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THIRTY-EIGHTH

ANNUAL REPORT
of the

BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

COVERING OPERATIONS FOR
THE YEAR

1951

98

ANNUAL REPORT OF BOARD OF GOVERNORS

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

further expansion of bank credit consistent with the maintenance of orderly
conditions in the Government securities market.

deavor to restrict credit and monetary expansion, to retire debt, especially

MARCH 1-2, 1951

ment securities market. In general, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve

1. Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord.
At this meeting the Committee voted to approve a statement to be released

by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Board of Governors
and of the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System
on March 4, 1951 reading as follows:
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have reached full
accord with respect to debt management and monetary policies to be
pursued in furthering their common purpose to assure the suc
cessful financing of the Government's requirements and, at the same
time, to minimize monetization of the public debt.
Votes for this action: Messrs. McCabe, Chairman, Sproul, Vice
Chairman, Eccles, Evans, Gidney, Gilbert, Leedy, Norton,
Powell, Szymczak, Vardaman, and Williams. Votes against this
action: none.

Since the meeting of the Committee on February 6-8, 1951, there had
been intensive discussions with representatives of the Treasury on System
credit and Treasury debt management policies. These discussions continued
during this meeting of the Committee and resulted in agreement on the pro

gram referred to in the above press statement.
The fundamental problem which both the Treasury and the Federal Re
serve faced in the postwar period developed out of the serious issue created
by the existence of a huge public debt in a period of growing private de
mands for goods and services. Liquidation of Government securities on the
part of holders was an important source of funds for current spending and
for credit expansion. In order to give some assurance to investors that their
securities would not be subject to severe declines in prices and to encourage
the holding of such securities and to aid Treasury refunding operations, the
Federal Reserve had been following a policy of supporting the market for
Government securities. In view of the recurrent heavy demands for funds
during the period, these purchases had the effect of monetizing substantial
amounts of Government securities, creating bank reserves, and laying the
basis for excessive credit expansion.
Both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury recognized the dilemma pre
sented by the conflicting problems of debt management and credit restraint
in the inflationary situation which developed. Various measures were
adopted through credit, fiscal, and debt management policies in an en-

99

that held by banks, and to attract the investment of savings into Govern
ment securities, while at the same time maintaining stability in the Govern
were in agreement as to the main objectives, i.e., the maintenance of a broad

and healthy market for Treasury securities, and restraint of further infla
tionary expansion of bank credit.
The interrelated problems of exercising credit and monetary restraint, of
endeavoring to maintain stable markets for Government securities, and of
debt management became most acute with the recurrence of inflationary

pressures following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. There developed
a growing volume of sales of Government securities by holders wishing to
obtain funds to extend other credits. This selling later was augmented by
sales, particularly of long-term bonds, on the part of some holders influ
enced by uncertainties as to the future of prices of the securities and by others
wishing to protect themselves against declines in the purchasing power of
money resulting from rising commodity prices. Large-scale purchases of
securities by the Federal Reserve to maintain a stable market resulted in
monetization of the public debt and creation of bank reserves, which in turn
helped to finance the inflation. Confidence in Government securities, as
well as in the value of the dollar, was in danger of being impaired, and this
fear was augmented by public discussion of disagreement between the Treas
ury and the Federal Reserve. Throughout the period from August 1950 to
February 1951, there were frequent consultations between Federal Reserve
and Treasury officials, and on some occasions with the President, concern
ing the coordination of monetary and debt management policies. The pol
icy actions taken at the meetings on January 31, 1951, and February 6-8,
1951, were adopted in the light of these discussions, precedent to working
out of the accord between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve.
The Treasury and Federal Reserve felt that everything possible should
be done to terminate the unwholesome situation that had developed and
to coordinate the debt management responsibility of the Treasury with the
Federal Reserve responsibility for restraining credit expansion. It was the
immediate object of the Treasury to restore conditions in the market that
would be favorable to refinancing the large volume of maturing obligations,
as well as financing several billions of new money required during the re
mainder of the year. It was the immediate object of the Federal Reserve to
endeavor to curb the unprecedented inflationary loan expansion that had con
tinued uninterruptedly since Korea by minimizing the monetization of the
public debt and by making it necessary for member banks to borrow from
the Federal Reserve in order to obtain additional reserves. It was agreed
that there were both immediate and long-run factors which had to be taken

