southern Pacific-------------- A-6617 153 A-6671 \ A-6696 j A-6700 155 157 Date of “Section 6” notice Union(s) number 151 154 Emer- Carriers) BRSC REA ___________________| IBT EW SCCC ________________ BLFE, SUNA, BLE, BRT, ORCB Pullman ------------------ ..." | Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific ___________ New York Central________ Soo Line ----------------Florida East Coast ___ _ A-6794 A-6795 A-6796 A-6797 A-6627, Sub. 1 159 160 A-6967 A-7030 28 161 28162 A-7107 A-7127 A-7128 164 11 cooperating nonoper ating unions236 7 BRS EWSCCC_______ _____ _ National Railway Labor Conference (NRLC)______ NRLC __________________ NRLC __________________ 28 163 j* 11- 1-61 | 1- 9-62 (i°) 3- 8-621 1-10-62J 5-17-62 y J ) (1°) 2- 1-63 (0 1) 1-24-64 1-28-64 12- 2-63 3-17-641 8 3-31-64 4-10-64 9-28-56 10-26-56 (i°) 5-17-66 8-12-60 July ’66 7-15-66 4- 6-66 5-23-66 (4) 6-20-66 1-23-67 9-28-66 10- 6-66 3- 2-59 (4) 7-13-66 11-14-66 (4) 11-15-66 9-24-59 11-16-66 (4) 12-30-65 (4) 1- 7-66 (4) 1-21-66 1- 4-66 9-27-68 7-30-65 1- 6-66 8-19-65 1-14-66 8-12-65 1-26-66 8-12-65 1-13-66 A-6318 169 A-7949 Atchison, Topeka and Santa F e ___________________ NRLC, EW SCCC _________ BRT RED2 7 170 E-322 A-7970 BRT IBEW 1A M ORCB 172 173 174 r 8-24-60 2- 1-67 9-24-59 11-16-66 Belt __________________ s Illinois Central _ 1 BRT ' Long Island . BRT (UTU) A-8458 " 1 A-8478, .. . .. _______ 1 sub. y NRLC . ________________j i- ORCB EW SCCC 32 1-7 i A-8448 BLE NRLC, EWSCCC__________ A-8433 BRS 7- 2-68 j> J 1 Date that one of the parties first requested the mediatory services of the National Mediation Board. 2 Date (1) agreement was reached by the parties, (2) agreement was ratified, or (3) arbitration award was rendered. 2 Parties settled directly; no evidence to indicate mediation or arbitra* tion was utilized to reach an agreement. 4 No data available. 5 No report or no formal recommendations issued. 6 Mediation agreement. 7 Related disputes that were handled concurrently or separately by the same board members. 8 Arbitration agreement. 9 Chicago, Great Western; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific; Davenport, Rock Island, and Northwestern; Denver and Rio Grande Western; Minne 56 (4) 1 y 12-30-65 y J (4) / 1 7- 6-65 > 1- 7-66 \ « ' 12-23-65 V J (4) > Louisville and Nashville J 175 5- 6-53 5-31-63 165 L 7-20-62 1-10-64 BLFE _ .j 9- 4-62 (1 ) 0 NRLC __________________ ... 3- 9-62 5-21-62 6-28-63 1-15-64 1-16-64 A-7173 NRLC .. 0°) Carrier(s) Date of proffer of mediation 1-18-62 Nov. ’62 (1°) RED39 A-6285 ^ A-7981 f A-7521, J & Sub. 1 A-7538, & Sub. 1 A-7566, & Sub. 1 1 A-7567, f & Sub. l j E-346 Union(s) (0 1) (0 1) NRLC . 171 6-12-62"| 8-24-62 7- 6-62 y 4- 3-62 J (20) 9- 1-61 ^ 9-26-61 1 J (2°) 9- 1-61 10-15-62 5-31-63 5-31-63 Long Island Date of request for mediation 1-17-62 RED2 9 7 RED27 RED29 ) Y J Ending date (1 4) * 2 11- 2-59 1 _J _ Beginning date 9-22-58 1 bscp Direct negotiations 9- 1-67 9-15-67 4 - 1-68 9- 1-67 4-30-68 3- 1-68 1- 4-66 8- 1-68 (0 !) (4) (4) (0 1 ) 9-18-68 10-13-67 9-13-68 8-16-68 9-30-68 9-19-68 12- 6-67 8-16-68 9— 68 18— 8— 68 16— apolis and St. Louis; Railway Transfer Co.; Northern Pacific Terminal Co. of Oregon; St. Paul Union Depot Co.; Sioux City Terminal Railway Co.; Western Pacific; Great Northern. 10 Negotiations on local properties commenced and/or ended on various dates. 11 See footnote 7. 1 IBBDF, IBBISB, BRC(A), IBEW 1A , SMW IBFO, BRSC, BM E, ORT, 2 , M IA, W BRS, MMP, NMEB, ILA HREU, RY . , A 13 Apparently steps skipped because of a work stoppage. 14 National conferences. »IAM, IBBDF, IBBISB, SMW IBEW BRC(A), IBFO, BRSC, BM E, ORT, IA, , W BRS, MMP, NMEB, ILA HREU, A A RY . , TD , A 16 Agreement signed with various carriers associated with the Eastern Carriers Conference Committee. Disposition of emergency board dispute Proffer of arbitration Initiation of mediation session Rejected by Date 1-29-62 Union 4-13-62 5- 9-62 6- 28-62 j5-23-62 Date of National Mediation Board notification to President 8- l - 6 2 \ Both 6-26-62J Unions Date emergency board created 8- 8-62 } Emergency boar d reported 9-11-62 } 4- 2-63 Rejected by Dated 8-10-62 \ 9-14-62 y Type of agreement 12-31-62 Union Negotiation (Arbitration) Union j ' Negotiation -n 11- 10-62 y 2 Date of agreement 5-13-63J Unions 11- 2-63 i Union 3-16-63 X 1-17-63 Arbitration J 11-26-63 (Negotiation) 6-25-64 y L 12-17-63 J None to date 8- 1-63 1 ! 11- 4-63 Both 10-25-63 6-25-63 Both 1-17-63 11-19-62 8-15-62 •12-20-63 1- 3-64 4- 3-64 Union Negotiation 1 [ [ 8- 7-64 10-20-64 10-20-64 Unions Unions Unions Mediation Mediation Mediation Mediation Mediation Mediation Negotiation Negotiation Mediation Mediation Arbitration Negotiation 2-21-65 9-25-64 11-21-64 11-21-64 2- 4-65 2- 4-65 2- 7-65 12- 2-64 8-13-64 10-31-61 9-25-65 9-15-67 9-27-67 J 12-23-63 J Carrier J 1-30-64 8- 5-64 8- 5-64 Unions Unions Unions 3- 10-64 8-13-64 8-13-64 3-10-64 8- 5-64 Unions 8- 13-64 i 10-20-64 Unions 7- 8-19-64 30-64 Union 9- 16-64 \ 11- 5-64 Union 11- 18-608-15-62 Union 9-11-65 5 () 6 (5 ) 1- 6-67 Unions 1-19-67 7 3-10-67 Unions 3- 3-671 Unions 4- 6-67 7V 5-12-67 10—1— 62*1 3-23-67 Both3 1 5- 23-67 10-19-66 | 1- 30-67 Aug. *62 1 2 - 1 -6 6 5-28-68 12-30-65 2- 23-66 12- 23-66 1-23-63 to 5- 1-64 l 10-22-63 3-10-64 3-10-64 1-18-68 1-18-68 1- 8-64 to 4- 7-64 7- 3-63 to 8-28-63 Negotiation Union 8 - 8 -6 6 4- 5-63 to 5- 7-63 "J 3 - 7-63 11- 6-62 2- 7-67 With a strike Before emer gency board