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Robust Policymaking in an Uncertain, Multi-Objective World
Simon Potter, Markets Group, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
September 21, 2015
I would like to thank Meg McConnell for help in producing this Deck and numerous insightful conversations on these
topics over the years.
The views expressed in this presentation are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York of the Federal Reserve System.

Road Map
1. Overview of a “generic” policy framework
2. Comparison of current macroeconomic, macroprudential and microprudential
frameworks
3. Consideration of role for “unconventional” monetary policy tools

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What are monetary policymakers, regulators, supervisors,
and conduct agencies trying to do?
o Transform a set of authorities into
outcomes consistent with the
achievement of their objectives

Authorities

Macroeconomic
Objectives

Economic and financial
environment
Macroprudential
Objectives

Microprudential
Objectives

Sustainable economic growth over
time
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What capabilities does the official sector need to effectively
transform authorities into objectives?
o Measure the world: Identify
concrete observable metrics for
policy objectives, and identify gaps
between objectives and the
environment
o Interpret the world: Determine
when and what type of intervention in
the environment is needed to
promote objectives
o Influence the world: Intervene in
environment to address gaps
between measured
conditions/behaviors and objectives
o Learn and adapt: Continuously
update the effects and efficacy of
interventions to remain effective in
promoting objectives over time
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Authorities

Macroeconomic
Objectives

Economic and financial
environment
Macroprudential
Objectives

Microprudential
Objectives

Sustainable economic growth over
time
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Two general observations on the current state of
policymaking for central banks and close cousins
• (1) Tendency to “silo” the pursuit of
macroeconomic and macroprudential,
and microprudential objectives (Bank
of England currently trying to push
against this), including:
o
o
o
o

Monitoring
Analysis
Decision-making
Deployment of tools

Implication:
• Tends to mask the presence of shortterm conflicts/tradeoffs across
objectives that can hinder ability to
achieve goal of sustainable growth
over time
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Authorities

Macroeconomic
Objectives

Economic and financial
environment
Macroprudential
Objectives

Microprudential
Objectives

Sustainable economic growth over
time
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Two observations on the current state of policymaking
• (2) Macroprudential policy frameworks
(the set of basic capabilities) are
underdeveloped relative to
frameworks for macroeconomic and
microprudential objectives
• [See table on next slide]

Authorities

Macroeconomic
Objectives

Economic and financial
environment
Macroprudential
Objectives

Microprudential
Objectives

Sustainable economic growth over
time
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(Informal and Subjective) Assessment of Current Policymaking “Capabilities” by Type of Objective
Type of capability:

Type of objectives:

Macroeconomic

Microprudential Macroprudential

I. Measuring the world: Understanding how the economic and financial environment is evolving relative to objectives
Identifying concrete, observable metrics/targets for objectives
Measuring, monitoring and analyzing developments in real time
Identifying gaps btw actual conditions and objectives on timely basis

II. Interpreting the world: Determining when and what intervention in the environment is needed to promote objectives
Establishing common thresholds for what constitutes a “material” gap
Determining in real time whether thresholds have been breached
III. Influencing the world: Intervening in environment to address gaps between measured conditions and objectives
Developing reliable and effective tools for intervening in environment
Determining which tool(s) can most effectively address a given gap
Promptly executing on a decision to deploy a tool to address a gap

Maintaining an intervention (i.e. desired policy stance) as necessary
IV. Learning and adapting: Remaining effective in promoting objectives over time
Evaluating monitoring/analysis, metrics/targets, tools, and thresholds
Making timely adjustments to above as necessary to remain effective
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Very low

Low

Medium

High

Very high

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The gaps in our macroprudential frameworks…
• are not a new problem…
“The most important characteristic of sound supervisory policy is that its impact on the banking
system and the economy as a whole be salutary, rather than considering only each individual bank in
isolation, as has unfortunately been customary among examiners.”
- Bach, Journal of Finance, Dec 1949
“But if the banker plays an important role [in the broader economy], the supervisory agencies should
be on the side of encouraging a generally beneficial use of this role. The goals of banking supervision
must run beyond the "soundness" of their individual institution and simple rules of safety; they should
comprehend the encouragement of sound developments in the banking system as a whole.”
- Robinson, Journal of Finance, Mar 1950

• …but there is renewed urgency…
“Going forward, a critical question for regulators and supervisors is what their appropriate ‘field of
vision’ should be. Under our current system of safety-and-soundness regulation, supervisors often
focus on the financial conditions of individual institutions in isolation. An alternative approach, which
has been called systemwide or macroprudential oversight, would broaden the mandate of regulators
and supervisors to encompass consideration of potential systemic risks and weaknesses as well.”
- Chairman Bernanke, “Reducing Systemic Risk,” August 2008
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Real time learning and adapting needs robustness to
achieve sustainable growth goal
Chairman Greenspan, 2005:

Chairman Bernanke, 2008:

• …advances in complex financial products…
, and
expanded the opportunities for,
…The new instruments of risk dispersal
have enabled the largest and most
sophisticated banks, in their credit-granting
role, to divest themselves of much credit risk
by passing it to institutions with far less
leverage…

• …more fundamentally, the turmoil was the
product of a global credit boom, characterized
by
, excessive
leverage by financial institutions, and an

than the
one that existed just a quarter-century ago.
After the bursting of the stock market bubble
in 2000, unlike previous periods following large
financial shocks, no major financial institution
defaulted, and
.
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. The unwinding of this
boom (and the associated financial losses) has
led to the withdrawal of many investors from
credit markets and deleveraging by financial
institutions, both of which have
.

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On the role of LSAPs and negative interest rates
 During the financial crisis, many advanced economy central banks hit the
zero bound on overnight interest rates
o This had the effect of reducing the efficacy of the main tool deployed in pursuit of
macroeconomic objectives

 Situation motivated the deployment of two “new” types of tools
o Large scale asset purchase programs
- Mostly viewed as acting through a portfolio balance rather than monetary base channel

o Reducing overnight rates below zero

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On the role of LSAPs and macroprudential objectives
 LSAPs and negative rates were primarily deployed to achieve
macroeconomic objectives, but may also be relevant for macroprudential
objectives
o For example, the use of LSAPs might exert influence (intentional or unintentional)
over macroprudential conditions
- Buying certain asset back securities vs. changing regulatory risk weights on certain asset
back securities

o In terms of ease of implementation, a purchase tool might be faster and easier
than many of the other tools referenced in the context of macroprudential
objectives

 Many open questions
o Would we understand what mix of purchases would improve the safety and
soundness of the system (however, this applies to other tools as well)?
o More generally, can we yet measure our macroprudential objectives well enough
to reliably deploy any tool to achieve them?
- E.g., is the mix or pace of credit creation macroprudential or macroeconomic?
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