ANNUAL REPORT OF BOARD OF GOVERNORS

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

into account in arriving at an accord, and that the purpose of the negotia
tion was to reach agreement upon policies that would reduce to a minimum
the monetization of the public debt without creating an adverse market
psychology with reference to Government securities.
First, consideration was given to the matter of long-term bonds over
hanging the market and at the time being offered for sale daily in large
amounts. It was agreed that a substantial portion of these bonds could be
taken off the market by a Treasury offer to exchange for them a nonmarket
able 2 3/4per cent, 29-year bond, redeemable at the holder's option before
maturity only by conversion into a 5-year marketable Treasury note. The
purpose of offering this new security, as announced by the Treasury, was to
encourage long-term investors to retain their holdings of Government se
curities, in order to minimize the monetization of the public debt through
liquidation of outstanding holdings of the Treasury bonds of 1967-72.
Second, there was the problem of the long-term Government securities
which private holders might try to sell on the market after the terms of the
exchange offering became public. It was agreed that a limited volume of
open market purchases would be made after the exchange offering was an
nounced; and that if sales on the market were excessive, the situation would
be assessed daily, the market would be kept orderly, and open market pur
chases, if any, would be made on a scale-down of prices.
Third, the pending task of refunding the large volume of short-term
securities maturing or callable in the near future presented difficult prob
lems both for the Treasury and for the Federal Reserve. It was agreed that
the Committee, in order to minimize monetization of the debt, would im
mediately reduce or discontinue purchases of short-term securities and per
mit the short-term market to adjust to a position at which banks would de
pend upon borrowing at the Federal Reserve to make needed adjustments
in their reserves. This contemplated a level of short-term interest rates
which, in response to market forces, would fluctuate around the Federal Re
serve discount rate. It was expected that during the remainder of the year
the Federal Reserve discount rate, in the absence of compelling circumstances
not then foreseen, would remain at 1 3/4per cent and that the Federal Re
serve would operate to assure a satisfactory volume of exchanges in the re
funding of maturing Treasury issues.
Fourth, the raising of new funds by the Treasury to finance the defense
mobilization program presented other problems. It was recognized that there
were no substantial amounts of nonbank funds seeking investment, and that
it would be some time before such funds would accumulate. It was agreed
that more frequent conferences between the Treasury and Federal Re
serve officials and staff should be held so that the Treasury and the Federal
Reserve might work together more closely on a joint program of Govern-

ment financing as well as in maintaining orderly markets for Government
securities.
2. Authority to Execute Transactions in System Account.

The following direction to the executive committee, which was in the
same form as the direction issued at the meeting on February 6-8, 1951, was
approved. The change in policy described above did not require any change
in the direction for the reason that the direction issued at the meeting on
August 18, 1950, was changed in the light of the policy adopted at that time,
to provide that open market operations should be carried on with a view
to exercising restraint upon inflationary developments, as well as for the
other purposes stated in the previous direction.
The executive committee is directed, until otherwise directed by
the Federal Open Market Committee, to arrange for such transactions
for the System open market account, either in the open market or
directly with the Treasury (including purchases, sales, exchanges,
replacement of maturing securities, and letting maturities run off
without replacement), as may be necessary, in the light of current
and prospective economic conditions and the general credit situation
of the country, with a view to exercising restraint upon inflationary
developments, to maintaining orderly conditions in the Government
security market, to relating the supply of funds in the market to
the needs of commerce and business, and to the practical administra
tion of the account; provided that the aggregate amount of securities
held in the account at the close of this date other than special short
term certificates of indebtedness purchased from time to time for the
temporary accommodation of the Treasury shall not be increased or
decreased by more than 3 billion dollars.
The executive committee is further directed, until otherwise directed
by the Federal Open Market Committee, to arrange for the purchase
for the System open market account direct from the Treasury of such
amounts of special short-term certificates of indebtedness as may be
necessary from time to time for the temporary accommodation of
the Treasury; provided that the total amount of such certificates held
in the account at any one time shall not exceed 1 billion dollars.
Votes for this action: Messrs. McCabe, Chairman, Sproul,
Vice Chairman, Evans, Gidney, Gilbert, Leedy, Norton, Powell,
Szymczak, Vardaman, and Williams. Votes against this action:
none.