After emer created or gency board during emer report issued gency board 7 } 6- 3-68 } 7-29-68 4- 7-66 8- 5-68 17-66 7-66 48—5— 68 Union } V 1 1 - 6 -6 8 > \ 7 / 8f 1 1 - 6 -6 8 1 2 -2 0 -6 8 8 12-27-68 Unions 1-10-69 9 1-13-69 Union 1- 2-69 1 0 -2 2 -6 8 1 1 -2 0 -6 8 Union 10— 68 31— 11-26-68 10-15-68 9-24-68 11- 25-68 1 2 - 2 -6 8 ' I 1 I | J 9 1-13-69 w ^ ! Unions (® ) 12-13-68 > Union 4-21-69 Union 1 Negotiation > J Negotiation T (Arbitration) r ► Negotiation Mediation (Arbitration) 5-29-67 6-14-67 7- 1-67 7-25-67 4- 4-69 ^ 4-13-69 I 2- 8-69 r May’69 7-29-68 to 11- 6-68 11- 6-68 to 11- 7-68 4- 8-69 to 4-12-69 1-13-69 7- 3-69 3-11-70 l l ]\ Unions J Mediation J 3-19-69 3-10-69 Negotiation 3-11-69 Negotiation J Union 4-21-69 Mediation 3- 7-69 2-12-69 17 1A , IBBISB, IBBDF, SMWIA, IBEW M M , MP, NMEB, HREU, BRC(A), IBFO, BRSC, BM E, ORT, BRS, ILA W . 18 On national basis. 13 1A , IBBIS, SM IA, IBEW BRC(A), IBFO, BRSC, BM , ORT, BRS, NM M W , W EB, ILA . 20 Did not appear to have bargained. 21 Impasse reached almost immediately. 22 New York Central; New Haven and Hartford; Brooklyn East District Terminal; Jay Street Connecting Railroad; New York Dock Railway; Bush Terminal; Baltimore and Ohio; Pennsylvania; Erie; Reading; Delaware, Lackawanna and Western; Central Railroad of New Jersey. 23 Six shopcraft (1A , BB, SW IA, IBEW, BRCA, IBFO) plus BRSC, BM E, M M W ORT, BRS, and HREU. 24 1A , BB, SM IA. M W 25 Baltimore and Ohio; Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal; Bush Termi nal; Central Railroad of New Jersey; Erie-Lackawanna; Lehigh Valley; New y 7-16-67 to 7-17-67 York Central; New York Dock Railway; New York, New Haven and Hart ford; Pennsylvania; and Reading. 28 MMP, NMEB, SIU. 27 Six shopcraft. 28 See footnote 7. 23 Six shopcraft, BRSC, BM E, ORT, BRS, HREU. W 33 BRS, BM E, ORT, HREU, BRS (except wages). W 31 The carrier in the first case, and the union in the second. 3 Only case A-8478 Sub. 1 used. 2 NOTE: FEC and union representatives terminated the dispute precipi tating Emergency Board No. 157 on Dec. 19, 1971, under a plan pre liminarily approved by a Federal judge. SOURCES: National Mediation Board case files, National Mediation Board Annual Reports, Presidential emergency board reports, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 57 Table A -6 . Railroad w ork stoppages, by duration and size of unit and group of workers, calendar years 1 9 5 0 -6 9 W orkers and m an-days in thousands Size of unit and group of workers Number of work stoppages Year 1950-691 1950 _________ ___ 1951 _____________ 1952 ____________ 1953 _____________ 1954 _____________ 1955 _____________ 1956 _____________ 1957 _____________ 1958 ____________ 1959 _____ . ____ 1960 - ________ 1961__________ 1962 ______ _____ 1963 _____________ 1964 _____________ 1965 ____________ H 1966 ____________ ^ 1967 ____________ -j 1968 ____________ u 1969 _____________ Number of workers involved 316 17 17 15 23 10 20 14 15 11 10 16 9 4 8 27 19 23 28 19 11 1,429.8 260.9 75.9 48.5 15.6 3.9 40.2 7.2 16.6 3.3 7.8 100.9 24.3 15.7 3.0 46.0 46.8 130.0 481.1 63.9 38.3 Under 100 workers Man-days idle Operating employees 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1950-69 1 . . . ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ....................... ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Operating employees 8,418.6 1,450.3 466.7 265.1 197.8 37.0 1,059.2 47.2 494.1 3.6 69.4 759.4 169.0 391.3 481.7 604.4 428.2 371.5 686.7 318.7 117.4 500 and under 1,000 workers Nonoper ating employees Both 23 3 1 — 1 — 2 — 2 1 2 1 — — — 3 1 2 — 2 2 15 — 1 — 1 3 1 1 1 — — — — — — 1 — — 4 1 1 6 1 — — 1 — 1 1 — — 1 — — — — 1 — — — — — 50 2 5 2 3 3 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 5 5 4 2 2 1 26 1 1 2 2 1 1 _ 1 1 2 1 — 1 4 — 1 5 2 100 and under 500 workers Both Operating employees 3 — 2 _ __ _ — Nonoper ating employees Both 35 1 2 1 2 5 — — 2 67 4 1 3 6 2 3 4 6 5 2 2 2 1 1 7 2 7 3 4 2 — __ — — 1 — — — — — __ — 1,000 and under 10,000 workers 1 4 2 1 3 1 — 3 — 3 3 6 2 10,000 workers and over Operating employees Nonoper ating employees Both Operating employees Nonoper ating employees Both 40 2 2 2 3 1 4 1 — 1 1 5 — — — 3 7 3 3 1 1 25 1 — 1 4 — 1 1 2 — 1 1 — — 1 1 — 2 4 3 2 4 — 1 1 — — 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — — — 12 2 1 1 — — — — — — — — — 1 — 2 — 1 — 2 2 5 — — __ — — 1 _ — — — 1 1 — — — 1 — 1 — — _ — — _ _ — — _ — — — — — — — — — _ _ — — 1 Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. 2 Figures are simple averages; each stoppage is given equal weight regardless of size. 3 Includes one 392-day stoppage. 