This direction was approved for the purpose of carrying into effect the
credit policy agreed upon earlier at this meeting. While the form of the

103

ANNUAL REPORT OF BOARD OF GOVERNORS

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

direction was unchanged from that issued on February 6-8, the limitation in
the first paragraph was increased from 2 billion to 3 billion dollars in antici
pation of the possibility of an increased volume of transactions which might
be necessary over the period immediately ahead in carrying out the policy.

be reduced from 3 billion to 2 billion dollars without interfering with the
execution of that policy.

102

MAY 17, 1951
1. Authority to Effect Transactions in System Account.

MARCH 8, 1951
1. Authority to Effect Transactions in System Account.

The following direction to the executive committee, which was in the
same form as the direction issued at the meeting on March 1-2, 1951, was
approved:
The executive committee is directed, until otherwise directed by
the Federal Open Market Committee, to arrange for such transactions
for the System open market account, either in the open market or
directly with the Treasury (including purchases, sales, exchanges,
replacement of maturing securities, and letting maturities run off
without replacement), as may be necessary, in the light of current
and prospective economic conditions and the general credit situation
of the country, with a view to exercising restraint upon inflationary
developments, to maintaining orderly conditions in the Government
security market, to relating the supply of funds in the market to
the needs of commerce and business, and to the practical administra
tion of the account; provided that the aggregate amount of securities
held in the account at the close of this date other than special short
term certificates of indebtedness purchased from time to time for the
temporary accommodation of the Treasury shall not be increased or
decreased by more than 2 billion dollars.
The executive committee is further directed, until otherwise directed
by the Federal Open Market Committee, to arrange for the purchase
for the System open market account direct from the Treasury of such
amounts of special short-term certificates of indebtedness as may be
necessary from time to time for the temporary accommodation of
the Treasury; provided that the total amount of such certificates held
in the account at any one time shall not exceed 1 billion dollars.
Votes for this action: Messrs. McCabe, Chairman, Sproul,
Vice Chairman, Eccles, Evans, Gidney, Gilbert, Leedy, Norton,
Powell, Szymczak, Vardaman, and Williams. Votes against this
action: none.
In adopting the above direction, it was understood that the Committee
would continue to carry out the policy approved at the meeting on March
1-2, 1951, but it was felt that the limitation in the first paragraph could

The following direction to the executive committee, which was in the same
form as the direction issued at the meeting on March 8, 1951, was approved:
The executive committee is directed, until otherwise directed by
the Federal Open Market Committee, to arrange for such transactions
for the System open market account, either in the open market or
directly with the Treasury (including purchases, sales, exchanges,
replacement of maturing securities, and letting maturities run off
without replacement), as may be necessary, in the light of current
and prospective economic conditions and the general credit situation
of the country, with a view to exercising restraint upon inflationary
developments, to maintaining orderly conditions in the Government
security market, to relating the supply of funds in the market to
the needs of commerce and business, and to the practical administra
tion of the account; provided that the aggregate amount of securities
held in the account at the close of this date other than special short
term certificates of indebtedness purchased from time to time for the
temporary accommodation of the Treasury shall not be increased or
decreased by more than 2 billion dollars.
The executive committee is further directed, until otherwise directed
by the Federal Open Market Committee, to arrange for the purchase
for the System open market account direct from the Treasury of such
amounts of special short-term certificates of indebtedness as may be
necessary from time to time for the temporary accommodation of
the Treasury; provided that the total amount of such certificates held
in the account at any one time shall not exceed 1 billion dollars.
Votes for this action: Messrs. Martin, Chairman, Sproul, Vice
Chairman, Eccles, Evans, Gidney, Gilbert, Leedy, Norton,
Powell, Szymczak, and Williams. Votes against this action:
none.
The period March 8 to May 17, 1951, was one of basic readjustment to
the new debt management and credit policies introduced immediately
following the announcement on March 4, 1951, that the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve had reached full accord with respect to debt management
and monetary policies to be pursued in furthering their common purpose
to assure the successful financing of the Government's requirements and,