58 Nonoper ating employees 4 Includes one 999-day stoppage. NOTE: Dashes denote zeros, SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics. __ _ 1 _ 1 _ 1 — — — — — — _ — Mean23 duration (in calendar days) 13.0 4.8 11.2 23.0 13.4 6.5 10.8 11.4 12.1 1.5 14.5 9.3 848.7 11.0 4 128.1 5.0 1.9 5.1 8.6 8.1 5.5 Table A -7 . M ajo r issues involved in railroad w ork stoppages, calendar years 1 9 5 0 -6 9 [Workers and man-days of idleness in thousands] General wage changes Year Num Num ber of ber of stop workers pages involved 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1950-691 _____ 70 8 ______________ ______________ 9 5 ______________ 5 _____________ ______________ 7 ______________ 3 ______________ 5 ______________ ______________ 1 ______________ ______________ 5 3 ______________ _ ________ ______________ 1 _____________ 4 4 . . . __________ ______________ 1 5 ______________ 1 ______________ ______________ 3 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1950-69 1 ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ Mandays idle Supplementary benefits Num Num ber of ber of stop workers pages involved 778.0 83.2 72.4 42.5 3.2 4,572.1 672.3 445.6 208.1 96.2 2.6 1.1 13.5 15.6 22.5 490.6 0.6 11.7 23.5 47.6 193.2 237.6 2.0 23.7 32.0 1,371.9 57.1 33.7 — 659.4 1.2 19.5 _ — « 461.1 1.2 3.7 C O 4 1 — _ _ _ 1 _ __ _ — _ — 2 — _ Jnion organization and security 4 1 — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — — — 1 — 2.9 0.3 — 1.4 — — — — — 1.0 — — — — — — — — — 0.2 — 50.7 0.3 — 48.8 — — — — — 1.0 — — — — — — — — — 0.6 — 27.6 0.7 — _ _ _ 23.9 Mandays idle 1,008.3 2.8 _ 1,002.5 _ __ _ _ _ _ — — 3.0 — — — 3.0 — _ _ _ — 27.6 co 1.0 0.4 4.7 1.5 3.2 3.5 0.1 0.8 6.0 188.8 C O 7.3 2.9 77.0 31.6 11.6 12.0 0.2 0.1 0.8 35.5 — 1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — 0.2 — 4.1 0.9 1.2 — 3.2 — 4.1 0.9 1.7 — 2 1 4 _ — Plant administration 116 2 4 3 9 2 5 5 6 1 4 4 4 2 4 8 9 11 16 11 6 153.2 0.4 2.4 2.3 7.1 1.1 8.5 1.0 1.7 0.2 2.4 10.6 0.6 0.4 0.6 3.6 11.3 4.1 13.3 47.6 33.8 Num Num Man- ber of ber of Mandays stop workers days idle pages involved idle 37 1 4 3 7 2 4 3 1 1 1 2 — 1 Because of rounding, sums of individual items may not equal totals. 2 Less than 50. Wage adjustments | Other contractual matters 1 Num Num ber of ber of stop workers pages involved C O 1 0.8 — — — — ___ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ 0.8 — — _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ — — — — _ 1 — — — — _ 0.8 — — — — — 0.8 Interunion or intraunion matters 546.8 0.5 14.4 4.2 18.0 2.4 27.5 10.6 2.1 0.2 6.6 23.4 1.3 0.4 1.8 9.6 11.8 12.6 17.9 288.6 93.0 14 — — 2 — 1 — — — 7.4 — — 1.8 — 0.6 — — — 12.5 — — 2.0 — 1.9 — — — — — — 1 1 — 1 — 3 — 3 2 — — 0.6 (2) — 0.1 — 0.7 — 1.9 1.7 — — 1.1 C O — 0.2 — 0.7 — 3.4 3.0 — — Job security Num Num ber of ber of stop workers pages involved 65 4 — 1 2 5 3 2 3 8 3 4 2 1 3 11 3 5 3 1 1 430.7 176.6 — 0.1 0.6 0.7 2.0 1.5 1.4 2.0 3.4 72.6 0.1 15.3 0.4 17.8 0.5 119.0 3.6 13.0 0.6 Mandays idle 2,035.7 774.3 — 0.3 4.9 1.1 2.0 1.7 1.4 2.2 16.0 504.6 0.1 320.7 0.4 19.8 1.1 349.9 4.7 26.0 4.6 Other working conditions 4 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 1 1 — 1 1.4 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — C O 0.7 0.4 — 0.2 2.5 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — C O 1.5 0.8 — 0.2 NOTE: Dashes denotes zeros. SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 59 Table A-8. Railroad work stoppages, by duration and major group of workers, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69 All s to p p a g e s P e rio d a n d m a jo r g ro u p o f w o rk e rs N um ber D u ra tio n o f s to p p a g e s 1 day 2 to 3 days 4 to 6 days 7 to 14 days 15 to 2 9 days 3 0 to 5 9 days 6 0 to 8 9 days 90 days A v e ra g e a n d o v e r p e r s to p p a g e N u m b e r o f S to p p a g e s 1 9 5 0 -5 4 82 50 24 8 17 12 5 19 11 6 2 15 10 3 2 14 9 3 2 9 5 3 1 4 2 2 1 1 70 43 20 7 24 19 5 22 14 5 3 7 4 3 5 2 2 1 4 1 3 6 3 1 2 1 64 40 21 3 33 18 14 1 11 9 2 1 9 6 2 1 3 2 1 10 0 59 41 All s to p p a g e s . --------------------- -------O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . _ _____ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . -------B o t h _____________________________ 54 35 19 24 12 12 11 6 5 5 2 2 5 316 19 2 10 6 18 128 84 43 1 76 46 25 5 34 20 12 2 33 17 12 4 3 * 2 1 .1 2 1 1 9 5 5 -5 9 All s t o p p a g e s ---------- -------------------_ _ _ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _ . . N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _____ B o t h '____ 1 U 0 .3 1 1 1 9 6 0 -9 4 All s to p p a g e s ----------------------.. O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ... N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _____ . B o t h _____________________________ 1 5 4 0 1 2 1 1 * 2 8 .0 2 2 2 2 * 6 .1 4 3 1 8 3 3 2 USX) U O .O 1 1 6 .6 1 2 3 .3 1 9 6 5 -6 9 All s to p p a g e s ___________ - O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s B o t h '_____ _______________________ 1 9 5 0 -6 9 All s to p p a g e s - . ________ O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ___________ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . . B o t h _____________________________ 18 10 7 1 15 9 3 3 W o rk e rs in v o lv e d [in th o u s a n d s ] 1 9 5 0 -5 4 All w o r k e r s ________________ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ____ B o t h _____________ __________ 5 .5 3 .9 1 .5 1 9 .4 15 .1 4 .0 .3 5 3 .9 5 2 .5 .7 .7 3 0 7 .9 3 0 6 .5 .7 .7 1 0 .5 1 .9 7 .2 1 .4 3 .5 2 .9 .6 . 4 0 4 .8 3 8 2 .9 1 7 .4 4 .5 All w o rk e rs _____ ___________ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . ________ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . . . B oth .................. .. .... _____ 7 5 .0 2 5 .1 4 5 .7 4 .3 10.1 7 .6 2 .5 6 .7 4 .6 1 .2 .9 1 0 .3 6 .4 3 .9 1 3 .2 5 .5 6 .6 1 .0 .9 .3 .6 2 6 .2 .6 2 3 .9 1 .7 1 8 9 .9 7 8 .1 1 1 0 .9 .8 2 4 .9 2 1 .0 3 .3 .6 2 3 .8 2 3 .1 .8 9 .8 1 0 3 .4 8 .4 9 5 .0 6 .3 6 .2 .1 7 6 0 .1 2 4 0 .6 5 1 9 .4 3 9 .6 4 9 .5 4 0 .0 4 3 4 .5 1 6 .0 4 6 8 .4 1 7 5 .3 1 7 2 .9 2 .6 8 .4 1 ,4 2 9 .8 7 2 6 .7 6 9 3 .5 9 .6 1 3 0 .0 8 2 .1 4 7 .4 .6 5 3 4 .4 5 8 .7 4 7 4 .4 1 .2 2 4 9 .5 2 3 1 .9 1 6 .9 .8 4 3 2 .9 3 2 0 .4 1 1 0 .7 1 .8 4 .1 (*) (■> 8 4 .9 2 .7 1 .4 1 9 5 5 -5 9 7 .2 .6 8 1.1 7 .2 .6 1 9 6 0 -6 4 All w o r k e r s _____ .. . ... O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _________ . N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ... . B o t h _____________________________ 9 .8 2 .4 .4 2 .0 8 3 .0 .2 .2 1 .3 1 .3 8 7 .6 4 9 .0 2 2 .6 2 4 .5 1 .9 7 .4 .3 7 .2 8 .3 1 .6 4 .7 2 .0 8 4 .5 8 3 .8 8 6 .5 8 .5 9 3 .9 7 1 .8 2 2 .1 2 .4 2 .4 2 0 0 .9 4 2 9 .5 1 9 .3 1 9 .1 .2 (?) 1 9 6 5 -6 9 All w o r k e r s ................ ..... O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . ____ . N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ........... B o t h _____________________________ 8 .4 .7 .7 1 9 5 0 -6 9 All w o rk e rs . . _______________________ O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ____________ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ................ B o t h _____________________________ 1 8 .3 9 .1 7 .9 1 .4 M an -d ay s o f i d le n e s s [in th o u s a n d s ] 1 9 5 0 -5 4 All m a n - d a y s ____ __ . _______ __ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . . . . N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ________ B o t h _____________________________ 60 2 ,4 1 6 .9 2 ,0 5 7 .9 2 8 9 .7 6 9 .3 5 .5 3 .9 1 .5 4 2 .7 3 4 .5 7 .6 .6 1 6 8 .6 1 6 3 .7 2 .0 2 .9 1 ,7 5 2 .1 1 ,7 4 2 .5 2 .8 6 .7 1 5 1 .0 3 9 .1 1 0 1 .5 1 0 .4 1 5 2 .2 4 8 .8 Table A-8. Railroad work stoppages by duration and major group of workers, selected periods, calendar years 195069— Continued D u ra tio n o f s to p p a g e s All s to p p a g e s P e rio d a n d m a jo r g ro u p o f w o rk e rs 1 day 2 to 3 days 4 to 6 days 7 to 14 days 15 to 29 N um ber ays d 3 0 to 5 9 days 6 0 to 8 9 days 90 days A v erag e a n d o v e r p e r s to p p a g e M an -d ay s o f id le n e s s [in th o u s a n d s ] — C o n tin u e d 1 9 5 5 -5 9 8 1 ,6 7 3 .5 7 9 .9 1 ,4 9 8 .6 ' 9 7 .6 1 0 .1 7 .6 2 .5 6 2 ,4 0 5 .6 7 4 6 .0 2 ,0 2 9 .2 6 .4 6 7 .8 1 8 .3 3 9 .2 1 0 .3 1 3 .2 4 .4 8 .8 6 8 9 .6 4 8 .8 6 4 0 .5 .3 1 3 6 .4 1 3 5 .2 1 .2 11 .9 8 .4 2 .2 1 .2 4 0 .1 2 3 .2 1 7 .0 2 4 .9 2 1 .0 3 .3 .6 4 8 .5 4 6 .4 2 .1 1 0 .2 7 1 ,9 2 2 .5 7 8 6 .0 7 5 8 .0 8 9 .6 4 9 .5 4 0 .0 6 9 2 .0 3 1 .7 6 6 0 .3 5 9 6 .8 5 9 2 .1 4 .7 5 2 .9 8 .4 1 8 .6 3 ,6 6 9 .8 4 ,5 7 5 .5 1 7 3 .3 All m an -d a y s - - - - - ________ _ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ________ B o th ’ _____ r ____ _________________ 1 3 0 .0 8 2 .1 4 7 .4 .6 7 9 5 .1 1 2 1 .1 6 7 2 .2 1 .8 8 1 5 .6 7 7 8 .9 3 3 .8 2 .9 2 ,5 6 2 .4 1 ,8 0 9 .6 7 3 5 .5 1 7 .3 1 ,0 5 9 .1 1 8 .1 1 ,0 0 2 .5 3 8 .5 4 2 6 .3 4 7 .6 4 2 3 .9 4 2 6 .3 4 7 .6 1 9 6 0 -6 4 All m an -d a y s _________________ . O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s -. . B o t h __________ __________________ 1 0 .2 1 ,4 6 7 .5 9 5 .5 1 ,3 7 1 .9 4 3 7 .6 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 9 1 .4 9 1 .4 4 1 9 .2 4 3 8 .6 1 2 .4 4 2 6 .3 1 ,8 0 7 .3 1 8 6 .9 1 ,5 2 4 .1 9 6 .3 4 2 6 l6 4 19.1 4 4 3 .2 4 9 .6 4 0 4 .6 3 9 9 .1 5 .5 1 9 6 5 -6 9 All m an -d a y s ______ _____ . . . O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s - ______ _ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . . . B o t h _____________________________ 1 1 .3 1 1 .3 5 2 .9 1 9 5 0 -6 9 All m a n - d a y s ____ __ _____ . . . O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s -----------------N o n o p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ________ B o t h ________________________ 1 — 1 A verage 2 L e ss d u ra tio n th a n 3 A verage 4 A verage p e rio d . o f th e s to p p a g e s in t h e p e rio d . num ber of per m an -d a y s 6 E x c lu d es a c a rry -o v e r e m p lo y e e s ' w o rk s to p p a g e s . of s to p p a g e of 2 ,5 8 0 in i d le n e s s m an -d a y s, th e per a ll 1 ,5 5 7 .6 4 8 9 .0 1 ,0 2 4 .6 4 4 .0 6 I n c lu d e s a c a rry -o v e r o f 2 ,5 8 0 m an -d a y s fro m t h e 1 9 5 5 - 5 9 p e rio d a n d e x c lu d e s a c a rry -o v e r o f 3 7 8 ,5 6 2 m a n -d a y s in t h e 1 9 6 5 - 6 9 p e rio d . 1 00. n u m b e r o f w o rk e rs 3 1 1 .9 1 8 9 .9 1 1 1 .6 1 0 .4 p e rio d . s to p p a g e due to in th e o p e ra tin g of by 7 In c lu d e s a c a rry -o v e r o f 3 7 8 ,5 6 2 m an -d a y s fro m t h e 1 9 6 0 - 6 4 p e rio d w h ic h 8 ,0 0 0 w e re lo s t b y o p e r a tin g c r a f t s ’ u n io n s a n d 3 7 0 ,5 6 2 n o n o p e ra tin g c r a f ts . NOTES: B e c a u s e o f ro u n d in g , s u m s o f in d iv id u a l ite m s m ay n o t e q u a l t o ta l s . D a sh e s d e n o te z e ro s . SOURCE: B u re a u o f L ab o r S t a ti s t i c s . 61 Table A-9. Railroad work stoppages,1 by major issue and group of workers, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69 (Workers and man-days idle in thousands) 1 9 5 0 -5 4 S to p p a g e s iss u e s W o rk e rs in v o lv ed N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t E co n o m ic is s u e s W a g es ___________________________ _____ — -O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _ . -------------- - - -------------N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s - ______________ ____ B o t h _______________________________________________ S u p p le m e n ta ry b e n e f its __ - - - _______ ______ - O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _ -------- ---------------- - - - - N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s -------- --------- ---------------B o t h _______________________________________________ W age a d j u s t m e n t s -----------_____ _ ___________ O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _______ ____ _ _ ________ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s . . ... _____ ... _____ B o t h . . . . _____ __________ 3 2 .9 45 T o ta l e c o n o m ic is s u e s . . . 27 14 10 3 1 — — 1 17 13 3 1 __ 2 0 1 .3 1 9 0 .0 1 0 .6 0 .8 0 .7 — — 0 .7 7 .7 5 .7 1 .9 .2 4 9 .7 5 4 .9 2 0 9 .7 5 1 .8 __ _ — — — 1.7 0 .3 __ 1 .2 2 0 .7 1 9 5 5 -5 9 M an -d ay s idile 0 .2 1 .9 N um ber S to p p a g e s W o rk e rs in volved M an -d ay s id le P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r 1 ,4 2 2 .2 1 ,1 3 9 .4 2 7 6 .1 6 .8 2 .8 — — 2 .8 1 1 8 .8 1 1 3 .4 5 .1 .3 5 8 .8 16 8 3 5 1 — 1 2 3 .2 4 .9 10 5 5 — 1 4 .5 1 ,5 4 3 .8 6 3 .9 27 3 9 .1 _ — — — 4 9 .1 0 .3 _ .__ __ — — — 1 1 __ 0 .1 1 .4 1 7 .7 2 .0 1 1 .8 3 .9 2 3 .9 — 2 3 .9 — 7 .6 6 .0 1 .6 2 3 .7 5 7 6 .2 2 0 .6 4 5 8 .7 9 7 .0 1 ,0 0 2 .5 — 1 ,0 0 2 .5 .— 2 4 .7 1 9 .2 5 .5 — 3 4 .4 6 5 .7 1 ,6 0 3 .5 9 5 .7 __ __ — — .— 1.0 1 .0 I M __ 3 1 .9 1 0 .1 — 4 9 .2 P ercen t 5 9 .8 1 .5 S e c u rity i s s u e s O th e r c o n tr a c tu a l m a t t e r s --------------------------------O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ________ _ _____________ - . . N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ------------------------ ---------B o t h _______________________________________________ Union o rg a n iz a tio n a n d s e c u r ity _______ _____________ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s - - - _. ------------------ ---------N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ B o t h _____________________________________ _______ _ Jo b s e c u r ity __________ _______ __ __________________ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s — ____ ____ ______ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s _ __________ ____ B o t h _______________________________________________ P la n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ________ ____________ ____________ O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s ____ _____ - _ _ ____________ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s __________________ ______ B o t h _______________________________________________ O th e r w o rk in g c o n d i t i o n s ____ _____________ _______ _ O p e ra tin g e m p l o y e e s _____________________ . _ _ _ _ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ------------------------ ---------B o t h _______________________________________________ I n tra u n io n o r in te r u n io n m a t t e r s ________ __________ O p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ___ ________ __ __________ N o n o p e ra tin g e m p lo y e e s ___ __________________ i B o t h _______________________________________________ T otal s e c u r ity is s u e s ___ ________________ _ — — # — 2 1 __ 1 12 9 2 1 20 12 7 1 — — 2 .4 1 4 .6 2 4 .4 — 1 .4 1 7 7 .7 1 7 6 .9 0 .7 0 .1 1 3 .2 8 .2 3 .6 1 .4 — — — 4 3 .9 3 .3 __ — 3 1 2 3 .7 37 4 5 .1 2 .4 1 .8 0 .6 0 .6 1 9 5 .1 4 8 .2 1 E x c lu d es o n e 2 -day s to p p a g e in 195 6 fo r w h ich no m ajo r is s u e w a s r e p o r te d a n d w h ich in v o lv ed 18 6 w o rk e rs a n d 3 7 2 m an -d a y s o f i d le n e s s . 62 0 .4 4 8 .8 7 8 0 .6 7 7 9 .4 0 .9 0 .3 3 9 .6 2 3 .5 5 .7 1 0 .4 __ — — 2 .0 3 2 .3 1.6 __ — 19 11 7 1 21 17 4 __ __ — 1 .4 0 .2 8 7 3 .2 3 6 .1 1 1 3 0 .4 __ 42 1 0 .2 4 .1 6 .0 0 .2 1 3 .9 1 1 .4 2 .5 __ __ — 6 0 .9 0 .6 0 .6 — 2 5 .7 0 .1 — 1 3 .6 1 8 .6 __ — 1 .4 — 2 L e ss t h a n .0 5 p e rc e n t, 1 .4 — 2 7 .5 — 3 .9 2 .0 1 .9 __ — — — 1.0 1 .0 2 3 .2 4 .1 1 8 .9 0 .3 4 6 .9 3 4 .0 1 2 .9 __ __ _ 1 .4 2 .8 __ — 0 .7 1 .1 1 .1 0 .1 — 3 4 .3 7 2 .3 4 .3 1 9 6 5 -6 9 1 9 6 0 -6 4 S to p p a g e s M an-days id le W o rk e rs involved N um bei P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t 13 9 1 — — — — 3 3 — 2 0 .3 — 4 .7 — 16 0 .2 — — — — 6 .1 6 .1 — 3 2 .1 — 3 .2 2 5 .0 __ 6 7 .1 3 5 .3 _ 5 .5 — — — — 3 8 .7 3 8 .7 — 6 6 .9 — 1.4 1 ,8 9 8 .5 _ — _ 1 0 6 .2 18.1 8 8 .0 5 5 .9 8 4 5 .5 2 0 .1 8 2 5 .4 3 0 .4 22 14 8 3 4 .4 15.9 4 .6 1 1.2 8 .4 3 6 .5 2 2 .5 14 .0 1.3 — __ 5 — 7 .8 3 2 48 0 .8 — — 1 2 2 .8 — 0 .4 1.0 00 0 .2 0 .8 6 4 .7 8 8 3 .0 3 1 .7 NOTE: B e c a u s e o f ro u n d in g , s u m s o f in d iv id u a l t o ta l s . 0 .4 0 .8 7 1 3 .9 4 8 .5 3 6 6 5 .3 — 3 .0 3 .0 — — 6 .6 4 .3 2 .3 — 4 6 .2 4 6 .9 2 6 .8 0 .2 0 .4 70 38 23 9 4 2 1 1 37 24 12 1 2 2 .2 7 7 8 .0 2 6 0 .7 51 1 ,5 1 0 .32 .4 4 .9 2 7 .6 1 .3 3 .0 2 3 .9 0 .7 1 1 .7 2 7 .6 2 2 .0 5 .4 0 .2 5 4 .4 111 3 5 .2 8 3 3 .2 N um ber P e rce n t 4 ,5 7 2 .1 1 ,5 5 2 .5 2 ,9 1 0 .4 1 0 9 .3 1 ,0 0 8 .3 3 .0 1 ,0 0 2 .5 2 .8 1 8 8 .8 1 7 5 .6 1 2 .9 0 .3 5 4 .3 5 8 .3 5 ,7 6 9 .3 6 8 .5 1 .9 1 .9 1 2 .0 2 .2 2 3 .0 5 0 7 .2 6 6 .7 7 2 3 .5 1 .0 0 .8 0 .8 0 .1 0 .8 0 .8 (2) 1 1 0 .3 0 .8 0 .8 0 .1 0 .8 0 .8 00 1 1 1.0 0 .2 0 .2 «> * 0 .6 0 .6 (2 ) 4 3 1 .3 2 .9 1 .5 0 .2 5 0 .7 1 .9 0 .6 13 7 6 1 3 .0 1 3 6 .7 1 3 4 .3 2 .4 1 8 .0 3 8 6 .3 3 7 8 .2 8 .1 2 5 .0 53 34 19 5 3 .0 1 1 0 .2 9 0 .6 1 9 .6 1 4 .5 4 2 3 .9 3 7 6 .7 4 7 .2 2 7 .5 4 4 .0 1 .4 1 .4 0 .2 2 .5 2 .5 0 .2 4 4 1 .3 5 .0 3 .6 0 .4 3 .2 0 .5 6 .4 0 .4 6 .0 0 .4 14 3 9 2 4.4 204 6 4 .8 _ — 5 — — 1 4 — 77 _ — 4 __ 0 .2 0 .6 7 5 .0 — — 6 5 .5 N u m b e r P e r c e n t N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t M an-days id le 23 — — — — — 7 .0 _ 3 2 .8 — — 2 .0 4 9 8 .1 3 4 .8 4 6 3 .2 — 3 .0 3 .0 — — 6 .2 4 .2 2 .0 — S to p p a g e s W o rk e rs in v o lv ed 1 1 6 8 .3 — _ — 1 4 .0 — 21 13 8 — 14 7 7 — 2 2 — — 7 3 4 — z — — _ — 1 ,8 5 9 .8 3 4 4 .0 M an-days id le P e r c e n t N u m b er P e r c e n t N u m b e r P e r c e n t — — — — 6 0 .9 3 3 .9 N u m b er S to p p a g e s 1 9 5 0 -6 9 1 W o rk e rs in v o lv ed — — 7 7 .0 2 5 2 .9 ite m s m ay n o t e q u a l — 3 3 .3 8 2 0 .5 5 3 .1 1 65 40 23 2 11 6 77 38 1 2 0 .6 3 6 .8 1 .4 4 3 0 .7 3 3 3 .4 9 7 .0 0 .3 1 5 3 .2 1 1 4 .8 3 7 .0 1 .4 1 .4 1 .4 7 .4 2 .7 3 0 .1 1 0 .7 0.1 2 4 .2 6 .5 00 0 .5 1 2 .5 3 .5 8 .1 0 .8 0.1 4 1 .7 2 ,6 4 8 .9 3 1 .5 4.0 0 .6 5 9 6 .5 4 8 .8 2 ,0 3 5 .7 1 ,1 8 1 .8 8 5 3 .3 0 .6 5 4 6 .9 4 5 6 .7 7 9 .8 1 0 .4 2 .5 2 .5 SOURCE: B u re a u o f L ab o r S t a ti s t i c s , 63 Table A-10. Duration of railroad work stoppages, by major issue, selected periods, calendar years 1950-69 “ ” '— — ~ — ' D u ra tio n in p e rio d (in c a le n d a r d a y s) 1 9 5 0 -5 4 M ajo r is s u e N um ber of s to p p a g e s ________________________ 82 W a g es 27 S u p p le m e n ta ry W age a d ju s tm e n ts b e n e f its U nion O th e r o rg a n iz a tio n w o rk in g and Job P la n t con s e c u r ity s e c u r ity a d m in is tr a tio n d itio n s O th e r c o n tr a c tu a l m a tte rs I n tra u n io n or in te r u n io n m a tte rs 17 1 2 12 20 — — 3 1 — — — — — — 1 4 3 2 1 2 — — — 7 7 3 2 1 — — — __ — — — — — — __ — — — — — — — — — 17 19 15 14 9 4 1 3 3 5 4 8 3 2 — 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 — __ — 1 — — — — — - *70 16 10 1 1 19 21 — — 1 1 d a y __________ - ................ 2 to 3 _________________________ - . . . . ________ 4 to 6 ______________________ 7 to 1 4 _____________________________ 15 to 2 9 _______________________ .. 3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 6 0 to 8 9 ________________________ _______ 9 0 & o v e r __________________ _________ 24 *22 7 5 4 6 1 1 2 4 — 2 1 5 1 1 1 4 4 — 1 — — 11 7 1 — — — — __ __ — — — — — — — — — — — — 1 — — __ __ — — — — 9 5 2 3 2 — — — __ — — — — 1 — 1 — — — — — — — — — — 64 13 3 — — 21 22 — — 5 33 11 1 9 3 5 2 3 — 2 1 3 __ __ — — — — __ — — — — __ — — — — 4 — __ 1 __ — 11 6 1 2 1 1 __ — — — — — 16 1 — 3 — 1 — — — 2 2 — — — — — — — — ________________ 100 14 7 2 1 13 53 4 1 5 1 d a y ---------------------- ---------- -------------2 to 3 __________________________________ 4 to 6 __________________________________ 7 to 14 ________________________________ 15 t o 2 9 ________________________________ 3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________ 9 0 & o v e r _____________________________ 54 24 11 5 2 6 3 2 2 — 4 2 1 — 2 — — — 1 — — 1 __ __ __ 3 2 __ __ — — 30 11 5 2 2 2 1 1 __ — 6 4 2 1 — — — — 2 2 __ __ __ _ __ __ __ __ 1 — — — — 2 1 — — — *316 70 37 4 4 65 116 4 1 14 128 *76 34 33 18 15 13 15 6 14 5 10 1 6 7 10 8 2 1 — 37 15 5 5 57 29 11 — — — 1 __ 2 2 1 1 — __ __ __ 1 __ — — __ __ , __ 7 4 1 2 — 1 — — 1 — 1 __ __ __ — — 1 — 1 — — — 1 d a y ___________ - - -------------------------2 to 3 __________________________________ 4 to 6 __________________________________ 7 to 14 ________________________________ 15 to 2 9 ________________________________ 3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________ 9 0 & o v e r _______________ ____________ 1 9 5 5 -5 9 1 9 6 0 -6 4 . _________ ____________ 1 d a y -------------------- ----------- --------------------2 to 3 __________________________________ 4 to 6 __________________________________ 7 to 14 ________________________________ 15 to 2 9 ________________________________ 3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________ 9 0 & o v e r --------------------------------------1 9 6 5 -6 9 1 9 5 0 -6 9 _ ________________________ 1 d a y _____________ ___________________ 2 to 3 __________________________________ 4 to 6 __________________________________ 7 to 14 ________________________________ 15 to 2 9 ________________________________ 3 0 to 5 9 ________________________________ 6 0 to 8 9 ________________________________ 90 & over _. _ _ ______ _______ _ 1 I n c lu d e s o n e c a s e f o r w h ic h NOTE: D a s h e s d e n o te s z e ro s . 64 4 8 no m a jo r is s u e w a s k now n. 1 .— 1 1 — 4 5 2 — 2 9 6 1 SOURCE: B u re a u o f L ab o r S t a ti s t i c s . 1 2 — — — — 2 Appendix B Selected Bibliography Aaron, Benjamin. “Emergency Dispute Settlement,” L abor L aw D evelopm ents, 1967. “National Emergency Disputes: Is There A Final Solution,” W isconsin L aw R e view, No. 1, 1970. “Observation on the United States Experience,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 14, No. 8, August 1963. American B ar Association. Final R ep o rt of the A d H oc C om m ittee to Study N ational E m ergency D isputes, 1966. Association of American Railroads. Y earbook of R ailroad Facts, 1950-66, Washington, D.C. Blackman, John. Presidential Seizures in L a b or Disputes, Cambridge, Mass., H arvard Press, 1969. Burgoon, Beatrice M. “Effects of the Structure of Collective Bargaining in Selected Indus tries: The Railway Industry,” L a b o r L aw Journal, Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1970. Cole, David. “U.S. Intervention Kills Collective Bargaining,” N ations Business, M arch 1962. Cullen, Donald. N ational Em ergency Strikes, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University, 1968. Curtin, William. “National Emergency Disputes Legislation: Its Needs and Its Prospects in the Transportation Industry,” G eorgetown L aw Journal, Vol. 55, April 1967. Derber, Milton. C ollective Bargaining in the Quasi-Public Sector, Institute of L abor and Industrial Relations, University of Illinois, 1970. Ernest, Dale and R obert Raimon. “M anagement, Unionism and Public Policy on the Rail roads and the Airlines,” Industrial and L a bor Relations R eview , Vol. 11, No. 4, July 1958. Federal Legislation to E n d Strikes: A D ocum entary H istory, Vols. 1-2, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, M ay 1967. Friedlaender, A nn F. The D ilem m a o f Freight Transport Regulation, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1969. Fulton, Joseph F. The R ailw ay Firemen M anning Dispute: H istory and Issues, 1 9 5 9 -7 0 , Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, Washington, D.C., Government Print ing Office, 1971. H arber, William and M ark L. Kahn. “M aintenance of W ay Employment,” M onthly Labor R eview , Vol. 80, No. 10, October 1957 and Vol. 80, No. 11, November 1957. Hardm an, J. C. “Cooperation in Collective Bargaining: The Airlines and Railroads Try 65 Novel Approaches,” Q uarterly R eview of E conom ics and Business, Vol. 2, No. 1, Feb ruary 1962. Herlong, A. Sidney. “Transportation Strikes: A Proposal F or Corrective Legislation,” Fordham L aw R eview , Vol. 36, Decem ber 1967. Horowitz, M orris A. “Labor’s Role in the Declining R ailroad Industry,” L abor L aw Jour nal, Vol. 9, No. 7, July 1958. Kaufman, Jacob J. “Emergency Boards U nder the Railway Labor Act,” L abor L aw Jour nal, Vol. 9, No. 12, December 1958. “Logic and Meaning of W ork Rules on the Railroads,” Industrial R elations R e search A ssociation Proceedings, Vol. 14, December 1961. “The R ailroad L abor Dispute: A M arathon of M aneuver and Improvisation,” In dustrial an d L a b o r R elations R eview , Vol. 18, January 1965. Krislov, Joseph. “Representation Disputes in the R ailroad and Airline Industries,” Labor L aw Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2, February 1956. Lecht, Leonard A. Experience U nder R ailw ay L abor Legislation, New York, N .Y ., Co lumbia University Press, 1955. Levine, M arvin J. “The R ailroad Crew Size Controversy Revisited,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 20, No. 6, June 1969. Levine, Morton. “Adjusting to Technology on the Railroads,” M onthly L abor R eview , Vol. 92, No. 11, November 1969. Levinson, David. “The Locomotive Firem en’s Dispute,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 17, No. 11, November 1966. “Railway Labor Act— A Record of A Decade,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1952. Leviton, T. S. and P. D. Bazazian. “Strikes-Toward A Total Answer,” Journal o f Urban Law , Vol. 45, 1967. Marsh, Michael. Strike C ontrol Proposals in L igh t of R ailroad Industry Experience, Wash ington, D.C., R LEA , 1967. M arshall, Anthony P. “New Perspectives on National Emergency Disputes,” L abor L aw Journal, Vol. 18, No. 8, August 1967. M urphy, Edward. “Injunctive Prevention of Strikes on Railroads and Airlines,” L abor Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 5, May 1958. Northrup, H. R. C om pulsory A rbitration an d G overnm ent Intervention in L abor Disputes, Washington, D.C., L abor Policy Association, 1966. Oliver, Eli L. “Labor Problems of the Transportation Industry,” L aw and Contem porary Problem s, Vol. 25, No. 1, W inter 1960. R eport o f the Presidential R ailroad Com mission, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, February 1962. Richardson, Reed. The L ocom otive Engineer, 1 8 6 3 -1 9 6 3 , A nn Arbor, Mich., Bureau of Industrial Relations, University of Michigan, 1963. Riche, M artha F. “R ailroad Unemployment Insurance,” M onthly L abor R eview , Vol. 90, No. 11, November 1967. Shils, Edward B. “Industrial Unrest in the N ation’s Rail Industry,” L a b o r L aw Journal, Vol. 15, No. 2, February 1964. 66 Sloane, Arthur. “National Emergency Strikes: The Danger of Extralegal Success,” Busi ness H orizons, Summer 1967. Stem, James. “Alternative Dispute Settlement Procedures,” Wisconsin L aw R eview , Vol. 41, Fall 1968. Troy, Leo. “L abor Representation O n American Railways,” L abor H istory, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 1961. U.S. Congress, House. R ailw ay L abor D isputes, Hearings before the Committee on Inter state and Foreign Commerce, U.S. H ouse of Representatives, 69th Congress, 1st Ses sion, on H.R. 7180, 1926. U.S. Congress, House. R ailroad W ork R u les D ispute, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session, on H .J. Res. 565, 1963. U.S. Congress, Senate. R ailw ay L abor A ct, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, U.S. Senate, 69th Congress, 1st Session, on S. 2306, 1926. U.S. Congress, Senate. R ailroad W o r k R u les Dispute, Hearings before the Committee on Commerce, Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, on S.J. Res. 102, 1963. U.S. Congress, Senate. T o Prohibit Strikes an d to Provide for C om pulsory A rbitration in the R ailroad Industry, Hearings before th e Subcommittee on Railway L abor Act. Amendments of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Congress, 2nd Ses sion, on S. 3463, 1950. U.S. Departm ent of Labor A nalysis o f W ork Stoppages, annual bulletins, 1950-69. E m ploym ent an d Changing O ccupational Patterns in the R ailroad Industry, 1963. H andbook o f L abor Statistics, 1970. Index of O utput Per M an-H our, Selected Industries, 19 3 9 and 1 9 4 7 -6 9 , 1970. P roductivity in the R ailroad Industry, 1970. R ailroad Shopcraft Fact Finding Study, September 1968. U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, E ighty-Third Annual R eport on Transport Statis tics in the U nited States for the Y ea r E n d ed D ecem ber 31, 1969, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1970. U.S. National Mediation Board. A dm inistration o f the R ailw ay L abor A c t B y the National M ediation Board, 1 9 3 4 -7 0 , Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1971. U.S. National M ediation Board. Annual reports, 1950-70, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office. U.S. National Mediation Board. D eterm ination of Craft or Class of the National M edia tion Board, July 1 , 1 9 34-Ju n e 3 0 ,1 9 4 8 , Vol. 1, Washington, D.C., Government Print ing Office, 1948. U.S. National M ediation Board. Presidential emergency board reports, (Nos. 76 -8 9 , 9 1 93, 9 5 -9 8 , 104-107, 109-119, 126-127, 129-134, 137-139, 141, 145, 147-148, 150-151, 153-155, 157, 159-165, 169-178). Wisehart, A rthur M. “Transportation Strike Control Legislation: A Congressional Chal lenge,” Michigan L aw R eview , Vol. 66, June 1968. ft U G V R MN PR T 6 O F E 1972 0-469-548 .S. O E N E T IN IN F IC : 67 yesterday's facts don't describe tom orrow 's jo b s . .. In to d a y 's fa st m oving w orld, y e ste rd a y 's o c c u p a tio n a l inform ation is quickly o u td a te d . T hat's w hy th e B ureau o f Labor Statistics re g u la rly revises th e O c c u p a tio n a l O u tlo o k H a n d b o o k , th e s ta n d a rd re fe re n c e tool fo r g u id a n c e a n d v o ca tio n al counselors, students, v eteran s, a n d o thers seeking au th o rita tiv e c a re e r in fo rm ation. The 1972-73 edition of th e H a n d b o o k reflects th e effects o f tech n o lo g ical a n d econom ic c h a n g e s on th e job outlook fo r 8 0 0 m ajo r o ccu p atio n s a n d 3 0 m ajo r industries. Each job discussion gives u p -to -d a te facts a b o u t th e n a tu re o f th e w ork, ea rn in g s, cu rren t em ploym ent, fu tu re em p lo y m en t p ro sp ects, a n d e d u c a tio n a l a n d train in g requirem ents. The 1972-73 H a n d b o o k describes m ore th a n 2 0 occu p atio n s not co v ered in e a rlie r editions. Included a r e m any new , fa st-g ro w in g sub p ro fessio n al jobs such a s su rgical technician, o ptom etric assistant, social service a id e , a n d fo o d process ing tech n ician . For th e person with less form al e d u c a tio n , th e new H a n d b o o k re p o rts on op p o rtu n ities in trucking a n d in la u n d ry a n d d ry c le an in g firms a n d in jobs such a s p a rk in g a tte n d a n t, g u a rd a n d w a tc h m a n , a n d stock clerk. The p rice of th e 1972-73 H a n d b o o k , th e b ig g e st— over 8 5 0 p a g e s — a n d m ost com prehensive in H a n d b o o k history, is $ 6 .2 5 . To o rd e r, use th e form below . S en d it, with p ay m e n t by check o r m oney o rd e r m a d e p a y a b le to th e S u p erin te n d e n t of D ocum ents to a n y R egional O ffice o f th e B ureau o f Labor Statistics: 1603 Federal Bldg. 1515 Broadway 1317 Filbert St. 1371 Peachtree St., N.E. Boston, M 02203 ass. New York, N . 10036 .Y Philadelphia, Pa. 19107 Atlanta, Ga. 30309 300 South Wacker Dr. 911 Walnut St. 1100 Commerce St. R . 687 m 450 Golden Gate Ave. Chicago, III. 60606 Kansas City, M 64106 o. Dallas, Tex. 75202 San Francisco, Calif. 94102 Order Form for 1972-73 Edition of Occupational Outlook Handbook FO PRO PT SHIPM R M ENT, PL A PRIN OR T P A D ESS ON L B L BELO INCLUDING Y U ZIP CODE E SE T YE D R AE W OR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR B R A OF LA O STA UE U BR TISTICS W ASHINGTON, D.C. 20212 OFFICIAL BU ESS SIN Penalty for private use, $300 POSTAGE AND FE S PA E ID Name............... Street Address. City and State. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR THIRD CLASS MAIL ZIP Code. BUREAU OF LABOR S T A T IS T IC S REG IONAL OFFICES Region I 1603 JFK Federal Building Government Center Boston, Mass. 02203 Phone: 223-6762 (Area Code 617) Region V 8th Floor, 300 South Wacker Drive Chicago, III. 60606 Phone: 353-1880 (Area Code 312) Region II 1515 Broadway New York, N.Y. 10036 Phone: 971-5405 (Area Code 212) Region VI 1100 Commerce St., Rm. 6B7 Dallas, Tex. 75202 Phone: 749-3516 (Area Code 214) Region III 406 Penn Square Building 1317 Filbert St. Philadelphia, Pa. 19107 Phone: 597-7796 (Area Code 215) Region VII and VIII Federal Office Building 911 Walnut St., 10th Floor Kansas City, Mo. 64106 Phone: 374-2481 (Area Code 816) Region IV Suite 540 1371 Peachtree St. NE. Atlanta, Ga. 30309 Phone: 526-5418 (Area Code 404) Region IX and X 450 Golden Gate Ave. Box 36017 San Francisco, Calif. 94102 Phone: 556-4678 (Area Code 415) *» Regions VII and VIII will be serviced by Kansas City. Regions IX and X will be serviced by San Francisco. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR BU REAU O F LA B O R S TA TIS TIC S T H IR D C L A S S M A IL W A S H IN G T O N , D .C . 2 0 2 1 2 POSTAGE A N D O F F I C I A L B U S IN E S S PENALTY FO R P R IV A T E USE, $300 F E E S P A ID U.S. D E P A R TM E N T O F LAB O R LAB-441